INTRODUCTION

Augustine is one of the most influential writers in the history of Christian church. He
stood at one of the major cross roads in the history, the transition from the Hellenistic period to
the middle ages.
1
Augustine was born in 354 Ad in agaste, a !oman town in "orth Africa to a
Christian mother and a pagan father in Algeria. #$entually he was influenced by his mother and
was bapti%ed into Christianity.
&t Augustine is a Christian philosopher and a church father, one of the chief sources of
Christian thoughts in the west. His importance in the medie$al and modern #uropean philosophy
cannot be circumscribed. 'atters are made difficult because Augustine wrote $oluminously and
dialectically as a Christian theologian, treating philosophical topics for the most part only as they
were helpful to theology or as corrected by it. Augustine wrote biographys with both a seducti$e
selection of biographical detail and a compelling story of his successi$e con$ersion from
adolescent sensuality, to the image laden religion of the 'anicheans, to a $ersion of "eo(
)latonism, and then to Christianity. he story is an une*celled introduction to the Augustine+s
$iew of philosophy. ,t shows for instance that Augustine recei$ed $ery little formal education in
philosophy.
-
hroughout his long literacy career, Augustine .354(43/0 stresses the role of di$ine
illumination in human thought. 1ne could choose almost any wor2 to illustrate this point. Here ,
will focus on the aspect where Augustine wrote and in$o2es di$ine illumination constantly and
1William F. Lawhead. Voyage of discovery, second edition. Eve Howard, united state of America. 2002. pg
122
2 o!ert Audi "ed#. Cambridge dictionary of philosophy, second edition. $am!ridge universit% press, &ew
'or(. 1))*. +g ,0
made bold claims for its global necessity. he personal $oice in Augustine+s writings stands out
in a time when most wor2s were commentaries and objecti$e, detached treaties.
3
Augustine was along with Aristotle and 3oethius the most important influence on how
medie$al philosophy de$eloped in 4atin west. 5ar more than any other 4atin Church father,
Augustine responded to ancient philosophy, "eo()latonism in particular6 borrowing, adapting,
rejecting, considering and reconsidering his stances. As a result of such changes in his $iews, the
$ariety of forms in which he wrote, and the open 7uestioning manner of many of his non
polemical wor2s, he did not be7ueath a single solid body of doctrine but rather, the basis for
many different, sometimes contradictory positions.
4
ST AUGUSTINE
8ith &t Augustine, the patristic era reached its culminating and conclusi$e moment in the
uni$erse on a platonic foundation. All the medie$al until &t homas and many after him
remained faithful to the Augustinian $ision. he merits and demerits of Augustine+s wor2 are to
be sought in the $alidity of his synthesis between Christianity and platonic philosophy. his
synthesis was not difficult, because )latonism and Christianity meet in many points of
fundamental importance6 for instance the immortality of the soul, creation of the world,
ontological dualism .between the sensible and intelligible worlds0, and eternal truths. 98e ought
rather to belie$e that the nature of the intellectual mind was so made that, by being naturally
subject to the intelligible realities, according to the arrangement of the creator, it sees these truths
in a certain incorporeal light of a uni7ue 2ind, just as the eye of the body see the things all
- William F. Lawhead. Voyage of discovery, second edition. Eve Howard, united state of America. 2002.
. /ohn 0aren!on. Medieval philosophy, an historical and philosophical introduction. outledge, 2 par(
s1uare, 0ilton +ar(, A!ingdon, 23on. 2004.
around it in this corporeal light:
5
. Augustine allowed himself to be o$ercome by the temptation
to ma2e room for )lato, e$en when it would ha$e been better to lea$e him out. his is seen in the
Augustine+s acceptance of the theory of illumination.
;

his term paper is concern with e*amining &t Augustine+s idea in his theory of illumination.
THEORY OF ILLUMINATION
<i$ine illumination is the oldest and most influential alternati$e to naturalism in the areas
of mind and 2nowledge. he theory holds that human beings re7uire a special assistance in their
ordinary cogniti$e acti$ities. Although it is most closely associated with Augustine and his
scholastic followers, the theory has its origin in the ancient periods and would reappear,
transformed in the early modern era.
his theory is generally concei$ed as distincti$ely medie$al and distincti$ely
Augustinian. he theory of illumination is intended as an e*planation, not of all belief and
2nowledge. he theory holds that there is certain 2nowledge that is crucial to cogniti$e
de$elopment. his theory has been in$o2ed to e*plain rational insight, that is, a prior 2nowledge.
Augustine+s theory of illumination is a tribute to the power of human reason to wrest something
intelligible from our situation. ,t begins with the con$iction that there is such a thing as truth and
that it is accessible to human reason. &uch con$iction stood o$er against a major component in
the philosophical milieu of s2epticism.
o start with the epistemology of &t Augustine is perhaps to gi$e the impression that
Augustine was concerned with the elaboration of the theory of 2nowledge for its own sa2e or as
* 5attista 0ondin. A history of medieval philosophy. 6heological pu!lications in 7ndia, 5angalore. 1))8.
,7!id. +g 12*.
a methodological propaedeutic to metaphysics.
=
Augustine was influenced by the pre medie$al
period. he influence of )latonism and Augustine+s spiritual interest and outloo2, led him to loo2
on corporeal objects as not being the proper objects of 2nowledge, owing to their mutability and
to the fact that our 2nowledge of them is dependent on bodily organs of sense which are no more
always in the same state than the objects themsel$es. ,f we ha$e not got 9true 2nowledge: of
sense objects, that is due, not merely to any deficiency in the subject but also to a radical
deficiency in the object. Augustine+s attitude to sense 2nowledge is much more platonic than
Cartesian.
&t Augustine made his first philosophical confrontation on the problem of 2nowledge
after his con$ersion to Christianity. He $iewed it from a two(fold perspecti$e6
a0 8hether the truth is 2nown to us and
b0 How do we 2now the truth>
&t Augustine+s response to the first problem of 9whether the truth is 2nown to us:, is a
criti7ue of s2epticism, while his response to the second problem of 9how do we 2now the truth:
is what made up for his doctrine of illumination which surpassed the platonic doctrine of
reminiscence and Aristotelian doctrine of abstraction. he focus of this paper is not to e*amine
Augustine+s criti7ue of s2epticism but, rather to e*amine his ideas on his doctrine of
illumination.
&t Augustine made a clear distinction of three cogniti$e operations? the senses, the
inferior reason and the superior reason. he operation as distinguished by Augustine has its own
4 Frederic( $opleston. A history of philosophy: medieval philosophy, continuum, the tower !uilding, 11
'or( road, London. 1)*0. +g *1.
objects. he senses 2now the 7ualities of the bodies, the inferior reason 2nows the laws of the
physical world and the superior reason 2nows the eternal truth. 5or instance6
THE SENSES: the sensiti$e 2nowledge of colours, odours etc is obtained through the faculty of
the senses. his according to Augustine does not imply that the soul is passi$e with regards to
this type of 2nowledge because 9sentire non est croporis sed animae per corpus:. Augustine+s
con$iction is that the soul is absolutely superior to the body and cannot be dependent on the body
for any of its acti$ities, not e$en sensible acti$ities. Augustine has a negati$e $iew of the senses.
He does not thin2 2nowledge can come from them because they ne$er pro$ide a stable
2nowledge. #$erything the senses percei$e is e$er(changing.
&ensation is an e*ercised acti$ity of the soul through the body. he body undergoes the
impression of other bodies, and the soul through these impressions gleaned from the body, and
ac7uires a corporeal 2nowledge of the world. Augustine here by is propounding that bodies are
not immediately 2nown, but through meditation. 9he soul gathers the image, not the sense, of
all the sensible objects:.
@
THE INFERIOR REASON6 the inferior reason gi$es scientific 2nowledge. &cientific
2nowledge occupies itself with the corporeal world and see2s to disco$er uni$ersal laws through
an abstract process.
A
THE SUPERIOR REASON6 2nowledge of eternal truths is obtained through di$ine
illumination not reminiscence, and illumination reaches the greatest height of reason. &t
Augustine shares the same con$iction with )lato? the eternal truth cannot come from e*perience,
8 5attista 0ondin. history of medieval philosophy: 9e civitate dei 3i, 2,. 6heological pu!lications in 7ndia,
:5angalore. 1))8. +g )0.
) i!id 9e trinitate 3ii,2,2 pg. )1.
both because of the contingency of the 2nown object and the contingency of the 2nowing
subject.
&t Augustine does not admit the pre(e*istence of souls in the hyperouranious? it isn+t a
possibility for him to use the doctrine of reminiscence to e*plain the 2nowledge of eternal truths,
just as )lato did. &t Augustine rather used the theory of illumination. ,llumination is 9quaedam
lux sui generis incorporea, which ma2es eternal truths $isible.
1/

Augustine+s concept of the inferior and superior reason is as two functions in which
2nowledge ta2es on two opposing directions. hough the inferior reason is oriented towards the
di$ine, the uni$ersal, the eternal and immutable the latter is directed at the world, the contingent,
the mutable and the particular. 3oth functions are necessary.
Augustine comes to the conclusion that 2nowing is a matter of an inner episode of
awareness called illumination.
11
Augustine recogni%es and accounted for cases of 2nowing. hat
do not seem to be episodes of awareness, such as unconscious learning. &traightening out such
matters is the tas2 of a positi$e theory of illumination. he scope of di$ine acti$ity in
illumination is also problematic. <oes Bod ha$e to directly act in each instance of 2nowledge, or
merely ordain the world in such a way that humans can be 2nowers>
1-
here is a real difference
between your situation when you do not understand the proof and your situation after
understanding it. 8e commonly describe this difference with $isual metaphors, spea2ing of the
ash of insight, seeing the truth, enlightenment, and so on. Augustine calls it illumination.
105attista 0ondin. history of medieval philosophy 6heological pu!lications in 7ndia, 5angalore. 1))8.
$onfesions vii,10,
11 +eter ;ing, 0etaphilosoph% 2) "1))8#, 14)<1)*
12 ibid
Augustine, li2e )lato, e*plains the metaphor of illumination as in$ol$ing the direct grasp of
special objects .i.e. 5orms0 in a public realm accessible only to the mind. )lato held that this too2
place prior to the soul+s incarnation? Augustine, that it happens during this life .<e libero
arbitrio0.
EVALUATION
he doctrine of illumination is a correcti$e to two common, though erroneous,
impressions about Christian educational philosophy. 5irst, Augustine does not argue from the
perspecti$e of an academic. 1n the contrary, he writes as a pastor concerned with the 7uestions
of real people who li$e, wor2, suffer, and die. His system of thought is eudemonistic, that is,
oriented toward the attainment of happiness. 8isdom, he insists, is necessary to reach this end?
moreo$er, while people in di$erse conte*ts can achie$e happiness, the same ethical standard
applies to all .DLA ,16A61(1/610.&econd, Augustine maintains that wisdom is not a commodity
someone can gi$e to another. ruth is not so much created as it is unco$ered. here are three
components to Augustine+s theory of illumination. he first in$ol$es the relationship between
body and soul, or the functions of the 9outer: and 9inner: man. "e*t is his notion of 9objecti$e
2nowledge.: he third part, Augustine+s concept of memory, is based on Bree2 categories
adapted for a Christian conte*t. ,n Augustine+s neo()latonic system, animals surpass inanimate
objects because they recei$e information about the world through their senses. Animals respond
to this data by means of 9inner sense: for the purposes of self(preser$ation, nourishment, and so
forth. Cet animals are not conscious of themsel$es. Human beings alone can understand the
meaning of their own e*istence .DLA ,-630.
Augustine tries to e*plain why thought is uni7uely a human acti$ity. 5or him, man
possesses two distinct yet inseparable powers that ma2e him superior to other creatures. He
shares with animals a percepti$e, 9outer: faculty for gathering information about the material
world, but unli2e them, he e*ercises an 9inner: power to form images in the mind .Conf., 1/6;?
DT, 15:10. &till, sense perception and image(ma2ing are different from reason or 9intellectual
sight: .DT, 110. 3y means of this, people can share 2nowledge, something not possible with
sense perception .DLA, !:", #0
13
. ,ntellectual sight is the concept with which Augustine accounts
for human 2nowledge. He writes6 9Animals cannot attain to that spiritual light with which our
mind is somehow irradiated....1ur power to judge is proportioned to our acceptance of this light:
..DCD ,116-=0.
14
his passage echoes the famous allegory of the sun from the $epu%lic, in which
)lato compares physical $ision to understanding. he sun is not $ision itself, but rather its cause,
inasmuch as it ma2es things $isible and lea$es the eye capable of seeing. &imilarly, the ,dea of
the Bood renders objects intelligible and causes the mind to 2now.
15
Augustine adopts this
metaphor, but does not embrace certain aspects of )latonic epistemology? not only are they
antithetical to Christian belief, but there is no concrete e$idence for them. 5or )lato, the soul,
which e*ists before a human being is born, possesses 2nowledge from eternity but loses it at
birth> 8hat we call learning is actually a 2ind of recollection of timeless truth.
1;
Augustine
rejects )lato+s idea of the soul+s pre(e*istence, but he does not disregard the concept of
recollection entirely. 5or him, memory is the intellectual operation that recalls the past, considers
the present, and anticipates the future .Conf., 116-/0? it is the mind+s $irtually infinite capacities
1- 5ruce 5a!ac=, Augustine s Theory of Knoledge "&ew 'or(> Edwin 0ellen +ress,1)81#,1)0?)1.
1. Augustine, City of !od ,trans. 0. 9ods "@rand apids>5a(er,1)4,#,1,)?40.
1* +lato, "epublic, trans. @.0.A. @ru!e, rev. $.9.$. eeve "7ndianapolis>Hac(ett,1))2#,*08!?e.
1; +lato, #haedo ,A6he $ollected 9ialogues of +lato,B ed..Edith Hamilton and Huntington $airns
"+rinceton>+rinceton Cniversit% +ress,1)4-#,4,c?dDMeno,81?8.,
to collect, organi%e, and store 2nowledge .Conf., 1/6@0. Augustine e*plains that the mind
contains material objects, not by drawing them physically into itself, but by retaining their
images. o recall is to 9shepherd: facts and images from their hiding places in the mind. Abstract
2nowledge resides in the memory as well. 8hether a thought can be e*pressed $erbally or
$isually, it is distinct from the words or images that gi$e rise to it. 5eelings are also stationed in
the memory to be recalled later, e$en when the indi$idual is in the throes of an 9opposite:
emotion .Conf., 1/6140.
his formulation is neutral on the disputed 7uestion whether for Augustine illumination is
that by means of which we are able to e*ercise our cogniti$e powers to grasp the truth .as
sunlight is that by means of which we can e*ercise our perceptual faculties to see objects0 or the
actual comprehension of the truth itself .as seeing itself grasps objects0.
1=
5irst, Augustine draws
a distinction between three types of cogniti$e acti$ity in his <e utilitate credendi 11.-5: there are
li2ewise three things that border in human minds, things that are worth distinguishing6
understanding, belie$ing, and holding an opinion. here is a great difference whether something
is grasped by a sure reason of the mind, which we call Dunderstanding+, or commending it to be
usefully belie$ed by posterity $ia report or writing. Hence what we understand we owe to reason?
what we belie$e? to authority? what we hold opinions about, to error.
1@
CONCLUSION
Augustine+s conception of the inferior and superior reason has a two dimensional
perspecti$es which are seen to be opposed to each other6 one follows from a di$ine and uni$ersal
orientation, it is necessary, while the other is implied from a contingent, the mutable and
14 +eter ;ing, 0etaphilosoph% 2) "1))8#, 14)<1)*
18 ibid
particular world. hough out of the two perspecti$es of Augustine, one is necessary and the other
is contingent, the functions of both are necessary to man, hierarchically in relation, they in$ol$e
the entire personality.
1ne can orient all acti$ities towards the di$ine, the eternal and one can also ma2e a
choice of the e*clusi$e e*ercise of science, hence orienting oneself towards the mutable and
e*ploiting them to one one+s ad$antage.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Eohn '. !ist, Augustine: Ancient Thought &apti'ed. Cambridge 1AA4.
2. Berard 1+<aly, Augustines (hilosoph) of *ind. <uc2(worth6 4ondon 1A@=.
-. <anilo F. !ogayan Er. Comparati+e Anal)sis (aper of Aquinas and Augustine,s
(hilosophies.
.. 3attista 'ondin6 A histor) of medie+al philosoph). heological publications in ,ndia,
3angalore, 1AA@.
*. 5rederic2 Copleston. A histor) of philosoph): medie+al philosoph), continuum, the tower
building, 11 Cor2 road, 4ondon. 1A5/.
,. A. &. 'cBrade .ed0. The Cam%ridge companion to *edie+al (hilosoph), Cambridge
uni$ersity press, "ew Cor2. -//3.