On Karl Marxs (181883) grave in Highgate Cemetery are his words The philosophers

have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.
Despite the immense influence of his ideas, relatively few people could give an accu-
rate account of what Marx believed. In this reading Jonathan Wolff (1959 ) provides
a clear and accessible overview of some of Marxs theory of alienation, a theory intended
to explain our relation to our work, to economic circumstances and to each other.
*
Recent history throws up an apparent paradox for Marxism. Above all,
Marxism is a philosophy of liberation, and in this lies its enormous attraction
throughout this century. Yet Marx was also committed to the planned econ-
omy, and increasingly people of all political persuasions have come to believe
that the planned economy leads not to human ourishing but to demoraliza-
tion. Hence our paradox: how can such a depressing and inefcient economic
system ever have been thought to be justied in the name of emancipation?
Some might say that the charges against the planned economy are exag-
gerated, that its advantages outweigh its disadvantages. Under communism
no one starves, and all have employment and shelter, even if the general stan-
dard of living is below that to which we aspire in bourgeois society. But this
does not explain why Marx valued the planned economy as liberating. His
view was not simply that the planned economy ensures that our basic needs
are met. He thought that only in a planned economy can a life fully worthy
of human beings be lived. My purpose is to explain why Marx held this (what
now seems quite bizarre) view.
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31
PLAYTHI NGS OF ALI EN
FORCES: KARL MARX AND
THE REJ ECTI ON OF THE
MARKET ECONOMY
Jonathan Wolff
From Cogito, Spring 1992
THE PHI LOSOPHY OF HI STORI CAL MATERI ALI SM
Throughout his writings Marx emphasized the idea of man as an essentially
productive being: the most characteristic and essential human feature is that
human beings produce (rather than forage for or hunt) their means of subsis-
tence. This is the key to our story, and we should start by considering the line
of philosophical reection that conrmed Marx in this view. It will be best to
approach Marxs position historically, through a criticism of earlier views from
Marxs perspective.
We begin by asking a vague or general philosophical question: what is the
relation between the human subject and the world? The question sharpens
somewhat when we consider Descartess answer. The essence of mind is
thought, while the essence of the world is extension. Hence there is a radical
separation between mind and the world: you can be assured of your own exist-
ence even if you doubt all else. But how, then, can one know any more than
the contents of ones mind and that one exists? Once such a gulf between the
thinking human subject and the external world has been established, how can
it be overcome and knowledge gained of that world? Notoriously Descartes
was able to advance only by rst proving the existence of God, and it is very
unclear whether anything of his constructive project remains if the proofs of
God are rejected.
At apparently the opposite pole is the materialist view of Hobbes. For
Hobbes human beings are simply part of the material world. Thoughts are
internal motions. Human behaviour is regulated by the laws of nature
like all else, and philosophical problems become, to a great extent, scientic
problems.
Whether this cuts off Cartesian doubt is an interesting question, but more
important from our point of view are the difculties with Hobbess position.
Once a scientic materialism, of a world of molecules in motion, is adopted it
is very unclear what room can be found for ideas of rationality, morality and,
if we want it, human freedom. Consider Hobbess explanation of morality.
Men call good those things they desire, and desire is an internal movement.
Hence morality seems reduced to motion.
A consistent materialist might reject morality, rationality and freedom. Yet
this puts the materialist social critic in a difcult position. Consider Marxs
criticism of the materialist utopian socialist Robert Owen. Owen argued that
human beings are simply products of their circumstances, and so they can be
reformed by the reform of their circumstances. As manager of the New Lanark
cotton mill Owen was able to put his ideas into practice. Here is the example
of the silent monitor:
This consisted of a four-sided piece of wood, about two inches long, and one broad,
each side colouredone side black, another blue, the third yellow, and the fourth
white, tapered at the top, and nished with wire eyes, to hang upon a hook with
either side to the front. One of these was suspended in a conspicuous place near
Jonathan Wolff 250
to each of the persons employed, and the colour at the front told the conduct of
the individual during the preceding day, to four degrees by comparison. Bad,
denoted by black, indifferent by blue, good by yellow and excellent by white.
Instead of punishing his workers Owen had his supervisors monitor their daily
performance, and Owen made a point of walking through the mill conspicu-
ously looking at the silent monitors, but saying nothing. Sure enough, the
workers performance greatly improved. Owen further comments:
Never perhaps in the history of the human race has so simple a device created in
so short a period so much order, virtue, goodness, and happiness, out of so much
ignorance, error and misery.
(Morton 1969, pp. 989)
Owens modern editor comments: It is often said that in this, and other
ways, Owen treated his work-people as if they were children. There is some
truth in this, but it must be remembered that a large proportion of them were
children.
Nevertheless there is something very apt in his comment: Owen treated
his workers in an extraordinarily patronizing fashion, and this leads to Marxs
criticism. Owens view that you can change people by changing their circum-
stances because people are wholly determined by their circumstances makes
problematic the role of the social reformer, who sets out to make the change.
For if the social reformer is a human being, then his or her notions should
also be determined by the circumstances. But to advocate and engage in reform
surely requires one to break free of that restraint of determination. Therefore
materialist social criticism seems to presuppose a class of peopleindividual
geniuses, as Owen saw himselfsuperior to society who are exempt from
the laws of determination. But there cannot be such people if deterministic
materialism is true.
Thus Marx rejected the crude materialism of Owen and others. But in
fundamental philosophical terms the main fault with the materialist view,
for Marx, is something it shares with the Cartesian picture. These views
have in common a theory of perception: that the mind is a passive receiver
of information from an independent outside world. We could call this a repre-
sentative or correspondence theory of mind: the mind is like a camera
recording external data.
What could be wrong with this? For Marx it leaves out the fact that human
beings are active in the world, changing nature and what they see. Things
outside of us are not merely given for us to perceive. The vast majority of
things one encounters are human products, created or transformed by human
endeavour.
This active side of mans relations with the worldthe objectifying power
of human thoughtwas, Marx argues, rst systematically developed by
idealism, although, according to Marx, in a mystied way. We can see what
Karl Marx and the rejection of the market economy 251
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Marx means by the objectifying power of human thought by considering
Kantian epistemology. Kants central idea is that the human mind structures
the world through categories which it imposes on reality. Thus, for example,
for Kant space and time have no independent existence but are forms of sense,
through which the human subject perceives and organizes the world. We see
things in spatial and temporal relations only because of the way the mind is
constructed. So the human mind is active in the sense that how the world is
presented to us depends on features of the human mind: its organizing
capacity. In this sense, the world is a human construction.
The insightwhich Kant mystiedis that human beings at least in part
create the world which they perceive. Yet Marx rejected Kants position,
endorsing certain Hegelian criticisms and then, in turn, criticizing Hegel. Of
Hegels criticisms of Kant two are most relevant here. First, for Kant, the mind
has a universal, ahistoric character. The basic structure of the mind is the same
at all times and places. By contrast Hegel argued for a developmental concep-
tion, and one which allowed for different levels of development for different
cultures.
Even more important is Hegels explanation for this development: the mind
changes through interaction with the world. This is part of the idea of a dialec-
tical development. As mind experiences and tries to understand the world, it
develops ever higher-level concepts, thus changing itself. But Hegels view is
also a form of idealism in which the mind makes up the world. So as the mind
changes the world changes. Consequently as mind develops so does the world.
Marx agrees that human action in the world changes both the world and
human beings. But Hegel, thinks Marx, states this only in an abstract way
idealisticallyonly in thought, as a history of the development of our
concepts. And this is Marxs objection.
To take stock, Marx has contrasted and criticized two dominant philo-
sophical positions. Firstly, the materialist position from Hobbes to Feuerbach
is criticized for its unreective ahistorical nature, failing to give due consid-
eration to the role mankind plays in creating the world it perceives. Secondly
idealism, at least in Hegels hands, understands the importance of historical
development, but restricts this to the development of thought.
In sum we might propose a rather stylized opposition between ahistorical
materialism and historical idealism. Having put matters like this, it then
becomes clear which elements Marx decides to take from each in order to
develop his philosophy of historical materialism. Like Hegel he says that man
changes himself and the world through interaction with the world. But unlike
Hegel this is an interaction that takes place in concrete reality, as practical
activity, not merely thought.
Marx identies this practical activity with productive activity: labour.
Hegels idealism is a mystied expression of the real relation between human
beings and the world. Human beings nd self-realization in nature. They
change the world not merely by changing their concepts of the world but by
physically transforming it. In doing this they change themselves by developing
Jonathan Wolff 252
new needs and abilities, which in turn gives rise to further forms of inter-
action with the world.
The root ideaone Marx nds neglected in all previous philosophiesis
that human beings have needs, and need, not contemplation, is their primary
relation to the world. Human beings labour on the world in order to satisfy
their needs, evolving more and more complex forms of production and social
interaction in an attempt to satisfy further needs which are always arising.
Thus a philosophical view about mans interaction with the world turns into
a theory of society, and a theory of history. For Marx this thought completes
the history of philosophy.
ALI ENATI ON
It is through the development of labour that societies develop. But labour
individual and socialalso has a crucial role in individual self-development
and fullment. As individuals express their lives, so they are. What they are,
therefore, coincides with their production, both of what they produce, and how
they produce (Marx 1970, p. 42).
This sets the scene for Marxs critique of capitalism. Although capitalism has
created immense social forces of production, capable of production on a scale
previously undreamt of, it nevertheless crushes individual ourishing. For
under capitalism the vast majority of people do not live lives worthy of human
beings. Their lives, and especially their labour, Marx says, are alienated.
The term alienation commonly indicates dislocation from ones surround-
ings; the thought of feeling lost in circumstances that ought to be familiar.
Marxs concept incorporates this subjective aspect, but goes far beyond it too.
It is best introducedas Marx does himselfthrough the idea of religious
alienation.
Marx took the idea of religious alienation from other Young-Hegelian
writersnotably Feuerbachalthough the root idea is much older. The central
thought is that man makes God in his own image. Protagoras said, If trian-
gles had a God, it would have three sides. Feuerbach agrees. Everything
human beings have said about God is a mystied expression of things true of
themselves. Human beings project their own powers and attributes on to
an abstract, non-existent entity. Instead of enjoying and glorying in these
powers, man alienates them, raises them to an innite level, and worships
them. Marx says that religion is a devious acknowledgement of man, through
an intermediary.
In general, for Marx, that alienation exists presupposes some normative
account of how things should be: what an appropriate or ourishing human
life would be. Secondly, it also presupposes that something is lost: things that
belong together become separated. Finally, and this is distinctive of the theory,
that which is lost must reappear in an alien form.
We can apply this in the case of religious alienation. Human beings have
what Feuerbach called a species-essence, a human potential. Yet they become
Karl Marx and the rejection of the market economy 253
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separated from this essence. They do not use and enjoy their capacities.
Rather, and this is the third point, they project them on to an abstract being,
which then comes to dominate them. Human beings come to feel that their
lives and destinies are controlled and determined by this external, alien, being:
by this object which, unacknowledged by them, is of their own making.
One can suffer from religious alienation without realizing. Marx knows
that many are content with their relation to their God. This he calls illusory
happiness, happiness based on an illusion. Yet even those who are happy are
still alienated.
Marx now deepens Feuerbachs analysis. Feuerbach does not explain why
alienation exists, and so is naive about how it is to be overcome. His view is
that when people come to see religion for what it is, it will wither away. Marxs
reply is that religious alienation comes into existence because conditions on
earth are so bad that people seek solace in heaven. Religion will not disappear
until it is no longer necessary: when it becomes possible for human beings to
enjoy their species-essence on earth.
ALI ENATED LABOUR
Although religion clearly predates capitalism, under capitalism Marx argues
that it is largely sustained by the problem, specic to capitalism, of alienated
labour. I want essentially to concentrate on just three of the many claims made
by Marx concerning alienated labour: rst, that under capitalism people
perform a form of labour unworthy of human beings; second, that capitalism
itself is an alienated product of human activity; third, that mankind does not
recognize its communal essence under capitalism.
Human production is elucidated by Marx by comparing it with the produc-
tive activities of other animals. Human beings can produce in accordance with
their will and consciousness. They can make elaborate plans, and then know-
ingly and deliberately carry them out. Also they can distinguish their lifes
activity from themselves. The spider, say, does not distinguish spinning a web
from being a spider: it just goes ahead and spins the web. We, on the other
hand, can recognize that our activities are distinct and under our control.
Human production is unrestricted. We can produce even in accordance with
the laws of beauty.
Under capitalism, according to Marx, we fail to produce this way. We
produce blindly, on the level of animals, or worse:
In the factory we have a lifeless machine which is independent of workers, who
are incorporated into it as living appendages.
(Marx 1976, p. 548)
[The Worker] is depressed, therefore, both intellectually and physically to the
level of a machine, and from a man becomes abstract activity and a stomach.
(Marx 1975, p. 285)
Jonathan Wolff 254
Productive activity should be part of the worker, in that it should be an end
in itself: a conrmation of the workers life, and a source of enjoyment. But
under capitalism labour is external. It is shunned when not necessary. It is
used to satisfy other needs, but it is not enjoyed in itself. Hence it is degraded
to a means. Indeed it has become a commodityhired out to others for their
use. Man is not able to enjoy those features which are most distinctively
human. Hence man feels free only when engaged in animal activity.
This, then, is a brief account of the degradation of labour under capitalism.
More insidious, however, is our non-human relation to our products: alien-
ation from the product. The basic idea here is that the world of objects is
created by human beings, but these objects appear hostile and alien. Human
beings are not at home in the world they create. Not only do workers lose
control of their products; their products come to control and dominate them.
Just as human beings rst create a God, and then bow down to it, they create
an economic world of objects and then become mystied and dominated by
it. They becomeand this is the cruxplaythings of alien forces.
This idea has two central aspects. First humans become strangers in the
world, not appreciating or understanding their own creations. Many human
products are treated as miracles or facts of nature: consider the water, sewerage
and electricity systems. Secondly, and crucially, human beings come to be
dominated and subjugated by these products. As we saw, for example, one of
the things that makes productive activity so alienating is production-line tech-
nology. But this technology was invented by human beings, and manufactured
by human beings.
Most importantly, however, domination also arises on another level,
affecting not only the worker. In fact, Marx says, the capitalist suffers a double
alienation: shielded from the fact of alienation. Like the worker, the behav-
iour of the capitalist becomes controlled by impersonal social forces. You
cant buck the market. Capitalism has its laws, and you out them at your
peril. If you ignore them, then, just like those who try to ignore the law of
gravity, you will come to grief.
But what, as it were, is the metaphysical status of these laws, these market
forces? According to Marx they are no more than the accumulated conse-
quences of human behaviour. Human beings act in certain ways, and this has
certain large-scale effects. Given these effects certain future action by people
seems rationally required and this reinforces the process, which becomes
endlessly reinforced by the behaviour it generates. Capitalism is a mad
machine, out of control, determining the behaviour of people in ways which
intensify its control. Like Frankensteins monster, or the Sorcerers
Apprentices broomstick, our creations come back to take on an independent,
oppressive, life. Capitalists must act as capitalists and seek ever-increasing
prots, or lose out in competition and sink to the level of the worker. But
because the capitalist must seek prot, then he or she must exploit the worker,
and impose alienating working methods, which the worker has no choice but
to accept.
Karl Marx and the rejection of the market economy 255
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This is all because we have created something we cannot restrain
capitalism. And, Marx argues in Capital, this system has catastrophic effects.
Capitalism contains mechanisms which depress wages to a minimum, and
ensure that there will always be a large body of unemployed. Capitalism will
be aficted by a continual drop in the rate of prot, and will be hit by recur-
ring and ever-deepening crises, in an ever-shortening boombust cycle. All
this is a consequence of the normal functioning of this anarchic system of
production. To take just one case, who wants stock-exchange crashes? Yet they
happen. And as a result of human behaviour, of a type mandated by capitalist
structures.
Finally under capitalism we do not recognize our common humanity, and
our communal essence. Human beings are hugely dependent on each other.
Without realizing it we are all part of an enormous division of labour,
producing things for other people, and consuming the products of others. This
mutual dependence partly constitutes our communal essence. Yet capitalism
also forces us to become alienated from this, and so from each other. Consider
the example of need. The human response to a fellow being in need is to do
whatever is required to full that need. Under capitalism another response is
appropriate: to use that need as a source of power or prot. Those extremely
short of money, for example, will work for very little pay. Thus we relate to
each other not with mutual need in mind, but individual prot.
The reason for Marxs hostility to the market, and his idea of the planned
economy as liberating, have emerged. Capitalism is something we have
created, through the unintended consequences of human action. It is a human
product, even though it often appears to us as a xture of nature. Capitalism
is, thus, an alienated human product, and it has disastrous effects. Labour
the central human activityis degraded. Individual lives are tormented and
less than fully human. We are screened off from our communal nature.
Capitalism contains vast irrationalities, leading to crisis and enormous waste
of human potential. We are playthings of alien forces.
TAKI NG CONTROL
This is how we have made the worldthe unintended consequence of human
action. But the world is anarchic, out of control. Thus to create a truly human
society it is necessary for us to remake the world: take control of our prod-
ucts, take control of the social forces. This will allow us to treat each other as
the communal beings we are, to treat others as ends in themselves.
But what would it be to remake the world in this way? The problem with
capitalism is anarchy of production: the solution, therefore, is to have a
planned, coordinated economy. To take control of the social forces is to have
a centrally planned economy. This, at least is how it appeared to Marx, and
Marx also assumed that this would be possible. If we can plan the economy
then we can remake the world in a truly human way.
Jonathan Wolff 256
This way of seeing the social world, I think, partially explains Marxs
dismissive attitude to questions of morality, especially of justice. To worry
about the injustice of capitalism, and try to remedy this by tinkering with the
mechanisms of distribution, is rendered quite irrelevant when one appreciates
the contingency of capitalism. If capitalism were irremovable, then all we could
do would be to work out how we can improve it. But the existence of capi-
talism is not a fact of nature, and its defects go far beyond problems of injustice.
What we should do is work to remove it and replace it with a better society.
But how is this to be done? Is this project any more realistic than
Feuerbachs thought that we will remove religion by explaining to people what
religion is? Marx does have a theory of history which purports to show how
the new society is to come about. It is beyond the scope of this essay to go
into the question, but Marx sees capitalism as ultimately leading to its own
destruction, to be replaced by some form of communal society. Of course it
might seem too good to be true that history is headed in the direction that a
concern for human ourishing would also recommend, but that is another
issue.
I hope, then, to have explained why Marx was so attracted to the planned
economy, and why he thought that such an economy would be liberating.
History seems to have shown us that Marx was wrong. Yet Marxs criticisms
of the market seem deep and often cogent (although I have not here tried to
indicate which I believe to be sound). If neither the market nor the planned
economy can give us what we want then where should we look next? That is
a question, I think, to which no convincing answer has yet been given.
REFERENCES
Marx, K. (1975) Early Writings, ed. L. Colletti, Penguin: Harmondsworth.
Marx, K. (1976) Capital, Vol. 1, Penguin: Harmondsworth.
Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1970) The German Ideology, ed. C.J. Arthur, Lawrence & Wishart:
London.
Morton, A.L. (1969) The Life and Ideas of Robert Owen, International Publishers: New York.
Karl Marx and the rejection of the market economy 257
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