A Stolen Verdict: Nirmalangshu Mukherji

May 23, 2014

tags: 2014 elections, Amit Shah, BJP, First Past the Post, Uttar Pradesh, Vote Share
by Shuddhabrata Sengupta
Guest Post by NI RMALANGSHU MUKHERJ I
The Bharatiya Janata Party secured about 19% votes in the general elections of 2009 to win 116
seats in the Parliament. With this most impressive conversion ratio, they had more or less
exhausted their possibilities in their safe states like Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh,
Jharkhand, Karnataka, and the like. They were still 157 seats away from a simple majority in the
Loksabha. Even assuming the impressive conversion ratio, they needed at least 26% more of the
vote share, that is 45% in all, to form a government.
When the elections for 2014 were announced, it was hard to see where the BJP would get these
additional votes from. Moreover, unlike the NDA of 1999-2004, they had rather modest support
from other parties with most of the big parties like AIADMK, TMC, JDU, BJD, and the like
staying away. Hence, even if we factor in some rise in number of seats in safe states, plus
handsome gains in Rajasthan, Maharashtra etc., their ability to reach anywhere near the 272+
mark looked rather dim.
This very plausible analysis of the general electoral picture might have led to some complacency
in the anti-NDA camps to launch a vigorous and united election campaign. Congress, for
example, chose to go alone except in Bihar. The Left failed to secure any allies as well. Most
started the campaign rather late while Narendra Modi, RSS, and BJP sprung into action many
months in advance.
Still, despite an unprecedented media campaign by the BJP involving thousands of crores of
rupees and a severe anti-incumbency against the UPAespecially against the Congressthe
picture of vote share sketched above very nearly held. The BJP managed to improve its vote
share from a paltry 19% to a very modest 31%, still very far away from the minimally required
45%. Large chunks of the country still remained mostly unaffected by the saffron onslaught:
West Bengal, Kerala, Tamilnadu, Andhra, Telengana, Orissaclose to 170 seats. Yet, BJP itself
managed to cross the 272 barrier in number of seats to reach 282. What explains this near
miracle?
FIRST PAST THE POST?
It is well-known that the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system of electoral win has shortcomings. For
example, it is possible for a party to win majority of the seats with just 26% of vote share; by the
same token, a party may not get a simple majority even with 74% of vote share. These are
possibilities in theory. In practice, we expect the natural course of distribution of popular
votesespecially in an extremely complex and heterogeneous population profile in Indiato
vary somewhat between these extremes in different regions to optimally settle at somewhere near
the 50% mark in the gross national picture.
This expectation had been largely met in the previous general elections in India. In a few cases,
majority governments have been formed with vote share hovering between 41% and 45% (TOI,
19/5/14). In most cases, majority governments enjoyed vote shares significantly above these
marks. For example, in the two previous UPA governments, the majority was reached with close
to 48%-50% vote share, combining the votes of all pre- and post-poll alliances plus outside
support on which the fate of the governments depended. In the remarkable electoral turn around
of 1977, the Janata Party did secure a majority of 295 seats with 41.1% vote share, but the
combined vote of the allies who joined the government rose to 52%. Also, the Janata Party itself
was a motley combination of various groups in conflict with each other. Averaging over these
results, it seems that the 45% mark, as mentioned in the opening paragraph, has substantial
historical plausibility.
Therefore, it is very important to keep in mind that the alarmingly low vote share of BJP in
2014 cannot be attributed to the limitations of the FPTP system as some commentators
even from the Left have done, because the system had generally served its democratic
purpose successfully for over six decades across the length and breadth of this pluralist
country. It had never failed as massively before. BJPs vote share of 31% in 2014 then
ought to be treated as a singular deviation from the general trend. As such, it needs specific
explanation.
An electoral system, like any other social system, is not a natural system; it is a man-made one.
Hence, its just and effective functioning depends on participants adhering to the founding
principles of the system in letter and spirit. Ongoing rectifications leading to progressive
legislation may result in more effective laws in course of time. But the point remains that no
social system can be so formulated as to remain totally immune from deliberate manipulation.
We may tighten the taxation system, judicial system, and the like, with as many controls as we
are able to furnish at a point in time; but the devil will always find its way by using some aspect
of the system itself. A combination of power and cunning, with suitable lacing of violence, can
defeat any system of welfare humans can imagine.
THE NUMBERS
Let us first get clear about what this 31% means for democratic representation. As Shuddhbrata
Sengupta (Kafila, May 18) and others have pointed out, the current population of India is 1.27
billion or 1270 million. The total electorate is 810 million. Since 66.3% of this electorate voted
in the elections, the actual number who voted is 541 million. At 31%, BJP won roughly 165
million votes. In other words, in the general population, over 1000 million or 1 billion people or
86% did not vote for BJP. Even among the registered electorate, nearly 650 million or 80% did
not vote for BJP.
The BJP government just elected is the most unpopular and unrepresentative in the history of the
republic of India. To emphasize, these abysmal numbers have little to do with the limitations of
FPTP; so they can only be the result of deliberate manipulation.
To understand the cunning that sabotaged the electoral system, it is important to note that,
from one direction, even the 31% figure is flattering. Among the 282 seats won by BJP,
about 95 accrued from the two states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh alone. If we assume
uniform vote per seat ratio throughout these 282 seats and calculate the contribution of UP
and Bihar on national vote ratio on that basis, it works out to nearly 10.5% (the actual
figure is likely to be higher due to the thumping wins in these two states). Subtracting this
figure from the gross national vote ratio, the residual national ratio turns out to be roughly
20.5%, close to BJPs 2009 figure and Congress vote-share in 2014. BJPs victory then is
entirely ascribable to the massive gain in seats in UP and Bihar.
It is important to recall that BJP secured just 10 seats in UP in 2009, occupying the fourth
position after Samajwadi Party (SP), Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), and Congress each of which
had around 20 seats. In Bihar, in alliance with Janata Dal (United, JDU), it secured 12 seats, JDU
had 20. In effect, BJP more than doubled its Bihar tally in 2014, while it increased the seat share
in UP sevenfold!
Yet, except for one vicious phenomenon to be sketched below, there was no indication of any
BJP-wave in these states in the last five years, no new charismatic leadership emerged, the BJP
led no significant social movement. In fact, the SP had formed the government in UP just two
years ago with comfortable majority. In Bihar, all credit for development and improvement in
law and order accrued to the dynamic leadership of Nitish Kumar of JDU. So the issue of what
led to BJPs massive victory in 2014 coincides with the issue of what led to sudden increase of
BJPs seat share in UP and Bihar.
AMIT SHAH
In June 2013, nearly an year before the elections of 2014, BJP (read, Narendra Modi) placed a
rogue element named Amit Shah in UP to organize its campaign. Amit Shah is a trusted
lieutenant of Narendra Modi, the erstwhile chief minister of Gujarat. Shah was also the minister
of state for home in Gujarat; Modi kept the home portfolio to himself. Shah was charged by the
CBI, acting on the directions of the Supreme Court of India, for engineering a series fake
encounters in Gujarat killing scores of mostly muslim persons in cold-blood. Shah was in
command of a police-intelligence system in Gujarat in which over three dozen of the topmost
police officers of the state are currently in prison on charges of kidnapping and murder. As
noted, these arrests have been made on the basis of charges filed by the CBI under the
supervision of the Supreme Court. Shah himself was charged and imprisoned for quite sometime.
He did manage to secure the bail subsequently, but was expelled from Gujarat by the Supreme
Court so that he is unable to vitiate the trials that are continuing. Denied entry into Gujarat where
he was minister of state for home, Shah moved to UP.
A high-powered inquiry by the judicial system, preferably the Supreme Court of India, is needed
to unearth the story of what happened in UP and the adjacent Bihar after Amit Shah moved into
that area and started organizing thousands of volunteers from the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
(RSS). One factor that needs to be thoroughly investigated is that apparently many dozens of
communal riots of varying intensity and location erupted in both UP and Bihar soon after Shah
moved in. The communal situation had in fact deteriorated sharply in Bihar even before Shah
shifted his base. Apparently RSS cadres got busy as soon as the old alliance between JDU and
BJP broke down when Narendra Modithe alleged architect and mastermind of the monstrous
pogroms of 2002 in Gujaratwas elevated as the supreme commander of BJP. Soon after,
Shahs presence in nearby UP appears to have further invigorated the communal forces in both
states. All of this culminated in the widespread riots in the strategic Muzaffarnagar area of UP in
which hundreds of muslims lost their lives and many thousands were rendered homeless.
The connection between incitement of riots and subsequent electoral gains is well-known. In a
familiar move, the victims, namely the muslims, were portrayed as the real culprits: Amit Shah
declared openly that it was a matter of honour that needs to be avenged through the ballot. After
the pogroms in Gujarat in which thousands of muslims were butchered and lakhs rendered
homeless, 286 persons were arrested under the draconian POTA: 285 were muslims, 1 was a
Sikh (no Hindus). Subsequently in Gujarat, the BJP enjoyed overwhelming electoral success that
established the authority of Narandra Modi in the Sangh Parivar.
What happens is fairly simple to understand. Once polarization is achieved on communal lines
projecting a demon/victim divide, old community alliances begin to break down. In the present
case, Amit Shahs clarion call not only consolidated the entire upper caste vote in BJPs favour,
it also galvanized a substantial chunk of (Hindu) backward caste votes to move towards BJP. As
a result, in a largely four-cornered contest, BJP was able to consolidate enough majoritarian
votes to defeat the caste-based structures of SP and BSP. For example, BSP had won 21 seats in
2009 through a skilled alliance of dalit, muslim, and upper caste votes. This time, BSP retained
its core dalit votes, but its upper caste votes moved away to BJP and the muslim vote was highly
fragmented between SP, BSP, and Congress. Thus, BSP failed to win a single seat despite a vote-
share of 20%, BJP secured 70 with 42% vote-share. (There were some other minor factors, such
as some consolidation of young voters for BJP, which I am setting aside).
If the story of UP and Bihar sketched above holds, it is difficult to dispel the impression that BJP
has reached absolute majority in 2014 by inciting communal divide in these two states. In that, it
has violated the basic spirit of the Constitution of India and the rules of franchise to artificially
engineer a seat per vote ratio to capture state power.
Even then this government is the most unrepresentative of all governments in post-
Independent India.