Greek Mediation in The First Macedonian War

Greek Mediation in the First Macedonian War, 209-205 B.C.
Author(s): Arthur M. Eckstein

Source: Historia: Zeitschrift fr Alte Geschichte, Vol. 51, No. 3 (3rd Qtr., 2002), pp. 268-297
Published by: Franz Steiner Verlag
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4436658
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GREEK MEDIATION IN THE FIRST MACEDONIAN WAR,
209-205 B.C.
Almost from the beginning of what modem scholars call the First Macedonian
War, - the war fought in European Greece between the Aetolian League and its
allies (most importantly the Romans), and Philip V of Macedon and his allies
-
prominent Greek states sought to bring the war to an end by diplomatic means.
Their attempts at mediation occurred each year between 209 and 206 B.C., and
eventually brought peace between Macedon and Aetolia in 206. Mediation by
less prominent Greek states then brought peace in 205 between Macedon and
Rome.I Great uncertainty exists, however, over the precise goal of the mediators
of 209-206. Was their diplomatic intervention focused primarily on the fighting
between Macedon and Aetolia, i.e., on bringing the Aetolians to a peace with
Macedon independently of their Roman allies? Or did the mediating states always
aim at a "comprehensive peace" in Greece that would include Rome? The first
goal appears inimical to Roman interests, since it would have left the Romans
alone to face Philip V. The second goal appears more congruent with the Ro-
mans' strategic goal in the Greek East in this period
-
which was, above all, to
keep Philip from attacking them while they had their hands full with Hannibal.2
Either of the above two conclusions would tell us a great deal about the
attitude(s) of these Greek mediating states towards Rome. And this is important
to know, because only a few years later (in 201 and 200 B.C.), three of the
mediating states of 209-206 - Ptolemaic Egypt, the Rhodian Republic, and
Athens
-
played crucial roles in urging Rome into a new war against Philip V
(the Second Macedonian War). If the policies of these states had previously run
counter to Roman interests and purposes regarding Macedon, then we would be
confronted with what appears a true diplomatic revolution in the eastern Medi-
terranean by 201-200 - a revolution that would itself require an explanation.
I V. KasU6ev points out that the modern term "mediation" actually covers a range of
different ancient diplomatic interventions, from mere use of good offices to bring the
contending parties together for peace talks, all the way to active proposal of specific
compromise peace terms: "Schiedsgericht und Vermittlung in den Beziehungen zwischen
den hellenistischen Staaten und Rom," Historia 45 (1997): 419-20. Because of the
sparseness of our evidence, we cannot often discern the exact nature of the interventions
of the neutral states in 209-205. What is clear is that serious attempts at mediation were
made in each year.
2 On Roman goals in the Greek East during the First Macedonian War, see further below.
Historia, Band LI/3 (2002)
? Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH, Sitz Stuttgart
Greek Mediation in the First Macedonian War, 209-205 B.C. 269
It was Maurice Holleaux, one of the founders of Hellenistic studies, who
originally argued that the Greek mediators of 209-206 sought a peace between
Macedon and Aetolia separate from Rome. The most forceful advocates of the
opposite thesis, the thesis of a "comprehensive peace" including Rome, have
been H. H. Schmitt and more recently J. W. Rich. And scholarly opinion
remains
deeply
-
and
evenly
-
divided. The
purpose
of the
present paper
is a
thorough re-examination of this problem.3
First, some preliminary observations. What is striking about the various
negotiations of 209-206 as the ancient sources present them is how often there
are peace talks between Greek mediators on one side and representatives of
Macedon and Aetolia on the other, with the Romans simply not present. This
circumstance is paralleled by the fact that to contemporaries this war was "the
Aetolian War": that is, the Greeks perceived the main antagonists to be Mace-
don and Aetolia.4 Moreover, in the one case where the Romans are explicitly
attested as involved directly in the peace talks (App. Mac. 3: 207 B.C.), the
Roman commander in Greece is shown attempting to subvert those negotiations
completely, even though a "comprehensive peace" including Rome is precisely
what is under discussion.5 This last fact suggests that whether the Greek
mediators sought to create a separate Macedonian-Aetolian peace or not (and
the evidence here is intriguing), this was still not the central issue as far as the
Romans were concerned; for them, the main issue was simply a mediation
which they did not want at all, no matter what its goals. The above findings tell
us a great deal about how the policies of the Greek states which sought a
3 See Maurice Holleaux, Rome, la Grece, et les monarchies hellenistiques au flle siecle
avant J.-C. (Paris, 1921): 35-38 and 74-75; vs. H. H. Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos (Munich,
1957): 17, 25-26, and esp. 193-211, and J. W. Rich, "Roman Aims in the First Macedo-
nian War," PCPhS 210 (1984): 145-47. In support of Holleaux: F. W. Walbank, A
Historical Commentary on Polybius II (Oxford, 1967): 229; W. Huss, Untersuchungen
zur Aufpenpolitik Ptolemaios' IV. (Munich, 1976): 129-31 and 167-68 (leaning); J. F.
Lazenby, Hannibal's War (Warminster, Engi., 1978): 163 (without discussion); C. Habicht,
Studien zur Geschichte Athens in hellenistischer Zeit (Gottingen, 1982): 135-36; S. L.
Ager, "Rhodes: The Rise and Fall of a Neutral Diplomat," Historia 40 (1992): 16
(without discussion). In support of Schmitt: in addition to Rich's important arguments,
see B. Ferro, Le origini della seconda guerra macedonica (Palermo, 1960): 7, n. 6; E.
Will, Histoire politique du monde hellenistique II (Nancy, 1982); R. M. Berthold, Rhodes
in the Hellenistic Age (Ithaca, N.Y., 1984): 106 (without discussion); N. G. L. Hammond-
F. W. Walbank, A History of Macedonia III (Oxford, 1988): 403 (without discussion). R.
M. Errington, in The Cambridge Ancient History VIII (Second Edition: Cambridge,
1989): 102, is elliptical and unclear.
4 See Livy (P) 27.30.4 (inter Philippum atque Aetolos bellum ... ) and 30.10 (de Aetolico
finiendo bello actum...); 28.7.10 (Aetolico bello...) and 7.14 (de finiendo Aetolico hello
ageretur...). For the Polybian origin of this material, see Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos
(above, n. 3), 195.
5 See esp. Rich (above, n. 3), 143-44; discussed below, pp. 278-280.
270 ARTHUR M. ECKSTEIN
mediated end to the war in 209-206 worked at cross-purposes to the objectives
which the Roman Republic sought in Greece in this period. That this was also a
conscious policy on the part of the mediators is shown especially by the anti-
Roman remarks of the mediator in Polyb. 11.4-6. And this is a text which (as
we shall see) does not stand alone.
Two aspects of the diplomatic context of the First Macedonian War also
need to be underlined before we proceed. First, the ancients thought of Philip V
as the aggressor in this war as far as Rome was concemed. The tradition was
that Philip, enticed by news of Hannibal's invasion of Italy and the subsequent
Roman defeats, turned his ambitions in 217 from Greece to the West. His aim
became Macedonian expansion at Roman expense. Philip's new ambitions led
to his sudden peace with Aetolia in 217 (ending the Social War of 220-217); to
the abortive Macedonian naval expedition against Illyria in 216 (a region which
had been in Rome's sphere of influence for more than a decade); and then to
Philip's treaty of alliance with Hannibal in 215. Roman writers later exaggerat-
ed the terms of this treaty, but even Polybius' more sober account shows that
Philip was planning to seize Illyria, and even an invasion of Italy was not
excluded.6 The worry of the Romans on learning of the Carthaginian-Macedo-
nian alliance - coming on top of the great Roman defeat at Cannae the previous
year - finds concrete expression in Rome's strong military reinforcement in the
Adriatic region from 215 onwards.7 In 214 Philip sailed against Illyria a second
time -
but was foiled by Roman action. In the succeeding years, however, his
overland conquests in Illyria were extensive. By 212 the king had reached the
Adriatic coast and the port-town of Lissus - where he began to build a fleet.
Philip was a man famous for his bold military gambles, and so to the Romans (if
not to moderns) a threat even to Italy could not be discounted.8 The result was
6 On the difference between the Polybian and annalistic versions of Philip's treaty of
alliance with Hannibal, see H. Mantel, "Der Biindnisvertrag Hannibals mit Philipp von
Makedonien," in C. Schubert-K. Brodersen-U. Huttner, eds., Rom und der griechische
Osten: Festschriftfur H. H. Schmitt (Stuttgart, 1995): 175-80.
7 On the importance of the Roman military preparations in the Adriatic for our understand-
ing of Roman worries after 215, see J. Seibert, "Invasion aus dem Osten: Trauma,
Propaganda oder Erfindung der Romer?," in Schubert-Brodersen-Huttner (above, n. 6):
239-41. News of Macedonian military-diplomatic initiatives in 217-216 had perhaps
already led to a Roman diplomatic response: see Polyb. 5.105.8 (unfortunately vague as
to chronology) with the comments of Seibert, 240, probably to be preferred to F. W.
Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius I (Oxford, 1957): 630; cf. also Livy
22.33.3, with the comments of Hammond, in Hammond-Walbank III (above, n. 3): 391,
and Errington in CAH (above, n. 3): 95.
8 On the extent of Philip's conquests by land in Illyria in 213-212, and new evidence that
Philip had begun to build a war-fleet at Lissus, see Hammond, in Hammond-Walbank III
(above, n. 3): 398-99. Philip's reputation as a military gambler is rightly underlined by
Rich (above, n. 3), 129-30. Note the story that the Syracusans had approached Philip for
help against Rome in 212: Livy 25.23.8-9, accepted by Rich, 130.
that M. Valerius Laevinus, the Roman commander in the Adriatic, entered into
discussions at about this time (ca. 212) with the Aetolian League with the object
of beginning a new war in Greece against Philip. These talks were successful by
the early autumn of 211, and joint Roman-Aetolian military operations soon
began. One should note, however, that the treaty of alliance with the Aetolians
was not
officially
sworn at Rome until after a
delay
of almost two
years
-
not
until the summer of 209. That delay may have had diplomatic consequences,
especially during the mediation effort of spring 209 (see below).9
Polybius says that from 217 onwards, Philip's policy towards Rome was
consciously aggressive (5.101.9-102.1; 7.13.1). Similarly, Livy says that the
primary Roman motive in the diplomatic initiative to the Aetolians was defen-
sive, for a new war with Aetolia would keep Philip distracted in Greece, thereby
impeding him from any idea of joining forces with Hannibal and the Carthagin-
ians (26.24.16). These ancient judgments on the character of Macedonian-
Roman relations between 217 and 21 1 seem borne out by the sequence of events
described above - in which Philip is the clear aggressor. The sequence and its
political-diplomatic implications are not doubted by modern scholars.10 But
this means that in any subsequent peace negotiation in which Rome played a
significant role, Philip or his representatives could hardly make confident
public claims of having not started the conflict. Rather, it was obvious that the
Macedonian king had opened these hostilities. This simple finding has impor-
tance because of what we are told was consistently said by representatives of
Macedon at the various peace conferences we are discussing: that the Macedo-
nians had not started the war that was being mediated. No one contradicted
them (see below).
Harris and Rich are probably correct, however, that beyond the primarily
defensive goal of the Romans
-
to keep Philip occupied in Greece
-
the Romans
9 On the terms of the Roman-Aetolian alliance, see the evidence in H. H. Schmitt, Die
Staatsvertrage des Altertums III (Munich, 1969): 258-66. On the date of the agreement
between M. Valerius Laevinus and the Aetolians -
seemingly shown by the link Livy
makes between Roman successes during the summer of 211 and the final Aetolian
decision (26.24.3) - see E. Badian, "Aetolica," Latomus 17 (1958): 197-203, and Rich
(above, n. 3), 155-57. Preliminary negotiations: see Livy 26.24.1. Livy says that the
treaty was not formally sworn at Rome until two years later (biennio post...): i.e., perhaps
sometime in summer 209. The reasons for this odd Roman delay in formalizing Laevinus'
agreement are not known. Perhaps it was sheer Roman procedural clumsiness, and not
hesitation over easten policy: so Badian (above), 206-8. But Errington (above, n. 3) now
suggests that Laevinus had personally to defend the terms of the treaty (in which Rome
got few concrete benefits
-
though one great strategic benefit) before the Senate, and that
this did not happen until after his consulship in 210, when he was busy in Sicily: see CAH:
210.
10 See most recently Hammond, in Hammond-Walbank III (above, n. 3): 387-401; Err-
ington in CAH: 94-101.
were also acting in Greece out of a desire for sheer revenge. Philip, after all, had
struck at the Romans when they had committed not the slightest hostile act
against him, and simply because they had appeared vulnerable: he deserved a
new war on his doorstep as a punishing response to his conduct, and to inflict
harm upon him.11 One may add that in a diplomatic world obsessed with
questions of status, and the reputation for power, the punishment of Philip by
war would restore to the Romans their status as a people with whom one did not
trifle. In an international system that was a lawless anarchy, restoring and
preserving such status was in itself important, for an acknowledged reputation
for strength helped deter others, and in turn preserved a state's security.12
The motivations of the Aetolians in beginning a new war against Philip
were, however, of a different nature. This is the second aspect of the diplomatic
context of the later Greek mediations which needs to be understood. In contrast
to the Romans, the Aetolians were the aggressors in the new war in terms of
relations with Macedon. The Aetolian League had sworn peace with Philip six
years previously, ending the Social War of 220-217; the basis of the peace had
been uti possidetis, and there is no evidence that Philip had broken it.13 The
Aetolian decision of 211 seems solely the result of a calculation of strategic
advantage: they were lured to war by the prospect of recovering, with Roman
11 See W. V. Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome (Oxford, 1979/1984): 213;
and Rich (above, n. 3), 129-31 and 149. The gaining of plunder, in part perhaps to finance
the on-going Hannibalic War, was another goal: on this clause of the treaty with Aetolia,
see the comments of Errington in CAH (above, n. 3): 100. The treaty also inevitably
deepened Rome's relations with a network of pro-Aetolian and/or anti-Macedonian
Greek states; but this should be seen as a natural consequence of international interaction
(cf. Errington, 99), rather than as a Machiavellian plot on Rome's part to gain control of
Greece (as in Rich, 131, and 150-51; cf. also Hammond III [above, n. 3J: 401).
12 For the establishment of status as a deep concern of Roman foreign relations, see R.
Kallet-Marx, Hegemony to Empire: The Development of the Roman Imperium in the East
from 148 to 62 B.C. (Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1995); 87-88 and 93-94; S. P. Mattern,
Rome and the Enemy: Imperial Strategy in the Principate (Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1999):
Chapter 1; and esp. J. Linderski, "Ambassadors Go to Rome," in E. Frezouls-A. Jac-
quemin, eds., Les Relations internationales: Actes du Colloque de Strasbourg, 15-17juin
1993 (Paris, 1995): 453-78. On the impact of international anarchy upon the actions of
individual states, the basic text is Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New
York, 1979). On the importance of maintaining reputation and status under a system of
international anarchy, see A. M. Eckstein, "Brigands, Emperors, and Anarchy," Int. Hist.
Rev. 22 (2000): esp. 876-79. Simultaneously, obsession with status seems to reflect the
prevailing ethos of the aristocratic, slave-owning men who by and large made ancient
diplomatic decisions: see the comments of B. S. Strauss, Athens after the Peloponnesian
War: Class, Faction and Policy, 403-386 B.C. (Ithaca, N.Y., 1986): 31-35.
13 The terms of the Peace of Naupactus: Schmitt, Staatsvertrage III (above, n. 9): 234-35.
The unbroken peace in European Greece between 217 and 211: see esp. Hammond, in
Hammond-Walbank III (above, n. 3): 390.
backing, the territories (and status) lost in 220-217 - and seizing more. Mace-
don after 217 was, for the moment at least, a satisfied power in terms of its
relations with the states of European Greece; and from that perspective it was
not Philip who began what contemporaries called "the Aetolian War," but the
Aetolians themselves. 14
Having established these basic diplomatic facts, let us proceed seriatim
through the various attempts at mediation organized by the non-belligerent
Greek states between 209 and 206, to see how far those states were acting
contrary to Rome's interests. Any discussion of the diplomacy of 209-206 is, of
course, bedevilled by the fragmentary and derivative nature of our sources.
Polybius covered these diplomatic interactions in great detail (as is clear from
Polyb. 10.25 and 11.4-6), but most of his direct account is lost. Livy preserves
much information which obviously is based on Polybian material, but Livy's
interest in Greek affairs is (equally obviously) not as intense as that of the
Greek historian; witness his carelessness with chronology, or the gap in record-
ing Greek events admitted at 29.12.1. Later writers such as Appian give us what
seems highly important information - but the historicity of that information
requires explicit defense. Any reconstruction, especially of the events of 207
and 206 B.C. (which the Livian narrative barely touches), must therefore
remain tentative. We proceed on that basis.15
The first attempt at mediation of the war by non-belligerent Greek states
occurred in late spring 209.16 The Aetolian League and their Roman allies had
made significant gains in the war up to this point: the seizure of Anticyra in
Phocis, and of Aegina; the adherence to the alliance of Elis, Messene, and
Sparta; the prospective military intervention on the allied side of Attalus I of
Pergamum. But these gains were balanced by a sudden turn of fortune in spring
209 when King Philip inflicted two successive severe defeats upon the Aetolian
army near Lamia in east-central Greece (Livy 27.30.1-2).17 While at Phalara
near the site of these victories, Philip was now approached by envoys from
Ptolemy IV, the Rhodians, the Athenians, and the Chians (27.30.4).18 The
14 See Polyb. 9.30.8-9 for the Aetolian strategic aims; cf. Rich (above, n. 3), 145.
15 Livy's dependence upon obviously Polybian material for his account of the First Macedoni-
an War, and his chronological carelessness with this material: see Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos
(above, n. 3), 193-94 and 198; Rich, 136-39. On Appian, see below, pp. 285, 287.
16 Livy dates this mediation to 208, but the reference to the Nemean Games (27.30.9) shows
that these events actually occurred the year before: see Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos (above,
n. 3), 194.
17 For an assessment of the strategic situation after Philip's twin victories near Lamia, see
esp. Hammond, in Hammond-Walbank III (above, n. 3): 403. The best detailed account of
the events between autumn 211 and spring 209 is Rich (above, n. 3), 131-34.
18 Habicht (above, n. 3), 136-37 with n. 80, noting an inscription which records the death of
a Chian ambassador at Alexandria in March 209, suggests that the diplomatic offensive of
the mediating states had in fact been coordinated from the court of the Ptolemies.
ambassadorial group had come, Livy says, "in order to bring an end to the war
between Philip and the Aetolians" (venerunt ad dirimendum inter Philippum
atque Aetolos bellum: 27.30.4). The mediators must already have directly
approached the Aetolians, winning their consent for this overture, or else the
mediators won Aetolian consent at this point, because the Aetolians soon sent
to Phalara a non-belligerent mediator of their own, to join actively in the peace
talks: Amynander, king of Athamania (adhibitus ab Aetolis... pacificator Amy-
nander rex Athamanum: ibid.).
Livy reports that the private reasoning behind the intervention of these non-
belligerent states was fear that Philip's war with Aetolia would lead to the
growth of his power in European Greece (27.30.5).19 There is no reason to
doubt this Livian analysis (which presumably derives from Polybian materi-
al).20 But the disruption of important commerce by the war may have been
another factor that impelled some of the mediators to act. This may even be true
of the Ptolemies, the regime most likely predominantly concerned with main-
taining the current political-military balance of power: the Aetolians, after all,
were famous as privateers during war-time, attacking just about anyone (see
esp. Polyb. 4.3.1-3). And this would be an even stronger reason for primarily
commercial states with strong interests in the Aegean trade (the Rhodians, the
Chians) to try to intervene to stop Macedonian-Aetolian warfare.21 Note from
this perspective, however, that the continuation of fighting just between Mace-
don and Rome would probably mean a war focused in the Adriatic and north-
west Greece
-
an area of no apparent interest to the Ptolemies, and much less
important to all the commercially-minded states.22
The discussions at Phalara between Philip, the mediators, and the pro-
Aetolian Amynander at any rate proved so promising that Philip eventually
19 Habicht (above, n. 3), 137, stresses that the motive ascribed to the mediators by the
ancient sources is political: the preservation of a congenial balance of power among the
Greek states; so, too, Huss (above, n. 3), 129-31, at least with regard to Ptolemy IV.
20 On the derivation of Livy 27.30 from Polybian material, see F. W. Walbank, Philip V of
Macedon (Cambridge, 1940): 89-90.
21 On Aetolian privateering, see now J. B. Scholten, The Politics of Plunder: Aetolians and
their Koinon in the Early Hellenistic Era, 279-219 B.C. (Berkeley/Los Angeles, 2000):
Chapter 3. That the Ptolemies themselves were not immune to the commercial considera-
tions here is suggested by E. Manni, "L'Egitto ptolemaico nei suoi rapporti politici con
Roma," RFIC 27 (1949): 95. Huss (above, n. 3), 130 thinks it likely that economic
motives were even stronger among the lesser mediating states. Note that in Polyb. 1 1.4.4-
5, in a speech primarily concerned with geopolitical reasons for ending the war, its
destructiveness upon even innocent by-standers is impressed upon the Aetolians by a
mediator (probably a Rhodian - see below, p. 288 and n. 66).
22 Huss (above, n. 3), 167 and n. 27, notes that the Ptolemies - in contrast to their great
desire to keep peace in central and southern Greece and the Aegean - had no interest or
interests in northwest Greece.
agreed to a 30-days' truce, until negotiations with the Aetolians themselves
could begin at Aegium in Achaea (Livy 27.30.6, cf. 9). But who was included in
this truce? Rich, the latest scholar to deal in detail with the Phalara events, has
argued that nothing in Livy shows that in 209 the mediating states were
intending to detach the Aetolians from their alliance with Rome into a separate
peace with Philip.23 But the fact is that the Romans are nowhere mentioned in
Livy 27.30.4-6. So far, we have seen only the Aetolians involved in any
prospective peace-making with Philip - and the negotiations towards a basic
framework for peace have evidently already gone far. The emphasis in Livy is
precisely upon the diplomatic interactions of the mediators, the Aetolians or
their representatives, and Philip; the private concerns of the mediators are
focused on the growth of Philip's power via his conflict with Aetolia; there is no
sign that the Romans even know about - let alone approve of - the Phalara
talks.24
Such an analysis of Livy 27.30.4-6 is confirmed by the very next item in
Livy
27.30- an item that has not been
brought
into the
scholarly
discussion. After
agreeing to the 30-days' truce, Philip then went to his headquarters at Chalcis
on Euboea, in order to prevent Attalus of Pergamum from landing there and
seizing the island and its great fortress:
Chalcidem Euboeae venit [Philippus], ut Attalum, quem classe Euboeam
petiturum adierat, portibus et litorum adpulsu arceret. Inde praesidio
relicto adversus Attalum... (27.30.7-8).
From this passage it is clear that although there is an important and promis-
ing truce established between Philip and the Aetolians as a result of the peace
talks at Phalara, Attalus is not expected to participate in it, nor (apparently) has
he even heard of it. On the contrary: Philip is concerned that Attalid military
operations, led by the Pergamene king himself, are about to be launched against
key Macedonian strongpoints south of Olympus, and he initiates military steps
(note: not diplomatic steps) to prevent such operations. Yet while Philip might
not have known the exact whereabouts of Attalus and his fleet, it should not
have been that difficult for either Philip or the Aetolians or (especially) the non-
belligerent mediators to send out diplomatic heralds or agents to find Attalus
and inform him of the existence of a truce. But neither Philip nor the neutrals
nor the Aetolians are depicted in the month after Phalara as attempting this. Of
course our information is fragmentary, but we do have a detailed account of
Philip's actions and itinerary (Livy 27.30.8-9), and we are dealing with more
than an argument e silentio: what we explicitly hear about in respect to Attalus
is Philip's military preparations against Attalid attack. There is no reason to
23 Rich (above, n. 3), 145.
24 See esp. Holleaux, Rome, la Grece (above, n. 3), 36 n. 4.
assume that Attalus was in a different category here from the Romans. The only
difference is that - unlike Attalus - there was not even a rumor in Greece as yet
that the Romans were about to appear there for the military campaign of 209 (cf.
Livy 27.30.1 1).
The assumptions behind the conference at Aegium a month later emerge
equally strongly in the fragmentary Polyb. 10.25 - where we are shown an
explicit attempt to split the Aetolians off from Rome. The Polybian fragment is
part of a speech by an ambassador, and it is securely located in the mediation
efforts of 209.25 The fragment in its current condition does not say who the
speaker is (but see below). The speaker says that at present "the Aetolians and
those Peloponnesians in alliance with them" are bearing the brunt of the
fighting with Philip, while the Romans hang back like a heavy phalanx which is
allowing the light-armed forces to be the first to be exposed to danger ( 10.25.1 );
such an analogy would have particular force in the immediate aftermath of
Philip's double defeat of the Aetolians at Lamia. The speaker also warns that if
"the light-armed"' are defeated, the phalanx (i.e., the Romans) will move off
unharmed (25.5), whereas if "the light-armed" are victorious, not only will "the
phalanx" then move in to claim the lion's share of credit for the victory (cf.
25.2), but the Romans will attempt to bring the Aetolians and their allies, as
well as the rest of Greece, under their control (25.5).
Since the speaker refers to an Aetolian victory in the war as something
"may the Gods forbid" (10.25.5), it is likely that the above speech is from a
Macedonian envoy at Aegium, and unlikely that it comes from an envoy of one of
the states attempting mediation.26 But even coming from a Macedonian envoy,
the tone of the speech in Polyb. 10.25 is striking in terms of the questions we are
asking: the speaker sharply differentiates the Aetolians and their European
Greek allies from the Romans, points out the sharply different interests between
the two categories of combatants, and seeks to create anger and fear concerning
Rome among the latter group, distancing them from the Romans. The tone of
Polyb. 10.25 is thus completely consistent with Livy's narrative of the origins
25 The placement of Polyb. 10.25 within the mediation effort of 209: Walbank, Commentary
II (above, n. 3): 229.
26 See Holleaux, Rome, la Grece (above, n. 3), 35 n. 4; Walbank, Commentary II (above,
n. 3): 228. Schmitt suggests that Polyb. 10.25 is in fact a speech by one of the mediating
ambassadors; he downplays the anti-Aetolian remark at 10.25.5 ("May the Gods forbid"),
- which would be highly tactless coming from a neutral mediator - subsuming it under the
general anti-Roman tone of the speech, i.e., the only problem with an Aetolian victory is
that it would increase Roman power in Greece: Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos (above, n. 3),
195, cf. earlier B. Niese, Geschichte der griechischen und makedonisc hen Staaten seit der
Schlacht bei Chaeronea II (Gotha, 1888): 486. If this were correct, we would then have
Polybian accounts of two anti-Roman speeches by mediating ambassadors during the
course of the war: here at 10.25 and again at 11.4-6. But the expressed hope against an
Aetolian victory at 10.15.5 is hard to accept as coming from a mediator.
of the Aegium conference: the point of the mediation is specifically to end the
war between Macedon and Aetolia, which is detrimental to all Greeks.
Further, Schmitt suggests that Livy 27.30.10, another sentiment expressed
at Aegium which is hostile to the Romans, is in fact a Livian (i.e., Polybian)
version of the public position taken there by the non-belligerent mediators: ibi
de Aetolico finiendo bello actum, ne causa aut Romanis aut Attalo intrandi
Graeciam esset. There is no contradiction between this sentiment at Livy
27.30.10 and the one found at 27.30.5, at the preliminary talks at Phalara (which
concerns the neutrals' fear of Philip, rather than fear of Rome and Attalus); the
latter sentiment, representing the neutrals' private views, could hardly have
been stated in public by them at Aegium with Philip himself present.27
Schmitt's does seem the most plausible interpretation of 27.30.10, for the
alternative is that the passage is a public statement by Philip and his Achaean
allies rather than the mediators
-
but that would not fit with what is
obviously a
proclamation of the general purpose of the peace conference, which should
come from the mediators. And such an interpretation of the statement at Livy
27.30.10 would
-
again
-
be perfectly consistent with the entire public tone and
purpose of the mediation of 209, which seems to be derogatory and excluding of
the Romans.
The peace conference at Aegium collapsed when the Aetolians suddenly
brought forward a series of territorial demands on Philip. One of these demands
(or perhaps two) would have helped restore Rome's position in Illyria (Livy
27.30.13-14).28 Livy places the blame for the collapse of the Aegium talks
squarely on the Aetolians (27.30.1 1); this must reflect the opinion of his source
Polybius, who had little love for Aetolia
-
but there seems no reason to doubt
that what Livy says happened.29 What is also clear from Livy is that the Romans
were not present at the Aegium conference any more than they had been present
at the preliminary talks at Phalara. Hence the Aetolian demands outraged
Philip, because he now viewed the League as the defeated party in the war and
himself as the acknowledged victor: enim vero indignum ratus Philippus victos
victori sibi ultro condiciones ferre (27.30.14). This statement reveals the im-
pact which Philip believed his twin victories at Lamia had had on the military
situation. It also reveals how much the focus at Aegium was on the Aetolians
alone
-
for
Philip
had never beaten the Romans.
27 Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos (above, n. 3), 195-96.
28 The Aetolians demanded that Philip return his conquests in Atintania to the Romans; and
they demanded that Philip return the Ardiaei to the Illyrian dynasts Scerdilaidas and
Pleuratus (who were currently allies of the Romans).
29 On Polybius' general attitude towards the Aetolians, see esp. D. Mendels, "Did Polybius
Have 'Another' View of the Aetolian League?," Anc. Soc. 15/17 (1984/1986): 63-73,
convincing against K. S. Sacks, "Polybius' Other View of Aetolia," JHS 95 (1975): 92-
106.
Rich argues that because the Aetolians' sudden territorial demands at
Aegium included one (or perhaps two) demands that would benefit the Romans,
the absence of the latter both at the Phalara talks and the Aegium conference
means nothing: the Aetolian demands at the Aegium conference are strong
evidence that the Romans were always intended to be included in the putative
peace.30 But Livy explicitly says that the Aetolians' negotiating position hard-
ened only when they heard the news that the Pergamene and Roman fleets had
finally arrived in nearby Greek waters (27.30.11) - and he indicates that the
new Aetolian demands were never meant to be taken seriously (ibid.). Thus it
would appear that the Aetolians, demoralized by their defeats at Lamia, at first
seriously considered a mediated peace with Philip - but when good news
arrived, in the form of strong Roman and Pergamene reinforcements, they
simply sought an excuse to break off the talks. This explains Philip's bitter
remark at the end of the Aegium conference: he had always been for peace, the
Aetolians for war (27.30.14).
31
In fact, an exact parallel to this type of Aetolian "zig-zagging" in diplomacy
can be found from just a few years previously, during the Social War. In 218 the
Aetolians, momentarily demoralized by Philip's success in sacking their capital
at Thermum, accepted a proposal from non-belligerent mediators (Rhodes and
Chios) for
-
precisely
-
a
30-days' truce, during
which formal
peace
talks
would begin (Polyb. 5.28.1). But when the Aetolians learned of severe political
problems within Philip's court, they took heart, and suddenly backed off from
the peace talks
- making new demands (5.29.1-3).32 This seems the easiest
explanation for the failure of the Aegium talks as well: the Aetolians, having
gained a full month's respite from Philip, now subverted the peace negotiations
they felt they no longer particularly needed, by making new and excessive
demands (including a couple from which the Romans would benefit). But in
that case, the Aetolians' demands at Aegium cannot count as strong evidence
that the Romans were all along intended to be included in the peace of 209.33
Of course, it might be argued that a separate Macedonian-Aetolian peace
was prohibited in the treaty of Roman-Aetolian alliance (Livy 26.22.12). But
30 Rich (above, n. 3), 145.
31 Ne antea quidem se aut de pace audisse aut indutias pepigisse dixit [Philippus]
spem
ullam habentem quieturos Aetolos, sed ut omnes soc ios testes haberet se pacis, illos belli
causam quaesisse.
32 For discussion of this incident, see Hammond, in Hammond-Walbank III (above, n. 3):
380.
33 On the Aetolian duplicity at Aegium, see esp. Ager (above, n. 3), 16 (adducing the
parallel from the Social War as well). Cf. also R. M. Errington, Philopoemen (Oxford,
1969): 56, and Hammond, in Hammond-Walbank III (above, n. 3): 403 (both of whom,
however, see the Aetolian demands at Aegium as having been formulated in a direct
conspiracy with Rome to keep the war going).
here the problem is that the Aetolians violated precisely that clause of the treaty
of alliance in 206, when they did indeed make a separate peace with Philip; they
were not stopped by legalities (see below). For that matter, the Punic-Macedo-
nian treaty of alliance of 215 contained a similar clause, forbidding a separate
peace with Rome (Polyb. 7.9.12) - which did not prevent Philip in 205 from
making a separate peace with Rome (see below). In both cases one could make
the argument from political-military necessity, but this in itself shows that in a
world ruled by Faustrecht, such clauses in treaties were mere hopeful rhetoric,
not viewed as completely binding.34 In 209, not only were the Aetolians
uncertain about the scale of Roman military intervention in Greece that year
(hence their great relief about this at Livy 27.30.11), but one should also note
that the Aetolian treaty of alliance with the Romans had not yet even been
formally ratified and sworn at Rome
-
even after almost two years' waiting.
This would be all the more reason for the Aetolians in 209, perhaps feeling left
in the lurch by Rome (as they did in 206), to have felt free to leave the war after
Philip's double victories at Lamia.35
Schmitt, unlike Rich, admits to the clear trend of the Livian narrative (and
cf. Polyb. 10.25) that the neutral mediators were negotiating with King Philip
and the Aetolians in 209 for the purpose of a peace solely between Philip and
the League.36 However, Schmitt goes on to argue that this conduct by the
mediating states should not be seen as counter to Roman interests, since a
separate peace between Philip and Aetolia would inevitably have led to a peace
between Philip and Rome
-
as happened in 206-205.37
This is very strained reasoning. A separate peace between Aetolia and
Macedon in 209 would have left Rome in an extremely difficult strategic
position in Greece. Abandoned by their major Greek ally, the Romans might
well have been forced to make peace with Philip
-
but most likely on humiliat-
ing and disadvantageous terms (including, no doubt, Philip's retention of the
port of Lissus and all his Illyrian conquests, creating a permanent threat to
Italy's Adriatic coast). Such a peace settlement would hardly have been in
34 Thus in Polybius' eye-witness account of the meeting of the Achaean faction led by
Archon and Lycortas in 170 to decide whether to back Rome against Macedon in the
Third Macedonian War or else to be neutral, many political considerations are brought
forward - but one that is never mentioned is that Achaea actually had a formally-sworn
treaty of alliance with Rome (see Polyb. 28.6).
35 On the Roman
delay
in
formally swearing to the Aetolian alliance
(Livy 26.24.14), see
above, p. 271 and n. 9. On the total absence of the Romans from the peace negotiations of
209, see already A. M. Eckstein, "Rome, the War with Perseus, and Third Party Media-
tion," Historia 37 (1988): 418 n. 22.
36 Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos (above, n. 3), 57, and 195-96.
37 Ibid., 57.
Rome's interest.38 But in 209 a continuation of war against Philip without the
Aetolian League would hardly have been in Rome's interest either. It would
have meant a conflict without major allied help on land against a formidable
and aggressive enemy whose own military resources had not yet (in contrast to
the situation in 206-205) been stretched very far.39 One need only consider the
dilemma the Romans would have faced later in the summer of 209 itself, when,
on top of having been deserted by the Aetolians, a strong Carthaginian fleet
threateningly appeared off Corcyra (Livy 27.15.8, cf. 30.16): what if Philip had
been free to march against the Roman position on the Adriatic coast at the same
time? This strong Punic fleet reappeared in 208 at the mouth of the Gulf of
Corinth, in what was intended as a coordinated operation with Macedon (Livy
28.7.17-18, and 8.8).40 And in autumn 208, Philip himself began to build a fleet
of 100 warships (Livy 28.8.14).41 In the actual circumstances of 209 and 208,
with the Aetolian League (and its Peloponnesian allies) still heavily involved in
the war, the Carthaginian naval threats were reduced to mere raids; and Philip's
ship-building program had to be long delayed.42 But war is a situation of
contingencies: those Punic naval expeditions to western Greece, and the Mace-
donan ship-building program, would have looked very different if Rome in 209
and 208 had been reduced to fighting on its own limited resources available for
the Greek theater. The dangerous isolation of the Romans would have been
further underlined if, as happened historically, Attalus of Pergamum withdrew
his fleet in 208 from helping Rome in the war (see below)
- and if the Aetolians
had abandoned Rome in 209, Attalus might well have left the war even sooner.
All in all, it is difficult to see how the Greek mediators who sought a peace in
38 Even in the separate peace between Rome and Philip in 205, when the balance of power
was somewhat more in Rome's favor, the Romans conceded Atintania to Philip: Livy
29.12.13 (a fact which, incidentally, shows the lack of seriousness of the sudden Aetolian
demands about Atintania in 209: see above, p. 277 and n. 28). Walbank suggests that even
in 205 Rome also conceded to Philip most of the king's Illyrian conquests
of 213,
including northern and western Dassaretia (though the fate of Lissus is unclear): see
Philip V (above, n. 20): 103.
39 The contrast in Philip's power between 209 and 205 is stressed by Hammond, in Ham-
mond-Walbank III (above, n. 3): 404.
40 Even K.-E. Petzold, who is very disbelieving of the traditions concerning Macedonian-
Carthaginian cooperation during 215-202, does not doubt the historicity of these threat-
ening Punic expeditions under Bomilcar to western Greece: see Die Eroffnung des
Zweiten Romisch-Makedonischen Krieges (Berlin, 1940): 49.
41 The historicity of this tradition is not doubted either. It derives from Polybius: see
Walbank, Philip V (above, n. 20), 97 and n. 5; Hammond, in Hammond-Walbank Ill
(above, n. 3): 405.
42 By 201 Philip's war-fleet amounted to only 40 or 50 cataphracts, though some of these
were very heavy ships: for sources and discussion, see Walbank, Philip V (above, n. 20),
117 and n. 2, and Commentary II (above, n. 3): 505. By 201 Philip also had about 150
light lembi (Polyb. 16.2.9).
209 between Macedon and Aetolia were not acting in contradiction to Rome's
desires and interests.
The mediation effort of 209 ultimately foundered; but this did not dissuade
the non-belligerent Greek states from attempting a new mediation the next year.
By spring 208, the war had momentarily turned against King Philip. A Dardani-
an invasion in autumn 209 had gravely damaged the Macedonian homeland,
and Philip's northern frontier continued throughout 208 to suffer from unsettled
conditions; yet in spring 208 many of Philip's allies in central Greece and the
Peloponnese were also calling upon him for immediate military help against the
multiple threats posed simultaneously by Aetolian, Roman and Pergamene
forces and, in the south, from Sparta.43 An embassy from the non-belligerent
states now appeared in Greece: Ptolemaic Egypt and Rhodes are explicitly
mentioned, but others may have been involved also, as in 209.44
This new embassy first approached the Aetolians, who happened to be
meeting with their Roman allies at Heraclea, west of Thermopylae (Livy 28.7.14).
The mediators were then sent on to consult with Philip, evidently in Thessaly
(28.7.13). But the meeting with Philip was delayed, because the king suddenly
took the offensive against his multiple enemies, and was spectacularly successful.
He raided Heraclea itself, and captured Thermopylae from its Aetolian garrison,
thereby opening up new areas of central Greece to his army; he then defeated
Attalus of Pergamum near Opus, helping to drive Attalus and his fleet completely
out of the war; then he conquered Epicnemidian Locris, the region east of
Thermopylae previously under Aetolian control (June-July 208).45 By the time
Philip met with the mediating envoys, at Elateia south of Thermopylae (July 208),
he was flushed with victory. He gave the envoys a friendly but vague answer
about ending the war, and sent them away (Livy 28.7.15: see below). In fact, he
was more interested in advancing now into the Peloponnese and striking a blow
43 On the difficulties in Philip's strategic situation in spring 208, see Walbank, Philip V
(above, n. 20), 93-94. On the Dardanian invasion, see Livy 27.32.9-33.3, Justin 29.4.6,
and Zon. 9.9, with Hammond, in Hammond-Walbank III (above, n. 3): 403.
44 It is sometimes suggested that Athens joined the mediators, as in 209, and that Chios
joined as well: Holleaux, Rome, la Grece (above, n. 3), 119 n. 1; Walbank, Philip V
(above, n. 20), 94 n. 7; Errington, CAH (above, n. 3): 103. But Habicht (above, n. 3),
136-37, rightly points out that the Athenians are missing from the list of persistent
mediators in the neutral ambassador's speech at Polyb. 1 1.4.1 (to be dated to 207 -
see
below), which suggests that they did not continue their efforts after the failure of 209.
Chios, however, does appear in the list at Polyb. 11.4.1, so perhaps the Chians did
participate in the mediation of 208 but Livy at 28.7.14 has abbreviated a more detailed list
of mediators he found in Polybius: cf. Errington, 103. Note that Livy puts the mediation
effort of 208 under events of 207, but his incidental reference to the Olympic games at
28.7.14 proves that it belongs in 208: Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos (above, n. 3), 198.
45 For a convenient summary of Philip's successes in this period, see Walbank, Philip V
(above, n. 20), 95-96.
against Sparta, which was threatening his allies there - a goal he accomplished
(28.7.14 and 16-17). At this time, too, Philip was expecting substantial Carthag-
inian naval help for a new offensive in western Greece (28.7.17-18).
Were the Romans intended by the mediators of 208 to be included in their
attempted peace? Schmitt and Rich are sure of this, because the envoys from the
mediating states met at Heraclea with the assembled Aetolian magistrates, and
Roman envoys were there as well (Polyb. 10.42.4), apparently to discuss
strategy for the war; after this meeting, the mediators went on to Philip.46 It
should be stressed that even if the Romans were intended to be included in the
attempted mediation of 208, this would not effect our findings concerning the
previous mediation of 209. But in fact the evidence on 208, when examined in
its totality, turns out to be ambiguous.
First, it is clear that the envoys from the mediating states were seeking a
meeting with the Aetolian leadership as the initial step towards peace. As it
happened, they found the Aetolian magistrates gathered at Heraclea with repre-
sentatives of P. Sulpicius Galba, the current Roman commander in Greece. But
that may have come as a surprise and an accident: Philip, for one, did not expect to
find the Aetolian magistrates meeting with anyone but themselves when he raided
Heraclea to disperse their gathering (Polyb. 10.42.4-5), though he did know that
Attalus of Pergamum - not the Romans - was nearby (10.42.4). That is, we
should not conceive this as a situation where the neutrals intentionally invited the
Romans to a preliminary conference on a mediated peace; rather, the ambassa-
dors dealt with the complex situation they faced when they arrived at Heraclea.47
Second, we have a story in Frontinus (Strat. 1.4.6) which says that envoys of the
Aetolians
-
not accompanied by any Romans
-
were sent slightly later to discuss
peace with Philip. Indeed, the point of the Frontinus story is that Philip tricked the
Aetolian envoys into thinking he was interested in peace with the League, so that
he could take the Aetolian position at Thermopylae by surprise:
Philippus... Graeciam petens, cum Thermopylas occupatas audiret et ad
eum legati Aetolorum venissent acturi de pace, retentis eis ipse magnis
itineribus ad angustias pertendit securisque custodibus et legatorum redi-
tus exspectantibus inopinatus Thermopylas traiecit.
46 Holleaux had thought this was a meeting of the Panaetolian Assembly: Rome, la GrkLe
(above, n. 3), 36 n. 3. This is clearly not the case, but rather a special meeting of the
Aetolian magistrates and perhaps the Aetolian Apocleti or Inner Council (cf. Toi; dpXov'ra;
at Polyb. 10.42.4), to discuss strategy for the war: see Walbank, Commentary 11 (above,
n. 3): 257; cf. Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos (above, n. 3), 198.
47 This is admitted by Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos (above, n. 3), 197. In this sense, although
Holleaux's statement that "les neutres n'y sont pour rien" (Rome, la Grece [above, n. 31,
36 n. 3) makes the non-belligerent ambassadors too passive at the Heraclea peace talks,
his essential point - that the neutrals had not intentionally invited the Romans - gets to the
heart of the matter (despite the criticism of Schmitt, 198).
For our understanding of what was going on in 208, this story seems at least
a balance to Livy's information that the Romans were present when the neutral
mediators met the Aetolian magistrates at Heraclea. We must canvass the
possibility that the events surrounding the peace negotiations of 208 were more
complicated than the passing references (themselves revealing Livian misun-
derstanding of Polybius' language) which we find in Livy 28.7.48
Finally, Livy's own account of the eventual meeting of the Greek mediators
with King Philip, a month or two after Heraclea, displays characteristics that are
odd if the underlying assumption is that the interlocutors at Heraclea are
discussing a comprehensive peace. The subject of the discussion is said to be de
finiendo Aetolico bello (28.7.14). And the idea that this means exactly what it
says, i.e., that what was being discussed was the ending of the war between
Macedon and Aetolia, finds support in Philip's final remark to the mediators: he
had not been the cause of this war (se neque causam eius bellifuisse: 28.7.15).
A propagandistic statement, to be sure: but as we have seen above, Philip's
remarks would have been nonsensical if the Romans were central to the peace
process under discussion, for everyone knew that he had been the aggressor
against Rome. Good propaganda requires at least some factual basis, and
Philip's statement to the Greek mediators constitutes good propaganda only if
Philip and the mediators were focused primarily on his relations with Aetolia
-
for it was indeed the Aetolians who had started war against him, in 211 (above,
p. 271-273).49
My point is not to prove that the mediation effort of 208 was intended solely
to bring the war between Macedon and the Aetolian League to an end; it of
course remains possible that the Romans were indeed involved here. My point
is merely to show that there is enough contrary evidence available to make us
cautious about assuming that the mediators of 208 were always focused on a
"comprehensive peace" including the Romans
-
for given the state of our
evidence, this is not something we can know for certain.
In contrast to the effort in 209, the mediation effort of 208 failed even to
obtain any serious discussion of specific peace terms. The belligerents
-
espe-
cially Philip
-
seem to have been more intent on prosecuting the war than
48 Livy's rendition of to;
adpXovTaq Et;
'HpOKckEav
&Opoi4eaOat (Polyb. 10.42.4) as
concilium Aetolis Heracleam indictum at 28.5.13 (i.e., this was a meeting of the regular
Panaetolian Assembly) is clearly a major error: see Walbank, Commentary II (above,
n. 3): 257 (and above, n. 46). Rich (above, n. 3), 146, find it "inconceivable" that the
Aetolians in 208 might have found an opportunity to negotiate a peace with Philip on their
own; but Walbank does not: see Philip V (above, n. 20), 95 n. 1.
49 The implications of
Livy
28.7.14
(de finiendo Aetolico bello
ageretur ... ) are taken as
obvious by Holleaux, Rome, la Grece (above, n. 3), 36 n. 4. Holleaux's position is
strengthened by adding Philip's statement in the subsequent passage 28.7.15 (se neque
causam eius bellifuisse).
negotiating its end.50 But in 207 important Greek neutrals tried once more to
bring about a negotiated peace; and this time matters proceeded much further.
New developments made spring 207 a propitious time for a new diplomatic
initiative. What should be stressed is that the tide in the war was still continuing
to run in Philip's favor - especially from the point of view of Aetolia. The
king's multiple victories on land during 208 had strengthened his already-
formidable military reputation and the prestige of the Macedonian army: as he
told his allies, no Greek forces wished to face him in battle (Livy [P]
28.8.3).
Attalus of Pergamum, having barely escaped capture when Philip defeated him
at Opus, had returned to Asia Minor to deal with an invasion of his kingdom by
Philip's ally and in-law Prusias I of Bithynia; and Attalus would not be coming
back. This dealt a serious blow to the Aetolians, depriving them of a most
trusted and major ally in the war.51 As for the Romans, their naval campaign in
the Aegean in summer 208, while destructive to Philip's Greek allies, had had
little strategic impact, and in spring 207 they showed no sign of stirring from
their bases in the Adriatic. Indeed, it is certain that the legion originally sent to
the Adriatic/Greek theater with M. Valerius Laevinus' fleet in 214 had now
been withdrawn - which meant that the most the Aetolian League could hope
for from Rome was more naval raids, rather than significant operations on
land.52 Meanwhile, Philip's allies the Achaeans, under the energetic leadership
of Philopoemen, had produced a powerful new army. This meant that Aetolia's
allies the Spartans, rather than being of help to the League, would soon face
their own severe problems.53 Nowhere the Aetolians looked were their pros-
pects promising. It was a return to the situation of spring 209.
Our information on the important mediation efforts of 207 consists unfortu-
nately of a problematic and summary account in Appian (Mac. 3), a vague
reference in Dio (frg. 57.58, cf. Zon. 9.11), and a tantalizing fragment
of
50 Cf. Errington, CAH (above, n. 3): 103.
51 On the close relations between the Aetolians and the rulers of Pergamum,
see R. Mc-
Shane, The Foreign Policy of the Attalids of Pergamum (Urbana, Ill., 1964): 100-2 and
106-7. The relationship dated from before ca. 250 and grew closer in the 220s (McShane,
100-1). King Attalus had even been elected one of the two Aetolian generals for 209 - a
very great honor (Livy 27.29.10 and 30.1).
52 On the date of the withdrawal of the legion, which left only Roman naval forces in the
Greek theater of operations, see Rich (above, n. 3), 153-55. Roman inaction in the
Adriatic and in Greece in spring and early summer 207 may also have been caused by
concern in the Senate over Hasdrubal's threatened invasion of Italy, which in the event
came down the Po Valley and along Italy's Adriatic coast: see Hammond, in Hammond-
Walbank III (above, n. 3): 406.
53 On Philopoemen's re-organization and strengthening of the Achaean army, which led in
207 to the great Achaean victory over Sparta at Mantineia, see Errington,
Philopoemen
(above, n. 33), 62-67; cf. A. M. Eckstein, Moral Vision in the Histories of Polybius
(Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1995): 163-64.
Polybius (11.4-6). The latter passage demonstrates that Polybius covered the
mediation of 207 in great detail. But his main narrative is no longer extant, and
Livy - whom one could normally depend upon in this period to give at least
Polybius' main points - chose not to preserve Polybius here, probably because
Livy found the Romans militarily inactive in Greece in both 207 and 206 (see
Livy
29. 12.1).54
App. Mac. 3 is unfortunately our only connected narrative of the diplomacy
of 207. But clearly it must be used with caution. The early chapters of the
Macedonica are rife with factual errors.55 And there is at least one major error
in Mac. 3 itself: the claim that strong Roman reinforcements arrived in north-
west Greece and carried out important operations with the Aetolians (namely,
the capture of the strategic city of Ambracia) before the League concluded a
separate peace with Philip in 206. The story of the operations at "Ambracia" is
not a problem in itself. Perhaps it reflects an action by P. Sempronius Tudita-
nus' actual expedition of 205; perhaps it is a mistake for the (hypothetical)
capture by P. Sempronius Tuditanus of the lesser-known town of Ambracus in
205.56 Far more worrisome is the illogic of major Roman reinforcements
54 Were the Romans militarily inactive in Greece in 207 and 206? Rich (above, n. 3), intent
on arguing that Rome always prosecuted the war in Greece with vigor, proposes (I136-43)
that the expedition of P. Sempronius Tuditanus to northwest Greece, which eventually led
to peace with Macedon and is placed by Livy 29.12 in 205, actually belongs in 206; cf.
also now Kas6eev (above, n. 1), 430. This should not be accepted. First, we have Livy's
statement at 29.12.1, at the beginning of the res Graeciae for 205, that negleciae eo
biennio res in Graecia erant (the obvious years being 207 and 206) - a passage which
Rich himself rightly argues derives from Polybius (137). Second, there is Livy 29.1 1.1 1,
which has P. Sempronius Tuditanus being elected consul in 204 in absentia while in
command in Greece, and which obviously derives from a Roman annalist. This places
Sempronius in Greece in late 205 - and there is certainly not enough campaigning
reported in Livy 29.12 to fill up two seasons (Livy indeed implies that Sempronius was in
Greece only for one). Thus both the Polybian and the annalistic traditions appear to put
Sempronius' expedition to northwest Greece in 205. And when our very skimpy sources
for this period agree on something, it is dangerous methodology to substitute something
else. Rich's thesis is rejected without argument (though it deserves one) by Hammond, in
Hammond-Walbank III (above, n. 3): 409 n. 1. See also below, n. 56.
55 For instance, App. Mac. 4 has Philip conquering Chios during his Aegean campaign of
201 - which did not happen.
56 So Rich (above, n. 3), 143-44 (but dating these events to 206: see above, n. 54). Ham-
mond, on the other hand, believes that App. Mac. 3 represents an actual, major Roman
expedition to northwest Greece in 207 (Hammond-Walbank III [above, n. 3]: 406-7).
This is hard to accept, given Livy's repeated statements that the Aetolians were aban-
doned by Rome during this period (29.12.1; 32.21.17; cf. 36.31.1 1 -
all from Polybius);
the similarity between the alleged "expedition of 207" and P. Sempronius Tuditanus'
actual expedition of 205 (10,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry each: App. Mac. 3; Livy
29.12.2); and the fact that Hammond has to make the alleged expedition of 207 return
immediately to Italy following only a few forays on the Illyrian coast
-
an extremely
arriving in northwest Greece while the Aetolians then go on to make a separate
peace anyway. Since Livy's version of events is that the Aetolians eventually
made a separate peace with Philip because the Romans had abandoned them
(29.12.1; 32.21.17; cf. 36.31.11), - a version which is evidently based on
Polybius, which makes logical sense, and which (since it reflects badly on
Roman fides) Livy would not have put forth unless he had strong evidence to
believe it - it seems clear that if Appian's tale of major Roman help to Aetolia
before the Aetolians' separate peace is not just sheer confusion, then it derives
from a deceptive Roman annalist intent (precisely) on defending Rome from the
charge of having abandoned Aetolia in 207-206. This does not raise our
confidence in the general narrative of 207 in App. Mac. 3.57 Yet it is not easy to
dismiss Appian entirely either, because part of his account of the diplomatic
mediation of 207 sounds very like Polyb. 11.4-6 and provides a plausible
historical context of this latter passage - as a whole range of scholars have
pointed out.58
The story in App. Mac. 3 is that a delegation from certain non-belligerent
states - the Ptolemies, Chios, Mytilene, and Amynander of Athamania - tried
twice, at the Panaetolian Assemblies first of spring and then of autumn 207, to
bring about a negotiated peace.59 This time we are explicitly told that the aim of
the mediators was at the beginning a comprehensive peace including the Ro-
mans: ?ti
&takkayji 'Pogaiwv
icai. APrwXcv KCCtV (Dtkin1oU.60 But Appian says
that P. Sulpicius Galba, the current Roman commander in the Greek theater,
sabotaged the peace effort: claiming publicly that he himself did not have the
legal power to commit Rome to peace, he simultaneously wrote secretly to the
Senate that it was to Rome's advantage that Aetolia should continue the war
against Philip. The Senate was convinced by Sulpicius' letter, and wrote to
Greece forbidding the putative treaty. There follows the tale of the large forces
sent to help the Aetolians, and the joint Roman-Aetolian capture of "Ambracia"
- all for naught, we are also told, for the Roman reinforcements immediately
inefficient use of manpower in the crisis year of 207, and an extremely cumbersome way
of dealing with the fact that obviously no permanent help was sent by Rome to its Greek
allies during these years.
57 Cf. Holleaux, Rome, la Grece (above, n. 3), 245 and n. 2; Walbank, Philip V (above,
n. 20), 99 and n. 9; Rich (above, n. 3), 144.
58 See Holleaux, Rome, la Grece (above, n. 3), 38 and n. 1; Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos
(above, n. 3), 207-8; Rich (above, n. 3), 144.
59 This is explicit in Appian:
6i;,
6vOa J?p oi Aitokoi Tai; nrxt;
ctKaECIoggva;
EKd-
Xotv.
60 For what it is worth, Dio reports that it was Philip, on the advice of envoys from Ptolemy
IV, who took an important initiative in including the Romans in these negotiations: frg.
57.58, cf. Zon. 9.1 1. (It is clear both from the placement of this Dio fragment within Dio's
general narrative of the Hannibalic War, and from the sequence of events which it
records, that the reference here parallels the negotiations in App. Mac. 3.)
returned to Italy, and Philip re-captured Ambracia. At a second meeting con-
cerning peace, the neutral envoys then spoke directly against the Romans,
questioning Roman motives and claiming that the conflict between Aetolia and
Philip was allowing Rome to form the habit of intervening in the affairs of the
Greeks, to the detriment of Greek freedom. When P. Sulpicius Galba rose to
reply,
he was shouted down
by
the audience
-
so
strong
had anti-Roman
feelings become. Nevertheless, Appian appears to indicate that the second
meeting, too, failed to bring about a negotiated peace, and the war thus contin-
ued for a while.61
Given the obvious problems in App. Mac. 3, it would be incautious to press
the details here. What is striking, however, is the tradition in Appian that P.
Sulpicius Galba was opposed to any mediated peace, believing it to be in
Rome's interest that the war should continue. That Rome was to be included
directly in the mediation of 207, i.e., that it was an intended "comprehensive
peace," did not matter.62 It is difficult to see why a tradition of Galba's general
opposition to peace would have developed out of whole cloth; and indeed, we
do not possess so far any evidence of Roman encouragement for any of the
mediators' several interventions. This leads to a (cautious) suggestion: Galba
was the Roman commander in Greece in 209 and 208 as well as in 207; perhaps
he was as fundamentally opposed to the mediations of 209 and 208 as he was to
that of 207; and he would thus have viewed the actions of the mediating states in
those years as contrary to Rome's interest, whether Rome was included in the
putative peace efforts or not (although obviously even more so in the latter
case)
-
just as he did in 207. Moreover, in the tradition as we have it, Galba's
view of Rome's strategic interests in Greece was not that of a single headstrong
individual, for his reasoning allegedly convinced the Senate to sabotage the
peace effort of 207. This tradition, too, makes sense
-
given Rome's strategic
need to keep Philip distracted in Greece, combined with the desire to punish
him with war for his treaty with Hannibal.63
The account in App. Mac. 3 also gives us a plausible historical context for
the important Polybian fragment 11.4-6. This is a speech by an ambassador,
61 The gap in time between the second mediation of 207 and the actual separate peace
between the Aetolians and Philip may be implied by the use of the term tXko; at App.
Mac. 3.2 init.: see Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos (above, n. 3), 208-9; Berthold (above, n. 3),
105 and n. 8. This means that App. Mac. 3-4 can be interpreted as conforming to the
sequence of events indicated in Livy 36.31.1 1, where an important intervening develop-
ment (namely, a destructive Macedonian invasion of Aetolia) is said to have led to the
final Aetolian decision to engage in a separate peace (Schmitt, 209; cf. Berthold, 105).
62 Galba's opinion, according to Appian: 'Pwiaiot;
cugo?pep
noXqisiv
Airoxob;
0txin-
tw. Holleaux is therefore fundamentally correct about the basic clash of interests between
Galba and the Greek mediators: Rome, la Grece (above, n. 3), 36 n. 3 (despite the
criticisms of Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos [above, n.
31, 209).
63 On Roman goals in the war with Philip, see further above.
which Polybius decided to recount at length; the speech argues for peace
between the Aetolians and Philip, and simultaneously it is hostile to Rome. The
speech belongs to Polybius' res Graeciae for 207, since it is preceded in the
Constantinian excerpta antiqua by the description of Hasdrubal's defeat at the
Metaurus (11.1-3: June 207).64 What needs emphasis is that the speaker of this
anti-Roman speech is a representative of one of the mediating Greek states: this
is explicit at 11.4.1-2. The fragment as we have it does not give the speaker's
name, but a gloss on one of the Polybian manuscripts identifies him as one
Thrasycrates. And there is a fair argument for identifying Thrasycrates as a
Rhodian, for Rhodes seems singled out in the list of persistent mediators
mentioned at the beginning of the speech (second after Ptolemy IV, and called
formally i] tiv'Poiowv
n6kt;,
as compared to the simple ethnicity names given
the other mediators).65 And actually more can be said, for the speaker has to
come from a state which not only has participated prominently in mediation
efforts since the beginning of the war (Polyb. 11.4.2), but from a state in the
Aegean or Asia Minor (see 1 1.4.6). That limits our choices even more obvious-
ly to the speaker being a Rhodian.66
The anti-Roman tone of Thrasycrates' speech in Polyb. 11.4-6 is not
congruent with any attempt by the mediators to construct a "comprehensive
peace" including the Romans (i.e., the "comprehensive peace" of Appian's first
mediation of 207). It does, of course, fit very well with the anti-Roman tone of
the speeches which Appian says the neutral ambassadors gave at the second
mediation attempt. It therefore seems reasonable to ascribe the speech in Polyb.
11.4-6 to that occasion. That will be the assumption made here.67
Thrasycrates' speech is addressed directly to the Aetolians (Polyb. 1 1.4. 1:
XO av8pE; Ai-rXoi). He speaks for all the mediating states (King Ptolemy, the
64 On the placement of Polyb. 11.4-6 in 207 B.C., see rightly Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos
(above, n. 3), 201; Walbank, Commentary II (above, n. 3): 6 and 274.
65 See Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos (above, n. 3), 199; Walbank, Commentary II (above, n. 3):
275.
66 The Byzantine and Mytilenean envoys (Polyb. 11.4.1) are from the Aegean, but we have
no record of the previous participation of these states in the mediations (unless one wants
to take 11.4.2-4 itself as referring to them). A Chian might just fit, since we have
evidence independent of 11.4.2-4 that there was Chian participation in the mediation
effort of 209 (Livy 27.30.4), and perhaps the Chians participated in the mediation effort
of 208 (based only on Polyb. 11.4.2-4 itself: see above, n. 44). But this thesis is difficult
to accept, given the minor place the Chians receive in the speaker Thrasycrates' list of
mediators at 1 1.4.1. The Rhodians, on the other hand, are from the Aegean, are mentioned
specially by Thrasycrates, and were prominent participants in the mediations both of 209
and 208; no other state fits so well.
67 So Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos (above, n. 3), 204-10; Ferro (above, n. 3), 7 n. 6 and 139-
40; G. A. Lehmann, Untersuchungen zur historischen Glaubwurdigkeit des Polybios
(Munster, 1967): 138; Rich (above, n. 3), 144 45.
Rhodians, the Byzantines, the Chians, and the Mytilenaeans).68 Thrasycrates
begins by saying that this is not the first or even the second time that the neutral
states have made proposals to the Aetolians concerning peace - for they
seriously seek the Aetolians' ending of hostilities (1 1.4.1-2). Indeed, the non-
belligerents have sought this goal from the moment the war began, seeing the
ruin the war was bringing upon both Aetolians and Macedonians, and the
damage it might inflict upon other Greek states as far away as Asia (4.2-6). The
reference here is clearly to the attempted mediations of 209 and 208.69 And thus
Thrasycrates' opening statement would suggest in itself, even if we did not
have additional evidence (which of course we do), that the primary goal of the
non-belligerent mediators had always been the reconciliation of Aetolia and
Macedon: that the neutrals had been strenuously trying all along to reconcile
Aetolia and Macedon is precisely Thrasycrates' point (and note that the Ro-
mans are totally absent from Thrasycrates' concerns about "ruin").
This point takes on additional force because it is followed by Thrasycrates'
extraordinarily hostile depiction of Rome. The Aetolians, he says, are engaged in
a war which is not only destructive and self-destructive (as all wars are), but also to-
tally dishonorable. The Aetolians claim that they are fighting for the freedom of the
Greeks against Philip, but in fact they are compromising Greek freedom in regard
to Rome: "You are fighting for the enslavement and destruction of Greece" ( 11.5. 1).
The terms of the Aetolians' treaty of alliance with the Romans, Thrasycrates says,
are disgraceful (tiiv
aioyXv1lv
{itv ?7t,?4?pe: 11.5.3) - for the treaty tums over
free Greeks "to the shameful violence and lawlessness of barbarians" (6e&Kawr
-roit 3pf3pOt; Ei; T'a; aOXiOata;
U"Pppt;
ical
napavogia;: 5.7).70 And beyond
this, the war will result in a general disaster to all the Greeks, for once the Romans
have finished the war in Italy against Hannibal (which they will soon do), they
will turn with all their strength against Greece, on the pretext of helping the
Aetolians against Philip, but really with the intention of subjugating Greece to
themselves (I 1.6.1-2). The Aetolians should have foreseen all these consequences
of their alliance with the Romans from the beginning (6.5). But they certainly have
no excuse now
-
after Roman atrocities such as those committed at Oreus and
Aegina
-
not to open their eyes to what is occurring and what will occur (6.0-8).71
68 Note that this list of mediators is quite close to the list in App. Mac. 3, though Appian
omits the Rhodians (!) and adds Amynander of Athamania. Amynander had been a
mediator in 209 (Livy 27.30.4); see above, pp. 274-275, and below, n. 86.
69 See Walbank, Commentary II (above, n. 3): 175.
70 Thrasycrates refers here to the fact that under the Roman-Aetolian treaty of alliance, the
Romans were to receive all the movable loot - including the enslavement of the free
population - in any town in Greece which the allies conquered (the Aetolians receiving
the territory and physical town itself). For discussion, see Schmitt, Staatsvertrage III
(above, n. 9): 263-64.
71 Thrasycrates refers here to Oreus on Euboea, which had been seized and plundered by
Roman forces under Galba in 208 (see esp. Livy 28.8.13), and to the great island of
Schmitt, intent on defending the thesis that informal Roman-Rhodian friend-
ship existed from ca. 306 B.C. - i.e., from fully 100 years before Thrasycrates'
speech -, minimizes the anti-Roman elements in this speech, and minimizes the
importance of the speech for our general understanding of the attitude of
Rhodes and the other neutral mediators towards the Romans; and other scholars
have followed him in this.72 But I do not see how this can be an acceptable
interpretation of Polyb. 11.4-6. It is reasonable to suppose that even if Polybius
has reworked Thrasycrates' speech in his own vocabulary, it still reflects the
fundamental tone of the original.73 And the language Polybius ascribes to
Thrasycrates in this speech is as violent as Polybian language gets: the deep
shame
(aiaX'vvq)
of associating with the Romans and their actions in Greece is
constantly reiterated (11.4.8; 5.2; 5.7); the Romans are condemned as
ppa-
pot, and their actions as
piaplkaptx&v
( 5.6; 5.7); the ascription of iapavojia to
them (5.7) is especially damning, for Polybius uses this word only of the actions
of the worst categories of people (criminals, Celts, the unruly mob).74
Aegina in the Saronic Gulf, which had been seized by Galba in 209. Galba's refusal to
allow the ransoming of Aeginetan prisoners being sold into slavery became famous as a
Roman atrocity (though in fact he soon relented: see Polyb. 9.42.5-8). He eventually
turned over the island to the Aetolians themselves (as per the treaty of 211), who in turn
sold it to Attalus of Pergamum: see Polyb. 22.8.9-10, cf. 11.5.8.
72 Rom und Rhodos (above, n. 3), 199-204; cf. Berthold (above, n. 3), 106 and n. 12.
73 On the basic historicity of the speech as we have it in Polyb. 11.4-6, see Walbank,
Commentary II (above, n. 3): 275, against Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos (above, n. 3), 202-3
(and compare Rom und Rhodos, 56, where Schmitt himself is much more willing to accept
the basic historicity of the speech).
74 Berthold (above, n. 3), 106, seeks to minimize the importance of Thrasycrates' speech for
our understanding of Rhodian policy towards Rome, on grounds that this is just an instance
of "unkind words." But the sheer violence of Thrasycrates' total attack on Roman motives,
methods and goals makes this unconvincing. On the fiercely anti-Roman tone of the speech,
see Holleaux, Rome, la Grece, 37. On Polybius' reserving of the accusation of 1apavoisia
solely for the worst categories of people, see Eckstein, Moral Vision (above, n. 53), 122 and
n. 15; 127 and n. 32; 137; 154. The terms
3(pf3apot
and Iaplcpuc6v in Thrasycrates'
oration speak for themselves; for the Romans as barbaroi see also Polyb. 9.37.6 and 38.5, a
speech (to be sure) by Lyciscus of Acarnania, a state allied with Macedon - which makes
the re-appearance of this terminology in the speech of a neutral ambassador all the more
remarkable. Polybius is clearly willing to employ the pejorative term barbaroi to describe
the Romans in the mouths of Greek historical figures whom he places prominently in the
Histories
- which is an interesting finding; and Walbank's rule that Polybius nevertheless
does not ever speak of the Romans as barbaroi in his own voice (Commentary II [above,
n. 3]: 176) turns out not to be quite true: see Polyb. 12.4b.1-c.1, now with C. Champion,
"Romans as
Bdpokapot:
Three Polybian Speeches and the Politics of Cultural Indetermina-
cy," CPh 95 (2000): 431-32. For the "deep shame" involved in allying oneself with Roman
barbaroi, see also Polyb. 9.38.6 and 39.1-5 (again, this comes in an oration by an ally of
Macedon
- but the re-appearance of this harsh theme in a prominent speech by one of the
neutral mediators of 207 is therefore once more very striking).
In contrast to Schmitt, Rich does admit that it is politically significant that
the Romans are mentioned in Thrasycrates' speech only to be villified.75 But he
goes on to ascribe the violent tone of the speech merely to the bitterness of the
neutral states over the Roman sabotaging of the first mediation of 207; this, he
argues, caused the neutrals to change their previous policy, in which they had
consistently urged a comprehensive peace including Rome.76 But if one accepts
the import of part of Thrasycrates' speech as it appears in Polybius (namely, its
virulently anti-Roman tone), then one should also accept the import of the rest
of the speech - which is that the mediators from the beginning had focused
primarily and persistently on a reconciliation between Aetolia and Macedon
(11.4.1-2). Perhaps there is an element of propaganda in that assertion, con-
structed for the specific political situation of autumn 207, when the rift between
the Aetolians and Rome was obviusly widening - but as we have said, good
propaganda needs to have at least a partial basis in fact. In fact, the statement of
the mediator at Polyb. 11.4.1-2, and the tone of 1 1.4-6 taken as a whole, fit
remarkably well with the anti-Roman tone that the mediators had acquiesced in
as far back as the peace talks of 209: see the speech preserved in Polyb. 10.25
(discussed above).
Polybius says that Thrasycrates' oration had a large impact upon the Aeto-
lians (11.6.9). Envoys from King Philip followed: they said they would post-
pone discussion of the details of a peace settlement for the moment, and only
say that if the Aetolians chose peace, the king readily consented, but if not, the
Aetolians -
not Philip
-
should be held responsible for what might then happen
to the Greeks (11.6.9-10). The speech of the Macedonian envoys in Polybius
thus parallels the position Philip had consistently maintained in previous nego-
tiations: that this war was not of his making.77 And in this passage the context is
explicitly negotiations for peace solely between Philip and the Aetolians
-
which is the only context where such statements make sense.78
The efforts of the Greek mediating states ultimately failed in 207, as they
had in 209 and 208. We do not know the reasons why the peace talks broke
down: Polyb. 11.4-6 ends with the speech of the Macedonians; App. Mac. 3 is
too summary; Dio/Zonaras is vague. But the failure of the talks is clear enough
from the placement of the fragment Polyb. 11.7.2-3, which describes a major
Macedonian invasion of Aetolia following this failure. This invasion (or per-
haps a second one, several months later) broke the will of the Aetolians to
75 Rich (above, n. 3), 144.
76 Ibid., 146.
77 On the connection between the Macedonian statement in Polyb. 11.8.9-10 and similar
statements at earlier peace talks by representatives of Macedon, see rightly Schmitt, Rom
und Rhodos (above, n. 3), 201; Rich (above, n. 3), 145 and n. 188.
78 See further above.
continue the war.79 Sometime in 206 (exactly when is uncertain), the Aetolians
were therefore driven by Realpolitik to come to a negotiated peace with Philip
by themselves, separate from Rome.80 Roman policy must have opposed this
peace: thus we find the Romans dispatching a large force to northwest Greece in
spring 205, ending two years of neglect (Livy
[PI
29.12.1), in the expectation or
hope that Aetolia was either still in the war or could be persuaded to rejoin it
(29.12.2-6). Livy in fact says that P. Sempronius Tuditanus, the new Roman
commander in Greece, was angry when he learned that the Aetolians had made
a separate peace with Philip
-
for it was a violation of their treaty of alliance
with Rome (29.12.4).
Given this political background, it is striking that we have a tradition where
at least one of the mediators of 209, 208 and 207 played a part in bringing about
the separate Aetolian peace with Macedon in 206. The state involved was
Rhodes: App. Mac. 4 highlights the Rhodian role in that peace
(tau.aKTA1pwv
oi
yeyov6tovw ... ). Most scholars in fact accept the idea that the Greek mediators
of 209-207 were probably involved in helping create the peace of 206.81 We are
79 The question is whether the invasion of Aetolia in Polyb. 11.7.2-3 is the same as the one
(seemingly different in detail) described retrospectively at Livy (P) 36.31.11. Niese 11
(above, n. 26): 495 and 500, followed by Hammond, in Hammond-Walbank III (above,
n. 3): 405-6, suggests two separate successful invasions by Philip, one in spring 207 and
a second one in summer 206; Hammond additionally proposes that the first invasion
called forth a Roman expedition to northwest Greece in summer 207, to encourage the
Aetolians (but see above, n. 56). Rich (above, n. 3), 147-48, opts for only one invasion, in
autumn 207, after the failure of the two mediation efforts of App. Mac. 3. Walbank, on
the basis of the placement of Polyb. 11.7.2-3 within the Polybian ms., opts for one
invasion in the summer of 207 (Commentary II
[above, n. 3]: 278; cf. Philip V
[above,
n. 20], 399); but this seems too early a date for the decisive stroke that drove Aetolia from
the war (see Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos [above, n. 31, 211 n. I - who therefore opts for two
invasions).
80 Some scholars place the peace in early 206: so Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos (above, n. 3),
211 n. 1; Rich (above, n. 3), 148. But in Rich's case this chronology is dictated by the
hypothesis that P. Sempronius Tuditanus' expedition to northwest Greece should be dated
to 206 rather than in 205 (for criticism, see n. 54 above). Other scholars suggest the
Panaetolian Assembly of autumn 206 for the swearing of peace with Philip, because this
makes Livy's remark that Tuditanus arrived in Illyria vixdum pace facta (29.12.3 -
assuming this is the spring of 205) only a slight exaggeration: so G. De Sanctis, Storia dei
Romani III:2 (Turin, 1916): 430 n. 87, and 444; Holleaux, Rome, la Grece (above, n. 3),
253 n. 4; Walbank, Commentary II (above, n. 3): 278; Hammond, in Hammond-Walbank
III (above, n. 3): 408-9; Errington, CAH (above, n. 3): 101.
81 Holleaux, Rome, la Grece (above, n. 3), 26 and 254-55; Walbank, Philip V (above,
n. 20), 99 and n. 9; Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos (above, n. 3), 206 n. 1; Hammond, in
Hammond-Walbank III (above, n. 3): 405; Errington, CAH (above, n. 3): 103; Ager
(above, n. 3), 16-17. But Holleaux, Walbank, Hammond and Errington, while implicitly
accepting the idea that the mediators of 209-207 also helped engineer the separate
Aetolian peace of 206, all base their reconstructions on the assumption that the second
dependent, of course, on Appian here - whose reliability is subject to question.
Yet Appian's reference to the mediating role of the Rhodians in the Aetolian-
Macedonian peace of 206 is not in contradiction to Livy 29.12. 1, according to
which Philip by this point was able to impose upon the Aetolians pretty much
whatever conditions he wished.82 If the tradition in App. Mac. 4 is correct, then
it confirms the other evidence that the neutral states were all along focused
primarily on ending the conflict between Aetolia and Macedon - with or
without Rome. Now they had finally succeeded.
The current scholarly consensus on the end of the fighting between Rome and
Macedon the next year (205), which has occasionally been challenged,83 is
nevertheless accepted here. That is: in the spring of 205 P. Sempronius Tuditanus
arrived in northwest Greece, bringing for the first time in two years a large Roman
force into the Greek theater of operations; after some fighting between Sempron-
ius and Philip, the neutral Epirotes (into whose territory the conflict was threaten-
ing to spread) took the initiative in mediating a peace. The result was successful
peace negotiations at the Epirote capital of Phoenice in summer/autumn 205.84
Polybius evidently described the Phoenice talks in detail
- as he evidently
described all the attempted mediations of the war in detail. Thus we know the
names of the three Epirote mediators, -
Aeropus, Derdas and Philip
-
and even
the order in which people spoke (Livy
[P] 29.12.12). The talks went relatively
smoothly, because both sides had now decided that peace was in their interest
(29.12.7, 10 and 16): Philip had given up hope in the Carthaginians (whom he
now abandoned, contrary to the terms of his treaty with Hannibal), while the
Romans
-
themselves abandoned by the Aetolians
-
had no powerful allies left
mediation of App. Mac. 3 refers itself to this separate peace of 206. But if we follow
Schmitt and Rich in positing that the second mediation of App. Mac. 3 actually belongs in 207
(= Polyb. 1 1.4-6) -, as I think we should -, then the position of these prominent scholars
in support of neutral involvement in the separate peace of 206 loses much of its force. It
seems better to follow Schmitt in employing here not App. Mac. 3 but the (retrospective)
reference to Rhodian mediation in App. Mac. 4 -
and since Appian is a summary, it may
well be that the other usual mediating states were involved in this peace also.
82 See esp. the reconstruction offered by Ager (above, n. 3), 16-17.
83 See Rich (above, n. 3), 136-43.
84 Rich wishes to date the Peace of Phoenice to summer 206 (but see n. 54, above). By
contrast, Walbank argues that the peace negotiations might actually have continued into
the spring of 204, since P. Sempronius Tuditanus in late 205 was elected consul for 204 in
absentia while in Greece (Livy 29.11.10: see Philip V, 205). But the negotiations as
described by Livy went quickly (29.12.12-13). Moreover, even if the preliminary peace
was concluded in summer/autumn 205, Sempronius and his forces would obviously have
had to remain on station in Illyria until it was actually formally ratified in Rome (cf. Livy
29.12.16); and even after that, there could have been much administrative work to do
(e.g., delicate diplomacy with the Parthini and the other polities newly released from
Macedonian control: cf. 29.12.13). All of this could easily account for Sempronius'
election as consul for 204 in absentia.
in Greece, and did not wish to devote large resources to fighting Philip when
their invasion of Africa was looming.85 In the negotiations Philip therefore
conceded some of his Illyrian conquests of 213-212 back to Rome, while the
Romans conceded to Philip some of those conquests. A compromise peace was
concluded, later formally ratified at Rome (Livy 29.12.13-16). No doubt the
results of the war actually left both sides disappointed.86
For our purposes, what is striking about the successful mediation of the
Peace of Phoenice in 205 is who is not there: the mediating states of 209-206.
No representatives of the Ptolemies, or Rhodes, or any of the other eastern and/
or commercial Greek polities, so persistent in the yearly diplomacy of 209-206,
helped to reconcile Rome and Macedon in 205. This is an important piece of
evidence - deserving more scholarly attention than it has previously received -
showing that the Greek states which had been so anxious to bring peace
between Macedon and Aetolia had less concern about relations between Mace-
don and Rome; and specifically, they did not view the continuation of war in
northwest Greece as a matter particularly requiring their attention.
The one previous mediator who was present also at Phoenice in 205 was
Amynander the king of Athamania (Livy 29.12.12). But his very presence
proves the point about the others: his kingdom was geographically proximate to
the fighting of 205. Amynander's diplomatic policies had fluctuated greatly
during the war: a pro-Aetolian mediator in 209 (Livy 27.30.4; see above, p.
274), and evidently a mediator in 207 (cf. App. Mac. 3), thereafter he had
allowed Philip to launch a major invasion of Aetolia via Athamania (the
invasion, we are told, that broke the Aetolians' will), in exchange for gaining
the island of Zacynthus from Macedon (Livy 36.31.1 1); now he appears as a
neutral mediator again. Presumably he was concerned - like the Epirotes - to
prevent the Roman-Macedonian war on the Illyrian coast from spreading into
his territory. That is: Amynander cared about what was happening between
Rome and Macedon in northwest Greece for an obvious reason, and so he now
acted; the other major mediators of 209-206, coming as they did from the
eastern Mediterranean, had always had a very different focus of concern.87
85 On the strategic situation facing Rome and Macedon in summer 205, see Errington, CAH
(above, n. 3): 103-4. Philip's violation of his treaty with Hannibal is noted by Hammond, in
Hammond-Walbank III (above, n. 3): 409 (and excused on the grounds of circumstances).
86 This is not to say that either side swore to the Peace of Phoenice in conscious bad faith -
despite the comments on Roman motives by Rich (above, n. 3), 151, and Errington, CAH
(above, n. 3): 106 (according to whom the Romans were just waiting for any opportunity
to effect an "adjustment" in the terms). Contrast Holleaux, Rome, la Grece (above, n. 3),
286-97, who presents good arguments for supposing Roman intentions to abide by the
treaty; cf. also Walbank, Philip V (above, n. 20), 105.
87 Huss (above, n. 3), 167 and n. 67, correctly but briefly notes the absence of the Ptolemies
from the Phoenice negotiations - and ascribes it, precisely, to lack of Ptolemaic interest in
events in northwest Greece.
The absence of the Greek mediators of 209, 208, 207 and 206 at Phoenice in
205 therefore underlines the main thrust of this paper - and the main thrust of
the policy of the major mediating states. It stands of a piece with the interven-
tion of Rhodes (and perhaps others) in helping create the separate peace
between Macedonia and Aetolia in 206. The interests of the mediating states
simply did not run parallel to the interests of Rome, and the mediating states
pursued those interests energetically in this period even when they ran contrary
to those of Rome.
The Ptolemaic regime in Alexandria possessed an informal amicitia with Rome
from the late 270s (cf. Livy Per. 14); the Rhodian Republic may also have had
a relationship of informal amicitia with Rome, which dated from ca. 306 -
though this is much more controversial.88 What is clear, however, is that these
informal relations of amicitia - even if they existed - had no weight in
determining the actions of these Greek states during the First Macedonian War.
Diels perceived the truth here long ago: "...die sogenannten Freunde Roms
(Ptolemaios Philopator, Rhodos) lediglich eine Politik des Eigennutzes trieben
und den Kampf zwischen Aetolem und Philipp beizulegen suchten." Holleaux
perceived the same basic truth
-
that the mediators of 209-206 were focused
primarily on ending the war between Macedon and Aetolia.89
The mediating states of 209-206 did not pursue a consistent anti-Roman
policy; clearly they were willing to have the Romans included in a peace in
Greece if that was part of the package for ending the war between Macedon and
Aetolia. This "comprehensive" peace may have been envisioned in 208 (though
that is uncertain), and such a process was pursued concretely during the first
mediation effort of 207. But when Schmitt asserts that in assessing the actions
of the prominent neutrals one should see "keine direkt antiromische Politik,"90
that is hardly true either. The scathing denunciation of Roman motives, aims
and conduct by the mediator Thrasycrates in Polyb. 1 1.4-6 belies it. Moreover,
even Schmitt admits that the mediators' diplomatic success in helping to create
the separate Macedonian-Aetolian peace in 206 put Rome in a very uncomfort-
88 On the controversy, compare Holleaux, Rome, la Gree (above, n. 3), 30-46 (arguing
against any serious Roman-Rhodian relationship), with Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos (above,
n. 3), 1-49 (arguing for an important though informal amicitia). A recently published
Rhodian inscription from ca. 200 B.C. strongly suggests that Roman-Rhodian contacts
before 200 had in fact been minimal. See V. Konterini, "Rome et Rhodes au tournant du
Ille siecle av. J.-C., d'aprbs une inscription in6dite du Rhodes," JRS 73 (1983): 24-32,
esp. 31-32 (against Schmitt, and reviving the thesis of Holleaux).
89 H. Diels, Sibyllinische Blatter (Berlin, 1890), 93; cf. Holleaux, Rome, la Grace (above,
n. 3), 36-38.
90 Schmitt, Rom und Rhodos (above, n. 3), 25.
able strategic position, confronting the Romans with a two-front war against
Carthage and Macedon simultaneously, and with no allies in Greece.91 In
addition, whether the mediators included the Romans in their efforts or not
turns out to be somewhat immaterial, for it appears from App. Mac. 3 that
Roman policy favored a continuation of the fighting between Aetolia and
Macedon
-
i.e., it was opposed to mediation in toto. In the one mediation where
we actually have evidence of direct Roman inclusion and involvement - the
first effort of 207 -, the Romans (we are told) intentionally sabotaged the entire
effort, in order to keep the war going (ibid.).92
If we had the complete text of Polybius for these years instead of scanty
fragments, the clash of interests beween Rome and the mediating Greek states
would probably be even more clear. From Polyb. 11.4-6 it is certain that he
stressed this clash of interests; why else would he have consciously chosen to
report the oration of Thrasycrates in such detail? Moreover, that speech was
part of a whole cycle of speeches, - of dramatic set-pieces within the Histories
- in which Roman motives, methods and goals in 217-207 were castigated, and
the fears of some Greeks concerning the impact of Roman intervention in Greek
affairs greatly underscored for the audience. The cycle started with the famous
speech of Agelaus at Naupactus in 217 (Polyb. 5.104: "the cloud in the west"),
continued through the speech of Lyciscus of Acarnania to the Spartans in 210
(Polyb. 9.37.4-39.5), the anti-Roman orator at the mediation of 209 (Polyb.
10.25), and culminated in Thrasycrates' speech in 1 1.4-6.93 To include these
speeches in the Histories was not a mere artistic decision on Polybius' part, nor
even a simple matter of reporting important speeches that had been made; it
was, above all, a political analysis.
In other words, relations between Rome and the prominent Greek states
attempting to mediate the war in 209-206 were distant or non-existent; and
sometimes their interests clashed. When that happened, the Ptolemies and the
Rhodians forcefully implemented their own desires, excluded the Romans
when necessary, and harshly criticized them. And yet within five years of the
separate peace between Aetolia and Macedon which Rhodes (and perhaps
others) helped engineer in 206 in direct contravention of Roman interests and
expressed Roman wishes, envoys from these very same mediators of 209-206
(including an important embassy from Rhodes) appeared before the Senate,
91 Ibid., 26.
92 The Roman commander Galba was present at the second mediation effort of 207 as well
as at the first, according to App. Mac. 3 - no doubt to speak in favor of continuing
the
war. He was shouted down after the anti-Roman speeches of the mediators (ibid.; cf.
Polyb. 11.4-6). See above, pp. 284-287.
93 On the historicity of Agelaus' speech in Polybius, see now C. Champion, "The Nature of
Authoritative Evidence in Polybius, and the Speech of Agelaus at Naupactus,"
TAPA 127
(1997):111-28.
asking for massive Roman military intervention in the Greek East.94 One
purpose of the present paper has been to show what a fundamental revolution in
Mediterranean diplomacy the arrival of these envoys was - how suddenly the
policy of these states had changed. Moreover, the Senate
-
having previously
accepted a compromise peace with Philip in 205 in order to be free of Greek
affairs - now answered these Greek appeals positively (even against the wishes
of the Roman People), thus precipitating the Second Macedonian War.95
Some excruciatingly important development must lie behind these sudden
and very sharp changes in policy. The most obvious development, of course,
was the discovery by the Ptolemies and Rhodians of the formation of "the Pact
between the Kings" - i.e., the secret treaty of alliance between Philip V and
Antiochus III (the Great) for the purpose of conquering the entire Ptolemaic
empire and thus totally disrupting the prevailing Hellenistic balance of power
(see esp. Polyb. 3.2.8 and 15.20 -
very emphatic). The historicity of the pact
between Philip and Antiochus has itself been strongly questioned, however, and
so this becomes a subject beyond our present scope.96 For now, the point has
been to establish exactly what the policies of the prominent Greek states which
attempted to mediate the First Macedonian War actually were in 209-206 -
towards Macedon, towards Aetolia, and towards Rome. Only when this has
been correctly established can one see the scale of the diplomatic revolution
which rocked the eastern Mediterranean in 201-200.97
University of Maryland, College Park Arthur M. Eckstein
94 See Livy 31.1.10 and 5.5ff. (the Athenians -
mediators in 209); 31.2.1 (the Rhodians);
31.9.1-4 (the Ptolemies); App. Mac. 4 (the Rhodians); Justin 30.2.8 (the Ptolemies); and
cf. Polyb. 16.24.2-3 (embassies from unspecified Greek states to Rome, asking for
Roman intervention - a passage often overlooked, but which confirms in an important
general way the other traditions).
95 On the conflict between the Senate and the People over declaring war against Macedon
again, see Livy 31.6.3-8.1 (including a long speech by P. Sulpicius Galba urging the new
war). Livy's account is strongly doubted by W. Dahiheim, Struktur und Entwicklung des
romischen Volkerrechts im dritten und zweiten Jahrhundert v. Chr. (Munich, 1968): 242-
44 and n. 23 - and strongly defended by J. Briscoe, A Commentary on Livy, Books XXXI-
XXXIII (Oxford, 1973): 69.
96 Doubters of the Pact: D. Magie, "The 'Agreement' Between Philip V and Antiochus III
for the Partition of the Egyptian Empire," JRS 29 (1939): 32-44; R. M. Errington, "The
Alleged Syro-Macedonian Pact and the Origins of the Second Macedonian War," Athe-
naeum 49 (1971): 336-54; cf. "Antiochos III., Zeuxis and Euromos," Epigr. Anat. 7
(1986): 5 n. 16; J. T. Ma-P. S. Derow-A. R. Meadows, "RC 38 (Amyzon) Reconsidered,"
ZPE 109 (1995): 76-80, esp. 80. The best current defense of the historicity of the Pact is
H. H. Schmitt, Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Antiochos' des GrojJen und seiner Zeit
(Wiesbaden, 1964): 226-36, cf. 242. The whole topic needs revisiting.
97 Holleaux was well aware of these implications of his thesis in terms of the later policies of
the non-belligerent mediating states of 209-206: see Rome, la Grece (above, n. 3), 45.

Greek Mediation in The First Macedonian War

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Greek Mediation in the First Macedonian War, 209-205 B.C.

Author(s): Arthur M. Eckstein

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