REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the

Department of Environment and Natural Resources, vs. HEIRS

OF FELIPE ALEJAGA SR., represented by ROQUETA ALEJAGA,
FELIPE ALEJAGA JR., MARIA DULLA ALEJAGA, FELIPE
ALEJAGA III, ROQUETA ALEJAGA, JENNIFER ALEJAGA,
EVERETTE CAPUNDAN, AND LYNETTE ALEJAGA; THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS
OF ROXAS CITY(G.R. No. 146030 December 3, 2002)

The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that
conversations communicated to a witness by a third person may
be admitted as proof that, regardless of their truth or falsity, they
were actually made. Evidence as to the making of such statements
is not secondary but primary, for in itself it (a) constitutes a fact in
issue or (b) is circumstantially relevant to the existence of such
fact.


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FRANK LOBRIGAS,
MARLITO LOBRIGAS and TEODORICO MANTE accused,
FRANK LOBRIGAS (G.R. No. 147649 December 17, 2002)
Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, only the
fact that such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or
falsity thereof is immaterial. The hearsay rule does not apply,
hence, the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to
the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the
statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially
relevant as to the existence of such a fact.

PRIMO C. MIRO, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for the
Visayas, vs. MARILYN MENDOZA VDA. DE EREDEROS,
CATALINA ALINGASA and PORFERIO I. MENDOZA (G.R. Nos.
172532 172544-45, November 20, 2013)

Non-hearsay v. legal hearsay, distinction
To the former belongs the fact that utterances or statements were
made; this class of extrajudicial utterances or statements is offered
not s an assertion to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but
only as to the fact of the utterance made. The latter class, on the
other hand, consists of the truth of the facts asserted in the
statement; this kind pertains to extrajudicial utterances and
statements that are offered as evidence of the truth of the fact
asserted.
The difference between these two classes of utterances lies in the
applicability of the rule on exclusion of hearsay evidence. The first
class, i.e. the fact that the statement was made, is not covered by
the hearsay rule, while the second class, i.e. the truth of the facts
asserted in the statement, is covered by the hearsay rule.
Pedroza's allegation belongs to the first class; hence, it is
inadmissible to prove the truth of the facts asserted in the
statement. The following discussion, made m Patula v. People of
the Philippines32 is particularly instructive:
Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human
utterance is offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted,
the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of inference, and,
therefore, the assertion can be received s evidence only when
made on the witness stand, subject to the test of cross-
examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not
as an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference
to the truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply.
For example, in a slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies
that he heard the accused say that the complainant was a thief,
this testimony is admissible not to prove that the complainant was
really a thief, but merely to show that the accused uttered those
words. This kind of utterance is hearsay in character but is not
legal hearsay. The distinction is, therefore, between (a) the fact
that the statement was made, to which the hearsay rule does not
apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, to
which the hearsay rule applies.