NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Newport, R.I.

Considerations for Opening a Secondary Theater

By

Scott Minium

Commander, United States Navy

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction
of the requirements of the Department of Strategy and Policy based on the following assigned
topic:

6. "The principle of aiming everything at the enemy's center of gravity admits of only one
exception-that is, when secondary operations look exceptionally rewarding." (Clausewitz, p.
618) What circumstances make opening a secondary theater exceptionally rewarding?
The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed
by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature:___________________

31 May 09
Seminar 6A Moderators:
Commander Peter Jannotta
Professor Colin Jackson
 Considerations for Opening a Secondary Theater

In On War, Clausewitz counseled that secondary operations only be undertaken when

they "look exceptionally rewarding." The circumstances under which a proposed secondary

operation may be considered exceptionally rewarding include, at a minimum: 1) the risk relative

to the primary operation is low, 2) the operation presents a direct way to attack the enemy or his

interests, and 3) the operation provides a way to exploit an advantage.

Secondary Operations Should Be Lower Risk

Rational actors contemplating the undertaking of a secondary operation must consider

many factors to ensure the risk of the proposed operation can be kept acceptable. Above all else

there must be relative certainty that a failure of the secondary operation will not result in a loss of

the war proper. In the case of the Sicilian Expedition, the Athenians did not fully consider that

their forces could be lost, captured or unable (physically or mentally) to disengage. This

secondary operation, incurring the loss of so many men and ships, severely impacted the main

war effort by Athens. In contrast, the British Peninsula Campaign by Wellington posed little risk

to Britain's overall effort, and the failure of Napoleon's Ireland invasion was not a direct

contributor to his ultimate defeat.

Next, in order to maintain the secondary theater at a lower risk level, the allowable cost

must be coldly calculated such that when it becomes to costly it can be terminated. This is

difficult for all belligerents, democratic or otherwise, because the concept of a sunk cost does not

adequately factor in the passions of war after blood has been spilt. Unfortunately, once the

shooting has started belligerents tend to see all combat operations as the same, making little
distinction between primary and secondary theaters. Such behavior inflates the value of the

secondary theater, masking the higher the risk it poses to the primary theater and the main

objective. Thus, the value of the object must be very carefully appraised before opening the

second theater so that it does not become more valuable just because losses are incurred. As an

example, Britain could have persisted in its costly 1915 Gallipoli campaign, but unlike when

Athens fought to the bitter end in Sicily, Britain ultimately chose to abort Gallipoli even though

significant losses had been incurred.

Lastly, secondary operations must not increase risk by expanding the scope of the war.

By definition, secondary operations are going to be in a location removed from the main event,

and that location may involve a new player. This should be carefully considered lest the

operation bring new enemies into the conflict. While the negatives of drawing third parties into

the war as new opponents should be obvious, the reaction of third parties has been overlooked or

poorly estimated from time to time. The German decision to use unrestricted submarine warfare

in World War I, which can be viewed as the opening of a secondary theater, is a good example. 1

By itself the use of submarines did not really impact the German war machine, making it low

risk to the war in Europe. For it to be effective, however, US shipping had to be targeted as well,

and this dramatically increased risk to Germany when the US entered the war.

In summary, when analyzing the risks of a secondary operation the analysis needs to be

worst case to ensure the risks posed cannot rise to a level that will threaten the primary operation.

Secondary Operations Should Directly Impact the Enemy

 Secondary operations, like all combat, will require blood and money to undertake. As

such any secondary operation that is undertaken must have the same goal as the primary

operation: to break the enemy's capacity and will to fight. Thus, the more oblique this attack the

less impact it has. Vietnam(1965-1972) and Korea (1950-) are examples of secondary theaters

opened by the Soviet Union (and China) and answered by the US. As secondary theaters in the

Cold War they were aimed directly at the US in order to challenge the containment policy and

further the spread of communism. It is somewhat harder to see the US effort as directly aimed at

the Soviets.

To be effective the secondary operation must provoke a response by the principal

opponent. Because the secondary is by definition on the periphery of the main effort, the

principal belligerent may choose not to engage. Wellington's efforts in the Peninsula Campaign

would have yielded much less impact had Napoleon not chosen to fully engage him. Had

Napoleon moved far enough away from Wellington's fleet support the increased risk would

likely have pushed him to end the campaign. Similarly, the German army did not have to hold

North Africa against Operation TORCH. A different sequence of events would have resulted

had the Germans simply withdrawn to Europe. From the Allied perspective, while TORCH had

its deficiencies, at least it was directed targeted at German forces.

The secondary operation must be able to directly affect the enemy. If the impact on the

enemy is not directly obvious, then it is a poor choice. Failure to make this link has resulted in

several secondary operations looking much more like new fronts or even new wars. This does

not mean that the gain need be combat victories over the enemy, only that the effect on the

enemy is not a second or third order effect. The Gallipoli campaign, in seeking a resupply route

to Russia as well as the taking of the Ottoman capitol, was direct and thus met this criteria. In
contrast, Napoleon's invasion of Egypt sought to disrupt British trade with India, something that

would have involved far more than just occupation and thus could not be a direct effect.

To summarize, a secondary operation must be aimed as directly as possible at the enemy

lest it simply expend resources for insufficient gain in pursuit of the primary object.

Exploiting an Advantage

The belligerent launching a secondary operation does so with the intent of bringing an

asymmetric advantage into play so that the battle can be fought on more favorable terms than

those offered in the primary theater. As always, the providing of forces to the secondary

operation must not significantly slow the primary effort. Thus, secondary operations should be

undertaken with forces that are not of immediate use elsewhere.

Amphibious mobility is one advantage that can be exploited when the land forces of one

side are unlikely to succeed in a direct action against the primary forces of the enemy. This is a

recurring problem when maritime powers engage with continental ones. The 'whale', not having

an army of sufficient size to meet the 'elephant' head-on, seeks a secondary theater where it can

bring its naval forces to bear as a counterweight or force multiplier. This has figured

prominently in amphibious operations through history. As the naval forces cannot serve in the

primary theater and the army is of insufficient size to fight in the main theater, a smaller joint

operation is a good choice. Pylos and Sphacteria, the Peninsula Campaign, and TORCH are

excellent examples. In each case the operations were chosen carefully in that: they exploited

amphibious mobility while limiting the mobility options of the enemy, they took on an enemy
force of appropriate capability, they targeted something the enemy wished to contest, and they

used forces that were not immediately needed for the primary effort.

A second possible case is when one side may have a capability that the other cannot

effectively counter, but that cannot be used in the primary theater. Submarines were used by

both sides in World War II as a way to take the fight to the enemy in a way that, at least initially,

could not be countered or avoided--a perfect choice for a secondary theater. In a similar manner,

strategic bombing can be seen as the opening of a secondary theater away from, and in this case

above, the front line. As the Allies had no front in Western Europe before June 1944, no air

support was needed for it and the bombers were perfectly available for use in a secondary

theater.

Clausewitz' Point: Maintain Your Focus to End the War

One can argue that the only exceptional reward a secondary theater can bring about is a

quicker end to the greater war. Clausewitz is trying to communicate that although estimates and

calculations may show the secondary theater to be of great value, they are probably incomplete.

This is crucial in decision making because states tend to enter much more readily into secondary

theaters of questionable value than primary theaters of critical value because the perceived

present cost is lower. Unwilling to go head-to-head, Athens and Sparta each persisted for years

in opening secondary theaters instead of figuring out how to directly fight each other. In World

War II Eisenhower voiced frequent concerns that TORCH was going to unnecessarily delay

Allied entry into France at the risk of losing Russia.2 In Vietnam and Korea the US elected to

engage in the Soviet's secondary theaters of choice, with mixed results of somewhat questionable
value. More than anything, secondary theaters tend to prolong war, which is very rarely a good

thing and something Clausewitz was definitely against. It seems that in many cases the

correctness of the secondary theater is evaluated not on conditions at the time, but on reflection

of history. Unfortunately this leads to the conclusion that it does not matter if you get it right for

the wrong reason; however, this line of reasoning poorly informs decisions in the present. Given

all the uncertainties, in almost every case blood and treasure would have been conserved had a

decisive battle in the primary theater been sought more diligently.

Secondary Theaters are Often Pragmatic Choices

Secondary operations can indeed have the effect of extending the duration of a war. But

the purpose is not to delay the war but rather to engage the enemy with the means now available

until victory in a decisive match becomes possible. It is also possible that a decisive engagement

cannot be made to occur. In this case secondary operations offer the chance to impact the

enemy, force a change, and develop conditions that might bring about a decisive engagement.

Years of stalemate in World War I were not due to secondary operations, but rather the cause of

them. Another example is the Cold War, wherein both sides actively avoided a decisive battle

and fought the entire war in secondary theaters.

While calculations of the costs and benefits of a secondary operation may never provide

the best answer, it is often the case that it may be the best answer right now. Acts of war

demand a swift response by the public, and civilian and military leaders need to answer

aggression in the quickest manner available. As such, the leadership may not have the political
luxury of denying a ready secondary theater when the primary one is unavailable or risks certain

defeat.

It is undoubtedly sophistry to argue that a decision for secondary operations was good

based solely on historical perspective, but you likewise cannot argue against a secondary

operation now based simply on what you think will happen later. It may not have been the best

of all answers, but in 1942 Britain and the US had to hit Germany, and TORCH was a much

better option than OVERLORD at that time. Going back further in time, while it should not

have taken the Spartans thirty years to rent a Navy and interdict grain shipments, they

nevertheless decided to conduct secondary operations they saw as the best fit for their means at

the time.

Final Thoughts

First, it is interesting to note that a maritime power has most always been involved on one

side of the secondary theater. The reason is freedom of action. Command of the sea gives a

maritime power the ability to choose when and where to give battle. As reasoned above,

command of the air allows the same choices. For the continental power, all ground combat is on

a border, while secondary theaters allow maritime and air powers a way to attack the enemy at a

distance. On a cautionary note, advancements in conventional ballistic missiles may now offer a

way to dispute command of territory, air and sea in a wholly new manner.

Second, an important aspect of secondary operations is their ability to confer the

initiative. Although it may be hard to estimate its value, initiative greatly affects the morale of
the military as well as the people at home. Well executed, taking the initiative will have many

hard to predict effects for both sides, but fortune favors the bold.

Lastly, while Clausewitz is right to urge caution in the conduct of secondary operations,

he is using a bit of hyperbole when he insists the conditions be exceptional. A carefully thought

out sequence of qualifying points, some of which have been discussed in this paper, is a better

answer than a de facto prohibition.

Notes.
1. In a lecture (Kaiser?) a chart was displayed showing the trajectories of WWI in which the use
of U-boats was alluded to as a secondary theater.
2. Weigley, ~p320, discussion of one lecturer (possibly Pain)