1

The Politics of Non-cooperation: the Boycott of the International Centre for Theoretical

Physics

by Alexis De Greiff*

Published with slight changes in OSIRIS (“Historical Perspectives on Science, Technology, and
International Affairs”, John Krige & Kai-Henrik Barth, eds.), Vol. 21 (2006), 86-109.

ABSTRACT: In 1974, the General Conference of UNESCO

approved three resolutions condemning Israel. In retaliation, a

group of physicists promoted a boycott of the International Centre

for Theoretical Physics, ICTP, an institute created to foster

collaboration in theoretical physics between industrialised and

Third World countries and partly supported by UNESCO. This

political action against the “politicisation” of UNESCO was led by

American and Israeli scientists. I show that the position towards

the boycott was very different among European scientists. I shall

argue that the boycott of the ICTP was motivated as much by the

formal connection between UNESCO and ICTP, as by the

identification of the ICTP with the Third World, which was

blamed for the “exclusion” of Israel from UNESCO. The episode

reflects the contradictions and workings of scientific non-

cooperation. It also reveals the limits of scientific internationalism

in the second half of the twentieth century. In this context I

investigate the meaning ascribed by the actors to the term the

politicization of science.
 2

From its creation in 1964, the International Centre for Theoretical Physics, or ICTP, was soon

the best-known institution where Third World physicists came to have access to the latest

developments in the field and had the chance to do research. Between 1964 and 1980, more than

6.000 scientists from the developing countries (and a similar figure from industrialized countries)

visited the Centre. It was located in Trieste and its deputy-director was a scientific diplomat

from that city, Prof. Paolo Budinich. 1 The central actor of the ICTP’s early history was however

Prof. Adbus Salam, its first director. Born in the region of British India that would later become

Pakistan, Salam read mathematics and physics in Cambridge. In 1958, he became the first

professor of Theoretical Physics at Imperial College. In 1979 he was awarded the Nobel Prize for

physics. Under his leadership, the ICTP became a reference point for scientists in developing

countries as the model of international scientific collaboration for Third World development, and

Salam perhaps the most famous spokesperson of the ‘science for development’ ideology amongst

political and scientific milieus both in the Third World and in industrialised countries.

In its early years, the ICTP operated under the auspices of the International Atomic

Energy Agency (IAEA, a United Nations technical agency) and also had substantial financial

support from the Italian Government. In 1970, UNESCO joined the IAEA in the operation.

1
Alexis De Greiff, “The tale of two peripheries: The creation of the International Centre for

Theoretical Physics in Trieste”, Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences, 33

Part 1 (2002): 33-60. Alexis De Greiff. "The International Centre for Theoretical Physics, 1960-

1979: Ideology and Practice in a United Nations Institution for Scientific Co-Operation and

Third World Development" (PhD Dissertation, University of London, 2002).

 3

UNESCO’s collaboration was vital to the survival of the Centre, for the ICTP’s financial

condition was always precarious. In the early years of the ICTP Salam did not like UNESCO’s

tutelage; however, by 1970, there were few alternatives for increasing the ICTP’s finances. Even

then, the sense of instability continued, for although the agreement with UNESCO brought more

resources, its future plans continued to be subjected to periodic approvals.2 What is more the

center became ensnared in a major political confrontation inside UNESCO which almost

destroyed it.

In the mid-1970s, tension in the Middle East put international co-operation with the Third

World in serious jeopardy. Three ‘anti-Israeli’ resolutions approved in the 1974 UNESCO

General Conference, sparked a massive boycott against the international organization and, as a

result of its association, against the ICTP as well.3 This was led by American and Israeli

2
In November 1974, a committee presided by CERN theoretical physicist Leon Van Hove stated

that: “a feeling of uncertainty concerning the future of the Centre is rampant, both among its

scientific leaders and its administrative staff,” and recommended the allocation of stable sources

of income because “the staff should be given a highest security of position.” IAEA, “Report of

the ad hoc consultative committee of the International Centre for Theoretical Physics, Trieste to

the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations

Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation” (Paris, 1975).

3
UNESCO was one of the most interesting and active international organizations aimed at

promoting cultural and scientific cooperation. However, critical works on its political, cultural

and scientific activities are scarce (See Aant Elzinga, “Introduction: Modes of Internationalism”

in Internationalism and Science, edited by Aant Elzinga and Catharina Landström, 3-20.

(London, 1996); Aant Elzinga, “Unesco and the Politics of Scientific Internationalism,” in ibid.,
 4

scientists who believed that UNESCO, and by ricochet Salam’s institute, were failing to respect

their international calling and had become politicized and beholden to radical groups determined

to attack Israel wherever and however they could.

“A boycott is a particular form of sanction against a country or a group in order to

pressure some change.” It is based on a theory of action that identifies a relationship between the

isolation of the target and the desired goal.4 This phenomenon, as part of international politics, is

relatively new. In the history of science, the best-known case regards the isolation of German

and Austrian intellectuals after the Great War. The chauvinistic stances adopted by scientific

intellectuals on both sides of the trenches broke down the kind of scientific internationalism that

had prevailed since ca. 1870. As Forman has shown, scientific internationalism – like

nationalism – is always a political stance.5 Boycotts act as a negation of scientific

89-131. In spite of its importance for the history of UNESCO, there is only one scholarly study

devoted to the so-called Israel Resolutions and the boycott that followed, written from the

international relations perspective (Clare Wells, The UN, UNESCO and the Politics of

Knowledge (London, 1987). Histories of UNESCO have systematically ignored the issue

(Fernando Valderrama. A History of UNESCO (Paris, 1995).

4
J. Haricombe Lorrain, and F.W. Lancaster, Out in the Cold. Academic Boycotts and Isolation of

South Africa (Arlington, VA, 1995), 1-2.

5
Paul Forman, “Scientific Internationalism and the Weimar Physicists: The Ideology and Its

Manipulation in Germany after World War I,” Isis 64 (1973): 151-80. Catharina Landström,

"Internationalism between Two Wars," in Internationalism and Science, Elzinga and Landström,

(cit. n. 3), 54. Also Daniel Kevles, “‘Into Hostile Political Camps’: The Reorganization of

International Science in World War I." Isis 62, (1971): 47-60.

 5

internationalism. Despite the potential interest in international relations of science, the literature

on scientific boycotts is practically non-existent, especially in the period after World War Two.6

This paper tackles three related questions regarding a scientific boycott. First, I am

concerned with the organizations of the boycott as well as the criteria and reasons scientists have

to boycott certain institutions instead of others. I shall argue that the motivations for the boycott

concerned essentially the image of the ICTP as a center for Third World development rather than

as a research institution. Such motivations never, or almost never, arose in an explicit way. Thus,

the boycott will allow us investigate how the scientific community reacted when the Centre was

trapped by a major crisis in UN politics, and also to scrutinize the workings of scientific

internationalism in the second half of the twentieth century. Second, I investigate how the

boycotting scientists moved the boundary between science and politics in order to suit their interests

and ideologies. Such boundary-work served as a basis to defend Mertonian norms such as the need

to keep science free from politics and the identification of science with the values of Western

6
Perhaps the only exception is the sanctions against the racist regime in South Africa

(Haricombe and Lancaster. Out in the Cold. (cit. n. 4)). The effects of the boycott upon South

Africa are a source of major debates. Some authors have studied the activities of the boycotting

activists, concluding that sanctions alone do not guarantee the desired effects. (P. Wallensteen,

“Characteristics of economic sanctions,” in A Multi-method Introduction to International

Politics, edited by W.D. Coplin and C.W. Kegley, (Chicago IL, 1971), 128-254; M.P. Doxey,

International Sanctions and International Enforcement (New York, 1980). Others criticize

scientific collaboration because science and scientists are pivotal for the prolongation of the

racist government (Yngve Nordvelle, “The Academic Boycott of South Africa Debate: science

and social practice,” Studies in Higher Education 15, N.3 (1990): 253-272).
 6

democracies.7 I suggest opposing the “politicization of science” was not only aimed at keeping

international scientific institutions politically neutral; rather, they purported to define “ideologically

correct ” science in the context of international exchange of scientific knowledge.8 Finally I

describe how the center handled the boycott, exploring Salam’s strategies to use the boycott in

order to stabilize the center financially. As we shall see, despite the disruption caused by the

boycott, it provided Salam with an instrument to negotiate successfully with UNESCO, and to

ensure finacial support from the Organization..

The UNESCO Resolutions: The “November Diplomatic Revolution”

In the two decades between 1950 and 1970, decolonization gave the UN and its technical

agencies a new composition. The emergence of a new majority, and the controversial character

of some of the issues it raised, became a source of high tension within the system. The UN was

transformed into a forum for the confrontation of the radical regimes in the Third World and

7
See Robert K. Merton, “Science and technology in a democratic order,” Journal of Legal and

Political Socilogy, 1: 15-26. On the relation of boundary-work with Merton’s norms see Thomas

F. Gieryn, “Boundaries of Science,” in Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, ed. Sheila

Jasanoff et al. (Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1995), 393-443. See also

Gieryn, Cultural Boudaries of Science. Credibility on the line (Chicago: University of Chicago

Press, 1999).
8
Michael Gordin, Walter Grunden, Mark Walker and ZouYue Wang, “ ‘Ideologically correct’

science,” in Science and Ideology. A Comparative History, ed. Mark Walker (London, New

York: Routledge, 2003), 35-65.

 7

former colonial countries.9 By the end of 1960s, the Third World commanded more than two

thirds of the votes in the UN General Assembly, UNESCO, the Food and Agriculture

Organization, and the World Health Organization.

The new states gained assertiveness in international scenarios under the leadership of

young, charismatic revolutionaries.10 For the first time, bloc positions and initiatives challenged

the “existing institutional order.”11 The strategic alliance between some Arab states and the Pan-

African movement catalyzed the dreams of the Bandung Conference (1955): to unite the Third

World against colonizers, neo-imperialism, and repressive regimes backed by the latter.

The confrontation in the UN reached a peak when, in 1974, after the Yon

Kippur/Ramadan war, the General Assembly and UNESCO’s General Conference approved a

number of resolutions against Israel and South Africa. Most of the African states developed

angry anti-Israel sentiments because of its close relationship with the white dominated regimes

of South Africa and Rhodesia, on one hand, and Portugal and the United States, on the other. As

an analyst pointed out in 1975, “Israel was considered too much part of the Western world. […]

9
Between 1954 and 1974 the number of UNESCO Member States increased from 70 to almost

130. In 1960 only, 17 new states were admitted.

10
Just to mention a few of the names: Egyptian Gamal Abd al Nasir, Patrice Lumumba from

Congo, and Fidel Castro from Cuba.

11
In the context of UNESCO, Wells defines it as: “matters of political representation and

legitimacy,” closely related to “the challenge to established patterns of resources allocation, that

is, explicit questioning of the political ends which may be served by extensibly technical

activity,” Wells, The UN, UNESCO and the Politics of Knowledge (cit. n. 3), 5.
 8

[It] appeared to be virtually the fifty-first state of the United States… In that respect Israel

seemed a piece of the West deposited in the heart of the Third World.”12 This revolt against the

traditional order in the UN institutional structure I call here the “diplomatic November

Revolution.”13

The tone was set by the UN in New York. The General Assembly requested that the

Secretary General establish contacts with the Palestinian Liberation Organisation “on all matters

concerning the ‘Question of Israel’.” Yasir Arafat was invited to address the Assembly and, a

year later, in 1975, the Assembly passed a resolution condemning Zionism “as a form of racism

and racial discrimination.”14 Furthermore, the PLO was admitted to the International Labour

Organisation, another UN agency that was increasingly opposed by the United States.

12
Ali A. Mazui, “Black Africa and the Arabs,” Foreign Affairs 53, no. 4 (1975): 725-742. See

also Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr., A Concise History of the Middle East, Fourth Edition ed (Boulder,

San Francisco, Oxford, 1991).

13
The US and the UK withdrawals from UNESCO were motivated by this kind of manifestation

of Anti-Western movements. The “free flow of information” debate exacerbated this

confrontation (see Elzinga, “Unesco and the Politics of Scientific Internationalism,” (cit. n. 3),

114-115). Another instance was the confrontation around the Rio Declaration on the

Establishment of a New International Order (1974).

14
A similar resolution had been adopted in Kampala by the Assembly of Heads of State of the

Organisation of African Unity. For a complete version of the resolutions see UN Doc.

A/RES/3236 (XXIX), Nov. 22, 1974 and UN Doc. A/RES/3379 (XXX), Nov. 10, 1975, in J.N.

Moore, The Arab-Israeli Conflict. Readings and Documents. Abridged and Revised Edition

(Princeton, NJ, 1977).

 9

Concomitantly, the UN suspended South Africa from its Assembly because of its racial policies,

as a token of the qui pro quo alliance.15

Similarly, the 1974 UNESCO General Conference held in Paris produced two major

outcomes. Firstly it saw the election of Amadou Mahtar M’Bow from Senegal. Secondly, three

resolutions attacking Israel were approved. It is worth describing at least their most general

points. The first “Israel Resolution” “invite[d] the Director General to withhold assistance from

Israel in the field of education, science and culture until such time as it scrupulously respects the

resolution and decisions of the Executive Board and the General Conference.” This referred to

decisions regarding the archaeological excavations carried out by Israel at Muslim sites in

Jerusalem, in violation of the 1967 UN and UNESCO resolutions. In addition, the conference

condemned Israel for violating the rights of the population of the occupied Arab territories to

“national and cultural life.” However, the bitter attacks against UNESCO originated when the

United States, Canada and Israel introduced a draft resolution asking that they be included “in

the list of countries entitled to participate in the European regional activities in which the

representative character of States is an important factor.” On 20th November, the United States

and Canada were admitted, while Israel was turned down.16 The rejection was interpreted as an

effective exclusion of Israel from UNESCO.

15
The December 1975 issue of the UNESCO Courier advertised two studies sponsored by that

agency: one on “Racism and apartheid in southern Africa” and another on “South Africa and

Namibia and Portuguese Colonialism in Africa: the end of an era.”

16
The draft Resolution was voted in the Commission for Social Sciences, Humanities and

Culture with the following results: 85 against; 2 in favor (Israel and Paraguay); 11 Abstentions

(Austria, China, Australia, France, Honduras, Chile, Finland, Japan, Nepal, Switzerland,
 10

The United States Department of State, through its Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger,

objected at once, stressing that these moves meant the “politicisation of UNESCO.” The New

York Times echoed declarations of US and Israeli diplomats on “the tyranny of the majority” and

the UN as the “World center for Anti-Semitism,” while the editorial pages denounced the way in

which the Arab bloc “and its allies, on behalf of the PLO, amassed votes of vengeance against

Israel.”17 Virtually without exception, the discourse of the American foreign affairs top officers and

the mass media led to the identification of the “politicization of UNESCO ” with the majority’s

imposition, namely the Third World countries and “its allies” – the communists and the terrorist

organization PLO. As Robert Jordan, an American UN research director, observed some years later

“… for the United States to bemoan the ‘politicization’ of UNESCO (or ILO) is merely a way of

saying that U.S. influence has been on the wane. ”. 18 The United States declared that it would stop

Uruguay). The socialist countries voted against, and many European countries were not present

in the room at the time of the vote; see Moore, The Arab-Israeli Conflict (cit. n. 12).
17
Anon., “Kissinger Role on U.N. Force Related,” New York Times, 1 December 1974, 14 . The

following day, the editorial reported that “the Arab bloc and its communist and African allies

ha[d] succeeded in politicising heretofore non-political UNESCO” (Editorial, “P.L.O. vs.

UNESCO,” New York Times, 23 November 1974, 30).

18
Anon., The New York Times, 22 November 1974, 6. In a speech at the Institute of World

Affairs, University of Wisconsin in 1975, Kissinger insisted that the “Third World sanctions

against Israel” was the expression of the “heavy politicisation” of UNESCO. Robert S. Jordan,

“Boycott Diplomacy: The US, the UN , and UNESCO,” Public Administration Review, July-

August, (1984): 283-291 .

 11

paying its contribution to UNESCO if the Resolutions were not lifted.19 France and Switzerland,

in spite of their ambiguous position during the General Conference, stated similar intentions.20

Director-General M’Bow replied to the attacks by pointing out that Israel had not been “excluded

from UNESCO,” as might be inferred from the presentation of the resolutions in the mass media.

Its exclusion was from “the list of countries entitled to participate in activities in which the

representative character of states is an important factor.”21 The statement was also published in

the New York Times but it passed unheeded: even the distinction was significant for it still

allowed for the exclusion of Israel from some UNESCO activities.

Jewish intellectuals had been mobilizing support against an Arab boycott ever since the

Yom Kippur/Ramadan war. A number of voices within the Israeli political sector began a

campaign to push the Israeli and US governments – as well as the United Kingdom, France and

Canada – to adopt appropriate counter-measures. In the words of Danny Halperin, founder in

1975 of the Israeli “Economic Warfare Authority,” the “philosophy” was “not to act, but to

activate.” Years later, he outlined the effectiveness of this strategy:

I think it would be true to say that before 1973 people in Israel looked at the boycott [of

Israel] as a nuisance. Something one could use to badmouth those applying it, but

nobody was involved in a real struggle against the boycott… But after 1973, we all

19
Anon., “Kissinger Warnes Majority in U.N. on U.S. Support,” New York Times, 15 July 1975,

1,4-5. M’Bow vehemently criticised the US (Paul Hoffmann, “UNESCO Prodding U.S. on

Payments,” New York Times, 21 October 1975, 9).

20
Anon., “U.S. Threat to UNESCO budget,” Times Educational Supplement, 6 December 1974,

16.
21
Amadou M. M'Bow, “A Statement on Israel,” UNESCO Courier, January, 1975 .
 12

realized that the boycott is not only a problem but a danger as well.22

A central issue was the mobilization of the public in the US and Europe. As Susan Rolef

eloquently put it: “The logic behind this approach was that the more noise one made around the

issue, both in Israel and abroad [the better]…With regard to North America and Europe this was

part of a broader approach which sought to convince the public opinion that the Arabs were up to

no good, and that the West could and should stand up to them.”23 Although the initiative

involved the three major American Jewish organizations, it was led by “panic-stricken persons”

from outside the Israeli government, and “in cooperation with well-wishers from abroad to make

greater effort than ever before to face up to the Arab-boycott on the legal, practical and moral

levels.”24 In addition, since 1974, Jewish associations in the United States, especially the

American -Jewish Congress, reacted definitively against the “Diplomatic November

Revolution.” Several demonstrations were organized in protest against the UN’s invitation to the

PLO to address the General Assembly. Articles and reports about the Arab boycott and the “new

Arab strategy” in the UN appeared every month on the pages of the Congress Monthly.25 But the

22
Danny Halperin, “Combatting the Arab Boycott -- An Historical Survey,” in Freedom of

Trade and the Arab Boycott, edited by Susan H. Rolef (Jerusalem, 1985).
23
Susan H. Rolef, Israel's anti-boycott policy (Jerusalem, 1989), 36 (my italics).
24
Rolef, Israel's anti-boycott policy, (cit. n. 21), 45.
25
The journal of the American-Jewish Congress. Joseph B. Shatta, “The New Arab Strategy”

Congress Monthly 41, no. 11 (Nov. 1974): 8. See also, Richard Cohen, “The American Jewish

Congress vs. the Arab Boicot”, Congress Monthly 43, no. 1 (Dec. 1975): 9-11; Anon., “Fighting
 13

conservatives were not the only ones who condemned the UN and UNESCO; also liberal writers

– “the New York intellectuals”26 – deplored the General Assembly’s decision. Collaborating

with UNESCO was presented by intellectuals and scientists in Israel as endorsing its policy

towards Israel: “Israelis are disappointed at the lack of reaction from the scientific community

abroad but grimly resigned to their increasing isolation,” reported an observer.27

The UNESCO resolutions were also widely repudiated by intellectuals across the political

spectrum on both sides of the ocean. The day after the resolution was voted, the New York Times

published a one-page advertisement with the heading “WE PROTEST”, condemning UNESCO

“in view of the increasing open and blatant anti-Israel bias shown by the recent decisions.”28

More than 100 intellectuals signed it, including scientists like Hans Bethe, Owen Chamberlain,

Robert Hofstadter, Isidor Rabi, Edward Teller and Eugene Wigner.29 It was followed by another

statement with a similar text signed in Paris by European intellectuals of all political affiliations,

from Raymond Aron to Jean Paul Sartre. In early 1975, an ad hoc committee, convened by

the Arab Boicot”, Congress Monthly 42, no. 10 (Oct. 1975): 2; Anon., “UNESCO Assailed”,

Congress Monthly 41, no. 12 (Dec. 1974).

26
David A. Hollinger Science, Jews, and Secular Culture. Studies in Mid-twentieth-century

American Intellectual History (Princeton, 1996), 8.

27
John Hall and Peter Newmark, “Problems in Israel,” Nature 252 (December 20, 1974): 626-

627.
28
“We Protest,” New York Times, 21 November 1974. The advertisement, with more signatures,

reappeared in the following weeks.

29
Anon., “UNESCO Adopt Resolution to Deny Israel Cultural Aid,” New York Times, 21

November 1974.
 14

Nobel Laureate André Wolf, and including intellectuals like Kenneth Arrow, Julian Huxley, and

writers Ernesto Sabato and Ignazio Silone, was set up to “look for the means and ways to bring

UNESCO back to its vocation.”30

Somewhat ironically it was the ICTP itself that, at just this time, drew attention to its

financial links with UNESCO. Salam had always used the scientific journals and magazines to

call for further support for his institute. Just a few months before the 1974 General Conference, a

long article about the ICTP appeared in the pages of Nature. “Financial support is shared in

about equal proportions by the IAEA, UNESCO and the Italian government,” the author wrote.31

On November 8th, just twelve days before the UNESCO scandal, another article in the same

journal detailed the finances of the ICTP: “UNESCO support, although modest at first, is, at least

formally, ten years old and UNESCO pursues a policy of regarding its financial aid as no more

than seed money to get an institution ongoing.” It also pointed out the fragile situation in which

the Centre found itself due to its financial instability and the hard line adopted by some

delegations at UNESCO.32 Therefore, when the Israel Resolutions were approved, the scientists

knew that ICTP, an institute well-known for its concern for the Third World, depended on

UNESCO. In Israel, this knowledge produced among the scientific community the decision to

boycott the ICTP.33

30
“Rencontre pour l'Universalité de l'UNESCO,” undated, mimeo. ASP, Bath UNIT. G. 116,

ASP.
31
Anon, “Centre for practice of theory,” Nature 248 (March 22, 1974): 270-271.
32
Anon, “Support for Trieste,” Nature 252 (Novembre 8, 1974): 87.
33
Luciano Bertocchi to Abdus Salam (internal memo), 26 July, 1975, G. 118, Abdus Salam

Papers. Catalogued by the National Cataloguing Unit for the Archives of Contemporary
 15

The Boycott of the ICTP’s programs

In June 1975, science writer John Maddox reported: “I heard that a conference due to be held at

the ICTP during July has to be moved to Venice, simply because there are limits to the freedom

of international scientific centres, such as that at Trieste, which are supported by UNESCO, to

sponsor conferences at which Israelis may or may not attend.”34 In 1975, Salam arranged 60th

birthday celebrations for Fred Hoyle. Soon after the announcement of the event, Israeli scientists

made it clear that they would not visit the ICTP because of its links with UNESCO, which had

“excluded” Israel. The Israeli scientists were led by Salam’s former pupil, Yuval Ne’eman, then

President of Tel-Aviv University. In early 1975 Ne’eman was elected “Corresponding Member”

of the ICTP, presumably as a manoeuvre to demonstrate that the Centre wanted to stay away

from the political feud at UNESCO. Ne’eman replied stating that he would not be willing to visit

or accept any honor from the Centre.35 After a few months, the Centre was flooded with letters

from Israeli physicists who followed the line taken by Ne’eman. Thus, Hoyle’s birthday

conference was moved to Venice. This was just the beginning of a difficult year for the ICTP.

During 1975, the ICTP scheduled sessions in complex analysis, solid-state physics,

nuclear physics, plasma physics and high-energy physics. By mid-December 1974 a number of

American and Israeli physicists and mathematicians had resigned as organizers of the ICTP

Scientists; catalogue no. 99/4/1. Library of the “Abdus Salam” International Centre for

Theoretical Physics Archives, Miramare-Trieste, Italy (hereafter cited as ASP).

34
John Maddox, “Affront to freedom in Science,” Times Educational Supplement, 1975.
35
Yuval Ne'eman to Salam, 13 May 1975, G.119 ASP.
 16

courses, and refused to attend any activity there. The boycott badly affected virtually all the

programs and activities.

Lipman Bers, a world-authority in complex analysis from Columbia University, took an

openly hostile position. He sent a strong letter of resignation with copies to a large number of his

colleagues.36 He convinced his good friend and eminent mathematician Lars Varedian Ahlfors,

to follow in his footsteps: as he explained to Salam: “the fact that some of my closest friends are

staying away makes my participation quite unattractive.”37 Wolfgang Fuchs, professor at Cornell

and the organizer of the course, did likewise: “the only way of protesting that [went] beyond

empty words [was] resigning.”38 More letters followed, and the trickle of resignations became a

flood from American mathematicians.

The Solid State Winter Course showed a similar pattern. In late April 1975, Walter Kohn

and Norton Lang, from the University of California at San Diego, both central figures to the

course, added their names to the list of boycotters. An attempt was made to reorganize the

course by replacing the Americans with lecturers from Spain and Latin America, and requesting

that remaining speakers assume additional sessions. The situation became critical in December

1975 when, a matter of weeks before the course was due to start, Leo Falicov, an Argentinean

solid state physicist who worked in the United States, resigned. Falicov was the leading speaker,

in charge of fifteen lectures. John Ziman, the organizer of the course, had to ask two Spanish and

Latin American speakers to fill the breach.

36
Lipman Bers to AS, 20 January 1975, G.118, ASP.
37
Lars Ahlfors to Salam, 27 January 1975, G.118, ASP.
38
Wolfgang Fuchs to Salam, 12 December 1974, G.116, ASP.
 17

The case of the nuclear physics course mirrored those of the mathematics and solid state

courses. Very few scientists apart from the Americans the and Israelis joined the boycott.

However, the absence of researchers from leading institutions in North America or from the

Weizmann Institute, badly disrupted the courses. The ICTP was precisely a space where Third

World scientists could meet colleagues from leading centers in the West. Young European

scientists were attracted to the ICTP meetings due mainly to the presence of leading physicists,

most of them working in American universities. Their resignation was a terrible blow to their

expectations.

The boycott against the ICTP took place while a big revolution in high-energy physics

was under way. High-energy physics was the main field of research and activities at the ICTP

because of Salam’s group. The 1974-76 events have been analyzed by various authors, including

insiders, largely concerned with the intellectual development of particle physics and the relations

between theory, experiments and machines. 39 On 11th November 1974, two American

laboratories investigating the e+e-(positron-electron) annihilation detected an enormous

resonance around 3.1 GeV. Burton Richter’s group at the Stanford Linear Accelerator (SLAC),

called the new particle Psi (ψ), and the Brookhaven National Laboratory-MIT collaboration, led

by Samuel Ting, called it J. A few days later, the Italian laboratory at Frascati confirmed the

discovery of the “J/ψ” particle. The outcome was the establishment of charmed quark and

quantum chromodynamics, the late twentieth-century model of particle interactions. It was the

39
On the “November Revolution” see Andrew Pickering, Constucting Quarks: A Sociological

History of Particle Physics (Chicago, 1984), 180-188, 213-228 and 253- 281; Lillian Hoddeson,

Laurie Brown, Michael Riordan, and Max Dresden, eds. The Rise of the Standard Model.

Particle Physics in the 1960s and 1970s (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
 18

community of particle physicists who coined the term the “November Revolution” in high-

energy physics to refer to this period.

A few weeks after the J/ψ discovery Salam and Jogesh Pati, his Indian collaborator,

offered a particle spectroscopy alternative to the one predicted by the charm model. They

claimed that it was necessary to begin a search in the energy regions in which their model

predicted the existence of new particles. Salam hoped the colour-gluons would be detected as

well as charm. Salam proposed holding a meeting in Trieste during the summer of 1975. Its title

was “Phenomenology in High Energy Physics and the Missing Particles,” referring to the

possible companions of the J/ψs. Leading theoreticians and experimentalists were invited,

including Richter, but the Americans and the Israelis refused to participate. Some influential

theorists in Israel like Ne’eman and David Horn had already rejected any collaboration with the

ICTP, as did Haim Harari. Refusing any collaboration with the Centre, he told Salam that “the

only possible reaction of the civilized world must be to reject any participation of UNESCO in

any …event.” He also advised Salam that he intended to circulate the letter in which he had

discouraged the participation of scientists in ICTP activities.40 Salam tried to persuade him and

the others to stop the boycott pointing out that it would damage the Centre and not UNESCO.

The new particles were discussed in August at a major SLAC conference. Both Salam

and Pati felt excluded from the debates being held in the United States, not because their model

was rejected, but because it was being utterly ignored and the chance to explain it in Trieste

denied. Harari gave a talk in which he referred to “[t]he many versions of the Han-Nambu

color,” stressing that “[a]ll such models suffer from common difficulties.” Thus the only tacit

40
Haim Harari to Abdus Salam, 4 February 1975, B.246, ASP; my italics.
 19

reference to the Pati-Salam model was in a reference to ten models that had to be discarded.

After a short comment he concluded that: “The rejection of the possibility that the -particles

are colored, returns us to the conventional theoretical framework of hadron physics.” Indeed,

Salam knew that alternative theories needed advocates, and that direct access to experimentalists

was crucial. He learned about SLAC’s official stance, through an internal memo signed at the

laboratory by 15 physicists, stating that “no experimental results obtained at SLAC could be

exhibited at a UNESCO institute like Trieste.”41 This was the coup de grace to the Trieste

meeting and actually the only ICTP activity that was cancelled as a result of the boycott.

In short, the boycott seriously disrupted all the activities held at the Centre between 1975

and 1976.

The proponents of the boycott

Although there was no explicit coordination of the boycott of the ICTP, there was a clear

national pattern: it was spearheaded by Israeli physicists who asked their American colleagues to

join them.42 Further, in each sub-discipline there was at least one promoter of the boycott: Kohn

(solid-state physics) circulated letters urging his colleagues, including Falicov, not to visit the

41
Abdus Salam to J. Harrison, 28 July 1975, G.118, ASP.
42
The idea of a conspiracy did arise in the minds of those in charge of ICTP’s activities. The

most explicit reference to someone pulling strings in order to damage the Centre came from Stig

Lundqvist. He thought that Walter Kohn was behind the boycott (Lundqvist to Budinich, 27 May

1975, G.121, ASP.). After all, Norton Lang, who joined him in the boycott, had been his pupil. It

is not clear whether Ziman felt the same way.

 20

ICTP; Bers (Complex Analysis), Harari (High-energy physics), and T.E.O. Ericson (Nuclear

physics) –the latter from CERN and one of the few physicists in Europe that boycotted the

Centre– sent similar letters urging their colleagues to follow their example.43 There were no

contacts between boycotting scientists from different sub-disciplines; in this sense the

phenomenon was local.

The motivations of those promoting the boycott were very different. Lipman Bers was

born in Latvia, where he was politically active. In 1940, due to his Jewish background, he

immigrated to the United States, where he was supported by a Yiddish research organization. For

his contributions in complex analysis he was one of the leading mathematicians of his day.

Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science since 1965, in 1972 he was

appointed Davies Professor of Mathematics at Columbia University. Bers led the creation of the

Human Rights Committee of the National Academy of Sciences. He was left-wing liberal and

widely respected among his American colleagues as a mathematician and as someone

commitment to humanitarian causes. 44 His friendship with Ahlfors dated from 1951.

Wolfgang Fuchs was another émigré from the Nazi government. After studying in

Cambridge, he went to the United States, where he pursued a brilliant career at Cornell

43
T.E.O. Ericson to Salam, 18 December 1974; and Bers to Salam, 20 January 1975, G.118,

ASP. Harari does not recall what his personal involvement in the affair was, but he remembers

sending copies of his “very strong letter to Salam” to other speakers (Haim Harari, email to

author).
44
William Abikoff, “Lipman Bers,” Notices of the AMS 42, no. 1 (January 1995): 8-18; Carol

Corillon and Irwin Kra, “On the Social Activism of Lipman Bers,” Ibid.: 18-21.
 21

University. He was well known for his political activism. In Ithaca, he was member of the local

Chapter of Amnesty International. More significant, during the Cold War he promoted contacts

between American, Russian and Chinese mathematicians.45 Neither Bers, nor Fuchs was a

Zionist. Fuchs, in fact, had signed letters against the violation of human rights by Israel.

Therefore, their goal was not necessarily to support Israel’s policy through the boycott, but

certainly to oppose to the decision made at UNESCO. Excluding a country from the United

Nations violated the most elementary principles defended by human rights activists.

Walter Kohn’s case was different. Born in Austria to an orthodox Jewish family, he

studied in a Jewish school in Austria in the 1930s. When the Nazis occupied the country, he

emigrated to England, and his parents died in Auschwitz. After the war, he studied first in

Canada and later in Harvard . His identity was always a matter of permanent reflection for Kohn:

“In terms of my identity, I see myself as an American, a world citizen, a Jew and a former

Austrian.” Yet, his strongest ties were with the Jewish culture and community. In San Diego he

worked in several Jewish projects. In Israel, where he “had some of [his] closest friends,” Kohn

had a reference point.46 His friends advised him of the position of Israeli scientists towards the

ICTP, and he joined them from California.

45
J. Milne Anderson, David Drasin and Linda R. Sons, “Wolfgang Heinrich Johannes Fuchs

(1915-1997),” Notices of the AMS 45, no. 11 (December ,1998): 1472-1478.

46
Tore Frängsmyr (ed.), Les Prix Nobel, available in

http://www.nobel.se/chemistry/laureates/1998/kohn-autobio.html [in 2004]. Karin Hanta “From

Exile to Excellence”, Austria Culture Vol. 9 No. 1 (January/February 1999).

 22

Despite the differences, we should notice a common factor. Bers, Fuchs and Kohn were

émigrés. They had learned first hand about the politicization of German academic world.

Furthermore, they strove not only against the “de-politicization” of academia. As scientific

émigrés they struggled for the secularization of academic life in order to confront the anti-

Semitism that prevailed in American universities in the 1930s and 40s. The importance of

keeping scientific institutions “politically neutral” had been crucial for their survival. Those who

presented the Israel Resolutions as the “politicization of UNESCO” thus brought back bitter

memories to the minds of several Jewish scholars. The way the Resolutions were presented to

these scientists was very effective in gaining their unquestioning support.

In high-energy physics Haim Harari overtly promoted the boycott. Privately Ne’eman

also campaigned against the ICTP, but he preferred keeping a low profile; Harari took the

mission of mobilizing high-energy physics in the United States. Harari had finished his PhD in

Israel in 1965, and visited the ICTP that same year. He became an Associate Member in 1967,

although he only visited the Centre to attend a few conferences,not to do research.47 In 1974-75,

he was a visiting theoretician at SLAC and it was from there that he energetically campaigned

against UNESCO and the ICTP. Wolfgang Panofsky, one of the most prominent Jewish

physicists in the West Coast, was director of the Laboratory. Its Deputy Director, Sidney D.

Drell joined other scientists who signed a “Statement on UNESCO” stating that they would “not

participate in, cooperate with, support, or contribute to any UNESCO programs or Activities”

unless the decision to exclude Israel was reversed.48 As we saw, several physicists from that

47
ICTP, ICTP Annual Reports, 1967, 1968, ICTP Archives.
48
A Statement on UNESCO, Papers of Professor Sidney Drell, SLAC Archives.
 23

laboratory refused to present their results at the Trieste center. SLAC did not oppose that

decision, which can be interpreted as tacit support by its directorship.

American scientific academies were also enrolled in the issue. In early 1975 a joint

Committee of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the National Academy of

Sciences was appointed to recommend what action should be taken regarding the political

“misuse of UNESCO.” Harvey Brooks, president of the American Academy, reported to Salam

about the angry feelings among his American colleagues “due to the politicization of

UNESCO.”49 He asserted that although he would try to help the Centre, “this new turn place[d]

grave obstacles.” The Centre should be prepared for a massive boycott.50 Most of the boycotting

scientists of the ICTP belonged to at least one of these academies. The “exclusion” of Israel

meant, in their view, an occupation of the free cultural field by the Third World and the

Communists. Jewish-American scientists found a chance to contribute to the defense of Israel on

49
Harvey Brooks, Letter read at the Annual Meeting of the American Academy on 14 May 1975,

G.116, ASP.
50
Harvey Brooks to Salam, 2 December 1974, G.116, ASP. Se also Harvey Brooks, Letter read

at the Annual Meeting of the American Academy on 14 May 1975, G.116, ASP. The joined

committee considered the possibility of having a meeting between scholars and scientists from

both industrialized and developing countries, “under the impartial aegis of the Swedish

Academy, but the idea of a conference was finally dropped in favor of a more thorough long

range approach through the carefully planned commission, discussion, and publication of scholar

papers” (S.R. Davis, “Report of the Special Committee on UNESCO.” In Records of the

Academy 1975-1976 (Cambridge (MA), 1976).

 24

their own battlefield. Scientists aligned themselves with other members of the Jewish Diaspora:

they were also part of the machinery that was “activated” against the “Arab boycott.”

Salam’s supporters in Europe

Most members of national communities outside the United States and Israel refused to join the

boycott. The Europeans were critical about the Resolutions, but moderate with regards to the

idea of taking action against UNESCO programs. For several years, the solid-state physics and

the mathematics courses had been coordinated by Europeans. John Ziman, a British Fellow of

the Royal Society and the Swede Stig Lunqvist had been collaborating with the Centre since the

end of the 1960s. Both had experience in programs sponsored by UNESCO; for instance,

UNESCO had sent Ziman to Cuba as a scientific expert. They considered that the Israel

resolutions represented a big mistake on behalf of the Third World representatives and posed

grave obstacles for the development of the ICTP. Throughout the two years of the boycott,

Ziman and Lunqvist strove to explain to their colleagues that the UNESCO resolution has no

“practical effects” whatsoever for the organizations under her tutelage and that there was no

“strong administrative links between” ICTP and UNESCO.51 Furthermore, both scientists were

convinced that Walter Kohn was behind the boycott of their course. Hence, Ziman’s reaction to

the resignation of Norton Lang, who had been Kohn’s pupil, was severe:

If you are seriously concerned about the general policies of all the various organisations,

corporations, institutions, governments etc. that happen to give support to your scientific

51
J. Ziman to Henry Ehrenreich, 15 January 1976, G.118.
 25

work, you should investigate these thoroughly and decide where your moral allegiances

really lie.52

Falicov’s reasons for boycotting the Centre added another ingredient to the Anti-Israel

affair, namely the exclusion of a nation like Taiwan from the ICTP activities. Falicov, however,

considered this a violation of the “principle of universality” that should prevail in science.53

Ziman perceived the danger of this argument and warned Salam: “I wrote back immediately

reassuring him as far as I possibly could and putting him right over Israel but the linking with

Taiwan is a very serious danger, since we have, indeed, excluded people from there.”54 In line

with the replacement of Taiwan by China in all UN agencies in 1971, the ICTP had to follow UN

rules. Budinich too replied to Falicov, explaining the legal reasons why the Centre could not

invite non UN-members.55 Ziman knew that this argument could open a new front in an already

difficult battle, igniting inconvenient debates about the real nature of scientific internationalism.

The ICTP was unwilling to open a discussion regarding which countries could and could not

participate in the ICTP activities.

Other scientists in Europe preferred to maintain UNESCO programs, like those sponsored

at ICTP, independent of the political feud ignited by the General Conference. While Harari and

the SLAC group boycotted the ICTP, Leon Van Hove, former director of the CERN Theory

52
J. Ziman to Norton Lang, 20 May 1975, G.118, ASP.
53
This “principle of universality,” as a token of the idealized scientific internationalism, was

invoked by a number of scientists, including those against the boycott.

54
J. Ziman to Salam, 2 December 1975, G.120, ASP.
55
P. Budini to Leo M. Falicov, 4 February 1976, G.122, ASP.
 26

Division, disapproved of the episode at UNESCO, “as a personal position,” but he “did not feel

that [his] contacts and doings with the Centre should be affected.”56 Similar reactions came from

mathematicians in England; J. Eells, coordinator or the Mathematics courses at the ICTP and a

professor in London, informed Salam that the general position within the American Mathematics

Society was to boycott any UNESCO affiliated organization, which he deplored.57 M.J. Field, a

colleague of Eells’, disagreed with the outcome of the 1974 General Conference, but was very

upset with Fuchs’ resignation.58 The sharp contrast between Americans and Europeans was

mirrored in music: the public discussion between virtuoso Yehudi Menuhin, on one hand, and his

colleagues in America Isaac Stern, Arthur Rubinstein and Leonard Bernstein on the other, is a

case in point; Menuhin, then president of the Music Council of UNESCO, refused to resign, as

his American colleagues urged him to do.59

An initiative taken by Victor Weisskopf (in the United States), Aage Bohr (in

Copenhagen), Alfred Kastler (in France) and John Ziman demonstrate their concern about the

future of scientific internationalism as a consequence of the boycott. Weisskopf, an Austrian

émigré who had built close ties with post-war European physicists as Director of CERN in the

early 1960s, decided to write a letter to Physics Today on the grave consequences of such a

56
Leon Van Hove to Salam, 3 February 1975, G.120, ASP.
57
J. Eells to Salam, 18 January 1974, G.120, ASP.
58
M.J. Field to Salam, 2 January 1975, G.120, ASP.
59
The exchange of open letters in the pages of the New York Times spanned three months in

early 1975; see, for instance the following dates: 19 January, 18; 11 February, 2; 14 February, 5;

23 February, 12.
 27

“division of the scientific community.”60 After long discussions about its terms, he, Kastler, Bohr

and Ziman published the letter in June 1976. It was the only public statement in favor of the

ICTP addressed to the scientific community. But the message went beyond the support to the

Centre; the authors were concerned not only with the division between First and Third World

scientists, but also between the scientific community in Europe and the US.

For intellectuals in Europe, UNESCO had been important in offering a new space for

international cooperation within Europe. In particular, UNESCO had been involved in the

negotiations to create CERN and therefore in the reconstruction of European science. For

scientists like Van Hove and Kastler the fact that UNESCO was “politicized” was not new. The

point was whether politics really obstructed international scientific exchange. American

scientists were more skeptical about multinational endeavors in general, and UNESCO in

particular. A study of sales of UNESCO publications for 1968 indicated that the most sizable

readership was in Europe, while attentiveness was greater in Latin America than in North

America.61 Europeans felt that the American and Israeli scientists were politicizing the issue,

while the Americans and Israelis argued that it was Arabs who had politicized UNESCO. All

were violently against the “November Diplomatic Revolution,” but their different experience and

interests with regards to UNESCO led to sharply different attitudes towards the ICTP.

60
Kastler, in France, went even further to suggest a letter urging not only not to boycott

organizations affiliated to UNESCO, but “not to boycott UNESCO itself” (Kastler to Victor

Weisskopf, December 1975, G.120, ASP).

61
Elzinga, “Unesco and the Politics of Scientific Internationalism,” (cit. n. 3), 114.
 28

The anatomy of the boycott

The common argument calling for boycott of the Centre was UNESCO’s sponsorship. To enter

into the anatomy of the boycott we need to investigate which other scientific initiatives, in areas

similar to those pursued by the ICTP, were sponsored by UNESCO.

UNESCO sponsored, since the early 1950s, international activities related to the

exchange of scientific information and to the establishment of regional centers for the promotion

of scientific research. Since 1946, the International Council of Scientific Union (ICSU) had been

UNESCO’s consultant on international co-operation in science. Although its financial

dependence on that institution had decreased since then, for the 1975-76 fiscal year UNESCO

contributed US$ 560.000 to ICSU for advisory services and specific activities, which was twice

UNESCO’s contribution to ICTP.62

The International Union of Pure and Applied Physics (IUPAP) was the foremost

international association of physicists. ICSU channeled funds for physics events through IUPAP.

UNESCO’s official documents explicitly stated this collaboration, extending its commitment to

support ICSU’s partners: “Further financial support will be provided, as appropriate, to the

unions, associations and other organs of ICSU for the execution of specific activities.”63

IUPAP’s Reports also established the links between the Union and UNESCO, and, although it

concentrated on educational programs, the agreement gave no limit to subject areas.64

62
UNESCO, “Approved Programme and Budget 1975-1976” (Paris, 1975), 186, par. 2113.
63
UNESCO, Approved Programme and Budget 1975-1976” (cit. n. 60).
64
IUPAP, “Report on the 14th General Assembly.” (Washington D.C., 1973), 5.
 29

A significant, though not surprising feature of IUPAP was its Western constituency and

image. In 1972, 10 out of the 39 National Committees of IUPAP were in Third World countries,

and of the total number of votes, allocated according the number of shares belonging to each

country, the Third World had only 15 out of 102. By July 1975, Salam decided that it was worth

trying to expose the potential danger faced by ICSU and IUPAP if the boycott widened. He

wrote to his friend Richard Dalitz: “If the boycott of all UNESCO-sponsored institutions

continues, ICSU is going to have a very difficult time soon.”65 Assuming political, and moral

consistency on behalf of the boycotting scientists, the equation was simple: if ICSU was worth

protecting, the scientific community should lift the boycott against the ICTP. The assumption

proved to be wrong.

The only IUPAP Book of Nomination Forms Salam kept in his personal library in Trieste

was the 1975 issue, the contents of which are revealing.66 At least three nominations from

Israel’s IUPAP National Committee were presented for consideration by the Fifteenth General

Assembly, due to be held in Munich in 1975: A. Muny, for a post at the Commission on

Superconductors; W. Low for a post at the Commission on Magnetism; and Haim Harari, who

was nominated for membership at the Commission on Particles and Fields. The form was

presumably submitted in May 1975, thus after Harari started his campaign against the ICTP.

65
Salam to Dick Dalitz, 1 July 1975, G.119, ASP.
66
In Abdus Salam Personal Library, held in the “Abdus Salam” ICTP Library (AS 341.16

IUPAP).
 30

Another member of IUPAP throughout these years was Yuval Ne’eman.67 It is remarkable that

Salam did not expose this apparent contradiction of some the boycotting scientists. He

recognised that, in order to retain a foot in both fields, Third World development and First World

science, he had to ensure that certain boundaries were not transgressed.

This was not the only incongruity between the adduced reasons for boycotting the ICTP

and the attitude towards other UNESCO-sponsored scientific initiatives. The August 1975 SLAC

(high-energy physics) conference was partly sponsored by IUPAP. Salam built his hopes on the

SLAC-IUPAP-UNESCO connection, and wrote to the Assistant Director-General for Science,

Canadian J.M. Harrison; “If SLAC knows of IUPAP’s relation with UNESCO, they must have

withdrawn hostility to UNESCO. This is good news for our programmes next year.”68

A few months later, Salam learned that the boycott was provoked not just by the

connection with UNESCO, but also by something deeper. Immediately after the SLAC

conference, Salam received a letter from an attendee, Tai Tsun Wu, a Harvard researcher. He had

visited the Centre only a couple of times and his contacts with Salam were sporadic,69 but

“strange conversations” among some participants on “what to do about the Trieste Conference,”

elicited the letter. The official position was to boycott the Conference because it was sponsored

by UNESCO, Wu told Salam. But, then he added:

67
In 1971 Ne’eman organised an International Conference in Tel-Aviv partially supported by

the union through a grant of US$1000 (IUPAP, “Report on the 14th General Assembly” (cit. n.

32)).
68
Salam to J. Harrison, 28 July 1975, G.120, ASP.
69
Tai Tsum Wu to the author, email to author.
 31

Somebody then mentioned that the SLAC conference was also partially supported by

UNESCO, and that Harari was well aware of this. I could not judge the accuracy of this

statement, but it was in any case not challenged. After some further discussions, a pro-

Israel physicist finally admitted that the real reason for the boycott was not against

UNESCO, but because of your close tie to the developing countries, who were

responsible for kicking Israel out of UNESCO.70

Salam replied to Wu: “It had always puzzled me why Harari had taken such an initiative against

us… Your letter seems to make the issues a little clearer.”71

This letter deserves careful examination. The “politization” of an international cultural

institution such as UNESCO had been linked in the United States to the “tyranny of the

majority.” Accordingly, the developing countries “and its allies” put in jeopardy the normal

course of international cooperation. Wu’s letter allows us to learn how the boycotting scientists

translated such a link and defined “normality” in the scientific field. I should like to extend

Jessica Wang’s thesis to argue that their aim was to call for an “anti-Third World” science as a

discursive strategy to define a “politically correct” science.72 For the promoters of the boycott a

“politically correct” science was, thus, keeping scientific institutions neutral regarding any

political conflict, meanung science should not be used to upset existing power relations in

70
T.T. Wu to Salam, 22 September 1975, G.119, ASP (my italics).
71
Salam to T.T. Wu, 20-Oct-75, G.119, ASP.
72
Jessica Wang, American Science in an Age of Anxiety: Scientists, Anticommunism, and the

Cold War (Cambridge, MA, 1999).

 32

international politics. The exclusion from international scientific exchange of those who

threatened the status quo was a corollary of that norm.

What was Salam’s link to Third World regimes interested in “politicizing” UNESCO and

other international organizations? Salam was indeed the leader of the Third World cause in the

Western physics community, and the ICTP embodied such a crusade to modernise the

developing countries through science. But it is worth considering another facet of Salam’s life

and his links to the Third World. Salam’s ties to Pakistan were at the highest level; for over 14

years, he had been scientific adviser to three different presidents. In early 1972, Pakistan left the

Commonwealth and by November it had left the SEATO security pact. It was hoped that cutting

economic and military ties with Britain and the United States, would pave the way to a leading

position among Arab nations. After being appointed as Prime Minister in 1973, Zulfiqar Ali

Buttho made a radical turn towards the Middle East and North Africa, hoping to impede an

eventual recognition of Bangladesh and to finance a Pakistani nuclear bomb.73 In February 1974,

the Islamic Summit gathered at Lahore. Radical leaders of the Arab world convened: Arafat,

King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, Colonel Qaddafi, and Presidents Assad, Sadat and Boumedienne.74

Salam in fact disliked Buttho’s anti-Western views, rhetoric and actions, but his position

was unclear to those outside his immediate circle – after all, he continued being Chief Scientific

73
A. Kapur, Pakistan's Nuclear Development (London, 1987), 74, 150; Ian Talbot, Pakistan. A

Modern History (London, 1998), 238.

74
In addition, the young Libyan leader, in a packed stadium, spoke before the crowd regarding

Pakistan as the “citadel of Islam in Asia” and stating that “our resources are your resources”

(Talbot, Pakistan (cit. n. 70), 237).

 33

Adviser to the President of Pakistan. Ironically, he was linked by his fellows in the West with a

movement in his native country which he disagreed. In mid-1974, Salam resigned his position as

Presidential Adviser, and a few months later he resigned his membership of the National Science

Council – a body of which he had been part since 1963. His discrepancies with Buttho’s foreign

policy were not the cause, but rather his concern about the domestic policy of the new president.

Salam belonged to an Islamic heterodox sect called the Ahmadiyya Jammat. In 1974, an eight-

party coalition of the ‘ulama launched a campaign against the Ahmadiyaas, and as a

consequence the sect was officially legally expelled from Islam.75 Two of Salam’s lives clashed,

leaving him an easy target for attacks from both extremes, the populist Muslims in Pakistan, and

the “pro-Israel” physicists in the scientific community. The ICTP was scapegoated for Salam’s

conflicting and ambiguous links with both a Third World country striving to strengthen its ties

with the Islamic world, and with a Third World centre seeking Western support. Ambiguous also

because, ignoring the callings of various colleagues from both sides of the dispute, Salam never

clarified publicly his position about the Israel resolutions.

75
As Talbot explains, Buttho “found that while closer ties with the Islamic world were all well

and good for strengthening Pakistan’s diplomatic position, money from the oil-rich Middle East

also flowed freely into the coffers of his would-be opponents” (Talbot, Pakistan (cit. n. 70),

238). The 1973 constitution declared that Islam was the state religion. Hence, the 1974 expulsion

not only had religious consequences that led to further persecution, but political and legal ones

too. Indeed, since 1974, the harassment and human rights violations against the Ahmadiyya

community escalated with the tacit complicity of the state, as organisations like Amnesty

International and others have made public (A.R. Gualtieri, Conscience and Coercion. Ahmadi

Muslims and Orthodox in Pakistan (Montreal, 1989)).

 34

Yet, Salam’s association to Islam was not enough to warrant the boycott; during its first

fifteen years, the ICTP did not achieve the status of a mainstream research school. It was

perceived as a center to foster Third World development rather than a mainstream research

institution. As a result , boycotting the ICTP had very different professional consequences from

boycotting a élite institution such as Stanford. While the former would not harm the professional

situation of a boycotter, the latter would have resulted in scientific suicide. Harari described his

first contact with the Centre in a letter as follows: “It was an unbelievable opportunity for me, as

a young scientist, to meet just about every prominent theoretical particle physicist in the world

(including USSR) in one place before I even become a postdoc.”76 By the mid-1970s, Harari was

a player in the big leagues, a regular visitor to SLAC and a Professor at the Weizmann Institute.

For most Israelis, the prospect of strengthening their links with a prestigious laboratory in the

United States was certainly more attractive than an association with a Centre identified with

Third World development. We can, then, begin to understand why the ICTP, was an obvious

scapegoat; its low scientific reputation, its identification with Third World aspirations and

unstable financial situation made it a soft target for an attack against UNESCO.

Negotiating with UNESCO

To understand Salam and Budinich’s strategy to handle the boycott, it is necessary to recall the

financial situation of the Centre by the mid-1970s. Between 1972 and 1977, the combined

contributions from “unstable sources,” especially the Ford Foundation, the United Nations

Development Program (UNDP) and the Swedish International Development Agency was greater

76
Haim Harari email to the author, 11 June 1999.
 35

than UNESCO’s or the IAEA’s. To make things worse, those contributions would end in 1977-

78, placing the continuation of such programs in jeopardy. Salam spelled out the situation in an

eloquent letter to Sigvard Eklund, IAEA’s Director, concluding that “under the actual conditions

[the ICTP was] not viable”.77 This was a dramatic touch to a long-time “plea for our parent

organisations to take charge of the funding and not to leave it to any persuasion the Centre can

hope to carry with great organisations like UNDP the task is getting beyond our humble

strength.”78

Hans Bethe then suggested a solution: “In the meantime, and until the UNESCO Board

rescinds its decision, could you not ask the government of Iran to support you for the intervening

years directly? In that case you could renounce UNESCO support for the time until the political

decision is reversed.”79 In fact, Salam had already taken the initiative to approach Iran motivated

by its government’s pro-Western leanings and public discourse about the importance of

promoting science and technology for development. In the Winter of 1974 he traveled to Teheran

seeking funds for the Centre. On returning home he was optimistic, but the offer did not

materialize. .

During 1975-76, Salam and Budinich negotiated with UNESCO and the IAEA on two

points: how to bring financial stability to the Centre, and how to survive the boycott. On the

financial side, they pointed to the ICTP’s chronic deficit, and its new programmes, the most

77
See Salam to S. Eklund, 19 January 1976, D.169, ASP; Salam to Eklund, 11 July 1975 and

Salam to Eklund, 12 September 1975, D.170, ASP.

78
Salam to S. Eklund, 11 July 1975, D.170, ASP.
79
H. Bethe to Salam, 27 December 1974, G.119, ASP.
 36

vulnerable of which were precisely those of most value for UNESCO. They lobbied UNESCO

through their Italian contact, Dr. A. Forti, in order to get support for courses on “appliable”

subjects, such as Oceanography and Applied Mathematics. This trend of aligning the ICTP

scientific program with UNESCO science policies had started before this date. However, given

M’Bow’s instrumentalist view of science, it was crucial to emphasize the ICTP’s commitment

with something other than theoretical physics. On 21 April 1975, the Director-Generals of the

IAEA and UNESCO arranged a lunch meeting in Paris, to which Salam was invited, to discuss

the future of the ICTP. Salam requested that the physicists Leon Van Hove (CERN) and Alfred

Kastler (Strasbourg), both strong supporters of the ICTP, be invited. These men had been

members of the 1974 ad Hoc Committee, whose recommendations served as a reference point to

prepare the agenda of the meeting.80 The agenda did not explicitly refer to the boycott, but it was

the political background to the meeting. In that meeting the extension of the agreement was

arranged, admitting the necessity of increasing the “stable” contributions, and on 3rd July 1975

the formal extension, valid until 1978, was signed by UNESCO and the IAEA.

Did Salam invoke the boycott during the negotiations? He certainly played with an

elementary feature of a patronage relationship: that at its most elemental level it entails an

exchange of loyalty for material support. In January 1975, Salam wrote to M’Bow thanking him

for his note to Eklund that had recommended an extension of the IAEA-UNESCO agreement. He

also briefed the Director-General about the risk of a massive boycott from the US and Israel.

Salam sent copies of his letter to M’Bow and Harrison, emphasising that, in view of the boycott

and of the critical financial situation, he “would deeply appreciate guidance.” 81 The word

80
P. Budini, to C.R. O'Neil, C.R., 16 March 1975, D.169, ASP.
81
Salam to M'Bow, 13 January 1975, G.118, ASP.
 37

“guidance” appears in both his letter to M’Bow and the annexed note to Harrison, but nowhere

else in his correspondence concerning the ICTP’s management did Salam make such a request.

He was a master at asking help for the Centre, but “guidance” also meant advice and such a plea

for instructions is unusual. Salam continued to consult UNESCO about the best steps to take and

to brief it about the boycott. He wanted to transmit a clear message: although he disliked the

Israel Resolutions for the damage that they could cause on the UNESCO programs, he would

remain loyal to the organization. Harrison insisted: “you [Salam] are in a unique situation to

make a statement […] to show the western scientists that their action in denying support to the

UNESCO secretariat will do precisely what western science does not want to happen: impede the

implantation of science and technology in the developing world.”82 Salam never make a public

statement, for or against the Resolutions and its consequences. The key, he believed, was

keeping a prudent distance from the political debate and, in private, displaying the art of

opportunism in the political context. The ICTP should not state an official position because that

may put in serious jeopardy its relations with UNESCO or with the Western scientific

community, both of which were crucial. .

This survey of their actions helps one appreciate Salam and Budinich’s strategy. Salam’s

punctual reports of the effects of the 1974 General Conference upon the Centre’s activities; the

desperate appeal for “guidance” just when the boycott was starting; and the combined efforts

with the Italians to make sure that UNESCO became aware of their efforts to widen the ICTP’s

programmes --- in tehse ways Salam and Budinich delivered a message of solidarity and loyalty

during a crisis generated by and within UNESCO. However, if the Centre had to suffer the

consequences of the confrontation between blocs in the General Conference, then UNESCO had

82
J.M. Harrison to Salam, 24 January 1975, G.118, ASP.
 38

to show its commitment in supporting the ICTP’s demands for more funds. The Centre, with its

halo of neutrality, would try to clarify the situation among the scientific community. In this

sense, the Centre could be instrumental to the purposes of UNESCO. If the Centre disappeared,

UNESCO would loose an important ally within the scientific community.

In 1976, the ICTP achieved an unprecedented increase in the IAEA’s and UNESCO’s

appropriations. Shortly before the beginning of both General Conferences in Vienna and Paris,

Salam mobilised all his allies, in the Third World and in the industrialised countries, to “exercise

their influence” upon their national delegations in support of the Director-Generals’

recommendations. For fiscal year 1977-78, they recommended raising IAEA’s contribution

from US$230.000 to US$ 450.000, and UNESCO’s from US$225.000 to US$300.000.83 The

recommendations were passed by both Conferences. After the UNESCO Conference, M’Bow

allocated an extra US$100.000 grant, a gesture that one could interpret as compensation for a

difficult year. Overall, it was the largest increase by both agencies during the 1964-1979 period

(Table 1). In current dollars, compared with the year before, the IAEA and UNESCO

83
Salam’s letter to a network of scientific-bureaucratic allies was dated on 11th March 1976.

Among them: V. Latorre (Perú); S. Mascarenhas (Brazil); J.J. Giambiagi (Argentina); A. Kastler

(France); V. Weisskopf (USA); B.D. Nag Chaudhury (India), M. Menon (India); A. Baiquni

(Indonesia); H.B.G. Casimir (Netherlands); F. García-Moliner (Spain); Edmundo de Alba

(Mexico); F. Claro (Chile); D.A. Akyeampong (Ghana) (D.171, ASP). For a discussion on the

ICTP’s Associates network see De Greiff, “The Intenational Centre for Theoretical Physics (cit.

n. 1), Chapter 5.
 39

allocations had increased by 85% and 38%, respectively.84 In constant dollars, the effective

combined contribution had increased by 20%. Finally, the negotiation with both agencies was

crucial to increasing the Italian component; as mentioned before, raising UNESCO and IAEA

appropriations would ease negotiations with the Italian government. As can be seen from Table

1, in 1978 and 1979 the Italian contribution also increased significantly.

1965 1966 1967 1968 196 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 198 198 1982

9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1

Italy -1.77 - - -8.2 -2.3 - - - - 2.9 1.8 - - 5.4 11. 2.6 26. 10.3

2.54 1.73 2.3 2.1 1.7 1.2 8 2 1.5 0.3 2 1 7 2 53

IAEA -0.35 14.4 8.74 - -0.5 - - - 0.2 2.7 15. -7 16. - - 7.3 - 6.23

9 2 1.58 1.4 1.3 1.7 2 3 4 3 5.9 0.1 2 1.7 5

UNESC -0.14 -0.2 - - -0.2 23. - -1 - 2.2 1.4 -1 4.8 - -1 - 1.5 -0.84

O 0.14 0.23 9 1.3 0.3 6 6 6 1.4 1.5 2

Other -2.26 11.7 6.88 -10 -3 20. - - - 7.9 18. - 20. - 9.9 8.5 26 15.7

5 2 4.6 4.4 1.3 7 7 9.5 8 1.9 2 1 48

Table 1: Increment of the contributions to the ICTP; comparison between two successive years

presented taking into account inflation, using constant dollars).

I should stress that in 1976 UNESCO itself was boycotted financially by the US, France

and Switzerland. Thus, it is remarkable is that, under such financial pressure, added to the world

84
The 1970 figure might be misleading without recalling that that in year UNESCO joined the

IAEA in the operation of the ICTP.

 40

financial crisis and inflation, UNESCO’s Secretariat decided to allocate more funds to the

ICTP.85 Salam described the improved relationship in a letter to his ally on the other side of the

Atlantic, Victor Weisskopf. He described the only consolation in the critical situation created by

UNDP’s withdrawal and the boycott: “Fortunately, we have now at the UNESCO secretariat,

some real friends. Both the new Director-General, M’Bow and the Head of the Scientific

Division, Prof. A. Kaddoura –a nuclear physicist – are good and courageous friends who try to

help us in every possible way… They will propose in the next meeting of Executive Board (Apr-

May) for an increase of 28% of ICTP.” Salam thus suggested to Weisskopf that he say “a word

to the US delegation at UNESCO” in favour of their initiative.86

Negotiating with the boycotting scientists

So far, I have not discussed Salam’s strategy for dealing with the boycotting scientists. In order

to analyse the director’s modus operandi among the American scientists, it is necessary to look

back to the summer of 1975. Salam suggested to Luciano Bertocchi, professor at the Institute of

Theoretical Physics of Trieste University, that he contact some Israeli physicists during his trip

to the United States to attend conferences. Salam thought that this would be a good occasion to

investigate the magnitude of the attack without exposing the Centre or himself directly.

Bertocchi could do what Salam could not: explain that the ICTP did not approve the UNESCO

resolutions either. Bertocchi provided Salam with a detailed report entitled “Report of his visit to

US” explaining that the Israelis wanted the ICTP to issue a public statement against UNESCO.

85
Salam to M’Bow, 3 December 1977, G.118, ASP.
86
Salam to V. Weisskopf, 3 March 1976, G.120, ASP.
 41

That would be enough, at least for some Israelis to lift the boycott. However, Salam had no

doubts that signing any statement against UNESCO would put in jeopardy his negotiations to

secure the financial stability of the Centre. Bertocchi was in the position of signing such a letter.

A few months later, he sent a letter in which the boundary between his personal opinion and the

ICTP’s official position was deliberately unclear.87 That was not enough for the Israelis.

Although he did not recall the episode, in an interview with the author he eloquently speculated

about the case:

…it was clear that for certain things Salam, even if he wanted, probably preferred not to

appear in first person. Because, after all, he was a United Nations officer… I was just a

university professor. I had a sort of contract with the Centre as an adviser, but I was not

directly responsible for it. Therefore, I could take a position that was a bit different.

And, of course, knowing Salam, and remembering the general situation, this letter, if it

was written, was written not against Salam’s will, but I would say, instead, on Salam’s

suggestion.88

Avoiding direct public confrontation on political matters would preserve the boundary between

science and politics. Salam was definitively not allowed to mix them. He must demonstrate that

his political actions were completely disconnected from his politics. Whilst the balance of power

allowed the boycotting scientists to “politicize science”, Salam was not. Furthermore, he was

fully aware that his political strength depended on preserving an image of a non-politicized

scientist. Indeed, Salam appealed to his allies to confront the political controversy.

87
See Adam Schwimmer , Avraham Rinat,and Julius Davis to Luciano Bertocchi, 29 January

1976, G.122, ASP.

88
Luciano Bertocchi, interviewed by author (my translation).
 42

The utility of Wu’s letter was that it provided Salam with an instrument to mobilise his

allies. Wu’s testimony showed that the boycott was motivated by ill-feelings towards some

members of the scientific community. Aware of its power, Salam forwarded the letter to several

scientists in the Third World as well as to some of his allies in the United States and Europe,

including Aage Bohr, Kastler and Weisskopf.89 The decision and terms of their letter to Physics

Today was triggered by their indignation after reading Wu’s revelations:

It would appear that the boycott is in itself an attempt to use a bona fide international

scientific activity as an instrument in the political conflict. It was thus at variance with

the very principle that provides the basis for the criticism of the developments in

UNESCO.90

In the meantime, the development of the High-energy physics November revolution was

unfolding quickly. Pati and Salam knew that their theory would not stand on its epistemological

merits alone, and to survive in had to be circulated within the appropriate social circles. As I

pointed out, the aim of the Conference at Trieste was having access to the experimenters. Salam,

however, never had this chance at the ICTP, although, in the summer 1976 the Centre held a

conference on the topic with the altered title “Lepton Interactions and New Particles.” Salam

approached Panofsky, the director of SLAC, asking him to suggest names of participants.

Panofsky replied dryly that arrangements should be made on a “personal basis,” and that he

could “not guarantee that some of the problems which beset your last conference may not arise

89
Kastler to Weisskopf, December 1975, G.120, ASP.
90
Hans Bethe, Aage Bohr, Ben Mottelson, Victor Weisskopf, and John Ziman, “No Boycott for

Trieste,” Physics Today June, (1976): 9.

 43

again.”91 The 1976 conference was a failure for one reason: by then, as Pickering points out, “the

critical phase of the November Revolution was over.”92 There was little space to convince the

experimentalists to start a search for alternatives to charm and confinement. Apparently, Salam

did not even go to the meeting; he had realized that the ICTP had been isolated from the high-

energy physics revolution. A new “established tradition” being created, and the ICTP could only

learn what was happening elsewhere.

Coda

The boycott was the instrument some Israeli and pro-Israeli scientists deployed in order to

sensitize and unify the American scientific community against the Arab boycott and, more

generally, in order to favor any eventual Israeli counter-measure. Whatever the Resolutions said,

UNESCO represented an ideal opportunity to mobilize American scientific intellectuals, with the

ICTP serving as a scapegoat. Scientists who boycotted the ICTP had different motivations.

However, their individual actions produced a global effect: a serious disruption in the ICTP

activities and a debate about it.

What were the effects of the boycott? Boycotts are intended to produce political changes

in the target. The boycotting scientists thought that denying scientific collaboration with the

Third World through the ICTP would pressure the delegations to reverse their decision about

Israel. At the outbreak of the boycott, Leon Van Hove was confident that “under [Salam’s]

direction the Centre [would] avoid any form of political prejudice” and estimated that the crisis

91
Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky to Salam, 17 February 1976, G.121, ASP.
92
Pickering, Constructing Quarks (cit. n. 37), 268.
 44

would last only a “few years.”93 Both judgments proved to be correct. The time factor is in fact

crucial in a boycott; this form of sanction require a sustained action during extended periods of

time due to the complexity of the networks involved in the academic field. By 1977, after the

UNESCO General Conference lifted the sanctions on Israel, independently from the boycott of

the ICTP, the Trieste Centre was again running normally.

This episode shows the tensions and contradictions of international science.94 In spite of

being aware that a clear boundary between science and politics was essential for the public

image of the Centre, Salam carefully strengthened the link between the ICTP and UNESCO

during the negotiations, and kept out of the public debate. He quickly realized that while the

boycott was contingent, the shortage of funds was the real obstacle to the ICTP’s consolidation

as a research centre. It was essential to avoid any direct confrontation because, otherwise, he

would be charged of “politicizing” science. Accusing someone of “politicizing” science, as

American and Israeli scientists did, is a political maneuver to discredit the opponent showing that

he or she is violating the supposedly neutral character of the scientific ethos. The ideological

force of the scientists’ own rhetoric about scientific internationalism lies in its power to mobilize

allies, even though counter-measures such as participating in a boycott demonstrate the political

character of science. Such behavior provides, perhaps, an ideal crucible in which to explore the

contradictions of the practice of scientific internationalism.

93
L. Van Hove to Salam, 3 February 1975, B.286, ASP.
94
Ron Doel, “Scientists as Policy Makers, Advisors and Intelligence Agents: Linking

Contemporary Diplomatic History with the History of Contemporary Science,” in The

Historiography on Contemporary Science and Technology, edited by T. Söderqvist, 215-244

(Amsterdam, 1997), 216.

 45

In relation to the politics of international scientific cooperation, Elzinga points out that

the idea of UNESCO as an Inter-Governmental Organization, in which scientific actions were

supposed to promote political consensus, instead of a Non-Governmental Organization,

concerned with scientific knowledge, was the outcome of the Anglo-American “populism”

during the initial negotiations. It was opposed by the French, who wanted a more “intellectual”

UNESCO. One could add thus that, since its inception, the “politicisation” issue has been part of

UNESCO’s history.95 The Israel Resolution was a manifestation of the process of “de-

technicization” that M’Bow’s administration represented in the history of that institution. It was

not the politicization of the institution, but an effort to bring it back to the “original more activist

spirit of its Constitution”, as conceived by its Anglo-American father-founders. Hence, rather

than the politicization it was the re-politicization of UNESCO. Thirty years after the

establishment of UNESCO, the positions about the “politicization” of that institution were

inverted. In the 1970s Americans and Israelis presented such re-politicization as a

misrepresentation of its “original” function. Conversely, the Europeans and Third World nations

saw UNESCO as a political institution. Indeed, “politicization” of science and scientific

institutions is a free-floating boundary between knowledge and power that, during a controversy,

every actor draws upon according to his own interests.

* Alexis De Greiff A., Departamento de Sociología, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogotá,

Colombia, ahdegreiffa@unal.edu.co.

95
Elzinga, “UNESCO and the politics of Scientific Internationalism,” 90-91.
 46

Acknowledgements

I wish to thank the staff of the National Catalogue Unit Archives of Contemporary Scientists,

Bath University; Jean Maries Deken from SLAC Archives and History Office, at Stanford

University; and the ICTP Archives for their crucial help. I am deeply grateful to John Krige and

David Edgerton for their careful reading and thoughtful criticisms and suggestions; this paper

owes much to their encouragement. My colleagues and students of the Seminario de Estudios

Sociales de la Ciencia , la Tecnología y la Medicina of the Universidad Nacional de Colombia ,

Bogotá, made insightful comments. Jimena Canales, Paul Forman, Stefania Gallini, Francisco

Ortega, Fernando Viviescas, Andy Warwick, as well as the participants of the Seminar of the

Centre for the History of Science, Tecnhnology and Medicine at Imperial College, London,

offered valuable critical suggestions. I thank also the participants of the Workshop this volume is

based on, especially Kai-Henrik Barth and Nikolai Krementsov, as well as two anonymous

referees. For their support at various stages of this work, I thank the Universidad Nacional de

Colombia, COLCIENCIAS and the Bogliasco Foudation. I thank Professors Luciano Bertocchi,

Haim Harari, Faheem Hussain and John Ziman for sharing with me their memories on the history

of the ICTP and UNESCO.