From Religion and Science to Kalam and Science

Basit Bilal Koshul 235

From Religion and Science to
Kalam and Science
By Basit Bilal Koshul
Abstract: While there is very little material in the Muslim world dealing directly with the topic of
theology and science, one can still discuss the topic fruitfully. Beginning with the vibrant discussion in
the area of religion and science one can infer what types of relationship are possible between kalam
and science. Most of the inferred positions do not see any positive relationship between kalam and
science; and one of them would see such a relationship to be actually detrimental to kalam. In the
work of Muhammad Iqbal, we have an example of a Muslim thinker who envisions the possibility of
a mutually enriching exchange between kalam and modern science. Drawing upon the resources in the
Quran and work done by Gerald Holton in the history of science, this article demonstrates that Iqbals
vision is scripturally and historically grounded.
Key Terms: theology, kalam, science, religion, Muhammad Iqbal, intuition, rationality, Gerald Holton,
thematic imagination
Discussing the field of theology and science from
an Islamic perspective brings with it at least two
difficulties from the outset. First, how are we to
understand the term theology? While this term is
well defined and the discipline itself is of central
concern in the Christian tradition, the term is for-
eign and the (equivalent/similar discipline) is of im-
portant but not central concern in the Islamic tra-
dition. The term from the Islamic tradition that is
most often translated as theology is ilm-u-kalam
or kalam. Ghazali notes that in studying the work
of the mutakallimun one sees that they showed an
earnest desire for attempting to defend orthodoxy
by the study of the true nature of things. They
plunged into the study of substances and accidents
and their principles.
1
Picking up on Ghazalis ob-
servation it can be said that kalam is that discipline
in the Islamic sciences that seeks to logically artic-
ulate/explain the central doctrinal teachings of Is-
lam in light of human understanding of the visible
universe. In other words kalam is the discipline in
Basit Koshul is currently an Assistant Professor in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at the Lahore University of Management
Sciences, Lahore, Pakistan. He was an Assistant Professor of Religion at Concordia College, Moorhead, Minnesota, from 20022006. He is
the co-editor of a forthcoming collection of essays titled Scripture, Reason and the Contemporary Islam-West Encounter: Studying the Other,
Understanding the Self (Palgrave, August, 2007). His most recent publication is The Postmodern Significance of Max Webers Legacy: Disenchanting
Disenchantment , (Palgrave, 2005), which is reviewed in this issue of Dialog .
traditional Islamic studies that links faith in God,
revelation and resurrection with knowledge of space,
time and causality.
The second difficulty in discussing theology and
science from an Islamic perspective is the fact that
there is paucity of resources, due to the novelty of
the question. One way around this difficulty is to
use the abundant literature on the topic of science
and religion in Islam as a springboard into the
more novel issue. Speaking of the way science is
viewed in the Muslim world Ibrahim Kalin notes:
When we look at the current discourse on
science in the Islamic world, we see a num-
ber of competing trends and positions, each
with its own claims and solutions. Without
pretending to be exhaustive, they can be clas-
sified under three headings: ethical, episte-
mological, and ontological/metaphysical.
2
Kalins classification proves to be helpful in begin-
ning the discussion on theology and science in
Islam because it summarizes the basic ways that the
236 Dialog: A Journal of Theology

Volume 46, Number 3

Fall 2007
religion and science relationship is viewed. We can
look at the basic characteristics of the three different
positions on the relationship between religion and
science as summarized by Kalin and try to infer
the type of relationship between science and kalam
that can be derived from each of three positions.
For the proponents of the ethical position, our
first one, modern science is an essentially neutral
and objective phenomenon with no philosophi-
cal or ideological components attached to it.
3
It
is the task of the individual to invest the find-
ings of science with meaning and significance and
to carry out scientific activity within the ethical
parameters dictated by religion. The basic func-
tion of the sciences from this perspective is to
help the believer marvel at the wonders of Gods
creation.
4
Three Islamic Positions on
Theology and Science: Ethical,
Epistemological, and
Ontological/Metaphysical
On a very basic level this ethical position sees
nothing essentially wrong with modern science,
and it is the materialistic representation of science
that lies at the heart of the so-called religion-science
controversy.
5
The controversy can be easily re-
solved by placing all scientific inquiry within the
framework of Islamic ethics. Thereby religion (i.e.
Islam) can play its primary function by setting the
parameters for an ethical life and science can play
its basic function of heightening the believers sense
of awe and wonder. Since the primary task of sci-
ence is to inspire a sense of awe of the Creator and
the created universe rather than deepen the rela-
tionship between faith and knowledge it is difficult
to derive a meaningful relationship between science
and kalam from this position.
The epistemological position, the second in our
list, views modern science as a social construct
and puts special emphasis on the history and so-
ciology of science.
6
This position creates a space
for Islam in the religion and science dialogue by
arguing that modern science is a culturally condi-
tioned and historical endeavor with claims to uni-
versality and objectivity.
7
Since its claims to uni-
versality and objectivity are not warranted, science
must acknowledge the Muslim voice as (at least)
an equal partner in the dialogue. This particular
Muslim critique of modern science is largely based
on the work of Western thinkers such as Popper,
Feyerabend and Kuhn. In the epistemological posi-
tion the focus is almost exclusively on the charac-
ter of and conditions for knowledge claims. There
is practically no discussion of the relationship be-
tween matters of faith and knowledge of the world.
Consequently, it is difficult to see a meaningful rela-
tionship between science and kalam emerging from
the epistemological position.
The ontological/metaphysical position, the third
on our list, goes beyond issues of ethics, episte-
mology and philosophy and focuses on the analy-
sis of the metaphysical and ontological foundations
of modern physical sciences
8
. This analysis reveals
that the metaphysics of modern science is a rad-
ical rupture from the metaphysics of pre-modern
(or traditional) science. The latter is based on a sa-
cred view of the cosmos due to the divine origin of
the universe and sees everything as a reflection of
this divine origin. Furthermore, everything in the
universe is seen as being intimately related to ev-
erything else on a hierarchical chain of being that
eventually terminates at the divine origin.
From the perspective of this metaphysics, under-
standing is arrived at by virtue of contemplative
knowledge and intellectual illumination. In the Is-
lamic tradition the doctrine of Tawhid provides the
basis for this sacred, relational, illuminative meta-
physics. In stark contrast, the metaphysics of mod-
ern science, is characterized by desacralization, di-
chotomy and rationality. According to Kalin, this
modern metaphysics is based on five premises: a
secular view of the universe, a mechanistic world-
picture, epistemological hegemony of rationalism
and empiricism, Cartesian bifurcation. . .between
res cogitans and res extensa culminating in a split
between subject and object, and exploitation of the
natural environment.
9
It is easy to infer a relationship between science
and kalam based on this distinction between the
From Religion and Science to Kalam and Science

Basit Bilal Koshul 237
metaphysics of modern science and the metaphysics
of traditional science, and the relationship is entirely
negative. For the metaphysics position, as described
by Kalin, any interaction between any part of Is-
lam (including kalam) with modern science would
inevitably and invariably undermine the integrity
of Islam because modern science is the very an-
tithesis of everything that Islam (and every other
pre-modern, traditional religion) stands for.
Iqbal and the Possibility of
Kalam and Science
Thus far we have not had much success in making a
case from within the Islamic tradition that suggests
even the possibility of a positive and enriching rela-
tionship between kalam and sciencelet alone be-
ing an example of a positive relationship. But such
an example does exist in the work of Muhammad
Iqbal (d. 1938). Iqbal goes beyond positing that a
mutually enriching relationship between kalam and
science is possible, he puts forth a detailed argu-
ment demonstrating that such a relationship must
emerge between the two if the integrity of religion
and philosophy (including natural philosophy, i.e.
science) is to be maintained in the post-traditional
period of human history.
Iqbal notes that the vitality of religion depends
on its ability to generate that special type of in-
ner experience on which religious faith ultimately
rests.
10
For Iqbal belief in God, revelation and life
here-after is ultimately the result of personal expe-
rience, not merely the acceptance of religious doc-
trine. He goes on to note that basing religious faith
largely on personal experience brings two challenges
with it. Firstly, there have always been individu-
als who have had intellectual/philosophical reser-
vations and difficulties in accepting the reality of
the aforementioned inner experience. Secondly,
the modern man, by developing habits of concrete
thought. . .has rendered himself less capable of that
experience which he further suspects because of its
liability to illusion.
11
Iqbal recognizes the fact that
in order to make religious faith meaningful in the
modern world one will have to go beyond received
tradition, while at the same time remaining loyal
to it:
The more genuine schools of Sufism have,
no doubt, done good work in shaping and
directing the evolution of religious experi-
ence in Islam; but their latter-day represen-
tatives, owing to their ignorance of the mod-
ern mind, have become absolutely incapable
of receiving any fresh inspiration from mod-
ern thought and experience.
12
Given the fact that we are living in a very differ-
ent cultural context than the ones from by-gone
eras, it is our duty to come up with methods that
would demonstrate the reality of God, revelation
and life here-after that are appropriate to our cul-
tural and historical context. For Iqbal this means
that there has to be constructive (as well as crit-
ical) engagement with modern science in the area
of kalam, because modern science is the one phe-
nomenon that lends our historical-cultural settings
its unique characteristics. Consequently, Iqbal con-
siders it a most urgent demand. . .to reconstruct
Muslim religious philosophy [kalam] with due re-
gard to the philosophical traditions of Islam and the
more recent developments in the various domains
of human knowledge.
13
While developments in modern science are
largely responsible for this sense of urgency, he lo-
cates a source of hope and optimism in the very
same source (i.e. developments in modern science):
And the present moment is quite favorable
to such an undertaking. Classical physics has
learned to criticize its own foundations. As
a result of this criticism the kind of ma-
terialism, which it originally necessitated, is
rapidly disappearing; and the day is not far
off when Religion and Science may discover
hitherto unsuspected mutual harmonies.
14
Iqbal makes his own contribution to laying bare
unsuspected mutual harmonies between religion
and science. He shows how a post-Einstein un-
derstanding of space, time and causality corrects
some of the most intractable difficulties that bedevil
the Cartesian-Kantian philosophical understanding
of freedom, immortality and the self or soul. Once
this correction has taken place a restatement of the
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Volume 46, Number 3

Fall 2007
religious conception of God, revelation and resur-
rection can be formulated that meets the demands
of modern individuals possessing habits of concrete
thought.
For Iqbal this interaction will be greatly ben-
eficial for modern science also. He notes that it
has mistaken the concepts and methods that it uses
to study reality for reality itself and almost always
falls into the trap of ascribing attributes to reality
that are actually attributes of its own concepts and
methods. Iqbal notes that it is only with the help
of religion that science can see (and then remedy)
this particular malaise. It is well beyond the scope
of this paper to even summarize the kalam and
affirmation/critique of modern science that emerges
out of Iqbals engagement with modern science and
philosophy.
What I will do in the remaining part of this ar-
ticle is to summarize and support Iqbals argument
on one specific topic, the relationship between faith
and rationality. Like St. Anselm before him Iqbal is
acutely aware of the fact that faith seeking under-
standing is the central aspiration of theology or
kalam. Before one can even engage in the task of
doing kalam, the legitimacy of this aspiration has to
be establishedit has to be legitimized from both
the religious and scientific perspectives. It is for this
reason that many hadith collections as well as books
on kalam begin with kitab-ul-ilm (book/chapter
on knowledge) before going into the more reli-
gious topics such as prayer, God, etc. Keeping in
line with this tradition Iqbal titles the first chap-
ter of his book Knowledge and Religious Experi-
ence.
The Cognitive Element in Faith
Iqbal points out that there are a number of different
ways of knowing the world around us; the poetic,
the philosophical/scientific, and the religious. The
religious is different from the poetic because re-
ligious knowledge is intra-subjective, while poetic
knowledge is largely merely subjective. Religious
knowledge differs from philosophical knowledge be-
cause it is not based merely on rationality. While
the philosophical quest is guided by pure reason
or rationality;
The essence of religion, on the other hand, is
faith; and faith, like the bird, sees its track-
less way unattended by the intellect which,
in the words of the great mystic poet of Is-
lam, only waylays the living heart of man
and robs it of the invisible wealth of life
that lies hidden within. Yet it cannot be de-
nied that faith is more than mere feeling.
It has something like a cognitive content,
and the existence of rival partiesscholastics
and mysticsin the history of religion shows
that idea is a vital element in religion.
15
By putting forth the observation that faith is not
mere feeling and has something like a cognitive
element Iqbal is bringing religion and science into
closer proximity on epistemological grounds. At the
same time he is opening up the possibility of re-
ligious faith claims being subject to the criteria of
scientific inquiry. The question that arises here is
the following: Is Iqbal justified in making the claim
that faith has something like a cognitive element?
A look at the Quran reveals that Iqbal is more
than justified in making this claim.
From the Islamic perspective the individuals
with the most perfect and complete faith are the
Prophets and after the Prophets their closest com-
panions, their disciples. If it can be shown that
even among these individuals we find instances of
faith seeking to complement itself with rational un-
derstanding, then we would have scriptural warrant
for Iqbals observation that faith is more than mere
feeling, that it has a cognitive element. While there
are a number of Quranic passages that touch upon
the subject, two passages are particularly relevant in
the context of the present discussion. In both of
these passages individuals whose faith is complete
and perfect, request empirical demonstration that
affirms the validity of their faiththis request is the
most compelling evidence that faith has a cognitive
element. This empirical demonstration is sought so
that the individuals concerned can accept rationally
what their faith has affirmed intuitively. The first
passage is a conversation between Prophet Abraham
and Allah (2:260) and the second is a conversation
between Prophet Jesus and the Disciples (5:1123).
From Religion and Science to Kalam and Science

Basit Bilal Koshul 239
In the second sura of the Quran a conversation
between Prophet Abraham and Allah is recorded
where the former requests an empirical demonstra-
tion of how the dead will be brought back to life:
And recall when Abraham said, My Lord,
show me how You give life to the dead, He
said, Do you not believe, then? [Abraham]
said, Most certainly [I believe,] but [I have
made the request] just to put my heart at
ease. (2:260).
It is difficult to say with certainty at what point in
his life Abraham had this conversation with Allah.
But the preceding passage (2:2589), as well as the
content of this passage, leave little doubt that the
conversation takes place at a time when Prophet
Abraham is in his mature adult years. Consequently,
it is more than a little surprising that he would be
requesting an empirical demonstration of a matter
of faith as basic and fundamental as the resurrection
of the dead. What is even a bit more surprising is
the fact that the request is granted:
So Allah said, Take four birds and train
them to come back to you. Then [cut them
up into pieces and] place a part of them on
separate hilltops, call them back, and they
will come flying to you: know that Allah is
All-Powerful and Wise. (2:260)
There is a great deal of discussion and difference of
opinion in the tafsir literature regarding the mean-
ing of train them to come back to you. There
is even more discussion and disagreement about
whether or not the birds were killed before they
were put on different hilltopsmost classical ex-
egetes are of the opinion that the birds were killed,
many modern commentators are of the opinion that
the birds were not killed. As important and sig-
nificant as these differences may be in other con-
texts, they are largely irrelevant in the context of
the present discussion. The passage leaves practi-
cally no room for disagreement on the point that
is most relevant to the present discussion: Prophet
Abraham, who would be given the titles of Father
of the Prophets, Leader of Men, and Friend of
God requests and is granted an empirical demon-
stration of a fundamental precept of faith. The pas-
sage also leaves little doubt about the fact that the
request for an empirical demonstration is in no way
a sign of a lack of faith. When Allah asks Prophet
Abraham if he is making the request because he has
some reservations about the reality of resurrection,
the reply is very, very emphaticmost certainly
not.
The conversation in Surah al-Maida between
Prophet Jesus and the disciples revolves around the
same issues as the conversation between Allah and
Prophet Abraham in Surah al-Baqara. In 5:110 Al-
lah recounts the many favors He bestowed upon
Prophet Jesus and reserves 5:111 for mentioning a
most special blessing of His: and how I inspired
the disciples to believe in Me and My messengers
they said, We believe and bear witness that we
devote ourselves to [Allah]. The fact that the dis-
ciples were people of faith from the very beginning
is hardly contestable. The fact that their faith is of
a special typethe disciples having been especially
chosen and inspired by Allahis also incontestable.
This background makes the dialogue between
Prophet Jesus and the disciples in (5:1123) all
the more interesting: And recall when the disci-
ples said, Jesus, son of Mary, can your Lord send
down a feast to us from heaven? he said, Be mind-
ful of Allah if you are true believers (5:112). Here
the disciples are making a request that a banquet
of food be sent down from heaven by Allah so
that they may taste the food of paradise in this
world. Prophet Jesus counsels care and caution be-
cause such a request could be seen as an indication
of a lack of faith. The reply of the disciples is not
unlike the reply of Prophet Abrahamas a matter
of fact one part of the reply is exactly the same as
Prophet Abrahams reply: They said, We wish to
eat from it; to have our hearts reassured; to know
that you have told us the truth; and to be wit-
nesses of it. (5:113) The disciples are making the
request not because they dont believe in the reality
of heaven, heavenly life, heavenly food, etc.they
are making the request so that their hearts may be
reassured. Once again there is a great deal of dis-
cussion in the tafsir literature regarding the meaning
of the words can your Lord send down a feast to
us from heaven?
Once again this discussion, though very signifi-
cant in other contexts, is irrelevant in the present
240 Dialog: A Journal of Theology

Volume 46, Number 3

Fall 2007
context. What is most relevant about this passage
in the present context is the following fact: Indi-
viduals with the most complete and perfect faith in
their time (after the faith of Prophet Jesus), request
empirical evidence that would affirm the validity of
their faith. The other point of significance is that
from the perspective of the individuals making the
request for empirical evidence, the request is in no
way a sign of a lack of faith, if anything it is a
sign of their affirmation of faith. As was the case
with Prophet Abraham, the request of the disciples
is also accommodated by Allah (5:115).
The point that is of immediate concern to us in
the present discussion is that there is explicit scrip-
tural warrant to support Iqbals observation that
faith is more than mere feeling and that faith
has something like a cognitive content. In the
case of both Prophet Abraham and the disciples
we have individuals who have perfect faith in their
hearts but still need rational demonstration that will
put their heart at rest. If we step back from the
scriptural passages we have treated separately above
and compare them with a view of identifying some
common themes running through themthemes
that are relevant to the topic that is of interest to
usthen the following three themes emerge.
1. Individuals hold certain beliefs about the universe
and their place in it in the absence of empirical
evidencetheir commitment to these beliefs is
based on intuitive attraction.
2. These individuals search for and discover empir-
ical evidence that affirms the validity of their al-
ready held beliefs.
3. Even though the empirical evidence makes no
difference whatsoever in what they believe, it
affects how they believethe empirical evi-
dence allows their hearts to be reassured or at
rest in a way that wasnt the case prior to seeing
the evidence.
The Intuitive Element in
Rationality
After noting that faith is not mere feeling, Iqbal
goes on to note that philosophical and scientific
thought are not mere rationality. He argues that
rational thought and intuitive feeling are intimately
related to each other. He notes that the two
feeling and ideaare the non-temporal and tempo-
ral aspects of the same unit of inner experience.
16
In other words, instead of seeing intuitive feeling
and rational thought as polar opposites, Iqbal sees
them as being intimately related and in need of
each other:
Nor is there any reason to suppose that
thought and intuition are essentially opposed
to each other. They spring from the same
root and complement each other. The one
grasps Reality piecemeal, the other grasps it
in its wholeness. Here one fixes its gaze on
the eternal, the other on the temporal as-
pect of reality. The one is the present en-
joyment of the whole of Reality; the other
aims at traversing the whole for exclusive ob-
servation. Both are in need of each other
for mutual rejuvenation. Both seek visions of
the same Reality which reveals itself to them
in accordance with their function in life. In
fact, intuition, as Bergson rightly says, is only
a higher kind of intellect.
17
By putting forth the claim that intuitive feeling and
rational thought are intimately related to each other
Iqbal is challenging the textbook definition of sci-
entific thought. In the textbook version of the is-
sue, it is argued that the great advances in science
have been made once faith, intuition, and other ir-
rational, subjective feelings are expunged from sci-
entific inquiry and replaced with objective, criti-
cal, rational thought. Leaving aside the textbook
account of how science is done and focusing our
attention on how scientists actually did their science
it becomes obvious that Iqbals description of the
intimate relationship between rational thought and
intuitive feeling is a much better description of ob-
served facts than the abstract, ahistorical textbook
descriptions.
To begin with we will compare the textbook de-
scription of how Copernicus formulated that helio-
centric model with how he actually did it. Holton
summarizes the textbook description of the circum-
stances leading up to the formulation of the helio-
centric model:
From Religion and Science to Kalam and Science

Basit Bilal Koshul 241
Until some years ago, the reigning opinion in
the history of science was that the Coperni-
can system was the very model of a new the-
ory arising from a crisis brought about by the
accumulation of data contradicting the old
and overly complex theory of Ptolemy and
his followers. Copernicus book on the revo-
lutions of the celestial objects, it was said,
used more trustworthy observational data,
yielded a better theory, and so rescued the
practitioners of the time by giving them at
last a calculational method of greater accu-
racy for astronomical predictions.
18
This textbook description of how Copernicus
came to formulate his revolutionary insights can be
summarized as follows:
1) The accumulation of empirical data caused
Copernicus to suspect and doubt the geocentric
theories of his day.
2) Copernicus constructed an alternative hypothesis
(the heliocentric model) that was in consonance
with the accumulated empirical data.
3) Copernicus hypothesis was confirmed because it
proved to be a more powerful explanatory device
than the geocentric models.
In sum empirical data is both the starting point
of inquiry (because it causes doubts to arise about
the dominant, accepted theory) as well as the end
point (because the validity of the novel, revolution-
ary theory is established by empirical observations.)
As tidy, neat and attractive as the textbook descrip-
tion is, it has to be rejected because it has nothing
to do with how Copernicus actually arrived at his
revolutionary insightand even less to do with the
reasons why he affirmed its validity.
Holton notes that scientists using Copernicus
method for calculating astronomical predictions
were no better off after the publication of his great
work, De Revolutionibus, and in fact they contin-
ued to use the Ptolemaic system in essentially the
form Ptolemy himself had set forth.
19
Just how
little of an improvement Copernicus method of
calculation was over earlier methods is illustrated
by the fact that Copernicus system of 1543 gave
the same large errors for the predicted location of
Marsup to five degreesas did the Regiomon-
tanes in the 1470s.
20
Consequently, Copernicus
affirmation of his theory was not based on its
superior explanatory powerthe instruments and
methods that could establish this superiority did
not exist at that time. Not only did Coperni-
cus theory not yield predictions that were any
better than Ptolemaic system, the data on which
he constructed his theory was no better either.
Holton notes: Like Ptolemy, Copernicus selected
just enough data (among them many with worse er-
rors than he realized) to get his orbits, even bending
some of them by a few minutes of arc as needed.
21
Given the fact that Copernicuss system was not
built on better observational data and did not yield
better predictions than the Ptolemaic system, the
question naturally emergesWhat was the source
of Copernicus confidence in his proposed system?
It is worth quoting Holton at length in this re-
gard. After detailing the fact that Copernicus sys-
tem was based on flawed observational data and
did not yield reliable predictions, Holton goes on
to note:
But one must remember what he really
wanted to achieve. This he made quite plain
near the very beginning of his great book:
To perceive nothing less than the design of
the universe and the fixed symmetry of its
parts. What is more, he wanted to do so by
sticking to what he called the first princi-
ple of uniform motion (that is to say, Aris-
totelian circular motion), instead of employ-
ing nonuniformities and nonconstancies, as
the Ptolemaics had allowed. What convinced
him to make this the cornerstone of his ar-
gument, and eventually persuaded his follow-
ers, was that he thereby produced a model
of the planetary system in which the relative
locations and order of orbits were no longer
arbitrary but followed by necessity. In short,
Copernicus is a case study of the privileg-
ing of an aesthetically based theoryabove
all the aesthetics of necessityand even of
the temporary disbelief in data that would
appear to disprove a favored theory.
22
In short Copernicus revolutionary scientific in-
sights were not the outcome of a scientific the-
ory built on carefully collected data, the validity of
which was confirmed because it yielded reliable pre-
dictions. The revolutionary insights were the result
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Fall 2007
of the privileging of an aesthetically based theory
which was privileged in spite of the fact that accu-
mulated data contradicted it and calculated predic-
tions failed to verify it. It is obvious that something
more than rationality (as commonly understood)
was at work in Copernicus scientific investigations.
By the time we reach Galileos advocacy of the
heliocentric model, evidence in the form of data
and predictive power of Copernican system was
hardly any better than it was at the time of Coper-
nicus death. The question rises once again: In the
absence of observational data and lack of predictive
power of the theory, what were the grounds for
Galileos confidence in the validity of the Coper-
nican system? It is indeed the case that Galileos
observations through the telescope brought to light
shortcomings in the Ptolemaic/Aristotelian system
that were not known before. This strengthened the
case in favor of the Copernican model by default
but not by positive evidence. In the words of Lang-
ford:
Despite his stunning findings, Galileo still
had no real proof that the Copernican sys-
tem was anything more than a theory. His
observations militated more against Ptolemy
and Aristotle than for Copernicus. The ap-
pearance of the sunspots in the telescope did
seem to question the distinction between ce-
lestial and terrestrial matter. The moons of
Jupiter and the phases of Venus did prove
that at least some planets revolve around
a physical center other than the earth. El-
ements of the Aristotelian-Ptolemaic system
had therefore definitely been shown to be
faulty.
23
Blackwell sums up the matter in succinct terms:
[O]n the scientific side, everyone involved
realized that no strict proof had yet been
found for Copernicanism. Galileos observa-
tions with the telescope, and in particular his
discovery of the phases of Venus, made the
new theory more probable, but not conclu-
sive. He fully realized this, and for the re-
mainder of his life he searched without suc-
cess for definitive proof.
24
It appears that privileging of an aesthetically
based theory played no less a role in Galileos
advocacy of the Copernican system than it had
played in Copernicus own advocacy. Evidence that
this is indeed the case comes from an unlikely
sourceGalileos complete rejection of the best ev-
idence available during his lifetime in support of
the Copernican system. This evidence was the plan-
etary laws of motions proposed by Kepler. Kepler
was acutely aware of the fact that his work com-
plemented that of Galileo and taken together their
work strengthened the case in favor of the helio-
centric model. Consequently, it is no surprise that
the junior scientist (Kepler) did everything he pos-
sibly could to get Galileos attention, approval and
support. What is surprising is the fact that the se-
nior scientist (Galileo) stubbornly rebuffed all of
Keplers efforts. Holton describes Galileos response
to Keplers overtures in these words:
Now it would have been very logical for
Galileo to reciprocate, because Keplers laws
clearly showed the superiority of the Coper-
nican way of imagining the system of the
world. But contrary to every reasonable ex-
pectation, Galileo kept his distance from Ke-
pler, always tried to brush him off, and never
accepted Keplers laws of planetary motion.
And that, for a long time, was a madden-
ing puzzle in the history of science. How
could Galileo avoid using Keplers support-
ive findings as a weapon, when he was so be-
leaguered by his enemies? What caused this
failure of imagination? Galileo never tried to
explain his strange rejection of Kepler, and
even this shows that it must have had a deep-
seated cause.
25
Holton suggests that the reason why Galileo
spurned all of Keplers overtures was because the
acceptance of Keplers findings required Galileo to
abandon a personal commitment to a particular
understanding of aestheticsand Galileo was not
willing to abandon this personal commitment even
if it meant rejecting Keplers work.
To Galileo, as to Aristotle and also to Coper-
nicus, all motion in the heavens had to pro-
ceed in terms of the superposition of cir-
cles, for example in a circular epicycle car-
ried along a circular deferent. The circle,
and uniform motion along the circle, were
the very signatures of uniformity, perfection,
From Religion and Science to Kalam and Science

Basit Bilal Koshul 243
eternity. Kepler had initially thought so, too,
but then had been driven by the data and
against his better instincts to announce, as
his first law, that the planets are in ellipti-
cal motions around the sun. Therefore they
were not in what Galileo regarded as nat-
ural motion but were continually changing
their speed as they moved.
To Galileo, who was still under the spell of
circularity, the ellipse was a distorted circle
a form unworthy of celestial bodies.
26
In sum Galileos advocacy of the Copernican sys-
tem in spite of the fact that it could not be sup-
ported by empirical data and his rejection of Ke-
plers findings in spite of the fact that they were
supported by empirical data can be traced back to
the same causethe privileging of an aesthetically
based theory. Galileos enchantment with the cir-
cle
27
played a greater role in generating his own
revolutionary insights (and rejecting the empirically
valid findings of Kepler) than either accumulated
data or the predictive power of a theory. As is the
case with Copernicus, it is patently obvious that
something more than rationality (as commonly
understood) was at work in Galileos scientific in-
quiry.
As he is providing different examples of some-
thing more than rationality being an integral part
of scientific inquiry, Holton is also constructing an
explanatory tool that can help us to make sense of
this phenomenon. Holton posits that all great scien-
tists have a particular faculty, the thematic imagi-
nation, that makes it possible for them to privilege
an aesthetically attractive theory in the absence of
supporting data. He describes the workings of the
thematic imagination in these terms:
[It is] the practice of quietly letting a fun-
damental presuppositionwhat I have called
a themaact for a time as a guide in ones
own research when there is not yet a good
proof for it, and sometimes even in the
face of seemingly contrary evidence. This can
amount to a willing suspension of disbelief,
the very opposite of what one usually takes
to be the skeptical scientific attitude.
28
The thematic imagination and a willing suspension
of disbelief that accompanies it is an essential part
of scientific inquiry. As far as Holton is concerned
it is practically impossible to talk about a scien-
tific imagination that is also not infused with the
thematic imagination. Speaking specifically about
Galileo, Holton notes: [T]he primacy of the cir-
cle was to Galileo one of those irresistible thematic
presuppositions, without which his scientific imagi-
nation could not operate.
29
Further evidence pro-
vided by Holton demonstrates that it is not only
in the relatively distant past and in the specific case
of Galileo that we have cases where the scientific
imagination cannot operate without the aid of the
thematic imagination.
It is not only in the relatively distant past that
we find examples of thematic commitments being
the basis of groundbreaking scientific discoveries.
Holton notes:
[I]t can turn out that when a thematically
and intellectually compelling theory is given
a chance, better data, gathered with its aid,
will eventually reinforce the theory. That is
the meaning behind a remark Einstein made
before the test of General Relativity: Now,
I am fully satisfied, and I do not doubt any
more the correctness of the whole system,
may the observations of the eclipse succeed
or not. The sense of the thing is too evi-
dent.
30
In other words, Einstein considered the aesthetic
merits of his theory to be a more reliable crite-
rion for judging its soundness than empirical data.
The fact that this was not hyperbole or a quixotic
lapse on Einsteins part is made clear by what hap-
pens when the initial data seemed to question the
soundness of his theory:
When a discrepancy of up to 10 percent re-
mained between the first set of measured de-
viations of light and the corresponding cal-
culations based on his theory, he responded,
For the expert this thing is not particularly
important, because the main significance of
the theory doesnt lie in the verification of
little effects, but rather in the great simpli-
fication of the theoretical basis of physics as
a whole.
31
It was not only Einstein who continued to em-
brace General Relativity theory in the absence
244 Dialog: A Journal of Theology

Volume 46, Number 3

Fall 2007
of data and on the basis of aesthetics. Holton
notes:
And even before more data came in, which
decreased the discrepancies, other scientists
joined Einsteins camp, persuaded, in the
words of H. A. Lorentz, that his grand
scheme had the highest degree of aesthetic
merit; every lover of the beautiful must wish
it to be true.
32
A look at the history of science (a study of how ac-
tual, living scientists actually did their work) leaves
little doubt that as important as the accumulation
of data is for science, it does not occupy the cen-
tral role that has been assigned to it in the textbook
version of science. Looking at the circumstance in
which Copernicus, Galileo, and Einstein came to
not just formulate but also advocate their respec-
tive scientific hypotheses it is obvious that the sus-
pension of disbelief played a major (actually the
major) role. Holton notes that time and again in
the history of science we find instances of scien-
tists letting their best work grow and mature out
of an unlikely idea that they prevent from being
destroyed at the hand of iron rationality.
33
The
hand of iron rationality requires that empirical
data and predictive powers of a theory always and
everywhere be the determinant criteria for affirm-
ing a particular hypothesis. From this perspective
all belief in a hypothesis has to be suspended until
and unless there is corroborating empirical evidence.
But the actual history of science shows that very of-
ten it has been the suspension of disbelief, not the
suspension of belief that has proven to be the cat-
alyst for revolutionary scientific breakthroughs. Be-
ginning with a cautionary note, he goes on to de-
scribe the critical role that thematic presuppositions
(and the willing suspension of disbelief that these
presuppositions entail) have played in the history of
science:
The graveyard of science is crowded with the
victims of some obstinate belief in an idea
that proved unworthy. But we must face the
strange fact that there are genial spirits who
can take the risk, and persevere for long pe-
riods without the comfort of confirmatory
support, and survive to collect their prizes.
By studying their private notes we now know
that Isaac Newton, John Dalton, and Gregor
Mendel, among many others, refused to ac-
cept data that contradicted their thematic
presuppositions, and were proven right in the
end.
34
It is obviously the case that science is not solely
the result of the thematic imaginationto make
such a claim would be absurd. Such a claim would
be as absurd as the claim that science is solely the
result of rational thought, empirical observations
and repeatable experimentation. It is certainly the
case that scientific knowledge cannot attain a desig-
nation as such in the absence of all of these things,
but it is just as certainly the case that no scien-
tific hypotheses would ever emerge to be tested, ob-
served etc. in the absence of the intuitive capacities.
I am not making the claim that Holtons under-
standing of the thematic imagination is equivalent
to Iqbals understanding of intuitive feelingthis
may very well be the case but it is not one I am
in a position to argue at this point.
The claim that I am making is that Holtons ex-
position of the role of the thematic imagination in
scientific inquiry supports Iqbals observation that
intuitive feeling and rational thought are intimately
related to each otherthe intimacy is such that
both need each others mutual rejuvenation. The
other claim that I am making is that even though
their role is different in each case, both elements
the intuitive and the cognitiveare present in both
religious faith and scientific inquiry. In short, it is
not only the case that faith has a cognitive element,
it is also the case that rationality has an intuitive
element. These observations by Iqbal, the evidence
that he presents to support them, and the evidence
that has emerged since his death all point in one
directionwe are indeed living in an era when
Religion and Science may discover hitherto unsus-
pected mutual harmonies. And with these discover-
ies, actually based on these discoveries, a new vision
of the relationship between faith in God, revela-
tion and resurrection and knowledge of space, time
and causality can be formulated. To the degree that
Iqbal has been successful in demonstrating the cog-
nitive in faith and the intuitive in thought, we can
From Religion and Science to Kalam and Science

Basit Bilal Koshul 245
judge how successful he could be in demonstrating
the relationship between kalam and science.
Endnotes
1. Al-Ghazali, Deliverance From Error: Five Key Texts Including His Spir-
itual Autobiography, al-Munqidh min al-Dalal. Translated and annotated
by R.J. McCarthy. (Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, 1980), 60.
2. Kalin, Ibrahim. Three View of Science in the Islamic World in
God, Life and the Cosmos: Christian and Islamic Perspectives. Eds. Ted Peters,
Muzaffar Iqbal, Syed Nomanul Haq. (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2002),
47.
3. Ibid.
4. Kalin, 48.
5. Kalin, 45.
6. Kalin, 47.
7. Kalin, 61
8. Kalin, 47
9. Kalin, 678.
10. Muhammad Iqbal. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam.
(Lahore, Pakistan: Institute of Islamic Culture,1996), xxi. Do not confuse
or conflate Muhammad Iqbal, now deceased, with contemporary Muzaffar
Iqbal, Editor of Islam and Science www.cis-ca.org/journal.
11. Iqbal, xxi
12. Ibid.
13. Iqbal, xxi-xxii
14. Iqbal, xxii.
15. Iqbal, 1.
16. Iqbal, 17.
17. Iqbal, 2.
18. G. Holton, Einstein, History, and Other Passions: The Rebellion
Against Science at the End of the Twentieth Century. (New York: Addison
Wesley, 1996), 59.
19. Ibid
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Holton, 59ff.
23. Langford, J. Galileo, Science and the Church. (Ann Arbor, MI: Uni-
versity of Michigan Press, 1987), 46.
24. Blackwell, R. Could there be another Galileo case? In The Cam-
bridge Companion to Galileo. Ed. Peter Machamer. (Cambridge, England:
University of Cambridge Press, 1998), 352.
25. Holton, 97.
26. Holton, 101.
27. Ibid
28. Holton, 96.
29. Holton, 101.
30. Holton, 60.
31. Ibid
32. Ibid
33. Holton, 96.
34. Holton, 967.