Chinese Air Zone

Frontline
1NC
Conflict is coming between Japan and China Escalation now
Al Jazeera 12/17/13 [Japan to boost military spending as East China Sea dispute continues,
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/12/17/japanmilitarydefensespending.html, JCook.] Accessed 12/19/13.

Japan will boost its military spending in coming years, buying early-warning planes,
beach-assault vehicles and troop-carrying aircraft, while seeking closer ties with
Asian partners to counter a more militarily assertive China. The planned 2.6 percent
increase over five years, announced on Tuesday, reverses a decade of decline and marks the
clearest sign since Prime Minister Shinzo Abe took office a year ago that he wants a bigger military role for Japan as
tension flares with China over islands they both claim. Abe's avowed top priority has been reviving a long-sluggish
economy, but he has also pledged to strengthen Japan's military and boost its security profile to meet
what he says is a threat from China's rapid military buildup and recent actions to back its
claims to Japanese-held islands in the East China Sea. "China is attempting to change the status quo by force in
the skies and seas of the East China Sea and South China Sea and other areas, based on its own assertions, which are incompatible
with the established international order," Japan said in its first national security strategy, one of three plans approved on Tuesday.
"China's stance toward other countries and military moves, coupled with a lack of
transparency regarding its military and national security policies, represent a concern
to Japan and the wider international community and require close watch."
Shifting focus away from reinforcing Japan-US alliance allows China to go
unchallenged which causes conflict
Shimbun 12-4 [Yomiuri, 2013 http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0000845319]

We heartily applaud the clear political message sent from a high diplomatic level that Japan and the United States will not tolerate
any self-righteous step taken by China. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and visiting U.S. Vice President Joe Biden on Tuesday
held talks in Tokyo. They agreed both countries would not recognize Chinas newly established air
defense identification zone, which they called an attempt by China to change status quo unilaterally by force, and would
cooperate closely on the issue. They also confirmed they will not condone any action that could threaten [the]
safety of civilian aircraft. Biden is expected to present the opinions of Japan and the United States when he holds talks Wednesday
with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Allowing Chinas latest move to go unchallenged could set a
bad precedent, as China is using strong-arm methods to back up its own assertions. This would send a
message that China might misconstrue. To halt Chinese diplomatic moves that deviate from
existing international rules and threaten the regional peace and stability of Asia, it is vital that
Japan and the United States reinforce their alliance and calibrate their diplomatic policies. The
Japanese version of the U.S. National Security Council, which is to be launched Wednesday, should assume a pivotal role in this
task. It is also important to seek support on this issue not only with South Korea, whose air defense zone overlaps with the one
China is claiming, but also with countries in Southeast Asia and Europe. A broad consensus must be built, based on the conviction
that ensuring China abides by international rules is a common challenge for the global community.
Chinese air zone causes miscalc and North Korean prolif
- Militarization of busy areas
- Previous island conflicts
- Conflates denuclearization talks
- Disrupts trade
- Crossover in military ground claims between Japan and China
- Lack of clarity over Chinese limits of defense
Williams 12/4/13 [Carol J., LA Times, Syndicated journalist, China air zone risks miscalculation, distracts diplomacy,
experts say, http://www.latimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-china-japan-korea-air-defense-zone-
20131204,0,5505923.story#ixzz2nxYDrFRM, JCook.] Accessed 12/19/13.

With memories of the Soviet military's 1983 downing of a South Korean commercial airliner still seared in the minds of many,
China's move to control the airspace over disputed islands has stirred fears of
another disastrous miscalculation. Asia experts see little likelihood of an intentional attack on military or civilian
aircraft in China's proclaimed Air Defense Identification Zone, or ADIZ, over the East China Sea, which overlaps Japanese and
South Korean airspace claims. But the risk of accidental engagement in the zone traversed by
hundreds of planes each day, the analysts say, has been greatly elevated by China's
unilateral assertion of sovereignty and its demands that all entering aircraft file
advance flight plans to Beijing. Of more immediate peril for the region, they add, might
be the diplomatic attention being distracted from other pressing security matters in
East Asia, most notably North Korea's unbridled moves to acquire nuclear weapons
capabilities . "North Korea stands out as the biggest lost opportunity that has emerged as a
result of China's ADIZ announcement," said Scott A. Snyder, director of U.S.-Korea policy at the Council on Foreign Relations.
"Before the announcement, there was the possibility that the United States, China, South
Korea and Japan might all be on the same page in pushing North Korea toward
denuclearization." Joint strategy in tackling that issue had been expected to be front and center during Vice President Joe
Biden's Asia visit this week, Snyder said. Instead, the diplomatic swing through the troubled region
has been dominated by the need to reassure allies Japan and South Korea that they
can count on U.S. treaty commitments to defend them. Also on Biden's agenda during meetings with
the leaders of Japan, China and South Korea had been a push to restart annual trilateral summits among the three countries that are
East Asia's biggest economies. China refused to attend this year in protest of Japan's purchase of the disputed islands, which Tokyo
calls the Senkakus, to bolster its claim to the territory under Japanese administrative control for decades. China also claims
sovereignty over the uninhabited islets it calls the Diaoyus that are surrounded by rich fisheries and undersea natural gas deposits.
Sheila A. Smith, the council's senior fellow for Japan studies, describes the dormant trilateral forum as an ideal instrument for
resolving the intensifying dispute over China's Nov. 23 imposition of the air defense zone. But Beijing's objective in
claiming airspace control may be a signal of intent to extend its authority farther in
the region, Smith said, deeming it unlikely that China will be eager to resume diplomatic engagement with its rivals.
China has running disputes with six of its neighbors over islands and fishing
grounds in the South China Sea. The territory, also rich in oil and natural gas deposits, is claimed in whole or part
by China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia. Since Japan renounced sovereignty over the South
China Sea islands after World War II, repeated incidents of gunfire exchanges and vessel ramming
involving Chinese patrols have occurred in the strategic maritime corridor through which
much of East Asia's energy imports are delivered. Elevating the territorial disputes to the airways with
China's ADIZ proclamation has stirred concern for the safety of air travel through the
region. "The overlap of the ADIZs means that Chinese and Japanese fighter jets are in the same
space, claiming the same mission, defending the same airspace against intruders, or
at least policing the same airspace," said Smith. " The more they are in proximity, the
more they have close interaction, the more potential for miscalculation of pilots who
have the political goal of defending that airspace." The United States, Japan and South Korea have sent
military aircraft into China's proclaimed airspace without notification, which has prompted China to scramble fighter jets to identify
the unannounced entrants, officials in Beijing have confirmed. No action has been taken to deter what Chinese authorities portray as
"intrusions," but the lack of clarity on how far Beijing will go to enforce its claim of
sovereignty has raised tensions and fears of confrontation.
Miscalc causes extinction
Fisher, 10/31/2011 (Max associate editor at the Atlantic, 5 Most Likely Ways the U.S. and China Could Spark Accidental
Nuclear War, The Atlantic, p. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/10/5-most-likely-ways-the-us-and-china-
could-spark-accidental-nuclear-war/247616/#slide1)

After 10 years of close but unproductive talks, the U.S. and China still fail to understand one
another's nuclear weapons policies, according to a disturbing report by Global Security Newswire. In other
words, neither the U.S. nor China knows when the other will or will not use a nuclear weapon against the other. That's not due to
hostility, secrecy, or deliberate foreign policy -- it's a combination of mistrust between individual
negotiators and poor communication ; at times, something as simple as a shoddy translation has prevented the
two major powers from coming together. Though nuclear war between the U.S. and China is still extremely unlikely, because
the two countries do not fully understand when the other will and will not deploy nuclear
weapons, the odds of starting an accidental nuclear conflict are much higher . Neither the
U.S. nor China has any interest in any kind of war with one other, nuclear or non-nuclear. The greater risk is an accident. Here's
how it would happen. First, an unforeseen event that sparks a small conflict or threat of conflict. Second,
a rapid escalation that moves too fast for either side to defuse. And, third, a mutual
misunderstanding of one another's intentions. This three-part process can move so quickly that the best
way to avert a nuclear war is for both sides to have absolute confidence that they understand when the other will and will not use a
nuclear weapon. Without this, U.S. and Chinese policy-makers would have to guess -- perhaps with
only a few minutes -- if and when the other side would go nuclear. This is especially scary
because both sides have good reason to err on the side of assuming nuclear war . If you
think there's a 50-50 chance that someone is about to lob a nuclear bomb at you, your
incentive is to launch a preventative strike , just to be safe. This is especially true because you know
the other side is thinking the exact same thing. In fact, even if you think the other side probably won't launch an ICBM your way,
they actually might if they fear that you're misreading their intentions or if they fear that you might over-react; this means they have
a greater incentive to launch a preemptive strike, which means that you have a greater incentive to launch a preemptive strike, in
turn raising their incentives, and on and on until one tiny kernel of doubt can lead to a full-fledged war that nobody wants. The U.S.
and the Soviet Union faced similar problems, with one important difference: speed. During the first decades of the Cold
War, nuclear bombs had to be delivered by sluggish bombers that could take hours to reach their
targets and be recalled at any time. Escalation was much slower and the risks of it spiraling out of control were
much lower. By the time that both countries developed the ICBMs that made global annihilation something that could happen
within a matter of minutes, they'd also had a generation to sort out an extremely clear understanding of one another's nuclear
policies. But the U.S. and China have no such luxury -- we inherited a world where total mutual destruction can
happen as quickly as the time it takes to turn a key and push a button. The U.S. has the world's second-largest nuclear arsenal with
around 5,000 warheads (first-ranked Russia has more warheads but less capability for flinging them around the globe); China has
only about 200, so the danger of accidental war would seem to disproportionately threaten China. But the greatest risk is
probably to the states on China's periphery. The borders of East Asia are still not
entirely settled; there are a number of small, disputed territories, many of them bordering
China. But the biggest potential conflict points are on water: disputed naval borders,
disputed islands, disputed shipping lanes, and disputed underwater energy reserves. These regional disputes
have already led to a handful of small-scale naval skirmishes and diplomatic stand-offs. It's not difficult to foresee
one of them spiraling out of control . But what if the country squaring off with China
happens to have a defense treaty with the U.S.? There's a near-infinite number of small-scale conflicts that
could come up between the U.S. and China, and though none of them should escalate any higher than a few tough words between
diplomats, it's the unpredictable events that are the most dangerous. In 1983 alone, the U.S. and Soviet Union
almost went to war twice over bizarre and unforeseeable events. In September, the Soviet
Union shot down a Korean airliner it mistook for a spy plane; first Soviet officials feared the U.S.
had manufactured the incident as an excuse to start a war, then they refused to admit their error, nearly pushing the U.S. to actually
start war. Two months later, Soviet spies misread an elaborate U.S. wargame (which the U.S.
had unwisely kept secret) as preparations for an unannounced nuclear hit on Moscow, nearly
leading them to launch a preemptive strike. In both cases, one of the things that ultimately diverted
disaster was the fact that both sides clearly understood the others' red lines -- as long as
they didn't cross them, they could remain confident there would be no nuclear war. But the U.S. and China have not
yet clarified their red lines for nuclear strikes . The kinds of bizarre, freak accidents that
the U.S. and Soviet Union barely survived in 1983 might well bring today's two Pacific
powers into conflict -- unless, of course, they can clarify their rules. Of the many ways that the U.S. and China could
stumble into the nightmare scenario that neither wants, here are five of the most likely. Any one of these appears to be extremely
unlikely in today's world. But that -- like the Soviet mishaps of the 1980s -- is exactly what makes them so dangerous.
And asian prolif causes extinction
Lyon 9 [December, Program Director, Strategy and International, with Australian Strategic Policy Institute, previously a Senior
Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Queensland, A delicate issue, Asias nuclear future]

Deterrence relationships in Asia wont look like EastWest deterrence. They wont be
relationships of mutual assured destruction (MAD), and there will be many
asymmetries among them. Regional nuclear-weapon states will articulate a spectrum
of strategies ranging from existential deterrence to minimum deterrence to assured
retaliation; and sometimes doctrinal statements will outrun capabilities. The smaller arsenals
of Asia and the absence of severe confrontations will help to keep doctrines at the level of generalised deterrence. Extended nuclear
deterrence will continue to be important to US allies in East Asia, although it is hard to imagine other Asian nuclear weapon states
extending deterrence to their clients or allies. Alagappas propositions contain a picture of what a more proliferated Asia might
look like. It could well remain a region where deterrence dominates, and where arsenals are typically constrained: an Asia, in fact,
that falls some way short of a nuclear chaos model of unrestrained proliferation and mushrooming nuclear dangers. An order in
flux? Notwithstanding Alagappas more reassuring view, we shouldnt understate the extent of the looming change from a nuclear
relationship based on bipolar symmetry to a set of relationships based on multiplayer asymmetries. As one observer has noted,
when you add to that change the relatively constrained size of nuclear arsenals in Asia, the likelihood of further nuclear reductions
by the US and Russia, and ballistic missile defences of uncertain effectiveness, the world is about to enter uncharted territory (Ford
2009:125). Some factors certainly act as stabilising influences on the current nuclear order, not least that nuclear weapons (here as
elsewhere) typically induce caution, that the regional great powers tend to get along reasonably well with each other and that the
region enters its era of nuclear pre-eminence inheriting a strong set of robust norms and regimes from the earlier nuclear era. But
other factors imply a period of looming change: geopolitical dynamism is rearranging strategic
relationships; the number of risk-tolerant adversaries seems to be increasing; most nuclear
weapons states are modernising their arsenals; the American arsenal is ageing; and the USs position of primacy is increasingly
contested in Asia. Indeed, it may be that dynamism which could most seriously undermine the Solingen model of East Asian
nonproliferation. Solingen, after all, has not attempted to produce a general theory about proliferation; she has attempted to explain
only proliferation in the post-NPT age (see Solingen 2007:3), when the P-5 of the UN Security Council already had nuclear weapons.
In essence, though, its exactly that broader geopolitical order that might be shifting. It isnt yet clear how the Asian nuclear order
will evolve. Its one of those uncertainties that define Australias shifting strategic environment. Its not too hard to imagine an
order thats more competitive than the one we see now. The managed system of deterrence The second approach to thinking about
the Asian nuclear order is to attempt to superimpose upon it William Walkers two key mechanisms of the first nuclear age: the
managed system of deterrence and the managed system of abstinence. What might those systems look like in Asia? In Walkers
model, the managed system of deterrence included: the deployment of military hardware under increasingly sophisticated
command and control; the development of strategic doctrines to ensure mutual vulnerability and restraint; and the establishment of
arms control processes through which policy elites engaged in dialogue and negotiated binding agreements. (Walker 2007:436) It
isnt obvious that those core aspects of the managed system are all central features
of Asian nuclear relationships. Perhaps most importantly, it isnt obvious that the world even has a good model for
how deterrence works in asymmetric relationships. Within the US, theres been something of a revival of interest in matters nuclear
as strategic analysts attempt to reconceptualise how nuclear relationships might work in the future. Recent work on the problems of
exercising deterrence across asymmetrical strategic contests, for example, suggests a number of problems: In asymmetric
conflict situations, deterrence may not only be unable to prevent violence but may
also help foment it (Adler 2009:103). Some of the problems arise precisely because
weaker players seem increasingly likely to test stronger players threatsas part of
a pattern of conflict that has emerged over recent centuries, in which weaker players
have often prevailed against stronger opponents.3 If we were to look at the case study of the India
Pakistan nuclear relationshipwhich is grounded in an enduring strategic rivalry, and therefore not typical of the broader nuclear
relationships in Asiaits a moot point whether Pakistani behaviour has been much altered by the deterrence policies of India.
Indeed, the case seems to show that Pakistan doesnt even accept a long-term condition of strategic asymmetry with India, and that
it intends to use its nuclear weapons as an equaliser against Indias larger conventional forces by building a nuclear arsenal larger
than the Indian arsenal arrayed against it. That would imply, more broadly, that increasing strategic rivalries
across Asia could be accompanied by efforts to minimise asymmetrical disadvantages
between a much wider range of players. In short, in a more competitive Asian
strategic environment, nuclear asymmetries that are tolerable now might well
become less tolerable . Furthermore, we need to think about how we might codify deterrence in Asia. In the Cold War
days, the MAD doctrine tended to be reflected in arms control accords that limited wasteful spending and corralled the competition.
As Walker acknowledges, the agreements were important stabilisers of the broader nuclear relationship, but to what extent can
they be replicated in conditions of asymmetry? It might be possible to codify crisis management procedures, but designing (and
verifying) limitations on weapons numbers would seem to be much more difficult when
the arsenals are of uneven size, and when the weaker party (perhaps both parties)
would probably be relying on secrecy about the numbers and locations of weapons
to minimise the vulnerability of their arsenals.
Uniqueness Focus on Japan
Yes, the US is focused on Japan and China
Heydarian 12/18/13 [Richard Javad, Asia Times Online, Japan, US squeeze China's ADIZ,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/SEA-03-181213.html, JCook.] Accessed 12/19/13.

ASEAN's polite rejection of a pure defense-oriented meeting has not discouraged individual member states, namely the Philippines
and Vietnam, from pursuing deeper bilateral ties to bolster their deterrence capabilities against China. Abe's hawkish
stance is part of a larger regional strategic re-alignment under the US's "pivot" to
Asia, which is widely viewed as an effort to contain China's rising influence and territorial assertiveness. Washington
has openly supported Japan's bid to become a more independent power in Asia , one
that could serve as a counterweight to China and assist strategic allies such as the Philippines
and Vietnam to cope with an increasingly precarious regional environment. The US has also flatly rejected
China's ADIZ, viewing it as a provocative challenge to the region's prevailing
balance of power. "China's [ADIZ] announcement will not affect US military operations in the region," US Secretary of
State John Kerry said in mid-December soon after US and Chinese naval vessels nearly collided in regional waters on
December 5. "The [ADIZ] should not be implemented, and China should refrain from
taking similar unilateral actions elsewhere, particularly in the South China Sea."
Beijing has not publicly responded to the near collision but a state-run Global Times newspaper report quoted by the Associated
Press claimed that the US ship harassed China's Liaoning aircraft carrier by drifting too close to a naval drill it was conducting with
support ships. The report claimed the US vessel inappropriately entered the Chinese fleet's "inner defense layer". Following
on Abe's call for a unified regional stance, Kerry this week made high-profile visits
to Vietnam and the Philippines, lobbying for deeper strategic ties and underscoring
Washington's commitment to regional strategic allies. Kerry backed his rhetoric
with funds, pledging $32.5 million for maritime security assistance to Vietnam, including $18
million earmarked for five Coast Guard patrol boats. Kerry referred to the promised aid as a "gradual and
deliberate expansion" of US support to regional allies that will rise to over $156
million over the next two years . "Peace and stability in the South China Sea is a top priority for us and for
countries in the region," Kerry stated after holding talks with his Vietnamese counterpart Pham Binh Minh. "We are very concerned
by and strongly opposed to coercive and aggressive tactics to advance territorial claims." He said the ADIZ "clearly increases the
risk of a dangerous miscalculation or an accident". In his first trip to the Philippines as the US's top diplomat, Kerry met his
counterpart Albert Del Rosario, viewed as one of the most vocal proponents of a deeper US strategic footprint in Asia, as well as
President Benigno Aquino, who has strongly criticized China's imposition of the ADIZ. In light of the deadlock in Philippine-US
negotiations over an expanded American rotational military presence at the Subic and Clark bases, with both sides failing to agree
on the nature and ownership of US troops and military equipment positioned on Philippine soil, Kerry pushed for a timely
finalization of an enhanced defense agreement. To sweeten the deal, Kerry offered $40 million in maritime security and counter-
terrorism assistance during his visit. China's ADIZ has handed Japan and the US a strategic
boost, giving both Pacific powers an opportunity to step up their bilateral strategic
ties with the Philippines and Vietnam while rallying ASEAN against China's
perceived threat to regional maritime security and freedom of navigation. It remains to be
seen, however, how China responds to what it views as an increasingly concerted effort to contain its rise and influence.
US supports Japan now
Guinto 12/17/13 [Joel, Bloomberg Politics, Japan Boosting Defense Shouldnt Upset Neighbors, Kerry Says,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-12-17/japan-to-add-military-hardware-amid-growing-tensions-with-china.html, JCook.]
Accessed 12/19/13.

The U.S. backs Japans efforts to expand its military as it becomes more engaged in
Asia, a move that shouldnt upset its neighbors, Secretary of State John Kerry said. Japan yesterday approved a
plan to boost defense spending with purchases of military hardware and further
investment in anti-missile systems to better protect its territory at a time when China
is flexing its military muscle. Other nations wont tolerate Japan becoming a major military power and challenging
international order after World War II, Chinas Peoples Daily said in a commentary today. Our belief is that with respect to the
participation in the overall challenges in this region, Japan has an ability to play an increasingly more
modern and engaged role, Kerry said yesterday at a press conference in Manila. Calling the Japanese
expansion of its defense a long-planned move, Kerry said, This is not a sudden response to something or anything that anybody
should get particularly upset about. The Japanese defense plans adopted yesterday are the latest
step in Prime Minister Shinzo Abes efforts to promote a more active security stance amid a
deepening territorial dispute with China. The move comes weeks after China
established an air defense identification zone in the East China Sea that encompasses a chain of islands claimed by both
countries, ratcheting up tensions with both Japan and its ally, the U.S. Maritime Disputes Kerry
reiterated yesterday that the U.S. does not recognize the China air zone and wont
comply with demands that all aircraft flying in the area seek approval. Kerry also said that
the U.S. did not want rising tensions with China. Kerry spoke in Manila after meeting with Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert del
Rosario. The Philippines, like Japan and Vietnam, is in dispute with China over maritime territory. Kerry urged China
not to declare a similar air zone over the South China Sea and pledged $40 million to
help improve Philippines maritime security and provide assistance for counter-
terrorism efforts. A day earlier, Kerry visited Hanoi and offered maritime assistance to Vietnam, including $18 million to
provide five fast patrol vessels in 2014 to the Vietnamese Coast Guard.
2NC Taiwan
Chinese air zone ensures inevitable Taiwan conflict
Keck 12/05/13 [Zachary, The Diplomat, Assistant Editor at The Diplomat, a researcher at the Middle East Desk at the online
global consulting firm Wikistrat, and an M.A. candidate in the Department of Public and International Affairs at George Mason
University, Forget Japan: Chinas ADIZ Threatens Taiwan, http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/forget-japan-chinas-adiz-threatens-
taiwan/, JCook.] Accessed 12/20/13.

In all reality, the East China Sea ADIZ is likely aimed in no small part at Japan in general and
the Senkaku Islands in particular. Still, theres another more important factor at play here for China: Taiwan.
Second Line of Defenses Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake have a characteristically perceptive article on the new ADIZ, and how
Taiwan fits into the equation. Laird and Timperlake analyze the East China Sea ADIZ through the lens of the strategic quadrangle
concept they develop in their new book: Rebuilding American Military Power in the Pacific A 21st-Century Strategy. The
strategic quadrangle is an enormous expanse of (mostly) water that stretches from
Singapore to South Korea to Japan and back down to Australia. The distances
involved in this quadrangle are daunting, they note: It is nearly 4,000 miles from Japan to Australia. It is
nearly 2,500 miles from Singapore to Australia and nearly 3,000 miles from Singapore to South Korea. The only thing that may
outmatch the sheer size of the quadrangle is its importance to the U.S. and allied forces. As Laird and Timperlake explain in the
article, [The strategic quadrangle] is a central area where the U.S. and several core
allies are reaching out to shape collaborative defense capabilities to ensure defense
in depth. Freedom to operate in the quadrangle is a baseline requirement for allies
to shape collaborative capabilities and policies. Effectiveness can only emerge from exercising evolving
forces and shaping convergent concepts of operations. Notably , Chinas ADIZ falls directly within this
quadrangle, as does Taiwan. This may not be a coincidence. With the East China ADIZ, Laird and Timperlake
warn, The PRC is putting down its marker onto the quadrangle and if not dealt with will undoubtedly expand its definitions of air
and maritime defense outward. More ominously, they write, We have placed the ADIZ down upon the strategic geography we
have identified and a key reality quickly emerges. Just by chance the zone covers reinforcements to
Taiwan. That is, the ADIZ happens to cover the exact areas that the U.S. or Japan
would have to traverse in order to promptly respond to a PLA invasion of Taiwan.
Thus, if China can deny U.S. and allied forces the ability to operate in the waters and
airspace covered by the ADIZ, the U.S. would be unable to use its immense military
resources in South Korea and Japan in defense of Taiwan. Instead, the U.S. military
would have to travel from Guam, the Philippines and other nations located around
the South China Sea (until China establishes an ADIZ over that body of water as well). This is where the tyranny of
distance really weighs heavily on U.S. forces. Its worth noting, in this context, that China has demanded that aircraft flying in the
East China Sea ADIZ identify themselves even when their destination is not the Chinese mainland. This is different from most
nations ADIZs, which only require aircraft identify themselves if they intend to enter national airspace. Notably, soon after
China declared the East China Sea ADIZ last month, its sole aircraft carrier, Liaoning,
passed through the Taiwan Strait on its way to the South China Sea. The Director-General of
Taiwans National Security Bureau, Tsai Der-sheng, said this week that the Liaonings passage through the strait
demonstrated that there was an inevitable imbalance of military forces between
China and Taiwan. At the same time, Tsai told Taiwans parliament that the country is prepared to use force to protect
its ADIZ. Thus, far Taiwan has joined with South Korea, Japan, and the United States in defying Chinas new ADIZ. As my
colleague Shannon pointed out last week, Chinas historic claims to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands rest on it
being part of Taiwan. Thus, were China to gain control over the disputed islands, it
would effectively be controlling part of Taiwan.
Extinction
Taipei Times 13(Taipe Times, 3/16/13, Taiwan Could Spark Nuclear War: Report,
www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211)

Taiwan is the most likely potential crisis that could trigger a nuclear war between
China and the US, a new academic report concludes. Taiwan remains the single most plausible
and dangerous source of tension and conflict between the US and China, says the 42-
page report by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
Prepared by the CSIS Project on Nuclear Issues and resulting from a year-long study, the report emphasizes that
Beijingcontinues to be set on a policy to prevent Taiwans independence, while at the
same time the US maintains the capability to come to Taiwans defense. Although tensions
across the Taiwan Strait have subsided since both Taipei and Beijing embraced a policy of engagement in 2008, the situation
remains combustible, complicated by rapidly diverging cross-strait military capabilities
and persistent political disagreements, the report says. In a footnote, it quotes senior fellow at the US Council
on Foreign Relations Richard Betts describing Taiwan as the main potential flashpoint for the US in East Asia. The report also
quotes Betts as saying that neither Beijing nor Washington can fully control developments that might ignite a Taiwan crisis. This
is a classic recipe for surprise, miscalculation and uncontrolled escalation, Betts wrote in a
separate study of his own. The CSIS study says: For the foreseeable future Taiwan is the contingency in which nuclear weapons
would most likely become a major factor, because the fate of the island is intertwined both with the legitimacy of the Chinese
Communist Party and the reliability of US defense commitments in the Asia-Pacific region. Titled Nuclear Weapons and US-China
Relations, the study says disputes in the East and South China seas appear unlikely to lead to major conflict between China and the
US, but they do provide kindling for potential conflict between the two nations because the disputes implicate a number of
important regional interests, including the interests of treaty allies of the US. The danger posed by flashpoints such as Taiwan, the
Korean Peninsula and maritime demarcation disputes is magnified by the potential for mistakes, the study says. Although
Beijing and Washington have agreed to a range of crisis management mechanisms, such as the
Military Maritime Consultative Agreement and the establishment of a direct hotline between the Pentagon and the Ministry of
Defense, the bases for miscommunication and misunderstandingremain and draw on deep
historical reservoirs of suspicion, the report says. For example, it says, it is unclear whether either side
understands what kinds of actions would result in a military or even nuclear response by the
other party. To make things worse, neither side seems to believe the others declared policies and intentions, suggesting that
escalation management, already a very uncertain endeavor, could be especially difficult in any conflict, it says. Although conflict
mercifully seems unlikely at this point, the report concludes that it cannot be ruled out and may become increasingly likely if we
are unwise or unlucky. The report says: With both sides possessing and looking set to retain formidable
nuclear weapons arsenals, such a conflict would be tremendously dangerous and quite possibly
devastating .
2NC SCS Conflict
SCS Escalates to extinction
Waldron 97 [Arthur, professor of Strategy and Policy at the Naval War College Commentary,
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.7442,filter.all/pub_detail.asp, accessed on 7/19/12, Kfo]

Then there is Southeast Asia, which, having weathered the Vietnam War and a variety of domestic insurgencies, and having moved
onto the track of prosperity, shows no desire to complicate matters with political headaches. Fault lines nevertheless remain, and
not least between the numerous and disproportionately successful ethnic Chinese and other inhabitants. And here again China is a
looming worry. Beijing's claim of "unquestionable sovereignty" over the Spratly Islands in
the South China Sea and its recent seizure of one of them, Mischief Reef, also claimed by the
Philippines, have alarmed Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei, and rattled
Indonesia, which asserts its right to gas fields nearby. India and South Asia, long
preoccupied with their own internal rivalries and content with their rates of growth,
now look with envy and some concern as East Asia opens an ever-increasing lead in
economics, military power, and general global clout. Indian and Chinese forces still
face each other in the high mountains of their disputed border, as they have done
since their war in 1962. Pakistan to the west is a key Chinese ally, and beyond, in the Middle
East, China is reportedly supplying arms to Syria, Iraq, and Iran. To the north, Tibet (whose
government-in-exile has been based in India since 1959) is currently the object of a vicious Chinese crackdown. And a new
issue between India and China is Beijing's alliance with Rangoon and its reported
military or intelligence-gathering presence on offshore Burmese territories near the Indian
naval base in the Andaman Islands. Finally there is Russia, which has key interests in Asia. Sidelined
by domestic problems, but only temporarily, Moscow has repeatedly faced China in this century,
both in the northeast and along the Mongolian border. The break-up of the Soviet
Union has added a potentially volatile factor in the newly independent states of
Central Asia and Chinese-controlled Xinjiang (Sinkiang), where Beijing is currently fighting a low-level counterinsurgency.
An Arms Race in Asia Making these flash-points all the more volatile has been a dramatic
increase in the quantity and quality of China's weapons acquisitions. An Asian arms
race of sorts was already gathering steam in the post-cold-war era, driven by national rivalries
and the understandable desire of newly rich nation-states to upgrade their capacities;
but the Chinese build-up has intensifiedit. In part a payoff to the military for its role at Tiananmen Square in
1989, China's current build-up is part and parcel of the regime's major shift since that time away from domestic liberalization and
international openness toward repression and irredentism. Today China buys weapons from European states and Israel, but most
importantly from Russia. The latest multibillion-dollar deal includes two Sovremenny-class destroyers equipped with the much-
feared SS-N-22 cruise missile, capable of defeating the Aegis anti-missile defenses of the U.S. Navy and thus sinking American
aircraft carriers. This is in addition to the Su-27 fighter aircraft, quiet Kilo-class submarines, and other force-projection and deterrent
technologies. In turn, the Asian states are buying or developing their own advanced aircraft,
missiles, and submarines--and considering nuclear options. The sort of unintended
escalation which started two world wars could arise from any of the conflicts around
China's periphery. It nearly did so in March 1996, when China, in a blatant act of intimidation,
fired ballistic missiles in the Taiwan Straits. It could arise from a Chinese-
Vietnamese confrontation, particularly if the Vietnamese should score some unexpected military successes against the
Chinese, as they did in 1979, and if the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which they are now a member, should
tip in the direction of Hanoi. It could flare up from the smoldering insurgencies among
Tibetans, Muslims, or Mongolians living inside China. Chains of alliance or interest,
perhaps not clearly understood until the moment of crisis itself, could easily draw in
neighboring states--Russia, or India, or Japan--or the United States.
That outweighs, nuclear taboo checks other impacts
Landsay 2k Jonathan S. Landay (staff) March 10 2000 Top administration officials warn stakes for U.S. are high in Asian
conflicts:, Knight Ridder Washington Bureau, l/n

WASHINGTON _ The 3,700-mile arc that begins at the heavily fortified border between
North and South Korea and ends on the glacier where Indian and Pakistani troops
skirmish almost every day has earned the dubious title of most dangerous part of the
world. Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But
even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global
economy and even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear
weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations,
negotiations and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five
decades in Cold War Europe. "Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and
relationships so fragile," said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a
Washington think tank. "We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with
lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place.
There are elements for potential disaster." In an effort to cool the region's tempers, President Clinton, Defense
Secretary William S. Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch Asia's capitals this month. For
America, the stakes could hardly be higher. There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South
Korea, and the United States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against
Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea. While Washington has no defense commitments to either
India or Pakistan, a conflict between the two could end the global taboo against using
nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation
regime. In addition, globalization has made a stable Asia _ with its massive markets,
cheap labor, exports and resources _ indispensable to the U.S. economy. Numerous
U.S. firms and millions of American jobs depend on trade with Asia that totaled $600 billion
last year, according to the Commerce Department.
SCS Ext. Yes War
Yes, there will be South China Sea conflict - Waldron 97 is very clear that this conflict
will arise over Chinas sovereignty in the region and increasing dispute over
resources Heres more recent evidence that proves this warrant
RT News 8/16/13 [Asia pivot: US set to boost military presence in Philippines, http://rt.com/news/philippines-us-
troops-china-treaty-545/, JCook.] Accessed 8/24/13.

The Philippines was a US colony between 1898 and 1946, and the presence of American troops remains a controversial issue. The
US abandoned its last base in the South Asian country in 1992. But tensions in the
region have escalated as in the past decade Beijing began to lay forceful claims to
almost the entirety of the South China Sea (which the Philippines calls West Philippine Sea), that rounds the
coastlines of most of the states in the region. As disputes over potentially lucrative sea lanes and
underground mineral resources have grown more bitter, Manila has made diplomatic
appeals to the UN over what it calls excessive claims, and has sought greater assistance from
the United States. After years of being bogged down in Afghanistan and Iraq, Washington has also re-
directed its foreign policy towards Asia, signing a docking agreement for its warships with Singapore, and
bolstering its troop numbers in Australia.
2NC Economy
Conflict kills the global economy
Coburn 12/16/13 [Andrew, Director of External Advisory Board, Centre for Risk Studies at University of CambridgeA
China-Japan conflict fits our scenario of global economic catastrophe, http://theconversation.com/a-china-japan-conflict-fits-our-
scenario-of-global-economic-catastrophe-21486, JCook.] Accessed 12/20/13.

The scenario envisions the provocations escalating to military exchanges leading to both China and Japan
suffering destructive attacks on mainland targets. It envisions shipping exclusion zones and restricted
air space that would curtail exports from the region for the duration of hostilities.
Open-source military war gaming for a conflict of this type expects to see extensive naval
interchanges, long-range missile attacks targeted on power supply and
manufacturing, cyber warfare inflicted on Japan and its allies and a resurgence of
nationalism and social unrest in both protagonists populations. The conflict would affect the
regions outsourced manufacturing, and increased transport time and risks would
have a knock-on effect. Businesses would also face an exodus of expatriate personnel from a number of affected
countries and maintaining continuity would be tough. Insurance companies have standard exclusions on policies that protect them
from major payouts. But this does not mean theyll be entirely safe. The conflict could trigger non-excluded
claims in other lines of business and regions, with indirect liability claims, political
interference and knock-on effects on defaults from trade credit. There could be
unexpected vulnerabilities that might increase the likelihood of other types of
insurance loss. To take one example: what if a backlog of shipping waiting outside the conflict zone causes ships to be
concentrated in the typhoon belt? Economic damage Conflict would damage the economies of both
China and Japan. Past wars have typically caused higher energy prices, increased
government expenditure and public debt, inflation hikes, and lengthy periods of
trade disruption for the protagonists. Foreign money tends to flee out of the country, causing
governments to impose currency restrictions and asset freezes. The volume of international
economic interactions mean that the effects would not be confined to the countries fighting. Our model suggests that
the impacts would be almost as bad to the national economies of Europe, for example, as
they are to China and Japan. Conflict would lead to a global recession lasting between 18
months and four years , depending on the duration of hostilities and how hard it would be to continue trading. Either
way, we would lose tens of trillions of dollars of global output . The financial markets would be
badly affected by an event of this magnitude. The traders adage of sell on the trumpets, buy on the cannons (stockmarkets fall
when it looks like war, but rally once war is underway) would amplify volatility and severity of the financial shock. During a
severe financial crisis, as seen in 2008, a domino effect can take hold. Ripples of defaults and liquidity
shortages, together with fire-sales of devalued assets by over-exposed institutions,
can escalate into crisis correlation, where stocks move up and down together and
market movements are exaggerated. Investment managers would see significant
losses. Even the safest of bonds would be affected by the volatility, inflation and
capital flight, that could be expected. Estimates by the Risk Centre suggest that a standardised high-quality portfolio could
see poor performance for years, with immediate returns up to a third lower than expected. This isnt just a problem for top bankers;
your pension is probably managed in this way too.
Economic decline escalates to full scale conflictimpact studies conclude affirmative
Royal 10 Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, Economic
Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises, in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and
Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has
contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defense behavior of
interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national
levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski
and Thompsons (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global
economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminentpower and the often
bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crisis could usher in
a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances,
increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of
power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to
challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Seperately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles
combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he
suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on
a dyadic level, Copelands (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that future expectation of trade is a significant
variable in understanding economic conditions and security behavious of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to
gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations, However, if the
expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the
likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access
to those resources. Crisis could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on
its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states. Third, others have
considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national
level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods
of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong
and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favor.
Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external
conflict self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. P. 89) Economic decline has been linked withan increase in the
likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external
tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. Diversionary theory suggests that, when
facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have
increase incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a rally around the
flag effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that
economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009)
suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that
democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000)
has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential
popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlated
economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic
decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels. This implied connection between integration, crisis and armed
conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.
Even the perception of economic weakness sparks war.
Lieberthal and OHanlon 12 Kenneth G. Lieberthal, Director of the John L. Thornton China Center and Senior
Fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development at the Brookings Institution, former Professor at the University of
Michigan, served as special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Asia on the National
Security Council, holds a Ph.D. from Columbia University, and Michael E. O'Hanlon, Director of Research and Senior Fellow in
Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, Visiting Lecturer at Princeton University, Adjunct Professor at Johns Hopkins
University, holds a Ph.D. from Princeton University, 2012 (The Real National Security Threat: America's Debt, Los Angeles Times,
July 10th, Available Online at http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/07/10-economy-foreign-policy-lieberthal-
ohanlon, Accessed 07-12-2012)

Lastly, American economic weakness undercuts U.S. leadership abroad. Other countries
sense our weakness and wonder about our purported decline. If this perception
becomes more widespread, and the case that we are in decline becomes more
persuasive, countries will begin to take actions that reflect their skepticism about
America's future. Allies and friends will doubt our commitment and may pursue
nuclear weapons for their own security, for example; adversaries will sense opportunity
and be less restrained in throwing around their weight in their own
neighborhoods. The crucial Persian Gulf and Western Pacific regions will likely
become less stable. Major war will become more likely.
Ext. Economy Collapse
Kills global economy and independently causes another world war
Wolf 12-3 [Martin, 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/672d7028-5b83-11e3-a2ba-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2mccBt5Et]

Will we sustain an open global economy while also managing tensions between a rising autocracy and democracies in relative
economic decline? That was the question posed by the arrival of imperial Germany as Europes leading economic and military
power in the late 19th century. It is the question posed today by the rise of communist China. Now, as then, mistrust is high and
rising. Now, as then, actions of the rising power raise risks of conflict. We know how this story ended in 1914. How will the new
one end, a century later? Chinas decision to create an East China Sea air defence identification zone that covers uninhabited
islands currently under the control of Japan (called Senkaku by Japan and Diaoyu by China) is evidently provocative: the two
countries air defence zones now overlap. Neither Japan nor South Korea recognises the new zone,
which China seems prepared to defend. The US does not recognise the zone either,
and is bound by treaty to support Japan in a conflict. Yet the state department has also indicated that it
expects US commercial aircraft to comply with Chinese demands, in order to avoid the danger to innocent lives. The signals,
then, are mixed; as usual in such situations. But, as William Fallon, a former head of US Pacific Command, has noted, the
Chinese zone raises the potential for an accidental conflict. What would happen if
Chinese and Japanese military aircraft were to fire on one another? What would
happen if Chinese military jets were to fire on a civilian aircraft or force it down?
The mixed signals from the US may even increase the risks of conflict. As we also
know from the onset of the first world war, seemingly minor events can quickly
escalate to catastrophic proportions. Europe never recovered from the disasters of that war, and the even worse
one it spawned 25 years later. Today, with China under the leadership of Xi Jinping, an assertive
nationalist, Japan under the leadership of Shinzo Abe, a no less assertive nationalist,
and the US committed by treaty to defending Japan against attack, the risk of a
ruinous conflict again exists. Such an event is far from inevitable. It is not even likely. But it is not impossible and it
is more likely than it was a month ago. Again, there are parallels with the rise of Germany. In the early 20th century, that nation
launched a naval arms race with the UK. In 1911, Germany sent a gunboat to Morocco in response to French intervention in that
country. The aim was, in part, to test relations between France and the UK. In the event, it cemented that alliance, just as Chinas
action is likely to cement the alliances between Japan and South Korea, on the one hand, and the US on the other. And, as was the
case for the UK then, the US of today is increasingly troubled by the challenge presented by Chinas desire to assert its rising
regional power. Why would the Chinese president take such a provocative action? Since he appears to be in an increasingly
powerful position inside his country, Mr Xi presumably took this decision consciously, perhaps with a view to further such actions.
Yet, to the disinterested observer, the gains from control over a few uninhabited rocks are vastly outweighed by the risks to his
nation, which has just embarked on complex economic reforms, is deeply embedded in the world economy and is still a long way
from its goal of becoming a high-income country. This was just the question raised by Norman Angell, the English liberal, in his
1909 book The Great Illusion . Angell did not argue, as some allege, that war among the European great powers was inconceivable.
He was not that foolish. He argued instead that a war would be fruitless, even for the victors. Absorbing conquered territory would
add nothing useful to the welfare of their citizenry, other perhaps than allowing them and their leaders to prance in temporary
glory. Never can a prediction have proved more true: the war, when it came, damaged all the main combatant nations
catastrophically. Today, again, one wonders why the Chinese leadership thinks asserting sovereignty over a few rocks worth the
risk. Yes, China may get away with it this time and the next, and the time after that. But each throw of the dice renews the risks.
What gains can justify the possible losses? Military experts assume that in a head-on conflict China would lose. While its economy
has grown dramatically, it is still smaller than that of the US, let alone of the US and Japan together. Above all, the US still controls
the seas. If open conflict arrived, the US could cut off the worlds trade with China. It
could also sequester a good part of Chinas liquid foreign assets. The economic
consequences would be devastating for the world, but they would, almost certainly, be worse for China
than for the US and its allies. China is, after all, an exceptionally open great power, with a higher ratio of trade to gross domestic
product than the US or Japan. Being resource poor, China depends on imports of a host of vital raw materials. While advancing
rapidly in its technological skills, the country is far more dependent on foreign knowhow and inward foreign direct investment than
the rest of the world is on Chinas skills. A conflict could force many western and Japanese companies to pull out and go
somewhere viewed as safer. Its foreign currency reserves, equal to 40 per cent of GDP are, by definition, held abroad. Much, then,
would be put at risk. (See charts.) Evidently, as Angell would tell us, risking a conflict makes no sense for China. The mutual gains
from rising trade and economic interdependence are orders of magnitude greater and, one would have thought, more persuasive
than those from marginal territorial gains offshore. In the same way, no gain could justify the disaster of the first world war. Yet
history, alas, also teaches us that frictions between status quo and revisionist powers
may well lead to conflict, however ruinous the consequences. Indeed, Thucydides, the great ancient historian, argued
that the calamitous Peloponnesian war was due to the alarm that the growing power of Athens inspired in Sparta. Nationalist
ambitions and resentment over past wrongs are all too human. But this game is just too risky. For the sake of the longer-term
interests of the Chinese people, Mr Xi should think again and halt.
2NC Link Run
Were controlling the brink of the link US diplomatic capital is already stretched
with the Mid east US focus is key to creating trust in the region
AP 12-6 [2012, http://www.news-sentinel.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20131206/AP01/312069963]

SEOUL, South Korea (AP) Invoking the chance to remake the world, Vice President Joe Biden pledged Friday that the U.S.
will play a leading role in creating a new century of prosperity and security in Asia. But he
warned that without trust and common ground-rules, that collective goal could be
threatened by mounting tensions on the continent. At an elite university in South Korea, Biden
pushed back against those who doubt America's resolve in Asia, where expanding the U.S.
footprint has been a defining aspiration for Biden and President Barack Obama that's been obscured in recent years by an array of
distractions at home and abroad. "This is one of those inflection points in history," Biden said as he neared the end of a trip to Asia
aimed at affirming that aspiration. "We actually have a chance a chance to bend history just slightly." In open societies lie
growth, and in growth lies peace, Biden said, laying out a broad vision for a U.S.-Asia bond in which cooperation coexists with
intense competition. Tracing the arc of South Korea's evolution since the end of the Korean War, Biden held up this northeast Asian
nation as a model for others seeking to emerge from chaos and authoritarianism. To that end, Biden called on Asian countries to
open their economies, drop trade barriers, create opportunities for women and cooperate on environmental protection. He called for
Asia to adopt a single set of rules to govern relations between nations in a neighborhood where many of the most powerful nations
are bitterly feuding. "With this growth have come new tensions, above and beyond the enduring threats that we face," Biden said.
"The rules and norms that help advance security and prosperity are still evolving to keep pace with the remarkable changes of the
21st century." Such threats became the backdrop for Biden's weeklong tour of South Korea, Japan and China, where Biden found
himself playing mediator for pressing international disputes in a departure from the softer diplomacy typical of vice presidential
visits. South Korea and Japan, the two closest U.S. allies in the region, are engaged in a painful dispute driven by historical
enmities dating nearly a century. And there are new, worrying signs from North Korea. Biden vowed the world would not tolerate
Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program, adding the U.S. was willing to resume multiparty talks with the North if it agrees to full
denuclearization. In the choppy waters separating South Korea, China and Japan, a turbulent dispute over Beijing's claim to
airspace over contested islands hanged over Biden's Asia trip. Seizing an opportunity to implore Asian nations to stop provoking
one another, Biden said he had stressed to Chinese President Xi Jinping that the U.S. military plans to ignore China's demand that
planes flying through the airspace first notify Beijing. "It will have no effect on American operations. Just ask my general," Biden
said. "None. Zero." The vice president's words, like his trip to Asia, sought to put a fine point on the Obama administration's
intention to realign America's foreign-policy focus toward Asia. The U.S. sees the potential for massive growth here, but worries
that authoritarian China will fill the power void by asserting itself more aggressively against its neighbors. "If we're going to be
honest about it, China is not the only country being assertive right now," Jonathan Pollack, an Asia policy expert at the non-partisan
Brookings Institution, said ahead of Biden's speech. "All the states involved are trying to buy
themselves more latitude in their decision-making, more space. That's all well and good until
something you don't want to happen does." Best laid plans to increase U.S.
influence, military presence and diplomatic outreach in Asia have been complicated
by Iran, Syria and Egypt, which have commandeered much of the foreign policy
bandwidth. In Washington, the abysmal rollout of Obama's health care law and intense gridlock in Congress have kept the
White House bogged down in domestic matters. South Korea's own concerns about frictions in the region were on display earlier
Friday when Biden met with President Park Geun-hye at her office amid the sprawling gardens of Seoul's Blue House. "At a
time when we have recently been seeing growing volatility and tensions in northeast
Asia, it is very helpful for peace in northeast Asia to have a vice president with such
profound insight into foreign affairs travel to this region," she said through a translator. Before
returning to Washington on Saturday, Biden was to lay a wreath at a ceremony honoring fallen U.S. troops. He'll conclude his trip
with a visit to the Demilitarized Zone between South Korea and North Korea, a potent symbol of the deep mistrust that continues to
estrange South Korea from its northern neighbor.
A clear and consistent message is key to de-escalating this crisis through
diplomacy
Ewing 12-5 [Philip, 2013 http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/china-pacific-territorial-dispute-100667.html]

The Chinese leadership is trying to do this balancing act. Its not about starting a war, but using tailored coercion to effectively gain
ground over the weakest links in the neighborhood, he said. In this case, the weakest links are the Philippines and Japan. China
believes it can better isolate those countries and take out their increasing claims in the region. American defense advocates warn
that Washington is all but inviting or enabling Chinese expansion. Sequestration has reduced military readiness and
created a perception of weakness, they argue, and the White House also has made specific
decisions that would only encourage Beijings behavior. For example, Rep. Randy Forbes (R-Va.), chairman
of the House Armed Services Committees seapower panel and a leader of the House China Caucus, has faulted President Barack
Obama for not inviting Taiwan to next years scheduled Rim of the Pacific naval exercises. Washington has invited the Peoples
Liberation Army-Navy to send warships, and Forbes said that by excluding Taiwan the U.S. was effectively spurning its alliance.
Forbes also sent a letter Tuesday to National Security Adviser Susan Rice in which he accused the administration of sending mixed
messages to the Chinese directing the Pentagon to ignore the air defense restrictions on the one hand, while advising civilian
airlines to comply on the other. Given the potential for miscalculation in the current environment, it is
essential that the administration speak with one voice on an issue directly affecting
the future of American security interests in the Asia-Pacific, Forbes wrote. Therefore, I
respectfully request that you reassess the U.S. governments official policy regarding commercial airline compliance with Chinas
imposition of an ADIZ. Cronin said he thinks the Chinese were not motivated primarily by the perceived weakness of the U.S.
military as sequestration squeezes the Pentagon budget and military leaders complain about reduced readiness though Beijing
does track every turn of the screw in Washington. The biggest reason is Chinas internal politics, Cronin said. President Xi Jinping,
whos set to meet with Biden, came to power believing his predecessor, Hu Jintao, underplayed a strong strategic hand in the
Western Pacific. So Xi and his camp want to be stronger men, Cronin said, and extend Chinas control over the East and South
China seas. That, they believe, will sell ordinary Chinese on the value of the establishment Communist Party, which badly wants to
stay in power, and safeguard Chinas access to the trade routes and potential natural resources under the ocean. Beijing probably
does not want to get into a shooting war in the process, but rather, wants to reach a point in perhaps five or 10 years when no one,
including the U.S., will dispute its claims of control over the neighborhood. In short, for defense and international analysts who
have spent years predicting a muscular 21st-century China, the future has arrived. The next big question is how American leaders
respond. Foreign policy scholar Marvin Kalb of the Brookings Institution wondered whether Obamas new preference for handling
foreign crises would work in the context of the Western Pacific. President Obama clearly wants to accent
diplomacy and lean no longer on military action, which seemed to be American policy in the last decade,
Kalb wrote. That seems to be the message of his recent decisions with respect to Syrias chemical weapons and Irans nuclear
program. But, China casts a huge shadow over his strategic deliberations, raising questions about whether his
preference for diplomacy can work in Asia, specifically in the East China Sea. A U.S.
official traveling with Biden told reporters that, for now, Washington believes the best course is to talk frankly with Beijing,
according to the pool report. The aim is being clear and consistent with China and Chinese
leaders about our alliance [with Japan and South Korea], the strength of our alliances
and commitments, regarding behavior that is destabilizing, the official said. Weve constantly
said relations with China are a balance of cooperation and competition. We need to grow the cooperative
elements, but its important that when we have disagreements with the Chinese to be
clear about them and help them understand there will be a cost to their actions. The
Pentagon, so far, is making a point to carry out its operations. U.S. Navy and Air Force flights have continued as normal through the
air defense zone, officials say, and American commanders plan to conduct business as usual. Pentagon spokesman Col. Steve
Warren told reporters he isnt even paying attention to operations in the disputed territory because from the Defense Departments
perspective, nothing has changed. Warren said he wouldnt get into a daily drumbeat about when or which American military
aircraft were in the area. One reason is that U.S. surveillance flights of China are classified and from the Pentagons perspective,
nothing has changed.
Taking on too many foreign policy issues at once leads to policy overstretch and
weakness on every issue, allowing less powerful governments to back out of
cooperation Independent solvency gut
WALT, 09 [Stephen, Robert and Rene Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University; Nibbled to death by
ducks? 7/27, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/07/27/nibbled_to_death_by_ducks]

Moreover, trying to advance the ball on so many different fronts simultaneously carries
its own risks. In particular, it provides governments that are opposed to some or all of
Washington's agenda with an obvious way to respond: they can "just say no." In Taming
American Power, I labeled this strategy "balking," (a term suggested to me by Seyom Brown) and I argued that it was a
common way for weak states to prevent a dominant power from imposing its will.In
a world where the United States remains significantly stronger than any other power,
few states want to get into a direct test of strength with Washington. But American
power is not so vast that it can simply snap its fingers and expect everyone to do its
bidding. Why? Because exercising leverage is itself costly, and the more you do in one
area, the more latitude that opponents somewhere else are likely to have. There are
still only 24 hours in a day, and the White House can't devote equal attention and
political capital to every issue. So states that dont want to do what Obama wants can
delay, dither, obfuscate, drag their feet, or just say no, knowing that the United States
doesnt have the resources, attention span, staying power, or political will to force
their compliance now or monitor it afterwards.
The plan forces Obama to focus his resources on Latin America, which causes foreign
policy overstretch and prevents his ability to deal with the Japan and China
ANDERSON AND GREWELL, 01 [Terry, Senior fellow at Hoover Institute; and Bishop, Research associate @
Political Economy Research Center; It Isn't Easy Being Green: Environmental Policy Implications for Foreign Policy, International
Law, and Sovereignty," Chicago Journal of International Law, Fall 2001, 2 Chi. J. Int'l L. 427, Nexis]

Foreign policy is a bag of goods that includes issues from free trade to arms trading
to human rights. Each new issue in the bag weighs it down, lessening the focus on
other issues and even creating conflicts between issues. Increased environmental
regulations could cause countries to lessen their focus on international threats of
violence, such as the sale of ballistic missiles or border conflicts between nations. As countries must watch over
more and more issues arising in the international policy arena, they will stretch the
resources necessary to deal with traditional international issues. As Schaefer writes, "Because
diplomatic currency is finite... it is critically important that the United States focus its
diplomatic efforts on issues of paramount importance to the nation. Traditionally, these
priorities have been opposing hostile domination of key geographic regions, supporting our allies, securing vital resources, and
ensuring access to foreign economies."40
US Key
The US is key to de-escalating this crisis multiple reasons
-Connections with Tokyo and CCP
-Military aid
-US can bring them to negotiating table
Jackson 11-25 [Allison, 2013, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/131121/china-japan-
senkaku-diaoyu-islands-dispute-war]

Robert Daly: The United States takes no position on the final sovereignty question, but has stated repeatedly that the
Diaoyu/Senkakus are covered by its mutual defense treaty with Japan. Given the historical animosities between China and Japan,
do you think it is possible for the two sides to resolve their differences over the islands in a peaceful manner? John Lee: A
peaceful resolution will need US involvement for several reasons. First, the United States is a
senior ally of Japan and has some capacity to restrain Tokyo. The US also has far more
connections with the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) and PLA (Peoples Liberation Army), which will
be needed to deescalate any incident. Second, China would be unlikely to
contemplate a war with Japan over the islands if it genuinely believed that the US
would come to Japans aid at least in the foreseeable future where its military capacity vis--vis the US is still weak.
Third, the United States is the only player that is powerful enough to force both sides
to the negotiating table, although the Chinese will resist that pressure. Gary Li: Despite
historical issues, China has always displayed a remarkable level of pragmatism in its foreign relations. Sino-Japanese relations were
exceptionally good during the 70s and 80s, and China opened its doors to the US during the height of the Cold War. Whether it is
strategic expediency or a change of heart, Chinese foreign policy has nevertheless displayed an ability to keep dialogue open and
attempt to reach bilateral win-wins. Diplomacy aside, there are very good economic reasons for both sides to resolve this issue
also. Japanese exports to China was around $145 billion in 2012, and it is set to grow. This shows that anti-Japanese sentiment
within China does not have a lasting effect on trade. Most Chinese are happy to continue buying Japanese products even if they
were unhappy about the island disputes. Any severe deterioration in this trade would also have a large impact on the region as a
whole. This is not ideal for a Chinese economy that is attempting to grow amid a worldwide recession.
Link
Cuba Embargo
Ending the Cuban embargo saps Kerrys diplomatic capital its not a current
priority
Miroff 7/31 Nick Miroff, Cuba reporter for GlobalPost, contributor to NPR, Washington Post, Mother Jones and the San
Francisco Chronicle, MA in Journalism from Berkeley (Can Kerry make friends with Cuba?, GlobalPost, Available Online:
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/americas/cuba/121231/kerry-cuba-secretary-of-state-obama, Accessed:
07/31/2013)

Now, with Sen. John Kerry (D-Mass.) likely to be confirmed as the next secretary of state, the United States
will have a top diplomat who has been a frequent critic of Americas 50-year-old effort to force regime change
in Havana. In recent years, Kerry has been the Senates most prominent skeptic of US-funded pro-
democracy efforts that give financial backing to dissident groups in Cuba and beam anti-Castro programming to the island
through radio and television programs based in Miami. Kerry has also favored lifting curbs on US travel to the island, and
opening up American tourism to the only country in the world the US government restricts its own citizens from visiting. For the
rest of Latin America, where leaders say they're eager for Washington to modernize its view of the region and engage in new ways,
Cuba remains a litmus test for the Obama presidency, according to Julia Sweig, director of Latin American Studies at the Council
on Foreign Relations. The strategic benefits of getting Cuba right would reverberate throughout the Americas, said Sweig,
calling Kerry ideally suited to the task. Kerry's instincts and experience in Latin America are to see past lingering and often
toxic ideology in the US Congress and bureaucracy in favor of pragmatism and problem solving, she said. Regardless of
Kerrys record on Cuba policy in the Senate, analysts say he will face several obstacles to
major change, not least of which will be the man likely to replace him as chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, Sen. Bob Menendez (D-New Jersey), a Cuban American. If Menendez becomes chairman, then the committee
responsible for shaping US foreign policy in the upper house will be led by a hardliner who wants to ratchet up not dial back
the US squeeze on Havana. So while Kerry may have some latitude to adjust Cuba policy from
inside the White House, Latin America experts dont expect sweeping change like an end to
the Cuba Embargo which requires Congressional action. On Latin America, in general, I think Kerry has a longer
and broader vision, said Robert Pastor, professor of international relations at American University. But when it comes to
Cuba, he cautioned, Kerry is also a political realist. Changing US policy is not a
high priority for him, but not changing US policy is the only priority for Bob Menendez, Pastor said. In 2011, Kerry
delayed the release of nearly $20 million in federal funds for pro-democracy Cuba projects run by the US Agency for International
Development (USAID), questioning their effectiveness and insisting on greater oversight. There is no evidence that the
democracy promotion programs, which have cost the US taxpayer more than $150 million so far, are helping the Cuban people,
Kerry said at the time. Nor have they achieved much more than provoking the Cuban government to arrest a US government
contractor. The US government contractor is Alan Gross, jailed on the island since December 2009. Cuban authorities arrested
Gross while he worked on a USAID project to set up satellite communications gear that would allow members of Cubas Jewish
community to connect to the internet without going through government servers. Cuba sentenced him to 15 years in prison, but
now says its willing to work out a prisoner swap for the Cuban Five, a group of intelligence agents who have been serving time in
a US federal prison. The Obama administration has refused to negotiate, calling on Havana to release Gross unconditionally, and
even US lawmakers who advocate greater engagement with Cuba say no change will be possible as long as hes in jail. The Castro
government insists its not willing to give up Gross for nothing. Carlos Alzugaray, a former Cuban diplomat
and scholar of US-Cuba relations at the University of Havana, said a resolution to the Gross
case and other significant changes in US policy would require a big investment of
political capital by Kerry and Obama. The question is if Kerry will be willing and able to convince Obama that he
should push for change, and if they can neutralize Menendez, Alzugaray said. If that happens, then we will see change, he
said. If not, it will be more of the same: minimal and timid changes but nothing big.
Cuba General
Cuban engagement trades off with other diplomatic priorities.
Leogrande 13 William M. Leogrande, Government Professor at American Universitys School of Public Affairs (The
Danger of Dependence: Cubas Foreign Policy After Chavez, in The Isolation Illusion: Foreign Policymaking in Cuba,
Zimbabwe and Belarus, a World Politics Review Feature Report, April 2, 2013, Available Online from Google Books,
Accessed: 08/07/2013)

Obama took some early steps that augured well. In April 2009, he ended restrictions on Cuban-American
remittances and family travel and subsequently eased regulations limiting cultural and academic exchange. At Washington's
initiative, the United States and Cuba resumed bilateral talks on migration, suspended by President George W. Bush in 2004. The
two governments also began discussions on other issues of mutual interest, such as Coast Guard cooperation and drug interdiction.
But the momentum in Washington soon dissipated in the face of more pressing
foreign policy priorities, opposition from Congress, even among some Democrats, and resistance from an
inertial State Department bureaucracy more comfortable with the familiar policy of the past -- its failure
notwithstanding -- than the risk of trying something new. As a former senior State Department official
explained, high-visibility foreign policy changes of this magnitude only happen if
the president demands that they happen, and Obama's attention was focused
elsewhere. In December 2009, Cuba's arrest of Alan Gross, a consultant for the U.S. Agency for International Development's
"democracy promotion" programs, brought all progress to a halt. At the end of Obama's first term, relations with Cuba were not
much better than at the start.
Mexico Border
Border infrastructure improvement requires substantial State Department
investment of resources the planning process is complex
Lee and Wilson 12 Erik Lee, Associate Director at the North American Center for Transborder Studies at Arizona
State University, former assistant director at the Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies at the University of California-San Diego, holds an
M.A. in Latin American Studies from the University of California-San Diego, and Christopher E. Wilson, Associate at the Mexico
Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, previously served as a Mexico Analyst for the U.S. Military and
as a researcher at American Universitys Center for North American Studies, holds an M.A. in International Affairs from American
University, 2012 (The State of Trade, Competitiveness and Economic Wellbeing in the U.S.-Mexico Border Region, Working Paper
of the Border Research Partnershipcomprised of Arizona State Universitys North American Center for Transborder Studies, the
Colegio de la Frontera Norte, and the Woodrow Wilson Centers Mexico Institute, June, Available Online at
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/State_of_Border_Trade_Economy_0.pdf, Accessed 08-10-2013, p. 18-19)

Coordination and Cooperation: Border Master Plans and the Interagency Process Managing the U.S.-Mexico
border is made particularly difficult by the large number of federal, state, and local
government entities that manage and protect the border and surrounding
transportation infrastructure. While the State Department and Mexicos Foreign
Ministry clearly guide and coordinate most bilateral issues, in the case of the border
they must work alongside a number of federal stakeholders, such as Commerce/Economa,
DHS/Gobernacin, DOT/SCT, and EPA/SEMARNAT, to name but a few. In light of border region complaints over the slowdown
in crossborder commerce due to increased concerns regarding terrorism and drug-trafficking related violence, the Obama
Administration reconfigured the interagency process by which the U.S. federal government coordinated its various border
operations as a part of the 21st Century Border initiative. The National Security Staff Interagency Policy Committee sits at the nexus
of a new Executive Steering Committee and three major components, Infrastructure Planning, Port Operations, and Corridor
Security. Figure 7, on the next page, gives an idea of this still-complex process by which the U.S. federal government organizes itself
in terms of border operations. [end page 18] [Graph/Chart omitted] A key component of how the U.S.-
Mexico border functions to facilitate trade has to do with transportation planning
because in its absence infrastructure investments on one side of the border or in one region can simply feed traffic into a bottleneck
in another area. This process is largely managed by the Joint Working Committee, a
binational entity comprised of representatives from the two countries transportation
agencies, the State Department, Mexicos Foreign Ministry, other federal agencies
and state departments of transportation, but as border communities felt themselves increasingly affected by
decisions made in Washington and Mexico City, their insistence in being included in these discussions led to the regional border
master plan process, in which state DOTs lead stakeholder discussions on border infrastructure priorities. While this process makes
sense from a U.S. perspective (in the absence of a national transportation plan, state DOTs essentially manage and spend federal
transportation dollars), this process is somewhat of a mismatch for Mexicos more centralized political system. The system seems to
work better in certain cross-border communities, as is seen with California and Baja Californias award-winning master plan.
Mexico General
Engagement with Mexico costs diplomatic capital.
Ayala 9 Elaine Ayala, Columnist, San Antonio Express News, Former President of the San Antonio Association of Hispanic
Journalists (Obama will have to invest diplomatically in Latin America, My SA: San Antonios Home Page, January 19, 2009,
Available Online: http://blog.mysanantonio.com/latinlife/2009/01/obama-will-have-to-invest-diplomatically-in-latin-america/,
Accessed: 07/31/2013)

The Washington Post writes a tough editorial about President-elect Obamas Latin America agenda. While President Bush
faced many democratic-leaning countries when he entered office, Obama faces more anti-
American-leaning ones, and not just Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. The editorial also says
Mexico may be Obamas more pressing Latin American issue. Mexican President Felix Calderons
war against drug cartels threaten to destroy Mexicos relatively fragile institutions. By the presidents own account, some 6,000
persons were killed in drug-related violence during 2008, a level of bloodshed exceeding that of Iraq. The Bush administration
initiated a $1.4 billion aid program to help Mexican security forces, and Congress has appropriated the first $400 million. But little
has been done to stop the massive flow of weapons not just guns but grenade launchers, night vision equipment and high
explosives from the United States. In April, President Obama will attend a summit of the Americas, as good as any
opportunity to address those issues, the Post editorial says. Unlike Bush, the new president has an objective and
urgent interest in investing some of his diplomatic capital in Latin America.
( ) Building trade ties with Mexico requires a shift in U.S. focus.
Seguin 13 Israel Hernndez Seguin, Deputy Director of the Mexican Council on Foreign Relations, 2013 (Open Borders:
Collaboration Between Mexico and the U.S., Chicago Policy Review, Interview conducted by Jonathan Grabinsky his
questions are italicized, February 14th, Available Online at http://chicagopolicyreview.org/2013/02/14/5011/, Accessed 08-10-
2013)

The United States and Mexico are closely connected geographically and economically. In what
waysif anywill the change in administration in Mexico and the re-election of President
Obama influence the US-Mexico diplomatic relationship? The tie with the United States is the
most important diplomatic relationship that Mexico has. Likewise, Mexico is one of the strongest
trading partners of the United States. Unfortunately, issues such as illegal immigration, counternarcotic plans, border security (after
9/11), and the war on drugs have clouded other matters of equal importance, such as economic issues, for more than two decades.
The change in administration in both countries offers a new opportunity to refocus
the priorities of the bilateral relationship. But it is Mexico that needs to take the lead
at reframing the agenda, as the United States will always remain concentrated on issues
of pressing domestic interest. Fortunately, Mexican President Enrique Pea Nieto has stated his
administrations interest in strengthening the economic relationship between both
countries. Many experts have recommended building a regional economic agenda
for North American competitiveness. This requires strong political communication
and strategic thinking about all the opportunities and potentials that lie ahead. It is
challenging to maneuver a regional agenda for competitiveness, however, when the
United States seems more focused currently on building its economic relationship with
Asia, as seen by the recent emphasis in the Trans Pacific Partnership.
Venezuela General
Engaging with Venezuela costs diplomatic capital its an ongoing uphill battle.
Shifter 13 Michael Shifter, Adjunct Professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign
Service (The Empire Makes Nice: Is it time for a Venezuela reset? Foreign Policy, March 11, 2013, Available Online:
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/11/the_empire_makes_nice_venezuela_hugo_chavez, Accessed: 07/31/2013)

Absent Chvez, Venezuela will continue to be tricky in the second Obama administration. The
administration will need to arrive at a more accurate on-the-ground reading of what
is happening in the country. It will need to engage in quiet, steady, high-level diplomacy with
key allies in the region not only to closely monitor the security situation and guard against dire scenarios
but to press for free and fair elections and adherence to the rule of law. None of this will be easy,
and recent history is not encouraging. But Chvez is gone, and although for now some measure of continuity in
Venezuela is most likely, conditions of scarcity -- in charisma, money, and political astuteness -- will soon be acutely felt. It is
important not to forget that Chvez was able to do what he did for 14 years for a simple reason -- because he could.

Venezuela Energy
Venezuelan energy investment requires long-term commitment to diplomacy.
Goldwyn 13 David Goldwyn, President, Goldwyn Global Strategies, LLC (The Impact of the Tight Oil and Gas Boom
on Latin America and the Caribbean: Opportunities for Cooperation, Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs;
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere on Energy Opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean, April 11, 2013,
Available Online: http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA07/20130411/100622/HHRG-113-FA07-Wstate-GoldwynD-
20130411.pdf, Accessed: 07/31/2013)

The three countries that need robust attention at this time are Mexico, Brazil and Venezuela. Mexico is considering major reforms
and we have much we can share at a technical level on gas markets, unconventional oil and gas technology, safe regulation of the
deepwater, and energy efficiency. We should create a quiet bilateral mechanism for sharing this information with Mexican
ministries, its nascent regulator and PEMEX. Changing global markets also impact Brazil, and we should ensure that the Strategic
Energy Dialogue is reactivated as soon as new officials are on board at the Department of Energy. Venezuela is trickier
because it is in political transition and there is a great deal of rhetorical hostility. But the
US had a technical dialogue with Venezuela that lasted over 30 years. We need to know the new officials at
the Ministry and PdVSA and to share our view of market realities, even if we may
not agree on them. Sometime in 2013, after the Venezuelan elections, this technical dialogue should be revived, perhaps at
the Assistant Secretary, or Deputy Assistant Secretary level. Conclusion Mr. Chairman, the ties between Latin America and the
Caribbean and the energy security of the United States are numerous. Here I have addressed only a few of the possible avenues
for improving U.S. energy security, and there are undoubtedly more, but the overarching conclusion is that energy security
goals in the Hemisphere can be achieved through improved dialogue and relations with allies and adversaries alike.
As I stated in 2008, it will require new approaches to energy and foreign policy. It will require
fresh policy approaches, money, and creative diplomacy. But more than anything it will require
leadership. As a citizen I thank the committee for its leadership on this critical issue.
Impacts
AT// No US-China War
Japanese escalation and Chinese commitment ensures war Takes out your defense
Al Jazeera 12/17/13 [Japan to boost military spending as East China Sea dispute continues,
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/12/17/japanmilitarydefensespending.html, JCook.] Accessed 12/19/13.

Relations between Japan and China have been overshadowed for years by what China says
has been Japan's refusal to admit to atrocities committed by Japanese soldiers in China
between 1931 and 1945. China's Xinhua news agency said they were clearly aimed at China
and it warned Japan against "big-power geopolitics." "If Japan really hopes to return itself to the ranks
of a 'normal country,' it should face up to its aggression in history and cooperate with its Asian neighbors instead of angering them
with rounds and rounds of unwise words and policies," state-run Xinhua said. Past Japanese governments have
stretched the limits of a post-World War II constitution, written during the U.S. occupation of a
defeated Japan, that renounces war and says Japan will never have an army or navy. Abe wants to go further,
including lifting a ban on fighting overseas or aiding an ally under attack.
China war likely because of World War II resentments kills economy and draws in
US Takes out key internal links of your defense --------list---------
[Michael Crowley 12-2 [2013, http://swampland.time.com/2013/12/02/why-a-pacific-war-is-possible-china-and-japan-
despise-each-other/]

It may be hard for you to understand, an expert at Beijings Academy of Military Science told me in October, echoing several
others to whom I spoke. The nationalist feeling, the emotion toward Japan, is very strong. Its true that China has been flexing its
muscles in recent years, by many accounts bullying regional neighbors like the Philippines and Vietnam. Thats one reason for the
Obama Administrations pivot to Asia strategy. But the rivalry between Beijing and Tokyo is much
deeper, and darker. Americans tend to think of World War IIs Pacific theater as a fight between the U.S. and Japan in
places like Midway and Okinawa, lasting from 1942 to the atomic bombs of 1945. But for China, practically speaking, there
was no world war only a brutal invasion and occupation by Japan that began more than
four years before Pearl Harbor. That fight cost 20 million Chinese lives, and included some of the worst atrocities of the entire war
in the now infamous city of Nanjing, where up to 300,000 Chinese were massacred. Few people with clear memories of those years
are still alive today. But China has not forgotten. One Beijing-based American blogger calls the subject of Japans wartime conduct
radioactive capable of eliciting such white-hot rage from seemingly normal people. A few years ago, TIMEs then Beijing
correspondent Matthew Forney captured how that rage is sustained: Chinese kids can be forgiven for thinking Japan is a nation of
devils, a slur used without embarrassment in polite Chinese society. They were raised to feel that way, and not just through
cartoons. Starting in elementary school children learn reading, writing and the Education in National Humiliation. This last
curriculum teaches that Japanese bandits brutalized China throughout the 1930s and would do so today given half a chance.
Although European colonial powers receive their share of censure, the main goal is keeping memories of Japanese conquest fresh.
Thousands of students each day, for instance, take class trips to the Anti-Japanese War Museum in Beijing to view grainy photos of
war atrocitieswomen raped and disemboweled, corpses of children stacked like cordwood. As one 15-year-old girl in a blue and
yellow school uniform, Ji Jilan, emerged from a recent visit to the gallery, she told a TIME correspondent: After seeing this, I hate
Japanese more than ever. Compounding the anger is a sense that Japan has never truly never
reckoned with its atrocities the way Germany did after World War II. Japanese officials have
issued statements of remorse over the years, but its typical to hear the Chinese say Japan has never really admitted to, or
apologized for, its actions. China especially resents Japans lack of public contrition about the thousands of sex slaves known as
comfort women. Japanese officials inflame these wartime wounds every time they visit a notorious shrine to the countrys war
dead that includes 14 wartime leaders convicted as war criminals by an allied tribunal; a government-linked Chinese newspaper
recently described one such visit as an attempt to deny and glorify the militarism and history of aggression. Further
stoking Chinas paranoia is Japans recent move away from its postwar pacifist stance
and toward a more potent military: It is one of the greatest concerns for China if Japan tries to revise its
constitution and have a normal military force, said the military-academy expert. Japans recent militarization is driven, in part,
because the feeling is mutual: polling shows that the animus in Japan toward China runs about as high as it does on
the other side of the East China Sea. The unfavorable feelings of each side toward the other runs poisonously above 90%. Its
certainly hard to argue that China has done anything to Japan comparable to the 193745 occupation. But one scholar on Sino-
Japanese relations argues the animus is about envy and anxiety toward the roaring Chinese dragon: with its economic
miracle stunted and political reform stagnating, many Japanese politicians played to
nationalist groups in order to boost national confidence and win popular votes. While
pacifism and the Japanese feeling of war guilt used to keep anti-Chinese nationalism marginal, the old culture has gradually faded,
much due to peoples anxiety about an increasingly powerful and assertive China in East Asia. How does all this affect the U.S.? In
part because a conflict between Asias two great economic powers could be a disaster for
the global economy ; but also because of Americas security treaty with Japan, which, in return for
basing rights, guarantees the U.S. will defend Japan against attack. And while Washington has
not taken an official position on the sovereignty of the disputed islands, it does, somewhat confusingly, consider them
covered by the security pact a fact not appreciated by China, which is already wary
about Americas intentions in the region. It just seems absurd that the U.S. would commit itself to the
defense of a few small islands that it has no position about, the military-academy expert told me. Most Americans would likely
agree if they even understood what the fuss was about to begin with.
AT// No North Korean Nukes
The recent execution in North Korea proves instability Ignoring North Korea
nuclear programs now leads to nuclear conflict
GLOBAL SECURITY NEWSWIRE 12/13/13 [Nuclear Threat Initiative, Analysts Question North Korean
Stability in Wake of Execution, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/analysts-question-north-korean-stability/, JCook.] Accessed
12/20/13.

North Korea's neighbors have long been concerned about stability in Pyongyang.
The fear is that an abrupt regime collapse could lead to more provocations against the outside world,
waves of refugees fleeing the country and -- particularly worrisome for the United States -- the proliferation of North
Korea's ballistic missiles, nuclear weapon-technology and fissile material. "If two weeks
ago, we thought that North Korea was somewhat stable, I think today people feel that it's not as stable as we thought it was," Victor
Cha, the Bush administration's former special envoy for North Korea policy, said in an interview with CNN. South Korean
lawmaker Suh Sang-ki said the determination to execute Jang indicates Kim has consolidated
less power than his father and wanted to head off any early domestic opposition to
his uncle's dismissal. Philip Yun, executive director of the Ploughshares Fund, said there is now a greater
risk of Kim employing "brinksmanship" tactics. North Korea this past spring brought
the region perilously close to war with its third atomic test and its repeated promises
to carry out nuclear-missile strikes on South Korea and the United States. "I think if we
continue to wait for him to do things, he's going to continue to shoot missiles, and
he'll probably at some point decide to test a nuclear weapon," Yun said.
Yes Escalation
Any minor conflict leads to escalation World war
Al Jazeera 12/17/13 [Japan to boost military spending as East China Sea dispute continues,
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/12/17/japanmilitarydefensespending.html, JCook.] Accessed 12/19/13.

Abe's government also vows to review Japan's ban on weapons exports, a move that
could reinvigorate struggling defense contractors like Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd and Kawasaki
Heavy Industries Ltd. The policies, including a five-year military buildup and a 10-year defense guideline, call for
stronger air and maritime surveillance capabilities and improved ability to defend
far-flung islands through such steps as setting up a marine unit, buying unarmed surveillance drones
and putting a unit of E-2C early-warning aircraft on Okinawa island in the south.
China and Japan have been embroiled in an increasingly strident row over tiny
islands, which Japan calls the Senkaku and China calls the Diaoyu. Tension spiked in late November
when Beijing announced an air-defense zone over a wide area including the islands,
prompting protests from Tokyo, Washington and Seoul and raising fears that a minor incident in the disputed
sea could quickly escalate.
That escalates to nuclear war
Gross 12 (Donald Gross, a Pacific Forum CSIS Senior Associate, is a former White House and State Department official whose
new book, The China Fallacy: How the U.S. Can Benefit from Chinas Rise and Avoid Another Cold War, was published in October
by Bloomsbury.

NHaving experienced and survived the widespread human rights abuses that occurred between 1966 and 1976, the year of Maos
death, Chinas new leadership will be more receptive to calls for political reform from the countrys middle class and liberal
intellectuals, who are highly critical of increasing corruption and cronyism within the CCCP. Chinas new leaders will welcome
overtures from the United States that aim to assist China in meeting its challenges. But harsh American trade measures or
heightened military pressure will likely be met with a tough response, as the new leaders seek to prove their mettle and their
capability to defend Chinas national interests. Increased tensions with China could have dire consequences. They could lead to a
military conflict over Taiwans political status, over whether Japan or China holds sovereignty
to a group of uninhabitable islands and offshore energy resources in the East China Sea or
over the ownership of small islands and energy resources in the South China Sea. In a worst case scenario, those
conflicts could escalate, by accident or by design, to a nuclear exchange . It is essential to
remember that Chinas rise strengthens Americas economy and future prosperity. Today, China is the largest growth market in the
world for U.S. goods and services. Trade with China, Americas third-largest export market and the leading market for U.S.
agricultural products, has helped Americas recovery from the global financial crisis.
Yes Miscalc.
Nuclear escalation is likely because of miscalc
Fisher, 10/31/2011 (Max associate editor at the Atlantic, 5 Most Likely Ways the U.S. and China Could Spark Accidental
Nuclear War, The Atlantic, p. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/10/5-most-likely-ways-the-us-and-china-
could-spark-accidental-nuclear-war/247616/#slide1)

After 10 years of close but unproductive talks, the U.S. and China still fail to understand one
another's nuclear weapons policies, according to a disturbing report by Global Security Newswire. In other
words, neither the U.S. nor China knows when the other will or will not use a nuclear weapon against the other. That's not due to
hostility, secrecy, or deliberate foreign policy -- it's a combination of mistrust between individual
negotiators and poor communication ; at times, something as simple as a shoddy translation has prevented the
two major powers from coming together. Though nuclear war between the U.S. and China is still extremely unlikely, because
the two countries do not fully understand when the other will and will not deploy nuclear
weapons, the odds of starting an accidental nuclear conflict are much higher . Neither the
U.S. nor China has any interest in any kind of war with one other, nuclear or non-nuclear. The greater risk is an accident. Here's
how it would happen. First, an unforeseen event that sparks a small conflict or threat of conflict. Second,
a rapid escalation that moves too fast for either side to defuse. And, third, a mutual
misunderstanding of one another's intentions. This three-part process can move so quickly that the best
way to avert a nuclear war is for both sides to have absolute confidence that they understand when the other will and will not use a
nuclear weapon. Without this, U.S. and Chinese policy-makers would have to guess -- perhaps with
only a few minutes -- if and when the other side would go nuclear. This is especially scary
because both sides have good reason to err on the side of assuming nuclear war . If you
think there's a 50-50 chance that someone is about to lob a nuclear bomb at you, your
incentive is to launch a preventative strike , just to be safe. This is especially true because you know
the other side is thinking the exact same thing. In fact, even if you think the other side probably won't launch an ICBM your way,
they actually might if they fear that you're misreading their intentions or if they fear that you might over-react; this means they have
a greater incentive to launch a preemptive strike, which means that you have a greater incentive to launch a preemptive strike, in
turn raising their incentives, and on and on until one tiny kernel of doubt can lead to a full-fledged war that nobody wants. The U.S.
and the Soviet Union faced similar problems, with one important difference: speed. During the first decades of the Cold
War, nuclear bombs had to be delivered by sluggish bombers that could take hours to reach their
targets and be recalled at any time. Escalation was much slower and the risks of it spiraling out of control were
much lower. By the time that both countries developed the ICBMs that made global annihilation something that could happen
within a matter of minutes, they'd also had a generation to sort out an extremely clear understanding of one another's nuclear
policies. But the U.S. and China have no such luxury -- we inherited a world where total mutual destruction can
happen as quickly as the time it takes to turn a key and push a button. The U.S. has the world's second-largest nuclear arsenal with
around 5,000 warheads (first-ranked Russia has more warheads but less capability for flinging them around the globe); China has
only about 200, so the danger of accidental war would seem to disproportionately threaten China. But the greatest risk is
probably to the states on China's periphery. The borders of East Asia are still not
entirely settled; there are a number of small, disputed territories, many of them bordering
China. But the biggest potential conflict points are on water: disputed naval borders,
disputed islands, disputed shipping lanes, and disputed underwater energy reserves. These regional disputes
have already led to a handful of small-scale naval skirmishes and diplomatic stand-offs. It's not difficult to foresee
one of them spiraling out of control . But what if the country squaring off with China
happens to have a defense treaty with the U.S.? There's a near-infinite number of small-scale conflicts that
could come up between the U.S. and China, and though none of them should escalate any higher than a few tough words between
diplomats, it's the unpredictable events that are the most dangerous. In 1983 alone, the U.S. and Soviet Union
almost went to war twice over bizarre and unforeseeable events. In September, the Soviet
Union shot down a Korean airliner it mistook for a spy plane; first Soviet officials feared the U.S.
had manufactured the incident as an excuse to start a war, then they refused to admit their error, nearly pushing the U.S. to actually
start war. Two months later, Soviet spies misread an elaborate U.S. wargame (which the U.S.
had unwisely kept secret) as preparations for an unannounced nuclear hit on Moscow, nearly
leading them to launch a preemptive strike. In both cases, one of the things that ultimately diverted
disaster was the fact that both sides clearly understood the others' red lines -- as long as
they didn't cross them, they could remain confident there would be no nuclear war. But the U.S. and China have not
yet clarified their red lines for nuclear strikes . The kinds of bizarre, freak accidents that
the U.S. and Soviet Union barely survived in 1983 might well bring today's two Pacific
powers into conflict -- unless, of course, they can clarify their rules. Of the many ways that the U.S. and China could
stumble into the nightmare scenario that neither wants, here are five of the most likely. Any one of these appears to be extremely
unlikely in today's world. But that -- like the Soviet mishaps of the 1980s -- is exactly what makes them so dangerous.
Yes US Involved
China-Japan war draws in US
Carl 11-30 [Michael, http://www.wnd.com/2013/11/chinese-sorties-over-disputed-islands-spark-war-fears/]

Burke says he believes many Chinese wouldnt object to a war with Japan. Large contingents of the Chinese population would
relish a war with Japan (even if they havent thought out how that would actually turn out). So China makes inroads with these
groups and simultaneously pressures Japan, Burke said. Burke said people in both countries hold long-standing resentments
toward the other. China has a populace that would be happy to see Japan suffer. And Japan feels much the same way at a
sociological level. So China pressuring this way costs the emperor and the Diet some infra-political coinage, Burke said. A
former CIA station chief who asked not to be identified said a war between China
and Japan would cost the U. S. economically big time. However, he added that in reality, the war
would evolve into a war between the U. S. and China. It would not be a war
between Japan and China. The U.S. has a mutual defense treaty with Japan, as well
as our treaties with South Korea, Taiwan, Australia and the Philippines. So, it would
be a war between the U.S. and China, the former station chief said. A war would end trade between the U. S.
and the Far East, he said, however, it also would erase the U.S.s debt to China. Some parts of the Japanese political scale really
would enjoy lashing out at China, Burke said. Analysts speculate on Taiwans interest in the dispute. Burke said Taiwan also
claims the islands and any conflict would impact Taiwans economy. He added that Taiwan also sees the islands as a military asset.
The ownership of the Senkaku Islands puts some pressure on Taiwan as they can be used for staging, intelligence gathering, etc. A
quick look at the map affirms this, Burke said. Burke said the dispute may be reflected by Taiwans military hardware purchases.
This is the major focus of this dance. Watch for submarine purchases on the part of Taiwan, U.S. 7th fleet deployments and weird
holidays or ceremonies in China that reaffirm patriotism, Burke said.
Yes Perception
Full US commitment to resolve current tensions key to preventing Japan from
causing a military conflict with China
Gertz 12-3 [Bill quoting Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman Geng Yangsheng, December 3, 2013,
http://freebeacon.com/china-threatens-japan-ahead-of-biden-trip/]

Chinas military ratcheted up tensions on Tuesday over its disputed East China Sea air defense zone by
threatening military action against Japan and saying it would enforce new aircraft
controls. Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman Geng Yangsheng accused Japan in a statement of
making trouble and he warned Chinese military aircraft would enforce the newly imposed
air defense identification zone, or ADIZ. Japans actions have seriously harmed Chinas
legitimate rights and security interests, and undermined the peace and stability in
East Asia, Geng said through the official Xinhua news agency. China has to take necessary reactions. Geng listed a
series of actions by Japan he said had increased tensions, including Tokyos frequent dispatch of
ships and aircraft to areas near the disputed Senkaku islands, threats to shoot down
Chinese drones, and overall escalation of regional tensions. Without mentioning the United
States, Geng also said other countries must correct wrong remarks and wrongdoings, he said. Other parties
should not be incited, or send wrong signals to make a very few countries go further on
the wrong track, which will follow the same old disastrous road and undermine
regional and world peace, Geng said, insisting that China adheres to peaceful development and defensive policies.
The comments were the most forceful by a Chinese government spokesman since Beijing unilaterally declared the ADIZ that
overlaps Japans air defense zone and covers the Senkakus, which China calls Diaoyu.
Answers
AT// Dip Cap Infinite
Diplomatic capital is finite too many policies will prevent the U.S. from achieving
important goals
SCHAEFFER, 00 [Brett, Fellow in the Center for International Trade at Heritage Foundation; The Greening of U.S. Foreign
Policy; p.46]

Diplomacy is the first option in addressing potential threats to U.S. national interests and expressing U.S. concerns and priorities to
foreign nations. The daily conduct of diplomacy through U.S. missions and representatives
is essential in articulating U.S. interests and eliciting cooperation and support for those interests
abroad. Because diplomatic currency is finiteclearly, foreign countries and officials
cannot be expected to endlessly support and promote U.S. concernsit is critically
important that the United States focus its diplomatic efforts on issues of paramount
importance to the nation. Traditionally, these priorities had been opposing hostile
domination of key geographic regions, supporting our allies, securing vital resources,
and ensuring access to foreign economies (Holmes and Moore 1996, xi-xvii).
AT// Iran Thumper
1. The crisis happened after the Iran deal they wont a perceive it as pulling
away from the commitment to de-escalate
2. The Iran deal is on a 6-month interim and involves six world powers means
no capital is being spent

3. Japan-Chinese relations are the top of our diplomatic priorities Thats
uniqueness
4. Japan-China dispute is a bigger geopolitical risk that means its the top
priority
Dhara Ranasinghe 11-26 [2013, http://www.cnbc.com/id/101227549]

Just as geopolitical risk showed signs of abating after Sunday's nuclear weapons deal
with Iran, tensions between China and Japan over disputed islands have re-surfaced.
And at a time when risk appetite in global markets is running strong, strategists say renewed strain between two of the top three
world economies is something that should not be taken lightly by financial markets. "At the moment if you look at the world, one of
the striking features is that there aren't many tail risks out there, especially if the U.S. and Iran
are now talking," said Bank of Singapore Chief Economist Richard Jerram, referring to a deal between
Iran and six world powers to curb Iran's nuclear program. "But with the China and Japan
dispute, both sides are stubborn and this is one of the bigger geopolitical risks the world still faces."
Beijing at the weekend declared an "Air Defense Identification Zone" that covers most of the East China Sea and a group of
uninhabited islands that have been the subject of heightened tensions between China and Japan in recent years.
AT// Israel Thumper
Obama not spending diplomatic capital on the peace processno hint at future plans
either
Gerges 13 Fawaz, Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science where he
directs the Middle East Centre, Obama and the Middle East: the lessons of Iraq? Feb-18, http://www.opendemocracy.net/fawaz-
gerges/obama-and-middle-east-lessons-of-iraq /// cmf

For example, after his initial attempt to help broker a Palestinian-Israeli peace process,
Obama has taken a cautious stance. Netanyahus opposition has frustrated Obamas quest.
Instead of challenging Netanyahu and exerting more pressure on him to accept a sensible
solution, Obama let the Israeli Prime Minister off the hook. Obama squarely lost the first and
final round because he was unwilling to spend more political capital at home. He recognized
the costs to his domestic and foreign policy agenda and cut his losses. Given Obamas worldview and
his priorities, it is doubtful if the US president will make another major drive to broker a
peace settlement between the Palestinians and Israelis.Just a few days ago, Obama
reportedly bemoaned Netanyahus decision to build more settlements on occupied Palestinian lands.
He reportedly called Netanyahu a coward because of his failure to meet the Palestinians halfway,
adding that he expected Netanyahu to continue his reckless ways. In his second term in office,
Obama will most likely avoid pursuing efforts to broker a peace settlement because he does
not see conditions ripe to do so. What this means is that the US president does not seem to be
inclined to exert pressure on Israel Americas strategic client in the region.
AT// Africa Thumper
Africa is not a prioritythe renewed interest is just a reaffirmation of existing
programs and commitments
Galvez 6/30 Rick, International Relations MA graduate of Syracuse University's Maxwell School, Obama Africa Trip: Bush
Was Better For Africa Than the Guy Accused Of Being Born in Kenya, http://www.policymic.com/articles/51549/obama-africa-
trip-bush-was-better-for-africa-than-the-guy-accused-of-being-born-in-kenya /// cmf

Obama, in contrast, has done little outside of a 2009 visit to Ghana when he offered words and
not much else. He has Kenyans in a "small uproar" because he will not be visiting, which is
representative of his larger stance or more aptly, non-stance on the region. The itinerary of this
"guilt trip," as some have called it, is a miss; it neglects the biggest regional powers in Nigeria, Kenya,
and Ethiopia. Additionally, the most successful USAID development programs Feed the
Future and the Global Health Initiative are simply incarnations of previous administration's
programs and are not limited to Africa in particular. The Commerce Department's "Doing
Business in Africa" campaign has produced minimal results, along with USAID attempts at bolstering
trade.The larger point is that African development is simply not a priority for Obama.
This is, to a certain extent, understandable. He's had a lot on his plate. Between economic crises,
war, and scandal, Obama has had to prioritize, leaving Africa on the back-burner. Many
argue that this is not necessarily a bad thing; Obama should be focusing on domestic crises and
shoring up security at home before spending time on security around the world which has minimal
impact on America.
AT// Small Issue
The plan would not turn out to be a small issue, because the simplest actions become
the most time-consuming and ultimately drive every other foreign policy item to
failure
WALT, 09 [Stephen, Robert and Rene Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University; Nibbled to death by
ducks?, 7/27, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/07/27/nibbled_to_death_by_ducks]

In On War, Carl von Clausewitz famously described what he termed the "friction" of warfare; the
accumulated set of minor obstacles and accidents that made even the simplest of
objectives difficult to achieve. The same problem can arise in foreign policy: even
when everything is simple, "the simplest things are very difficult." States that oppose
what the United States is trying to do have lots of ways of increasing that friction
without triggering an actual crisis. In other words, Obama's foreign policy may fail not
because he loses some dramatic confrontation, but simply because a whole array of
weaker actors manage to grind him down. In this scenario he doesn't get vanquished,
just "nibbled to death by ducks."
AT// Winners Win

AT// Winners Win

1) Our link is a unique instance in which a political win doesnt lead to more
wins. We need to spend all of our focus and energy on creating a successful
de-escalation in East Asia There is no room for other issues Thats
Colby 11
2) Foreign policy success requires focus on a single issue, because trying to
manipulate different countries in different regions will overstretch
Obamas staff and lead to failure everywhere. Political wins do not create
resources and focus Thats ANDERSON AND GREWELL
3) Time-frame takes out the winners win argument. During the time that
the plan is passed and implemented our impacts happen
4) Diplomatic capital is finite too many policies will prevent the U.S. from
achieving important goals
SCHAEFFER, 00 [Brett, Fellow in the Center for International Trade at Heritage Foundation; The Greening of U.S. Foreign
Policy; p.46]

Diplomacy is the first option in addressing potential threats to U.S. national interests and expressing U.S. concerns and priorities to
foreign nations. The daily conduct of diplomacy through U.S. missions and representatives
is essential in articulating U.S. interests and eliciting cooperation and support for those interests
abroad. Because diplomatic currency is finiteclearly, foreign countries and officials
cannot be expected to endlessly support and promote U.S. concernsit is critically
important that the United States focus its diplomatic efforts on issues of paramount
importance to the nation. Traditionally, these priorities had been opposing hostile
domination of key geographic regions, supporting our allies, securing vital resources,
and ensuring access to foreign economies (Holmes and Moore 1996, xi-xvii).
5) Taking on too many foreign policy issues at once leads to policy
overstretch and weakness on every issue, allowing less powerful
governments to back out of cooperation Independent solvency gut
WALT, 09 [Stephen, Robert and Rene Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University; Nibbled to death by
ducks? 7/27, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/07/27/nibbled_to_death_by_ducks]

Moreover, trying to advance the ball on so many different fronts simultaneously carries
its own risks. In particular, it provides governments that are opposed to some or all of
Washington's agenda with an obvious way to respond: they can "just say no." In Taming
American Power, I labeled this strategy "balking," (a term suggested to me by Seyom Brown) and I argued that it was a
common way for weak states to prevent a dominant power from imposing its will.In
a world where the United States remains significantly stronger than any other power,
few states want to get into a direct test of strength with Washington. But American
power is not so vast that it can simply snap its fingers and expect everyone to do its
bidding. Why? Because exercising leverage is itself costly, and the more you do in one
area, the more latitude that opponents somewhere else are likely to have. There are
still only 24 hours in a day, and the White House can't devote equal attention and
political capital to every issue. So states that dont want to do what Obama wants can
delay, dither, obfuscate, drag their feet, or just say no, knowing that the United States
doesnt have the resources, attention span, staying power, or political will to force
their compliance now or monitor it afterwards.