T H E A R T OF

MILITARY L O
I
m^ine a military force entrenched on a river-
bank, dug into a mountaintop, or isolated by
a brutal winter storm. Members of the mili-
tary force must have suppliesfood, water,
ammunition, fuelto maintain their posi-
tion and survive. How do they communicate
their requirements to the rear area? What is
the most efficient route and method to trans-
port the materiel?' Many years ago, these were the basic
problems oF military logistics. Today this field has
grown infinitely more complex. Drastic changes in
supply chain management practices of military forces
have been dictated by ever-changing
global politicsand sometimes
even changing political bound-
aries. United States military
planners have begun trans-
loiming their logistical opera-
tions to accommodate a new
national security environment,
changing how logistic functions are
accomplished while revising traditions and organiza-
tion structures. But military organizationswith their
rich historical traditions and special budgetshave
proven an especially difficult domain to promote orga-
nization change and unification. For instance, one
NATO government proposed a single unified enter-
prise resource planning (ERP) system to streamline its
internal logistics system. Each element of its armed
forces immediately presented a different ERP solution
favoring its own supply system design. Since no service
was willing to compromise or change its existing sup-
ply system, the project was terminated. Information
technology has proved to be a unifying force in the
business environment, in military organizations it will
certainly prove a greater challenge.
' I he dcCiiiition of maTcricI as used, here is "equipmenc, apparaciu. and supplies used
by an otgailizaiion or inscituiion."
The U.S. military spends almost 30% of its operat-
ing budget on supply, maintenance, and transporta-
tion, with an increasing share devoted to technology
[1]. Logisticians understand information is a tiinda-
mental element for effective logistic management. This
has been true in the military context since armies were
first organized and is even more critical today. Every
aspect of the military supply chainfrom consump-
tion rates on the battlefield, to supply levels in Forward
and rear area depots, plus the ability to obtain air- or
sea-lift capacity including the facilities and manpower
to unload and store suppliesis contingent on solid
information, and more critically on the capacity to
communicate that information expeditiously.
Lx)gistics and supply chain management is rarely
mentioned when countries expound upon their mili-
tary achievements. The public rarely sees demonstra-
tions of cargo aircraft, transport ships, and trucks it
does fighter aircraft, warships, and tanks. Despite this
lack of publicity, logistics has been a topic ot interest
for military philosophers and historians. Stin Tzu, the
Chinese philosopher, and Carl Von Clausewir/. discuss
the art of logistics in their works. Von Clausewitz, in
his renowned text On War, refers to logistics and sup-
ply lines as centers of gravity, or targets that if
destroyed can defeat an enemy force without direct
engagement. Military historians cite campaigns lost as
a result of inadequate supply chain management.
Logistic targets and objectives have been the focus of
offensive actions including Shermans march through
Georgia during the American Civil War (the Union
army's drive was directed at splitting the Southern
states and breaking the Confederate Army logistics
supply chain), the Allied strategic bombing campaign
of the Axis Forces (targeting German industrial pro-
duction), and the German U-boat campaign during
World War II (focused on merchant shipping, there-
fore limiting supplies from the U.S. as opposed to
sinking warships).
62 June lOOI/Vol 44.No 6 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM
Moving to a dynamic
supply chain.
ISTICS
Steven John
Simon
Military logistics has changed as warfere has
become more sophisticated. The French army (of
150,000) under Bonaparte subsisted "off the land" if
the population density was approximately 3,000 per
25 square miles. If the population density fell below
this threshold, troops were forced to carr^- their own
provisions, which reduced their fighting capabilities.
As armies became larger, more mobile, and the inten-
sity of warfare increased, formal lines of supply devel-
oped, requiring movement of regular provisions to
soldiers in the field. To shorten die distances required
to resupply field units, armies developed a depot sys-
tem to assemble and disperse soldiers near the front
lines (the supply chain). The larger and faster mov-
ing the army, the longer the supply
chain and the more difficult the
resupply effort. Advances (forward
movement) have been limited by
the length of the supply chain and
in some cases armies have made
tactical blunders by advancing
beyond the capability to resupply.
Cold War Scenario
During the Cold War, the U.S. and its allies were
structured ro fight two major conflicts. Eastern
Europe and the Korean peninsula. The size of oppos-
ing armies and the intensity of warfare at the end of
the 20th century required massive logistics undenak-
ings, and for every combatant an estimated six to ten
non-combatants were required to maintain the sup-
ply eflort. Additionally, military equipment became
increasingly complex (and heavy) widi greater dis-
tances from suppliers and rear area supply depots to
the batdefield.- Logistics planners compensated for
these factors by using a variation of the classic depot
W.irs arc becoming shoriiT i n duraiioii Jui; ro ihc accuracy and rapid expendicurM
i)f muni:ions and other t o iisumablti. for example, ftjel, A prime example of this is
(iperarion Discrt Storm in the Persian Gulf.
scheme. In both Europe and Korea, forward-
deployed units and supply depots were positioned in
strategic locations, holding several days of supplies.
In Kor^, forward-deployed forces are/were posi-
tioned north of the Han River, with supply depots
located south of their positions from Seoul to the
southern coast. These supply depots were supplied
from bases in japan and the Phillippines, which in
turn were supplied from rear area bases in the U.S. or
allied countries. I he main supply bases received and
stockpiled their materiel from suppliers under con-
tact to the military and moved it through the supply
chain as required.
The scheme described here is similar to che supply
chain for a traditional manufacturing opera-
tion, in which the manufacturer contracts
with a supplier to make and deliver material
to the facility, where it is stockpiled for later
use. The manufacturer determines his
demand requirements and establishes a sup-
ply chain system allowing him to obtain and
move the required material from supplier to
the plant, and from the plant to the customer. This
is a "static supply chain," which has fixed ends, a
known supplier at one end, the inanufacturer in the
middle, and a customer destination at the other end.
To a certain extent, the volume of material moving
through rhe supply chain at any given time can be
predetermined based on the projected demand
requirements. Much the same scenario would occur
to keep deployed forces in Korea supplied. Goods
would be moved forward as the conflict progressed,
with each link ot the supply chain utilized.
Post Cold War
With the end of the Cold War, the diametrically
opposed force structure of the world changed. There
was no longer the threat of a major ground war in
Eastern Europe as the Soviet bloc dissolved. Cur-
COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM June ZOOI/Vol 44. No 6 63
rently, there is optimism for a reduction in tensions on
the Kore;in peninsula. Unfortunately, there has not
been a corresponding reduction in military missions
and in some ways, todays climate is more explosive and
certainly more difficult, especially from a logistics per-
speaive. If Cold War logistics was charaaerized by a
static supply chain with forward deployed supply
depots, then post Cold War logistics must be charac-
terized by a "dynamic supply chain."
Current military missions are radically different than
the conflicts envisioned during the Cold War. No
longer do forces enjoy prepositioned materiel located
dose to potential battlefields. Today, the area of conflict
is not known until days or weeks before an incident
occurs and many missions involve non-traditional mil-
itary roles such as humanitarian efforts or peacekeep-
ing. This has forced militar)' logistics planners to create
innovative means to move personnel and materiel ro
any location rapidly. Force restructuring has accounted
for some of this ability but some sittiations require tra-
ditionally heavily armored forces, as used in Desert
Storm. As a result, planners have created mobile for-
ward supply depots. Materiel has been placed on
squadrons of large ships, which are rotated near poten-
tial "hotspots." The ships are designed to rapidly
unload equipment and supplies and then exit the com-
bat area. Troops are usually flown into the area, mated
with the equipment, and moved to the batdefield. To
maintain the resupply effort, the U.S. Navy has devel-
oped the concept of "logistics over the horizon," which
allows ships to offload miles from shore on floating
causeways. These scenarios are similar to the idea of
just-in-time supply in manufacturing. As soon as sup-
plies reach the beach they are moved to the forward
location and into the hands of the combatants. This
reduces the number of supply depots, the threat of
attack by hostile forces, and proves useful in areas with-
out developed seaports. In regions without seaports, the
resupply effort must be conducted via air, which is
more difficult, time consuming, and expensive.
Current Logistics System Deficiencies
The current operating environment uses isolated,
independent, and sometimes incompatible systems,
processes, and data. Planning lacks realistic detailed
data necessary to provide effective and timely logistics
support at the unit level; higher levels of command
lack visibilit)' into ongoing logistics operations at lower
levels; and there i.s no common interoperable end-to-
end system to support decision-makers, at any level.
Consequently, the very rapid replanning and redirec-
tion necessary to support crisis action responsiveness
for multiple simultaneous missions cannot be accom-
plished today.
A significant deficiency is the current process of cre-
ating and maintaining Time Phased Force Deploy-
ment Data (TPFDD), which specifies and schedules
logistics support activity in response to anticipated
operational needs, but does not lend it.self to crisis
action planning and dynamic execution environ-
ments. TPFDDs are difficult to generate, lack accu-
racy due to degraded source data, and are not
responsive to changing operational requirements or
logistics support failures during execution. Data struc-
tures currently used in TPFDDs and other supporting
documents do not allow for a tight binding between
dynamic operational realities and the ongoing logistics
activities.
The transportation planning and execution
processes and supporting systems are fragmented.
Transportation-related automated .systems are
"srovepiped" and not integrated among services, uni-
fied commands, subordinate commands, or among
modes of transportation. As a result, meaningful and
acctirate information relative to either deployment or
sustainment planning and execution is not available in
a timely manner or, in some cases, at all. The result is
an inefficient use of critical transportation assets, port
congestion, improper sequencing of units and their
support, excess costs, a disrupted flow of units and
materiel into the theater of operations, and a general
lack of in-transit visibility.
Finally, defense logistics materiel management
methods, procedures, and supporting automated sys-
tems have not kept pace with advances in information
technology. Existing systems are not integrated either
within or among the services. The accuracy of demand
forecasting is marginal. This compartmentalization
hinders the generation of a fiised, accurate, and timely
asset visibility picture across the entire operational
spectrum, which greatly complicates the decision-
making process. It al.so results in excess costs to sup-
port both day-to-day and contingency response
operations.
Given the current environment of stovepiped logis-
tics systems, sub-optimal use of transportation, the
lack of integrated business processes, and inaccurate
total asset visibility information, commanders at all
echelons lack confidence in the logistics pipeline.
Additionally, they are unable to maintain an accurate,
real-time knowledge of the operational environment
and the location and availability of assets required to
function effeaively. This results in redundant requisi-
tion of materiel and supplies, which clogs the trans-
portation pipehne and complicates the logistics
planning and execution processes.
Existing logistics planning and decision support sys-
tems must be changed from a long lead-time deliberate
64
June 2001/VolM-I.No 6 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACH
planning process to an extremely rapid automated cri-
sis action planning process with links to all operational
and logistics planners. This highly automated rapid
reaction system must also provide the capability to
maintain a common understanding of the operational
situation, permit real-time monitoring of operations,
and automate rapid replanning when significant devia-
tions in the operational situation dic-
tate. As Department of Defense
(DOD) resources continue to decline.
large DOD-held iinventaries, replenish-
ment supplies, and safety stocks are
being reduced. Responsibility for main-
taining adequate inventories must be
shared with commercial facilities, ven-
dors, and manufacturers. This wilt
necessitate faster, more automated
capabilities to:
ALP will develop a computer network infrastructure
that allows distributed real-time visualization and inter-
acrion with all phiises. elements, and components of
the military and commercial transportation infrastruc-
ture. Applications are being developed to provide a
technology environment allowing warfighters to
rapidly understand and assess the logistics and sustain-
Monitor the operational readiness of
materiel and equipment;
Predict equipment failure using fore-
aisting and simulation technologies;
Rapidly identify, order, acquire,
source, pack, and transport required
sustainment supplies and equipment; and
Monitor and enhance retrograde movement and
repair of failed components and return of items to
i nventory for reissue.
The overriding common goal of these programs is to
enable the warfighter to project and stistain over-
whelming combat power sooner through better control
of the logistics pipeline.
Advanced Logistics Solution
The Advanced Logistics Program (ALP) will dc^-elop
automated, multi-echelon, collaborative information
S)'stems/transportation technologies that will provide
warfighters with an unprecedented capability to moni-
tor, rapidly replan and re-execute logistical support.
Dominant Maneuver
Precision Engagement
Focused Logistics
Full-Dimensional Protection
ment implications of a crisis situation. ALP also helps
generate effective plans and courses of action, monitors
a plans execution, and uses that information to replan.
Additionally, automated systems are under develop-
ment that will enable significant efficiency improve-
ments in transportation and sustainment, such as
monitoring rhe condition of assets and the infrastruc-
ture, the creation of plan sentinels to ser\'e as an early
vrarning system for plan deviations, and improvements
in theater distribution.
The dynamic supply chain must be proactive as well
as reactive, with the ability to reconcile multiple and
varied contingencies. Ahumanitarian operation in
Africa requires a radically different composition of
forces and supplies than peacekeeping operations in
UltraLog Objectives
Real-time visibilityof actual usage at point of
consumption (battlefield)
Real-time information about locallyavailable
parts on a global basis
Real-time status of materiel requests and
supplyactians withimmediate feedbackto the
battlefield unit
Optimize real-time, field-level, data gathering
and analysis witha resulting increase in forecast
accuracy
Real-time linkbetween commercial supply
sources, transportation providers, and systems
utilized.
Provide an automated capabilityto prioritize and
optimize materiel shipments
Reducing order shipment times from days to hours
COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM June 2001/Vol. 44. No 6 65
former Yugoslavia during the winter months. Addi-
tionally, operations are multinational (under United
Nations sponsorship and others), which changes the
force structure and increases resupply complexity.
The time frame associated for operations has also
become shorter. Humanitarian operations do not
have the luxury of spending weeks or months in
preparation. Most operations must be deployed
within hours to provide effective aid to those in need.
As a result, technology is being employed to support
logistics planning. The Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) will spend S90 million
over the next four years to develop UltraLog, a vast,
Web-based intelligent network that determines logis-
tics requirements in real time. The system revolves
around a revolutionary agent-based architecture
using individual computers to solve discrete pieces of
logistics problems and working together to deter-
mine a fmal solution. This wedding oi information
technology and logistics is key to the effective man-
agement of a dynamic supply chain for military and
other organizations {such as disaster relief). As illus-
trated in the Joint Vision 2010 figure, technology-
infused logistics has become one of the pillars of the
U.S. military's force projection concept and a full
partner with operational forces. Raising logistics to
this strategic level allows logistics-based information
technology systems to directly interface with opera-
tional systems, providing the real-time information
flow necessary to meet dynamic requirements. Once
in place, the ALP will reduce the development time
for a logistics plan from 60 days to under one hour.
Communications links with forward-deployed units
will give supply consumption rates to Ultralog,
which will relay this information to rear-area supply
depots, as well as schedule transportation. This sys-
tem has the ability to revolutionize the management
of the dynamic supply chain while cutting planning
time, improving efficiencies and reducing costs, and
insuring prompt delivery of supplies to the forward
area.
One example of rhe change introduced by Ultra-
Log is adaptive workflow brought by the introduction
of logistics technology to deployed units. The Naval
Construction Forces (Seabees) have adapted technol-
ogy originally developed by the Marine Corps and
created a fully deployable and rapidly implementable
local-area network (LAN in a box) with satellite com-
munications capabilities. This system allows the
Seabees and their component forces to communicate
with rear-area elements, expediting the process of
ordering supplies, checking the status of orders and
shipments, and streamlining reporting. This system
has reduced the lengthy approval process through the
introduction of adaptive workflowallowing person-
nel throughout the chain of command to change their
procedures based on evolving requirementswhile
increasing the discretionary authority of commanders
in the field.
Military decision-makers and senior-level com-
manders have recognized the importance of logistics
and supply chain management as an integral element
of strategic plans. Rear-area technology such as Ultra-
Log and the increasing tisc of deployable technology
and global commimications systems will continue to
allow commanders to make more effective use of their
supply chain as a force mtiltiplier. B
REFERENCE
1. Nationa! Rcstarch Council. Technology Jhr tin Uniteii States Navy and
Marine Corps, 2000-2035. National Academy Press, Washington, DC.
1997.
STEVEN J OHN SI MON (suppoig'iwon.com) is a professor at the
Stetson School of Business and Economics at Mercer University in
Atlama, CJA, and a lJcutcnant Commander in die U.S. Navy Reserve.
Sample of UltraLog Technologies
The interconnection of models, simulations,
and applications that lead to real-time logistics
control
Shared operations and logistics command and
control schema
Adaptive work flow
Object-based information representation v^ith
"drill down" capability
Plan sentinels, based on l<nown or forecasted
logistics capabilities that identify plan deficien-
cies during the planning process; and execution
sentinels that, based on planning assumptions
and expectations, detect when an action is not
being executed according to plan
Autamatic replanning options
Semiautonomous search and retrieval of data
Integration of commercial data sources
Mediator processing
Ad-hoc query capability
Extensions for electronic data interchange
User-friendty human-computer interfaces
Data mining
6 6 June 2001/Vol 44, No 6 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM