TotalitarianSocialismanditsDevelopmentalTasksinRomania

(19481956)
TotalitarianSocialismanditsDevelopmentalTasksinRomania(19481956)
byCezarStanciu
Source:
ValahianJournalofHistoricalStudies(ValahianJournalofHistoricalStudies),issue:78/2007,
pages:1732,onwww.ceeol.com.
17
Totalitarian Socialism and its Developmental Tasks
in Romania (1948-1956)
Cezar STANCIU
1
Keywords: development, underdevelopment, industrialization, Socialism, economic
nationalism, protectionism
Abstract
The Communist regime embarked itself into a vast program of industrialization and development
which reflects the principles of economic nationalism, as explained by Helga Schultz. The pursuit of
economic and industrial development had been a constant political feature in Romania, after the
foundation of the modern nation-state. Taking advantage of the authoritarian instruments available
to it, the Communist regime continued this policy of state-led development. In its relations with other
Socialist countries, Romania was guided by this project, as much as the political circumstances of the
Soviet domination allowed it.

Economy and Politics in Eastern Europe
he Communist regime established in Romania in the aftermath
of World War II engaged itself in a vast endeavor meant to
reconstruct the social and economical structures in the country,
according to the ideological imperatives of Marxism-Leninism. Constructing
the material bases of Socialism involved a preliminary destructive process
directed towards a removal of all political and socio-economic obstacles. This
initial phase was soon followed or even accompanied by a large
mobilization of forces to be employed in a massive constructive effort
2
.
According to the regime, the top priority was considered to be the
industrialization. Industry was credited with the capacity to offer the material
bases for removing inequality and generating prosperity for the entire working
class. Furthermore, in the bipolar context of the early Cold War,
industrialization was also seen and explained as a method of overcoming the
traditional underdevelopment of the country, maintained until then by the local

1
Ph.D. Candidate, Grigore Gafencu Study Center for the Research of the History of
International Relations, Valahia University of Trgovite
2
Stelian Tnase, Regimul Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej: elit comunist i societate. Polis. Revist
de tiine Politice 1(1996), 36
T
Access via CEEOL NL Germany
18
bourgeoisie in cooperation with the Western capitalist forces. The global forces
of capitalism enslaved Romania in the modern age with the help of the local
bourgeoisie and industrialization, as the regime preached, and Socialism will
put an end to this situation and restore the power to the working people. This
ideological approach makes a determinative connection between political
independence and economical development.
Such a relation had a strong tradition in Romania and in Eastern
Europe generally. This study would prove that the Socialist industrialization
process, in its first phase, did in fact pursue goals similar to the Romanian
modern political and economical thinking. As a new-born nation-state,
Romania was involved in a long effort to consolidate its national independency
at political level by supporting industrial and economical developments. The
countrys position on the world arena, its capacity to deal with security threats
were seen as strictly connected with economical development, mainly
industrialization. The Communist regime, although using different ideological
premises, continued after 1948 to pursue the same goals. The industrialization
process initiated after 1948 assumed numerous premises of the modern efforts
to overcome underdevelopment.
The industrialization process in the Socialist countries, although
defined as an imperative of Marxist-Leninism, does contain a large proportion
of the previous political culture of economical nationalism. The modernization
was an on-going evolution in most of the Eastern societies, at the time when
Communist regimes assumed power. The theory of modernization relies on
two schools of thought: the Weberian school, arguing that it is culture which
determines political and economical evolutions and the Marxist school, arguing
the opposite
3
. The Eastern Socialist regimes consider themselves as Marxists
and proclaim that their project is of Marxist inspiration. Nevertheless, given
the backward state of development in both Russia and most of the Eastern
European societies, development and industrialization were a constant of
political and economic thought long before the emergence of Communist
regimes. Therefore, the terrible strive for modernization had visible traditions
in these societies, which inspired Bolshevism as well. Neumann argues that in
Russia the Bolsheviks were the most radical Westernizers, looking from the
Slavophil-Westernizing dichotomy. Their purpose was to avoid a European
course of development, but in the end to attain the same goal:
industrialization
4
. It is obvious that in spite of their Marxist claims, the efforts

3
Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization. Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43
Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 67
4
Iver Neumann, Russia and the Idea of Europe. A Study in Identity and International Relations
(London: Routledge, 1996), 74
19
to overcome underdevelopment may also be seen as a cultural inheritance,
making possible a Weberian interpretation of the Socialist construction.
The most active social factor promoting change and modernization
through revolution and industrialization was the frustrated intelligentsia. Its
conviction resulted from the contact with the more advanced Western
societies, which had a great psychological and mental impact. The development
of economic forces, as Marx argues, did not contribute in a relevant measure to
the formation of such beliefs
5
. As mentioned before, such an interpretation
gives much more credibility to the Weberian theory of modernization, rather
than the Marxist one. But no matter which theory proves to be more accurate
in offering answers, connections between culture and the evolution of politics
and economy do persist, in both approaches, as Inglehart points out
6
. This
strong relation between political tasks and economic development obtains new
values in other agrarian societies from Eastern Europe.
During the interwar period, the young nation-states of Central and
South-East Europe pursued economical nationalism as a developmental
strategy in front of an aggressive Western capitalism, by using protectionism
and state interventionism
7
. Economical nationalism was recently defined as a
specific economical culture, originating in agrarian societies, without national
bourgeoisie. The leaders of economical nationalism were usually non-bourgeois
elements, intellectuals with a vital role in promoting the values of a national
consciousness
8
. Schultz sees economic nationalism as a component of the
nation-building process.
Economic nationalism was consolidated in the interwar period as a
solution to political insecurity. Countries which resulted from the dismantling
of the Habsburg Empire like Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia, feared an
Austrian or Hungarian economic domination. This domination was considered
a security threat. From such reasons, these countries looked for a certain
degree of economic autarchy in relation with the other states resulted from the
fall of the dual monarchy
9
. Romania rejected the project of a Danubian
Economic Union for nationalist reasons, accusing the fear of economic
colonization or the need to preserve economic sovereignty. Romanian
economist Mihail Manoilescu argued that capitalism in the developed countries

5
Hugh Seton-Watson, The Pattern of Communist Revolution. A History of World Communism
(London: Methuen, 1960), 352
6
Inglehart 1997, 67
7
Helga Schultz, Introduction: The double edged sword of economic nationalism, in History
and Culture of Economic Nationalism, eds. Helga Schultz, Eduard Kub (Berlin: Berliner
Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2006), 12
8
Schultz 2006, 13
9
Rawi Abdelal, Purpose and Privation: Nation and Economy in Post-Habsburg Eastern
Europe and Post-Soviet Eurasia, East European Politics and Societies 16, no. 3 (2003), 905
20
relied on the exploitation of the agrarian economies, which is why Socialism of
nations is much more justified than a class Socialism. Manoilescu saw
protectionism as a weapon of underdeveloped countries to fight against
exploitation
10
.
In interwar Romania, one of the most prominent political parties was
the National-Liberal Party, which supported market economy and industrial
development. In the aftermath of World War I, National-Liberal ideologists
like Mihail Manoilescu or tefan Zeletin initiated a new current of political and
economic thought called neoliberalism. The neoliberal doctrine encouraged
capitalist development but stressed the great relevance of the national capital
against foreign penetration. Manoilescu stated in his works that the states duty
was to protect the national industry against foreign competition. Zeletin, too,
promoted the idea that a Romanian capitalist development can only rely upon
a national bourgeoisie
11
. Furthermore, Manoilescus ideas evolved in late 1930s
towards a corporatist type of system, based upon a unique national plan of
economy, an integrated system of national economy and an economic
development based only on Romanian forces. In the neoliberal approach,
promoting a national bourgeoisie would be the only solution for the countrys
development, because its interest would correspond to the national interests
12
.
In the interwar period, Romania experienced two waves of
industrialization. The first occurred during the 1920s, under the National
Liberal influence and failed in the disaster of the Great Economic Depression.
The second wave appeared in the 1930s and registered remarkable successes in
the field of metallurgy, armament, petrochemicals, timber, etc. But in spite of
all this progress, the vital problems continued to persist: the overpopulation of
the rural areas could not be solved and the commodities were still missing
from the lives of the peasants due to low industrial production
13
. Romania
never actually took part in the industrial and technological revolution because
of an imperfect educational system and the absence of investments in research.
Industrialization was therefore dependent on technological transfer from
Western Europe
14
.

10
Schultz 2006, 15
11
Mihail Manoilescu, Neoliberalismul, in Doctrinele partidelor politice. 19 prelegeri publice organizate
de Institutul Social Romn n 1922-1933 (Bucureti: Editura Garamond), 198-200. For Zeletins
ideas, see: tefan Zeletin, Neoliberalismul. Studii asupra istoriei i politicii burgheziei romne (Bucureti:
Editura Nemira, 1997)
12
Eugen Ghiorghi, Rational and Practical Prerequisites of Socialism in Rumania (1945-1989). Paper
presented at the EBHA 11th Annual Conference, Geneva 13-15 September 2007
13
Joseph Rothchild, East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars (Washington: Washington
University Press, 1974), 318
14
Turnock 2005, 458
21
Romania had a historical gap to overcome and its influence was
difficult to surmount. The flow of technological progress from Western
Europe encountered obstacles while spreading towards the Eastern periphery
due to political reasons. This part of the continent was subjected to endless
confrontations among different empires looking to expand. Later on in the
modern age, economic and social progress was disturbed by conflicting
nationalisms. Such factors prevented a fast recovery of the gap in
development
15
. In the field of economics, history passes on cultural models
and patterns of thought with the power to self-regenerate over numerous
generations. Overcoming history in this issue is a matter of state policies,
mainly by encouraging access to education and improving the quality of
education
16
. Economist Dilip Mookherjee argues that in the case of
underdeveloped societies, there exists a so-called historical self-
reinforcement consisting in the capacity of certain factors of perpetuating
themselves. It is the case with initial inequalities in the distribution of wealth
17
.
Romania was in a similar situation and in overcoming the obstacles towards
development, state action was necessary.
Totalitarian Socialism offered the necessary instruments for
accomplishing such a program. The Communist regimes, as a historian recently
remarked, are wrongly called Communist since none of them ever claimed to
be Communist, but merely Socialist or on the way to Socialism. Ioan Scurtu
proposes another expression: Totalitarian Socialism, which is much closer to
what they represented, on the one hand, and what they claimed to be, on the
other hand
18
. Constructing Socialism with totalitarian instruments followed the
model first implemented in the Soviet Union. The model was inspired from
Stalins modernization programs of the 1930s
19
. A radical collectivization
process imposed by forceful instruments created the surplus for industrial
investments in a state-led process which mobilized the entire society.
The model consisted in a centrally planned economy, which relied on a
planning institution (Gosplan in the USSR, CSP in Romania) in charged with
compiling the plans and allocating the resources by administrative measures
and a group of ministries in charges of organizing the production for each

15
David Turnock, The Economy of East Central Europe 1815-1989. Stages of transformation in a
peripheral region (New York: Routledge, 2005), 458
16
Karla Hoff, Joseph E. Stiglitz, Modern Economic Theory and Development, in Frontiers of
Development Economics. The Future in Perspective, eds. Gerald M. Meier, Joseph E. Stiglitz
(Washington DC: World Bank Publications, 2001), 395
17
Dilip Mookherjee, Debraj Ray, Readings in the Theory of Economic Development (New Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 2001), 8
18
Ioan Scurtu, Regimul politic din Romnia (1948-1989), in Hegemoniile trecutului, eds. F.
Anghel, M. Anton, C. Popa (Bucureti: Editura Curtea Veche, 2006), 343-348
19
Turnock 2005, 294
22
economic field. The control over economy was first experimented during the
War Communism period, later to be abandoned. Stalin and his team of
supporters elaborated the system in the 1930s
20
, in which form it was
implemented in all Central and Eastern European countries under Soviet
influence. According to Stalin, the planning of economy had a particular role in
the development of Socialism: to ensure the economic independence of the
Socialist homeland in front of capitalist encirclement, as a weapon against
aggressive capitalism. He rarely tolerated the enthusiasm of Soviet scholars
arguing the benefits of planned economy. Instead, Stalin preferred a sober,
scientific tone, non-propagandistic
21
. Centrally planning the economy was, in
his view, a political necessity and a scientific issue at the same time. Stalins
controversies with Bukharin result from the same conviction that political
independence is strictly connected to industrial development
22
.
Differences in the developmental stages between East and West, as
well as the fragile character of the new-born nation states (and the regime, in
the USSR) during the interwar period determined a constant preoccupation for
removing the gap. In order to catch up with the economically advanced West,
most Central and Eastern European states have resorted to political measures
carried on by the state. Romania had followed the same pattern as well.
Political independence and security were conditioned in the interwar thinking
by economic development and industrialization.
The Socialist Solution to Underdevelopment
The seizure of power by the Communists in the Soviet satellite
countries had been described as a popular revolution, facilitated by the
presence of the Red Army which repressed the Fascist elements
23
. This created
the conditions for constructing the material bases of Socialism. The goals of
such a project were multiple: bringing equality among all people by material
welfare and overcoming the traditional underdevelopment which was
maintained by Western capitals with the cooperation of the local bourgeoisie.
The interpretation is meant to bring support for the project, first by a

20
Paul R. Gregory, The Political Economy of Stalinism. Evidence from the Soviet Secret Archives
(Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 2-3
21
Ethan Pollock, Conversations with Stalin on Questions of Political Economy. Cold War
International History Project Working Paper no. 33, Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars, p. 10-12
22
I.V. Stalin, Raportul politic al Comitetului Central la Congresul al XVI-lea al PC(b) al URSS 1930
(Bucureti: Editura PMR, 1951), 92
23
Anonymous, The Character of a Peoples Democracy, Foreign Affairs October 1949, 145-
147
23
propagandistic description of a bright future and secondly by channeling
social frustrations towards the West and the capitalist system
24
.
The socio-economic development of the country was a primary goal of
the regime. In its propaganda, as well as in its ideological approaches, the
regime often identified Socialism with the overcoming of underdevelopment.
Ideologically, the backwardness was blamed upon the bourgeois regime and its
complicity with world capitalism. Socialism declared itself as embarked on a
route toward socio-economic development meant also to restore the countrys
independence and prestige on the world scale. Once again, economic
development was strongly connected with the political status of the country
and its independence was seen as a result of the developmental process. This
process was directed toward the liquidation of the previous exploitation of
the country by foreign capitalist forces, working with the local bourgeoisie.
A memoir prepared in 1959 for the party leadership regarding
Romanias economic relations defines the evolution in the following terms:
for the first time in its history, Romania appeared on the scene of
international political and economic relations as a sovereign state, equal in
rights with all other states. The existence of the Socialist Camp lead by the
Soviet Union represented the decisive factor in the emergence of this situation
for our country.
25
The memoir compares Romanias situation as well as that
of the other backward Eastern European countries to the situation of the
Latin American countries, considered to be a resource base for the United
States. This is why, the document specifies, the Americans were very reticent in
investing technology in these countries. World capitalism, with the complicity
of the national bourgeoisie, tried to preserve Romania in the same situation of
a backward agrarian country, so that they could better exploit it. Capitalism was
considered an obstacle in the way of Romanias development. Its commercial
relations in the interwar period, as party propaganda affirmed, relied on heavy
exports of raw materials to be processed in the industrialized countries, from
where industrial products were bought at a very high price, perpetuating the
state of economic backwardness
26
. The regime, on the contrary, took pride in
the fact that it mobilized all resources in order to build a modern industry and
overcome underdevelopment.
The memoirs of top Communist leaders, written after 1989, are very
insistent over this point of view. As Silviu Brucan defined it, Socialism in

24
V. Carra, Rolul rilor de democraie popular n economia Europei, Probleme Externe 2
(1948), 41
25
Despre unele aspecte ale ajutorului economic acordat de URSS pentru construirea socialismului n ara
noastr, AMAE dos. 220/1959 URSS Romnia, p. 142-144
26
Capitalul strin (englez, francez, american, german). Influena lui asupra dezvoltrii rii noastre din punct
de vedere politic, economic i cultural, ANIC, fond CC al PCR secia Relaii Externe, dos. No.
3/1949, p. 36
24
Eastern Europe was nothing but a great effort to overcome
underdevelopment. Other writers like former minister Gheorghe Gaston
Marin or Alexandru Brldeanu put great emphasis on the regimes efforts to
develop industry and other modern economic sectors. Sorin Toma, former
chief-editor of party official Scnteia, stresses the giant difference between the
condition of the country right after the war and the massive construction
projects initiated by the Communist Party in the field of industry, education,
health and welfare. All these testimonies coincide on the same idea: Socialism
was a program of development which brought the country out of its previous
backwardness, by employing massive forces and national mobilization
27
.
The first Five-Year Plan in Romania was adopted in 1950, at the
Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers Party
(RWP) which gathered between 13 and 16 December 1950. The Plan was
complied for the years 1951-1955. According to the Soviet model, the primary
importance belonged to the heavy industry, considered to be the basis of
industrial development. Miron Constantinescu, the head of the State Planning
Committee (CSP), stated in front of the Central Committee of RWP that
industrialization had a vital political role to play in the international conditions
of that moment. According to Constantinescu, the industrialization was
required by the historical conditions when the aggressive Western Imperialism
was threatening the very existence of Socialism
28
.
One year later, Romania signed an Economic Agreement with the
Soviet Union, through which numerous industrial factories were going to be
imported in the field of metallurgy, energy, chemistry, construction and
mechanics. The Agreement was valid for five years and was meant to facilitate
both the planning work and the industrialization itself
29
. Moscow supported
this program actively, not only by providing the technological bases for the
industry but also by supplying the raw materials necessary for the emerging
industrial sectors: coal, iron, steel, etc
30
. The Soviet Union was becoming the
most important trade partner for Romania.

27
Silviu Brucan, Generaia irosit. Memorii (Bucureti: Universul i Calistrat Hoga, 1991); Lavinia
Betea, Alexandru Brldeanu despre Dej, Ceauescu, Iliescu (Bucureti: Editura Evenimentul, 1997);
Gheorghe Gaston Marin, n serviciul Romniei lui Gheorghiu-Dej. nsemnri din via (Bucureti:
Evenimentul Romnesc, 2000); Sorin Toma, Privind napoi. Amintirile unui fost ziarist comunist
(Bucureti: Editura Compania, 2004)
28
Romnia. Viaa politic n documente (Bucureti: Arhivele Naionale ale Romniei, 2002).
Stenograma discuiilor Plenarei CC generate de raportul prezentat de Miron Constantinescu
privitor la Planul Cincinal de Dezvoltare a economiei naionale, 325
29
Acord de lung durat privind livrarea de utilaj industrial i acordarea de ajutor tehnic Romniei, precum i
dezvoltarea mai departe a schimbului de mrfuri ntre URSS i RPR, ANIC fund CC al PCR Relaii
Externe, dos. 37/1951, p. 15-28
30
Raport asupra Acordului de lung durat cu URSS, ANIC fund CC al PCR Relaii Externe, dos.
37/1951, p. 2
25
Such an agreement, as well as the cooperation with other peoples
democracies, contributed to a fast growth of the industrial output. According
to statistics, in 1950 the industrial production had increased with 47%
compared to 1938, the last year before the war. In 1955, the growth was of
199% compared to the 1938 reference figures. The largest increases were
registered in the energetic industry (476%), the chemical sector (402%), the
construction materials (586%) and the machinery construction (396%). The
percentages were calculated in comparison to the 1938 standard
31
. The
statistics elaborated by the regime offer higher figures than the real rates of
growth. The political scientist Stelian Tnase had calculated an estimated
growth rate of 18.2% per year, for the period 1948-1953
32
. Even so, the growth
rate is extremely high for an agrarian economy exhausted by the war and its
financial obligations to the Soviet Union, as resulted from the Peace Treaty.
The regime employed large efforts to achieve its industrialization
program, the only one able to offer the regime public legitimacy.
Industrialization became the ideology of the Socialist elites. From the very
beginning, the program was placed under a national flag and sometimes
nationalism acted as a substitute for the welfare that was missing. Economic
nationalism, as shown by Helga Schultz, is an even more than an ideology, but
often a matter of state policy. This would also explain COMECOMs failure in
breaking down national borders
33
.
The regime in Romania acted upon the same premises. The
industrialization was pursued not only by domestic efforts sacrificing the
consumption in favor of accumulation but also by foreign trade instruments.
In its relations with the other peoples democracies, Romania actively
promoted the cooperation with industrialized countries, like East Germany and
Czechoslovakia. The GDR was a source of industrial products for almost every
country in the Socialist camp. Given the difficulties arisen from the Hallstein
Doctrine, the GDR depended upon the peoples democracies both for markets
and for raw materials
34
. Romania took benefits from this situation.
The economic cooperation between the two countries was delayed by
East Germanys uncertain situation until 1949. Active economic relations were
initiated in 1952, after Stalin had given up his hopes of a peaceful German
reunification on his own terms and decided to begin the construction of
socialism in the GDR. In 1952, Romania and East Germany negotiated four

31
Anuarul Statistic al Republicii Socialiste Romnia (Bucureti: Direcia Central de Statistic, 1968),
166-167
32
Stelian Tnase, Elite i societate. Guvernarea Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej 1948-1965 (Bucureti:
Editura Humanitas, 1998), 70
33
Schultz 2006, 18-19
34
David Childs, The GDR: Moscows German Ally (London: George Allen & Unwin Publishers,
1983), 308
26
conventions of economic cooperation, aimed at developing the chemistry and
mechanical industries in Romania. The GDR offered the technological
equipment necessary for increasing the exploitation of certain raw materials
available in Romania like gas and reed. In exchange, Romania was going to pay
the equipment delivered with products of those industries
35
. This was a form
of cooperation that Romania strived for with great energy in the early 1950s
because it allowed the transfer of technology without great financial efforts and
turned Romania into an exporter of industrial products. These conventions
were included in an Economic Agreement signed on 12 September 1952 in
Berlin. It stated that the GDR was going to contribute massively to the
development of industry in Romania by supplying technology which was to be
paid with products, after the industrial enterprises in question were complete
and working
36
. In 1950 Romanias trade with East Germany did not account
for more than 10 million rubles, the value increased in 1955 to almost 150
million rubles. The exchanged goods which accounted for more than three
quarters of the bilateral trade consisted in: industrial equipment, technology,
machinery, chemical fertilizers, imported by Romania, and wheat, timber and
fuels, imported by the GDR from Romania
37
. The trade balance marked a
steady deficit for Romania, especially between the years 1950-1954, due to
large and unbalanced imports of technology. The deficit was corrected in
1955
38
, after Malenkovs New Course had put a temporary stop to the
irresponsible investments in industry.
The same interest of satisfying the needs of industrialization had led
the Romanian Communists towards a very intense approach to
Czechoslovakia. The imports of technology from this country represented
almost half of the total imports. Czechoslovakia offered a large part of the
materials needed in the electrification process, including a thermo-electric plant
which was entirely designed and assembled by Czechoslovak specialists. At the
same time, more than 90% of Romanias exports to Czechoslovakia
represented agricultural products and raw materials, up to 1956
39
. The most
important thing Romania had to offer to industrialized countries was the
resources, present in large amounts and insufficiently used.

35
Proiect de Convenie no. 1-4, ANIC, fond CAER, dos. RPR-RDG no.1/1952, p. 1-4
36
Protocol privitor la colaborarea economic dintre RDG i RPR, ANIC, fond CC al PCR Relaii
Externe, dos. No. 23/1952, p. 4-5
37
Comerul exterior al RPR 1950-1957, AMAE, fond 220, dos. URSS 1959 Sinteze relaii RPR
URSS, p. 90
38
Not privind principalele aspecte ale relaiilor economice i tehnico-tiinifice ntre Republica Popular
Romn i Republica Democrat German, ANIC, fond CAER Comisia de Stat a Planificrii,
grupa CAER, dos. RPR-RDG no. 11/1952-57, p. 125-126
39
AMAE, Oficiul de Studii i Documentare nr. 21/2185/1967. Ioan Popescu, Relaiile Romniei
cu Cehoslovacia ntre anii 1939-1967., p. 25
27
Hungary was also an interesting economic partner for Romania, but in
a smaller measure. The initiative to develop active economic cooperation
belonged to Hungary. The issue was discussed in October 1951 in Budapest.
On this occasion, Gheorghiu-Dej met with a Hungarian state and party
delegation including: Mthias Rkosi, Ern Ger and Zoltan Vass. The
Hungarian requested Romanias cooperation in one of their projects regarding
the construction of a large chemical plant near Budapest. As Zoltan Vass
explained, the Hungarian gas resources were insufficient and Hungary was
willing to supply the plant with gas imported from Romania
40
. During the
Budapest meeting, the Romanian delegation argued with great energy in favor
of the idea of a chemical plant built in Romania by cooperation in order to
supply both countries with chemical products. The main argument was the
proximity to the resources. A gas pipe connecting Romania and Hungary
would be much too expensive and economically unjustified. Nevertheless, the
Hungarians did not give up and defended their plan with just as much energy.
The solution finally reached after intensive debates was to construct two
chemical plants, one in each country and a gas pipe for supplying the
Hungarian plant
41
.
In 1952 the two countries signed and Economic Agreement
establishing the bases of methane gas exploitation. Romania and Hungary
assumed the task of building two chemical plants for the industrialization of
methane gas and a pipe to connect the Hungarian plant to the resources in
Romania. The Romanian plant was going to be built on bilateral cooperation
with equal contributions. The Hungarian contribution consisted in equipment
and technology. In exchange, 30% of the production was going to be destined
for Hungary
42
.
Another Protocol was signed on the same occasion regarding the
increase of production capacity at the Ocna Mureului Sodic Enterprise. The
investments were made by the Hungarian part with the purpose of reserving a
large part of the production for import. Similar arrangements had been made
regarding the extraction of minerals. Hungary offered mining equipment in

40
Proces-verbal asupra edinei informative de partid inut la Bucureti la data de 8 iunie a.c. n legtur cu
posibilitile de colaborare economico-industrial iniiate de partea maghiar dintre RPR i RPU, ANIC,
fond CAER Comisia de Stat a Planificrii, grupa CAER, dos. RPR-RPU no. 2/1951, p. 2
41
Proces-Verbal 25 octombrie 1951, ANIC, fond CAER Comisia de Stat a Planificrii, grupa
CAER, dos. RPR-RPU no. 2/1951, p. 61
42
Protocol ncheiat la Budapesta ntre reprezentaii Partidului celor ce muncesc din Ungaria i Partidul
Muncitoresc Romn n chestiunea construirii a dou combinate chimice pe gaz metan (strict sectret), ANIC,
fond CAER Comisia de Stat a Planificrii, grupa CAER, dos. RPR-RPU nr. 15/1952, p. 10-
14
28
exchange for the products obtained from their exploitation
43
. In July 1952
another Agreement had been signed specifying an increase in the Hungarian
exports of machinery and industrial technology to Romania
44
.
Economic cooperation with other Socialist countries also had trilateral
forms. In 1954 Poland proposed a common project on reed exploitation.
Romania had vast reserves of reed in the Danube Delta but the industrial
processing was below both needs and resources. Initially, Poland enquired
about the possibility of importing reed but later the proposal focused on
common exploitation
45
. The industrial processing of reed had been the object
of a Convention signed with the East German government in 1952, but it
could not be completed because of the changes which occurred in the GDRs
investment policy after 1953, in the aftermath of the Berlin workers riot
46
. The
reed-processing project was finally completed in 1956 through an inter-
governmental agreement involving East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia.
The Convention stipulated that the four parties will build a cellulose factory in
the Danube Delta for processing the reed resources. The three foreign parties
were going to contribute with the industrial equipment necessary for the
enterprise. The production had to satisfy the economic needs of all four
countries
47
.
Polands interest toward Romania covered other fields, as well.
Romanias large reserves of methane gas were necessary for any emerging
chemical industry. In 1955, the Polish government, as was indicated by
COMECOM, raised the question of cooperation in this field. Poland intended
to construct a factory of chemical fertilizers based on methane gas and was
interested in supplying the gas from Romania. The Polish delegates in
Bucharest described their plan to build a pipe between Romania and Poland
for gas transportation. Also, the Polish government was highly interested in
acquiring unprocessed oil for another chemical plant. Romania rejected the gas
pipe project as unrealistic, describing the inconveniency of a 700 km long pipe.
In return, the Romanians proposed to build the factory in Romania with Polish

43
Protocol ncheiat ntre reprezentanii Guvernului R.P.R. i guvernului R.P.U. n chestiunea colaborrii
economice romno-maghiare, ANIC, fond CC al PCR secia Relaii Externe, dos. no. 15/1952, p.
25-29
44
Protocol. Propunerile ctre Guvernul RPU i Guvernul RPR strict secret exemplar nr. 1, ANIC, fond
CAER Comisia de Stat a Planificrii, grupa CAER, dos. RPR-RPU no. 5/1952, p. 1-2
45
Nota Comisiei de Colaborare Tehnico-tiinific de pe lng Consiliul de Minitrii ctre Comisia
Guvernamental CAER nr. 6189/22.10.1954, ANIC, fond CAER Comisia Guvernamental de
Colaborare Economic i Tehnic, dos. RPR-RPP no. 1/1954, p. 2
46
Proiect de Convenie no. 2, ANIC, fond CAER Comisia Guvernamental de Colaborare
Economic i Tehnic, dos. RPR-RDG no. 2/1952., p. 1
47
AMAE Oficiul de Studii i Documentare. Ioan Suciu, Relaiile romno-poloneze de la declanarea
celui de-al doilea rzboi mondial pn la ultima ntlnire la nivel nalt dintre reprezentanii celor dou ri, p.
36
29
equipment. This way, it was explained, the production would be much cheaper
due to the proximity of the resources and Romania could easily supply Poland
with all the chemical products it needed
48
.
Misunderstandings regarding the cooperation in the industrial
processing of different resources also appeared in the relations between
Czechoslovakia and Romania. In 1954 Czechoslovakia raised the question of
importing Romanian oil for a refinery which was almost ready. In July 1954 the
government in Prague addressed a letter to Romanian prime-minister (former
and future party leader) Gheorghiu-Dej, asking for his support in their efforts
to obtain oil supplies from Romania. The letter was signed by Defense minister
A. Cepicica. He explained that his country had a few refineries under final
stages of construction but cannot rely upon any resources, which is why
Romanias cooperation was vital
49
. The Romanian governments reply affirmed
that the problem is very complicated since Romania has the capacity to process
the entire quantity of oil extracted. Only by giving up some processing unit
would create a surplus for exportation
50
.
In November 1954, Gheorghiu-Dej, accompanied by Miron
Constantinescu, head of the CSP and Mihai Florescu, minister of chemistry,
met with Rudolf Barak, a Czechoslovakian Politburo member, to discuss the
same issue. Barak was insisting for Romania to offer the oil necessary for the
refineries. Gheorghiu-Dej evaded the issue by some technicalities, regarding
the discontinuous character of the resources which demands a slower rhythm
of extraction
51
. Beyond this, the meeting had proved fruitless, since Romania
did not agree to supply the oil. Actually, as Mihai Florescu explained to his
Czechoslovak counterpart Otto Simunek in March 1954, it simply was
inconvenient for Romania to export raw oil, since there were sufficient
capacities for processing and the export of processed oil was much more
efficient in terms of profitability. Florescu made it clear to Simunek that
Czechoslovakia should not count on such deliveries from Romania
52
.

48
Protocol privind prima sesiune referitor la schimbul de informaii n domeniul industriei chimice, ANIC,
fond CAER, dos. RPR-RPP no. 2/1955, p. 9-10
49
Preedintelui Consiliului de Minitri al RPR, Gheorghiu-Dej, Praga 17 iulie 1954, ANIC, fond
CAER, dos. RPR CSR no. 2/1954, p. 60
50
Primului Vice-Preedinte al Consiliului de Minitri al Republicii Cehoslovace, tov. A. Cepica (proiect),
ANIC, fond CAER, dos. RPR CSR no. 2/1954, p. 61-62
51
Not de edin. edina din 27 noiembrie 1954 dintre reprezentanii Guvernului RPR i ai Guvernului
CSR cu privire la cererea cehoslovac de produse petrolifere, ANIC, fond CAER, dos. RPR CSR no.
2/1954, p. 46-49
52
Extras din Protocolul convorbirilor cu Preedintele Comisiei de Stat a Planificrii, tov. Miron
Constantinescu, ce au avut loc la sediul Consiliului de Minitri la 17.III.1954, ANIC, fond CAER, dos.
RPR CSR no. 8/1955, p. 33
30
The issue of Romanias oil exports was brought up at the COMECOM
meeting in March 1954 in Moscow. The Czechoslovaks complained to the
Soviets that Romania, although had increased its oil extraction very much, is
not willing to make any exports. The Czechoslovak delegate Dvorjak expressed
its concerns about the future of the refineries his country had built, given the
fact that Romania refuses cooperation on this matter. Florescu, who was
present in Moscow, argued that Czechoslovakias decision to construct
refineries without having any resources was unreasonable. The same protests
against Romanias foreign trade policy were expressed by the Poles, the East
Germans and the Bulgarians. They were all complaining that Romania refuses
to export raw production, but only processed oil. A. Mikoian, representing the
Soviet government at the meeting, supported such points of view. According
to him, Romania should reserve a part of its oil extraction in order to supply
the needs of other peoples democracies, as well
53
. As we have seen, as late as
November, the same year, Romania was still refusing to accept the Soviet
proposals.
In June 1955 Romanian and Czechoslovak delegates met again to
discuss various other ways to develop economic cooperation. Czechoslovakia
offered refractory materials for export and also expressed a great interest for
importing non-ferrous metals from Romania. For what concerned the
refractory materials, the Czechoslovak delegation explained that their country
along with Hungary possessed sufficient production facilities as to satisfy the
needs of all Socialist countries. Both offers were declined. The Romanian
delegates informed their counter-parts that although Romanias production in
the field of refractory materials is insufficient, the government prefers to
develop its own facilities rather than relying on imports. Regarding the metals,
the answer was similar. Romanias intention was to construct processing units
for non-ferrous metals so it would be unwise to offer these resources to
export, for processing abroad
54
. In 1952, Hungary too expressed its intention
to import non-ferrous metals from Romania. The proposal met with refusal.
Miron Constantinescu argued that strategic resources cannot be exported on
the usual bases of bilateral trade. Furthermore, Romania was interested in
acquiring such products, even if they should be paid in gold
55
.

53
Not Miron Constantinescu ctre Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej, ANIC, fond CAER, dos. No. 13/1954, p.
28-30
54
Protocol privind prima sesiune ntre Delegaia Guvernamental a RPR pentru colaborare tehnico-economic i
Comisia Special a CSR pentru colaborare economic cu rile prietene, ANIC, fond CAER, dos. RPR
CSR no. 3/1955, p. 15-17
55
Scrisoare ctre Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej semnat de M. Constantinescu i Chivu Stoica nr. 1846/2 august
1952, ANIC, fond CC al PCR secia Relaii Externe, dos. no. 22/1952, p. 2-3
31
Conclusion
It is noticeable from the examples set forth above that during the first
Five-Year Plan Romanias foreign trade policy was protectionist. Given the
political circumstances of the Soviet domination, a vast and elaborated
affirmation of such a policy was not possible, especially in what concerns the
Soviet Union. A large part of the relations with other Socialist countries were
dictated either by Moscow or by the international political conditions.
Nevertheless, it seems obvious that within the limits allowed by the political
context, the Communist regime in Romania acted from a protectionist
perspective. Its policy regarding foreign trade was aimed, on one hand at
providing the technology necessary for industrialization, and on the other hand
at preserving the resources for local processing. Through this last method,
Romania was trying to leave behind the past of a backward agrarian country
and to become a producer and exporter of industrial goods.
The regime defined the industrialization as an effort to overcome
underdevelopment in order to obtain both a better standard of living and more
political prestige. The accomplishment of such purposes was pursued with the
help of state policy instruments, as offered by the centrally planned economy.
The situation in which the state takes control of authoritarian instruments in
order to promote a massive program of development and industrialization
which included political finalities of great significance is what we previously
defined as economic nationalism. Helga Schultz considers that Socialism
merely offered the instruments the centrally planned economy for
achieving the program of economic nationalism. This is why, Schultz argues,
COMECOM never really managed to break the limits of national borders
56
and
to evolve towards an economic transnational community of Western model.
For the period discussed above, the Soviet criticism of COMECOM
cooperation in 1954 carries great relevance. In light of Malenkovs New
Course, the meeting which took place in March 1954 in Moscow adopted a
Protocol which disavowed the practice of not coordinating the industrialization
programs among different Socialist countries. The Protocol, as conceived by
Moscow, affirmed that Socialist countries do not pay attention to each others
economic plans, which led to parallelism. Also, no Communist party had paid
attention to the Soviet industrialization plans either. This caused a situation in
which many useless factories and plants had been built, without market or
resources
57
. In other words, no Socialist country considered relying on other

56
Schultz 2006, 18-19
57
Anexa 1 la Protocolul al Sesiunii Consiliului de Ajutor Economic Reciproc din 26 i 27 martie 1954,
Moscova. Cu privire la reorganizarea i activitatea viitoare a Consiliului de Ajutor Economic Reciproc,
ANIC, fond CAER, dos. No. 14/1954, p. 5-6
32
friendly countries for different industrial products and preferred to develop
its own industrial base comprising all sectors.
During the period in question, Romanias economic policy, although
limited by political coercion factors, followed the principles of economic
nationalism. Industrialization was considered the primary goal of the regime,
with the double purpose of increasing the standards of living and consolidating
the countrys independence, as much as the Soviet control permitted it. A
protectionist economic policy aimed at domestic development with political
purposes had been a constant of Romanian economic, political and social
thought during the modern age. Totalitarian Socialism takes over this direction
after coming to power. This, combined with Ceauescus emphasis of
nationalism, may explain the support it managed to obtain in the society in the
1960s and later.