The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy

Fight against terrorism is one of the greatest challenges the Union is facing today. The challenge
lies in the complex nature of this phenomenon. Hence, if the EU wanted to be successful in
fighting terrorism, it needed a strategic document which would reflect the comprehensive nature
of EUs response to terrorism.
"This page of the Sub-section related to the European fight against terrorism gives a general
presentation in two parts:
Part I covers the latest developments which occurred within the recent years.
Part II gives a general view of the accomplishments and the acuis at European level of the
matter concerned."
I Latest Developments
n !ecember "##$ the %ustice and Home &ffairs 'ouncil adopted the European Union
Counter-Terrorism Strategy. ()!F File *+, -./ The 0trategy was also welcomed by the
Heads of 0tates and 1overnments on *$ and *2 !ecember "##$. The aim of the document is to
ta3e the agenda of wor3 set out at the 4arch "##5 European 'ouncil in the wa3e of the 4adrid
bombings constituting the EU &ction )lan on Terrorism ()!F File "## -./ into the next
phase.
The 0trategy commits the European Union to combat terrorism globally while respecting human
rights! and to ma"e Europe safer! allowing its citi#ens to live in an area of freedom! security and
$ustice. t ma3es clear that terrorism is a threat to all 0tates and to all peoples. Terrorism is
considered to be a criminal and un6ustifiable act under any circumstances.
n order to be successful in reducing threat posed by terrorism and EUs vulnerability to attac3,
the 0trategy re7uires wor3 at national, European and international levels. The 0trategy is divided
into the four pillars 8 Prevent, Protect, Pursue and Respond. &ctions covered by each pillar
cut across policy areas.
&lthough the 0trategy suggests that 4ember 0tates have the primary responsibility for
combating terrorism, the EU adds value y!
0trengthening national capabilities9
Facilitating European cooperation9
!eveloping collective capability9and
)romoting international partnership.
&s a community based on democratic values and principles, the EU has to pursue its goals in a
democratic and accountable way. The European Council "ill revie" progress on the Strategy
once every si# months$ Every six months before this review process the %igh-level political
dialogue on counter-terrorism will ta3e place. This dialogue will bring together the 'ouncil,
the European 'ommission and the European )arliament to consider progress and to promote
transparency and balance in the EUs approach.
II &eneral Conte#t
'our pillars o( the Strategy ) Prevent, Protect, Pursue and Respond
Prevent
Under this heading the EU aims to prevent people turning to terrorism by tac"ling the factors or
root causes which can lead to radicalisation and recruitment! both in Europe and
internationally.
-ey priorities:
!evelop common approaches to spot and tac3le problematic behaviour, in particular the
misuse of the internet9
&ddress incitement and recruitment in 3ey environments (for example prisons and places
of religious training or worship/ notably by introducing new criminal offences covering
such behaviour9
!evelop a media and communication strategy to explain EU policies more effectively9
)romote good governance, democracy, education and economic prosperity through
'ommunity and 4ember 0tate assistance programmes9
!evelop inter;cultural dialogue within the Union and outside it9
!evelop a non;emotive lexicon for discussing the issues9 and
To further develop our understanding of the issues and policy responses through
continued research and the sharing of experience and analysis.
Protect
)rotection of citi<ens and infrastructures is essential. n its actions the EU see3s to reduce our
vulnerability to attac"! through improved security of borders! transport and critical
infrastructure.
-ey priorities:
mprove the secure nature of EU passports through the introduction of biometrics9
Establish the =isa nformation 0ystem (=0/ and the second generation 0chengen
nformation 0ystem (00/9
!evelop effective ris3 analysis of the EUs external border through Frontex9
mplement agreed common standards on civil aviation, port and maritime security9
&gree a European programme for critical infrastructure protection9 and
4a3e best use of EU and 'ommunity level research activity.
Pursue
The ob6ective of the Union is to pursue and investigate terrorists both within the EU and
globally. t is crucial to impede terrorist planning! travel! and communications. Terrorist
networ3s should also be disrupted by cutting off the supply of both financial finding and
operational materials. %ore generally! the aim is to bring terrorists to $ustice.
-ey priorities:
0trengthen national capabilities to combat terrorism, in light of the recommendations of
the peer evaluation of national anti;terrorism arrangements9
4a3e full use of Europol, Euro6ust and the %oint 0ituation 'entre9
Further develop mutual recognition of 6udicial decisions, including by adopting the
European Evidence >arrant9
Ensure full implementation and evaluation of existing legislation as well as the
ratification of relevant international Treaties and 'onventions9
!evelop the principle of availability in the exchange of law enforcement information
between 4ember 0tates9
Tac3le terrorist access to weapons and explosives, ranging from components for home;
made explosives to '.?@ materials9
Tac3le terrorist financing, by implementing agreed legislation, wor3ing to prevent the
abuse of the non;profit sector, and reviewing the EUs overall performance in this area9
and
)rovide technical assistance to priority third countries in order to enhance their own
counter;terrorism capabilities.
Respond
>hen )revention, )rotection and ?esponse fail, we have to be prepared, in the spirit of
solidarity! to manage and minimise the conseuences of a terrorist attac". This can be done by
improving capabilities to deal with the aftermath! the co-ordination of response and the needs of
victims.
-ey priorities:
&gree EU 'risis 'o;ordination &rrangements and supporting operational procedures9
?evise the legislation on the 'ommunity 4echanism for civil protection9
!evelop ris3 assessment as a tool to help inform the building of capabilities to respond to
an attac39
mprove co;ordination with international organisations on managing responses to terrorist
attac3s and other disasters9 and
0hare best practice, and develop approaches for, the provision of assistance to victims of
terrorism and their families.
Strategies for Countering Terrorism:
Lessons from the Israeli Experience
1

Jonathan B. Tucker
March 2003
Jonathan B. Tucker, Ph.D., is a policy analyst specializing in chemical
and biological weapons proliferation and control. He is a 200203 senior
fellow at the .!. "nstit#te of Peace in $ashington, D%, on lea&e from
the Monterey "nstit#te's %enter for (onproliferation !t#dies. )efore
*oining the center in +,,-, he ser&ed for si. years in .!. go&ernment
positions at the Department of !tate, the %ongressional /ffice of
0echnology 1ssessment, and the 1rms %ontrol and Disarmament
1gency. "n +,,2, he was a ( biological weapons inspector in "ra3. He
holds a ).!. in biology from 4ale and a Ph.D. in political science from the
Massach#setts "nstit#te of 0echnology. "n addition to n#mero#s papers
and reports, he is the a#thor of Scourge: The Once and Future Threat of Smallpox and the
editor of Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons.
Introduction
Eer since its founding in !"#$% the state of &srael has faced the threat of terror attac's
from re(ectionist organi)ations such as the *opular Front for the +i,eration of *alestine%
-amas% *alestinian &slamic .ihad% and -i),ollah.

Because these groups cannot defeat the

&srael /efense Forces 0&/F1 on the ,attlefield% the2 target &sraeli citi)ens in an attempt to
su,ert the national 3ill. According to Boa) 4anor% executie director of the &nternational
*olic2 &nstitute for Counter5Terrorism in -er)li22a% terrorist iolence aims 6to undermine the
personal securit2 of ciilians% to so3 fear and trepidation% and to sap pu,lic morale7 in order
to pressure decision ma'ers to ma'e political concessions.
!

Oer the past 89 2ears% the &sraeli goernment has deeloped a ariet2 of measures to
preent terrorist attac's or mitigate their effects. &srael has also made a irtue of necessit2
,2 creating a cutting5edge securit2 industr2 that mar'ets counterterrorism technologies%
products% and serices throughout the 3orld.
"
The primar2 goals of &sraeli counterterrorism
strateg2 are to preent terrorists from influencing the national agenda and presere the
ps2chological resilience of the ciilian population. According to :a(. 4en. U)i /a2an%
chairman of the &srael ;ational Securit2 Council% the goernment<s campaign against terror
inoles stri'ing ,ac' against terrorist cells to protect the homeland% expanding the
campaign against terrorist organi)ations and their state sponsors% and delegitimating
terrorism in internationall2.
#

Because &srael and the United States ,oth face threats from &slamic extremists 3ho are
prepared to sacrifice their lies in carr2ing out attac's% man2 of the lessons learned ,2
&sraeli counterterrorism experts oer the past 89 2ears are releant to the current U.S.
campaign against al5=aeda. At the same time% the t3o countries face distinct securit2
challenges. Whereas &srael<s ps2chological and een ph2sical surial is at sta'e in its 3ar
on terrorism% the ris's for the United States are su,stantial ,ut not existential. :oreoer%
3hereas *alestinian terrorists narro3l2 focus on nationalist5separatist o,(ecties% al5=aeda
is a glo,al net3or' 3ith ,roader political and ideological am,itions.
Israel$s Experience %ith Terror
&srael has learned oer the 2ears that terrorism is a stu,,orn phenomenon and that% in
contrast to conentional 3arfare% decisie ictor2 oer terrorism is rare. When
countermeasures ,loc' one aenue of attac'% terrorists often improise some ne3 means of
inflicting damage. After a series of aircraft hi(ac'ings in the !">9s forced &srael to improe
aiation securit2% terrorists ,egan to target &sraeli em,assies oerseas. When securit2 at
em,assies 3as strengthened% terrorists responded ,2 attac'ing mar'ets% ,uses% and
pedestrians in &sraeli cities.
&
Accordingl2% counterterrorism strategies must continuall2 adapt
to?and prefera,l2 anticipate?changing terrorist tactics. 4eneral :eir /agan% head of the
Bureau for Counterterrorism in the &sraeli *rime :inister<s Office% o,seres that 6fighting
terrorism is li'e ,oxing?2ou usuall2 3in ,2 points.7
'

*alestinian terrorism against &srael has escalated dramaticall2 since the second intifada
06uprising71 ,egan in Septem,er @999A it has included the use of mortars and =assam &&
roc'ets 03ith a range of # to > miles1 against .e3ish settlements and militar2 ,ases in the
4a)a Strip.
(
*articularl2 damaging to the morale of the &sraeli population has ,een a 3ae
of suicide ,om,ings ,2 *alestinian terrorists in cro3ded ,uses% mar'ets% restaurants% and
nightclu,s. These attac's% 3hich occur essentiall2 at random% pose a serious threat to the
ps2chological and economic 3ell5,eing of &sraeli societ2.
The crude ,ut effectie tactic of suicide terrorism 3as inented ,2 -i),ollah and used for
the first time on @B Octo,er !"$B% to destro2 the U.S. :arine ,arrac's in Beirut 3ith a truc'
,om, 'illing @#! American soldiers. Eleen 2ears later% on > April !""#% Caed Da'arne% a
@852ear5old mem,er of -amas% ,le3 himself up in a car next to a cro3ded &sraeli ,us in the
to3n of Afula% 'illing eight &sraelis 0including a female Ara, passenger1 and 3ounding ##.
)

Since then% -amas% *alestinian &slamic .ihad% and more recentl2 the al5AEsa :art2rs
Brigades of Tan)im% the Fatah militia% hae recruited% indoctrinated% and eEuipped scores of
suicide ,om,ers.
At first% suicide terrorists 3ere all religious% militant 2oung men recruited from *alestinian
uniersities or mosEues. &n earl2 @99@% ho3eer% the profile ,egan to change as secular
*alestinians% 3omen% and een teenage girls olunteered for suicide missions. On @" :arch
@99@% A2at A'hras% an !$52ear5old *alestinian girl from Bethlehem 3ho loo'ed European
and spo'e -e,re3% ,le3 herself up in a West .erusalem supermar'et% 'illing t3o &sraelis.
1*

Suicide ,om,ers hae also sought to foil profiling efforts ,2 shaing their ,eards% d2eing
their hair ,lond% and 3earing &sraeli uniforms or een the traditional clothing of orthodox
.e3s.
11

4ien the high motiation of suicide ,om,ers and the relatie simplicit2 and lo3 cost of the
explosies the2 use% deterrence is impossi,le and preention is far from certain.
1
Although
&sraeli counterterrorism authorities interdict more than $8F of attempted suicide attac's%
the small num,er of ,om,ers 3ho penetrate the securit2 net can still 3rea' considera,le
death and destruction. The argua,le 6success7 of suicide terrorism in derailing the Oslo
peace process and inflicting serious 3ounds on &sraeli societ2 ma2 inspire other militant
groups to adopt this tactic.
1!
&ndeed% FB& director Co,ert S. :ueller &&& 3arned in :a2 @99@
that suicide ,om,ings li'e the ones that hae terrori)ed &sraeli ciilians are 6ineita,le7 in
the United States.
1"
An2 insights that &srael can proide into com,ating suicide terrorism
are therefore of great interest to American officials. &sraeli counterterrorism strateg2
comprises fie elements:
!. &ntelligence collection and anal2sis
@. :ilitar2 and paramilitar2 operations to disrupt terrorist infrastructure
B. Commercial aiation securit2
#. /efense against chemical and ,iological attac's
8. Efforts to strengthen the ps2chological endurance of the ciilian population
The +ole of Intelligence
The igilance of the &sraeli pu,lic pla2s a 'e2 role in preenting terrorism. According to
securit2 experts% the aerage &sraeli is highl2 a3are of suspicious pac'ages% indiiduals% and
actions that could pose a threat to pu,lic safet2 and does not hesitate to notif2 the police.
As a result% ordinar2 citi)ens foil more than $9F of attempted terrorist attac's in &srael%
including time ,om,s left ,2 terrorists.
1#

&sraeli experts contend that ,e2ond a igilant citi)enr2% intelligence is the essential
foundation of an2 s2stematic effort to com,at terrorism. According to 4en. /agan%
6&nestments in intelligence are inisi,le% 3hereas increased securit2 is isi,le ,ut often
3asteful. The first priorit2 must ,e placed on intelligence% then on counterterrorism
operations% and finall2 on defense and protection.7
1&
To support its 3ar on terrorism% &srael
has deeloped a highl2 coordinated and efficient intelligence apparatus. /ra3ing on human
and technical means% &sraeli goernment agencies 3or' continuall2 to identif2 terrorist
operaties and cells. Threats are categori)ed into those that appear imminent and reEuire
immediate attention% those that are less pro,a,le ,ut could emerge later on% and those that
are unli'el2 ,ut still possi,le.
1'

&n contrast to the infamous rialr2 ,et3een the C&A and the FB&% &sraeli foreign and
domestic intelligence agencies cooperate 3ell in collecting and sharing terrorism5related
information. The &srael Securit2 Agenc2% 'no3n as !hin )et% reports directl2 to the *rime
:inister and is responsi,le for domestic intelligence% counterespionage% internal securit2%
and the preention of terrorist acts. The Ara, Affairs /iision of !hin )et conducts political
su,ersion and sureillance of Ara, terrorists% 3hile the *rotection and Securit2 /iision
safeguards &sraeli goernment ,uildings and em,assies% defense contractors% scientific
installations% 'e2 industrial plants% and the national airline El Al.
1(
&srael also has a foreign
intelligence agenc2% Mossad 0-e,re3 for 6institute71% and a militar2 intelligence serice%
1man. !hin )et 3or's closel2 3ith Mossad and 1man to prepare an annual terrorism threat
assessment for the *rime :inister.
&sraeli goernment agencies gather human intelligence on terrorism ,2 deplo2ing
undercoer agents in the *alestinian5controlled areas and ,2 recruiting local informants
inside or close to terrorist organi)ations. Seeral factors ma2 lead *alestinians to colla,orate
3ith the &sraeli authorities: cash incenties% non5monetar2 ,enefits such as a ,uilding
permit or a ca, license% and ps2chological factors such as a desire for reenge% ideolog2% or
adenture.
1)
0Still% sp2ing for &srael is extremel2 ris'2% and suspected colla,orators are
often executed or l2nched ,2 *alestinian mo,s.1 &srael also engages in freEuent police
operations in 3hich large num,ers of suspected *alestinian militants are rounded up and
interrogated. Onl2 rarel2 do such operations 2ield tactical 3arning of an imminent terrorist
attac'% ho3eer% and apparent tips o,tained during interrogation ma2 ,e disinformation
designed to deflect attention from the real target.
&n addition to human intelligence% &srael has deeloped sophisticated technologies for
detecting explosies and arms at a distance% electronic eaesdropping and signals
intelligence% and isual intelligence 3ith unmanned aerial ehicles. ;eertheless% &sraeli
intelligence agencies gie priorit2 to human intelligence oer high5tech methods and
contend that the United States has placed too much emphasis on the latter at the expense
of the former. Although a satellite image can reeal the location of a terrorist training camp%
it cannot proide insights into the thin'ing of operaties planning an attac'.
5essons for .!. Policy
The failure of the U.S. &ntelligence Communit2 to proide earl2 3arning of the !!
Septem,er terrorist attac's in ;e3 Gor' Cit2 and near Washington% /C% exposed s2stemic
pro,lems 3ith intelligence collection and anal2sis. Both the C&A and the FB& came under fire
for not sharing information that might hae ena,led anal2sts to connect the dots and
preent the deastating attac's. :oreoer% the ;ational Securit2 Agenc2 reportedl2 failed to
detect a 3arning intercepted the da2 ,efore !! Septem,er ,ecause the message 3as not
translated and anal2)ed in a timel2 manner.
*

The main lessons for the United States from the &sraeli experience are 0!1 the fundamental
role of intelligence in the fight against terrorismA 0@1 the need for close coordination and
cooperation ,et3een foreign and domestic intelligence agencies% particularl2 in the case of
terrorist net3or's such as al5=aeda that operate ,oth inside and outside the United StatesA
0B1 the importance of human intelligence as a complement to technical collection s2stemsA
and 0#1 the need to improe the timeliness 3ith 3hich ra3 intelligence data are translated
and anal2)ed.
Counterterrorism ,perations
&sraeli counterterrorism operations are designed to disrupt the 6terrorist infrastructure7 in
the West Ban' and 4a)a ,2 attac'ing ,om, factories and safe houses% gathering
intelligence% and arresting or 'illing 'e2 terrorist leaders and ,om,ma'ers. Seeral
organi)ations and units are inoled in such operations. !hin )et detachments 3or' 3ith
1man undercoer units to counter *alestinian terrorists% including the militar2 3ing of
-amas. &n addition% an elite &/F commando unit called !ayeret Mat6al is &srael<s premier
counterterrorism organi)ation% the eEuialent of /elta Force or the British SAS. The -e,re3
3ord sayeret means 6reconnaissance or commando force7A mat6al is the -e,re3 acron2m
for 6general headEuarters7 and signifies that this unit is under the direct command of the
Arm2 chief of staff. !ayeret Mat6al has ,een inoled in almost eer2 ma(or counterterrorist
operation conducted ,2 &srael% as 3ell as hostage rescue operations.
1
&n April !"HB% a
!ayeret Mat6al team led ,2 Ehud Bara'% a future prime minister of &srael% aenged the
massacre of &sraeli athletes ,2 *alestinian terrorists at the !"H@ :unich Ol2mpics ,2 'illing
three of the suriing terrorists in Beruit.

:ore recentl2% the &/F and the Frontier *olice% a

militar2 organi)ation under police control% hae created ne3 counterterrorism units%
including D#&de&an 0-e,re3 for 6cherr271 and !himshon.
!
The &sraeli *olice Force<s
4amam professional antiterror unit% esta,lished in !"H#% speciali)es in hostage rescue.
4amam operaties hae the adantage of long experience% 3hereas the mem,ers of
!ayeret Mat6al and other &/F counterterrorism units do t3o 2ears of ,asic training and then
sere three 2ears as commandos.
"

A ma(or focus of &sraeli counterterrorism operations is to preent *alestinian terrorists from
the West Ban' from infiltrating &srael to stage attac's. Because recent suicide ,om,ers do
not fit a standard profile% the2 are difficult to identif2 and intercept in adance. Accordingl2%
&srael has sought to preent suicide operations ,2 disrupting them at the organi)ational%
training% and planning stages% ,efore the shahid 06mart2r71 is on his 3a2 to the target. &/F
operations to eliminate the 6terrorist infrastructure7 are directed against the actiists 3ho
recruit and train the suicide ,om,ers% manufacture the explosie ,elts% gather operational
intelligence% drie the shahid to the target% and other3ise proide logistical and moral
support.
#
Because terror organi)ations continuall2 recruit ne3 operaties and reEuire a
large net3or' of supporters% aggressie counterterrorism campaigns can 3ea'en the morale
of the terrorists% hamper enlistment efforts% and deter colla,orators. :ilitar2 operations
against terrorism also reassure the &sraeli pu,lic that the initiatie in the 3ar against terror
is on the side of the goernment.
&

One particularl2 controersial &sraeli tactic inoles the assassination of terrorist leaders and
,om,ma'ers ,2 undercoer units of the &/F and Mossad.
'
Adocates of this polic2 argue
that in addition to interdicting imminent attac's% targeted 'illings undermine the terrorist
groups< sta,ilit2 and morale% increase tensions and rialries among 3ould5,e successors%
and force the terrorists to deote resources to hiding and protecting their leaders.
(

Targeted assassination also puts terrorist 'ingpins under seere ps2chological stress.
;eertheless% the &sraeli polic2 of targeted 'illings raises complex issues of legalit2 and
cost5effectieness. Under 3hat conditions does national self5defense (ustif2 the summar2
execution of terroristsI :ost countries ie3 terrorism as a crime and ,eliee that retri,ution
for terrorist acts should ,e pursued through the legal process. &srael% in contrast% ie3s
terrorism as a form of 3arfare and claims that the la3s of 3ar appl2% including the right of
preemptie action. &n earl2 @99@% an &/F (udge adocate5general ruled that the
assassination of terrorists is legal 3hen 0!1 3ell5supported information exists that the
suspect has organi)ed terror attac's in the past and is planning to carr2 out another one in
the near futureA 0@1 appeals to the *alestinian Authorit2 to arrest the terrorist hae ,een
ignoredA 0B1 attempts ,2 &sraeli troops to arrest the suspect hae failedA and 0#1 the 'illing
is not intended as retri,ution for past acts of terror ,ut is designed to preent an incipient
attac' that is li'el2 to inflict multiple casualties.
)

Su,seEuent to the (udge adocate5general<s ruling% &srael<s -igh Court of .ustice considered
petitions against the targeted 'illing polic2 ,rought ,2 an Ara, mem,er of parliament% the
3ido3 of a Fatah actiist in ;a,lus% and t3o local human rights organi)ations. The -igh
Court supported the &sraeli goernment<s claim that the *alestinian intifada is no longer a
popular uprising ,ut an armed confrontation and that terrorists are illegal fighters not
entitled to the protection of international la3. Other &sraeli legal experts disagreed 3ith this
opinion% ho3eer% arguing that ,ecause the &sraeli arm2 is an occup2ing force% extra(udicial
'illings are (ustified onl2 under conditions of immediate self5defense.
!*

Aside from Euestions of legalit2% the strateg2 of targeted 'illings has seeral practical
dra3,ac's. First% it imposes diplomatic costs for &srael<s international reputation ,2
tarnishing its image as a moral nation% particularl2 3hen famil2 mem,ers or other innocent
persons are 'illed along 3ith a 'no3n terrorist. Second% targeted 'illings impose intelligence
costs ,ecause each assassination reEuires precise% real5time information% the use of 3hich
ma2 compromise intelligence sources and methods. Third% the ,enefits of targeted 'illings
ma2 ,e onl2 temporar2. /uring Operation /efensie Shield in April @99@% &sraeli militar2
forces arrested or 'illed all -amas terrorists in the West Ban' 3ho had mastered the
formula for ma'ing homemade explosies% dealing a serious ,lo3 to the organi)ation. But
-amas ,om,ma'ers from the 4a)a Strip soon infiltrated the West Ban' and ,egan
producing explosies% reitali)ing the organi)ation.
!1
The 3orst5case outcome is 3hen an
assassination attempt fails. On @# Septem,er !""H% Mossad operaties carr2ing forged
Canadian passports entered .ordan and in(ected -amas political leader Jhalid :ashaal 3ith
poison% ,ut he suried. &n the aftermath of this ,otched operation% the goernment of
.ordan 3as a,le to extract political concessions from &srael% including the release from an
&sraeli prison of -amas founder Shei' Ahmed Gassin.
!

A fourth dra3,ac' of targeted 'illings is that the2 increase the motiation of terrorist groups
to retaliate% resulting in 3hat Boa) 4anor of the &nternational *olic2 &nstitute for Counter5
Terrorism has termed the 6,oomerang effect.7 The ris' of retaliation depends on the
motiation of the targeted organi)ation and its operational capa,ilities. &n some cases% such
as the West 4erman Baader5:einhof 4ang and the *eruian Shining *ath% the arrest or
'illing of the top leadership effectiel2 neutrali)ed the organi)ation. But ,ecause -amas%
&slamic .ihad% and -i),ollah hae a large pool of operaties and potential recruits%
assassinating a fe3 prominent indiiduals ma2 ,e counterproductie. For example% the
assassination of -amas ,om,ma'er Gih2a A2ash 06The Engineer71 in 4a)a on .anuar2 >%
!"">% proo'ed four suicide attac's against &srael in eight da2s% 'illing >9 ciilians and
in(uring hundreds.
!!

5essons for .!. Policy
The United States should emulate the &sraeli approach of tr2ing to preent terrorist attac's
,2 disrupting the ,roader infrastructure inoled in the recruitment% indoctrination% training%
and logistical support of terrorist operaties. At the same time% for the reasons descri,ed
a,oe% it 3ould ,e un3ise to adopt the &sraeli polic2 of assassinating terrorist leaders%
except in the context of actie com,at operations such as the 3ar in Afghanistan.
Assassination tactics 3ould almost certainl2 proo'e retaliation in 'ind% including potential
reprisals against senior U.S. political leaders.
Commercial -.iation Securit/
&srael<s expertise in aiation securit2 is legendar2% and this area remains a top priorit2
,ecause the sta'es are so high. +arge passenger aircraft are attractie targets for terrorists
,ecause once in the air% the2 are extremel2 ulnera,le. A small explosion that might 'ill
onl2 a fe3 people on the ground can ,ring do3n a (um,o (et% 'illing hundreds. Such a
disaster 3ould also attract extensie media coerage% magnif2ing its ps2chological% political%
and economic impact.
El Al% the &sraeli national airline% has a securit2 ,udget of roughl2 K$9 million% coering Ben
4urion &nternational Airport near Tel Ai and the airliners themseles. Terminal securit2
has ,een a ma(or concern for &srael since !"$8% 3hen *alestinian terrorists attac'ed the
chec'5in counters at the airports in Come and Lienna 3ith guns and grenades% 'illing !$
people. Ben 4urion airport is protected ,2 a defense in depth that ,egins 3ith a chec'point
on the single access road% 3here armed guards examine ehicles and Euestion suspicious5
loo'ing driers or passengers. Additional plainclothes securit2 officials monitor the entrances
to the terminal% continuall2 scan the cro3ds inside% and freEuentl2 chec' 3aste,as'ets for
explosie deices.
El Al<s passenger screening s2stem% esta,lished in the earl2 !"H9s% relies on ps2chological
profiling techniEues ,ac'ed up 3ith high5technolog2 eEuipment. This s2stem has ,een
highl2 effectie: the last successful hi(ac'ing of an El Al (et 3as in !">$% 3hen *alestinian
terrorists dierted a flight from Come to Algiers.
!"
Whereas the United States gies priorit2
to screening ,aggage rather than people% &srael<s securit2 model aims at ferreting out
indiiduals 3ith terrorist intentions. This profiling process relies on access to intelligence and
careful o,seration of 3ould5,e passengers.
The main reason for &srael<s primar2 emphasis on human factors is that adances in
explosies technolog2 hae made it increasingl2 difficult to find ,om,s hidden in luggage.
*lastic explosies can no3 ,e disguised in almost eer2 conceia,le form% including shoe
soles% to2s% cell phones% and clothing. :oreoer% the !! Septem,er terrorists did not carr2
guns or explosie deices ,ut used small% easil2 concealed 3eapons 0,ox5cutters1 to hi(ac'
four airliners and transform them into fl2ing ,om,s. Although scissors and ,ox5cutters are
no3 ,anned from carr25on ,ags% determined terrorists could emplo2 seemingl2 ,enign
o,(ects% such as the stiletto heel of a 3oman<s shoe or a man<s ,elt% to sei)e control of an
aircraft in flight.
According to /aid -arel% an aiation securit2 specialist 3ith Shin Bet% some t2pe of profiling
s2stem is essential ,ecause it is impractical to su,(ect eer2 passenger to a high leel of
scrutin2. Traelers on El Al are told to arrie at the airport three hours ,efore a flight to go
through preliminar2 screening. *assengers are categori)ed at the outset as to 3hether the2
are &sraeli .e3s% foreign5,orn .e3s% and so forth% 3ith Ara,s and certain other foreigners
most li'el2 to ,e profiled. The fact that the El Al securit2 s2stem is o3ned and operated ,2
the &sraeli goernment facilitates the use of intelligence and la35enforcement data,ases to
help identif2 the small minorit2 of passengers 3ho ma2 hae criminal or terrorist intent.
!#

&n addition to searching goernment 3atch lists% interie3ers as' each traeler a detailed
set of Euestions that ta'es seeral minutes. Based on this initial screening% the great
ma(orit2 of El Al passengers are classified as lo3 ris' and su,(ected to a routine leel of
securit2. A,out !F% ho3eer% are flagged as high ris' ,ecause the2 are on a goernment
3atch list or appear nerous at the chec'point% or ,ecause their ans3ers or ,ehaior arouse
suspicion. These indiiduals are dierted into a more intensie screening that ta'es an
aerage of 8H minutes per person.
!&
The process inoles a length2 personal interie3% a
complete search of all carr25on ,ags% and the use of sophisticated explosies detection
eEuipment. For example% 3hen Cichard Ceid 0the future 6shoe ,om,er71 decided to fl2 in
.ul2 @99! from Amsterdam to &srael% allegedl2 to chec' out terrorist targets% El Al securit2
personnel selected him for profiling and su,(ected him to a full securit2 chec' from head to
toe 0including an M5ra2 scan of his shoes1 that sho3ed he carried no ,om, or 3eapon.
Although Ceid 3as allo3ed to ,oard the plane% El Al remained suspicious and made sure he
3as sitting near an armed s'2 marshal% 3ho 3as instructed to 'eep a close 3atch on him.
!'

American Airlines 3as not as careful% ho3eer% and allo3ed Ceid to ,oard a flight from *aris
to :iami in /ecem,er @99!. This time the al5=aeda operatie carried an explosie deice%
concealed in a shoe% and he attempted to detonate the explosie in mid5flight. Onl2 timel2
interention ,2 the other passengers and cre3 preented a ma(or disaster.
Another situation in 3hich profiling has proen effectie is in the case of a 6duped
passenger7?a naNe indiidual 3ho has ,een manipulated ,2 terrorists to carr2 an explosie
deice on ,oard an aircraft. &n !"$>% Anne5:arie :urph2% a B@52ear5old &rish 3oman% 3as
interie3ed at -eathro3 Airport ,efore ,oarding an El Al flight from +ondon to Tel Ai.
When as'ed the purpose of her trip% she said that she 3as traeling to &srael to see her
.ordanian fiancO% the father of her un,orn child. T3o factors made the interie3er
suspicious: it 3as unusual for a pregnant 2oung 3oman to trael alone% and although :s.
:urph2 said she planned to sta2 in &srael for a 3ee'% she did not chec' an2 luggage and
had onl2 one carr25on ,ag. Further Euestioning reealed that she planned to sta2 at the Tel
Ai -ilton and to pa2 3ith a credit card. When the card 3as examined% it proed to ,e an
&/ that allo3ed her onl2 to cash chec's in the United Jingdom. At this point% :s. :urph2
3as declared a suspicious traeler and su,(ected to greater scrutin2. -er carr25on ,ag 3as
emptied% 3eighed% and found to ,e unusuall2 hea2. M5ra2 examination reealed a false
,ottom containing a gra2ish material that proed to ,e plastic explosie. Un,e'no3nst to
:s. :urph2% her fiancO 3as a *alestinian terrorist 3ho had concealed in her ,ag a ,om,
designed to detonate in flight% 3ith the intent of 'illing all BH8 passengers on ,oard.
!(

&srael has found that s'illed profilers are essential for conducting passenger interie3s.
Although El Al securit2 3or'ers are not all ciil serants% the goernment sets and enforces
rigorous standards of training and performance. Aiation securit2 (o,s in &srael are relatiel2
3ell paid% and man2 mem,ers of the airport securit2 staff are college students 3ho find the
part5time 3or' interesting and challenging. To 'eep the screeners at a high state of
igilance% a unit 3ithin !hin )et<s *rotection and Securit2 /iision carries out surprise drills
3ith dumm2 ,om,s.
!)

/espite its strengths% the El Al profiling s2stem has potential pitfalls% including human error.
*ersonal rapport ,et3een the interie3er and a charming passenger can hae a 6,linding7
effect% so that the interie3er does not detect suspicious signs. &n addition% ,ecause of co5
sharing agreements ,et3een El Al and other carriers% some transiting passengers 0mainl2
,usiness people1 arrie at Ben 4urion &nternational Airport onl2 one hour ,efore a flight.
This ,rief la2oer does not proide enough time for profilers to erif2 passengers< stories
3ithout dela2ing ta'eoffs. Fortunatel2% onl2 a fe3 international passengers transit through
Ben 4urion airport.
Because of the limitations of profiling and the fact that een the ,est intelligence data,ase
ma2 not include eer2 terrorist% El Al has found that a defense in depth is essential. Second5
tier measures include luggage conciliation 0matching ,ags to passengers 3ho ,oard an
aircraft1 and the processing of ,aggage and cargo through explosies5detection deices
such as &nLision scanners and chemical sniffers. Screened luggage that appears suspicious
is dierted to an on5site la,orator2 at Ben 4urion airport for detailed chemical sampling and
anal2sis. &n addition% a compression cham,er is used to chec' ,ags for ,om,s that hae air5
pressure fu)es. As a third line of defense% El Al emplo2s on5aircraft protectie measures%
including at least one armed s'2 marshal per flight% reinforced and ,ulletproof coc'pit doors%
and explosion5resistant cargo holds.
Another threat to &sraeli aiation deries from the possi,le terrorist use of shoulder5fired
ground5to5air missiles% such as Stingers. Ben 4urion airport is situated onl2 a fe3 miles
from the West Ban'% so the threat of a missile attac' is real. Because installing antimissile
countermeasures on eer2 plane 3ould ,e prohi,itiel2 costl2% &srael relies on enhanced
perimeter securit2. 4round serices such as cleaning% catering% and refueling also present
potential ulnera,ilities and necessitate the careful etting of personnel. !hin )et stries to
remain one step ahead of the terrorist enem2% 3ho ma2 deise ne3 tactics to circument
the existing securit2 s2stems. To this end% &sraeli securit2 specialists continuall2 anal2)e
6possi,le 3a2s of action7 for attac'ing passenger aircraft% collect operational information%
and tr2 to spot and correct 3ea' lin's in the securit2 s2stem.
"*

5essons for .!. Policy
&n at least some areas% the United States 3ould do 3ell to emulate the &sraeli model of
aiation securit2. One example is to improe airport terminal securit2 ,2 means of
concentric rings of professionall2 trained securit2 guards 0,oth uniformed and plain5clothed1
3ho can respond promptl2 to a terrorist attac'. The shootings at the El Al tic'et counter in
+os Angeles &nternational Airport on # .ul2 @99@% in 3hich t3o people and the attac'er 3ere
'illed% illustrate the need for improed terminal securit2 before passengers enter the
screening chec'points.
Shortl2 after the !! Septem,er terrorist attac's% Caphael Con% the former director of
securit2 at El Al% receied a four5month contract 3orth K899%999 to recommend securit2
upgrades at +ogan &nternational Airport in Boston% 3here t3o of the hi(ac'ed flights had
originated.
"1
Con proposed improements costing roughl2 K!99 million% including
technolog2% construction 3or'% and training and deplo2ment of personnel. -e also
recommended that all U.S. airports adopt uniform securit2 standards% 3hich 3ould reduce
costs ,ecause airports 3ould not hae to rescreen transiting passengers 3ho had alread2
,een screened else3here.
"

Should the United States adopt the &sraeli approach and place primar2 emphasis on profiling
passengers rather than on screening luggageI 4ien the finite resources aaila,le for
aiation securit2% it ma'es sense to identif2 the small num,er of passengers 3ho pose the
greatest potential threat. The Federal Aiation Administration has deeloped computeri)ed
profiling soft3are called the Computer5Assisted *assenger *rescreening S2stem 0CA**S1%
3hich seres as the ,asis for 6random7 searches of passengers in the gate area% ,ut this
s2stem is much more limited than the one used in &srael% and the criteria used to identif2
suspicious passengers hae ,een critici)ed as oerl2 simplistic. Ceportedl2% CA**S gies
each traeler a ris' profile ,ased on factors such as the purchase of a one53a2 tic'et%
pa2ing in cash% traeling alone% and ,u2ing tic'ets for passengers 3ith different last names
on the same credit card.
"!
Although CA**S has recentl2 ,een upgraded% it still lac's input
from federal data,ases and does not dra3 on information from personal interie3s.
The applica,ilit2 to the United States of the &sraeli approach to passenger profiling is
constrained ,2 seeral factors: the much larger olume of U.S. commercial air traffic% the
multi5ethnic nature of American societ2% the large num,er of passengers transiting through
6hu,7 cities 3ho catch connecting flights 3ith short la2oers% and the fact that personal
interie3s 3ould ,e too time5consuming for most Americans to tolerate. &n the aftermath of
!! Septem,er% U.S. traelers are prepared to accept some3hat longer dela2s during the
passenger screening process in return for greater securit2 and peace of mind. Een so% the
hassles associated 3ith heightened securit2 hae caused man2 freEuent ,usiness traelers
to drie rather than fl2% costing the airlines ma(or losses in reenue. :oreoer% passenger
profiling ,ased on racial or ethnic criteria 3ould ,e legall2 and culturall2 unaccepta,le in the
United States.
One possi,le solution to these pro,lems 3ould ,e a modified profiling s2stem% implemented
,2 the airlines 3ith oersight ,2 the Transportation Securit2 Administration. This s2stem
3ould ,e ,ased on the principle of reerse profiling. When someone purchased a tic'et% the
airline 3ould as' the Transportation Securit2 Administration to run the passenger<s name
through a computeri)ed% goernment53ide terrorism 3atch list containing data collected ,2
the FB&% C&A% and other agencies. 0Such an integrated data,ase does not 2et exist.1 *ersons
assessed to ,e lo3 ris' 3ould then ,e directed to a less rigorous screening process%
ena,ling the screeners to focus on the small minorit2 of traelers a,out 3hom the initial
securit2 chec' has raised suspicions or reealed a lac' of information. These indiiduals%
selected not ,ecause of their racial or ethnic ,ac'ground ,ut ,ecause of a possi,le
association 3ith terrorist organi)ations% 3ould ,e directed to a more rigorous screening
process and Euestioned closel2. &f their ans3ers or ,ehaior aroused additional concerns%
their carr25on ,ags and chec'ed luggage 3ould ,e carefull2 searched.
""
A complementar2
approach 3ould ,e for freEuent ,usiness fl2ers to undergo a oluntar2 ,ac'ground chec'
and o,tain a 6trusted traeler7 card% including ,iometric identifiers% that ena,les them to
,2pass the more rigorous screening. Alternatiel2% the names and identifiers of trusted
traelers could ,e stored in the airlines< computer data ,an's.
0efense -gainst Chemical and Biological -ttacks
Another area of terrorism preention in 3hich &srael is a 3orld leader is passie defenses
against militar2 or terrorist use of chemical and ,iological 3eapons. ;ot onl2 do &sraeli
ciilians face a direct threat of chemical or ,iological attac' from countries such as S2ria%
&raE% and &ran% ,ut *alestinian terrorists hae sho3n a gro3ing interest in these 3eapons.
&n /ecem,er @99!% the &sraeli police reealed that a -amas suicide ,om,er in -aifa had
used an explosie charge containing a toxic pesticide% although most of it 3as consumed in
the explosion.
"#
Although the chemical 3arfare capa,ilities of -amas are still rudimentar2%
&sraeli securit2 officials are concerned that the group appears determined to acEuire or
produce more adanced chemical agents.
"&
&n :a2 @99@% a -amas agent% A,,as Sa2ed% 3as
arrested and later ac'no3ledged that he had o,tained assistance from -i),ollah in
attempting to produce c2anide and nere gas.
"'

&n ie3 of this threat% &srael has implemented the 3orld<s most sophisticated ciil defense
program against chemical and ,iological attac'. &n the mid5!"$9s% the &sraeli goernment
,egan to proide each citi)en 3ith a free 'it consisting of an indiiduall2 fitted gas mas' and
an auto5in(ector containing nere5agent antidotes. Special mas's are issued for infants%
children% and indiiduals 3ith respirator2 pro,lems. The &/F<s -ome Front Command
0Pe6ood ha7/rref1 operates a nation3ide net3or' of distri,ution centers% including a
computeri)ed record of eer2one 3ho has receied a 'it and the date of issue. ;otices are
mailed out reminding citi)ens to replace the mas'% air filter% and auto5in(ector 3hen the
eEuipment<s operational life has expired.
"(

/uring the !""! *ersian 4ulf War% 3hen &raEi *resident Saddam -ussein threatened &srael
3ith a chemical attac'% the &/F deeloped the doctrine of 6a sealed ,od2 in a sealed room.7
Each household 3as instructed to prepare a special shelter against chemical or ,iological
attac': an interior room that has fe3 if an2 3indo3s and can ,e sealed 3ith plastic sheeting
and tape to render it airtight. &n response to air5raid sirens% 3arnings ,roadcast on radio
and TL% or the sound of a near,2 explosion% &sraeli citi)ens 3ere told to enter the special
room% seal the door 3ith tape or cloth% don their gas mas's 0creating the 6sealed ,od271%
and 'eep them on until the 6all clear7 is gien.
Since !""@% the goernment of &srael has reEuired all ne3l2 constructed pu,lic ,uildings%
apartment complexes% and single5famil2 homes to incorporate a 6protectie room7 that is
,oth ,om,5resistant and capa,le of ,eing sealed airtight. :ost protectie rooms are
eEuipped 3ith electricit2 and a telephone hoo'upA the more ela,orate ones hae 3ater% a
,athroom% and a TL connection. Another lesson of the 4ulf War 3as that not eer2one could
hear the air5raid sirens. To address this pro,lem% &sraeli citi)ens 3ere told to turn on the
radio ,efore going to sleep and tune it to a special station that ,roadcast onl2 static. &n the
eent of a chemical attac'% the station 3ould commence a lie ,roadcast to 3a'e people
and tell them to enter the sealed room.
")
&sraeli pu,lic health authorities are also a3are of
the threat of ,ioterrorism and hae stoc'piled accines and anti,iotics. &n late @99!% the
&sraeli goernment placed an order for > million additional doses of smallpox accine%
enough to accinate the entire population.
#*

5essons for .!. Policy
Surrounded ,2 hostile countries armed 3ith chemical and ,iological 3eapons% &srael faces a
much more immediate threat than does the United States. &srael is also a small countr2%
ma'ing it economicall2 feasi,le to issue and maintain gas mas's and antidote 'its for the
entire ciilian population free of charge. ;eertheless% the United States should do far more
to improe its domestic preparedness for chemical and ,iological terrorism and to educate
the pu,lic a,out these potential threats. Although distri,uting a gas mas' and an antidote
'it to eer2 American 3ould not ,e practical% centrali)ed stoc's of mas's and antidotes
should ,e aaila,le for rapid distri,ution and use in the eent of a chemical attac'.
Bioterrorism preparedness reEuires a different set of measures. Because the release of a
,iological agent such as anthrax 3ould ta'e a fe3 da2s to produce s2mptoms in those
exposed% the ictims of a ,ioterrorist attac' 3ould disperse 3idel2 and the first responders
3ould ,e emergenc2 room doctors and clinicians in priate practice. These indiiduals
reEuire training in the diagnosis of exotic infections such as anthrax and smallpox% 3hich
the2 3ould neer encounter in their routine medical practice. The2 also need to 'no3 ho3
to report unusual disease out,rea's to the pu,lic health authorities% so that the appropriate
treatment and containment measures can ,e ,rought to ,ear rapidl2. Finall2% it 3ould ,e
desira,le to reduce the ulnera,ilit2 to chemical or ,iological attac' of certain high5ris'
,uildings 0such as federal goernment offices1 ,2 ma'ing air5inta'e ents less accessi,le
and ,2 installing high5efficienc2 particulate air filters and actiated5charcoal filters in the
entilation s2stems to screen out toxic agents.
Strengthening 1s/chological Coping Skills
The &sraeli goernment has made a deli,erate effort to counter the demorali)ing effects of
terrorism ,2 strengthening the ps2chological coping s'ills of ordinar2 citi)ens. Terrorists
see' to ino'e a perasie fear in the ciilian population ,2 personali)ing the threat so that
eer2one feels ulnera,le% regardless of the statistical pro,a,ilit2 that a gien indiidual 3ill
,e affected. &n an effort to counter this form of ps2chological 3arfare% &sraeli terrorism
experts from the &nternational *olic2 &nstitute for Counter5Terrorism isit schools
throughout the countr2 and proide educational programs tailored to students of different
age groups. These lectures descri,e the moties and operational strateg2 of terrorists% 3ith
the aim of immuni)ing students against the personali)ation of terror. According to institute
executie director 4anor% 6Education directed to3ards familiarit2 3ith the phenomenon Pof
terrorismQ% in all its aspects% 3ill lo3er the leel of anxiet2 and foil one of the terrorists<
principal aims: to instill fear and undermine the personal securit2 of ciilians.7
#1

5essons for .!. Policy
The U.S. goernment should deelop a more effectie strateg2 for communicating terrorist
threats to the pu,lic in order to promote igilance 3ithout arousing undue alarm and
anxiet2. Cecent 3arnings issued ,2 U.S. goernment officials hae ,een poorl2 coordinated
and oerl2 ague and hae often appeared motiated more ,2 ,ureaucratic interests than
,2 real securit2 needs. For example% the color5coded threat5leel s2stem deeloped ,2 the
Office of -omeland Securit2 has ,ecome a target of ridicule.
&deall2% a single goernment representatie 3ho appears trust3orth2% 'no3ledgea,le% and
disinterested should ,e charged 3ith cone2ing threat information to the general pu,lic. 0&n
the case of a ,ioterrorist attac'% the Surgeon 4eneral 3ould ,e the most appropriate
spo'esperson.1 Terrorist threats should ,e pu,lici)ed onl2 3hen the2 appear imminent and
the supporting intelligence is relia,le and specific. Such 3arnings should also ,e
accompanied ,2 recommendations to the pu,lic for prudent action. &n all cases% information
a,out terrorist threats% particularl2 those inoling unconentional 3eapons% should ,e
cone2ed in a clear ,ut non5alarmist manner to offset the sensationalistic tendencies of the
mass media. Finall2% programs?similar to that organi)ed ,2 the &nternational *olic2
&nstitute for Counter5Terrorism in &srael?in 3hich academic terrorism experts trael around
the United States giing tal's on terrorism to elementar2% high school% and college classes
and communit2 groups 3ould help ordinar2 Americans cope ps2chologicall2 3ith the
perasie 2et amorphous threat the2 no3 face.
Conclusions
What can the United States learn from the &sraeli experience 3ith preenting terrorismI The
main lessons appear to ,e
!. The importance of an alert and motiated citi)enr2 for helping to preent terrorist
attac's
@. The 'e2 role of intelligence collection and anal2sis% 3hich proide the foundation for
all counterterrorism efforts
B. The need for close cooperation and coordination ,et3een foreign and domestic
intelligence agencies in collecting and anal2)ing information on terrorist threats
#. The limited utilit2 of assassination as a counterterrorism tool% including the ris's of
the ,oomerang effect
8. The alue of ,asing aiation securit2 primaril2 on an assessment of human factors%
,ac'ed up 3ith a ariet2 of screening technologies and steps to 6harden7 passenger
aircraft against hi(ac'ing and explosies
>. The importance of educational campaigns to ,olster the ps2chological resilience of
the ciilian population against the demorali)ing effects of terrorism
To date% ,oth &srael and the United States hae focused narro3l2 on militar2 actions against
terrorism 3hile neglecting its root causes. Although ,rutal iolence against innocent ciilians
is unaccepta,le and can neer ,e (ustified% terrorism is a s2mptom of deeper political%
religious% or social pro,lems that cannot ,e soled ,2 militar2 means alone. An effectie
campaign to preent terrorism must therefore treat the disease as 3ell as the s2mptoms ,2
addressing the political and social conditions that gie rise to extremism and iolence.
Because *alestinian terrorism is in part a response to the &sraeli militar2 occupation of the
West Ban' and 4a)a% steps that ma'e the occupation harsher are unli'el2 to improe the
securit2 situation. Get een the unilateral &sraeli 3ithdra3al from the occupied territories
3ould not appease re(ectionist groups such as -amas or &slamic .ihad% 3hich aim to destro2
the .e3ish state. A realistic middle ground 3ould ,e for &srael to reach out to *alestinian
moderates 3hile continuing to pursue aggressie police actions against the extremist fringe.
&n much the same 3a2% the United States needs to address the roots of &slamic terrorism%
3hich lie in the chronic lac' of political freedom and economic opportunit2 in the Ara, 3orld%
3hile aggressiel2 pursuing those extremists 3ho see' to 'ill Americans. &srael<s long
experience demonstrates that a ariet2 of polic2 tools?militar2% political% economic% and
diplomatic?3ill ,e reEuired oer a protracted period. As Goram Sch3eit)er% a senior
researcher at the &nternational *olic2 &nstitute for Counter5Terrorism% has o,sered% 6The
fight against terrorism resem,les a marathon race and not a sprint.7
#