De Villa vs CA

G.R. No. 87416. April 08, 1991

FACTS:

[P]etitioner Cecilio S. de Villa was charged before the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial
Region (Makati, Branch 145) with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Petitioner moved to dismiss
the Information on the following grounds: (a) Respondent court has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged; and (b) That no offense was committed since the check involved was payable in dollars, hence,
the obligation created is null and void pursuant to Republic Act No. 529 (An Act to Assure Uniform Value
of Philippine Coin and Currency). A petition for certiorari seeking to declare the nullity of the RTC ruling
was filed by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition with
costs against the petitioner. A motion for reconsideration of the said decision was filed by the petitioner
but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals, thus elevated to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

Whether or not:
(1) The Regional Trial Court of Makati City has jurisdiction over the case; and,
(2) The check in question, drawn against the dollar account of petitioner with a foreign bank, is covered
by the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22).

HELD:
YES on both cases. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit. For the first issue: The trial courts
jurisdiction over the case, subject of this review, can not be questioned, as Sections 10 and 15(a), Rule
110 of the Rules of Court specifically provide. The information under consideration specifically alleged
that the offense was committed in Makati, Metro Manila and therefore, the same is controlling and
sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The Court acquires jurisdiction
over the case and over the person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or information in court
which initiates a criminal action (Republic vs. Sunga, 162 SCRA 191 [1988]).

For the second issue: Exception in the Statute. It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that
where the law does not distinguish courts should not distinguish. Parenthetically, the rule is that where
the law does not make any exception, courts may not except something unless compelling reasons exist
to justify it (Phil. British Assurance Co., Inc. vs. IAC, 150 SCRA 520 [1987]). The records of the Batasan,
Vol. III, unmistakably show that the intention of the lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever currency
may be the subject thereof. The discussion on the floor of the then Batasang Pambansa fully sustains
this view.










People vs. Echavez
G.R. Nos. L-47757-61 January 28, 1980

FACTS:

Petitioner Ello filed with the lower court separate informations against sixteen persons charging them
with squatting as penalized by Presidential Decree No. 772. Before the accused could be arraigned,
respondent Judge Echaves motu proprio issued an omnibus order dismissing the five informations (out
of 16 raffled) on the grounds (1) that it was alleged that the accused entered the land through stealth
and strategy, whereas under the decree the entry should be effected with the use of force,
intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner, and (2) that
under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land. From
the order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440.

ISSUE:

Whether or not P.D. No. 772 which penalizes squatting and similar acts, (also) apply to agricultural lands.

HELD:

NO. Appeal was devoid of merit.Trial courts dismissal was affirmed.

RATIO:

[T]he lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble
shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal
constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The squating complained of involves
pasture lands in rural areas.

The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court does not apply to
this case. Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban
communities, particularly to illegal constructions. The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of
statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain.















Buenaseda vs. Flavier
G.R. No. 106719. September 21, 1993

FACTS:

The petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or
Temporary Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, seeks to nullify the Order of
the Ombudsman directing the preventive suspension of petitioners Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda et.al. The
questioned order was issued in connection with the administrative complaint filed with the Ombudsman
(OBM-ADM-0-91-0151) by the private respondents against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. The Supreme Court required respondent Secretary to comply with the
aforestated status quo order. The Solicitor General, in his comment, stated that (a) The authority of the
Ombudsman is only to recommend suspension and he has no direct power to suspend; and (b)
Assuming the Ombudsman has the power to directly suspend a government official or employee, there
are conditions required by law for the exercise of such powers; [and] said conditions have not been met
in the instant case

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees
working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the
administrative complaints filed against said officials and employees.

HELD:

YES. Petition was dismissed, status quo lifted and set aside.

RATIO:

When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power to recommend the suspension of a
public official or employees (Sec. 13 *3+), it referred to suspension, as a punitive measure. All the
words associated with the word suspension in said provision referred to penalties in administrative
cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, the word suspension
should be given the same sense as the other words with which it is associated. Where a particular word
is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by considering
the company of terms in which it is found or with which it is associated.

Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public
officials and employees facing administrative charges before him, is a procedural, not a penal statute.
The preventive suspension is imposed after compliance with the requisites therein set forth, as an aid in
the investigation of the administrative charges.







ALU-TUCP vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 109902. August 02, 1994

FACTS:

Petitioners, as employees of private respondent National Steel Corporation (NSC), filed separate
complaints for unfair labor practice, regularization and monetary benefits with the NLRC, Sub-Regional
Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan City. The complaints were consolidated and after hearing, the Labor Arbiter
declared petitioners regular project employees who shall continue their employment as such for as
long as such *project+ activity exists, but entitled to the salary of a regular employee pursuant to the
provisions in the collective bargaining agreement. It also ordered payment of salary differentials.

The NLRC in its questioned resolutions modified the Labor Arbiters decision. It affirmed the Labor
Arbiters holding that petitioners were project employees since they were hired to perform work in a
specific undertaking the Five Years Expansion Program, the completion of which had been
determined at the time of their engagement and which operation was not directly related to the
business of steel manufacturing. The NLRC, however, set aside the award to petitioners of the same
benefits enjoyed by regular employees for lack of legal and factual basis.

The law on the matter is Article 280 of the Labor Code, where the petitioners argue that they are
regular employees of NSC because: (i) their jobs are necessary, desirable and work-related to private
respondents main business, steel-making; and (ii) they have rendered service for six (6) or more years
to private respondent NSC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners are considered permanent employees as opposed to being only project
employees of NSC.

HELD:

NO. Petition for Certiorari dismissed for lack of merit. NLRC Resolutions affirmed.

RATIO:

Function of the proviso. Petitioners are not considered permanent employees. However, contrary to
petitioners apprehensions, the designation of named employees as project employees and their
assignment to a specific project are effected and implemented in good faith, and not merely as a means
of evading otherwise applicable requirements of labor laws.

On the claim that petitioners service to NSC of more than six (6) years should qualify them as regular
employees, the Supreme Court believed this claim is without legal basis. The simple fact that the
employment of petitioners as project employees had gone beyond one (1) year, does not detract from,
or legally dissolve, their status as project employees. The second paragraph of Article 280 of the Labor
Code, quoted above, providing that an employee who has served for at least one (1) year, shall be
considered a regular employee, relates to casual employees, not to project employees.


Geotina vs Court of Tax Appeals
G.R. No. L-33500 August 30, 1971

FACTS:
Petitioner is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the
Philippines. On December 22, 1970, the vessel M/V "Mindanao Sea" arrived at the Port of Manila carrying
37,042 cartons fresh apples consigned to herein petitioner. After payment of the taxes and duties on the
portion of the shipment consisting of 10,000 cartons of fresh apples covered by Bills of Lading Nos. PM-1,
PM-2, PM-3 and PM-4, the necessary transfer permits were issued by the Collector of Customs of Manila.
While this portion of the importation was being unloaded from the carrying vessel and transported to the
designated cold storage house, the Collector of Customs, on December 22, 1970, issued warrants of seizure
and detention (S.I. Nos. 11993 to 11996) ordering the seizure of a portion of the goods already unloaded and
their detention for allegedly having been imported in violation of Central Bank Circulars Nos. 289, 294 and
295, in relation to Section 2530 (f) of the Tariff and Customs Code "pending termination of the seizure
proceedings thereof and/or until further orders."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the fresh apples in question are "articles of prohibited importation.

HELD:






























Pangilinan vs Alvendia
G.R. No. L-10690 , June 28, 1957

FACTS:
Petitioners Apolonio Pangilinan, Mariano Bundalian, Miguel Galang, and Valentin Santos are tenants of
respondents Felisa Alvendia in barrios San Nicolas and Sto. Cristo, Florida Blanca, Pampanga, under
tenancy contracts executed on July 17, 1953 (Exhibits A, B, C, and D). On July 27, 1954, respondent
Alvendia filed a petition in the Court of Industrial Relations for the ejectment of petitioners on the
ground that for the agricultural years 1953-54 and 1954-55, they did not personally perform the
principal work of plowing and harrowing on their respective landholdings, but entrusted said work to
other persons, notwithstanding repeated demands by respondent that they do the farm work
themselves. Petitioners in their answer, denied respondent's claims, and alleged that they were the
ones working the land although at times, they were helped by their children and sons-in-law; and that
respondent filed the ejectment action against them because they refused to sign tenancy contracts with
her on the 45-55 sharing basis and insisted on a 70-30 sharing basis.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners violated the law and their tenancy contracts in entrusting their farm work to
such relatives.

HELD:
No. Republic Act 1199 defines "tenant" as:. . . a person who, himself and with the aid available from
within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by another, with
the latter's consent, for purpose of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share
tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or
both, under the leasehold tenancy system; While "immediate farm household," according to the same
Act, includes:. . . the members of the family of the tenant, and such other person or persons, whether
related to the tenant or not, who are dependent upon him for support and who usually help him
operate the farm enterprise. Under the above definition of "tenant" given by Republic Act 1199,
petitioners were within their legal rights in asking assistance in their farm work from their sons-in-law or
grandsons. Such relatives fall within the phrase "the members of the family of the tenant"; and the law
does not require that these members of the tenant's family be dependent on him for support, such
qualification being applicable only to "such other person or persons, whether related to the tenant or
not", whom, as they are "dependent upon him for support" and usually help him operate the frame
enterprise", the law considers also part of the tenant's immediate household.













Amadora vs. CA
GR No. L47745, April 15, 1988

Facts: Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the commencement exercises
where he would ascend the stage and in the presence of his relatives and friends receive his high school
diploma. As it turned out, though, fate would intervene and deny him that awaited experience. While they
were in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a
gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well.

Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the
victim's parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de
San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together
with Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents. The complaint against the students
was later dropped. After trial, the CIF of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs. On
appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision was reversed and all the defendants were completely
absolved.

Issue: Whether or not teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for the death of
Alfredo Amadora.

Ruling: The Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question (Art. 2180) should apply to all
schools, academic as well as non-academic.

Following the canon of reddendo singular singuli, where the school is academic, responsibility for the tort
committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student. This is the general rule.
Reason: Old academic schools, the heads just supervise the teachers who are the ones directly involved with
the students.

Where the school is for arts and trades, it is the head and only he who shall be held liable as an exception to
the general rule. Reason: Old schools of arts and trades saw the masters or heads of the school personally
and directly instructed the apprentices.

Therefore, the heads are not liable. The teacher-in-charge is not also liable because theres no showing that
he was negligent in enforcing discipline against the accused or that he waived observance of the rules and
regulations of the school, or condoned their non-observance. Also, the fact that he wasnt present cant be
considered against him because he wasnt required to report on that day. Classes had already ceased.