The Disposition of Counterplans and

Permutations: The case for Logical, Limited

Conditionality
Roger Solt
2003 Mental Health Policies: Escape from Bedlam?

The conditionality of counterplans has !een one of the most persistent
contro"ersies in de!ate theory# Reconnoitering the dim archi"es of my
longterm memory, $ can "aguely recall counterplan conditionality !eing
a theoretical issue in the early %&'0s# This (as in an era in (hich
counterplans really (ere a )theoretical) issue !ecause almost no one ran
themthey (ere considered a )strategy of desperation#) *hen the age of
the counterplan did finally arri"e +starting in the mid%&'0s and really
gaining force in the early %&,0s-, the de!ate o"er conditionality !ecame
!oth more practically rele"ant and more heated# .or a time it (as T/0
central theoretical issue in academic de!ate +stirring some of the same
sound and fury that no( surrounds the 1riti1- since it (as the 2uestion
(hich most clearly di"ided the t(o leading paradigms of the day, policy
ma1ing and hypothesis testing# +Policy ma1ers, (ith some nota!le
e3ceptions, (ere against conditionality4 hypothesis testers fa"ored it#-
5s de!ate theory and practice ha"e continued to e"ol"e, the
conditionality contro"ersy has !ecome less central# Still, arguments
concerning conditionality occur in a high percentage of the de!ates in
(hich counterplans are run# 5nd the conditionality de!ate has !ecome
more muddled, in part !ecause it has !ecome separated from more
o"erarching paradigms of de!ate theory, and in part !ecause of the
emergence of that strange form of 2uasiconditionality referred to, rather
inelegantly, as )dispositionality#) 6ot only is )dispositionality) an
ungainly (ord4 it is also an am!iguous (ord, inconsistently employed#
$n innumera!le de!ates the follo(ing e3change has occurred: )*hat is
the status of the counterplan7) )$t8s dispositional#) )*hat does that
mean7) This essay is (ritten in part to ans(er that 2uestionto cope (ith
the reigning terminological confusion!y sorting out the assorted
meanings of conditionality and dispositionality# $n doing so, $ (ill
descri!e the t(o traditional, polar positions on the matter: classic,
unconstrained conditionality +C9C- and strict, single option ad"ocacy
+SS:5-# $ (ill argue that the t(o main theories of counterplan
dispositionality fall on a continuum of permissi"eness !et(een these
t(o poles and that !oth "ersions of dispositionality can !e descri!ed as
forms of logical, limited conditionality +LLC-# $ (ill also argue that !oth
forms of logical, limited conditionality are superior to the more e3treme
alternati"es of classic, unconstrained conditionality and strict, single
option ad"ocacy#
T/0 D$SC:9RS0 :. D$SP:S$T$:65L$T;: 56 565L;S$S :.
T0R<S
De!ate has presuma!ly !orro(ed the term )conditional) from formal
logic# $n logic, a conditional statement is !asically an )if=then)
statement# $. a certain antecedent condition e3ists, T/06 a certain
conse2uence follo(s# De!aters also fre2uently employ an )e"en if)
logic# This is commonly seen in (eighing arguments, as in )there is no
lin1 to the disad"antage, !ut 0>06 $. there is one, the case out(eighs#
There is also a certain conditional logic in"ol"ed in dilemmas and
dou!le !inds, for e3ample, )the plan does not sol"e, !ut if it does, then it
lin1s to a disad"antage#) $t has e"en !een suggested that there is a 1ind
of conditionality !et(een topicality arguments and arguments
concerning policy desira!ility# .or e3ample, )the plan is not topical, and
e"en if it is, it8s a !ad idea#) +This same argument, ho(e"er, could !e
phrased nonconditionally: )the plan is not topical, 56D it is a !ad
idea#) -
$t should !e clear that these 1inds of )if=then,) )e"en if,) and )either=or)
arguments are perfectly common in de!ate +as (ell as in other argument
settings- and that for the most part their legitimacy is not particularly
contro"ersial# *hat is contro"ersial (ithin academic de!ate are
C:6D$T$:65L P:L$C; 5LT0R65T$>0S# The negati"e team is
presenting conditional policy alternati"es (hen it offers more than one
policy option to the ?udge# The e3treme e3ample of this occurs (hen the
negati"e offers t(o or more counterplans in the same round# *hat is
more common today, ho(e"er, is for the negati"e to say that the ?udge
can "ote either for the counterplan or the status 2uo# .or e3ample, the
negati"e side might argue that pu!lic health ser"ices for mental health
care should not !e increased at all, !ut if they should !e, the states rather
than the federal go"ernment should increase them#
The affirmati"e also sometimes offers conditional policy alternati"es,
that is, more than one policy option, either of (hich is said to ?ustify an
affirmati"e !allot# The most radical form of affirmati"e conditionality is
pro!a!ly the theory of alternati"e ?ustification# 5ccording to this theory,
the affirmati"e can present t(o or more distinct plans in the same round,
and if any of its plans is determined to !e desira!le at the end of the
round, they (in# The idea of plan se"erance is a second form of
affirmati"e conditionality# 5ssume that the affirmati"e plan has more
than one pro"ision, and that one part, !ut not e"ery part of the plan is
pro"en to !e undesira!le# The affirmati"e might then argue that the
?udge can re?ect +se"er out- the undesira!le parts of the plan and still
"ote affirmati"e for the fa"ora!le portions, (hich remain# 5 third form
of affirmati"e conditionality is an intrinsicness argument# /ere the
affirmati"e argues that a disad"antage is not an $6TR$6S$C reason to
re?ect its plan +or the resolution- !ecause an additional policy element
could !e added to the plan that (ould stop the disad"antage# +.or
e3ample, Congress could adopt the plan 56D !an national missile
defense, if that is the disad"antage#- :ne could imagine intrinsicness
arguments !eing made in a nonconditional (ay4 that is, the affirmati"e
(ould add a ne( plan element in the 25C, !ut it (ould then !e stuc1
(ith it and lia!le to any disad"antages it entailed# $n general, though,
intrinsicness arguments ha"e !een ad"anced conditionally# $f the
intrinsicness argument=minor repair (as pro"en undesira!le, it simply
dropped out of the round# 5 fourth form of affirmati"e policy
conditionality in"ol"es permutations, if they are concei"ed of as policy
options the ?udge can endorse at the end of the round# Permutations ha"e
not traditionally !een thought of as !eing conditional, !ut if the ?udge
has the option of "oting for the original plan, :R permutation one, :R
permutation t(o@etc#, then this seems ?ust as conditional as saying the
?udge can "ote for the status 2uo, :R counterplan one, :R counterplan
t(o@etc#
Contemporary de!ate theory re?ects affirmati"e policy conditionality in
most, if not all, of its forms, and (ith good reason# The theory of
alternati"e ?ustification, first ad"anced in the %&'0s, (as ne"er (idely
accepted# :ne o!?ection is that it (ould ma1e de!ate too superficial# $t
is hard enough to ha"e an in depth discussion of one affirmati"e plan
(ithin the less than t(o hours allocated for academic de!ates# To
consider t(o or more affirmati"e plans in that time period in"ites
superficiality# This is especially so since each affirmati"e plan might !e
ans(ered !y multiple negati"e counterplans, and each counterplan
might in"o1e multiple affirmati"e permutations# This is argument
<althus (ith a "engeance# Second, alternati"e ?ustification encourages
argument a"oidance# *here"er the negati"e strongly attac1s, the
affirmati"e (ill !e encouraged to retreat, ultimately falling !ac1 to
(hate"er policy option the negati"e (as least a!le to engage# Third,
alternati"e ?ustification is especially pro!lematic on !idirectional topics#
$f plan one mo"es in one direction and plan t(o in the opposite, then
negati"e arguments (hich defeat the first plan are li1ely to support the
second# .ourth, alternati"e ?ustification (ould let the affirmati"e run
ne( and=or marginally topical plans (ith relati"e impunity# The normal
disincenti"es to doing so are "astly reduced if the ne( plan can simply
!e dropped and one can go for the old# $n sum, alternati"e ?ustification
seems pro!lematic !oth on grounds of education and fairness# Ay
ma1ing de!ates highly superficial and discouraging direct clash,
significant educational "alues figured to !e lost# 5nd alternati"e
?ustification also seemed li1ely to o"er(helmingly !ias competiti"e
results to(ards the affirmati"e# .inally, there is (hat might !e
considered a definitional argument against alternati"e ?ustification: the
plan is the central focus of the de!ate, so the plan should remain a fi3ed
and unmo"ing point of reference throughout the round#
<ost of these arguments also apply to plan se"erance# +The difference
!et(een three plans and a plan (ith three detacha!le elements is not
"ery great#- The se"erance approach also suggests the decoy strategy:
put some especially !ad pro"isions into your plan, let the negati"e
concentrate its attac1 there, and then se"er those parts out# 6o one,
presuma!ly, thin1s this (ould ma1e for good de!ate#
$ntrinsicness arguments seem less fatally fla(ed than either alternati"e
?ustification or se"erance# $f decision ma1ers can foresee disad"antages
to a policy and also see ho( to a"oid them, consistent (ith the policy8s
central thrust, then rationally they should do so# 5nd especially if one
sees de!ate as a search for the !est policy, then intrinsicness arguments
ma1e sense as part of the optimum policy pac1age# Still, the o!?ections,
!oth practical and theoretical, to intrinsicness seem on !alance to !e
compelling# .irst, intrinsicness arguments ma1e the plan a mo"ing
target, "iolating the principle of fi3ed plan focus# .urther, intrinsicness
arguments can ha"e the effect of changing the plan more than once4
indeed, they can ma1e it into a "erita!le amoe!a, sprouting and
retracting policy tentacles from speech to speech# The 25C adds the
minor repair=intrinsicness argument to the plan4 the negati"e pro"es the
minor repair disad"antageous4 the affirmati"e drops the minor repair and
re"erts to its original plan# :r, in (hat is termed the infinite regress
pro!lem, the %5R offers a ne( minor repair to ans(er the disad"antage
to the first minor repair, and the 25R potentially a third minor repair to
ans(er any disad"antage to the second minor repair# Second, as a
practical matter, it is "ery difficult to find intrinsic disad"antages#
Politics D5s, for e3ample, are almost ne"er intrinsic# Third,
intrinsicness arguments may !e too utopian4 that is, they let the
affirmati"e create a (orld in (hich its plan is a good idea# .ourth, they
are generally nontopical# 5nd fifth, they may demonstrate the
insufficiency of the resolution, that is, illustrate that the resolution isn8t a
good idea unless coupled (ith other, nontopical elements# These are the
most common arguments against intrinsicness, listed largely in
descending order of persuasi"eness# 6one of them seems totally
decisi"e, !ut ta1en together they pro!a!ly ?ustify the con"entional
(isdom that intrinsicness arguments are, on !alance, illegitimate in
academic de!ate# The issue of permutation conditionality (ill !e
reser"ed until later#
*hile affirmati"e conditionality has fe( defenders, negati"e
conditionality has many, and it is the "arious forms of negati"e
conditionality (hich $ no( (ish to descri!e# The traditional theory of
negati"e conditionality, associated (ith hypothesis testing and e"en
defended !y some policy ma1ers, is (hat $ ha"e termed classic,
unconstrained conditionality +C9C-# .or hypothesis testers, conditional
counterplans merely functioned as inherency +or intrinsicness-
arguments against affirmati"e ad"antages4 that is, they pro"ed that the
resolution isn8t necessary in order to achie"e the affirmati"e ad"antage#
+To achie"e the ad"antage, (e need not do 5# *e could ?ust as (ell do
A, C, D, or 0#- Since counterplans are ?ust logical tests of inherency,
there (as no real theoretical limit on ho( many could !e introduced#
.or traditional policy ma1ers, the plan, not the resolution, (as the focus
of the de!ate, !ut the negati"e argua!ly should !e a!le to attac1 the plan
from multiple "antage points# Rational policy ma1ers should consider
multiple policy options, and if any one is superior to the plan, then the
plan should !e re?ected# 5gain, (ithin this theory, there seemed to !e no
logical limit to the num!er of counterplans (hich the negati"e could
ad"ance#
The theory of classic unconstrained conditionality stands in opposition
to the perspecti"e $ ha"e la!eled strict, single option ad"ocacy# *ithin
the SS:5 frame(or1, each team is re2uired to ad"ocate one and only
one policy option and to do so consistently throughout the round# Thus,
in this (orld, the affirmati"e can ha"e only one plan, the negati"e only
one counterplan, and if the negati"e ad"ances a counterplan, the status
2uo is no longer an option (hich the negati"e can also defend or the
?udge endorse#
Theories of dispositionality, $ ha"e suggested, fall !et(een the e3tremes
of classic, unconstrained conditionality and strict, single option
ad"ocacy# They entail a position that $ ha"e la!eled as LLClogical,
limited conditionality# To understand the concept of dispositionality, a
little history lesson seems ad"isa!le# $ ha"e suggested that
)dispositionality) is an unfortunate term (hich de!ate (ould !e !etter
off (ithout, !oth for reasons of clarity and of felicity of e3pression#
/o(e"er, no( is also pro!a!ly a good time to offer a confession: $ thin1
that $ am +indirectly- responsi!le for the introduction of the terms
)dispositional) and )dispositionality) into de!ate8s le3icon# Perhaps
there are other stories (hich could !e told a!out these terms8 etymology,
!ut this is my "ersion of the matter#
$n the mid%&,0s, $ !ecame interested in de"eloping a theoretical middle
ground !et(een classic unconstrained conditionality and strict, single
option ad"ocacy# $n particular, it seemed to me that e"en if the negati"e
(ere limited to only one counterplan, there might !e circumstances
under (hich the status 2uo should remain an option a"aila!le to the
?udge at the end of the round# $ therefore encouraged my teams to
ad"ance theoretical arguments in the %6C concerning the )disposition)
of the counterplan# The first article to discuss )the disposition of
counterplans) (as produced !y my former student +and current !usiness
partner- :uita Pap1a <ichel, (riting in the %&,B DEBATERS'
RESEARCH G!DE# Ay counterplan )disposition) (e simply meant
)(hat happens) to the counterplan under a certain set of circumstances#
:ne disposition of the counterplan is that if it is pro"en undesira!le :R
theoretically illegitimate, the ?udge still has the option of endorsing the
status 2uo# :r, to put it another (ay, the negati"e can al(ays re"ert to
the status 2uo as its position at the end of the round# 5 second
disposition of the counterplan is that if the counterplan is sho(n to !e
theoretically illegitimate, the negati"e can re"ert to the status 2uo, !ut if
the affirmati"e only attac1s the counterplan8s desira!ility as a policy
+that is, if they )straight turn) the counterplan-, then the negati"e is stuc1
(ith it# 5 third disposition of the counterplan is that if the counterplan
loses either on theoretical accepta!ility or on policy desira!ility, the
negati"e loses# The counterplan in this "ie( is unconditionally non
conditional# This is !asically the strict, single option ad"ocacy position#
The negati"e team has only one policy ad"ocacy# $n a counterplan
round, that is the counterplan# 5nd if the counterplan is defeated, the
negati"e loses +unless they (in topicality-# There is literally nothing to
"ote negati"e for#
Some time after the term )counterplan disposition) emerged out of the
matri3 of Centuc1y de!ate, the terms )dispositional) and
)dispositionality) !ecame common, paralleling the terms )conditional)
and )conditionality#) $ regard this terminological e"olution as
unfortunate# <y o!?ection is in part esthetic# )Conditional) and e"en
)conditionality) are at least (ords in the 0nglish language employed
!eyond de!ate# )Dispositional) and )dispositionality) stri1e me as ugly
de!ate neologisms (hich (e could li"e "ery (ell (ithout# Aut more
importantly, to simply say that a counterplan is )dispositional) literally
means nothing# .or it to !e dispositional means that something happens
to it under certain conditions, !ut that term, standing alone, neither
specifies (hat happens nor the conditions under (hich a gi"en
disposition of the counterplan ta1es place# There are se"eral different
dispositions possi!le for defeated counterplans, and unless you specify
(hich one of them you intend, the counterplan8s disposition remains
indeterminate#
Aet(een the e3tremes of classic, unconstrained conditionality and strict,
single option ad"ocacy, $ ha"e suggested that there are t(o main options
for counterplan disposition# .ollo(ing the felicitous suggestion of Ste"e
<ancuso, $ (ill refer to these options as )negati"e counterplan
disposition) and )affirmati"e counterplan disposition#) The theory of
negati"e counterplan disposition is that the negati"e, li1e the
affirmati"e, gets one and only one proposal for change !ut that the status
2uo al(ays remains a logical option a"aila!le to the ?udge# The theory
of affirmati"e counterplan disposition is that the status 2uo is an option
if the counterplan is dismissed for theoretical reasons !ut not if the
counterplan is simply undesira!le as a policy# The affirmati"e in this
case controls the disposition of the counterplan !ecause they can decide
to only argue its desira!ility and there!y stic1 the negati"e (ith it# $n the
alternati"e theory, the counterplan al(ays remains su!?ect to the
disposition of the negati"e since they can al(ays a!andon it and re"ert
to the status 2uo#
So then, to ans(er an oftenas1ed 2uestion, (hat is the difference
!et(een a conditional and a dispositional counterplan7 <y suggestion is
that (e reser"e the term )conditionality) for the traditional "ie( (hich $
ha"e la!eled classic, unconstrained conditionality# $n a nutshell, the
theory of conditionality, as $ understand it and as $ thin1 it (as
traditionally understood, is that the negati"e can ad"ance t(o or more
counterplans in the same round# $n contrast, the "arious theories of
counterplan disposition come into play (hen there is only one
counterplan in the round !ut the status 2uo is still considered to !e an
a"aila!le policy option# There is a longstanding argument to the effect
that there is really no distinction !et(een conditional and dispositional
counterplans# $ thin1 that there is, at least gi"en the (ay in (hich $ am
using the terms, !ut some degree of confusion is understanda!le#
Dispositionality is perhaps !est understood as !eing a form of
conditionality, a logical, limited form of conditionality !ut a form of
conditionality nonetheless# $n contrast, (e might thin1 of
)Conditionality,) +(ith a capital C- as !eing the theory of multiple
counterplans, that is classic, unconstrained conditionality#
That the theory of counterplan disposition is a theory of limited
conditionality should !e clear# The negati"e gets one counterplan, ?ust as
the affirmati"e gets one plan# The negati"e also gets the status 2uo as a
policy option, ?ust as the affirmati"e gets any legitimate permutation#
:ne may still re?ect the theory, !ut it does place clear limits on the
num!er of negati"e policy options +t(o-# 5s long as the negati"e is
limited to one counterplan, there can !e no slippery slope to more than
t(o optionsthere is, after all, only one status 2uo# $ ha"e also said that it
is a theory of L:D$C5L, limited conditionality# $n (hat sense is this the
case7 The a!ility to re?ect !oth plan and counterplan seems to me
inherent in the logic of most decisionma1ing situations# .aced (ith t(o
competing proposals for change, almost any decisionma1er (ill ha"e
the option of re?ecting !oth and stic1ing (ith (hat (e ha"e no(# To
deny the ?udge the status 2uo as an a"aila!le choice defies the logic of
rational decisionma1ing as it appears in almost e"ery other real (orld
setting# 5gain, perhaps de!ate should !e different# +$ (ill argue in
greater depth in fa"or of logical, limited conditionality !elo(#- The only
thing $ (ish to esta!lish at this point is that there is a principled
difference !et(een Dispositionality and Conditionality +one counterplan
"ersus more than one- and that the status 2uo as a fall!ac1 option en?oys
a logical status +it is almost al(ays a"aila!le in the real (orld- distinct
from the theory of classical, unconstrained conditionality# There are
many situations in the real (orld in (hich (e place limits on the
num!er of proposals for change (hich (e consider +prep time, after all,
is ne"er really infinite, either (ithin de!ate or !eyond it-, !ut the status
2uo (ill almost al(ays remain a logically a"aila!le option if all of the
proposals for change to !e considered are deemed inferior# To put it
another (ay, the status 2uo is al(ays an a"aila!le !enchmar1 for
e"aluating any proposal for change, and disallo(ing it as a choice
a"aila!le to de!ate ?udges is a significant departure from the inherent
logic of rational decisionma1ing# Perhaps considerations uni2ue to
academic de!ate ?ustify such a mo"e4 my point for no( is simply that
there is an apprecia!le cost for choosing to do so#
CL5SS$C C:6D$T$:65L$T; R0C:6S$D0R0D
The Case 5gainst Classic 9nconstrained Conditionality
$n this section, $ (ant to re"ie( the arguments for and against C9C#
These are timehonored arguments, !ut they still appear recurrently in
contemporary conditionality=dispositionality de!ates# 5ssessing their
merits therefore is of !oth theoretical and strategic interest in its o(n
right, !ut it also is intended to function as a step to(ard my ultimate
conclusion that logical, limited conditionality +one counterplan plus the
status 2uo- is the !est theoretical solution to the conditionality
conundrum#
There are four main traditional arguments against C9C, t(o of (hich
seem relati"ely principled and t(o of (hich are more pragmatic# The
first argument is that conditionality "iolates the principles and practices
of good ad"ocacy# This, $ thin1, is the strongest theoretical argument
against conditionality, and it is also the most fundamental in that it
appeals most clearly to a specific paradigmatic understanding of the
de!ate acti"ity# That said, it should also !e noted that )ad"ocacy) is one
of those terms (hich is commonly in"o1ed in de!ates !ut (hich is
rarely analyEed# $t is often assumed as selfe"ident that de!ate is, first
and foremost, an e3ercise in oral ad"ocacy and that sound ad"ocacy
practice entails the +almost- complete re?ection of conditional
arguments# $ (ill suggest !elo( that !oth of these assumptions are
pro!lematic# Aut for no( $ ?ust (ant to attempt to clearly state the
ad"ocacy o!?ection to conditional counterplans#
The ad"ocacy position, as $ understand it, de"elops as follo(s# .irst,
de!ate is inherently an e3ercise in ad"ocacy# The affirmati"e ad"ocates
its plan4 the negati"e is o!liged to present some 1ind of counter
ad"ocacy# Clashing ad"ocacies are central to de!ate# Second, ad"ocacy
training is central to the educational mission of de!ate## La(yers and
lo!!yists, politicians and political acti"ists all engage in ad"ocacy, and
it is a primary purpose of de!ate to train people to successfully and
ethically fulfill these roles in society# Third, conditional argument is
inconsistent (ith good ad"ocacy# :ne argument for this conclusion
appeals to persuasion research, (hich it is claimed pro"es that
conditional arguments are unpersuasi"e# :ne can see intuiti"ely (hy
this might !e the case4 arguments ta1ing the form of )<y client didn8t do
it, and !esides he (as craEy,) seem more than a little suspect# There also
seems to !e an at least implicit sense that consistent +that is, non
conditional- argument is ethically superior to inconsistent argument# 5n
ethical ad"ocate ta1es a position and stic1s (ith it throughout## Shifting
from one position to another is a form of sleaEy sophistry#
This ethical sense that conditionality is sleaEy segues into the second
ma?or argument against conditionality: that it encourages argumentati"e
irresponsi!ility# Conditionality allo(s teams to ad"ance policy positions
(ithout +much- cost# $f defeated, the position can !e simply ?ettisoned,
and the only loss is the time it too1 to present it# :ne conse2uence of
this is that teams may feel freer to ad"ance radical, ris1y, or e"en
repugnant positions, 1no(ing that they (on8t !e stuc1 (ith them#
5nyone (ith an e"en marginally lengthy de!ate memory can come up
(ith ready e3amples# Pro!a!ly my fa"orite is the )!e mean to old
people) counterplan +claiming a domestic <althus net !enefit-# 5 more
sinister e3ample is a )rene( the /olocaust) counterplan +also claiming a
domestic <althus net !enefit-#
Shifting to the more pragmatic arguments against conditionality, one
encounters first and foremost the claim that the time limits (ithin (hich
academic de!ates occur render conditionality an undesira!le option#
Less than t(o hours are allocated for e"ery de!ate# 0"en t(o policy
alternati"es can8t !e e3hausti"ely e"aluated (ithin that time span, and
e"ery additional policy option tossed into the mi3 (ill further distract
from depth of discussion# )$f (e had (orld enough and time) it (ould
!e great to consider the full range of possi!le policies, !ut (e don8t# $t is
therefore !est to force each team to do its o(n )scan) of the a"aila!le
policy options, select one and de!ate it to the ma3imum depth possi!le#
5 further ramification of the classic, unconstrained conditionality
position is that there are really no limits, e3cept for speech times, on the
num!er of conditional counterplans (hich could !e introduced into a
gi"en de!ate round# There is therefore almost unlimited a!use potential
associated (ith this theory#
The fourth and final argument against conditional counterplans is that
they legitimate conditional affirmati"e policy options, including
alternati"e ?ustifications +that is, multiple independent affirmati"e
plans-, plan se"erance, and intrinsicness arguments# The argument for
this conclusion is one of simple reciprocity4 if the negati"e can !e
conditional, the affirmati"e should also !e allo(ed to !e# 5s a strategic
matter, it is sometimes ad"isa!le for the affirmati"e to accept
conditionality4 affirmati"e conditionality +including the a!ility to minor
repair a(ay most disad"antages- is almost certainly a more po(erful
tool than negati"e conditionality# Aut as a theoretical issue, the
argument proceeds as follo(s# 6egati"e conditionality legitimates
affirmati"e conditionality# 5ffirmati"e conditionality is a terri!le idea#
+Reasons for this (ere discussed a!o"e#- Thus, negati"e conditionality
should also !e re?ected#
5ns(ers to the 5rguments 5gainst Classic 9nconstrained
Conditionality
The ad"ocacy argument against conditionality is the most fundamental
and philosophical4 $ therefore (ant to consider it especially carefully#
The first premise of the argument, that de!ate is intrinsically an
ad"ocacy acti"ity, is one (hich $ am (illing to accept, al!eit (ith
2ualifications# Aut a 1ey 2uestion concerns e3actly (hat are the
ad"ocacy !urdens of the t(o sides# *ith regard to the affirmati"e, $ am
perfectly content (ith the traditional ans(er: it is the affirmati"e8s
responsi!ility to ad"ocate a topical plan (ith sufficient specificity that
producti"e de!ate can proceed, and the affirmati"e should defend the
totality of its plan throughout the de!ate# The affirmati"e can
concei"a!ly add to its plan, through the process of permutation, !ut it
can ne"er su!tract from it# +5 possi!le e3ception (ould !e the dismissal
of plan elements (hich the negati"e has argued are e3tratopical#- Aut
(hat is the negati"e8s ad"ocacy !urden7 The conser"ati"e ans(er is that
the negati"e must defend a competiti"e policy alternati"e and stic1 (ith
it throughout the de!ate# Aut there is another ans(er (hich seems at
least !roadly consistent (ith an ad"ocacy!ased "ie( of de!ate: the
negati"e must ad"ocate the re?ection of the affirmati"e plan# $n this
formula, negati"e de!aters are still ser"ing as +counter-ad"ocates, and
they still must clash (ith the affirmati"e8s ad"ocacy# Aut conditional
arguments can !e employed as part of their o"erall ad"ocacy stance that
the affirmati"e plan should !e re?ected#
The second premise of the ad"ocacy argument, as $ descri!ed it, is that it
is a central educational mission of de!ate to teach sound ad"ocacy
s1ills# 5gain, this is a premise $ (ould accept, (ith the 2ualification that
this is not de!ate8s :6L; educational mission# *hat else is there7
Some of my colleagues (ould pro!a!ly claim that de!ate is more
centrally a!out teaching argumentation s1ills in general than (ith
teaching ad"ocacy s1ills in particular# :thers might stress education in
such areas of current academic interest as critical theory and postmodern
philosophy# <y central claim, ho(e"er, is some(hat different# $n my
"ie(, a central element of de!ate8s educational purpose should !e
teaching s1ills associated (ith the effecti"e analysis of pu!lic policy
issues# <y point is not that de!ate should focus on training professional
policy analysts# This is a role (hich some de!aters do e"entually come
to occupy, !ut it is surely a narro(er ?o! niche than la(# Rather, $ thin1
that de!ate needs to teach policy analysis s1ills in the !roader sense in
(hich they are rele"ant to all informed citiEens in a functioning
democracy# $f (e (ish to !e informed citiEens, (e are all o!liged to !e
effecti"e analysts of pu!lic policy, and de!ate can help a good deal in
that process# $s the teaching of policy analysis s1ills incompati!le (ith
the teaching of pu!lic ad"ocacy s1ills7 6o dou!t there is a (ide degree
of o"erlap, !ut there are certain differences in emphasis# *hereas the
pu!lic ad"ocate may !e (ell ad"ised to ta1e a consistent position and
stic1 to it +flip flops !eing politically damaging-, the informed citiEen or
the academic social critic is li1ely to thin1 in a more tentati"e and
hypothetical (ay a!out pu!lic policy 2uestions# .aced (ith a specific
policy proposal +li1e an affirmati"e plan-, s=he might (ell (ish to
e3amine it from a "ariety of "antage points# S=he might (ant to engage
in a process of mi3ed scanningfirst considering a range of alternati"es,
then focusing on a smaller num!er in detail# S=he might (ant to proceed
along the !ranches of decision tree, considering first, for e3ample, do
(e (ant to increase pu!lic health ser"ices for mental health care7, then
considering, if so, (hat agent could do this most successfully# The
citiEen and social critic ha"e room to sometimes play )de"il8s ad"ocate)
for e3ample, !y loo1ing to the polar policy e3tremes and playing them
off against the middle# 5ll of these thought processes in"ol"e (hat
(ould !e considered )conditional) argument (ithin de!ate, !ut they are
"alua!le thought processes, especially for people (ho don8t already ha"e
their minds made up, (ho are approaching pu!lic policy 2uestions as
thin1ers and in2uirers instead of as acti"ists and ad"ocates#
<y !roader point is not that ad"ocacy s1ills don8t matter, nor do $ thin1
de!ate can or should !e totally di"orced from ad"ocacy# $nstead, $ am
trying to ma1e the more limited point that teaching ad"ocacy +at least
ad"ocacy narro(ly concei"ed- is not the only purpose of academic
de!ate# 5nother important purpose is to teach s1ills associated (ith
sound policy analysis, s1ills useful to the citiEen and the social critic#
5nd among these s1ills is the a!ility to thin1 tentati"ely and
hypothetically, to consider pro!lems from a "ariety of perspecti"es,
e"en to entertain mutually e3clusi"e alternati"es# Consistency may !e a
"irtue for ad"ocates, !ut from the standpoint of the thin1er and the
reflecti"e citiEen )a foolish consistency) may !e )the ho!go!lin of small
minds) +0merson-#
Aut if ad"ocacy and analysis are !oth important, ho( does one proceed7
The t(o in"ol"e, as $ ha"e suggested, differences in emphasis# 5nd it
may (ell !e that in the end different ?udges and de!ate theorists (ill
simply emphasiEe one or the other !ased on their o(n interests and
temperamental dispositions# Still, $ do ha"e a suggestion for anyone
interested in a middle ground# /old the affirmati"e to strict ad"ocacy
standardsone plan (hich they must defend from the !eginning to the
end# Aut hold the negati"e to looser ad"ocacy standards# Still re2uire
that they 5D>:C5T0 the re?ection of the affirmati"e plan, !ut let them
do so (hile incorporating at least limited elements of conditional logic
into their arguments# $n sum, let them approach the de!ate as analysts
and in2uirers, as de"il8s ad"ocates rather than as the fully committed
partisans of a specific policy alternati"e# This is not an argument for
complete critical license, nor is it a defense of negation theory# $t is
legitimate, $ thin1, to hold the negati"e to the same degree of policy
specificity as the affirmati"e# $ am simply arguing that the negati"e
should get more than one policy alternati"e#
5nother (ay to thin1 a!out this is in terms of t(o different models of
ad"ocacy# The traditional ad"ocacy paradigm in de!ate appealed to the
model of the pu!lic ad"ocate# The pu!lic ad"ocate spea1s to a general
audience and represents a certain specific interest +or interest group-#
The pu!lic ad"ocate is concerned less (ith )truth) or (ith logic than
(ith successfully pleading a case# The pu!lic ad"ocate employs
relati"ely simple modes of argument !ecause s=he is addressing the
general pu!lic# $n contrast, (e might choose to em!race the model of
the academic ad"ocate# 5cademics also function consistently as
ad"ocates# They ad"ocate the acceptance and re?ection of certain
theories, and sometimes they ad"ocate the acceptance or re?ection of
certain pu!lic policies# Aut they proceed in a some(hat different (ay#
.irst, they mainly address a specialiEed audience# Second, they can
focus more on the logical and less on the psychologically persuasi"e
aspects of their arguments# Third, they are also more li1ely to employ
hypothetical modes of reasoning, including mi3ed scanning, the use of
decision trees, reductio ad a!surdum logic, and de"il8s ad"ocacy# $n
sum, they are more li1ely to em!race conditional modes of argument
than are pu!lic ad"ocates#
There are se"eral reasons to thin1 that an academic ad"ocacy model is
superior for academic de!ate# The first is that !y definition (e are
academics4 (e are not actual pu!lic ad"ocates or decisionma1ers# The
position of the academic ad"ocate is therefore more natural, more
intuiti"e, for most of us than is the position of the pu!lic ad"ocate#
Second, the !ul1 of our practices in de!ate harmoniEe !etter (ith an
academic ad"ocacy than a pu!lic ad"ocacy model# De!ate ?udges are a
specialiEed audience# They can !e e3pected to !e more rational in their
argument e"aluations and less su!?ect to purely psychological
influences# De!ate argument tends to !e fast and technical# $t (ould
utterly !e(ilder a general pu!lic audience# De!aters fre2uently employ
arguments (hich ha"e currency (ithin the academy !ut no(here else#
Criti1s are an e3ample of this, !ut this is also true of many policy
arguments too radical in their assumptions and implications to appeal to
the general pu!lic# Since (e don8t act li1e pu!lic ad"ocates in most of
our other de!ate practices, it is far from clear (hy conditionality should
!e the sole e3ception#
The third premise of the ad"ocacy argument against conditionality is
that conditionality is unpersuasi"e and +potentially- unethical# There is
also implicit in this argument a certain appeal to practice, an assumption
that real (orld ad"ocates do not argue conditionally# This, it seems
clear, is an o"ersimplification# $n response to a proposal for federal
(elfare !enefits, an opponent of (elfare might (ell say that s=he is
opposed to (elfare !ut thin1s that if (elfare !enefits are to !e increased
it should !e done at the state le"el# This 1ind of )conditionality) is
common e"en in the (orld of actual policy ma1ing, and it does not seem
to !e intrinsically unpersuasi"e# :nce again, it seems to !e an
o"ersimplification to say that all conditional argument is unpersuasi"e in
all settings and for all audiences# Conditional arguments are, for the
most part, logically sound# 0"en the argument that )my client didn8t do,
and !esides, he8s craEy,) presents t(o logically consistent claims# $f your
audience is a ?ury, that may !e a !ad argument4 if your audience is a
logician, it could !e a good one# /ypothetical argument is a staple of
academic, especially philosophical, discourse# $f may !e used less
fre2uently in the conte3t of pu!lic de!ates, !ut it is undou!tedly used,
sometimes persuasi"ely, e"en there# $n sum, $ am suspicious of the logic
of completely dismissing an entire mode of argument !ecause there is
some research that in some settings and (ith some audiences it is
psychologically counterproducti"e# 5cademic de!ate em!races many
practicesincluding rapid deli"ery, radical social criticism, and
speculati"ely lin1ed chains of e"ents(hich (ould !e unpersuasi"e for
most audiences# $n general, our model of argument is far closer to the
standards of academic de!ate than it is to pu!lic de!ate in front of lay
audiences# 6o dou!t this has a "ariety of disad"antages, educational and
other(ise# Aut as long as academic de!ate assumes in e"ery other (ay a
specialiEed audience, it seems anomalous to uni2uely re?ect conditional
argument !ecause it is unpersuasi"e to the general pu!lic#
The notion that conditional argument is someho( unethical stri1es me
as e"en less compelling# Considering se"eral different alternati"es does
not, on its face, seem morally pro!lematic# 6or does it seem immoral,
generally spea1ing, to modify one8s position to some e3tent o"er the
course of a discussion or a de!ate# :ne might e"en defend such a course
as ethically superior to the approach of adopting a dogmatic stance
permitting neither compromise nor modification !ased on ne( insights#
The argumentati"e irresponsi!ility argument stri1es me as more
persuasi"e on its face than it is upon consideration# .irst, it suffers the
same pro!lem as all potential a!use arguments# ;ou can re?ect the
repugnant counterplans (hen you see them (ithout re?ecting the "ast
ma?ority of conditional counterplans (hich are not repugnant# Second, it
is simply not true that the negati"e is placed at no ris1 (hen they run a
conditional counterplan# They ma1e a time in"estment in the argument#
They read e"idence and ad"ance analysis (hich can potentially !e used
against them# The affirmati"e may !e a!le to capture the counterplan8s
net !enefit "ia lin1 turn and argue that it is more of an ad"antage to the
plan than to the counterplan# The counterplan may in"o1e a permutation
(hich could ta1e out another disad"antage# Third, (hile disad"antages
can !e straight turned, fe( other types of de!ate argument entail that
same degree of argumentati"e ris1# ;ou cannot turn a harm, inherency,
or sol"ency argument# 5ttempts to turn topicality +as a re"erse "oting
issue- are unpersuasi"e# 6egati"es can almost al(ays get out of 1riti1s#
5nd e"en disad"antages are not straight turned all that often# $n sum, the
argument that the negati"e should !e at /$D/ ris1 for any argument it
ad"ances seems untena!le# .ourth, (e should not artificially e3aggerate
argument responsi!ility# De!aters should !e responsi!le in proportion to
the logical (eight (hich an argument carries# $f the negati"e claims that
either of t(o policies is superior to the plan and one of their policies is
sho(n to !e inferior, they can still logically (in on the other# .ifth and
finally, the fear of repugnant counterplans seems e3aggerated# There are
natural disincenti"es to running offensi"e arguments4 they alienate
?udges and you are unli1ely to (in on them# $n the age of 1riti1s,
e3treme "iolations of political correctness are e"en more dangerous#
5nd if you (ant to defend that people dying is good, you can pro!a!ly
do so in the form of a disad"antage (ithout recourse to counterplan as
lin1 magnifier#
:f the t(o pragmatic arguments against counterplan conditionality, the
time limits argument is !y far the more persuasi"e# Aut it too has its
pro!lems# $t is far more persuasi"e at the e3tremes than at the margin# 5
good de!ate (ith t(enty alternati"e negati"e policy options is difficult
to imagine, !ut there ha"e !een plenty of good de!ates in (hich the
negati"e has defended t(o# Second, it is o!"ious that speech time (ithin
a de!ate is finite# The time the negati"e team in"ests in a counterplan
trades off (ith time they (ould spend de"eloping other arguments#
Third, it is not clear that the introduction of a counterplan adds a uni2ue
le"el of comple3ity to the round# The standard affirmati"e argument is
that a counterplan is a complete policy system, raising issues of
comparati"e sol"ency and desira!ility as (ell as a (hole gamut of
theory issues# The counterplan, it is said, interacts (ith e"ery other issue
in the round, ma1ing it a uni2uely time demanding negati"e argument#
This argument is pro!a!ly truesometimes# Aut often counterplans are
not especially comple3# They may ma1e one minor modification in the
affirmati"e plan and generate one narro( net !enefit# 5 small
procedural counterplan is li1ely to !e less comple3 and time consuming
than a ma?or meat!all disad"antage li1e <althus or hegemony#
.urthermore, empiricism seems to !e against the claim that counterplans
are uni2uely time consuming# The a"erage num!er of ans(ers to a
counterplan does not e3ceed the num!er de"oted to a disad"antage, a
1riti1 or a topicality argument# $ndeed, it may ta1e less time to ans(er
the counterplan !ecause there are more (ays in (hich the counterplan
can !e attac1ed and more of the ans(ers (ill !e une"idenced theoretical
o!?ections# 5s (ith any argument, you must ma1e a strategic choice
concerning ho( seriously to ta1e a counterplan# $f it is a po(erful
argument, you (ould presuma!ly (ant to ma1e many ans(ers# $f it is
(ea1 or underde"eloped, far fe(er ans(ers should suffice# .ourth, time
s1e(s are central elements of de!ate strategy, at least gi"en the (ay that
the academic de!ate game is currently played# Teams attempt to s1e(
time (ith thro(a(ay arguments of all sorts: (ith lo( impact or hard to
turn disad"antages, (ith topicality arguments, and increasingly (ith
1riti1s# Claims that time s1e(s are "oting issues are themsel"es time
s1e(s# $ do not find this emphasis on tactical time tradeoffs to !e a
particularly appealing part of our acti"ity, !ut gi"en its per"asi"eness, it
seems a little odd to !ecome uni2uely agitated o"er the time s1e(
potential of conditional counterplans# .ifth, fe(er arguments are not
necessarily !etter# Ay the logic of ma3imum depth, the negati"e could
!e held to one disad"antage# Aut if they thin1 they ha"e t(o or more
good disad"antages, (e let them !e run !ecause there is intellectual
"alue in considering a range of arguments against a gi"en position# The
same logic (ould seem to apply to counterplans# Si3th, (ith regard to
depth of analysis (hat seems critical is the num!er rather than the 1ind
of ma?or offensi"e negati"e positions# Fudges are li1ely to moan at the
mention of )se"en off,) e"en if none of them is a counterplan# $n
contrast, )t(o off,) !oth of (hich are counterplans (ould almost
certainly produce a more indepth de!ate# $n sum, the time limits
argument points to a real danger for potential a!use, !ut it is so selecti"e
and situational in its impact that it hardly seems to !e a decisi"e
o!?ection to negati"e conditionality#
The argument that negati"e conditionality ?ustifies affirmati"e
conditionality stri1es me as the (ea1est of the ma?or arguments against
conditional counterplans# 5t least it is easy to ans(er if one thin1s that
the plan is the focus of the de!ate# $f that is the case, then the plan
cannot change and affirmati"e conditionality is disallo(ed, !ut the
negati"e can still attac1 the plan8s desira!ility from more than one policy
perspecti"e# This may seem unfair !ecause it is nonreciprocal, !ut at
least a couple of points should !e made# The affirmati"e a!ility to select
a specific case and plan is a huge strategic ad"antage# The affirmati"e
almost al(ays 1no(s more a!out the specific policy on (hich the
de!ate is focusing# 5nd the plan must remain the focus, e"en if there is
more than one counterplan in the round !ecause counterplans are
re2uired to compete, that is, pro"ide a reason to re?ect the plan# :ften,
the affirmati"e has a "ast ad"antage in terms of specific 1no(ledge and
specific preparation# Thus, gi"ing the negati"e more fle3i!ility in terms
of its counterad"ocacy can easily !e considered to !e a reciprocal
ad"antage offsetting the affirmati"e8s case selection side ad"antage#
5lso, the affirmati"e isn8t really ?ust limited to the plan, the (hole plan,
and nothing !ut the plan# Permutations +of (hich each counterplan is
li1ely to suggest a num!er- in effect function as additional policy
alternati"es (hich can ?ustify an affirmati"e !allot# Permutations, $ (ill
argue !elo(, are inherently conditional arguments, !ut a legitimate form
of logical, limited conditionality# 5nd letting the ?udge "ote for a
permutation at the end of the round seems ade2uate reciprocation for
letting the ?udge "ote for a conditional counterplan#
To summariEe this section: the ad"ocacy and the time limits arguments
against conditional counterplans ha"e considera!le merits# +The
argument responsi!ility and the affirmati"e conditionality arguments are
less compelling#- De!ate is an acti"ity in (hich ad"ocacy plays an
important part, and in at least some ad"ocacy settings conditional
arguments seem to ha"e limited persuasi"e appeal# The tendency of
conditional counterplans to ma1e de!ate analysis more superficial, no
matter ho( nonuni2ue this may !e, is also a "alid concern# This is
especially a pro!lem if there are no principled limits placed on the
num!er of counterplans (hich the negati"e can run# $n sum, there are
"alid, though not utterly decisi"e o!?ections to classic unconstrained
conditionality# $ (ill attempt to argue !elo( that these o!?ections can !e
ade2uately ans(ered (ithin theories of counterplan disposition relying
on logical, limited conditionality#
T/0 60D5T$>0 D$SP:S$T$:6 :PT$:6 565L;G0D
5ccording to the theory of negati"e counterplan disposition, the
negati"e, li1e the affirmati"e is limited to one proposal for change# The
status 2uo, ho(e"er, al(ays remains a logical option a"aila!le to the
?udge# 5ccording to this approach, the counterplan is al(ays at the
negati"e8s disposition in that they can al(ays concede the counterplan
and defend the status 2uo, e"en if the affirmati"e has only attac1ed its
desira!ility, that is, they ha"e straight turned the counterplan#
The first argument in fa"or of this position is that it follo(s from the
logic of real (orld decisionma1ing# 5 rational decisionma1er,
confronted (ith t(o proposals for change, can almost al(ays re?ect !oth
and 1eep things as they are, and indeed, s=he should do so if !oth
changes (ould !e inferior to the policy that no( e3ists#
Second, this form of limited conditionality is also consistent (ith real
(orld ad"ocacy# .aced (ith one proposal for change, opponents of a
policy fre2uently offer a counterproposal# $n response to the
Repu!lican ta3 cut proposal, the Democrats (ill offer an alternati"e ta3
cut proposal of their o(n# Aut e"en if the Democrats8 plan is re?ected,
the Repu!licans8 need not !e em!raced# Democrats can still "ote against
the Repu!lican plan# $ndeed, this posture of proposing an alternati"e, !ut
still defending the status 2uo as superior to the policy proposed !y one8s
political opponents is so common that it is essentially !usiness as usual#
Thus, re?ecting all forms of conditional argument is in fact less in accord
(ith the practice of real (orld pu!lic ad"ocates than is the acceptance of
limited conditionality#
Third, the time limits argument against unconstrained conditionality has
minimal force against this "ersion of limited conditionality# 0ach side
gets only one proposal for change# The status 2uo is still a logical policy
option ?ustifying a negati"e !allot4 that is, it is a competiti"e reason to
re?ect the affirmati"e plan# Aut there is only one status 2uo4 thus, the
num!er of negati"e policy options can ne"er e3ceed t(o# There is thus
no possi!ility of the e3treme a!use potential associated (ith multiple
counterplans#
.ourth, allo(ing the negati"e to re"ert to the status 2uo is reciprocal
(ith the affirmati"e8s a!ility to suggest doing !oth# The )do !oth)
permutation also follo(s from the logic of rational decisionma1ing# $f a
rational decisionma1er (ere confronted (ith t(o mutually compati!le
and simultaneously desira!le policies, s=he (ould presuma!ly em!race
!oth# Li1e(ise, if the ?udge is modeling the !eha"ior of a rational, real
(orld decisionma1er, s=he should !e a!le to simultaneously endorse
!oth plan and counterplan, if the t(o ta1en together constitute the !est
policy option# Similarly, s=he should !e a!le to endorse the option to )do
neither,) since this option e2ually (ell follo(s from the logic of
rational, real (orld decisionma1ing# :ne could e"en regard the )do
neither) option as a 1ind of negati"e permutation of plan and
counterplan#
.ifth, normal permutation theory still gi"es the affirmati"e more policy
options than the negati"e, e"en allo(ing the negati"e an inherent right
to the status 2uo# There are almost al(ays se"eral legitimate
permutations (hich can !e articulated in response to a gi"en
counterplan# Thus, in most rounds there (ill !e se"eral policy options
+the original plan or any of a num!er of permutations- ?ustifying an
affirmati"e !allot# 0"en allo(ing the status 2uo fall!ac1, the negati"e
does not reach complete parity# Aut disallo(ing e"en that option
constitutes a ma?or failure of reciprocity#
Si3th, the status 2uo is ?ust one more policy# $n a (orld in (hich the
?udge can already "ote to do the plan alone, the counterplan alone, or
!oth plan and counterplan, the a!ility to endorse neither plan nor
counterplan, e3tends the ?udges options only from three to four#
Se"enth, the status 2uo is a uni2uely unpro!lematic option to add into
the mi3# The affirmati"e has already had the (hole %5C to indict the
status 2uo4 thus, the status 2uo has already !een su!?ect to reasona!ly in
depth discussion# Disad"antages commonly esta!lish their uni2ueness
relati"e to the status 2uo# The affirmati"e8s initial ad"ocacy is that the
plan is superior to the status 2uo# 6ot re2uiring that the affirmati"e
successfully sustain this claim at the end of the round lets them shift
their fundamental ad"ocacy stance# Consistent ad"ocacy on the part of
the affirmati"e logically re2uires them to (in !oth that their plan is
superior to the status 2uo and that their plan +or a permutation- is
superior to the counterplan#
0ighth, the negati"e disposition option constitutes a reasona!le middle
ground !et(een the e3tremes of classic, unconstrained conditionality
and strict, single option ad"ocacy# 6egati"e disposition helps offset the
large side ad"antage associated (ith affirmati"e case and plan selection#
$t also allo(s, at least to a limited degree, 1inds of hypothetical thin1ing
(hich contri!ute to sophisticated policy analysis#
9ndergirding this theory of counterplan disposition is a "ie( of de!ate
(hich $ ha"e la!eled )policy analysis#) Aasically, this is the "ie( that
the purpose of a policy de!ate is to find the !est policy# 5t least, this is
the !est purpose# Politicians may use de!ates to gain political "ictories
o"er their opponents# Aut in de!ate (e are not acti"e politicians, and (e
can use de!ate in a more disinterested (ay# *hy should academic
de!ate !e concerned (ith finding the !est policy7 Aecause as citiEens
(e are concerned a!out finding optimal policies# Aecause policy ma1ers
S/:9LD !e concerned a!out finding optimal policies# Aecause de!ate
should pro"ide training in the processes of rational policy assessment
(hich are essential for a democracy# Training in the logic of finding the
!est policy option is not the only thing de!ate should see1 to
accomplish# $t should also train ad"ocates, acti"ists, and academics# Aut
learning ho( !est to pursue the !est policy is surely an $<P:RT56T
thing for policy de!ate to teach# This does not mean that (e can ne"er
depart from the logic of rational, real (orld decisionma1ing#
Sometimes other "alues, competiti"e or educational, may !e more
compelling# Aut it does mean that departures from clear, real (orld
models of rational choice should !e underta1en reluctantly and only for
compelling reasons# 5cademic de!ate, all too clearly, is not the real
(orld# Aut it is designed to train us to thin1, to argue, and to e"aluate
(ithin the real (orld# $f the logic of sound policy analysis matters in the
real (orld, it should also matter in de!ate#
Some .urther :!?ections to 6egati"e Counterplan Disposition
$n addition to the traditional arguments against conditional counterplans,
there is a more recent generation of arguments (hich has gro(n up in
the age of disposition as opposed to the age of classic conditionality#
<ost of these are "ariations on familiar themes, !ut they are still (orth
re"ie(ing#
:ne argument of more recent "intage is that the counterplan is so
po(erful a tool for the negati"e that if they choose to run one they
should !e stuc1 (ith it +or at least ha"e the potential to !e stuc1 (ith it-#
5 counterplan has the potential to completely, or almost completely,
negate the affirmati"e8s ad"antage# $t can shift the de!ate in fair measure
a(ay from the affirmati"e8s ground# Di"en all this, if the negati"e
chooses to run one, its a!andonment should not !e ris1 free#
$ (ould not deny, of course, that the counterplan is a po(erful tool for
the negati"e, nor that the theory of negati"e disposition offers strategic
ad"antages to the negati"e# 0"ery theory offers !enefits to one side or
the other4 strict, single option ad"ocacy is a theory (hich strongly
fa"ors the affirmati"e# Thus, helping one side or the other is not really a
compelling argument against a theory construct# This is especially true if
the other side has reciprocal, offsetting ad"antages +li1e the po(er of
permutation- or if, in general, side e2uity remains reasona!ly in !alance#
The days of massi"e affirmati"e side !ias appear to ha"e passed, at least
temporarily, !ut (e ha"e hardly entered an era of clear negati"e
preponderance# Thus, arguments of the )pity the poor affirmati"e)
"ariety seem a !it premature# Counterplans are po(erful tools, !ut they
are not o"er(helmingly po(erful# Counterplans generally function as
defensi"e arguments4 that is, they negate affirmati"e ad"antages# Aut it
is rare that a counterplan, operating on its o(n, pro"ides a sufficient
reason to "ote negati"e# Denerally, it must !e coupled (ith a
disad"antage to ser"e as a net !enefit# Thus, (hereas the negati"e can
often (in on a disad"antage standing alone +!ecause it out(eighs the
case-, or on topicality, or on a 1riti1, it is rare that the negati"e can (in
?ust on a counterplan# Since counterplans are not T/5T po(erful, they
need not !e su!?ect to special theoretical impediments#
5 second argument is that the affirmati"e is too constrained in attac1ing
a counterplan# Conditionality of any sort forces the affirmati"e to de!ate
in t(o (orlds at once, and this may force them to de!ate against
themsel"es#
To start (ith the last point first, it seems clear that the affirmati"e ne"er
/5S to de!ate against itself# $t can al(ays defend the position that its
plan +or a permutation- is the !est policy option in the round#
5ffirmati"e de!aters ha"e presuma!ly de"oted a (hole speech to
pro"ing the plan !etter than the status 2uo4 no( all they ha"e to do is to
pro"e the plan superior to the counterplan# $f the status 2uo is still an
option, this does place some constraints on e3actly ho( the affirmati"e
attac1s the counterplan# They cannot, for e3ample, run a disad"antage to
the counterplan (hich applies e"en to a lesser degree to the plan if the
disad"antage has the effect of pro"ing the status 2uo superior to the plan
as (ell# Aut it is not clear to me that the affirmati"e should !e a!le to
ma1e arguments (hich pro"e they are inferior to the status 2uo# This
seems to amount to refuting their o(n ad"ocacy, something that is ruled
out in almost any de!ate rule!oo1# 5s far as de!ating in t(o (orlds,
there is some truth to this argument, !ut it also seems o"erstated# The
e3istence of t(o negati"e policy options in the same round does create
argument interactions (hich the affirmati"e must identify and 1eep
straight# Aut ma1ing t(o policy comparisons at the end of the round
instead of ?ust one is not 2uantum physics# $n a (orld (ithout negati"e
disposition, (e ha"e to ans(er the 2uestion, (hich is !est, the plan or
the counterplan7 $n a (orld (ith negati"e disposition, (e must ans(er
the 2uestion, (hich is !est, plan, counterplan, or status 2uo7 This does
not seem monumentally more comple3# Aesides, de!ate is supposed to
!e intellectually challenging# Pro!a!ly the (orst argument against
1riti1s is that philosophy is too comple3 to de!ate a!out# $f (e can
intellectually cope (ith postmodern philosophy, glo!al circulation
models, and theories of deterrence, $ suspect (e can cope (ith the status
2uo as a fall!ac1 option# 5nd the challenges of de!ating in t(o (orlds
at once are reciprocal# The negati"e also has to 1eep trac1 of the "arious
argument interactions and ma1e their strategic choices accordingly#
5..$R<5T$>0 D$SP:S$T$:6 :. C:96T0RPL56S 565L;G0D
The theory of affirmati"e disposition is also a form of limited
conditionality# 5gain, the negati"e is limited to only one counterplan,
!ut (ithin the confines of this theory, the negati"e cannot concede the
counterplan if there are no theoretical o!?ections to it# $f the affirmati"e
only pro"es that the counterplan is disad"antageous and other(ise
accepts its legitimacy, the negati"e is stuc1 (ith it# *hat arguments
fa"or this position7
.irst, (hether or not the counterplan e3its or remains in the round is a
matter of the affirmati"e8s discretion4 the fate of the counterplan is
su!?ect to the affirmati"e8s disposition# This ma1es the counterplan more
li1e a disad"antage# $t can ne"er !e a ris1 free argument# Aut if the
affirmati"e chooses, for its o(n strategic reasons, to ma1e arguments
li1e )no negati"e fiat,) then they ha"e made the choice to allo( the
negati"e to escape from disad"antages to the counterplan#
Second, theory arguments offer rational reasons (hy the counterplan
cannot stay in the round# $f there is no negati"e fiat, or if the counterplan
is an a!use of fiat, then it is !asically a nonargument, and it has to !e
dismissed# The same thing is true if the affirmati"e claims that the
counterplan is topical and that counterplans must !e nontopical# This
means that the counterplan (as ne"er fair game for the negati"e, so it
has to !e dismissed# $f the counterplan is indicted for !eing partially
plan inclusi"e, the same logic pre"ails# :f course, one can argue that
theory failures should !e "oting issues# To ade2uately discuss this
2uestion (ould re2uire another long article# Aut in a nutshell, $ thin1
that this gi"es too much (eight to theory arguments# $t prioritiEes theory
o"er the su!stanti"e issues in the de!ate# 5nd it rests on an e3aggerated
notion of the significance of time s1e(s, a matter addressed in terms of
the conditionality time s1e( de!ate a!o"e#
Third, this theory also offers a middle ground# $f classic, unconstrained
conditionality and strict, single option ad"ocacy are considered the
e3tremes, then !oth affirmati"e and negati"e disposition positions
constitute middle grounds# Aut if negati"e disposition and strict non
conditionality are considered the e3tremes +(ith classic conditionality
completely off the map-, then the theory of affirmati"e disposition is
li1ely to seem the most moderate#
The theory of affirmati"e disposition does possess one unresol"ed
dilemma, (hich $ (ould li1e to !riefly address# This concerns the status
of competition arguments as ?ustifications for the negati"e conceding the
counterplan# $s competition a theoretical !urden of the counterplan or is
it a 2uestion of su!stanti"e policy desira!ility7 *ith net !enefits as the
o"erarching standard of competition, it seems that competiti"eness is
really a matter of su!stanti"e desira!ility rather than a theory 2uestion#
Through the lens of net !enefits, one can say that if a counterplan is
undesira!le, that is, not net !eneficial, then it is not a reason to re?ect the
plan and therefore is noncompetiti"e# Aut if !eing noncompetiti"e
?ustifies the negati"e a!andoning the counterplan, then the negati"e can
al(ays do so, !ecause all undesira!le counterplans are noncompetiti"e#
*hat the foregoing logic (ould suggest is that permutations, !ecause
they demonstrate the noncompetiti"eness of the counterplan, are not a
legitimate !asis for the negati"e conceding it# There may, ho(e"er, !e
another reason (hy permutations ?ustify negati"e re"ersions to the status
2uo# This is that permutations are themsel"es a form of conditional
argument# :nce the affirmati"e has said that the ?udge can "ote either
for the plan or for the plan plus all or part of the counterplan, then they
ha"e em!raced t(o policy options# 5nd at that point, the negati"e is
logically entitled to re"ert to the status 2uo so that it too has t(o policy
options for (hich the ?udge can "ote#
$ should perhaps note at this point that (hile $ prefer the theory of
affirmati"e disposition to strict, single option ad"ocacy, $ "astly prefer
the theory of negati"e disposition to either# The affirmati"e disposition
theory does gi"e the negati"e a little more room to maneu"er than does a
theory of strict nonconditionality# 5nd it has for me the not
inconsidera!le !enefit of ma1ing counterplan theory issues non"oting
issues# Aut it does not go nearly far enough in terms of follo(ing the
logic of real (orld ad"ocacy and analysis or in terms of reciprocating
the ad"antage the prerogati"e of permutation pro"ides to the affirmati"e#
The arguments in fa"or of the negati"e disposition of counterplans apply
(ith full force to the option of strict nonconditionality, !ut they still
apply (ith considera!le force to the option of affirmati"e disposition#
5R0 P0R<9T5T$:6S C:6D$T$:65L7
:ne of the most po(erful arguments in fa"or of the theory of negati"e
counterplan disposition is that the status 2uo option is reciprocal (ith
the affirmati"e8s a!ility to permute# Aut there is a fairly o!"ious
o!?ection (hich (ill dou!tless ha"e come to the minds of many readers
at this point in the argument# This is that permutations are only a test of
competition4 they are not a policy option a"aila!le to the ?udge at the
end of the round# $ !elie"e that this "ie( is misguided# $ (ill argue in
this section that permutations should indeed !e regarded as conditional
affirmati"e policy options and that they are options (hich the ?udge can
endorse at the end of the round# .urthermore, in light of this, the
e3istence of permutations ?ustifies at least minimal negati"e
conditionality in the form of the retention of the status 2uo option#
The first point $ (ould li1e to ma1e is that permutations +or their
functional e2ui"alents- are logical and necessary responses to
counterplans# Aasically, they are our most elegant tool for ensuring that
negati"e counterplans compete# $f the affirmati"e cannot argue for !oth
the plan and all of the counterplan or for the plan and part of the
counterplan, then there (ould !e no limit on (hat counterplans could !e
run# 5s noted a!o"e, any rational decisionma1er (ho could com!ine
t(o policies to create an optimal policy pac1age (ould and should do
so#
Aut if (e say the ?udge can "ote to do !oth, then the ?udge has t(o (ays
to "ote affirmati"e, since it (as already assumed that the ?udge can "ote
for the plan alone# 5nd this, un2uestiona!ly, is affirmati"e policy
conditionality# So if se"erance, alternati"e ?ustification, and intrinsicness
arguments are all !ad, (hy is this form of affirmati"e conditionality
legitimate7 The !est ans(er, $ thin1, is that the affirmati"e is still
defending its full l5C plan +thus there has !een no se"erance of its
ad"ocacy-, and the permutation +if it is a legitimate permutation- only
incorporates policy elements ad"ocated !y the negati"e# +Thus, the
permutation adds no ne( element not found in either plan or
counterplan#- $f follo(s from the logic of rational decisionma1ing that
the ?udge should !e a!le to endorse !oth the plan and the counterplan# $f
the ?udge can endorse the plan !y "oting affirmati"e, and if the ?udge
can endorse the counterplan !y "oting negati"e, there is no reason (hy
the ?udge cannot endorse the t(o policies in com!ination# This logic is
perfectly real (orld# $f Congress has t(o mutually compati!le and
mutually desira!le !ills on its doc1et, then it can and should pass !oth#
*hen presented (ith t(o policy options the rational decisionma1er
(ill almost al(ays ha"e the opportunity to do either option 5, option A,
or options 5 and A together# 6ot to permit the ?udge this range of
choices defies the logic of rational decisionma1ing#
$ ha"e ?ust argued that permutations are a form of conditionality
grounded in the logic of real (orld decisionma1ing# They are also a
limited form of conditionality# The affirmati"e may !e a!le to come up
(ith se"eral legitimate permutations to a gi"en counterplan, !ut the
range of permutations is still limited !y the content of the counterplan#
:f course, if the counterplan is long and comple3, there are more
potential permutations, !ut this is a ris1 the negati"e assumes (hen they
choose to run a long and comple3 counterplan#
$ ha"e no pro!lem (ith the position that permutations are a form of
logical, limited conditionality and that as such they are options a"aila!le
to the ?udge at the end of the round# Aut from the standpoint of strict,
single option ad"ocacy, this is not an accepta!le solution# <em!ers of
the strict ad"ocacy school ha"e therefore gone through a series of
theoretical contortions in order to come up (ith an understanding of
permutations in (hich they are not conditional arguments#
The most popular mo"e along these lines is to claim that permutations
are only )tests of competition#) This means that the ?udge does not really
"ote for them at the end of the round# They merely ser"e to defeat the
counterplan# $n a (orld of strict nonconditionality, this means !asically
that the negati"e loses since there is no negati"e policy option to "ote
for# Aut ha"ing defeated the counterplan, the permutation can, li1e a
*estern hero, no( slip 2uietly into the night allo(ing the ?udge to "ote
for the original plan#
$f this seems fishy, it is for good reason# The "ery language of )testing)
arguments should !e a dead gi"e a(ay# *ithin the logic of strict policy
ad"ocacy, policy positions must !e ad"ocated# 5 policy position (hich
is not ad"ocated, (hich is merely a test +li1e an intrinsicness argument-
is a nonargument# The notion of )testing) arguments comes from
hypothesis testing, the traditional paradigm (hich most emphatically
em!raced conditionality in all of its forms# $f permutations )test)
counterplan competition, (hy shouldn8t intrinsicness arguments test
disad"antages7 *hy shouldn8t conditional counterplans test the plan8s
necessity and desira!ility7
.urthermore, the notion that the ?udge "otes for the plan instead of the
permutation at the end of the round is !asically a con?urer8s tric1# The
?udge is de facto "oting for the permutation !ecause (ithout the
permutation the counterplan (ould !e superior to the plan alone# The
decisi"e comparison, on (hich the round hinges, is !et(een the
counterplan and the permutation, not the plan and the counterplan, or
e"en the plan and the status 2uo +a comparison (hich may not e"en
ha"e !een addressed since the %5C-#
$n my "ie(, the permutation as test notion is a hopeless (ay out of the
pro!lem of permutation conditionality# Tests are conditional arguments#
$f permutations are tests then permutations are conditional# $f the
affirmati"e can employ the +limited- conditionality implicit in
permutations, then the negati"e should !e a!le to employ the +limited-
conditionality implicit in the status 2uo as an al(aysa"aila!le logical
option#
.rom a strict ad"ocacy standpoint, there is, ho(e"er, another (ay of
dealing (ith this dilemma# This alternati"e is to limit the affirmati"e to
one permutation and, if they ad"ance a permutation, to re2uire them to
a!andon their initial plan# 0"en this does not totally eliminate an
element of conditionality from the affirmati"e8s ad"ocacy# $t means that
the plan does definitely mo"e# 5nd it means that the affirmati"e is
ad"ancing t(o distinct comparisons, its plan, as superior to the status
2uo, and the permutation, as superior to the counterplan# $n other (ords,
the affirmati"e is !asically arguing that relati"e to the status 2uo, its plan
is !est, !ut that if the o!?ect of comparison is the counterplan, then the
permutation is !est# 5s noted, this still seems to lea"e an element of
conditionality in the affirmati"e8s ad"ocacy# This is seen in the if=then
logic of the t(o comparisons and in the e"olution of the plan into the
permutation as the policy that the affirmati"e ultimately ad"ocates# The
conclusion that $ (ould dra( from this is that once there is a
counterplan in the de!ate, it is practically impossi!le to a"oid elements
of conditional argument# Aut, that said, it seems to me that the approach
$ ha"e outlined in this paragraph in"ol"es the smallest degree of
conditionality possi!le, consistent (ith attac1ing counterplan
competition# +The affirmati"e could, of course, !e completely non
conditional !y ne"er offering a permutation# Aut in that case they (ould
fre2uently lose to counterplans (hich are rather flagrantly non
competiti"e#-
There may !e some strict ad"ocacy theorists (ho are (illing to em!race
the ?ust one permutation, either plan or permutation !ut not !oth
approach# Aut this theoretically Spartan choice is not in practice "ery
appealing# The reason is that it se"erely limits affirmati"e fle3i!ility in
responding to counterplans# <ore specifically, it drastically undercuts
the a!ility to !oth permute and to run disad"antages to the counterplan#
Denerally spea1ing, a disad"antage to a counterplan (ill also apply to a
permutation# +5n e3ception (ould !e a disad"antage to an element of
the counterplan not incorporated in the permutation# Aut this is li1ely to
!e a rare occurrence#- So, if the permutation is the affirmati"e8s ultimate
ad"ocacy position, the affirmati"e is running a disad"antage to itself#
5nd e"en if the disad"antage does not lin1 more to the permutation than
to the counterplan +a distinct possi!ility-, unless it lin1s less to the
permutation, it can8t !e a rele"ant net !enefit#
The plan :R permutation option seems to entail the minimum possi!le
degree of conditionality consistent (ith attac1ing competition at all#
5nd one could persuasi"ely argue that it is necessary to allo( the
affirmati"e at least this much conditionality if it is to ha"e any chance of
effecti"ely ans(ering counterplans# Aut in terms of the logic of rational
decisionma1ing, forcing the affirmati"e to choose !et(een plan and
permutation rather than !eing a!le to defend a more clearly conditional,
either=or approach does not ma1e much sense# $f a policy ad"ocate
proposes a policy and another policy ad"ocate proposes a counter
policy, it seems perfectly sensi!le for the first ad"ocate to argue along
the follo(ing lines# )$ thin1 that my opponent8s counterproposal is a
terri!le idea# $n terms of its o(n merits it eminently deser"es re?ection#
Aut (hate"er its merits, it is not a reason to re?ect my proposal# The t(o
a perfectly compati!le# So, if you li1e her idea, you can em!race it, and
mine as (ell#) Since this is a perfectly sensi!le series of arguments in
the real (orld, it is also a series of arguments (hich (e should allo( in
policy de!ate# *e should not distort the fundamental logic of rational
decisionma1ing, (hich in this case (ould permit the affirmati"e to
press !oth horns of a dilemma fore(ord, in order to limit e"ery "estige
of policy conditionalityespecially since doing so is a practical
impossi!ility any(ay#
STR$CT S$6DL0 :PT$:6 5D>:C5C; R0C:6S$D0R0D
Strict, single option ad"ocacy +complete nonconditionality- has
!enefits# $t does ma3imiEe depth of analysis to ha"e t(o and only t(o
policy alternati"es considered in a gi"en de!ate round# $t limits the
potential of counterplans to achie"e strategic time s1e(s# 5nd it may
!est comport (ith real (orld standards of pu!lic ad"ocacy, at least
sometimes#
The !asic pro!lem (ith strict nonconditionality is that, in a (orld of
counterplans, it is inconsistent (ith principles of rational decision
ma1ing# *hene"er t(o proposals for change are simultaneously on the
floor, t(o other logical options (ill almost al(ays emergeto do !oth
and to do neither# The )do !oth) option is one (hich has to !e
entertained4 other(ise there is no real chec1 on noncompetiti"e
counterplans# :f course, (e can, as a matter of con"ention, choose to
rule out of !ounds one or more of these four options# Aut if the
affirmati"e can defend !oth its plan and one or more permutations, then
reciprocity as (ell as decisionma1ing logic (ould seem to dictate that
the negati"e also !e a!le to sustain !oth the counterplan alone and the
)do neither) options# Real (orld pu!lic ad"ocates and rational, real
(orld decisionma1ers ali1e employ the 1inds of logical, limited
conditionality suggested !y the status 2uo fall!ac1 and !y allo(ing the
affirmati"e !oth plan and permutation as policy options# 9nless there
are compelling reasons, (e shouldn8t depart from the logic of rational,
real (orld decisionma1ing#
:6 .5$R60SS 56D 0D9C5T$:6
Disputes o"er de!ate theory often rest upon disagreements concerning
underlying "alues# 5t one le"el, the "alues appealed to in de!ate theory
argument seem simple enough# Theory claims almost al(ays rest on
appeals to some standard of fairness or some standard of education# Aut
!oth )fairness) and )education) are more comple3 entities than might
appear at first sight# De!ate can em!race a num!er of different
educational missions# The de!ate o"er conditionality, $ ha"e suggested,
turns hea"ily on (hether one associates de!ate8s educational mission
more strongly (ith the "alue of teaching a certain notion of sound
ad"ocacy s1ills or (ith teaching rational processes of pu!lic policy
analysis# :ther participants in the acti"ity may thin1 it is more important
to teach the perspecti"es of oppositional politics and s1ills associated
(ith political acti"ism# 5nd of course part of de!ate8s educational
mission is still to teach more mundane s1ills associated (ith oral
communication, research, analysis, refutation, and so on#
5 pro!lem in deciding (hich educational "alues to stress is that all +or
almost all- seem (orth(hile# :ne solution to this is "alue pluralism, to
try to accommodate as many different educational "alues as possi!le
into the de!ate acti"ity# $ am generally sympathetic to "alue pluralism,
in de!ate as else(here# Aut pluralism has its limits# .or e3ample, there
may !e certain critical or postmodern approaches and perspecti"es
(hich do not fit coherently (ithin the frame(or1 of pu!lic policy
ad"ocacy or (ithin the frame(or1 of rational policy analysis# 5nd at
this point some hard choices may ha"e to !e made# $f one face of
pluralism is the desire to accommodate as many "alues and perspecti"es
as possi!le, the flip side of pluralism is the recognition, on occasion, of
irreconcila!le incompati!ilities#
$ do not !elie"e there are irreconcila!le incompati!ilities !et(een the
policy ad"ocacy and the policy analysis perspecti"es# :r, if there are,
they e3ist at the margin# $ ha"e suggested (hat $ regard as a middle
ground (ith regard to the conditionality de!ate# This is to limit each side
to the initiation of one policy proposal for change, !ut to let the
affirmati"e defend any com!ination +that is, permutation- of those t(o
policies as (ell, and to let the negati"e defend !oth its counterplan and
the status 2uo as superior to the affirmati"e plan# $ ha"e argued that this
approach is the most consistent !oth (ith standards of rational decision
ma1ing and (ith the actual practice of real (orld ad"ocates# To restate
the argument !riefly: (hen there is only one proposal for change on the
floor, there is a relati"ely easy choice situationem!race the change or
retain the status 2uo# $n a counterplan situation, ho(e"er, the matri3 of
choices !ecomes more comple3# *hen there are t(o proposals for
change on the floor, the rational decisionma1er has at least four
choices: the initial plan for change, the counterplan for change, the t(o
together +either in (hole or in part-, or neither# 5nd since a rational
decisionma1er (ould !e a!le to choose from among any of the four
options, it significantly distorts the analytical frame(or1 of policy
de!ate +"ie(ed as an e3ercise in rational decisionma1ing- not to allo(
the ?udge to "ote for any of the four options at the end of the round#
*hat $ strongly suspect, ho(e"er, is that many readers might follo( me
this far do(n the path(ay of my analysis and then !al1# 5nd the most
li1ely stum!ling !loc1 is a (idespread perception that the positions $
ha"e la!eled )classic unconstrained conditionality) and )negati"e
disposition of counterplans) are !oth unfair to the affirmati"e# To
ans(er this o!?ection, $ (ant to reflect for a !it on the nature of fairness
arguments in de!ate#
.airness arguments in de!ate, it seems to me, almost al(ays appeal to
some notion of reciprocity# *hat is fair for one side should !e fair for
the other# There are also at least t(o (ays in (hich reciprocity claims
can !e framed4 (e might tag these )local) and )glo!al) reciprocity#
Local reciprocity focuses on specific theory issues and suggests that
!oth sides should !e treated in a reciprocal (ay in terms of a specific
issue# 03amples are a!undant# 6egati"e conditionality legitimates
affirmati"e conditionality# 5ffirmati"e fiat ?ustifies negati"e fiat# $f the
plan must !e topical, the counterplan should !e nontopical# $f the
affirmati"e has to defend a specific policy alternati"e, the negati"e
should ha"e to defend one too# $f the affirmati"e can !e counterplan
inclusi"e +"ia permutation-, the negati"e should !e a!le to !e +partially-
plan inclusi"e# Dlo!al reciprocity is slightly more comple3# 5 glo!al
reciprocity argument is !eing made (hen a team argues that one
theoretical ad"antage to one side is properly !alanced !y another,
different theoretical ad"antage held !y the other# $n general, local
reciprocity arguments seem to !e more compelling# $t is easier to see
ho( reciprocity is truly preser"ed if the focus is on a single theoretical
issue# Dlo!al reciprocity arguments can easily !e reduced to the le"el of
)the affirmati"e (ins too much, so you should let the negati"e do
(hate"er it (ants#)
6onetheless, $ thin1 that there are "alid glo!al reciprocity arguments#
.or e3ample, a consensus has pro!a!ly emerged that topicality needs to
!e a concern only for the affirmati"e# That is, (hile affirmati"e plans
must !e topical, negati"e counterplans can !e either topical or non
topical# *hat ?ustifies this apparently nonreciprocal treatment of the
affirmati"e7 :ne ?ustification can !e dra(n from the logic of rational
policy analysis# $f the plan is the focus of the de!ate, then any
competiti"e policy, topical or nontopical, (hich offers a reason to
re?ect the plan should !e grounds for "oting negati"e# $n addition, this
formulation suggests a glo!al reciprocity argument: the re2uirement that
the affirmati"e !e topical is reciprocal (ith the re2uirement that the
negati"e !e competiti"e# Aoth are !asically germaneness re2uirements#
The plan must !e germane to the resolution, and the counterplan must !e
germane to the plan# Though the reciprocity here is not e3act, not local,
not internal to each specific theory 2uestion, it still seems to (or1#
Though $ ha"e disparaged arguments of the )pity the poor negati"e) or
)pity the poor affirmati"e) sort, there is a certain logic in loo1ing to the
!ottom line# $f one side does (in significantly more often, then
arguments that a certain theory approach is unfair to that
disproportionately ad"antaged side lose a certain element of plausi!ility#
.or a long time, from the %&'0s into the %&&0s, the affirmati"e did ha"e
a su!stantial side ad"antage# Pro!a!ly affirmati"e teams (on !et(een
si3ty and se"enty percent of the time# *hen teams (on a coin flip, they
almost al(ays chose affirmati"e# $n such a (orld, claims that one should
defer to the negati"e on theory had some appeal# Aut my sense is that in
current de!ate this side !ias has !een largely corrected# 6egati"es no(
(in a!out as much as affirmati"es# :f course, this reflects in part greater
theory li!erality to(ards the negati"e: looser standards of negati"e
conditionality, allo(ance of plan inclusi"e counterplans, and so on# $t
also reflects the emergence of 1riti1s as po(erful negati"e arguments#
Di"en all of this, the status of glo!al side !ias as a !asis for theory
argument seems some(hat unclear# The fact that the t(o sides no(
seem more e2ual, in terms of competiti"e results, than they ha"e !een
for some time tends to cut against the force of this argument# Aut it is
still possi!le to argue that relati"ely e2uity no( pre"ails precisely
!ecause of greater theory li!erality to(ards the negati"e# 6either of
these positions stri1es me as totally compelling#
*hat does the conditionality=dispositionality de!ate loo1 li1e through
the lens of reciprocity7 There are se"eral (ays in (hich local reciprocity
could !e achie"ed in terms of the conditionality issue# .irst, (e could
allo( !oth sides to employ classic, unconstrained conditionality# Since
this means e"erything from alternati"e ?ustifications and affirmati"e
se"erance and intrinsicness arguments to multiple conditional
counterplans (ould !e allo(ed, this approach has little current appeal#
Second, (e could deny all forms of conditionality to !oth sides# This is
the traditional position of strict, single option ad"ocacy# Aut, as $ ha"e
suggested, this may !e harder than it seems# $f counterplans are
permitted, then an element of logical policy conditionality seems to
ine"ita!ly enter de!ate# 5nd if permutations are allo(ed +a competiti"e
as (ell as a logical necessity-, then some element of affirmati"e
conditionality seems ine"ita!le# 0"en employing the strictest possi!le
standard regarding consistency of ad"ocacy, the affirmati"e must still !e
permitted to em!race t(o different ad"ocacies o"er the course of the
de!ate: the plan in the %5C and the permutation thereafter#
This suggests to me the third and !est (ay of achie"ing local reciprocity
(ith regard to conditionality# This is to allo( logical, limited
conditionality to !oth sides# Let each side offer only one proposal for
change !ut let each side also defend any logical com!ination of the t(o
policies# This (ould mean that the ?udge can "ote affirmati"e for plan or
permutation and negati"e for counterplan or status 2uo# This seems
locally reciprocal, and this for me largely moots any fairness o!?ections
to negati"e disposition# $ndeed, $ thin1 that fairness, grounded in the
reciprocity of the )do neither) (ith the )do !oth) option, is in fact an
ad"antage of the negati"e disposition approach#
Aeyond this, $ thin1 that there is also a plausi!le argument, grounded in
glo!al reciprocity, in fa"or of the negati"e disposition of counterplans#
This is !ased on the recognition that affirmati"e case and plan selection
options represent a huge side ad"antage# The affirmati"e almost
ine"ita!ly 1no(s more a!out the particular plan on (hich the de!ate is
focusing# Since the negati"e (ill almost al(ays !e at a su!stantial
preparation deficit, they should ha"e more fle3i!ility in attac1ing the
plan from a "ariety of "antage points# This, of course, is an argument for
classic conditionality of counterplans# 5nd unconstrained counterplan
conditionality is pro!lematic# 5 de!ate in (hich the only t(o negati"e
arguments (ere t(o conditional counterplans (ould hardly !e
superficial relati"e to most de!ates (hich no( occur# Aut unconstrained
conditionality places no principled limit on the num!er of counterplans
(hich can !e introduced into the round, and this is a serious pro!lem
(ith the theory# Still, the glo!al reciprocity argument, that affirmati"e
case selection ad"antages ?ustify some latitude (ith regard to negati"e
ad"ocacy !urdens also seems to ha"e merit# <y conclusion from all of
this is that glo!al reciprocity considerations at least ?ustify negati"e
counterplan disposition, e"en if they don8t ?ustify unconstrained
conditionality#
5s $ ha"e noted, appeals to reciprocity, either local or glo!al, seem to !e
the most principled (ays of resol"ing fairness 2uestions# The only other
alternati"e $ see is to e"aluate matters !ased on the degree to (hich a
gi"en fairness )(hine) resonates su!?ecti"ely (ith a gi"en ?udge#
.airness arguments, $ thin1, commonly suffer from one of se"eral
systematic fla(s# .irst, there are arguments that a certain theory or
practice is unfair !ecause it !enefits one side o"er the other# This seems
less than compelling !ecause adopting the alternati"e theory or practice
(ould !enefit the other side# Second, there are arguments that a certain
approach is unfair !ecause it ma1es de!ate harder, intellectually more
challenging# The pro!lem (ith this sort of argument is that de!ate is
supposed to !e intellectually challenging# $f a strategy is hard for the
other side to ans(er, this may mean that it is a good strategy, not that it
is an unfair one# Third, there is the recurrent complaint that a certain
practice distorts one8s time allocation# Aut time pressures and time
allocation choices are intrinsic to de!ate, at least as it is currently
practiced# Aoth sides systematically see1 to distort the other side8s time
allocation# 0"en the argument that time s1e(s should !e "oting issues is
commonly ad"anced in order to secure a fa"ora!le time tradeoff#
5ppeals to fairness are generally su!?ecti"e and selfinterested# +So, of
course, are many other 1inds of arguments#- Strategies and approaches
(hich you commonly employ are li1ely to seem )fair#) Those fa"ored
!y your opponents +especially those you find hard to ans(er- are li1ely
to !e deemed )unfair#) $ don8t foresee the !anishment of fairness
arguments from de!ate theory# 6or do $ e"en fa"or it# De!ate is a
competiti"e acti"ity, (hich means that it is, in part, a game# 9nless, as
seems unli1ely, (e agree to (rite a definiti"e rule!oo1, there are going
to !e disputes a!out (hat practices and con"entions are fair# $
nonetheless thin1 that fairness arguments are o"eremphasiEed, !oth !y
de!aters and !y many coaches# $t is easy to see (hy de!aters find
fairness!ased arguments the most compelling# They are in the trenches,
and their competiti"e ?uices are flo(ing# Aut it is important to remem!er
that de!ate is not ?ust a game !ut an intellectual game underta1en for
educational purposes# Thus, it seems to me that arguments grounded in
the educational "alues of the acti"ity should generally ta1e precedence
o"er fairness considerations# $ am enough of a pluralist to thin1 that (e
should perhaps !e (illing to trade off a little education for a lot of
fairness# 5nd, of course, (e should trade off a little fairness for a lot of
education# <ore commonly, of course, (e are not really tal1ing a!out a
(hole lot of either# Aoth fairness and education claims tend to operate at
the margin# $ (ould find a de!ate (orld (ithout logical, limited
conditionality less intellectually satisfying# Aut de!ate (ould almost
certainly still !e an intellectually challenging, educational acti"ity
(hate"er con"entions reign (ith regard to conditionality# Similarly,
someone else might find a de!ate (orld in (hich logical, limited
conditionality is accepta!le to !e less fair than a de!ate (orld (ithout it#
Aut a (orld (ith limited conditionality is certainly not grossly unfair4
(ith or (ithout limited conditionality, a reasona!le degree of
competiti"e e2uity is li1ely to pre"ail#
Di"en that the effects of a particular theory construct on !oth fairness
and education are li1ely to !e marginal, (hich claim, fairness or
education should !e deemed the more compelling7 $ suggested a
moment ago that educational "alues should generally come first# <y
rationale for this conclusion is as follo(s# .irst, the educational "alues
of de!ate persist much longer than the competiti"e "alues# *hat one
learns from de!ate is long lasting4 competiti"e success is relati"ely
ephemeral# Second, de!aters, coaches, and educational institutions
in"est tremendous amounts of time and money into de!ate# The
in"estment in the acti"ity seems utterly disproportionate unless it is a
highly educational one# Third, there are lots of good games in the (orld#
The reason (e choose to play this one is presuma!ly !ecause (e deri"e
uni2ue educational !enefits from doing so# .ourth, to !orro( a topoi
from the 1riti1ers, de!ate8s educational "alues ha"e an impact in the real
(orld, (hereas its competiti"e "alues are confined to the round# Some
de!aters do !ecome actual decision ma1ers, so (e hope they (ill !e
rational ones# <any de!aters !ecome influential, opinion leaders of one
sort or another# 5lmost all de!aters participate in some measure in the
democratic process, and in doing so it is the 1no(ledge they gained in
de!ate, not their degree of competiti"e success, that matters#
<ay!e the !est argument for fairness concerns coming !efore education
is that it is the competiti"e element (hich encourages de!ater
participation# $f de!ate (ere a !ad, unfair game, no one (ould (ant to
play it, and all of its educational "alues (ould !e lost as (ell# This is a
!ig impact, !ut for it to really (or1 as an argument it re2uires a !ig
fairness lin1# 0ffects on fairness, at the margin, are not going to destroy
the acti"ity# 6or does it e"en seem li1ely that o"erall participation in the
acti"ity is proportional to its fairness# .or decades participants accepted
a su!stantial degree of affirmati"e side !ias (ithout engaging in mass
e3odus from de!ate# :f course, de!aters de!ate on !oth sides of the
topic, so for half of the time any side !ias figures to (or1 in their fa"or#
This certainly limits the ultimate fairness impact of side !ias arguments#
The sense of unfairness is undou!tedly greater in elimination rounds,
especially those (ithout side e2ualiEation, (hen sides are determined !y
coin flips# 0"en this, one might argue, does not ma1e de!ate unfairit
?ust ma1es it more random# 6or is it clear that this randomness
discourages participation# 5s sides !ecome more e2ual, the s1ills of the
de!aters, rather than the luc1 of the side assignment, !ecome more
important# :n !alance, this is presuma!ly a good thing# Aut it does ha"e
the effect of causing the same teams to (in more and more consistently#
$f randomness lets a (ider range of teams do (ell at tournaments, it
might (ell encourage !roader participation in the acti"ity# $ am not
ad"ocating that (e adopt policies to ma1e de!ate more random# <y
point is simply that side !ias, at the margin, is as li1ely to encourage
participation as it is to discourage it#
De!ate8s policyoriented elements ha"e feuded o"er conditionality for
decades# $ suppose that this, more than anything, pro"es that it is indeed
a paradigmatic issue, an issue (hich goes to our core conceptions of the
acti"ity# *here core conceptions are at sta1e, compromise is difficult,
and e"en understanding opposing "ie(points may not !e easy# There is
"alue in achie"ing theory consensus, though consensus dou!tless also
has its dangers# $t (ould !e nice if, thirty years from no(, (e (ere no
longer engaging in !ad tag line conditionality de!ates +though $ suppose
that (ould at least mean that de!ate, in a recogniEa!le form, had
sur"i"ed-# $ ha"e suggested that there are options for logical, limited
conditionality !et(een the e3tremes of unconstrained conditionality and
unconditional nonconditionality# $t (ould !e good if the policy de!ate
community could con"erge on that conditionality middle ground# There
are more important theoretical !attles to !e fought#
5PP06D$H: :6 T/0 C:6D$T$:65L$T; :. CR$T$CS
5re 1riti1s conditional7 <y simple ans(er to this is that some are and
some are not# Criti1s often employ the forms of conditional argument#
.or e3ample, )The affirmati"e8s frame(or1 is !ad, !ut e"en (ithin their
frame(or1, their plan is a !ad idea#) :r, )our opponent8s discourse is
disgraceful, !ut e"en if you li1e marginaliEing, otheriEing language,
their policy proposal is rotten as (ell#) *hile arguments li1e this are
conditional in form, they are not necessarily conditional in the strong
sense of offering more than one policy option# 5nd it is policy
conditionality +conditionality in the strong sense- rather than logical
conditionality +conditionality in the (ea1- sense (hich is generally
contro"ersial#
Criti1s function in a "ariety of (ays# They can function as sol"ency
turns or as indictments of underlying "alues# They can function as
deontological disad"antages or as moral side constraints +as, for
e3ample, 1riti1s of offensi"e language-# They can also function "ery
much li1e counterplans, attempting to capture much of the affirmati"e8s
ad"antage (ith a competiti"e counterad"ocacy#
$f a 1riti1 is only ser"ing as a harm or a sol"ency argument, then it is
pro!a!ly not a conditional ad"ocacy# $t is (hen 1riti1s are functioning
most li1e counterplans that conditional ad"ocacy is most li1ely to arise#
5nd (hen the negati"e, o"er the course of the round, ends up defending
t(o or more alternati"es, it seems reasona!le to descri!e their position
as a form of conditional ad"ocacy#
Criti1s !ecome implicated in conditional ad"ocacy in se"eral different
(ays# .irst, there might !e t(o or more 1riti1s, each proposing a
different alternati"e# Second, there might !e a critical alternati"e
coupled (ith a conditional defense of the status 2uo# Third, there might
!e a critical alternati"e coupled (ith an incompati!le counterplan
alternati"e# 5ll of these (ould seem to !e forms of conditional
ad"ocacy#
The e3istence of multiple 1riti1s is not a sure sign of conditional
ad"ocacy# $f all of the 1riti1s are mutually compati!le, then they (ould
not seem to !e conditional, any more than t(o or more disad"antages
are conditional# The situation !ecomes a little tric1y (hen the negati"e
says that its alternati"e is simply )re?ect the affirmati"e#) $n a formal
sense, this is ?ust one ad"ocacy# Aut multiple counterplans could !e
defended, !y the same logic, as nonconditional4 they too all ultimately
?ustify re?ecting the affirmati"e# $n the case of the multiple counterplans,
the glo!al claim )re?ect the affirmati"e) contains (ithin it se"eral
conditional policy alternati"es, each of (hich is said to independently
?ustify re?ection# So, to say that all the counterplans lead to the same
final conclusion +re?ect the affirmati"e- doesn8t really deny that they use
conditional policy ad"ocacy as a means of leading to that conclusion#
$n terms of 1riti1s, (e pro!a!ly ne"er really )?ust re?ect#) *e re?ect
something a!out the affirmati"e or (e re?ect !y em!racing an
alternati"e ideology or intellectual frame(or1 or (orld"ie(# >oting for
the 1riti1 means generally "oting for its (orld"ie(# 5nd that (orld"ie(
is often conditional, in a strong sense, (ith other negati"e arguments#
Some e3amples may help to sho( this#
03ample one# The negati"e argues that (e should re?ect normati"e
policy argument and that normati"ely the affirmati"e plan is a !ad idea#
This seems conditional# There are t(o alternati"es and the t(o are
mutually e3clusi"e# ;ou cannot normati"ely re?ect the plan and at the
same time re?ect all normati"e legal=policy argument#
03ample t(o# The negati"e 1riti1s !oth statism and capitalism# 0"en if
they say their only alternati"e is )re?ect the affirmati"e,) in the case of
one 1riti1 you seem really to !e "oting to re?ect the affirmati"e in order
to re?ect statism and in the other case "oting to re?ect the affirmati"e in
order to re?ect capitalism# $f the negati"e is in effect proposing t(o
alternati"es, )re?ect statism) and )re?ect capitalism,) then it seems they
are !eing conditional# $f their alternati"e is to )re?ect statism 56D re?ect
capitalism,) then they are not conditional# *hy does this matter7 $f the
negati"e has to defend the alternati"es implied !y !oth 1riti1s, their
ad"ocacy is analogous to a counterplan (ith t(o parts# $f they can argue
to re?ect capitalism :R re?ect statism, then it is !asically li1e t(o
counterplans# This is important for the affirmati"e# Re2uiring the
negati"e to defend the alternati"es implied !y !oth 1riti1s means that if
the affirmati"e turns one, these turns can !e (eighed against the other#
$f the t(o are operating separately, they pro!a!ly cannot#
$s 1riti1 conditionality legitimate7 :ne plausi!le ans(er is that it is as
legitimate as counterplan conditionality# The same, or "ery similar,
arguments spea1 for and against !oth counterplan and 1riti1
conditionality# There is, $ (ould suggest, at least one argument to the
effect that 1riti1 conditionality is less legitimate than counterplan
conditionality# $t is sometimes said that conditional counterplans force
the affirmati"e to de!ate in t(o different (orlds at once# +The negati"e,
of course, has to do so too#- Aut this seems to !e a !it of an
e3aggeration# Conditional policy arguments at least all operate (ithin
the general realm of policy discourse# Conditional 1riti1s may in"ol"e
t(o or more distinct discursi"e frame(or1s or (orld"ie(s# $t is this
(orld"ie( conditionality (hich may !e deemed uni2uely pro!lematic#
:ne reason might !e that it is too hard to thin1, se2uentially, (ithin
different (orld"ie(s# This does not seem to !e a "ery strong argument#
Learning to thin1 (ithin different frame(or1s is pro!a!ly a good thing#
5 !etter argument, $ thin1, is that if (e choose to de!ate a!out core
underlying assumptions or a!out fundamental (orld"ie(s, (e should
attempt to do so in as much depth as possi!le# 5nd especially if these
are, as 1riti1ers often argue, the most important things to tal1 a!out, then
if they are raised, de!ating them e3clusi"ely might (ell seem (arranted#
There is also, of course, the pro!lem of the less radical argument
contaminating the ad"ocacy of the more radical# ;ou shouldn8t eat at the
restaurant you are pic1eting, e"en if you say the food is !ad#
$s there a form of logical, limited 1riti1 conditionality7 Pro!a!ly so# $t
seems reasona!le for the negati"e to say !oth )re?ect statism) and )re?ect
the plan !ecause it ma1es the e"il statist system e"en (orse#) This
seems closely analogous to the counterplan plus status 2uo option (hich
$ ha"e defended in the main article as legitimate# Aut once the range of
alternati"es the negati"e can choose to em!race goes !eyond 1riti1 plus
status 2uo, they (ould seem to ha"e entered the realm of unconstrained
1riti1 conditionality# 5nd this seems to happen fairly fre2uently#
6egati"e teams often defend t(o or more 1riti1s in the same round, each
of (hich at least implies an independent alternati"e# :r, a 1riti1 is often
coupled (ith !oth a counterplan and (ith a status 2uo defense# :nce
again, this (ould seem to constitute unconstrained, rather than limited
conditionality#
Criti1s are not counterplans, !ut they often function in the same (ay, as
forms of counterad"ocacy# Therefore, counterplan theory offers at least
a heuristically useful analogue for our thin1ing a!out 1riti1s# Fust as
counterplan permutations enlighten us as to the mutual compati!ility
and mutual desira!ility of policy options, 1riti1 permutations can
enlighten us as to the mutual compati!ility of the ideas ad"anced !y the
t(o sides in the de!ate# The plan inclusi"eness de!ate (ith regard to
counterplans should help to illuminate the de!ate o"er ad"ocacy
inclusi"e 1riti1s# Li1e(ise, (hat (e thin1 a!out conditionality in the
conte3t of counterplans (ould seem to ha"e rele"ance to ho( (e thin1
a!out it in relation to 1riti1s#