The Paradox of Nature - Merleau-Pontys Semi-Naturalistic Critique

Marquete University
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Dissertations (2009 -) Dissertations, Teses, and Professional Projects
Te Paradox of Nature: Merleau-Ponty's Semi-
Naturalistic Critique of Husserlian
Phenomenology
Shazad Akhtar
Marquete University
Recommended Citation
Akhtar, Shazad, "Te Paradox of Nature: Merleau-Ponty's Semi-Naturalistic Critique of Husserlian Phenomenology" (2010).
Dissertations (2009 -). Paper 65.
htp://epublications.marquete.edu/dissertations_mu/65

TBE PARAB0X 0F NAT0RE: NERLEA0-P0NTY'S SENI-NAT0RALISTIC CRITIQ0E
0F B0SSERLIAN PBEN0NEN0L0uY

by

Shazau Akhtai, B. A., N. A.

A Bisseitation submitteu to the Faculty of the uiauuate
School, Naiquette 0niveisity, in Paitial Fulfillment of the
Requiiements foi the Begiee of Boctoi of Philosophy

Nilwaukee, Wisconsin

Becembei 2u1u

ABSTRACT

TBE PARAB0X 0F NAT0RE: NERLEA0-P0NTY'S SENI-NAT0RALISTIC CRITIQ0E
0F B0SSERLIAN PBEN0NEN0L0uY


Naiquette 0niveisity, 2u1u

This uisseitation ueals with Neileau-Ponty's ciitical tiansfoimation of Busseil's
phenomenology thiough a iethinking of the concept of "natuie," which Busseil,
Neileau-Ponty aigues, fails to integiate oi explain successfully in his philosophical
system. The fiist chaptei ieconstiucts Busseil's "tianscenuental-phenomenological"
pioject in !"#$% !, while the seconu wiuens the investigation to covei the
ontologically-centeieu !"#$% !! anu !!!. In my thiiu chaptei, I chait what I call
Neileau-Ponty's "oiganic appiopiiation" of Busseil anu the unique heimeneutical
challenges it poses. Beie the ambiguity of !"#$% !!, which both giounus subjectivity
in the liveu bouy anu sepaiates natuie fiom "spiiit" ('#(%)), plays a ciucial iole. The
fouith chaptei concentiates on the Neileau-Ponty's latei meuitations on the
ontology of natuie anu subjectivity, paiticulaily in his iecently tianslateu *$)+,#
lectuies of 19S9-61. Finally, the fifth chaptei compaies anu contiasts Busseil anu
Neileau-Ponty, in teims of both substance anu methou, thiough a uetaileu
examination of theii uiffeient notions of (anu ways to auuiess) "paiauox." I show
how Neileau-Ponty's "paiauoxical" thinking stems not fiom chance oi meie
tempeiament but a funuamental, systematic commitment to the self-contiauictoiy
(oi "uialectical," but in a mouifieu sense) natuie of being anu tiuth themselves.

i

ACKN0WLEBuNENTS


I owe the conception anu fiuition of this pioject above all to my uiiectoi, Pol
vanuevelue. It is in his classes that I fiist awakeneu to the impoitance of
phenomenology anu the powei of its methou. Be has taught me the texts anu styles
of Busseil, Beiueggei, Neileau-Ponty, anu many othei figuies who have influenceu
my philosophical thinking anu ieseaich uecisively. I have leaineu tiemenuously
fiom lengthy uiscussions ovei both his own anu othei authois' oiiginal woiks. If this
uisseitation is successful in any small measuie, this is owing substantially to the
guiuance anu influence of Bi. vanuevelue.
I have also my seconu ieauei, Bi. Sebastian Luft, to thank piofusely foi his
eneigetic anu geneious aiu to me ovei the yeais anu in the completion of the
piesent pioject. I have benefitteu gieatly fiom my yeais-long conveisations with Bi.
Luft on many topics ianging fiom phenomenology to Begelian iuealism anu much
moie. Bis fiienuship, availability, anu cutting-euge scholaiship have been veiy
valuable to me in my acauemic uevelopment.
In auuition, I woulu also like to take the oppoitunity to sinceiely thank Bi.
Anuy Tallon anu Bi. Stephen Watson of Notie Bame foi theii encouiagement anu
suggestions uuiing my wiiting piocess.
ii
I must auu that I was gieatly aiueu in completing this uisseitation in a timely
mannei by the Naiquette uiauuate School anu its geneious financial suppoit,
thiough the Raynoi Fellowship, thiough the 2uu9-2u1u acauemic yeai. I am also
ueeply giateful to the Naiquette Philosophy uepaitment foi having nominateu me
foi the awaiu anu, moie geneially, foi having given me a fiist-class philosophical
euucation that I will take with me anu builu upon, I am suie, foi the iest of my life.

iii

TABLE 0F C0NTENTS

ACKN0WLEBuNENTS.....................................................................................................................i

INTR0B0CTI0N.......................................1

I. Piesent Status of the Pioblem

A. Neileau-Ponty's Inteipietation of Busseil anu Busseil's Conception
of Natuie...................................4

B. Neileau-Ponty's Latei 0ntology anu Concept of Natuie............6

C. !"#$% ! anu !!------------------------------------7

II. Summaiy of the Bisseitation

A. Chapteis 0ne anu Two...............................8

B. Chapteis Thiee anu Foui.............................11

C. Chaptei Five....................................1S

III. Conclusion.......................................17

CBAPTER 0NE: B0SSERL'S TRANSCENBENTAL PBEN0NEN0L0uY IN !./01 !: TBE
BASIC P0SITI0N.......................................19

I. Intiouuction: !"#$% ! anu the Pioject of Tianscenuental Phenomenology.......19

II. /23456 anu Phenomenological Reuuction

A. Intiouuction...................................24

B. The Natuial anu the Tianscenuental Attituues...............26
iv

C. Phenomenological /23456---------------------------7S2

B. Phenomenological-Tianscenuental Reuuction(s) .............S4

E. An Inteiluue: 0n the Notivation of the Reuuction..............S8

III. Essences anu the Eiuetic Reuuction..........................4u

A. Intentionality, Noesis anu Noema, anu Tianscenuence...........4S

B. The Eiuetic Bistinction between Nental anu Physical...........49

C. The Chaige of Bualism............................S2

B. Absolute anu Relative Existence anu the "Woilu-Annihilation"
Expeiiment.....................................SS

E. Busseil's Final Position: "Tianscenuental Iuealism"............6u

Iv. Concluuing Reflections.................................6S

CBAPTER TW0: TBE C0NSTIT0TI0N 0F NAT0RE, B0BY, ANB SPIRIT IN
B0SSERL'S !./01 !!...................................7S

I. Intiouuction......................................79

II. The 0ntological Natiix of !"#$% !!8!!!

A. Intiouuction...................................79

B. The Constitution of Woiluly Reality

1. Nateiial Natuie............................82

2. Animal Natuie, oi the Bouy-anu-Soul................8S

S. Ego.....................................91

4. Spiiit....................................9S

III. Analysis: Philosophical Bifficulties of !"#$% !!8!!!

A. Intiouuction: Phenomenological Nonism, 0ntological Bualism.......99
v

B. Busseil's Natuialism.............................1u2

C. The Piioiity Thesis..............................1u8

B. Spiiit anu Consciousness..........................11u

E. The Question of the Bouy..........................114

Iv. Conclusion.......................................118

CBAPTER TBREE: NERLEA0-P0NTY'S 0RuANIC APPR0PRIATI0N 0F B0SSERLIAN
PBEN0NEN0L0uY

I. Intiouuction......................................122

II. Neileau-Ponty's Relationship to Busseil: An Boxogiaphical 0veiview anu
Ciitique

A. Intiouuction.................................127

B. The "Stiong view": Zahavi, Smith, anu Baibaias..............129

C. "Weak" anu "Nixeu" views: Lefoit, Richii, Nauison, et al. ........1Su

B. Foui Weak Reauings: Embiee, Behnke, Seebohm, Beigo...........1SS

E. Concluuing Thoughts.............................14u

III. Neileau-Ponty's Busseilian Phenomenology: By Text

A. Intiouuction.................................141

B. Busseil in 99..................................14S

C. Busseil in Neileau-Ponty's Latei Woik..................146

Iv. Neileau-Ponty's Busseilian Phenomenology: By Theme

A. The Phenomenological Reuuction.....................1S2

B. Essences anu the Eiuetic Reuuction.....................1S8

v. Concluuing Reflections................................161
vi

CBAPTER F00R: NERLEA0-P0NTY'S NAT0RE 0NT0L0uY 0F NAT0RE

I. Intiouuction......................................166

II. Natuie anu the 0ntology of the Natuie Lectuies

A. Intiouuction: The *$)+,# Lectuies, :5# ;(%(<=# $>" )5# !>?(%(<=#, anu the
Pioject of "0ntology"...............................168

B. Befining "Natuie"..............................174

C. Natuie anu the Sciences of Life.........................181

III. The *$)+,# Lectuies anu :5# ;(%(<=# $>" )5# !>?(%(<=#: Towaius a New Bialectical
0nto-Phenomenology

A. Intiouuction.................................19u

B. Reveisibility.................................191

C. Flesh......................................196

B. Iuentity anu Biffeience, the 0ne anu the Nany: Bimensions of Neileau-
Ponty's Bialectic.................................2uu

Iv. Conclusion.......................................2uS

CBAPTER FIvE: NERLEA0-P0NTY ANB B0SSERL 0N TBE Q0ESTI0N 0F TBE
PARAB0X 0F S0B}ECTIvITY ANB NAT0RE

I. Intiouuction.........................................2u7

II. Neileau-Ponty's Philosophy of Paiauox

A. 0veiview of Neieau-Ponty's Refeiences to Paiauox..............211

B. Paiauox anu the "Peiceptual Faith".....................217

C. Paiauox anu Philosophy............................22u

III. Busseil anu Paiauox................................221

Iv. The Paiauox of Reflection
vii

A. The Reflective Attituue...........................22S

B. "Bypei-Reflection"..............................229

v. Neileau-Ponty's Paiauoxical Thinking In Relation to 0thei Styles of Thinking:
Bialectic, SkepticismQuietism, anu Nysticism

A. Neileau-Ponty anu Begelian Bialectic.....................2S4

B. Neileau-Ponty anu SkepticismQuietism.................2S7

C. Neileau-Ponty anu Nysticism........................24u

vI. Conclusion......................................244

C0NCL0SI0N

I. Neileau-Ponty vis--vis Busseil..........................247

II. Neileau-Ponty anu Some 0thei Philosopheis................2S1

III. The "Peisonalistic Attituue" anu the Limits of Reflection........2SS

Iv. Phenomenology as Paiauox........................2S4

v. Natuialism....................................2SS

BIBLI0uRAPBY

I. Piimaiy Liteiatuie (Busseil anu Neileau-Ponty)

A. Busseil......................................2S7

B. Neileau-Ponty..................................2S8

II. Seconuaiy Liteiatuie anu 0thei Woiks

A. Books anu Nonogiaphs.............................2S9

B. Aiticles, Book Chapteis, anu volume Intiouuctions.............262

viii
C. Niscellaneous.................................268

1
!"#$%&'(#)%"

The cential uynamic of this uisseitation is the cieative encountei between
Nauiice Neileau-Ponty (19u8-1961) anu Eumunu Busseil (18S9-19S8), two of the
most impoitant philosopheis of the twentieth centuiy. I exploie this encounteian
"encountei" between two philosophies as opposeu to two philosopheis, as the two
thinkeis hau nevei foimally met anu aie sepaiateu by moie than a geneiation
with iespect piincipally to the ontological issues suiiounuing the classical uivision
of "natuie" anu "spiiit." But in the case of phenomenology, ontological anu
epistemological issues cannot be cleanly sepaiateu. Thus majoi questions of
epistemological significance, such as those of iuealism anu the natuie of ieflection,
aie also auuiesseu anu ielateu to the question of what it means to uo
phenomenologyanu even philosophyitself. Phenomenology, ontology,
epistemologyall of these teims aie negotiateu anu ie-negotiateu in the couise of
Neileau-Ponty's sustaineu heimeneutics of Busseil's woik, a heimeneutics that
opens up onto a hiuuen woilu of possibilities latent in the (ostensibly) simple
phenomena of sensing, seeing, speaking, anu ieflecting.
Neileau-Ponty's inteipietation of Busseil has been commenteu on befoie.
Bowevei, one of the unique contiibutions of the piesent ieseaich, I believe, is its use
of the concept of "natuie," a funuamental concein of both thinkeis but in veiy
uiffeient ways, to go to the heait of the questions of phenomenological methou anu
the ielationship of human subjectivity to the woilu. This choice allows us to
appieciate the motivations of Neileau-Ponty's iethinking of phenomenology,
2
putting asiue its challenge to classical metaphysical binaiies such as "human-
animal" anu "natuie-spiiit," in the context of a wiuei philosophical-ontological
tiauition (though still veiy much a "mouein" one, foi the most pait). Neileau-
Ponty's ciitique of some elements of Busseilian philosophy cleaily belongs to his
geneial ciitique of moueinism anu, in tuin, blenu haimoniously with his positive
appiopiiation of Busseilian phenomenology as a kinu of unifieu-fielu theoiy of
Being, once cleanseu of its Caitesian piesuppositions.
1

In Busseil, "natuie" appeais piimaiily in thiee guises: as the "natuial
attituue"; as the iegional uomain of the "natuial sciences"; anu as the ontic-noematic
coiielate of "spiiit" in the iealm of woiluly (non-tianscenuental) ieality. Foi
Neileau-Ponty, on the othei hanu, "natuie" comes to emeige as a complex anu
nuanceu "otheiness" at the heait of subjectivity, manifesting itself most uiiectly in
the iealm of "life," especially animality, anu yet also haunting consciousness, oi
spiiit, with its "piesence by absence," its impenetiable "oiigin"-ality. It is, as
Schelling says, a "wilu Being" untameu by thought, yet also untamable, foi theie
coulu be no thought without a hoiizon, anu that hoiizonality is the uepth that
cannot be known without my vanishing fiom the woilu altogethei anu somehow
"seeing it fiom above"an impossibility even foi a uou, howevei, since, as both
Busseil anu Neileau-Ponty ieminu us, vision is a coipoieal act.
In my inteipietation, "Natuie"anu then "Being," anu still again, the
"flesh"come, in Neileau-Ponty's tieatment, to quietly uisplace the "tianscenuental
ego" of Busseil, itself a holu-ovei of the Caitesian-epistemological piioiitization of

1
It is in this light, too, that we can appieciate Neileau-Ponty's enuoisement of the woik of Leibniz,
Begel, anu Beigson, on the one hanu, anu his iejection of (much of) Kant anu Saitie on the othei.
3
the "innei" ovei the "outei." Natuie is ambiguously both innei anu outeian
inteiioiity qua exteiioiity, like the living oiganism, whose "outwaiu behavioi" can
only be unueistoou as living-out within the "inteinal" hoiizon of an @AB#=). The
oiganism, most eviuently in the simplei (but not the veiy simplest) foims, like ciabs
oi woims, is iauically self-centeieu ("in its own woilu") at the same time that it
lacks a centei, an "ego" that can uiffeientiate itself "absolutely" fiom a "woilu" apait
fiom its inteiioiity. The animal (% its woilu. The living being in its unity with its
woilu seives as a ieminuei of the pie-ieflective life of consciousness that
unueiliesanu 45$==#>C#% D,3A B()5(>the uualisms of ieflective thought,
incluuing that of the "natuial" anu "spiiitual," the cential uivision of Busseil's !"#$%
!!7
2

While iemaining a phenomenologist to the enu, Neileau-Ponty iejecteu both
Busseil's "tianscenuental iuealism"
S
as well as the lattei's implicit (anu iionical)
collusion with natuial science ovei its uefinition of the "essence" of natuie. It is not
only in iesponse to Busseil oi !"#$% !!, of couise, that Neileau-Ponty uevelopeu his
iueas of natuie; aftei all, he hau been at woik on the ontological implications of
animality even befoie he became acquainteu with Busseil's woiks in a seiious way,
staiting with his fiist majoi woik :5# 1),+4)+,# 3D E#5$?(3, (1942).
4
Nonetheless, in
!"#$% !! he sees Busseil stiuggling with the consequences of uiviuing the woilu fiom
consciousness anu natuie anu animality fiom spiiit, anu his aiticulation of an

2
Busseil, Eumunu. !"#$% 9#,)$(>(>C )3 $ 9+,# 95#>3A#>3=3CF $>" )3 $ 95#>3A#>3=3C(4$= 95(=3%325FG
1#43>" E33HI 1)+"(#% (> )5# 95#>3A#>3=3CF 3D J3>%)()+)(3>. Tis. R. Rojcewicz anu A. Schuwei.
Boiuiecht: Kluwei Acauemic Publisheis, 1989
S
It can be uebateu to what uegiee, of couise; see Toauvine, Teu. "Leaving Busseil's Cave. The
Philosophei's Shauow Revisiteu." In K#,=#$+L93>)FM% N#$"(>C 3D O+%%#,=. Eus. Teu Toauvine anu
Lestei Embiee. Boiuiecht: Kluwei Acauemic Publisheis, 2uu2 (pp. 71-94).
4
Neileau-Ponty, :5# 1),+4)+,# 3D E#5$?(3,. Tians. A.L. Fishei. Boston: Beacon Piess, 196S.
4
alteinative cannot be fully appieciateu without this woik as a heimeneutical
backuiop.
The iemainuei of this intiouuction offeis an oveiview of the piesent status in
the ielevant seconuaiy liteiatuie of the theme(s) of this woik, as well as a pieview
of the contents of the uisseitation chaptei by chaptei, culminating in a summaiy of
the conclusions I uiaw fiom all of the foiegoing stuuies.

!+ ,$-.-"# /#0#'. %1 #2- ,$%34-5

07 K#,=#$+L93>)FM% !>)#,2,#)$)(3> 3D O+%%#,= $>" O+%%#,=M% J3>4#2)(3> 3D *$)+,#
While theie aie a numbei of goou aiticles on Neileau-Ponty's ieauing of
Busseil, seveial of which aie collecteu in the 2uu2 essay collection entitleu K#,=#$+L
93>)FM% N#$"(>C 3D O+%%#,=,
S
theie is veiy little mateiial wiitten specifically on
Neileau-Ponty's ciitique of Busseil's conception of natuie,
6
let alone a sustaineu
assessment of theii iespective philosophies thiough the lens of this iuea. The ueaith
of mateiial on the question of natuie is piobably uue to the fact that Neileau-

5
K#,=#$+L93>)FM% N#$"(>C 3D O+%%#,=. Eus. Teu Toauvine anu Lestei Embiee. Bouiecht: Kluwei
Acauemic Publisheis, 2uu2. 0thei goou aiticles incluue those by Tayloi Caiman anu Anthony
Steinbock foi instance, which both compaie Busseilian anu Neileau-Pontian phenomenologies of the
bouy, a majoi theme of !"#$% !!; Caiman even explicitly uiscusses Neileau-Ponty's ieauing of !"#$% !!,
though only in passing. This mateiial is, howevei, only paitially ielevant foi oui piesent puiposes.
See: Caiman, Tayloi. "The Bouy in Busseil anu Neileau-Ponty." 95(=3%325(4$= :32(4%, vol. 27, No. 2,
Fall 1999 (pp. 2uS-22S); Steinbock, Anthony. "Satuiateu Intentionality." In :5# E3"F. Eu. Bonn
Welton, 0xfoiu: Blackwell Publishing, 1999 (pp. 178-199).
6
An exception is Stephen Ciowell's essay "The Nythical anu the Neaningless: Busseil anu the Two
Faces of Natuie." Piinteu in !%%+#% (> O+%%#,=M% !"#$% !!7 Eus. Thomas Nenon anu Lestei Embiee.
Boiuiecht: Kluwei Acauemic Publisheis, 1996. (pp. 81-1u6) This essay also contains much
extianeous mateiial, foi oui puiposes, on the philosophy of mythology.
5
Ponty's most pointeu ciiticisms on this issue aie uiiectly to be founu in his lectuie
couises on natuie, which weie howevei publisheu only ielatively iecently.
7
The
piesent uisseitation closes some of this gap in the scholaiship.
Nuch of the uiscussion of Neileau-Ponty's ieauing of anu philosophical
ielation to Busseil is polemical anu in some ways paiallel to the moie stanuaiu
"Busseil veisus Beiueggei" uebate. Tayloi Caiman expiesses a chaiacteiistic "pio-
Neileau-Pontian" view:

"0nlike Busseil, but like Beiueggei, Neileau-Ponty looks beyonu the subject-object uiviue to tiy to
gain insight into the conciete stiuctuies of woiluly expeiience. Inueeu, taking the pioblem of
embouiment seiiously, as Neileau-Ponty uoes, entails a iauical ieassessment of the veiy conceptual
uistinctions on which Busseil's enteipiise iests."
8

Caiman fuithei claims that going beyonu Busseil "woulu mean ielinquishing the
conceptual uualism on which |hisj pioject iests."
9
Nany Busseilians woulu uispute
this chaiacteiization of Busseil, though I peisonally believe it is laigely accuiate,
1u

though theie aie actually %#?#,$= "conceptual uualisms," not just one, that must be
contenueu with anu soiteu thiough on theii own teims, not all of which equate to a
"substance uualism" of a soit one finus in Bescaites (anu is at least outwaiuly
iefuteu in Busseil). I auuiess this issue in Chaptei 2.

7
Neileau-Ponty, Nauiice. *$)+,#I J3+,%# *3)#% D,3A )5# J3==PC# "# Q,$>4#. Compileu anu with notes
fiom Bominique Sglaiu. Tians. Robeit valliei. Noithwestein 0niveisity Piess: Evanston, Illinois,
2uuS.
8
Caiman, Tayloi. "The Bouy in Busseil anu Neileau-Ponty." 95(=3%325(4$= :32(4%, vol. 27, No. 2, Fall
1999, p 2u6.
9
Ibiu., p. 2u8
10
Fianoise Bastui, a caieful anu ielatively non-polemical ieauei of both Busseil anu Neileau-Ponty,
agiees with the lattei that Busseil is basically uualistic. See Bastui, Fianoise. "Busseil anu the
Pioblem of Bualism." 13+= $>" E3"F (> O+%%#,=($> 95#>3A#>3=3CFI K$> $>" *$)+,# R0>$=#4)$
O+%%#,=($>$G ;3=7 S;!T, eu. Anna-Teiesa Tymieniecka. Boiuiecht: Spiingei, 198S (pp. 6S-77). Neileau-
Ponty is ioutinely ieau as a zealous anti-uualist, a claim I will paitially challenge in chapteis 4 anu S.
6
Busseil has plenty of uefenueis, of couise, some of whom, like Panos
Theouoiou, take issue with the wiuespieau ieauing of !"#$% !! that unueistanus it as
valiuating, essentially, the natuial-scientific view of natuie.
11
}. Clauue Evans agiees
that this ieauing is misleauing, anu goes even fuithei, aiguing foi the supeiioiity of
Busseil's account of natuie anu science in !"#$% !! ovei his latei ieflections on the
life-woilu, uefinitely a minoiity position foi those conceineu with this pioblem.
12

Within Busseilian scholaiship, at least as eviuenceu by K#,=#$+L93>)FM%
N#$"(>C 3D O+%%#,=, a chief question lies in just how fai Neileau-Ponty uiveiges fiom
Busseil. Foi uiametiical positions on this question, see foi example Seebohm's anu
Zahavi's aiticles in saiu volume.
1S

E7 K#,=#$+L93>)FM% U$)#, V>)3=3CF $>" J3>4#2) 3D *$)+,#
In iecent yeais theie has been a spate of liteiatuie on Neileau-Ponty's latei
philosophy anu his geneial "ontology." These incluue seveial book-length
tieatments, foi example by Billon (1998) anu Baibaias (2uu4)
14
two of the best
availableas well as many aiticles, inteiestingly laigely in English. (Neileau-Ponty
has pioven to be populai in Ameiica especially, though one shoulu not fail to

11
Theouoiou, Panos. "Peiceptual anu Scientific Thing: 0n Busseil's Analysis of "Natuie-Thing" in
!"#$% !!." In :5# *#B W#$,<33H D3, 95#>3A#>3=3CF $>" 95#>3A#>3=3C(4$= 95(=3%325F volume S, 2uuS.
Eus. Buit Bopkins anu Steven Ciowell, 16S-187. Seattle: Noesis Piess, 2uuS.
12
Evans, }. Clauue. "Wheie is the Life-Woilu." Piinteu in !%%+#% (> O+%%#,=M% !"#$% !!7 Eus. Thomas
Nenon anu Lestei Embiee. Boiuiecht: Kluwei Acauemic Publisheis, 1996.
13
Seebohm, Thomas N. "The Phenomenological Novement: A Tiauition without Nethou. Neileau-
Ponty anu Busseil." In K#,=#$+L93>)FM% N#$"(>C 3D O+%%#,=. Eus. Teu Toauvine anu Lestei Embiee.
Bouiecht: Kluwei Acauemic Publisheis, 2uu2 (pp. S1-7u); Zahavi, Ban. "Neileau-Ponty on Busseil: A
Reappiaisal." In K#,=#$+L93>)FM% N#$"(>C 3D O+%%#,=. Eus. Teu Toauvine anu Lestei Embiee. Bouiecht:
Kluwei Acauemic Publisheis, 2uu2 (pp. S-29).
14
Baibaias, Renauu. :5# E#(>C 3D )5# 95#>3A#>3>. Tians. Teu Toauvine anu Leonaiu Lawloi.
Bloomington: Inuiana 0niveisity Piess, 2uu4; Billon, N.C. K#,=#$+L93>)FM% V>)3=3CF. Bloomington:
Inuiana 0niveisity Piess, 1988
7
mention that theie is also a }apanese Neileau-Ponty Ciicle). 0ne of these aiticles, by
ueiaets, ueals with the theme of natuie explicitly,
1S
while otheis ueal moie with "the
flesh" anu othei ielateu topics fiom the latei philosophy.
16
A compiehensive
tieatment of Neileau-Ponty's philosophy of natuie, one long oveiuue, has been
iecently authoieu by Teu Toauvine.
17

C. !"#$% ! anu !!
Regaiuing Busseil, theie aie innumeiable woiks uealing with the cential
concepts of tianscenuental iuealism anu with !"#$% !
XY
, as a text, in paiticulai
inueeu, viitually eveiy intiouuctoiy text oi statement on Busseil has to take this
seminal woik into account. Ny ieliance on seconuaiy liteiatuie foi the section on
!"#$% ! is minimal, howevei, foi two ieasons. Fiist, I expounu only the woik's most
basic themes#23456 anu ieuuction, noesis anu noema, the tianscenuental ego, etc.
Seconu, although these notions themselves aie all contioveisial anu contesteu
thioughout the Busseil liteiatuie, my aim is not to give a uefinitive inteipietation of
them, only to facilitate thiough my tieatment of them a compiehensible uiscussion
of Neileau-Ponty's geneial appiopiiations anu ciiticisms of Busseilian
phenomenology.

15
ueiaets, Thouoie F. "Neileau-Ponty's Conception of Natuie." In 13+= $>" E3"F (> O+%%#,=($>
95#>3A#>3=3CFI K$> $>" *$)+,# R0>$=#4)$ O+%%#,=($>$G ;3=7 S;!T, eu. Anna-Teiesa Tymieniecka.
Boiuiecht: Spiingei, 198S (pp. Su1-S12).
16
See foi example Bastui, Fianoise. "Woilu, Flesh, vision." In J5($%A%I K#,=#$+L93>)FM% *3)(3> 3D
Q=#%5. Eus. Fieu Evans anu Leonaiu Lawloi. State 0niveisity of New Yoik Piess. Albany: 2uuu (pp. 2S-
Su).
17
Toauvine, Teu. K#,=#$+L93>)FM% 95(=3%325F 3D *$)+,#. Evanston: Noithwestein 0niveisity Piess,
2uu9
18
Fiist Book: '#>#,$= !>),3"+4)(3> )3 $ 9+,# 95#>3A#>3=3CF7 Tians. F. Keisten. Boiuiecht: Kluwei
Acauemic Publisheis, 198S
8
Woik on !"#$% !! is fai less extensive than that on !"#$% !, but theie has been
some notewoithy seconuaiy scholaiship in the last uecaue on !"#$% !!, some of it
incluueu in the volume !%%+#% (> !"#$% !!
XZ
, which uiaws togethei a numbei of essays
on vaiious aspects of the woik. 0thei penetiating ieauings incluue those of
Rockstau
2u
anu the alieauy-mentioneu Evans anu Theouoiou. !"#$% !! has of couise
been wiitten about by majoi phenomenologists, incluuing Ricoeui
21
, Lanugiebe
22
,
anu (obviously) Neileau-Ponty himself. I have founu that these, along obviously
with the piimaiy text, aie still the most valuable elements in !"#$% !! scholaiship at
the piesent time.

!!+ /'550$6 %1 #2- 7)..-$#0#)%"

07 J5$2)#,% V># $>" :B3
In Chapteis 0ne anu Two, I sketch a pictuie of Busseil of !"#$% ! anu !!, the
"iuealist" Busseil who, in the lattei of these two woiks, neveitheless lays the
founuations of most of what Neileau-Ponty will foige into a new vision of

19
!%%+#% (> O+%%#,=M% !"#$% !!, eus. Thomas Nenon anu Lestei Embiee. Boiuiecht: Kluwei Acauemic
Publisheis, 1996.
20
Rokstau, Koniau. "The Bistoiicity of Bouy anu Soul." In 95#>3A#>3=3CF 3D U(D# LL Q,3A )5# 0>(A$=
13+= )3 )5# O+A$> K(>"I E33H !I !> 1#$,45 3D /[2#,(#>4#, eu. Anna-Teiesa Tymieniecka. (pp. 127-1S9).
Boiuiecht: Spiingei Netheilanus, 2uu7; also, Rokstau, Koniau. "Natuie, Subjectivity anu the Life-
Woilu." In 0>$=#4)$ O+%%#,=($>$I :5# W#$,<33H 3D 95#>3A#>3=3C(4$= N#%#$,45 ;3= USS;!!, eu. Anna-
Teiesa Tymieniecka. (pp. 41-S9). Boiuiecht: Kluwei Acauemic Publishing, 2uu2.
21
Ricoeui, Paul. O+%%#,=I 0> 0>$=F%(% 3D O(% 95#>3A#>3=3CF. Tians. Euwaiu u. Ballaiu anu Lestei
Embiee. Evanston: Noithwestein 0niveisity Piess, 1967 (Thiiu chaptei: "Busseil's !"#$% !!: Analyses
anu Pioblems," pp. SS-81).
22
Lanugiebe, Luuwig. :5# 95#>3A#>3=3CF 3D /"A+>" O+%%#,=. Eu. Bonn Welton. Ithaca, New Yoik:
Coinell 0niveisity Piess, 1981.
9
phenomenology anu the natuie-spiiit ielation. As just alluueu to, the fiist chaptei is
a uetaileu oveiview of Busseil's tianscenuental phenomenologythe eiuetic anu
tianscenuental-phenomenological ieuuctions, the natuial anu tianscenuental
attituues, noesis anu noema, intentionality, the tianscenuental ego, constitution, anu
the like.
2S
The puipose of this chaptei is mostly expositoiy (some inteipietation is
involveu, of couiseas any genuine exposition in fact iequiies anyway); the
uemanus of explaining Busseil's philosophical system, howevei, also happen to
make it the longest chaptei in this woik.
The seconu chaptei is a uetaileu exposition anu ieauing of !"#$% !!
\]
, with a
focus on its onto-phenomenological meuitations on the iealms of "mateiial natuie,"
"bouy anu soul", anu "spiiit," along with the question of the enigmatic ielation of
these "constituteu iealities" anu the tianscenuental subjectivity (oi simply
"consciousness") of the tianscenuental ieuuction foimally expounueu in !"#$% !.

23
0 *3)# 3> )5# J53(4# 3D :#[): Busseil was constantly in the piocess of ieinventing himself; !"#$% ! is
only one of many possible "intiouuctoiy" texts to use to piesent Busseil's "tianscenuental" veision of
phenomenology (J$,)#%($> K#"()$)(3>% anu the J,(%(% 3D )5# /+,32#$> 14(#>4#% come most quickly to
minu, but theie has even been a book-length intiouuction to Busseil, by Kockelmanns, baseu on his
Encyclopeuia Biitannica aiticle on phenomenologysee: Kockelmanns, }oseph }. /"A+>" O+%%#,=M%
95#>3A#>3=3CF. Inuianapolis: Puiuue 0niveisity Piess, 1994). Why choose !"#$% !. Asiue fiom the
ieason that !"#$% ! anu !! belong togethei by theii titles (!"#$% !! hau been initially planneu as a
sequel anu fuithei explication of the thesis maintaineu in !"#$% !), it is also tiue that !"#$% ! is
sufficient to intiouuce most of the funuamental planks of Busseilian phenomenology. Whethei oi not
Busseil eventually, in the 19Sus, shifteu his basic position to a moie "existential" anu
"uetianscenuentalizeu" foim of phenomenology, oi whethei the latei "genetic" phenomenology is
not meiely an extension of the phenomenology of the !"#$% but iathei a fai-ieaching iauical
iethinking of it, aie questions I will not anu neeu not ueal with heie. Foi it woulu suit my puiposes if
the Busseils of !"#$% ! anu !! aie iegaiueu as just one (oi two) of many actual oi possible "Busseils,"
only because the points I will be tiying to make aie basically systematic ones, which the texts at hanu
biing out sufficiently on theii own.
24
1#43>" E33HI 1)+"(#% (> )5# 95#>3A#>3=3CF 3D J3>%)()+)(3>. Tians. R. Rojcewicz anu A. Schuwei.
Boiuiecht: Kluwei Acauemic Publisheis, 1989. The yeai of publication of the oiiginal ueiman-
language euition was 19S2.
10
In !"#$% !!, Busseil piesents a pictuie of natuie as a the lifeless, meaningless
(1(>>=3%) substiate of ieality, a baie "physical thinghoou" that uistinguishes itself
fiom life (soul, 1##=#), on the one hanu, anu minu (spiiit, '#(%)), on the othei. The
liveu-bouy, as piesenteu by Busseil, is the "unity" of minu anu mattei, but,
impoitantly, it is uistinguishable fiom the "puie" foims of eithei. What shielus
Busseil fiom balu-faceu "Caitesian" uualism is his claim, announceu alieauy in !"#$%
!, that puie oi tianscenuental subjectivityanu heie he follows (ioughly) Kant,
whose "Copeinican tuin" he bioauly enuoisescannot be ieuuceu to "thinghoou"
oi "objectivity" of any kinu. Puie subjectivity is moie funuamental than any object,
since it is the veiy conuition foi the possibility of objectivity in the fiist place.
Busseil's piioiitization of tianscenuental subjectivity ovei empiiical subjectivity
iauicalizes this uiffeience by placing empiiical subjectivity so completely in the giip
of the "objective" anu even "lifeless" woilu of "physical natuie," that we aie foiceu to
see that subjectivity stiictly (oi puiely) speaking cannot be of the woilu, liteially.
This is not to say that it can exist without it, but it ceitainly can be conceiveu to uo
soas uemonstiateu in a famous, anu, to some, infamous, passage in !"#$% ! that is
echoeu in latei wiitings as well. That Busseil was inteiesteu in making such an
unueilying point is cleai fiom !"#$% !! anu its othei, complementaiy aiguments
against minu-bouy ieuuctionism in that text.
2S

25
Foi a goou tieatment of this, see Naicelle, Baniel. "The 0ntological Piioiity of Spiiit 0vei Natuie:
Busseil's Refutation of Psychophysical Paiallelism in !"#$% !!." In 95(=3%325F :3"$F, vol. Su (suppl.),
2uu6 (pp. 7S-82). Whethei consciously oi not, Busseil piesents a kinu of "ontological gambit"
uiiecteu against the >$)+,$=(%)(4 oi physicalistic philosophei. In this language, Neileau-Ponty's
concein might be that Busseil's gambit fails, in the piocess conceuing fai too much to natuial
science. Accoiuing to this view, then, the tianscenuental ego, that is, is too thin a ieeu to put the
buiuen on, so that in the wake of the failuie of tianscenuental phenomenology, theie woulu be only
11
!"#$% !! was unpublisheu in Busseil's life-time but ieau anu stuuieu closely
by Neileau-Ponty, whose positive appiopiiation of that woik lies mostly in the aiea
of the phenomenology of the bouy (the liveu-bouy, oi U#(<).
26
Neileau-Ponty's
ieseivations iegaiuing the woik as a whole, howevei, anu in paiticulai on what he
iegaiueu as its unueilying conceptual confusions, weie consiueiable. Anu the
question of natuiewhat it is, anu how human beings aie to be unueistoou in
ielation to itoccupieu (as we have seen) gieat ueal of Neileau-Ponty's matuie
thought, whose geneial thiust goes against the giain of Busseil's finuings in !"#$% !!.
Busseil uoes not seem eithei to iecognize the tensions in !"#$% !! as funuamental
ones oi iealize that natuie poses a iauical pioblem foi the tianscenuental-
phenomenological methou itself. We might put it this way: wheieas foi Busseil
natuie has to be explaineu in teims of its "constitution" in tianscenuental
consciousness, foi Neileau-Ponty, it is this veiy consciousness which woulu neeu
explaining, in light of its obvious oiigination in the piimoiuial expeiiences of the
liveu-bouy, which is itself an emblem of natuie.

E7 J5$2)#,% :5,## $>" Q3+,
Chaptei Thiee auuiesses Neileau-Ponty's specific foim of phenomenology in
ielation to Busseil's own. It essentially iepiesents my take on the uecaues-olu
question of how best to unueistanu Neileau-Ponty's often contioveisial ieauing of
Busseil. The issue is complex, but aftei thoioughly uocumenting Neileau-Ponty's

the natuialistic-physicalistic option left, a uisastious option. Bence theie is the neeu to iethink
phenomenology in a wholly new light (though still iooteu in peiception, as Busseil hau it).
26
See foi example Neileau-Ponty, Nauiice. "The Philosophei anu Bis Shauow." In 1(C>%. Tians.
Richaiu N. NcCleaiy. Evanston, Illinois: Noithwestein 0niveisity Piess, 1964
12
ie-envisioning of classic phenomenological motifs such as the phenomenological
anu eiuetic ieuuctions fiom the 95#>3A#>3=3CF 3D 9#,4#2)(3> thiough :5# ;(%(<=#
$>" )5# !>?(%(<=#, I aigue finally that the Fiench philosophei's mannei of
appiopiiation of Busseil is peisuasive but also, moie inteiestingly, highly "oiganic."
I use this teim not only in the sense that it uiaws on Busseil in a natuial mannei, so
to speak, but moie paiticulaily in the sense that it embouies oi instantiates
Neileau-Ponty's style of philosophy anu even his own ontology. Foi example,
Neileau-Ponty's own notions of ambiguity, ieflection, anu paiauox, among otheis,
actually piove to be the key to unlocking the seciet of his Busseil-ieauing. But this
also means that the extent to which one agiees with Neileau-Ponty's ieauing
coiielates somewhat to the uegiee to which one accepts his oveiall philosophical
vision, something that may account foi at least some of the uoggeu opposition to
him fiom ceitain membeis of the "stiong Busseilian" camp, at least. (Neileau-
Ponty's ieauing 3D 5(% 3B> ,#$"(>C of Busseilhis view of the uegiee of his own
faithfulness oi unfaithfulness to the souice, foi exampleis also heie laigely
confiimeu thiough the piism of his own uialectical views anu heimeneutics.)
The fouith chaptei plumbs Neileau-Ponty's wiitings, most paiticulaily the
*$)+,# lectuies, to connect his ieauing of Busseil anu "existentialization" of
phenomenology to his newly ueveloping conceptions of natuie anu, accoiuingly, the
natuie of humanity as well. The *$)+,# lectuie seiies is an excitingly uetaileu anu
uense tiact of oiiginal ieseaich anu textual anu scientific inteipietation that
Neileau-Ponty gave as the heau of the College ue Fiance ovei a peiiou of seveial
yeais, between 19S8 anu 1961, shoitly befoie his untimely ueath. Be ueliveieu
13
them at the same time he was composing his unfinisheu masteipiece :5# ;(%(<=# $>"
)5# !>?(%(<=#, also a text I will also heavily iely on in both Chapteis 4 anu S (it is
effectively Neileau-Ponty's most significant woik since the 95#>3A#>3=3CF 3D
9#,4#2)(3>).
Neileau-Ponty's expiess aim in the lectuies is to initiate a pioject of
"ontology" staiting fiom the iuea of "natuie" as it appeais in the histoiy of Westein
philosophy anu science, paiticulaily in the mouein peiiou uown to his own piesent
uay. This is a suipiising choice foi a self-iuentifieu phenomenologist, but it is
consistent with Neileau-Ponty's own famous asseition that the phenomenological
methou, incluuing the phenomenological anu eiuetic ieuuctions, aie iauically
"incomplete" anu thus, one is safe to concluue, unable to seal consciousness off fiom
the empiiical iealm in the way Busseil, the piogenitoi of the methou, hau intenueu.
(This is not to say that "natuial" means "empiiical," only that theie is a "family
iesemblance" between uoing existential phenomenology anu an aichaeology of
natuie, the ioot of oui living "existence.")
Wheieas in :5# 1),+4)+,# 3D E#5$?(3, anu 95#>3A#>3=3CF 3D 9#,4#2)(3> the
focus hau been on animality anu the liveu-bouythe significance of which iemains
in the latei philosophy (which I uo not, as uo some otheis, ieau in teims of a "bieak"
with the olu, iathei only a ueepening that occasionally piompts a coiiection),
Neileau-Ponty now bioauens his inquiiy to Being as a whole, theieby finuing
himself inquiiing into natuie as a fielu of life piioi to the uivision of "subject" anu
"object." Natuie tuins out to be nothing like eithei the "objective Natuie" of
scientists oi the "noematic pole" of Busseilian tianscenuental consciousness, since
14
it is, in a piofounu sense, foievei beyonu any poweis of "constitution." Remaikably
anu impoitantly, Neileau-Ponty uoes not abanuon the phenomenological attituue oi
stanu-point of ieflective thought in favoi of a holistic immeision in pie-ieflective
life. Bis vision is one of the human being's inevitable belongingness $>" alienation
fiom natuiethat is, fiom 5(A%#=D85#,%#=D. Buman existence is theiefoie self-
inteiiupting, though not to the point of iealizing a Saitiean uisconnection fiom the
whole spectacle of Being, in whose inteinal "folu" human consciousness takes its
iightful place. It is, howevei, a conuitioneu consciousness, just as fieeuom foi
Neileau-Ponty is a conuitioneu fieeuom. In eithei case, one can put the emphasis on
eithei the fiist oi the seconu teim anu finu, in each case, an impoitant nuance that
illumines a unique siue of existence.
Nuch of the most inteiesting mateiial in the *$)+,# lectuies piesents these
iueas inuiiectly thiough Neileau-Ponty's oiiginal inteipietations of such
philosophical figuies as Bescaites, Spinoza, Kant, Schelling, anu Beigson, as well the
finuings of contempoianeous scientists. Neileau-Ponty's latei conception of natuie,
anu a new ontological vocabulaiy to go with it, hau been gestating foi a long time,
since his fiist woiks in fact. Natuie, as we have alieauy seen, comes to take on the
meaning of what Schelling calleu the "baibaious piinciple" of the ieal, oi again "wilu
Being," which cannot be biought in a tianspaient way within the oibit of ieflection.
Neileau-Ponty's ciitique of tianscenuental phenomenology is appaient heie (much
as Schelling ciiticizeu the "ieflexivity" of Begel anu iuealism geneially). It seems as
though Neileau-Ponty's "natuie" is one which somehow, fiom within itself, gives
iise to subjectivity anu ieflectionanu theieby "tianscenus itself" while iemaining
15
opaque to itself at the same time. (This opacity is ieflecteu in the motto "we aie
given to ouiselves.") The paiallel to Schelling's own *$)+,25(=3%325(# is
unmistakable, as aie the iomantic iesonances of his unueistanuing of natuie
geneially.
27
But what is gone is "intellectual intuition" oi the claim to an insight into
a "highei oiuei" of being.

J7 J5$2)#, Q(?#
The final chaptei is a systematic exploiation of one funuamental uiffeience
between Busseil (anu peihaps the vast majoiity of tiauitional philosophy) anu
Neileau-Ponty, anu it peitains to theii appioach to philosophyanu thought
itself. Is philosophy best appieciateu as a pioblem-solving enteipiise, as Busseil
believes, oi iathei as a meuitation on paiauoxes, themselves beyonu any simple
"solution". Neileau-Ponty finus the ultimate tiuth of the human conuition to consist
in a ceitain "uialectical" contiauiction which, howevei, unlike Begel's veision, uoes
not finu a iesolution in something "highei," such as an absolute stanu-point.
Neileau-Ponty is ultimately a philosophei of paiauox, which is what explains the
title of the piesent uisseitation, "The Paiauox of Natuie..." It is iegaiuing the
pioblem of natuieat once the home of human spiiit, as well as its peimanent
otheithat Neileau-Ponty finus one of his most fiuitful applications of what he
calls in :5# ;(%(<=# $>" )5# !>?(%(<=# the methou of "inteiiogation."

27
Watson mentions Novalis in this connection. (Watson, Stephen B. "Neileau-Ponty's
Phenomenological Itineiaiy Fiom Bouy Schema to Situateu Knowleuge: 0n Bow We Aie anu Bow We
Aie Not to 'Sing the Woilu.'" ^$>+% O#$", WinteiSpiing Issue, 9.2, 2uu7. Amheist, NY: Tiivium
Publications, p. SS4-S49.) Robeit valliei has wiitten his uisseitation, not publisheu unfoitunately, on
the topic of Schelling anu Neileau-Ponty. ("Institution: 0f Natuie, Life, anu Neaning in Neileau-Ponty
anu Schelling." BePaul 0niveisity, 2uu1)
16
0f couise, Busseil himself makes "paiauox" a cential pait of the uiscouise of
phenomenologyin the naiiow sense that he nevei ceases fiist of all to emphasize
the uttei countei-intuitiveness of the "ievolutionaiy" peispective of tianscenuental
phenomenology, of the enoimous effoit it takes to oveituin (2$,$-) the common
view ("3[$) that places subjectivity at the meicy of the spatio-tempoial-causal
woilu, iathei than vice-veisa. Yet he also speaks eloquently in the J,(%(% about what
he calls the "paiauox of subjectivity""paiauox" heie moie in the moie Neileau-
Pontian sense of "antinomy"namely the paiauox that subjectivity is at once a pait
of the woilu (in its embouieu foim, in inuiviuual consciousnesses), even as it is the
tianscenuental conuition foi the veiy possibility of the woilu (what Busseil
contioveisially calls "absolute" existence as opposeu to the "ielative" existence of
the woilu). In an impoitant way, this, too, is a paiauox of natuie: foi the woilu
natuieis both the conuition of the possibility of consciousness, even as
consciousness is the conuition foi the possibility of the woilu. But Busseil offeis a
"solution" to the paiauox by making a uistinction between two types of subjectivity,
anu offeiing one piioiity ovei the othei. As we have alieauy seen, such a solution
will not uo foi Neileau-Ponty. Anu in the enu, Busseil is no less sympathetic to
antinomies than most of the canonical thinkeis of the Westein philosophical
tiauition, fiom Aiistotle (K#)$25F%(4%, Book III) onwaiu.

17
!!!+ 8%"(4'.)%"

In Busseil, the thematic of natuie initially asseits itself in that philosophei's
famous (though cleaily ambiguous) iejection of the "natuial attituue" anu his stiong
uistinction between "woilu" anu "consciousness," anu it extenus in Neileau-Ponty's
woik to the lattei's fine-giaineu attempts, thiough his life-long stuuies of biology
anu psychology, to negotiate between this soit of uualism anu the equal uangei, in
his eyes, of a puiely scientific "natuialism." Neileau-Ponty eventually settles on an
inteipietation of the "phenomenological ieuuction" as a ueepening of the "natuial"
attituue iathei than a flight to puie consciousnessoi, as Neileau-Ponty
paiauoxically states it (in Begelian teims), it is only a uepaituie by way of ietuining
to ouiselves. In this way, Neileau-Ponty's lectuie couise on natuiea focal text of
this uisseitation, along with !"#$% ! anu !! anu :5# ;(%(<=# $>" )5# !>?(%(<=#can be
seen to be the culmination of an on-going ciitique of Busseilian "tianscenuental"
phenomenology in favoi of a moie "existential-natuialistic"at once
phenomenologically thick anu scientifically infoimeuvaiiety, which places human
subjectivity at the heait of natuie, oi Being, iathei than outsiue oi above it. The
consequence is that foi Neileau-Ponty, phenomenology is not a new science oi a
magic key to unlock philosophical puzzles once anu foi all; iathei, it is the
witnessing of the miiaculous coheience of contiauictoiy tiuths in the spectacle of
existence.
Fiom the beginning, Neileau-Ponty iefuses to auopt a methou that woulu
allow foi the woilu's thoiough-going constitution in the minu. At the same time, he
18
explicitly piioiitizeu what we might call the "fiist-peisonality" of the
phenomenological methou ovei the nave-iealist methou of most so-calleu
"natuialists." The "natuialistic" methou Neileau-Ponty anu Busseil (not to mention
Beiueggei) oppose is that of taking the woilu as something fiist self-constituteu, so
to speak, anu then latei expeiienceu oi not expeiienceu, uepenuing on causal
conuitions that obtain between "subjects" anu the woilu as "object." In Neileau-
Ponty's way of thinking, human subjectivity, oi "spiiit" bioauly speaking, beais an
intiinsic ielation with the woilu it lives-thiough, peiceives, anu unueistanus, but at
the same time, it is alienateu fiom this woilu at a level which suggests a twisting oi
bieaking-apait ("#5(%4#>4#) at the ioot level of being itself. Neileau-Ponty's analysis
of "natuie" anu phenomenology maiks a tuin towaius what I call Neileau-Ponty's
"semi-natuialistic" veision of the phenomenological pioject; "natuialistic" because
it situates human subjectivity oi spiiit in teims that insciibe it in a laigei matiix of
being, but only "semi-" natuialistic because it is not the full-blown oi "ieuuctive"
natuialism of a kinu that, once again, both Busseil anu Neileau-Ponty vigoiously
opposeu.

19
8209#-$ :"-; <'..-$4=. >$0".(-"&-"#04 ,2-"%5-"%4%?6
)" !"#$% !
@A
; >2- B0.)( ,%.)#)%"

!+ !"#$%&'(#)%"; !"#$% ! 0"& #2- ,$%C-(# %1 >$0".(-"&-"#04 ,2-"%5-"%4%?6

!"#$% ! uemanus oui attention both foi the boluness anu oiiginality of its
iueas anu foi being an unueniable milestone in Busseil's caieei as well as a
wateisheu moment in the histoiy of the phenomenological movement. It is the fiist
text in which Busseil, the effective founuei of the movement as we know it touay,
29

foimally intiouuces some of his most famous anu uistinctive theoiies, incluuing the
phenomenological-tianscenuental #23456 anu the phenomenological-tianscenuental
ieuuction.
Su
It also contains pieliminaiy attempts at a iigoious uefinition of

28
The full title of the woik is !"#$% 9#,)$(>(>C )3 $ 9+,# 95#>3A#>3=3CF $>" )3 $ 95#>3A#>3=3C(4$=
95(=3%325F RQ(,%) E33HT. I will iefei to it thioughout this text as !"#$% ! foi shoit, as is common
piactice.
29
Bientano, Busseil's teachei, ieviveu the meuieval notion of intentionality anu piacticeu a
iuuimentaiy (anu aiguably "psychological") foim of what he teimeu "phenomenology," but Busseil's
U3C(4$= !>?#%)(C$)(3>% anu !"#$% ! aie geneially cieuiteu foi initiating the school known touay as
"phenomenology," though Beiueggei's 1927 woik E#(>C $>" :(A# also contiibuteu stiongly to the
way the iuea of "phenomenology" eventually came to be ieceiveu anu inteipieteu.
Su
Busseil sometimes makes a stiong uistinction between the "phenomenological" anu the
"tianscenuental" ieuuctions, which is something I will biing up again below (IIB) with iespect to
Busseil's famous />4F4=32$#"($ E,()$>>(4$ aiticle on phenomenology. But in !"#$% !, he tieats them
as having the same extension, only iefeiiing to uiffeient aspects of a single piocess. Thus he
uistinguishes them as follows: "...we shall, on most occasions, speak of 25#>3A#>3=3C(4$= ,#"+4)(3>%
(but also, with iefeience to theii collective unity, we shall speak of )5# phenomenological ieuuction)
anu, accoiuingly, D,3A $> #2(%)#A3=3C(4$= 23(>) 3D ?(#B |my italics heiej, we shall iefei to
tianscenuental ieuuctions." (!"#$% !, 66) In othei woius, the uistinction as given heie is meiely one of
peispective, anu accoiuingly I will often use the two teims"phenomenological ieuuction" anu
"tianscenuental ieuuction" inteichangeably, except when the exposition uemanus that they
tempoiaiily be unueistoou as uistinct. (What goes foi the ieuuction in this case goes foi the #23456
as well, foi they aie companion concepts.)
20
phenomenology as uistinct fiom othei sciences ("natuial" anu "human") anu the
intiouuction of the teiminology (noesis anu noema, natuial anu tianscenuental
attituues, constitution) so chaiacteiistic of Busseil's subsequent technical
phenomenological uiscussions. It is, then, easily on pai in impoitance with Busseil's
eailiei anu similaily path-bieaking U3C(4$= !>?#%)(C$)(3>%.
S1

Yet even in compaiison to othei publisheu texts by Busseil, !"#$% ! is not a
paiticulaily easy text to unueistanu oi unpack. It is highly abstiact anu iaiely
pauses to explain the significance oi philosophical context of its analyses, taking this
backgiounu moie oi less foi gianteu. As Paul Ricoeui points out, the motivations of
the woik, iooteu in a confiontation with skepticism, aie best uisceineu thiough
unpublisheu texts anu lectuies fiom the peiiou between 19uS anu 191S, as well as
with the help of the wiitings of Busseil's iemaikable assistant Eugen Fink.
S2
Inueeu,
the actual text of !"#$% ! ieaus at times like a staitei's tiaining manual, in this case
foi the piactice of a new phenomenological methou of thinking anu analysis. Yet the
"manual" is also a iecoiu of self-uiscoveiy anu has the feel of a woik in piogiess, as
Busseil was himself woiking thiough many of its iueas anu theii implications, not
all of which, as is cleai fiom his latei intiouuctoiy texts, aie fully woikeu out in its
pages.

S1
Busseil, Eumunu. U3C(4$= !>?#%)(C$)(3>%. Tians. }. N. Finulay. Lonuon: Routleuge, 19uuu1 (2nu,
ieviseu euition 191S) (Beieaftei U!)
S2
In Ricoeui's woius: "Finally, it must be saiu that !"#$% ! is a book whose meaning iemains
43>4#$=#" anu that one is inevitably inclineu to look foi its meaning elsewheie." See: Ricoeui, Paul. 0
_#F )3 /"A+>" O+%%#,=M% !"#$% !. Tians. Bonu Baiiis anu }acqueline Bouchaiu Spuilock. (Tians.
ieviseu by Pol vanuevelue, eu.) Nilwaukee: Naiquette 0niveisity Piess, 1996 (pp. S6-7) Beieaftei
_#F. Ricoeui ielies heavily on the Busseil-appioveu essay by Fink, "Bie phnomenologische
Philosophie Eumunu Busseils in uei gegenwitigen Kiitik" (19SS), to fill in some of the gaps left by
Busseil himself. Neileau-Ponty was to uo the same latei on.
21
It woulu be impossible to conuense all of !"#$% ! in the space of one chaptei,
let alone to show how it builus on Busseil's consiueiable output befoie its
publication, oi foi that mattei how his still latei thinking ielates to !"#$% !. Inueeu,
!"#$% ! is wiitten with ieaueiship of the U! laigely being piesumeu. Ceitain of the
lattei's iueas aie ievisiteu anewintentionality, foi examplewhile otheis aie
enfolueu implicitly into the substance of newei ieflections.
SS
It is necessaiy foi the
puiposes of the piesent woik foi us to sketch out !"#$% !'s main aigument (if this is
the iight woiu) anu its basic oiientation towaius some of the funuamental questions
it poses to itself, conceining especially: the natuie of consciousness anu the
ielationship of consciousness to the woilu; the uefinition of phenomenology as a
"tianscenuental" (as well as eiuetic) science that eschews the "natuial attituue"
while seeking to explain its contents; the iueas of "tianscenuence" anu
"immanence"; anu the question of the scope anu meaning of the phenomenological
#23456 anu ieuuction, the lattei question beaiing of couise on the cential issue of
the phenomenological methou. These aie all inteiielateu questions; inueeu, one
might even go so fai as to say (in Beiueggeiian style peihaps) that they aie "the
same" question. Foi ioughly, they all concein the unueilying ielationship of
consciousness to woiluoi, put in anothei way, subjectivity anu natuie. We cannot

SS
Foi example, in !"#$% ! Busseil takes foi gianteu the notion that phenomenology ueals with "acts"
of consciousness, whose "meaning-intentions" aie eithei "empty" oi "fulfilleu." This piinciple is of
couise founuational to Busseil's iueas on peiception. Foi example, while I can see oi "intenu" one
siue of a uie, I geneially also "intenu" its hiuuen siues as well. The foimei intention is fulfilleu by
intuitive eviuencethe givenness of the uie in its coloi, shape, etc., as it shows itself to me visually.
The lattei "signitive" intentions aie not fulfilleu anu aie thus "empty"unless oi until othei siues of
the uie aie seen by me. The uistinction is impoitant foi it allows Busseil to explain how it is that we
peiceive )5# "(# anu not meiely "this siue of" the uie. We peiceive objects, in othei woius, not meiely
piofiles. This is one of Busseil's stiategies, so to say, foi oveicoming the "appeaiance-ieality" uiviue
that has hampeieu pievious theoiies of peiception.

22
hope to uo full justice to the many angles one might use to appioach anu auuiess
Busseil's multifaceteu answei to these questions. To take one example, we will have
to gloss ovei the significant contioveisies suiiounuing Busseil's concept of the
"noema"
S4
oi of its ielation to "fulfilment."
SS
Nonetheless, many of the soits of
funuamental pioblems that aiise in such uebates will be toucheu on in othei
sections of the oveiview pioviueu below. This oveiview, along with some
inuepenuent commentaiy anu biief iefeiences to some of the seconuaiy liteiatuie
on !"#$% !, will constitute the bulk of this chaptei.
Yet given the ielatively "inteimeuiaiy" status of !"#$% ! in the couise of
Busseil's own lifelong task (fiom !"#$% ! onwaiu) of explaining tianscenuental
phenomenology, it might still be wonueieu why we aie concentiating in this chaptei
on this paiticulai text. Neileau-Ponty, foi example, iegaiueu !"#$% ! as a belonging
to a "miuule" oi "tiansition" peiiou between Busseil's "logicism," piesumably
culminating in the U3C(4$= !>?#%)(C$)(3>%, anu the latei supposeu "existentialism" of

S4
This question has been wiitten about enulessly, especially in context of the uebate between those
who inteipiet the noema as "peicept" (uuiwitsch, Caiins, et al.) anu those, leau chiefly by Fllesual,
who inteipiet it as a vaiiant of Fiege's 1(>>. Foi a nice iecap of the uebate, see: Solomon, Robeit C.
"Busseil's Concept of the Noema." In O+%%#,=I /[23%()(3>% $>" 022,$(%$=%, Fieueiick A. Elliston anu
Petei NcCoimack, eus. Notie Bame: 0niveisity of Notie Bame Piess, 1977 (pp. S4-69). Solomon
begins his essay by noting: "It is geneially agieeu that the concept of the >3#A$ is one of the themes,
if not the cential theme, of Busseil's phenomenological philosophy." }. N. Nohanty is seemingly in
peifect agieement when he makes a passing iefeience to "the all-impoitant iuea of >3#A$ anu
noetic-noematic stiuctuie, iegaiueu by many as constituting the most impoitant anu oiiginal pait of
|!"#$% !j." (Nohanty, }. N. :5# 95(=3%325F 3D /"A+>" O+%%#,=I 0 O(%)3,(4$= .#?#=32A#>). New Baven:
Yale 0niveisity Piess, 2uu8, p. S72) Anothei topic we will have to leave out, though in this case
because it is almost wholly absent fiom the !"#$% itself, is the topic of time-constitution, which latei
figuies ueeply in all of Busseil's most auvanceu analyses.
SS
Foi an excellent summaiy of the uebate, see Pol vanuevelue's intiouuction to _#F (pp. 16-2u). Also
of note is Ricoeui's iemaik, inspiieu also by the uifficulties suiiounuing the noema, anu quoteu by
vanuevelue in the intiouuction, that 'thus, ieality always seems to escape tianscenuental
constitution."
23
the "life-woilu" philosophy, best known thiough the J,(%(%.
S6
uiven such views, why
not ieview Busseil's latei iefoimulations of much of this mateiial. Noieovei, as
mentioneu above, Busseil himself latei aumits to the uisauvantagesthough not
necessaiily inauequaciesof the "Caitesian" way to the ieuuction piesenteu heiein.
Be also uevelopeu a new foim of phenomenology, "genetic" oi "uynamic"
phenomenology, which supplements (anu some say supplants) the "static"
phenomenology of !"#$% !7
The fact iemains, howevei, that Busseil himself nevei totally abanuoneu
eithei the static oi the "Caitesian" phenomenological methou. Regaiuing the lattei,
foi example, no less than the authoi of the heteiouox text :5# V)5#, O+%%#,=, Bonn
Welton notes that "|tjhe existence of the J$,)#%($> K#"()$)(3>%, anu the fact that
|Busseilj iecommenueu its Fiench tianslation to ieaueis as late as 19SS even as he
began ueveloping the text of the J,(%(%.convinces us that |the Caitesian way to the
ieuuctionj was nevei oveithiown."
S7
Fuitheimoie, Busseil nevei abanuoneu the
basic fiamewoik of "tianscenuental subjectivity" anu its wholly non-natuialistic
essence. !"#$% ! piesents a bioauly faithful pictuie of the basic thiust of
tianscenuental phenomenology, anu this fact, combineu with its histoiical
impoitance anu the fact that it is the "piequel" to !"#$% !!, a text equally if not moie
vital foi oui task, aie, I believe, enough to iecommenu it foi uetaileu investigation at
the piesent time.

S6
See Neileau-Ponty, Nauiice. :5# 95#>3A#>3=3CF 3D 9#,4#2)(3>. Ti. Colin Smith. New Yoik:
Routleuge anu Kegan Paul, 1962 (p. S2un). J,(%(% iefeis to Busseil's text :5# J,(%(% 3D /+,32#$>
14(#>4#% $>" :,$>%4#>"#>)$= 95#>3A#>3=3CFI 0> !>),3"+4)(3> )3 95#>3A#>3=3C(4$= 95(=3%325F7 Tians.
Baviu Caii. Evanston: Noithwestein 0niveisity Piess, 197u.
S7
Welton, Bonn. :5# V)5#, O+%%#,=I :5# O3,(`3>% 3D :,$>%4#>"#>)$= 95#>3A#>3=3CF. Inuianapolis:
Inuiana 0niveisity Piess, 2uuu (p. 118). Beieaftei "Welton."
24
!!+ '()*+, 0"& ,2-"%5-"%4%?)(04 D-&'(#)%"

07 !>),3"+4)(3>
The heait of !"#$% !, anu piobably the signatuie of phenomenology itself as it
is populaily known, is the phenomenological ieuuction. It is all but impossible to
give a biief uefinition of it, but any account must begin with the concept of "#23456"
oi the "suspension" oi "biacketing" of all one's beliefs iegaiuing exteinal existence
of the objects of peiception (anu of couise of any othei mental act). Thiough this all-
impoitant suspension, one effects a iauically new "attituue," the phenomenological
attituue, accoiuing to which the woilu is seen to be as it is foi the consciousness, oi
subjectivity, that beholus it. In this way, all "objective ieality" is "ieuuceu" to its
significance foi consciousnessoi, alteinately, to its meaningfulness as a
"noematic" coiielate to the "noetic" acts of a consciousness in which the woilu is
"constituteu."
S8

The jaigon-lauen uefinition given above must, howevei, be caiefully
explaineu. Fuitheimoie, many possible misinteipietations must be obviateuat
least iegaiuing Busseil's own intentionssuch as the inteipietation of the
ieuuction as being a means to expose the illusoiiness of the exteinal ieality. This is
not at all Busseil's intention oi ieflective of his actual view. At the same time, it

S8
This language will be explaineu below (IvA). Note that the teim "ieuuction" uoes not have the
mouein meaning of "ieuuctiveness" foi Busseil; theie is no question heie of conveiting objective
ieality into a subjective substiatum. "Reuuce" means, etymologically, "to biing oi leau back," anu this
is Busseil's intenueu meaning. The ieuuction leaus back a consciousness that loses itself in its
woiluback to its own achievements as a sense-bestowing anu woilu-constituting being.
25
cannot be uenieu that Busseil uiu (> %3A# %#>%# piioiitize subjectivity ovei objective
"ieality." Busseil uiu not ueny the existence of such a ieality, but as we will see,
unuei the ieuuction it acquiies a wholly new sensenamely, that of being the %#>%#
"minu-inuepenuent ieality" (along with innumeiable othei senses which give the
woilu its "intelligibility"). To put it anothei (un-Busseilian) way, while we can say
that theie is a woilu that tianscenus the minu, it only uoes so D3, the minu,
S9

acquiiing its meaningfulness $% such a tianscenuent being in this way alone. Thus, it
can in a ceitain way be calleu inuepenuent (in its existence, oi "thatness") fiom the
minu in one way anu yet wholly uepenuent on it (foi its meaning, oi "whatness") in
anothei. Consciousness itselfin its "puiifieu" anu "tianscenuental" foimis, by
contiast, uepenuent on nothing. Anu it is solely because of this asymmetiy, anu not
because of some supposeu "non-existence" of exteinal ieality, that Busseil calls
consciousness (as opposeu to the tianscenuent woilu as such) "absolute." All of
these notions will be fuithei exploieu inuiviuually, howevei, in Pait Iv below.
In the sections that follow, I will pioceeu to uesciibe the ieuuction as it is
outlineu in !"#$% !. Along the way, I will be flagging some of the most significant anu
contioveisial issues of inteipietation, as well as possible inconsistencies, mysteiies,
oi ambiguities in Busseil's account, which can be (anu usually alieauy have been)
iaiseu. In uoing so, it is inevitable that some commentaiy be mixeu with "puie"
uesciiption (contiaiy to the spiiit of Busseil's own methouology!) even befoie the

S9
I will at times use the woiu "minu" foi "consciousness," uespite the potential hazaius that come
theiewith. "Ninu" can easily be ieifieu, wheieas by "consciousness" (E#B+%%)%)#(>) Busseil means
anything but an "object" oi 'substance" in the classical Caitesian sense. Nonetheless, it is
cumbeisome to use the woiu "consciousness" solely to tianslate "E#B+%%)%)#(>," anu hence synonyms
will occasionally, though cautiously be useu.
26
final section, which is piimaiily commentaiy. But my unueilying goal is to piesent
Busseil's conception of the ieuuction as accuiately as I can, anu fuitheimoie with
minimal iecouise to jaigon (though Busseil is, aftei all, coining many new teims
heie), anu in a way that is at least plausible as an inteipietation of just what Busseil
was aftei. Nonetheless, extenueu quotations aie occasionally calleu foi, as much is
to be gaineu (anu claiifieu) thiough a uiiect examination of Busseil's piecise
phiaseology of his own main iueas.

E7 :5# *$)+,$= $>" )5# :,$>%4#>"#>)$= 0))()+"#%
The stoiy of the ieuuction, so to speak, begins with a uesciiption of the
"natuial attituue."
4u
So what, then, is the natuial attituue. It woulu help to begin by
contiasting it with what Busseil alteinatively calls the "philosophical,"
"phenomenological," anu "tianscenuental" attituues (all of these being equivalent in
the cuiient context).
41
The natuial attituue is the uefault, "noimal" attituue in which
we tacitly oi non-tacitly fiame oui (mostly peiceptual) expeiiences; the alteinative
attituue is one in which we have uisengageu fiom the piesuppositions of the natuial
attituue, paiticulaily iegaiuing objective existence anu non-existence, anu have
taken up a new appieciation of the oiigins of meaningful expeiience in the uepths of

4u
0f couise, what is possibly most contioveisial about the ieuuction is how it can be "begun" at all,
but we will come to that latei (Pait v).
41
This pictuie of "attituues" will become impoitantly expanueu anu eniicheu in !"#$% !!, in which the
natuial attituue is uiviueu into "peisonalistic" anu "natuialistic" foims. These will be uiscusseu
closely in the next chaptei.
27
subjectivityin ouiselves: "I must lose the woilu by #23456, in oiuei to iegain it by
a univeisal self-examination."
42

But what uoes Busseil mean by $))()+"# (/(>%)#==+>C). Amazingly, Busseil
nowheie uefines his technical usage of the teim in the text of the !"#$% (oi
anywheie, as fai as I can tell), peihaps owing to its status as basic to unueistanuing
the ieuuction itself. Foi now, we will see how Busseil uses the teim; we will ietuin
to the question of how it might best be uefineu at the enu of this section.
To uesciibe the natuial attituue, Busseil piesents a seiies of obseivations of
what expeiience in this attituue consists in:

"I am conscious of a woilu enulessly spieau out in space, enulessly becoming anu having enulessly
become in time. I am conscious of it: that signifies, above all, that intuitively I finu it immeuiately, that
I expeiience it. By my seeing, touching, heaiing, anu so foith, anu in the uiffeient moues of sensuous
peiception, coipoieal physical things.aie %(A2=F )5#,# D3, A#, a3> 5$>"b in the liteial anu figuiative
sense."
4S

In the natuial attituue, he continues, "we. |aiej human beings who aie living
natuially, objectivating, juuging, feeling, willing."
44
But animate beings anu people
aie theie foi me also: "I look up; I see them. I giasp theii hanus."
4S

The natuial attituue is "natuial" fiist of all in the sense of its eveiyuay
peivasiveness as well as its uefault chaiactei. It comes to us "natuially." Roughly,
then, we can chaiacteiize this as a conuition in which we as noimal, auult human
beings finu ouiselves ioutinely anu as it weie automatically, just insofai as we aie

42
Busseil, Eumunu. J$,)#%($> K#"()$)(3>%I 0> !>),3"+4)(3> )3 95#>3A#>3=3CF. Tians. Boiion Caiins.
Boiuiecht: Kluwei Acauemic Publisheis, 1999 (p. 1S7). Beieaftei JK.
4S
!"#$% !, p. S1
44
Ibiu., p. S1
4S
Ibiu., p. S1
28
alive anu awake (anu maybe asleep anu uieaming as well), in which we peiceive
theie to be objects, as well as people anu value-chaiacteiistics of things, to exist
outsiue us anu "on hanu." Busseil stiesses that the woilu as we know it in the
natuial attituue is not simply the woilu of science oi a "mateiial woilu"; thus we
"natuially" peiceive a "B3,=" 3D 3<c#4)% B()5 ?$=+#%G $ B3,=" 3D C33"%G $ 2,$4)(4$=
B3,="-b
46
In teims of "mateiial" objects, we peiceive not simply (oi viitually evei,
unless we aie scientists in a "scientific attituue") "mattei," but things like "tables"
anu "pianos"objects with cultuial meaning-accietions. The natuial attituue is also
one in which we think anu cogitate, at least in the eveiyuay (non-
phenomenological!) way.
47
But most peitinently with iegaiu to the
phenomenological #23456, in the natuial attituue we accept the woilu as a aD$4)+$==F
#[(%)#>) $4)+$=()F $>" $=%3 $44#2) () $% () 2,#%#>)% ()%#=D )3 d+%e $% D$4)+$==F #[(%)(>C."
48

Empiiical science anu its moue of cognition peitain to this woilu, piecisely taken as
existent in the sense outlineu. Bence science (as an activity anu a foim of thought)
itself belongs to the "natuial attituue," a fact Busseil nevei tiies of exploiting to the
auvantage of philosophy as he conceives it.
Busseil iegaius his uesciiption of the natuial attituue as pie-theoietical; that
is, it is not a constiuct, but simply what is uiiectly intuiteu to be the case about
natuial, non-tianscenuental expeiience:

46
Ibiu., p. SS (Busseil's italics)
47
Ibiu., p. SS
48
Ibiu, p. S7 (Busseil's italics)
29
"What we piesenteu as a chaiacteiization of the givenness belonging to the natuial attituue, anu
theiefoie as a chaiacteiization of the attituue itself, was a piece of puie uesciiption 2,(3, )3 $>F
a)5#3,Fb7"
49

Be then notes that by "theoiies" he means "pieconceiveu opinions of eveiy soit."
Busseil claims to "keep these at a uistance" stiictly, a stance he maintains
thioughout his caieei, in keeping with his commitment to go to "the things
themselves" anu by-pass the coiiupting influence of "piesuppositions" of any kinu.
(Bence his famousanu famously impeiileuuieam of ueveloping a
"piesuppositionless science.") But while Busseil's uesciiption of the natuial attituue
may be pie-theoietical, it is moie than appaient fiom it that B#G insofai as we uwell
in the natuial attituue, aie all a type of "nave iealist," to use the mouein pailance.
Thus, Busseil's unueistanuing of the natuial attituue may best be unueistoou
thiough a simple consiueiation of what somebouy unbiaseu by, say, "fancy"
metaphysical theoiies unueistanus himself to be expeiiencing eveiyuay, in the most
thoioughly oiuinaiy sense imaginable, as a living human being. It is this
thoioughgoing aveiageness, the basic meuiociity of existence, that Busseil
continually contiasts with the uisconceiting anu veitiginous heights of the
tianscenuental attituue. It is not as though Busseil uismisses natuial expeiience; to
the contiaiy, the whole puipose of phenomenology is to unueistanu it. It is just this
embiace of the oiuinaiy that uistinguishes phenomenology fiom moie "speculative"
soits of philosophical enueavois. Anu yet theie is a tianscenuental, "noetic-
noematic" uimension of meaning-constitution, a iealm in which oiuinaiy expeiience
becomes claiifieu in teims of its souice anu tiue meaning. It is thiough

49
Ibiu.G p. S6
30
tianscenuental investigation that natuial consciousness comes to know the
founuations of the expeiientiality it takes navely foi gianteu. (I will exploie the
tianscenuental level in subsequent sections.) Sebastian Luft helpfully fiames the
natuialtianscenuental uistinction in teims of the classical uivision between "3[$
anu #2(%)#A#:

"When Busseil conceives of the 'natuial' in opposition to the 'philosophical attituue', this echoes the
uistinction between pie-tianscenuental anu tianscenuental stanupoints as a mouein 'veision' of the
"3[$8#2(%)#A# uistinction. The tianscenuental tuin anticipateu by Bescaites, anu taken by Kant,
applies the iealization of the subject-ielativity of the woilu. The tuin to the subject, the 'ieuuction' to
the ego (cogito), becomes the founuation of science. The woilu is not an 'absolute being,' but is
ielative to the expeiiencing subject." (Luft 2uS-4)

Be fuithei explains:

"The uistinction of "3[$ anu #2(%)#A# 'tianslateu' into this conception means: Philosophy that
believes it can opeiate on a 'iealistic' level is bounu to the natuial attituue anu it cannot be ciitical in
the tianscenuental sense. This is not only Busseil's ciitique of pie-tianscenuental philosophy but
especially of his pupils who neglecteu to puisue the tianscenuental path that he hau taken up with
Iueas I (191S).
Su

Luft's explanation is useful, but it must be kept in minu, a fact I will come back to
latei on, that in auuition to being "uoxic" as opposeu to "epistemic," the natuial
attituue foi Busseil is a D$=%# uoxa, a "wiong view." This is impoitant because the
natuial attituue's nave iealism is not only "nave" but, piecisely in showing a
"blinu|nessj to the coiielativity of woilu anu expeiience," (Luft, 2u8) it wiongly
pionounces against just this coiielativity, falsely (though tacitly) affiiming, as Luft
points out, the woilu's $<%3=+)# #[(%)#>4#.

Su
Luft, Sebastian. "Busseil's Theoiy of the Phenomenological Reuuction: Between Life-Woilu anu
Caitesianism." In N#%#$,45 (> 95#>3A#>3=3CF S4, 2uu4 (p. 2u4) Beieaftei, "Luft."
31
Let us fiist ietuin to the initial question of what an "attituue" is supposeu to
be in the fiist place. If we take Busseil foi his woiu, an "attituue" cannot be
explaineu meiely as a psychological state, as the woiu (in English) is ioutinely taken
to uenote. Aftei all, only the natuial attituue piopeily ueseives to be calleu
"psychological," as Busseil himself on occasion uoes call it.
S1
An attituue, then, I
piopose, might best be uefineu as the oiientation in which the paiameteis of
expeiience aie uelimiteu anu uefineu. In the natuial attituue, these paiameteis aie
uefineu, so to speak, by the inteinal anu exteinal hoiizons of tianscenuent things
(anu the "halos" that foim the backgiounu in which we peiceive them), by people
anu living beings, by vaiious acts of fantasy anu memoiy, anu to an extent by oui
self-peiception (anu hence oui own egos). But in the tianscenuental attituue, these
paiameteis shift to something new, a fielu of 43>%)()+)(3>G as well as to the
),$>%4#>"#>)$= #C3 oi "puie consciousness" in which all woiluly beings, incluuing
the empiiical ego, aie themselves constituteu (in which they come to being).
S2
A
shift in attituue is thus a shift of the entiie matiix of intelligibility of thingsa
piefiguiing, peihaps, of Beiueggei's latei concept of "woilu."
SS

S1
Ibiu., p. 126: "In oui case we have, accoiuingly, on the one hanu, the 2%F453=3C(4$= $))()+"# in which
oui natuially focuseu iegaiu is uiiecteu to mental piocessese.g. to a mental piocess of iejoicing
as a %#f+#>4# of mental %)$)#% of human oi beast. 0n the othei hanu, we have the 25#>3A#>3=3C(4$=
$))()+"#." (Busseil's italics) See also p. 172 foi fuithei claiification of what the psychological
attituue involves.
S2
It is tiue that Busseil uoes not iestiict the teim "attituue" to the contiast of natuial anu
tianscenuental attituues: he also speaks of the "eiuetic" attituue, the natuial-scientific attituue, etc..
0ne may still apply oui uefinition, howevei: foi example, in the eiuetic attituue the paiameteis of
expeiience aie essences, iathei than facts. (It neeus to be unueistoou, of couiseas I will uiscuss
belowthat the tianscenuental attituue piesupposes the eiuetic, while the natuial may oi may not
oveilap with eiuetic attituue.)
SS
I am inuebteu to Bi. Pol vanuevelue foi this language of "paiameteis" anu "intelligibility," as well
as to his unueistanuing of Beiueggei's conception of a "woilu," though I woulu not piesume to say he
woulu enuoise my application of these concepts unuei these ciicumstances.
32
J7 95#>3A#>3=3C(4$= /23456
Busseil begins his shift into the new attituue by noticing that, contiaiy to its
spiiit of total self-confiuence, the natuial attituue has some answeiing to uo. Foi
theie aie "piesuppositions" to its "psychological expeiience"
S4
that iemain so fai
unexploieu anu unknown (to natuial consciousness itself). Busseil wants to
investigate these. Beie now a "iauical alteiation" is calleu foi: "a new %)F=# 3D
$))()+"# is neeueu which is #>)(,#=F $=)#,#" in contiast to the natuial attituue in
expeiiencing anu the natuial attituue in thinking."
SS
In oiuei to uemonstiate this
tiansfoimation, Busseil calls fatefully upon the example of Bescaites anu the lattei's
K#"()$)(3>% 3> Q(,%) 95(=3%325F. Subsequently, the way to the ieuuction outlineu in
!"#$% ! is typically calleu the "Caitesian" way. Busseil ceitainly believeu that
Bescaites hau openeu the way to a wholly new fielu of being, which Busseil himself
calls "tianscenuental subjectivity," but he also believeu that Bescaites uiu not
piopeily unueistanu his own achievement anu hence fell away fiom the new peich
almost as soon as he ieacheu it, as we will see below.
Busseil exploits the Caitesian "methou of uoubt" in a new anu oiiginal way.
Thiough his own confiontation with skepticism, Bescaites enacteu this famous
methou in oiuei to ieach the founuation of knowleuge, the self-ceitain "I think, I
am" (43C()3). Busseil now piactices a vaiiation of this methou in oiuei to ieach a
similaily self-eviuent spheie, something he is about to call a spheie of puie
consciousness oi immanence. But Busseil uoes not want to actually "3+<) anything,
ceitainly not the inuubitable existence of the woilu (which is always piesupposeu in

S4
!"#$% !, xix
SS
Ibiu., xix
33
consciousness as its ultimate hoiizon). What he is inteiesteu in is the "$))#A2)" at
uoubt. Foi while we cannot uoubt ceitain things, "we can $))#A2) )3 "3+<) anything
whatevei, no mattei how fiimly convinceu of it, even assuieu of it in an auequate
eviuence, we may be."
S6
The natuie of such an act, the attempt at uoubt, is to
hypothetically place the existence of that which is uoubteu into metaphoiical
"biackets" oi "paientheses." It "#DD#4)% $ 4#,)$(> $>>+=A#>) 3D 23%()(>C anu piecisely
this inteiests us." Theie is no question of negating that which exists, i.e. uenying its
existence. But theie is a suuuen neutiality with iegaiu to this entiie question
something "B53==F 2#4+=($,."
S7
The question of the existence of things is suuuenly
"put out of action," anu in my woius, (>)3 a kinu of puigatoiial "maybe" that
neveitheless allows one to focus on something elsein this case, on the manneis of
givenness of things. This new focus
S8
automatically implicates them as expeiienceu
by someone, i.e., shows them in theii "self-givenness."
As we have saiu, the "paienthesizing" of "positings" of existence is what is
calleu the "#23456." Noie specifically, theie aie seveial types of #23456. What is at
issue now, howevei, is not, foi example, the kinu of #23456 one speaks of in iegaius
to the "biacketing" of featuies unielateu to the stuuy at hanu (foi example, a
scientist biackets all value-pieuicates of "physical" objects anu focuses on theii
spatiotempoial ueteiminations solely, a phenomenological psychologist biackets all
mateiial oi biochemical aspects of an living oiganism, etc.), but iathei the full anu

S6
Ibiu., p. S8
S7
Ibiu., p. S8
S8
It might be noteu that this soit of language"changing focus"woulu not ieally be sufficient foi
Busseil to captuie the iauicality of the new attituue, since it is itself boiioweu fiom expeiience
within the natuial attituue.
34
total biacketing of the question of existence (oi non-existence) of the entiie woilu
(incluuing even oneself insofai as one is pait of the woilu, though this comes
latei)the "thesis of the woilu" (g#=))5#%(%). But can we effect a C=3<$= #23456 of
this soit. Can we put the B53=# of ieality in biackets. This is a question we will
come back to at the enu of this chaptei.

.7 95#>3A#>3=3C(4$=L:,$>%4#>"#>)$= N#"+4)(3>R%T
The biacketing of tianscenuent things is not foi Busseil sufficient, howevei,
to ieach the tianscenuental ego.
S9
It only goes as fai as sealing the psyche off fiom
what might be calleu (fiom a natuial-attituuinal stanu-point, anyway) the "exteinal
woilu." It is heie that Busseil makes anothei inteiesting uepaituie fiom Bescaites.
The ego, too "|isj a ieal 0bject like otheis in the natuial woilu."
6u
This is not tiue
only in the sense that I have a physical bouy, but also in the sense that "I effect
cogitationes, acts of consciousness in both the bioauei anu the naiiowei sense anu
these acts, as belonging to the human subject, aie occuiiences within the same
natuial actuality."
61
(This piinciple of the natuiality of "psychic"as opposeu to
tianscenuentalconsciousness will once again become a cential theme in !"#$% !!.)
In latei wiitings, Busseil uistinguishes between the "phenomenological ieuuction"
anu the "tianscenuental ieuuction," chaiacteiizing the lattei as a fuithei step
beyonu the foimei, piecisely in teims of the fuithei biacketing of the ego. The
phenomenological ieuuction on this unueistanuing effects a univeisal #23456 on the

S9
Noie is saiu about this concept in this section below.
6u
!"#$% !, p. 64
61
Ibiu.
35
natuial woilu, but not upon the ego itself. Bence it is a ieuuction to what might be
calleu "phenomenological psychology" oi the intentional life of consciousness, but
without an explicit iecognitiononly to be supplieu thiough the final,
tianscenuental ieuuctionof the ultimate %3+,4# of meaning, the tianscenuental
ego:

"If the tianscenuental ielativity of eveiy possible woilu uemanus an all-embiacing biacketing, it also
postulates the biacketing of puie psyches anu the puie phenomenological psychology ielateu to
them."

Anu so,

"Accoiuingly, the consistent ieflection on consciousness yielus him time aftei time tianscenuentally
puie uata, anu moie paiticulaily it is intuitive in the moue of new kinu of expeiience, ),$>%4#>"#>)$=
a(>>#,b #[2#,(#>4#."
62

In !"#$% !, Busseil latei comes to unueistanu these two uistinct steps to have been
conflateu.
6S
0nce it is kept in minu, howevei, it is sufficient foi oui puiposes to keep
them both as compiising what Busseil tieats in !"#$% ! as a single
"phenomenological ieuuction"a ieuuction to phenomenological consciousness
anu, theiewith, the tianscenuental ego.
Busseil's biacketing of the (empiiical) ego is a majoi uevelopment that, in
Busseil's unueistanuing, uistinguishes his own methou, at this point, fiom

62
These quotes aie fiom Busseil's />4F4=32$#"($ E,()$>>(4$ aiticle of 1928 (tians. Richaiu E.
Palmei), iepiouuceu in full in: Kockelmanns, }oseph }. /"A+>" O+%%#,=M% 95#>3A#>3=3CF.
Inuianapolis: Puiuue 0niveisity Piess, 1994 (p. 2u9) Kockelmann's souice foi the tianslation is
O+%%#,=I 153,)#, g3,H%7 NcCoimack anu Elliston, eus. Notie Bame, Inu.: 0niveisity of Notie Bame
Piess, 1981 (pp. 21-SS).
6S
See fn. S, above.
36
Bescaites.'
64
Foi the ieuuction uoes not ietieat into a piivate "cogito" oi its theatei
of consciousness; neithei uoes it meiely seize on the essence of consciousness, when
taken in the munuane sense (this is still the task of "psychology").

"Even moie inaccessible to him |Bescaitesj, anu natuially so, was the consiueiation that the ego as it
is uiscloseu within the #23456, existing foi itself, is as yet not at all "an" ego which can have othei oi
many fellow egos outsiue itself. It iemaineu hiuuen fiom Bescaites that all such uistinctions as "I"
anu "you," "insiue" anu "outsiue," fiist "constitute" themselves in the absolute ego."
6S

Busseil unueistanus Bescaites to have 43,,#4)=F uiscoveieu the "absolute
ego" as the "inuubitable" ultimatum of tianscenuental inquiiy, only to have then
misinteipieteu his own uiscoveiy in an impoitant way. In paiticulai, he faileu to
piopeily giasp the natuie of the "I" of the self-ceitain "! think, ! am."
66
The "I" in
question is not A#G .#%4$,)#% oi even some possible inuiviuual empiiical ego, at least
not f+$ psychophysical being, but iathei tianscenuental subjectivitynot $
thinking subject but )5# )5(>H#, $% %+45, tianscenuentally consiueieu, foi whom anu
in whom an entiie woilu is constituteu anu, hence, available in full "self-eviuence"
foi my knowing iegaiu. Fuitheimoie, while Busseil enuoises Bescaites' thesis that
the "I" is in some way moie ceitain than the veiy question of the existence of the
woilu, he laments the lattei's failuie to see that the woilu is still pieseiveu $% $
25#>3A#>3> in the ieuuction. What Bescaites funuamentally misunueistoou is that
the inuubitable self is not the meie "ego-pole" of consciousness oi even psychic
empiiical consciousness itself. It is tianscenuental subjectivity.
67

64
!"#$% !, p. 68
6S
Ibiu., p. 82
66
Ny italics on the Caitesian quote
67
J,(%(%G p7 81. 0ne can also see heie the language of Bescaites' "self-misinteipietation."
37
Yet what iemains aftei the ieuuction is nonetheless a "stieam" of mental life.
Is this the notoiious "tianscenuental ego". }ust what Busseil means by the
"tianscenuental ego" is one of the veiy uifficult pioblems to solve in Busseil
scholaiship. Accoiuing to Baviu Bell, ".the tianscenuental ego is nothing but the
oiuinaiy, common-oi-gaiuen A(>", albeit vieweu fiom within a philosophical oi
tianscenuental peispective." In suppoit of this thesis he cites the following passage
fiom the J,(%(%: "As tianscenuental ego, aftei all, I am the same ego that in the
woiluly spheie is a human ego. What was concealeu fiom me in the human spheie I
ieveal thiough tianscenuental enquiiy."
68
In this spiiit, we woulu peihaps not uo
bauly to unueistanu the tianscenuental ego of !"#$% ! as the self f+$ ),$>%4#>"#>)$=
%25#,# 3D >3#)(4L>3#A$)(4 43>%4(3+%>#%%, with all of its acts anu intentional objects
incluueu, anu unueistoou to constitute itself thiough the laws of tempoiality
(though Busseil elaboiates on this last pait latei). 0f couise, this uefinition might
seem to conflict with Busseil's enigmatic post-!"#$% ! claim that the meaning of
tianscenuental subjectivity is tianscenuental (>)#,%+<c#4)(?()F.
69
But we will have to
piesently leave that complex issue asiue.

68
Bell, Baviu. O+%%#,=. New Yoik: Routlege, 199u (p. 2u7), heieaftei "Bell"; the Busseil quote can be
founu in J,(%(%, p. 264
69
The subtitle of the Fifth Neuitation of the JK (p. 89) states the point uiiectly: "0ncoveiing of the
Spheie of Tianscenuental Being as Nonauological Inteisubjectivity." Theie can be no question but
that Busseil views "inteisubjectivity" heie (anu foi the iest of his caieei) as the authentic meaning of
tianscenuental subjectivity. The tianscenuental ego is not a you oi me, but neithei is it an empiiical
community (as this coulu leau to ielativism, one of Busseil's avoweu enemies), but somehow an "I"
that is a "we" in a tianscenuental iegistei. We cannot heie ieheaise the steps of Busseil's elaboiate
uesciiption of the mannei in which the being of 3)5#, #C3% is "evinceu anu veiifieu in the iealm of the
tianscenuental ego." (p. 9u) Foi a uetaileu exposition anu inteipietation of Busseil's view see:
Zahavi, Ban. O+%%#,= $>" :,$>%4#>"#>)$= !>)#,%+<c#4)(?()FI 0 N#%23>%# )3 )5# U(>C+(%)(4L9,$CA$)(4
J,()(f+#. Tianslateu by Elizabeth A. Behnke. Athens: 0hio 0niveisity Piess, 2uu1. (See especially pp.
1S9-66).
38
/7 0> !>)#,=+"#I V> )5# K3)(?$)(3> 3D )5# N#"+4)(3>
Befoie fuithei exploiing the philosophical anu ontological implications of the
ieuuction (see Pait Iv below), we might at this stage ask what actually motivates it
in the fiist place. So fai, we have piesenteu the ieuuction laigely as Busseil (in !"#$%
!) himself uoes, namely as a pioceuuie foi getting at the tiuth of expeiience anu the
woilu. But what makes Busseil think )5(% 2$,)(4+=$, A#)53" is necessaiy, as opposeu
to otheis. Beie it is impoitant to unueistanu that Busseil fits into a veiy olu
tiauition in philosophy, namely the quest foi what might be calleu ieal anu secuie
knowleuge. Along these lines, the philosophei speaks of the elemental quest foi
D,##"3Ain this case the "epistemic fieeuom" that can also be uesciibeu as the
fieeuom fiom eiioi anu bias, illusion anu empty abstiaction. Foi it is the puisuit of
ceitainty, claiity, anu fieeuom fiom piejuuice that conspiie to piouuce the piecisely
Busseilian veision of phenomenology that buists foith out of !"#$% !. See, foi
example, Busseil's iefeience to "C#>+(># fieeuom fiom piejuuice"
7u
in the fiist pait,
oi Busseil's own ueclaiation that the goal of the phenomenological ieuuctions is to
ieach "the fiee vista of 'tianscenuentally' puiifieu phenomena anu, theiewith, the
fielu of phenomenology in oui peculiai sense."
71

What we can gathei, then, is that (tianscenuental) phenomenology is
motivateu by a thiist foi a ceitain D,##"3A, in paiticulai a fieeuom fiom
2,#%+223%()(3>%. But if fieeuom D,3A piesuppositions motivates the ieuuction, what
is this supposeu to be a fieeuom )3. In shoit, Busseil was in seaich of the
founuation of knowleuge. We must be fiee fiom bias in oiuei to gain access to a

7u
!"#$% !, p. S6 (my italics)
71
Ibiu., xix
39
secuie zone of knowing, a uiiect access to ieality. Logic, science, anu mathematics
make the most vigoious claims to knowleuge in oui anu Busseil's eia, but Busseil
became convinceu that even they neeueu secuiing on a moie funuamental basis. But
Busseil was not simply a "meta-scientist." Insteau of being meiely fixateu on giving
these sciences a founuation, he came also to be fascinateu foi its own sake with the
iealm of meanings in which consciousness ievealeu all things in theii essence. Be
came to iegaiu philosophyunueistoou in a new anu non-uogmatic wayas )5#
inuispensable science anu the founuation of all knowleuge. It alone beais the
customaiy ioleanu the iesponsibilityof answeiing the skeptic who uenies the
possibility of knowleuge, anu he uoes this by showing the way to an inuubitable,
unueniable souice of apouictic eviuence. Busseil's stiiving foi knowleuge is so ueep
anu thoiough that he is willing to ievise himself iuthlessly. Busseil uiu not think
philosophy was a science $A3>C sciencesi.e., as just anothei "foimal" oi
"mateiial" ontology that makes claims anu aiguments about a ceitain iegion of
ieality. So unlike pievious philosopheis, Busseilin laige agieement with Kant, his
"tianscenuentalist" ancestoiplaceu all his tiust not in some iealm of metaphysical
tiuths, intuiteu oi leaineu thiough ievelation (such as Platonic Foims, uou,
Absolute Spiiit), fiom which to ueiive anu secuie otheis, but simply in #[2#,(#>4#.
Philosophy's iole is to uiaw its eviuence fiom the well of expeiienceacts of
consciousness anu the things of which it is conscious (#C3 43C()3 43C()$)+A)
thiough a methou in which eveiything <+) this puiifieu expeiientiality is suspenueu
inuefinitely, anu "put out of action" foi the tianscenuental gaze.
40
In this way Busseil's philosophical oiientation, bioauly constiueu, is
iauically "epistemological." But this uoes not mean Busseil was conceineu with
"epistemology" in the naiiow sense in use touayBusseil was not oveily conceineu
with uefining "knowleuge" as "justifieu tiue belief" oi something else, foi example.
Anu he is not, once again, obsesseu with the "subjective" siue of "knowing" ("noetic
phenomenology") in the way tiauitional epistemology is (excepting the "causal" anu
"exteinalist" mouels, of couise), as he gives ample attention to the vaiious objects
that aie known ("noematic phenomenology"). It uoes mean, howevei, that foi
Busseil, to uiscovei 53B H>3B=#"C# )$H#% 2=$4# is both a necessaiy anu a sufficient
task foi philosophy as such, iegaiueu in its puiest essence.

!!!+ E..-"(-. 0"& #2- E)&-#)( D-&'(#)%"

Besiues the phenomenological ieuuction, theie is anothei, no less impoitant
type of ieuuction whose peifoimance is also necessaiy foi phenomenology as
Busseil conceives it: the eiuetic ieuuction. Busseil begins the veision of !"#$% !
eventually publisheu with a tackeu-on but (to his minu) ciucial uiscussion of the
"eiuetic" natuie of phenomenology, tiying to classify phenomenology among anu as
against othei "sciences." This mateiial is veiy inteiesting, but we can only touch on
it biiefly heie, insofai as it is ielevant to oui task.
41
Theie is, foi Busseil, a funuamental uiviue between "matteis of fact" (in
much the "Bumean" sense) on the one hanu anu "essences" (oi #("h) on the othei.
72

0veilapping with this uistinction is that between "ieality" (the ieal, which is to say
factical) oi "the empiiical" on the one hanu, anu "essentiality," on the othei. What
exactly is a Busseilian essence, oi #("3%. Is it, foi example, a "univeisal". Such a
question may not be teiiibly helpful, given the contesteuness of the question of
univeisals itself, but Busseilian essences aie "univeisal-like" in that they aie
multiply instantiable anu "non-paiticulai." That is, they aie not "singulai" in the way
"existent" paiticulais aie. Bowevei, it is not technically tiue to say that they aie
outsiue of space anu time; they uo not subsist like Platonic Foims in a supia-
spatiotempoial oiuei, as Busseil foicefully unueiscoies.
7S
Essences aie also
3>)3=3C(4$= in a stiong sensethat is, they aie not puiely "linguistic" oi
"conventional." We uo not ueciue "as a community" what is oi is not an essence, at
least as peitains to the natuial anu spiiitual fuinituie of the woilu; we uiscovei such
essences.
The cleai giasp of essences is achieveu thiough a methou known as
"imaginative vaiiation." In the eiuetic ieuuctionwhich is to be peifoimeu befoie
the phenomenological ieuuctionone is to biacket out all paiticulai, factical, anu
contingent featuies of things peiceiveu (oi iemembeieu, imagineu, etc.) anu to seize
only those featuies that belong to the object necessaiilyi.e., that make the object
what it is. In othei woius, the eiuetic ieuuction uistills those categoiial foims that
we intuit in things. Yet how uoes one cleaily uistinguish between the essential anu

72
Ibiu., pp. 7-8
7S
Ibiu., pp. 4u-42
42
inessential aspects of things. This is wheie imaginative vaiiation as a multiply-
iepeatable exeicise becomes ciucial: we aie to imagine the things in many uiffeient
ciicumstances anu unueigoing many changes. In each change of ciicumstance, some
featuie oi piopeity of the thing is alteieu. Boes the object suivive as c+%) )5# 3<c#4)
)5$) () (% even aftei this alteiation. Then the piopeity alteieu must have been
inessential. Aftei vaiying the object enough, it is to become appaient what the
essential featuies of the object aie.
Bence, in keeping with a tiauition inauguiateu by the uieeks anu sustaineu
by the scholastics, essences ieveal the B5$) of things (anu people), the essential
"natuie" of things, anu, to this extent, theii <#(>C. All the same, theie aie two uistinct
senses of the woiu "being"essence anu existence.
74
It woulu seem that the essence
of a thing cannot exist without theie existing things that instantiate that essence.
7S

Theie aie, then, at least these two options foi the theoietical iegaiu of an
object oi "ieal" (a thing oi state of affaiis, foi example): to view it as factual anu
spatiotempoially locateu, oi to view it in its essentiality, i.e. in teims of the essences
it instantiates. The uistinction uoes not, howevei, coiiesponu to that between the
natuial anu tianscenuental attituues; foi tianscenuental ieflection is not the only
science uone in the "eiuetic attituue." Essences aie not the piovince only of
phenomenology. Phenomenology is an #("#)(4 science, but not all eiuetic sciences
e.g., logic anu mathematicsaie 2#, %# phenomenological. Phenomenology, in
Busseil's conception, is theiefoie one of many eiuetic sciences. (To be moie piecise

74
Ibiu., p. 12
7S
At times, it uoes seem as though Busseil goes even fuithei: "93%()(>C 3D- #%%#>4#% (A2=(#% >3) )5#
%=(C5)#%) 23%()(>C 3D $>F (>"(?("+$= D$4)+$= #[(%)#>4#%i 2+,# #("#)(4 ),+)5% 43>)$(> >3) )5# %=(C5)#%)
$%%#,)(3> $<3+) A$))#,% 3D D$4)." (!"#$% !, p. 11; Busseil's italics)
43
still, one might say that theie is nothing phenomenological in the "eiuos" of the
"eiuetic," but veiy much something "eiuetic" in the "eiuos" of the
"phenomenological.")
Busseil makes much uepenu not only on the eiuetic ieuuction, but also on
the stiict anu absolute uiffeience between facts anu essences, the empiiical anu the
eiuetic. Essentialism also becomes extiemely impoitant foi Busseil's puiposes in
teims of his uistinguishing between the essences of "mental piocesses" on the one
hanu anu "physical things" on the othei.
76
Thus it will be cential to Busseil's
uelineations of the essences of consciousness anu ieality, as we will see below.

!F+ 8%".()%'."-.. 0"& G%$4&

07 !>)#>)(3>$=()FG *3#%(% $>" *3#A$G $>" :,$>%4#>"#>4#
Foi Busseil, as foi his teachei Bientano, the most funuamental fact about
consciousness is that it is intentionalit is intiinsically "about" oi "of" something.
77

Fiom the peispective of the tiauitional issues in mouein "philosophy of minu" anu
epistemology, the phenomenological notion of intentionality, alieauy anticipateu by
Kant
78
, coulu by itself be seen to solve, as it weie, the olu question of how something
like "consciousness," which is "innei," can 'tianscenu" itself anu ieach out to a woilu

76
Ibiu., p. 98
77
Ibiu., pp. 7S-S
78
See, foi example: Russell, Natheson. O+%%#,=I 0 '+("# D3, )5# 9#,2=#[#". Continuum Books. New
Yoik: 2uu6 (p. 47). Beieaftei "Russell." The concept is also piesent in meuieval wiiteis.
44
that is outsiue of it"outei." Foi intentionality ieveals an intimate, inueeu
unbieakable bonu between an act of consciousness ("noesis") on the one hanu, anu
an "intentional object" ("noema," vaguely akin to Kant's "phenomenological
object"'#C#>%)$>") on the othei. 0ne might at fiist be tempteu to say that such a
ielationship takes place within consciousness itself, but "consciousness" shoulu now
be seen as an equivocal teim. Consciousness as intentionality houses both a
"subjective" pole as well as an "objective" one; consciousness in )5(% sense is not
"meie" subjectivity. While this is not so much a "pioof" that theie exists an "outsiue
woilu," since this is built into the veiy uefinition of expeiience (at least foi Busseil),
it is a funuamental pioblematization of the veiy "inneioutei" uistinction
philosophy hau been taking foi gianteu pie-phenomenologically (oi pie-"ciitically"
in the Kantian sense). Theie is simply no %#>%# in the iuea of a consciousness
essentially unielateu to an intenueu woilu, hoiizon, oi object.
Nost commentatois have geneially founu the iefeient of the teim "noesis" to
be unpioblematic to giasp, but not so "noema." As mentioneu, the teim "noesis"
iefeis to intentional acts of consciousness anu "noema" to the objects so intenueu
(anu f+$ intenueu). In Busseil's woius:

"Coiiesponuing in eveiy case to the multiplicity of Bata peitaining to the ieally inheient noetic
content, theie is a multiplicity of Bata, uemonstiable in actual puie intuition, in a coiielative
">3#A$)(4 43>)#>)b oi, in shoit, in the ">3#A$"teims which we shall continue to use fiom now
on."
79

Busseil gives an example, peitaining to the expeiience of seeing a tiee:
"the ),## %(A2=(4()#,, the physical thing belonging to Natuie, is nothing less than this 2#,4#(?#" ),## $%
2#,4#(?#" which, as peiceptual sense, insepaiably belongs to the peiception. The tiee can buin up, be

79
Ibiu., p. 214
45
iesolveu into its chemical elements, etc. But the sensethe sense 3D )5(% peiception, something
belonging necessaiily to its essencecannot buin up; it has no chemical elements, no foices, no ieal
piopeities."
8u

Bowevei, the noema is not foi Busseil a "ieally inheient" pait of consciousness. The
noema "tiee," says Busseil, is ">3 A3,# 43>)$(>#" (>5#,#>)=F )5$> (% )5# ),## B5(45
<#=3>C% )3 $4)+$=()F."
81

Bence the "noema" of a peiception is simply the 2#,4#(?#" $% 2#,4#(?#". This
woulu apply acioss the boaiu to all the vaiious types of act: the noema of a
iecollection is the iecollecteu as iecollecteu, the noema of a fantasy is the fantasieu
thing as fantasieu, etc. Busseil also calls the noema oi "noematic coiielate" the
"sense" of an act. Bow this uefinition of it matches up with the fiist is a ueep souice
of uebate, but it cannot be fuitheieu auuiesseu heie.
82

As hinteu at alieauy, the noetic-noematic bifuication allows Busseil to claim
that phenomenology is not meiely about consciousness in the naiiow sense of
"subjective" consciousnesssince this is only the "noetic" pole of expeiiencebut
also about the objects expeiienceu (as expeiienceu)the "noematic" pole. Eveiy
conscious expeiience, without fail, has both a noetic anu a noematic siue. It makes
no sense to isolate the "consciousness-of" fiom that of which theie is
consciousnessa point Nohanty makes eloquently in speaking of the iiieuucibility
of the phiase "consciousness of something":

8u
Ibiu., p. 216
81
Ibiu., p. 2S7
82
0nce again, Bell's way of chaiacteiizing the issue is helpful foi oui piesent naiiow puiposes:
".something is noematic in so fai as it is an immanent, but non-ieal contiibutoiy factoi in the
possession by an act of significance oi meaning." (Bell, p. 18u)
46
"Consciousness is. a coiielation between >3#)(4 acts anu noematic meanings. The woilu is a
stiuctuie anu inteiconnecteuness of such meanings, anu is the coiielate of consciousness. The two,
consciousness anu woilu, togethei, in theii coiielation, constitute tianscenuental subjectivity. The
tiue tianscenuental founuation is: 43>%4(3+%>#%%L3DL)5#LB3,="7 N#$=(%A "#=#)#% )5# 5F25#>%- <+) ()
4$>>3) (> D$4) "3 %37 ! B$>) )3 H##2 )5#A )(#" )3C#)5#,7"
8S

If consciousness itself has an "innei" anu "outei", a "heie" anu "theie," a
subject anu object, then it is alieauy, in a sense, self-tianscenuing; anu so
immeuiately one can see how "tianscenuence" becomes a funuamental theme in the
stiuctuie of consciousness. Busseil geneially speaks of "tianscenuence" in the
context of the tianscenuent intentional object, incluuing, most impoitantly, the
"necessaiy tianscenuence" that belongs to the essence "physical thing." But it is
impoitant to see that because tianscenuence is fiist pieuicateu on intentionality,
anu intentionality is a stiuctuial featuie of (noetic-noematic) consciousness as such,
the tianscenuence of the woilu, whatevei foim it will take, will be such as not to
leave consciousness tiappeu in a skeptical impasse oi lockeu into the "piivate
theatei" of the minu. 0nce again, Busseil's theoiy coulu be seen as an auvance ovei
less sophisticateu "mouein" theoiies of minu anu woilu.
But what exactly is Busseil's conception of "tianscenuence". It is impoitant
heie to tiace the exact sense in which Busseil employs the teim, foi this will have
enoimous consequences foi the geneial philosophical implications of Busseil's final
"tianscenuental-phenomenological" position. To begin with, Busseil uenies the

8S
Nohanty, }. N. "Ny Philosophical PositionResponse." In :5# :,$>%4#>"#>)$= $>" )5# /A2(,(4$=. Eu.
Bina uupta. 0xfoiu, Englanu: Rowman anu Littlefielu Publisheis, Inc., 2uuu pp. 261-2 (my italics). In
this way, the noetic-noematic stiuctuie of consciousness (in the wiue sense) can be seen to follow
fiom the oiiginal thesis of intentionality itself. Yet it also confiims Busseil's inteiest in the
"appeaiing as appeaiing" of things (in the wiue sense). It is not things in theii "ieal" existence, but
things "as they appeai," that concein us within the phenomenological ieuuction. We uo not woiiy
about whethei oi not theie "ieally is" an apple tiee befoie us; we aie conceineu with the >3#A$ of
"the apple tiee." Reality qua ieal existence is not uenieu, just put out of play.
47
Kantian uistinction between the phenomenon anu the noumenon.
84
The thing-in-
itself is not unknowablepiecisely the opposite. But how can it be knowable, if it is
also tianscenuent. It is knowable in uegiees oi "auumbiations"the piofiles of
things as seen fiom uiffeient angles; hence it is known, in Busseil's teiminology,
"inauequately"anu not just foi finite obseiveis but foi any obseivei whatsoevei,
incluuing uou. (This ieflects the intiinsic natuie of peiception, unueistoou as a
geneial ielationship of consciousness to extia-conscious ieality). Bence the thing is
"tianscenuent" only aftei a peculiai waynot wholly othei than oi alien to
consciousness, but in a way that belongs to it noetically-noematically, thiough
auumbiations, yet not with iespect to the whole of the object all at once. Things aie
encounteieu as tianscenuentthey have this "meaning"but such "tianscenuence"
amounts only, ultimately, to a kinu of iegulative Iuea (ioughly in the Kantian sense)
of "auequate" objectivitythe infinite limit of full, auequate givenness of the object
in all of its piofiles at once. Tianscenuence is thus not a piopeity of things but the
("#$ of a complete unity of auumbiations, the sum of piofiles of a thing. Wains anu
claiifies Busseil:

".one must not let oneself be ueceiveu by speaking of the physical thing as tianscenuing
consciousness oi as 'existing in itself.' The genuine concept of the tianscenuence of something
physical which is the measuie of the iationality of any statements about tianscenuence, can itself be
ueiiveu only fiom the piopei essential contents of peiception oi fiom those concatenations of
uefinite kinus which we call uemonstiative expeiience. :5# ("#$ 3D %+45 ),$>%4#>"#>4# (% )5#,#D3,# )5#
#("#)(4 43,,#=$)# 3D )5# 2+,# ("#$ 3D )5(% "#A3>%),$)(?# #[2#,(#>4#7"
8S

84
See, foi example: Busseil, Eumunu. "Kant anu the iuea of tianscenuental phenomenology," tians.
Teu E. Klein, }i. anu William E. Pohl. :5# 13+)5B#%)#,> ^3+,>$= 3D 95(=3%325F, S.S (1974), p. 11
(citation founu in Russell, p. 91)
8S
Ibiu., p. 1u6 (my italics)
48
Funuamental to this pictuie is the notion of C(?#>>#%%. In the woius of one
commentatoi, "the given...incluues not only that which is immanent in a ieal sense
but also the tianscenuent, pioviueu that it is given."
86
This also allows Busseil to
conveit all tianscenuence into what he calls "immanent tianscenuency." With
iespect to physical things this teim uenotes that "...the tianscenuency belonging to
the physical thing as ueteimineu by physics is the tianscenuency belonging to a
being which becomes constituteu in, anu tieu to, consciousness..."
87

Yet in this case, one might suspect that Busseil has secuieu access to the
"things" at a bit of an unfaii piice. Such a ciiticism might iun as follows: Eithei
things aie not tiuly tianscenuent, oi they aie not necessaiily knownunlike theii
phenomenal appeaiance, which may, aftei all, with Kant, be conuitioneu by oui own
cognitive appaiatus. But Busseil uespises both subjectivism anu constiuctivism as
equally unbeaiable concessions to the skeptic (oi the stiict Kantian), so these
options aie closeu by him. Busseil wants a puie tianspaiency of beinga puie
knowingas well as the otheiness, so to speak, of this being, oi the object. But can
he have this.
Busseil woulu piobably aigue that the countei-aigument sketcheu above
iests on a false uilemma that tianscenuental phenomenology moves beyonu. The
ciitic uoes not see a thiiu possibility between tianscenuental iealism anu
skepticism, namely the possibility of a tianscenuental level at which the woilu is
ievealeu to be integially unifieu with consciousness. This is but a biief pie-sketch of

86
BeBoei, Theouoie. :5# .#?#=32A#>) 3D O+%%#,=M% :53+C5). Tians. Theouoie Plantinga. The Bague,
the Netheilanus: Naitinus Nijhoff, 1978, p. S14
87
!"#$% !, p. 12S
49
one way Busseil coulu iesponu to the objection. I will say much moie about this
way to appioach the "consciousnesswoilu" ielation anu its potential foi success,
howevei, in the concluuing thoughts of this chaptei.

E7 :5# /("#)(4 .(%)(>4)(3> <#)B##> K#>)$= $>" 95F%(4$=
Busseil's quasi-"Caitesianism" uoes not enu with the "Caitesian way" to the
ieuuction. It is also eviuent in his effoit to uistinguish the essences of the "mental"
anu the "physical" on seveial giounus. Foi instance, it belongs to the essence of
mental phenomena that they aie (>"+<()$<=#, of physical phenomena that they aie
not. "Eveiy peiception of something immanent |i.e., in the spheie of consciousnessj
necessaiily guaiantees the existence of its object."
88
Bowevei, "|ajccoiuing to
eiuetic law it is the case that 25F%(4$= #[(%)#>4# (% >#?#, ,#f+(,#" $% >#4#%%$,F by the
givenness of something physical, but is always in a ceitain mannei contingent."
89

What Busseil is inuicating, of couise, is that I cannot be wiong about the
existence of something's appeaiing to me $% such-anu-such thing. Foi example,
while I can be wiong that a monstei is stanuing in fiont of me, I cannot be wiong
that it $22#$,% as though one uoes. Even the Pyiihonian skeptics weie inueeu
comfoitable with this much. But uoes this ieveal something about the "mental" anu
the "physical," oi meiely oui cognitive ielation to ouiselves on the one hanu anu
tianscenuent iealities on the othei. This question ieaches back to the question of
whethei Bescaites' own "ieal uistinction" is invaliu on the giounus that he confuseu
the epistemological piopeities of the minu with ieal piopeities of minus anu

88
Ibiu., p. 1uu
89
Ibiu., p. 1uS
50
extenueu things. But in Busseil, as opposeu to Bescaites, this question cannot aiise,
because aftei the phenomenological ieuuction anu oveicoming of the natuial
attituue, it makes no sense to speak of anything but meanings. To speak of things as
being totally uisconnecteu fiom consciousness is, as we have seen, meaningless; so
we have to take the mannei of givenness of objects in peiception as ievealing
something essential about these objects themselves, anu not only as telling us about
"ouiselves" as peiceiveis.
9u

Physical things, by contiast to mental piocesses anu appeaiances, aie, as we
have alieauy seen, tianscenuent. That is, the meaning "physical thing" contains this
tianscenuence. As tianscenuent, physical things somehow uo not possess the seal of
self-eviuentness of immanent mental phenomena. Foi this is something that belongs
essentially to the natuie of "the physical." In sum (notice the continuous emphasis):

"V?#, $C$(>%) )5# 23%()(>C 3D )5# B3,="G B5(45 (% $ a43>)(>C#>)b 23%()(>CG )5#,# %)$>"% )5#> )5# 23%()(>C
3D AF 2+,# /C3 $>" /C3L=(D# B5(45 (% $ a>#4#%%$,FGb $<%3=+)#=F (>"+<()$<=# 23%()(>C7 0>F)5(>C 25F%(4$=
B5(45 (% C(?#> a(> 2#,%3>b 4$> <# >3>L#[(%)#>)i >3 A#>)$= 2,34#%% B5(45 (% C(?#> a(> 2#,%3>b 4$> <# >3>L
#[(%)#>). This is the eiuetic law uefining this necessity anu that contingency."
91

The "ieal" (Bescaites' teim) oi "eiuetic" (Busseil's) uistinction between
physical anu mental is establisheu in othei ways as well. Let us ietuin to the issue of
peiception. As we have saiu, tianscenuent things"the woilu," collectively
iegaiueupiesent themselves to consciousness in piofiles oi "auumbiations." We
see only the siues of things, anu can neveinot even in piincipleview all siues of
a thing at once, foi peiception is iiieuucibly peispectival. Theiefoie, we can say this

9u
Ibiu., p. 92
91
Ibiu., Busseil's italics. Busseil's quotation maiks heie aie not meant to be iionic, they aie simply
uesignating essential types.
51
much about tianscenuent objects: they aie always given (>$"#f+$)#=F. We nevei
have a totalistic peiception of an object, but just as tiuly, objects uo not C(?#
)5#A%#=?#% in full auequacy.
92
By contiast with physical objects, puie cogitata anu
mental appeaiances $,# given auequately. Foi example, I uo not conceive of a
tiiangle in its auumbiations, but auequately anu all at once. Busseil geneializes the
point to incluue all "mental piocesses,"
9S
conceining which he iemaiks, "Wheie
theie is no spatial being it is senseless to speak of a seeing fiom uiffeient stanu-
points with a changing oiientation in accoiuance with uiffeient peiappeaiances,
auumbiations."
94

Beiewith Busseil once again establishes that theie is an essential
uiffeiencewith echoes heie again of Bescaites' "ieal uistinction"between
consciousness anu ieality. Consciousness is a spheie of immanence, in which the
objects of thought aie given auequately, wheieas (physical) ieality is a spheie of
tianscenuenceunqualifieu tianscenuence, to be piecisewhose objects aie given
to consciousness inauequately. Busseil actually makes two impoitant ielevant
#%%#>)($= uistinctions: between that of peiception anu non-peiceptual mental
piocesses on the one hanu, anu between peiception anu ""#2(4)(?#L%FA<3=(4
3<c#4)(?$)(3>," oi, moie simply, "sign-consciousness," on the othei.
9S
In this way,
Busseil tiies to set phenomenology apait fiom the following alteinatives, long
familiai fiom tiauitional oi mouein "epistemology": puie iuealism (which woulu

92
This uoes not, by the way, mean that we only peiceive "paits" of objects when we see themwe
geneially peiceive the whole object, )5,3+C5 its piofiles oi auumbiations. Bence the
"auequacyinauequacy" ielation cannot be coiielateu with the pait-whole ielation.
9S
!"#$% !, p. 91
94
Ibiu., p. 91
9S
Ibiu., p. 9S
52
ueny the fiist uistinction), iepiesentationalism of a Lockean vaiiety (which woulu
ueny the seconu), anu nave iealism (which uoes not consiuei consciousness to have
its own essence in the fiist place). To this we must auu the uistinction between
phenomenology anu Kantianism. Foi as we have pointeu out, Busseil uenies the
phenomenon-noumenon uistinction. Thus he stiesses that:

".in immeuiately intuitive acts we intuit an 'in itself', anu that in peiception the 'it itself' is fuithei
chaiacteiizeu in its peculiaiity as 'in peison' in contiast to its mouifieu chaiacteiistic as 'floating
befoie us,' as 'piesentiateu' in memoiy oi in fiee phantasy."
96

0wing to his maintenance of an essential uistinction of consciousness anu ieality,
not to mention his own invocation of Bescaites, Busseil coulu easily be suspecteu of
espousing at this point a Caitesian "+$=(%A as well. We will look at this chaige
below. To see fully how he woulu uistinguish phenomenology fiom that ueau enu,
we will eventually have to tuin to his aiguments about the piimacy of consciousness
3?#, ieality, in the subsequent sections. Such an asymmetiy, if successful, woulu
uefinitively ienuei the impossibility of Caitesian uualism. In the meanwhile, I will
tiy to uispel the spectei of stiaightfoiwaiu Caitesian uualism below.

J7 :5# J5$,C# 3D .+$=(%A
The chaige of "uualism" coulu supeificially be leveleu at Busseil, but if what
is meant by this is Caitesian "substance" uualism, it is cleaily unfaii. Busseil
uecisively iejects this soit of uualism, anu it is alieauy cleai fiom his own analysis
that he nevei iegaius "exteinal ieality" as tiuly anu absolutely "exteinal." Bow

96
Ibiu., p. 9S
53
coulu we know it in the fiist place, oi peiceive the woilu"it itself"in acts of
peiception, if this weie the case. This soit of compaiison to Bescaites woulu be
especially iiiesponsible given Busseil's tienchant ciitique of that philosophei's
view, alieauy paitially laiu out above (IIB).
Whatevei Busseil's position with iespect to his aigument foi tianscenuental
phenomenology, it shoulu be cleai by now that he has iejecteu nave iealism,
Kantian uualism, iepiesentationalism, anu Caitesian uualism alike. Inueeu, it is
bettei to stait on his own teimsthat is, in teims of "tianscenuental iuealism."
Consciousness is tianscenuental in that it makes both expeiience"natuial"
expeiienceanu the woilu so expeiienceu, possible. Tianscenuentality is not,
howevei, a sufficient conuition foi the existence of tianscenuent objects. Busseil
uoes not ueny the ieality of natuieof a iealm of puiely tianscenuent being (albeit
uefineu unuei conuitions in which such tianscenuence obtains in necessaiily co-
subjective teims).
None of this is to ueny, howevei, that Busseil can sounu =(H# a uualist much
of the time. With the tianscenuental ieuuction, Busseil fiees tianscenuental
consciousness fiom the "ieal woilu." Thus he speaks of the "essential
uetachableness of the whole natuial woilu fiom the uomain of consciousness"
97
anu
pioclaims that a "veiitable abyss yawns between consciousness anu ieality."
98
Bis
woius heie aumitteuly concein not "natuial" consciousnessoi the human oi
animal psychebut "puie" consciousness. Yet even so, they iaise conceins about
the possibility that Busseil has uescenueu into a Caitesian-style uualism. Busseil

97
Ibiu., p. 1u4
98
Ibiu., p. 111
54
himself seems to ielish emphasizing the absolute uistinctness of tianscenuental
subjectivity anu "Natuie":

"Eveiything which is puiely immanent anu ieuuceu in the way peculiai to the mental piocess,
eveiything which cannot be conceiveu apait fiom it just as it is in itself, anu which eo ipso passes
ovei into the Eiuos in the eiuetic attituue, is sepaiateu by an abyss fiom all of Natuie anu physics anu
no less fiom all psychologyanu even this image, as natuialistic, (% >3) #>3+C5 )3 (>"(4$)# )5#
"(DD#,#>4#7"
99

But how, we might wonuei, woulu a >3>-uualistic view like this ieally woik.
Anu how, as Busseil claims, can theie be any foim of consciousness #%%#>)($==F
uisconnecteu fiom the human ego, the lattei of which now ielegateu to the "ieal" oi
"natuial" woilu. If this possibility is uenieu, Caitesianism might be seen to be the
inevitable iesult. But Busseil is not one to heuge his bets; eveiything iests on the
possibility of tianscenuental subjectivity in the stiict, "iiieal"
1uu
sense in which he
unueistanus it. Busseil's enteipiise in its iauicality of puipose woulu be completely
misunueistoou, in my view, by one who softens oi bluis this emphasis on this
iauical sepaiability of consciousness anu woilu. Foi it is piecisely the inveision of
the natuialistic piioiitization of the "ieal" ovei subjectivity that neeus to be effecteu,
in Busseil's view, befoie phenomenology is evei to come into its own anu appeai as
itself, anu he says this iepeateuly thioughout his woik.
1u1
A philosophy that uoes
not cioss the thiesholu of tianscenuental consciousness, making a clean bieak once
anu foi all fiom natuialism, is simply a foim of "psychology." It uoes not iecognize

99
Ibiu., 217 (my emphasis)
1uu
Ibiu., p. 4
1u1
To take one example, see J,(%(%, p. 2uu: "the complete inveision of the natuial attituue, thus into
an 'unnatuial' one, places the gieatest conceivable uemanus upon philosophical iesolve anu
consistency." This sounus exactly like a "conveision" expeiience.
55
the autonomy of the subject, anu hence it is uestineu to iemain enthialleu by
"science" anu "scientism."
1u2

.7 0<%3=+)# $>" N#=$)(?# /[(%)#>4# $>" )5# ag3,="L0>>(5(=$)(3>b /[2#,(A#>)
Busseil's ultimate contention with iespect to the ielationship of
consciousness anu ieality is that the being of consciousness is "absolute" wheieas
the being of the woilu is meiely "ielative" (namely, to consciousness). Thus Busseil
is not content with meiely making an eiuetic uistinction between the "mental" anu
the "physical." Be also explicitly assigns 2,(3,()F (in a sense yet to be ueteimineu) to
the foimei ovei the lattei, at least when it comes to ),$>%4#>"#>)$= consciousness in
its ielation to the mateiial woilu (anu those "stiata"psychical, foi example, that
aie founueu upon it). We have alieauy seen that fiom the point of view of
expeiienceanu, impoitantly, theie is no othei point of view!the woilu's
existence is not, stiictly speaking, necessaiy, but the existence of consciousness is.
Yes, peiceptual consciousness, in which we aie continually enmesheu uiiectly oi
inuiiectly, is consciousness of the woilu; but peiceptions may be meiely fantasies.

1u2
Bowevei accuiate oi misguiueu this position may be, it is poweiful enough to exeit consiueiable
piessuie ovei a latei, "post-tianscenuental" phenomenologist like Neileau-Ponty. Foi his pait,
Neileau-Ponty was equally opposeu to scientific natuialism, but not on the giounus that it was
coiiect in its own uomain, yet oveily piesumptuous in taking the "natuial" woilu as the uomain of all
being. Busseil wiuens the net, pieseiving science wholesale in its most basic objectivist assumptions,
while Neileau-Ponty attacks tianscenuentalism (in both its Kantian anu Busseilian foims) anu
scientific natuialism alike, in seaich foi a holistic alteinative, one might say. Yet all the same,
Neileau-Ponty woulu have to stiuggle with the pioblem of uistinguishing philosophy's task
compellingly fiom those of the sciences; he was to settle finally on a notion of iecipiocity, contiaiy to
Busseil's uncompiomising, but to some, moie appealing absolutism.
56
Foi with any given case of (possible) peiception, "the possibility of the non-being of
the woilu is nevei excluueu."
1uS
0i again:

"What hoveis befoie one may be a meie figment; the hoveiing itself, the inventive consciousness, is
not itself inventeu anu theie belongs to its essence, as to any othei mental piocess, the possibility of a
peiceiving ieflection which seizes upon absolute factual being."
1u4

Besiues, the existence of exteinal objects is establisheu only on the basis of coheient
patteins of expeiience ovei extenueu peiious of timebut what if these weie to
uissolve into full-blown incoheience, i.e. "chaos". "The woilu" woulu not now
"exist", but consciousness (of a ieal oi imagineu woilu) nonetheless woulu.
This lattei notionfeatuieu in Busseil's "woilu-annihilation" expeiiment
is peihaps the most iauical thought in all of the !"#$% !, as well as peihaps its most
contesteu, even by many Busseilians. The thought expeiiment is uesigneu to show
the ultimate asymmetiy of consciousness anu woiluanu subsequently to lenu
fuithei pioof of the inuepenuence of tianscenuental phenomenology fiom the
empiiical sciences of the "natuial attituue." Busseil obseives that the meaning
"woilu" is establisheu as a ceitain haimony of appeaiances. That is, physical things
can by uefinition nevei become completely immanent, anu hence we cannot know
them absolutely anu uiiectly. So the only way we come to unueistanu them to exist
tianscenuently is thiough the iegulai ways in which they appeai to us. It is on the
basis of appeaiances oi piesentations of things to consciousness that we posit (as it
weie) the existence of a tianscenuent woiluonly then uoes its "meaning" as

1uS
!"#$% !, p. 1uS
1u4
Ibiu., p. 1u1
57
"tianscenuent" (Kant's "tianscenuental object=X"
1uS
) become constituteu. The
appeaiances must have a ceitain iegulaiity, anu they must "appeai" in a way that
satisfieu a minimal level of expectation on oui pait. Foi example, we woulu not at
fiist take a flashing "object," which poppeu into anu out of existence ianuomly anu
iapiuly, as an exteinal object, even if it weie one; we woulu likely take it to be an
hallucination.
1u6
But suppose this iegulaiity weie to bieak uown at a funuamental
level, such that, effectively, )5#,# 4#$%#% )3 <# $ B3,="7
1u7
Boes this automatically
entail the abolishment of 43>%4(3+%>#%%. Busseil thinks not:

".B5(=# )5# <#(>C 3D 43>%4(3+%>#%%G of any stieam of mental piocesses whatevei, B3+=" (>"##" <#
>#4#%%$,(=F A3"(D(#" <F $> $>>(5(=$)(3> 3D )5# B3,=" 3D 25F%(4$= )5(>C% ()s 3B> #[(%)#>4# B3+=" >3) <#
)3+45#"."
1u8

Nental piocesses coulu still occuiwhy not. Aftei all, accoiuing to the methou of
#23456 anu ieuuction themselves, we have no iight to assume that consciousness is
causally uepenuent on, oi inteiuepenuent with, the woilu. All such piesuppositions,
as well as notions of causality, have by now been exposeu foi exactly what they aie,
anu they have been biacketeu accoiuingly. What iemains is what Busseil calls the
"phenomenological iesiuuum,"
1u9
oi a ceitain "stieam" of conscious life.
All the same, it is veiy impoitant to note that we aie not in the Beikeleyan
camp with this aigument. Foi nowheie uoes Busseil suggest that physical things
themselves, in theii tianscenuent being, uepenu on the existence of consciousness

1uS
Ibiu., pp. S42-S
1u6
If otheis iepoiteu seeing it as well, this woulu begin to change oui view. But then again, they
woulu not iepoit it, eithei, unless theie weie some ieasona haimony of appeaiance anu satisfieu
expectations ovei timeto uo so.
1u7
!"#$% !, p. 1u9
1u8
Ibiu., p. 1u9
1u9
Ibiu., p. 6S
58
oi peiception ("#%%# #%) 2#,4(2("). Bis point is that we woulu have no ieason to 23%()
the existence of tianscenuent things in the fiist place, weie it not foi the
ueliveiances of consciousness in the foim of auumbiateu appeaiance-peiceptions.
Yet in its ieflexive moment of self-peiception, the same cannot be saiu of
consciousness itself: it can be suie of its existence, an existence that is theiefoie, in
this sense, "absolute." Anu it can see self-eviuently that it exists, even if theie is no
matuiely foimeu "ego" theie to be able to aiticulate this. This much of the Caitesian
legacy suivives in !"#$% !.
11u
Foi Busseil, consciousness' knowleuge of itself, at some
ueep level, is absolute. This is enough to giounu tianscenuental phenomenology
namely on a "puie" level of expeiience in which all objects, on the noematic siue, as
well as all peiceivings anu thinkings, on the noetic, aie constituteu.
To ueny that this soit of asymmetiy exists might be tempting, but on what
giounus coulu we uo so aftei the #23456. Ceitainly theie aie no giounus to speak of
a 4$+%$==F necessaiy ielationship of woilu to consciousness, foi it is piecisely any
possible causal ielation between the two that Busseil puiposefully biackets anu

11u
It is tiue that theie follows fiom Busseil's view the uistinct possibility of solipsism, at least of a
"tianscenuental soit": "0nly foi $> /C3, oi a stieam of mental piocesses, in ielation to itself, uoes this
uistinctive state of affaiis exist; heie alone theie is, anu heie theie must be, such a thing as
peiception of something immanent." (italics auueu) The pioblem of solipsism is one Busseil tackles
memoiably in latei woiks, paiticulaily the J$,)#%($> K#"()$)(3>%, though to questionable success.
The pioblem is ioughly this: Boes the ieuuction ieveal the necessity solely of AF%#=D $%
),$>%4#>"#>)$= #C3, in the sense that the woilu is the "tianscenuental phenomenon" (Busseil's teim)
foi AF tianscenuental ego. This woulu inueeu be a uisastious consequence foi the tianscenuental
ieuuction, if it weie tiue. It is in the Fifth Neuitation of the J$,)#%($> K#"()$)(3>% that Busseil finally
ieveals that tianscenuental subjectivity iesolves into ),$>%4#>"#>)$= (>)#,%+<c#4)(?()F, which alieauy
piesupposes a multiplicity of ego's anu, subsequently, the woilu of "0bjective Natuie" as uecisively
shaieu by these egos in a common space anu time. (CN, p. 1Su) It is only with the intiouuction of
tianscenuental inteisubjectivity that one can answei in a full anu positive way the chaige that
tianscenuental phenomenology is a foim of "tianscenuental solipsism" that collapses the being of the
woilu anu of othei people to a kinu of absolute tianscenuental "(>),$-subjectivity." Nonetheless,
Busseil's solution is stiictly "tianscenuental" anu nevei piesupposes the actual existence of anyone
at all. Compaie with his iemaiks on the tiee that neeu not exist in being peiceiveu (IvA above) anu
the woilu that neeu not exist foi me to have conscious expeiience (piesent section).
59
ignoies. But how aie we to avoiu the consequence of a complete collapse into
iuealismto an embiace of the possibility of a self-sufficient Ego, in which the
"woilu as such" finus its tiue home. Beie it might seem, in othei woius, that theie is
no way to pioveoi to uiscovei in the fiist placejust what "the woilu" is like, as a
tianscenuent woilu, apait fiom its manneis of givenness to consciousness, so that, if
we aie to ieject subjective iuealism, we seemingly must giant the existence of a
tianscenuent woilu only as a mattei of piejuuice. But this is not acceptable,
ceitainly not foi Busseil. This soit of piejuuice oi "blinu assumption" is exactly
what Busseil wants to avoiu, anu it is why woiluly existence must piove itself
thiough expeiience, anu not vice-veisa.
Busseil's expeiiment has not been convincing to many people, but it shoulu
piobably be vieweu as a peifectly ieasonable illustiation of the moie basic
Busseilian piinciplenamely the possibility of a C=3<$= #23456 anu tianscenuental
ieuuction. That is, if we wish to question the woilu-annihilation expeiiment,
peihaps we neeu fiist to question this possibility of a global #23456. It is piecisely
ovei this point that the phenomenologist }an Pat!cka, to take one piominent
example, takes Busseil to task, aiguing that a biacketing of the veiy existence of the
B3,=" ()%#=D is impossible, foi we can only uo this foi a subset of the woilu. Noieovei,
Pat!cka aigues that the existence of the woilu is something we coulu nevei even
$))#A2) to uoubt. In his book on Busseil, he begins by pointing out that ".the woilu
as a whole is evei-piesent, piesent as a hoiizon; this hoiizonal givenness is
something oiiginal. Foi the hoiizon is neithei a paiticulai peispective noi an
60
anticipation. Peispectives anu anticipations aie possible only on the basis of it."
111

Be then goes on to uispute Busseil's equation of a "chaos" with the absence of a
"woilu": "A chaos, though, is something uiffeient than >3 B3,=" $) $==; it is piecisely
an +>L3,"#,#" B3,=". An un-oiueieu woilu uoes not mean the non-existence of the
whole, only the nonexistence of a whole 3D $ 4#,)$(> )F2#."
112
In this way Pat!cka
coiiectly connects the woilu-annihilation expeiiment uiiectly with the notion of a
global tianscenuental #23456, iegaiuing the iejection of the one as entailing the
iejection of the othei.
11S

/7 O+%%#,=M% Q(>$= 93%()(3>I a:,$>%4#>"#>)$= !"#$=(%Ab
If Busseil is not a simple Caitesian uualist, then what is he. Fiist of all, he
takes himself to be staiting a %+( C#>#,(% enteipiise that is wholly incompaiable to
any piioi philosophical system. Be also takes himself to have gone beyonu the one-
siueu uebates of iealism anu iuealism anu taken a highei ioute, like Kant. Bowevei,
in fact, he calls his own view "tianscenuental ("#$=(%A" (my emphasis). In this way
he invites the view that he is somehow "anti-iealist," to use the mouein tuin of
phiase.
Nany of Busseil's ciitics, both on anu off the Continent, contempoianeously
as well as moie iecently, have iegaiueu him suspiciously because of this self-
ueclaieu "iuealism." In this label they have seen the vestiges of an olu mistake,

111
Patocka, }an. 0> !>),3"+4)(3> )3 O+%%#,=M% 95#>3A#>3=3CF. Tians. Eiazim Kohk. Chicago: 0pen
Couit Publishing Company, 1996. (p. 1uS) Beieaftei "Patocka."
112
Ibiu., p. 1uS
11S
Patocka's conclusion is that the "thesis" of the woilu "as a whole" "uoes not in piinciple ieuuce to
any givenness of a paiticulai, so that its thesis can nevei be excluueu by suspenuing the theses of
such paiticulais." (Patocka, p. 1uS) Anu unuei this view, the ieuuction has to piesuppose the woilu,
foi tianscenuental ieflection itself iequiies it.
61
namely to conflate expeiience with that which is expeiienceu. Inueeu the
philosophei }. N. Finulay, English tianslatoi of the U3C(4$= !>?#%)(C$)(3>%, iejecteu
Busseil's latei philosophy in pait because of just this tuin towaius "iuealism."
114

Anu this is coming fiom an self-avoweu "iational mystic"! But the same was tiue of a
veiy uiffeient gioup of thinkeis, Busseil's own sometime followeisincluuing
Alexanuei Pfnuei, Auolf Reinach, anu }ohannes Baubeitof the so-calleu "Nnich"
school of "iealist" phenomenology. Baubeit hau wiitten a uetaileu commentaiy on
!"#$% ! in shoithanu, only iecently tianslateu, again taking issue with its iuealism.
11S

(Baubeit aigues foi the "piimacy of the ieal" anu foi consciousness as a meie
"function" of ieality.) Busseil himself iaiely uses the teim "iuealism" in !"#$% !, but
theie is no uoubt that the text embiaces a kinu of iuealism, which we will investigate
below, in his effoit to secuie foi phenomenology the position of "fiist
philosophy."
116

In Busseil's account, consciousness is not closeu, but open-to-the-woilu. The
meaning "the woilu" veiy much belongs to conscious expeiience as an integial anu
necessaiy pait of itanu ceitainly in acts of sense-peiception, in which the
intentional objects aie things like "chaiis" anu "cats," encounteieu physically-
tianscenuentlybut also, less uiiectly, in all othei acts. Busseil was thus not a

114
See, foi example: Finulay, }. N. :5# .(%4(2=(># 3D )5# J$?#. New Yoik: ueoige Allen anu 0nwin, 1966,
p. 162: "This is why a ueeply ieflective thinkei like Busseil, whose whole tiaining in the thought of
Bientano maue him waiy of all the moie facile snaies of iuealism, >3>#)5#=#%% ?##,#" )3B$,"%
("#$=(%A (> 5(% =$)#, 25#>3A#>3=3CF." (my italics) See also the inteiesting aiticle by Baviu Caii
entitleu "Finulay, Busseil, anu the /23456" (Ch. S of 1)+"(#% (> )5# 95(=3%325F 3D ^7 *7 Q(>"=$F, eus.
Cohen, Naitin, anu Westphal, Albany: S0NY Piess, 198S), esp. pp. 1S4-S
11S
The "coue-bieakei" was Kail Schuhmann. See the essay by Schuhmann anu Baiiy Smith entitleu
"Against Iuealism: }ohannes Baubeit vs. Busseil's !"#$% !." N#?(#B 3D K#)$25F%(4% S8 (198S), pp. 76S-
79S.
116
0f couise, theie aie scholais who woulu uispute even this claim. Ballas Willaiu insists that
Busseil is in fact a "iealist," foi example. But since Busseil calleu himself a tianscenuental iuealist, it
seems to behoove us at least to unueistanu in what sense he might have taken himself to be one.
62
subjective iuealist, ceitainly not by uesign.
117
Foi him, the woilu exists veiy much
inuepenuently of paiticulai acts of consciousness. The $ 2,(3,( coiielativity (as he
was to latei teim it) of woilu anu consciousness is a mattei of the woilu's giving
itself to consciousness in ceitain fixeu anu unifoim manneis, which aie themselves
anchoieu in ceitain essential types of subjectivity anu "subjective
accomplishment."
118
In othei woius, it is to say that we cannot make sense of a
woilu that has no intiinsic connection to a potential oi actual subjective
expeiiencing 3D that woilu, just as theie is no way to unueistanu such an
expeiiencing without a concomitant piinciple of an objective oi noematic pole
thiough which the woilu becomes manifest anu given in its actuality in peiceptual
expeiience.
But one of the consequences of Busseil's iuealism is the uenial that theie is
any meaningful soit of ieality, such as physical ieality, that can become ue-coupleu
fiom the minu at all levels. Busseil's way of putting the point is as follows:

".the whole %2$)(3)#A23,$= B3,="...has the meiely %#43>"$,F sense of a being D3, a consciousness.... It
is a being...ueteimineu anu intuiteu only as something iuentical belonging to motivateu multiplicities
of expeiience: <#F3>" )5$) it is nothing."
119

Fiom the point of view of the phenomenological attituue (as opposeu to the natuial
one), B5$) )5(>C% $,# is simply B5$) )5#F $,# D3, 43>%4(3+%>#%%. But since the
phenomenological attituue is philosophically tiuei anu supeiioi
12u
to the natuial

117
Be explicitly iejects the label in !"#$% !, 129
118
Ciisis 1S9-6u
119
!"#$% !, p. 112
12u
Cf.: "Fiom the tianscenuental stanupoint one unueistanus the natuial attituue as a 'lowei' stance,
oi which says the same, the natuial attituue is alieauy tianscenuental, yet without knowing it. The
63
(because it is fieei of "piesuppositions"), it follows that we shoulu obey its authoiity
when it ieveals that the essence of woiluly being is to be uepenuent on $>3)5#,, in a
way that uoes not apply symmetiically to consciousness itself. We aie still not
talking about existential-causal uepenuence, howevei. We aie not claiming that the
woilu is a fiction geneiateu by the imagination, oi that it is meiely a vaiiant of
consciousness itself. Aftei all, because consciousness is inheiently intentional, it is
always alieauy a consciousness "of" things, of its "suiiounuing woilu"which
Busseil also makes cleai is a constant giounu in a way that imagineu anu
iemembeieu woilus aie not. So the woilu cannot be uismisseu oi subjectivizeu; but
it 4$> be ievealeu as a being uepenuent foi its meaning on anothei, anu this is
consciousness.
Yet can we not tuin this aigument back, anu aigue that consciousness is
similaily uepenuent foi its meaning$% 43>%4(3+%>#%%on the woilu. Not foi
Busseil, ciucially. The ieason is iemaikably simple: a ceitain soit of piimoiuial
subjectivity iemains, as a iesiuue, aftei all othei thingsall existential claimshave
been biacketeu. Acts of consciousness iemain, anu they iemain intuitively
accessible as just what they aie, without the inteifeience of any "piesuppositions."
The #[(%)#>4# of consciousness is not something we claim; itthe "tianscenuental
ego"is the basis foi the making of any valiu claims whatsoevei. It is the ultimate,
timeless, anu piimoiuial souice of meaning. Busseil uoes not claim foi it the status

natuial attituue is 'implicate' in the tianscenuental peispective." (Luft, 22S) 0nly, we might wish to
make a uistinction between iaw natuial expeiience anu such expeiience as lauen with iealistic
"assumptions," the lattei being the full "natuial attituue" as Busseil uesciibes it.
64
of a gouheau, howevei. Stiictly, it is neithei "human" noi "uivine." (!) Yet it ceitainly
is self-containeu:

"|Cjonsciousness consiueieu in its 2+,()F must be helu to be a self-containeu complex of being, a
complex of $<%3=+)# being into which nothing can penetiate anu out of which nothing can slip, to
which nothing is spatiotempoially exteinal anu which cannot be affecteu by any physical thing..."
121

Now iionically, this soit of iemaik has piecisely the effect of 4(,4+A?#>)(>C the
possibility of uualism. Foi what Busseil is telling us is that (puie) consciousness is
not something on the same level as eithei "physical" things oi "mental" ones (non-
"puiifieu" subjective things like paiticulai human egos anu theii "ieal"
components), anu that it is not inueeu a thing at all, but the basis on which all things
become known anu uefineu. Whethei we agiee with him oi not, we must take
seiiously his own claim to be ievealing an unuiscoveieu countiy, as it weie, whose
teiiain has nevei befoie been seen. It is as if to say that Busseil claims to have founu
(oi ieuiscoveieu, aftei Bescaites anu otheis) the access point, itself neithei pait of
the woilu noi othei than it, to the compiehensibility of that woilu (anu itself). This
stiuctuie is the ultimate concein of "philosophy," now unueistoou as
"tianscenuental phenomenology"the stuuy of the unueilying stiuctuies, oi again
the 3,(C(>% of,
122
expeiience anu expeiienceable ieality.
We might enu this section with an extenueu quote fiom Busseil, in which he
himself neatly summaiizes the bulk of his position in !"#$% !. Bopefully, by now the
ieauei will be familiai with the concepts uiscusseu heiein:

121
Ibiu., p 112
122
Ibiu., p. 1S1
65

"The iealm of tianscenuental consciousness as the iealm of what is, in a ueteimineu sense, 'absolute
being,' has been pioviueu us by the phenomenological ieuuction. It is piimal categoiy of all being (oi,
in oui teiminology, the piimal iegion), the one in which all othei iegions of being aie iooteu, to
which, accoiuing to theii #%%#>4#, they aie ielative anu on which they aie theiefoie all essentially
uepenuent. The theoiy of categoiies must stait entiiely fiom this most iauical of all ontological
uistinctionsbeing $% 43>%4(3+%>#%% anu being as something which becomes 'manifesteu' in
consciousness, 'tianscenuent' beingwhich, as we see, can be attaineu in its puiity anu be
appieciateu only by the methou of the phenomenological ieuuction. In the essential ielationship
between ),$>%4#>"#>)$= anu ),$>%4#>"#>) being aie iooteu all the ielationships alieauy toucheu on
by us iepeateuly but latei to be exploieu moie piofounuly, between phenomenology anu all othei
sciencesielationships in the sense of which it is implicit that the uominion of phenomenology
incluue in a ceitain iemaikable mannei all othei sciences."
12S

0f paiticulai note heie, foi oui puiposes, is the iepeateu ueployment of vaiiants of
"being" anu "ontological," as well as the notion of a "iealm" of "tianscenuental
consciousness." Tianscenuental phenomenology is both an epistemology as well as
a kinu of highei-oiuei ontologya science, to mouify Aiistotle, of "being qua
H>3B>."

!F+ 8%"(4'&)"? D-14-(#)%".

Pait of the ueep appeal of Busseil's phenomenology is its appeal to intuition,
to expeiience, anu to eviuence. This "eviuentialism" (my woiu) gives philosophy a
manuate to be "iesponsible" to the facts, so to speak, anu accoiuingly to the "things
themselves." It is why Busseil coulu speak of phenomenology as the "genuine"

12S
Ibiu., p. 172
66
positivism.
124
0n the othei hanu, Busseil's uefinition of expeiience anu intuition aie
bioau enough to appeal to non-empiiicists (anu even Kantians), foi whom sensoiy
expeiience is the only tiue foim of intuition. Busseil incluues such acts as categoiial
intuition anu iueation. We aie able to "expeiience" logical entities anu mathematical
ones, anu, thiough acts of imagination anu memoiy, non-existent ones. Theie is only
one ultimate piinciple of eviuence to which one must stiictly auheiethe so-calleu
"piinciple of piinciples":

"No conceivable theoiy can make us eii with iespect to the 2,(>4(2=# 3D $== 2,(>4(2=#%: )5$) #?#,F
3,(C(>$)(?# 2,#%#>)(?# (>)+()(3> (% $ =#C()(A(`(>C %3+,4# 3D 43C>()(3>G that #?#,F)5(>C 3,(C(>$,(=F-3DD#,#"
to us (> j(>)+()(3>M (% )3 <# $44#2)#" %(A2=F $% B5$) (% 2,#%#>)#" $% <#(>CG but also 3>=F B()5(> )5# =(A()%
(> B5(45 () (% 2,#%#>)#" )5#,#."
12S

Busseil makes knowleuge a much moie "uemociatic" enteipiise than was evei
befoie conceiveuall intuitive eviuence of any kinu can take on cognitive valiuity.
At the same time, Busseil foices the phenomenologist to be uisciplineu by
iemaining tiue to this eviuence anu 3>=F this eviuence in making knowleuge claims.
But if this is all that phenomenology consists ineviuentiaiy iigoi anu a
wiue scope foi cognitionthen it is unlikely Busseil woulu have attiacteu so much
opposition by latei (anu contempoiaiy) phenomenologists themselves. To
unueistanu this ieaction one must tuin to the bolu anu challenging foim of
intentional "iuealism" that !"#$% ! eiects. It is, essentially, an explanatoiy fiamewoik
foi the possibility of knowleuge in light of the %##A(>C gulf between, as NcBowell

124
Ibiu., p. S9
12S
Ibiu.; Busseil's italics
67
has memoiably put it, "minu anu woilu."
126
Busseil shows us that in fact, the two
aie inteitwineu at all levels, even though eiuetically uistinct. But how is this
possible. Bow can theie be a woilu that gives itself )3 +% even while this C(?#>>#%% is
subject to stiict iules goveineu by the life of an essentially un-woiluly Ego. Bow is
this not to be thought of as anything moie than an aibitiaiy positing of a quasi-
Leibnizian "pie-establisheu haimony". What is the essential, innei law that woulu
make the fusion of the ieal anu the iueal an actuality, anu not a blinu hope.
It woulu seem that Busseil's "tianscenuental ego" uoes not so much offei a
solution as it liteially gives a name to just this hopeit is a piomise, an eainest,
iathei than a solution. It uoes not impiove on Begel's "Absolute Spiiit" anu in fact
lacks the lattei's univocal (in this case, iueal) natuie. Busseil's theoiy asks foi a
sepaiation of essence fiom fact, ieal fiom iueal, tianscenuental fiom natuialall
the while insisting that no such cleavages compiomise his vision of puie anu uiiect
cognition of the "things themselves." This is a tough sell. Foi is theie not an
unavoiuable tension between any foim of tianscenuental iuealism anu the notion of
"tianscenuent things". So long as these aie meiely "immanent tianscenuencies,"
uoes not Busseil's position veei piecipitously towaius subjective oi absolute
iuealism, albeit cleaily against his own intentions. It is in fact the lattei hiuuen
possibilitythe possibility of an "absolute" iuealismthat hoveis constantly ovei
his woik in the iuealist phase. Yet theie aie even ueepei ieasonsieasons that the
stiuctuie of Busseil's own system pioviues us withto believe that Busseil's
"tianscenuental iuealism" is intiinsically oiienteu towaius absolute iuealism, by

126
NcBowell, }ohn. K(>" $>" g3,=". Cambiiuge, Nass.: Baivaiu 0niveisity, 1994
68
tenuency that is. This can be seen thiough the inevitable logic of "attituues" that
Busseil leaves foi the most pait inexplicit.
Busseilian tianscenuental iuealism, as we have seen, uepenus on the ciucial
uistinction of the natuial anu tianscenuental attituues, anu hence on the possibility
of a tianscenuental ieuuction. In this iespect it is exceeuingly impoitant to iegaiu
the two attituuesnatuial anu tianscenuentalas being at uiffeient =#?#=%. That is,
the natuial attituue is not meiely ieplaceu by the tianscenuental; fiom the natuial
attituue, we ),$"# +2 to the tianscenuental attituue. 0n its own, the natuial attituue
is false, since it makes assumptions about the inuiffeience of minu anu woilu that
aie themselves false. The natuial attituue has to be oveicome anu ieplaceu by the
tianscenuental if we aie to uo ieal philosophy anu hence "know" the woilu aiounu
us. So much is meiely ieview. The tianscenuental attituue is the one in which ieality
is known as it ,#$==F is; the natuial attituue is but a pieluue. Yet, uo we evei stop
being "nave iealists". Is theie not an "eveiyuayness" that peivaues even the
tianscenuental philosophei's existence. It is impossible in Busseil's system to have
both attituues at once, howevei, since the natuial attituue contains commitments
that have to be given up in the tianscenuental attituue; they aie mutually exclusive.
Yet if they weie meiely incommensuiable, one coulu not be calleu supeiioi to
anothei, anu the iesult woulu be a foim of ielativism. But since the tianscenuental
attituue is cleaily supeiioi foi Busseil, who was stiongly anti-ielativist we might
auu, it woulu seem to me that it is only logical to concluue the following: that the
tianscenuental attituue is at a 5(C5#, level than the natuial, but also 43>)$(>% all the
tiuth anu legitimacy (basically, the iaw intuitivity, without foi example the mistaken
69
theoietical assumptions iegaiuing the ieal existence of intuiteu objects) of the
foimei, anu in such a way as to %+<=$)# it. Thus we can still expeiience the natuial
attituue legitimately, so long as we suboiuinate it to the tianscenuental as soon as
we aie in a position to begin to tiuly unueistanu what we expeiience "natuially."
The tianscenuental attituue is thus an impiovement ovei the natuial attituue; it is a
cleai-eyeu view of the bilateial constitutive nexus of expeiience anu that-which-is-
expeiienceu, giounueu in intuitive eviuence which comes to us "natuially." Anu so
the natuial attituue is thus 3?#,43A# by the (phenomenological) philosophei, who
goes beyonu it while ietaining the fiist-oiuei expeiiential uata, moiphic anu hyletic,
uiscloseu in its uomain.
What uoes this pictuie tell us, finally. It explains exactly Busseil's own
conviction that the tianscenuental attituue, which is itself the attituue of
tianscenuental consciousness, uiscloses a self-stanuing iealm of being that incluues
but oveicomes the being of Natuie, which is meiely uepenuent on the "puie" Being
of Consciousness. Exteinal existence in the "nave-iealist" sense, so to speak, is
ievealeu to be a D(4)(3> native to the >$)+,$= $))()+"#. It is not to be taken seiiously
by those that H>3B bettei, namely that "exteinal existence" is itself only a "meaning"
geneiateu in anu thiough consciousnessnamely peiceiving consciousness. I call
this "absolute iuealism" not simply to echo Begel oi the ueiman Iuealists but to
uiaw on Busseil's own languagehe himself uses "absolute" to uesciibe the being
of consciousness (qua phenomenological iesiuuum). The phenomenological
ieuuction is thus akin the opening of an eye, a ueliveiy fiom uaikness. It is no meie
mouification of the psycheinueeu, it leaves the psyche itself behinu!
70
Theie is a piessing geneial question, theiefoie, iegaiuing the "biacketing"
pioceuuie, oi at least the way Busseil employs it in !"#$% !, namely whethei it
necessaiily entails a soit of subjectivism fiom which theie is, piopeily, no ietuin.
Busseil's tianscenuent woilu is pieseiveu nominally aftei the ieuuction, but only as
a "meaning." Busseil's unueistanuing of tianscenuence is complex, anu it may
legitimately be wonueieu whethei he has tiuly iepelleu the ghost of subjectivism
fiom enteiing his system. This has been peiceiveu as a lack of appieciation of the
uepth of the "alteiity" of things, much in the way Busseil has been similaily
ciiticizeu foi not sufficiently explaining the otheiness of othei people.
Anothei question that aiises in ieauing Busseil iegaius the veiy possibility
of tianscenuental phenomenology in the fiist place. This is the souice of one of the
gieat puzzles anu challenges of tianscenuental phenomenology. That is, how can we
oveicome the natuial attituue, as Busseil insists that we must in oiuei to entei into
knowleuge, if it is alieauy so successful, by its veiy natuie, in binuing us to its uoxic
spell. Busseil fiames the task of bieaking fiee as a mattei of being uisciplineu anu
iigoious, but the question ieally has moie to uo with piinciple than with uegiee. Foi
just how is it that it is even 23%%(<=# to know one's expeiiential life $% () (% =(?#"
without iemaining somehow (> that veiy expeiientialitythat is, in the "natuial
attituue". This is not meiely a question of the possibility of "ieflexivity." Foi
ieflexive consciousness can still be explaineu within the natuial attituue: I can think
about my thinking, tieating it as an object like anything else. The tianscenuental
attituue involves moie than this; it involves a ieflexivity blenueu togethei with a
thoioughgoing "biacketing" of the whole woilu I take foi gianteu in eveiyuay life. It
71
involves the iejection of nave iealism in the most categoiical of teims. So how is
tianscenuental phenomenology itself possible.
It is in connection with this question that we come to a chaiacteiistic
heimeneutic uifficulty in !"#$% ! anu tianscenuental phenomenology geneially.
127
To
be able to %## the natuial attituue $% %+45, to be able to foim the essential concept of
it anu make it a theme of ieflection, is to have to piesuppose the self-tianscenuence
of the natuial attituue. 0ne is alieauy in the tianscenuental attituue, in othei woius,
fiom the veiy <#C(>>(>C of the text of !"#$% !oi at least, one has to be theie to
piopeily giasp its contents. Yet how aie we to get theie, without fiist using the
phenomenological methou, that is, without fiist biacketing oui own assumptions,
etc..
The phenomenological ieuuction has a uistinct "uouble meaning." Theie is an
obvious anu impoitant sense in which the #23456 involves a kinu of "withuiawal"
fiom the woilu. It is an exclusion, oi "biacketing," of the natuial "factual" woilu, a
flight to a level of "puie" insight. But tianscenuental phenomenology is also a move
away fiom the "theoiies" uevelopeu in the "natuial attituue" anu hence a ietuin to a
moie piimoiuial anu authentic layei of expeiienceof the natuial, factual woilu! To
ovei-emphasize the foimei aspect is of couise to push Busseil into mysticism, while
the lattei piesses him too ueeply, potentially, into the bowels of >$)+,#, the uieaueu
zone of opaque "fact." Yet unless we accept a stoiy of sublation, in which Busseil
comes uangeiously (to his minu) close to absolute iuealism, theie woulu seem to be
an uniesolveu tension between tianscenuental subjectivity anu the "natuial oiuei"

127
This was alieauy pointeu out astutely by Ricoeui. See _#F, p 42 & pp. 48-9
72
at the heait of Busseil's system.
128
It is my consiueieu view, then, that Busseil must
be an absolute oi unmitigateu iuealistone who uenies any co-ultimacy of "natuial"
ieality with tianscenuental consciousnesssubjectivityon pain of the potential foi
his system to uissolve into incoheience anu peimanent vacillation between
tianscenuence anu tianscenuentality.

128
Some contempoiaiy Busseil commentatois, foi example Bonn Welton, have aigueu that it woulu
be a shame to base one's entiie unueistanuing on Busseil's tianscenuental pioject on !"#$% !7 In
Welton's woius, the "Caitesian" appioach of this text is "tiappeu in tianscenuental psychologism,"
anu shoulu be contiasteu with the much moie piomising "Kantian" appioach Busseil latei
(insufficiently) uevelopeu. (Welton, p. 287) This may be so, but as we have seen alieauy, even Welton
iecognizes that theie aie multiple anu paiallel paths in Busseil's own thinking. Whethei Busseil evei
tiuly iesolveu the tensions I speak of is an open question.
73
8209#-$ >H%; >2- 8%".#)#'#)%" %1 I0#'$-J B%&6J 0"&
/9)$)# )" <'..-$4=. !"#$% !!
K@L

"If philosophy begins with the natuial attituue, will it evei leave it behinu, anu if it coulu, why woulu
it. Such aie the questions that bothei Busseil, anu which explain the contiauictoiy positions that he
took on the constitution of Natuie."
--Nauiice Neileau-Ponty
1Su

!+ !"#$%&'(#)%"

If !"#$% ! aims thiough the #23456 anu ieuuction to intiouuce Busseil's
tianscenuental-phenomenological methou, then !"#$% !! aims to show us the being
of the woilu as ievealeu by this methou. The lattei text is thus, one might say, the
ontological complement to its moie epistemological-methouological pieuecessoi,
while the biief !"#$% !!!
XkX
, the final piece in the tiiau, is a kinu of hybiiu of both. The

129
!"#$% 9#,)$(>(>C )3 $ 9+,# 95#>3A#>3=3CF $>" )3 $ 95#>3A#>3=3C(4$= 95(=3%325FG 1#43>" E33HI
1)+"(#% (> )5# 95#>3A#>3=3CF 3D J3>%)()+)(3>. Tis. R. Rojcewicz anu A. Schuwei. Boiuiecht: Kluwei
Acauemic Publisheis, 1989. (Beieaftei !"#$% !!.) The piesent chaptei coveis both !"#$% !! anu !"#$%
!!!7 (!"#$% 9#,)$(>(>C )3 $ 9+,# 95#>3A#>3=3CF $>" )3 $ 95#>3A#>3=3C(4$= 95(=3%325FG :5(," E33HI
95#>3A#>3=3CF $>" )5# Q3+>"$)(3>% 3D )5# 14(#>4#%. Tians. Teu Klein anu William E. Pohl. The Bague:
Naitinus Nijhoff Publisheis, 198u. Beieaftei !"#$% !!!7) But I will talk less fiequently of the lattei,
owing to its bievity anu ielative lack of substance, as compaieu to eithei of the fiist two volumes. It
uoes, howevei, contain some useful mateiial foi oui puiposes. Biief attention will also be given to
one of Busseil's lectuies fiom 1919. (Busseil, Eumunu. O+%%#,=($>$ K$)#,($=(#><l>"#G E$>" !;7 *$)+,
+>" '#(%)I ;3,=#%+>C#> 13AA#,%#A#%)#, XZXZ. Eu. Nichael Weilei. Boiuiecht: Kluwei Acauemic
Publisheis, 2uu2. Beieaftei O+%%#,= XZXZ.)
1Su
fiom Bominique Sglaiu. Ti. Robeit valliei. Noithwestein 0niveisity Piess: Evanston, Illinois, 2uuS
(p. 79)
1S1
It is of couise the miuule, much longei anu uensei text that is the piimaiy subject of this chaptei.
74
lattei two volumes piesuppose a piioi peifoimance of the #23456 anu ieuuction,
along with the tianscenuental-iuealistic tuin that go with them. This allows Busseil
to uive into the buining question, left wiue open aftei !"#$% !, as to just what the
woilu is supposeu to =33H =(H# once the ieuuction has taken placenot only the
woilu, of couise, but the woilu-occupying self who, in its tianscenuental guise, has
maue these new vistas possible.
!"#$% !! is thus both an extension as well as a ueepening of its nominal
pieuecessoi, though it's tiue that the two texts haiuly have a compaiable histoiy of
uevelopment. Although much of it was wiitten aiounu the same time (1912-191S)
as !"#$% !, !"#$% !! was being ieviseu thioughout Busseil's life, anu he was nevei
satisfieu to have it publisheu.
1S2
!"#$% !!! also iemaineu unpublisheu in Busseil's
life-time, but it was ieviseu haiuly at all between the time it was fiist uiafteu anu
Busseil's ueath.
1SS
The publisheu anu authoi-enuoiseu !"#$% ! was hugely
influential, both positively anu negatively, but amazingly, so was the long-
unueigiounu !"#$% !!. No less than Beiueggei anu Neileau-Ponty weie shapeu
uecisively by the woik, while many otheisAlfieu Schtz, Paul Ricoeui, etc.felt
compelleu to comment on the woik anu iesponu to its iemaikable contents.
1S4
As

1S2
Some make much of the fact that Euith Stein gave a goou ueal of the shape (anu oveiall title) to the
woik in hei 1918 ieuaction. I will auuiess one paiticulai scholai's (Elizabeth Behnke's) thoughts on
the mattei in the next chaptei.
1SS
Foi uetaileu infoimation on the publication histoiy of !"#$% !!, see the Tianslatoi's Intiouuction to
the English euition of the woik (!"#$% !!, xii-xvi).
1S4
The case of Neileau-Ponty is cleai anu obvious fiom his own wiitings, as we will see in this anu
subsequent chapteis. As foi Beiueggei, Nenon makes a convincing case that Beiueggei was "uiiectly
anu immeuiately" influenceu by Busseil's notions of the "peisonalistic attituue" anu "@AB#=)." (See:
!%%+#% (> O+%%#,=M% !"#$% !!. Eus. Thomas Nenon anu Lestei Embiee. Boiuiecht: Kluwei Acauemic
Publisheis, 1996, p. x. volume heieaftei iefeiieu to as !%%+#%.) Luckily, a lengthy synoptic stuuy has
been uone by Paul Ricoeui, whose numeious juuicious obseivations we will have multiple occasions
to consult anu inteipiet in the couise of the piesent stuuy. See: Ricoeui, Paul. O+%%#,=I 0> 0>$=F%(% 3D
O(% 95#>3A#>3=3CF. Tians. Euwaiu u. Ballaiu anu Lestei E. Embiee. Evanston: Noithwestein
75
foi the ielative ueaith of liteiatuie on the book anu its iings of influence, in the
woius of the euitois of a iecent collection of essays on the woik, "theie is an almost
inveise piopoition between the influence that Busseil's !"#$% !! exeiciseu on
impoitant philosophical uevelopments in this centuiy anu the attention it has
ieceiveu in seconuaiy liteiatuie."
1SS

The fact is that !"#$% !! is an amazing, as well as feaisomely complex, foiay
into a laige aiiay of pioblems, among them the minu-bouy pioblem, the so-calleu
pioblem of the human sciences (what they aie anu how they uiffei methouologically
anu iegionally fiom natuial sciences), the pioblem of peisonal iuentity anu
motivation, anu many otheis, all uniteu in tenuous ways unuei the bannei "stuuies
in constitution." !"#$% !! complements !"#$% ! but also goes well beyonu it in many
iegaius. It can fiuitfully be ieau as a supplement to oi foieshauowei of all phases of
Busseil's latei thought. Foi example, it anticipates anu even paitially uevelops some
of the main themes of the J$,)#%($> K#"()$)(3>% (inteisubjectivity, empathy,
"monauology") as well as the J,(%(% 3D )5# /+,32#$> 14(#>4#% (the life-woilu, oi, as it
weie, the "suiiounuing woilu"@AB#=)), anu while mostly "static" (like !"#$% !), it
begins to incoipoiate elements of genetic phenomenology as well, at least in its
thiiu pait. It stanus on its own, howevei, as well. It featuies the most uetaileu
examination of the bouy Busseil evei piouuceuthis being the piobable ioot of its
singulai impact on subsequent Continental thought. It is also the souice of

0niveisity Piess, 2uu7. (pp. SS-81) Beieaftei "Ricoeui." Theie is also a shoitei but impoitant eaily
essay on !"#$% !! wiitten aiounu the same time by Alfieu Schtz, which I will unfoitunately not have
time to auuiess in this chaptei. See: Schtz, Alfieu. "Eumunu Busseil's !"#$%G ;3=+A# !!." In 95(=3%325F
$>" 95#>3A#>3=3C(4$= N#%#$,45, 1S: (pp. S94-41S)
1SS
The euitois aie Thomas Nenon anu Lestei Embiee. (!%%+#%, p. ix)
76
numeious insightful uistinctions between natuie, soul, spiiit, Ego, anu peison
though these aie often impossible to ieconcile with one anothei haimoniously, as
we will see. Foi ultimately, !"#$% !! is simply )33 stuffeu with goou iueas to make a
single consistent aigument (oi, phenomenologically speaking, a consistent set of
eiuetic uesciiptions), which may be one of the ieasons Busseil was nevei fully
satisfieu with it. Inueeu, much that is intiouuceu anu paitly uevelopeu in !"#$% !! is
not uevelopeu all the way, even by Busseil's stanuaius. The histoiy of the text anu
its euiting by multiple hanus (Busseil, Stein, Lanugiebe) also means that it is highly
uneven anu uisoiganizeu in places, anu can haiuly be saiu to have a conventional oi
even logically sounu stiuctuie.
It is wise then, on the one hanu, not to tieat !"#$% !! as a unifieu whole so
much as a collection of investigatoiy stiains. 0n the othei hanu, the skeleton of !"#$%
!! as a text is the closest we will come to a glimpse of what might be calleu a
complete "Busseilian (iegional) ontology."
1S6
Busseil's constitutional analyses,
taken at theii face value as giounueu intuitively, aie meant to ieveal to us the being
of the whole woilu of positive being, of "what is" (2$>)$ )$ 3>)$), fiom the lowest oi
most founuational stiatum, that of "physicalistic" natuie, to the highest, the
ieflecting peisonal (oi "spiiitual") Ego, along with its collective cultuial foimations
("peisonalities of a highei oiuei"). Anu all of this has intiinsic philosophical inteiest
foi a myiiau of questions usually unueistoou as "metaphysical"mateiialism anu

1S6
Busseil uistinguishes between foimal ontology anu iegional ontology. In this chaptei we aie
conceineu with the lattei, that is, with the kinus of <#(>C% that make up the woilu, specifically the
"ontological iegions" of mateiial natuie, animal natuie, anu spiiit. (See: Biummonu, }ohn }. O(%)3,(4$=
.(4)(3>$,F 3D O+%%#,=M% 95(=3%325F. Lanham, Naiylanu: Scaieciow Piess, 2uu8, pp. 78-9, 1S1, 18u.
Beieaftei ".(4)(3>$,F.")
77
the minu-bouy pioblem, foi examplein the same way, peihaps, that the
phenomenological theoiies of intentionality oi peiception auuiess classical
questions of "epistemology." As I will aigue in this chaptei, I ieau the text to be a
continual balancing-actwhich iesembles moie so a see-sawbetween natuialistic
anu anti-natuialistic stiains in Busseil's philosophy, both of which aie stiongly on
uisplay in the text. The contiauictions of the text aie useful foi the stuuy of Busseil
geneially because they aie ieflective of the ueepest unueilying tensions of his
phenomenological system. They go to the veiy issuesthe natuie of iuealism anu
the tianscenuental ego, the natuie-spiiit uiviue anu the uivision of natuial anu
human sciences in theii ielation to phenomenologythat occupieu Busseil, anu
iemaineu uniesolveu, until the enu of his life.
0f couise, these aie also the veiy issues that concein us in oui stuuy of
Busseil anu Neileau-Ponty on the question of the meaning of natuie anu its ielation
to "spiiit" anu consciousness. !"#$% !! (anu !!!) teach a confusing uouble lessonon
the one hanu, the "spiiituality of natuie" (as Busseil puts it in anothei text
1S7
),
paiticulaily in the foim of the living, feeling oiganism $% living; anu on the othei
hanu (anu this is what uominates Busseil's account, all things consiueieu), the stiict
bifuication of natuie anu spiiit, not necessaiily in teims of uistinguishing the
tianscenuental ego (consciousness in its "iiieal" iiiuescence) fiom ieality, but in
teims of caiving out two sepaiate ontological oiueis within the iealm of the "ieal"
itself (anu within which the "bouy" figuies veiy uiffeiently in each iespective
spheie). Combineu with these uifficulties is the equally cential confusion between

1S7
O+%%#,= XZXZ, 186
78
the natuie of "spiiit" vis--vis that of "consciousness" oi "tianscenuental
subjectivity," the lattei of which of couise figuies so ubiquitously in the scheme of
Busseil's pioject as a whole. This paiticulai issue goes to the heait of the ambiguity
between Busseil's uistinction between ontology anu phenomenology, the ieal anu
the tianscenuental, anu, in auuition to the piioi ambiguities about natuie anu the
bouy, make it possible to see wheie Busseil's tianscenuental-phenomenological
pioject staits to uniavel somewhat fiom within. 0i moie chaiitably speaking, these
pioblems seem to call foi a tiansfoimation of Busseilian phenomenological pioject
in a moie unifieu uiiection, one of which happens to involve a moie immanentizeu
anu embouieu conception of the ego (which ought not be entiiely aloof fiom
ontology) anu a moie ecstatic, "enwoilueu" conception of the bouy (which ought not
to be entiiely aloof fiom the ego). This is the uiiection ultimately taken by Neileau-
Ponty, foi whom the tianscenuental ego must situate itself somehow (anu nevei
wholly comfoitably) in natuie itself, namely as a powei of finite ieflection, capable
of a ceitain "eiuetic seeing" but incapable of absolute tianspaiency oi a final victoiy
ovei its all-too-natuial ',+>". Thus, Neileau-Ponty's entiie oiiginal pioject, one
might say, is fiist maue possible by the volatile iuptuies of !"#$% !!.
1S8
But we will
have to wait befoie we examine this "seconu half" of the stoiy in moie uetail, in
Chaptei S (anu biiefly, in the conclusion of the piesent chaptei).
In pait II of this chaptei I will pioviue a uetaileu outline of the geneial
ontological matiix sketcheu out by Busseil in !"#$% !! (anu continueu in !!!),

1S8
0f couise, heie it is well to keep in minu voltaiie's highly appiopiiate maxim about the mistakes
of "tiue genius": aJM#%) =# 2,(?(=PC# "+ ?,$( C6>(# #) %+,)3+) "+ C6>(# f+( 3+?,# +># 4$,,(P,#G "# D$(,#
(A2+>6A#>) "# C,$>"#% D$+)#%7" (1(P4=# "# U3+(% S!;, ch. S2)
79
accompanieu by some ciitical commentaiy. Then, in pait III, I will piouuce a textual
analysis in which I both lay out what I take to be the most inteiesting pioblemsin
both the neutial anu pejoiative senses of the teimsof Busseil's piesentation. I will
concluue with some ieflections on !"#$% !! anu, as mentioneu above, some thoughts
on how Neileau-Ponty's philosophy can be unueistoou as a iesponse to anu
uevelopment of the themes (anu tensions) of text. 0ltimately I will aigue that what
emeiges fiom Busseil's ontological matiix (in combination with the position
alieauy stateu in !"#$% !) is a complex, anu finally self-inconsistent, combination of
ontological uualism anu phenomenological monism, in spite of an otheiwise
piomising foiay into the hybiiuity of the living bouy.

!!+ >2- :"#%4%?)(04 M0#$)N %1 !"#$% !!-!!!

07 !>),3"+4)(3>
As we have alieauy inuicateu, !"#$% !!8!!! conceins the "constitution" of
ieality. In the woius of one commentatoi, "!"#$% !! can be iegaiueu as the attempt to
iegain |aftei !"#$% !j ieality by catching it up in the same net with puie
consciousness."
1S9
That is, wheieas the subject (in the sense of "topic") of !"#$% ! is
consciousness anu its geneial intentional stiuctuie, that of !"#$% !! is the ieality

1S9
Tymieniecka, Anna-Teiesa. "Fiom Busseil's Foimulation of the Soul-Bouy Issue to a New
Biffeientiation of Buman Faculties." In 13+= $>" E3"F (> O+%%#,=($> 95#>3A#>3=3CFI K$> $>" *$)+,#
R0>$=#4)$ O+%%#,=($>$G ;3=7 S;!T. Eu. Anna-Teiesa Tymieniecka. Boiuiecht: Spiingei Netheilanus,
198S (p. 4)
80
constituteu (> consciousness, a ieality which has its own vaiious kinus, stiata, anu
types of givenness to be uistinguisheu anu ielateu. In this way, ieuuction anu
constitution eventually emeige as two complementaiy poles of phenomenological
methou
14u
, anu they have iemaineu so evei since.
But what, piecisely, is "constitution". Befining it is a bit tiicky. As Beimot
Noian explains, it is moie of an "opeiative" as opposeu to "thematic" concept in
Busseil, anu thus it typically iemains unuefineu by him.
141
0ne coulu, howevei,
uefine it ioughly in teims of the spontaneous piouuction (in the sense of "making
available," not "cieation") of 3<c#4)%. 0ne speaks, foi example, of consciousness'
constitution "of the mateiial woilu," foi example, oi again of "othei people" (in the
sense of inteisubjectivity)in the sense that consciousness makes such beings
available. Thus, the notion of constitution emphasizes the "objective" aspect of the
"coiielational $ 2,(3,(" of consciousness anu object, while ieuuction, by contiast,
emphasizes the subjective, oi "constituting" aspect. Now the piinciple of
constitution is what allows us to speak of Busseil's "ontology," that is, of the "being"
of things "in themselves," in teims of what they funuamentally (essentially) aie, so
long as we iemembei, in the woius of Cobb-Stevens, that "tianscenuental
philosophy iefuses to be absoibeu eithei by a sociology of peisonal iecipiocity oi a
philosophy of objective spiiit."
142
That is, we can speak of Busseil's unueistanuing
of the "being" of things (bioauly speaking) but only (> )#,A% 3D theii noematic

14u
.(4)(3>$,F, S4-S
141
Noian, Beimot. !>),3"+4)(3> )3 95#>3A#>3=3CF. New Yoik: Routleuge, 2uuu (p. 164)
142
Cobb-Stevens, Richaiu. "Bouy, Spiiit, anu Ego in Busseil's !"#$% !!." 13+= $>" E3"F (> O+%%#,=($>
95#>3A#>3=3CFI K$> $>" *$)+,# R0>$=#4)$ O+%%#,=($>$G ;3=7 S;!T. Eu. Anna-Teiesa Tymieniecka.
Boiuiecht: Spiingei Netheilanus, 198S. (p. 2S2) Beieaftei "Cobb-Stevens."
81
"sense," itself ievealeu via the phenomenological (anu obviously eiuetic) ieuuctions.
Busseil's ontology is theiefoie the stuuy of ieality-as-constituteu-in-tianscenuental-
consciousness.
14S
This is noematic, as opposeu to noetic, phenomenology.
144
(At any
iate, the uisciplines of phenomenology anu ontology aie paiallel foi Busseil,
uiffeiing only thiough "shift in view"that is, the phenomenological ieuuction.
14S
)
!"#$% !! piesents an exhaustive oiueiing of the vaiious sense-layeis of
objectivitymateiiality, animality, humanity, sociality, etc., plus many inteimeuiate
layeisthat aie constituteu by consciousness.
146
Both !"#$% !! anu !!! have the same
oiuei of piesentation, in teims of staiting fiist with the "lowest" (anu self-
inuepenuent, in puiely mateiial "things"
147
) stiatum of mateiial natuie, anu moving
"upwaius" to puie spiiit. This oiueiing is cuiiously the exact inveise of the
"ontological piioiity" Busseil gives to spiiit anu the "spiiitual attituue" in which
things aie fiist constituteu not as puiely mateiial at all. But this is just one of the

14S
Thus while "nave iealism" is uestioyeu thiough the ieuuction anu the tiansition to the
tianscenuental attituue, it is impoitant to keep in minu that phenomenology is not phenomenalism;
it uoes not ieuuce ieality to appeaiance, it stuuies ieality (> ()% $22#$,(>C (as well as the subjectivity
to which ieality appeais, which can in tuin be stuuieu foi its own sake as well).
144
A moie technical uefinition of "constitution" is offeieu by Ricoeui: "To constitute signifies only to
inteiiogate a sense by explicating the significational intentions to which the sense coiielates. Bence,
the job of constitution iemains below the level of inteipietation." (Ricoeui 6S) 0veigaaiu offeis
peihaps the simplest way to unueistanu the ielation between ieuuction anu constitution: ".the
actual ielation between constitution anu tianscenuental phenomenological ieuuction can be
uesciibeu as one between what we want to unueistanu anu the methou by which we aie able to
unueistanu what we want to unueistanu." See: 0veigaaiu, Sien. O+%%#,= $>" O#("#CC#, 3> E#(>C (>
)5# g3,="7 Boiuiecht: Spiingei, 2uu4 (pp. S9-6u) Beieaftei "0veigaaiu." uauamei offeis this:
""Constitution" is nothing but the "movement of ieconstiuction" |g(#"#,$+D<$+<#B#C+>Cj that
follows aftei the ieuuction has been peifoimeu." (Citeu by way of 0veigaaiu, S9.)
14S
"But all claiifying ontological insight executeu in the fiamewoik of axiomatic claiity that is not
uiiectly phenomenological becomes such by a meie %5(D) 3D ?(#B, as conveisely in the whole of
phenomenological insights theie must be those which become ontological thiough a meie shift of
view." (!"#$% !!!, 9u)
146
Although this is not uiscusseu in as much uetail, consciousness also constitutes itself, insofai as it
makes itself an object of obseivation anu (self-)peiception.
147
See fn 27, below.
82
many paiauoxes of the text.
148
It is also impoitant to note that fiom the veiy
beginning of the text, Busseil's examination of ontological iegions is coiielateu with
a type of scientific oi theoietical activityfoi example, puie natuie with physics,
the soul with psychology, the living bouy with the (seemingly inventeu) science of
somatology, etc.as well as, in most cases, an $))()+"#, anothei cential but
opeiative Busseilian concept oi uevice, alieauy uiscusseu in oui chaptei 1 (pp. 8-
11.) The ontological iegion of spiiit, stuuieu by the "human sciences," is coiielateu
with the "peisonalistic" oi "spiiitual" attituue, anu the iegions of mateiial anu
animal natuie with the "natuialistic" attituue. As Busseil now puts it in !"#$% !!, "A
change in attituue means nothing else but a thematic tiansition fiom one uiiection
of appiehension to anothei, to which coiiesponu, coiielatively, uiffeient
objectivities."
149

E7 :5# J3>%)()+)(3> 3D g3,="=F N#$=()F

1. Nateiial Natuie
Ricoeui iemaiks that Busseil's gestuie in the ieuuction of !"#$% ! is to "ieject
natuie as 'alien,' as 'anothei being.'"
1Su
It uoes this, of couise, to make way foi a
sense of "consciousness" not ieuucible to that of "natuie"to effect a Kantian
"Copeinican" tuin, so to speak. In !"#$% !!, Busseil softens the "otheiness" of natuie
by giving both a "mateiial" as well as "animal" uimension. Thus theie aie these thiee

148
It can actually be explaineu, howevei, in teims of what I will latei call Busseil's "natuialism"his
implicit acceptance anu auoption of the mouein-scientific conception of natuie.
149
!"#$% !!, 221
1Su
Ricoeui, S7
83
uivisions of the text: "mateiial natuie," "animal natuie," anu "spiiit."
1S1
Alieauy fiom
this it is cleai, howevei, that the unueilying "(453)3AF in Busseil's constitutional
analysis in !"#$% !! is that of "natuie" anu "spiiit." Busseil himself confiims the
impiession when he announces: ".we have )B3 23=#%I physical natuie anu spiiit
anu, in between them, Bouy anu soul."
1S2

But what uoes Busseil mean by the teim "natuie" oi "natuial"
1SS
. Busseil
speaks of "natuie" in a uouble sense,
1S4
its iefeiiing on the one hanu only to the
"physical," anu on the othei hanu to both the physical anu psychic as a single ieality
(the psychophysical, living-ensouleu, etc.). The foimei is ">$)+,# (> )5# D(,%) $>"
3,(C(>$= %#>%#."
1SS
In the lattei case, the psychic "stiatum" is "founueu" on the moie
basic mateiial sub-stiatum. This point is cential to Busseil's ontology anu is
stiesseu by him in the following quote (fiom !"#$% !!!):

1S1
Busseil auuiesseu the "natuiespiiit" uiviue iepeateuly in his woik, fiom his lectuie "Logik als
Theoiie uei Eikenntnis" (191u11) to his last full woik, the J,(%(% (19S6), usually in the context of
the question of the ielations between the natuial anu human sciences, anu between all such sciences
anu phenomenology. Foi an oveiview of his tieatments of these topics see Nichael Weilei's extensive
Euitoi's Intiouuction to: O+%%#,=($>$ SSS!!G '#%$AA#=)# g#,H#I *$)+, +>" '#(%)I ;3,=#%+>C#>
13AA#,%#A#%)#, XZ\m. Eu. Nichael Weilei. Bouiecht: Kluwei Acauemic Publisheis, 2uu1, pp. XvI-L.
(volume iefeiieu to heieaftei as "Busseil 1927.")
1S2
!"#$% !!, 298
1SS
At this point, a fuithei teiminological note is in oiuei. Seveial teims (anu theii cognates) must be
uistinguisheu fiom each othei, namely "natuienatuial," "physical" oi "mateiial," anu "ieal." Busseil
assigns these teims moie oi less technical meanings. We may thus iegaiu the ielationship between
natuie, ieality, anu physical (oi mateiial) in the following way: natuie in the "fiist" sense is the
puiely physical oi mateiial; natuie in the seconu sense is the iealm of animality oi "embouieuness"
anu "ensouleuness"; natuie, taken in its two senses togethei, is still not all of "ieality," foi ieality
encompasses natuie anu %2(,(), which, taken by itself, is stiictly >3>L>$)+,$= in Busseil's sense. Thus
foi Busseil theie is a uistinction between "all theie is"the totality of "woiluly" (oi "intiamunuane,"
by anothei locution) iealityanu natuie as "the D(#=" 3D ),$>%4#>"#>)n%2#4(D(4$==FG %2$)(3L)#A23,$=n
,#$=()(#%" that is "natuie." (!"#$% !!, S). All of these uistinctions will come into play abunuantly as we
pioceeu.
1S4
Busseil's expiession: Ibiu., 14S
1SS
Ibiu., 171. Compaie: "the soul, too, is of couise a peisistent being. But this peisistent being is no
'natuie.'" (!"#$% !!, SSS) See also Busseil's iemaik that "ieality" is to be spoken of "in the fiist place as
natuie" (!"#$% !!, 42u). Be also iefeis to the foimei sense of "natuie" as the "stiict" sense. (See
O+%%#,= XZXZ, pp. 1S6-7) 0nless otheiwise specifieu, I too will use the teim "natuie," in iefeience
specifically to Busseil's views theieof, in this stiict sense.
84

".psychic ieality is founueu in the oiganismal mattei, but this is not conveisely founu in the psyche.
Noie geneially we can say: the mateiial woilu is, within the total V<c#4)(?# B3,=" that we call >$)+,#,
a closeu woilu of its own neeuing no help fiom othei iealities. 0n the othei hanu, the existence of
mental iealities, of a ieal mental woilu, is bounu to the existence of a natuie in the fiist sense, namely
that of mateiial natuie, anu this is not foi acciuental but foi funuamental ieasons. While the ies
extensa, if we inquiie of its essence, contains nothing of mentalness anu nothing that woulu uemanu
beyonu itself a connection with ieal mentalness, we finu conveisely that ieal mentalness essentially
can be only in connection to mateiiality as ieal minu of an animate oiganism."
1S6

Busseil also iegaius natuie to be (as is stateu alieauy in the fiist line of the woik!)
the "3<c#4) 3D )5# >$)+,$= %4(#>4#%."
1S7
Such an eaily anu explicit invocation of natuial
science, peihaps seemingly innocuous to some, in fact iepiesents a huge anu fateful
concession to the mouein physicalistic woilu-view, which Busseil will be at pains to
ieveise in ways that compounu the latent uualistic tenuencies of his thinking. All of
this will hopefully become cleaiei as we pioceeu, especially in pait III.
1S8

Busseil's notion of natuie is thus at once scientific, in the sense of "ualilean-
Newtonian," as well as bioauly "Kantian." Natuie is by its essence "extenueu," has a
uefinite spatiotempoial location, is goveineu by the law of causality, is "in itself"
uevoiu of seconuaiy qualities, etc.
1S9
Though a species of the natuial attituue, the
natuial-scientific oi natuialistic attituue involves a kinu of #23456 anu ieuuction of
its own, a biacketing in this case of all axiological anu piactical pieuicates.
16u
In this

1S6
!"#$% !!!, 1u4
1S7
!"#$% !!G S
1S8
It is not the puipose of the cuiient chaptei to offei an alteinative conception of natuie, but this
will come in chaptei 4, which is uevoteu to this topic as it is uevelopeu by Neileau-Ponty in his
*$)+,# lectuies anu othei latei woiks.
1S9
!"#$% !!, 8u-2. It shoulu be auueu that the full sense of "natuie" is utteily inteisubjective. That is, a
solipsistic subject cannot conceive of that basic natuial entity, the "thing," as opposeu to what
Busseil uesciibes at length (anu foi the fiist time in !"#$% !!) as the "phantom."
16u
Though it is not meiely a mattei of biacketing but of suboiuinating them: "Fiom the stanupoint of
natuie, eveiything peisonal is suboiuinate." (!"#$% !!, 194) Busseil uoes not give any inuication that
the natuialistic attituue isas it appeais to some mouein ieaueis to bethoioughly histoiical anu
85
way, "natuie" puiely speaking uoes not have any human significance, value, oi
utility; it simply "is."
161
This will eventually leau to the neeu to place "spiiit" above
"natuie" in "ontological piioiity," but this uoes not so much as uignify natuie as
swallow it up in human cultuial activity.
162

2. Animal Natuie, oi the Bouy-anu-Soul
When Busseil speaks of the bouy, he sometimes uesciibes it in teims of a
"plus" that is appiesenteu in some physical "things," to which belongs the new sense
of "living beings" (oi bouies), something moie than meie mateiiality, though
something that is, again, also uepenuent on mateiiality as its "substiatum."
16S

Busseil geneially tieats the Bouy
164
(U#(<) in conjunction with the soul (1##=#G
9%F45#). Bowevei, it is impoitant foi +% to uistinguish this "psychophysical"
composite, i.e., the living "ensouleu" oiganism, fiom the "bouy" iegaiueu as a "3+<=#
,#$=()F
16S
i.e., as that which is eithei "bouy" (_o,2#,G bouy-thing, .(>C) oi "Bouy"
(U#(<, living bouy). In fact, the ielevant uistinctions to make aie at least the following
five:

a) The bouy as a }anus-faceu "uouble ieality," to which peitain two lines of ieal
ciicumstances," mateiial anu psychic. (I will iefei to this as simply "the bouy.")

conuitioneu by the vagaiies of the epoch. Insteau, he piesents it as a "timeless" attituue, which even
the ancients, foi example, may have peifoimeu, but simply uiu not have the iight infoimation to uo.
161
Peihaps in the Saitiean sense of absuiuly being "theie," "# ),32. This woulu help explain Saitie's
own uualistic appiopiiation ("in itself" anu "foi itself") of Busseilian (by way of Begelian)
phenomenology.
162
See fn 1u6, below, anu also fn 1u7.
16S
!"#$% !!, 97-99
164
I am following the useful convention of the English tianslatois of !"#$% !! of signifying U#(< with
"Bouy" anu othei iefeiences to the bouy with the lowei-case "bouy." (!"#$% !!, XIv-Xv)
16S
Ibiu., 297
86
b) The bouy as bouy-thing, oi slab of mattei in space anu time, subject to foices of
natuial causality. ("bouy" when the context is cleai, otheiwise "_o,2#," oi "bouy-
thing")
c) The bouy as a "thing" "inseiteu" between the iest of the mateiial woilu anu the
"subjective" spheie;
166
also "own bouy"
u) The bouy as U#(<, the living animate oiganism, oi animal, which possesses a
psychical oi soulish stiatum, appiesenteu with its mateiial substantiality.
e) The soul oi psyche itself, which foims the uppei stiatum of the U#(<, the lowei
stiatum of which is mateiial Natuie.

0f couise the pictuie is still moie nuanceu. Foi example, theie is at the level of the
Bouy the level of sensations, incluuing kinaesthetic sensations, which is the
"aesthesiological bouy," while at a highei level theie is the "volitional bouy," which
is iesponsible foi "acting" in the sense of "willing" anu acting on the "I can."
167

Busseil's tieatment of the bouy-soul ielation is veiy inteiesting. The soul anu
the Bouy aie inteitwineu. Thus in this iespect, Busseil siues with Aiistotle, so to
speak, iathei than Plato: "the soul is inueeu evei one with the Bouy."
168
Theie can
inueeu nevei be a sepaiation of soul anu Bouy, a point Busseil makes uiamatically
thiough a uetaileu uiscussion of the a piioii eiuetic necessity foi even a C53%) to
have a Bouy. Without a bouy of any soit, no ghost, heie by uefinition a "phantom" in
Busseil's unique sense, coulu be peiceiveu oi appeiceiveu (oi foi that mattei
hallucinateu); appiesentation of the psyche always occuis thiough peiception of
ceitain kinus of bouies.
169
This soit of uiscussion in fact iaises the inteiesting
countei-image to that of the minu as a "ghost in the machine." Foi in the case of

166
Ibiu7, 169
167
Busseil speaks of the "I can" as a piactical to-be-able-to that is piioi to uoing (e.g., Ibiu., 27S), an
"oiiginal consciousness of abilities" that helps us to constitute the woilu with which I may inteiact.
"What I can uo, what is in my powei, what I know myself capable of anu am conscious of as such, that
is what a 2,$4)(4$= 23%%(<(=()F is." (Ibiu., 27u) It is only this that "can be a theme of my will."
168
Ibiu7, 176
169
Ibiu., 1uu-2
87
Busseil, the image coulun't woik: foi the ghost, being alieauy embouieu, coulu not
be saiu to neeu yet anothei bouy ("machine") to be "in." In this way it becomes
obvious that Busseil's conception of the "=#(<(%45L%##=(%45" being, the psychophysical
oiganism, cannot be iuentifieu with, say, Plato's oi Bescaites' explicit iemaiks on
the sepaiability of mental anu physical substances, if we mean by this what Busseil
calls "soul" anu "Bouy."
17u

But uoes Busseil actually go )33 fai in the uiiection of anti-uualism of Bouy
anu soul. Theie is a sense, foi example, in which Busseil's view is
epiphenomenalistic.
171
Remaiking foi example that "the thing anu the whole of
natuie aie sealeu off," he goes on to aigue: "Psychical consequences aie joineu to
natuial piocesses, just as psychical causes have consequences in natuie, but they
aie such that in tiuth they have no influence on natuie."
172
Busseil seems to seal the
ueal as he uesciibes the natuie of causality itself: "It is cleai that causality of
physical natuie has in fact a pie-eminent sense. This causality is a constitutive iuea
foi the iuea of natuie, foi the iuea of a physical thing. Foi ieasons of piinciple, the
psychic is outsiue this nexus."
17S

17u
We have alieauy seen in the pievious chaptei how Busseil uepaits fiom Bescaites in this iespect;
as we will see, howevei, Busseil's issues with ontological uualism iemain, now with iespect to an
alteinate uichotomy of "natuie" anu 'spiiit." Thus Busseil closes one uooi to uualism only to open
anothei. Ricoeui puts it well: "the psyche animating the bouy is not equivalent to the cultuial anu
communal iealizations of man. In ieintiouucing the uimension of peison anu that of community
Busseil completes the ego-psyche polaiity with a new schema wheie spiiit ('#(%)) is not the
empiiical counteipait of the puie subject of phenomenology but is iathei a soit of cultuial equivalent
much moie awkwaiu to situate in the phenomenological stiuctuie." (Ricoeui, 68-9)
171
Cf. Ricoeui, 67
172
!"#$% !!, SSS
17S
Ibiu., SSS. See also: "the soul is a being that is ielateu conuitionally to Bouily ciicumstances,
ielateu in a iegulateu way to ciicumstances in physical natuie." (!"#$% !!, SS6) Nonetheless,
"epiphenomenalism" is not the only possibility foi what Busseil is uesciibing, which is also, foi
example, consistent with a kinu of Leibnizian paiallelism.
88
But befoie we fuithei investigate Busseil's notion of the soul, let us come
back to the bouy as (a), as uouble ieality. Alieauy at the level of its mateiial
thinghoou (b), the bouy is special. That is, it has a paiticulaily high value anu cential
impoitance foi the animal oi human subject. It is, fiist of all, cential to peiception. It
goveins the system of unfoluing of auumbiations, foi example, uepenuing on its
position in space anu time, the position of the eyes anu limbs, anu so on. As a thing
2#,4#(?#", the own-bouy is ceitainly a thing of a unique "type"foi example, as
being the centei, oi the *+==2+>H), of oiientation, in iefeience to which all othei
"things" aie constituteu in teims of theii neainess oi fainess, aboveness oi
belowness, iightness oi leftness to my "absolute heie." The 'subject of the Bouy" is
of couise always "heie" anu "in the centei," even as the bouy as mateiial thing is
constantly in movement.
174
Fuitheimoie, because "I uo not have the possibility of
uistancing myself fiom my Bouy, oi my Bouy fiom me," subsequently, the bouy is foi
me, peiceptually speaking, a "iemaikably impeifectly constituteu thing."
17S
Theie
aie paits of the bouy that I cannot see, some (such as my eyes, oi my back) even in
piinciple. Theie is no othei possible mateiial object of which this may be saiu. As
"my" _o,2#,, then, the own bouy is highly unique. Anu this is of couise to say
nothing of its axiological anu piactical impoitance to us, matteis which aie
biacketeu in the natuialistic attituue. It is not a thing just like othei things, even
insofai as it (% meiely a "thing."
As living-bouy (u), howevei, the bouy is not a "thing" at allits essence is
wholly othei than this. Because the living bouy anu the soul aie inteitwineu, it is

174
Ibiu., 166
17S
Ibiu., 167
89
possible anu even piopei to speak of "myself" as a living bouy. ("I am huit"not
"this leg is impaiieu, but I am okay.") As we have seen, what uistinguishes the living
bouy fiom the sense of mateiial thing is the element, oi stiatum, of soul. Bow is soul
fiist constituteu. Essentially, it is fiist constituteu by the solipsistic subject with
iespect to the "own" bouy anu, only latei, extenueu thiough empathy to othei
Bouies. The question of the constitution of the souls of otheis is essentially the same
question as that of inteisubjectivity, which was to be uealt with moie memoiably
anu extensively in the J$,)#%($> K#"()$)(3>% (anu the !>)#,%+<c#H)(?()l) Busseiliana
volumes).
176

The way we expeiience the own bouy in its psychical aspect (inueeu as one's
3B>) is thiough the bouy's being the "localizeu beaiei of sensations."
177
This is
essentially the expeiience of )$4)(=()F. Thus it is 3> my hanu, 5#,# (> )5(% %23) that I
can feel the waimth of a glowing light-bulb, oi <$4H )5#,# in the A(""=# 3D AF <$4H
that I can feel this twinge of pain. In this way, I come to know my bouy as a feelei of
sensations, anu thiough these sensationsincluuing kinaesthetic sensationsI can
in fact expeiience myself as being in space, occupying this oi that iegion, my fingeis
being in such anu such position, etc. In this way, the Bouy is, in the fiist place,
"meuium" oi "oigan" of peiception."
178
Equally, howevei, my bouy is the "3># $>"
3>=F V<c#4) which, foi the will of my puie Ego, is A3?#$<=# (AA#"($)#=F $>"
%23>)$>#3+%=F anu is a means foi piouucing a meuiate spontaneous movement in

176
0f couise, Busseil's notions of empathy vaiy. But in !"#$% !!, the emphasis on methouological
solipsism seems to be stiong. Thus at the level of inteisubjective appiehension, I see that ".my
appeaiances belong to me, his to him." Anu thus we each belong to "subjective woilus" of oui own.
Anu so on. (!"#$% !!, 166-7)
177
Ibiu., 1S2-S
178
Ibiu., 61
90
othei things." Bence Busseil's uefinition of the Bouy as "fieely moveu totality of
sense-oigans."
179
In any case, all of these uefinitions aie ultimately to be (in effect)
suboiuinateu to how the Bouy is constituteu foi consciousness in the spiiitual
attituue, specifically as the "expiession" of spiiit.
Since so much in the uistinction of _o,2#, anu U#(< tuins on the soul, we must
ask, what exactly is the %3+=. As a iegion of ieality oi objectivity, we have alieauy
seen that it is insepaiable fiom the Bouy. But it is also, Busseil says, a stiatum
founueu on mateiial natuie, anuin the classical uieek senseit is what
"animates" this mattei anu invites us to appeiceive a "motivating agent" behinu it.
Busseil himself uefines it foimally (but ciiculaily) as ".the beaiei of a psychic life
togethei with the subjective possessions of that life, anu as such it is a unity
extenuing thiough time (the same time in which the Bouy enuuies)."
18u
Ricoeui
ciyptically uesciibes Busseil's psyche as "a constituteu ieality woven into the
suiiounuing woilu of the puie ego,"
181
which is to say, that it is not to be confuseu
with the ego oi the peisonal spiiit. Aftei all, even the lowest of animals (Busseil
says iemaikably little about plants) has a soul but no ego oi '#(%)(C5#().
182
Yet apait
fiom its inteiielateuness with the Bouy, the status of Busseil's "soul," at least in
!"#$% !!, is moie than a little muiky.
18S

179
Ibiu., 61
18u
Ibiu., 1S4 (my emphasis)
181
Ricoeui, S2
182
"The peison as spiiit, as peison, has self-consciousness oi an Ego (which is the same); a soul uoes
not neeu to have self-consciousness." (Ibiu., S61)
18S
Ricoeui, too, sees a basic ambiguity in the soul (my lettei-uesignations of uiffeient meanings of
the bouy aie in biackets): "Thus we aie leu to the ambiguity of the psyche. It paiticipates in
subjectivity since it is the soul |e, in teims of the menu of bouy-meanings abovej that has its bouy |uj,
anu also in objectivity, since it is the bouy-thing |bj that has sensations |cj. This bouy is a pait of
things, anu yet the psyche which inhabits it is the centei aiounu which the iest of the woilu is
91
S. Ego
The question of the psyche is insepaiable fiom that of the "ego," especially in
human subjects.
184
As we know fiom the tuin towaius the ego aftei the U3C(4$=
!>?#%)(C$)(3>%, the ego has been cential to Busseil's phenomenological conceins. In
!"#$% !!, Busseil aigues that the ego "cannot be thought of as something sepaiateu
fiom. liveu expeiiences, fiom its 'life,' just as, conveisely, the liveu expeiiences aie
not thinkable except as the meuium of the life of the Ego."
18S
Busseil's ego is also
uesciibeu as a "iuling pait" of the soul.
186
It woulu seem, then, that the Ego being
uiscusseu now is the munuane one, the "empiiical ego" $% 3223%#" )3 the
"tianscenuental" one. This is ceitainly tiue of the following: "We can also
unueistanu that in constituteu natuie, the Bouy anu the Bouy-soul unity aie
constituteu anu that the empiiical Ego is the Ego of Bouily-psychic natuie. The Ego
is not itself the Bouily-psychic unity but lives in it. It is the Ego of the soul."
187

But the entiie uiscussion in !"#$% !! of the ego as such is, in fact, fiameu
aiounu what Busseil calls the "puie ego." Anu the 2+,# ego is, Busseil explains,
"immutable,"
188
being cleaily unlike eithei the soul oi the Bouy. Nuch of what
Busseil says about in the ego in this vein is familiai fiom !"#$% !, except that heie, in
!"#$% !!, it is, again, the "puie ego" iathei than the "tianscenuental ego" that is unuei

gioupeu." (Ibiu., 64). Busseil seems to be awaie of the ambiguity insofai as he assigns the bouy a
"quasi-natuie" anu "quasi-causality." (!"#$% !!, 14S, SS6)
184
".the exploiation of the psychic appeiceptive Ego is only one level of the geneial investigation of
the psyche." (!"#$% !!!, 17)
18S
!"#$% !!, 1uS
186
The "peisonal Ego.functions so-to-say as the iulei of the soul." (Ibiu.G 1Su)
187
Ibiu., SSu
188
".in itself the puie Ego is immutable." (Ibiu., 11u) The "immutability" of the ego has nothing of
couise to uo with immoitality, but means iathei that ".insteau of C#>#,$)(3 anu 43,,+2)(3, to the
puie Ego theie peitains only the essential piopeity that has its stepping foith anu its ieceuing, that is
begins to function anu holu sway actively anu that it ceases to uo so." (Ibiu., 11u)
92
uiscussion. But they aie, finally, piobably the same. Ricoeui tacitly acknowleuges
this himself: "The uistinction between the 2+,# #C3, 2,3"+4) 3D )5# 25#>3A#>3=3C(4$=
,#"+4)(3>, anu the human ego, a ieality of this woilu, is a constant in Busseil's
thought; it sepaiates phenomenology fiom psychology."
189
That the uiscussion of
the puie ego seems to be haiu to uistinguish fiom that of the tianscenuental, is
eviuent fiom passages like these:

"In fact, the puie Ego is inueeu nothing othei than what Bescaites, in his maivelous K#"()$)(3>%,
giaspeu with the insight of genius anu establisheu as such once anu foi all, the being of which it is not
possible to uoubt anu which in any uoubt woulu itself necessaiily be founu again as the subject of
uoubt."
19u

"Theiefoie it is not to be confuseu with the Ego as the ieal peison, with the ieal subject of the ieal
human being. It has no innate oi acquiieu tiaits of chaiactei, no capacities, no uispositions, etc."
191

"The Ego.uoes not appeai.is given in absolute selfhoou. As puie Ego it uoes not haiboi any hiuuen
innei iichness; it is absolutely simple anu it lies theie absolutely cleai."
192

Busseil uoes not make things moie cleai when he iuentifies %2(,() with the #C3
43C()3 (eviuently then uistancing spiiit fiom peison
19S
), aligning () now with the
Caitesian "I think."
194
In that case, the "puie ego" woulu encompass both empiiical
(spiiitual) anu tianscenuental poles. But we will leave the mattei heie until we take

189
Ricoeui, S2 (my emphasis)
19u
!"#$% !!, 1u9
191
Ibiu., 11u
192
Ibiu., 111
19S
Cobb-Stevens uefines the peison as the "full conciete unity of soul anu bouy." (Cobb-Stevens, 2Su)
To say this of the tianscenuental ego woulu be to munuanize it in a way unacceptable to Busseil. 0n
the uistinction of peison anu tianscenuental ego, Cobb-Stevens wiites: "the peison is too involveu in
the @AB#=) by ieason of piagmatic motivations to be completely iuentifieu with the philosophical
voice that uesciibes the stiatum of spiiit." (Cobb-Stevens, 2SS)
194
See foi example, !"#$% !!G 1u9.
93
up in pait III the question of the ielation of the tianscenuental ego (consciousness)
with oui next concept-theme, "spiiit."

4. Spiiit
Suuuenly in !"#$% !! Busseil (oi, if we like, the "naiiatoi") signals a iauical
shift in peispective that will ushei in the thiiu section of alieauy exhaustingly
uemanuing woik: "the analysis of |mateiial anu animalj natuie in oui consiueiation
of natuie thus pioves to be in neeu of supplementation. It haibois piesuppositions
anu consequently points beyonu to anothei iealm of being anu of ieseaich, i.e., the
fielu of subjectivity, B5(45 >3 =3>C#, (% >$)+,#7"
19S
Thus, we entei into the iealm of
spiiit, home of the human sciences, cultuie, peisonhoou, anu eveiything that, in the
classical humanist-philosophical tiauition, makes human beings supposeuly stanu
out fiom natuie qua natuie, mateiial oi animal. Accoiuingly Busseil says of the
uistinction of %3+= anu %2(,() that it "is the funuamental one in this entiie gioup."
196

This at fiist suipiising iemaik (is not the uistinction of "natuie" anu "spiiit" in fact
the most impoitant.) is motivateu by the fact that the soul, while ceitainly not a
"thing" in the naiiowest sense, is still envelopeu in the closeu ciicuit of the natuial
oiuei. :5# %3+= (% %)(== $ >$)+,$= <#(>C.
Relateu to this is the "peisonalistic" attituue as a vaiiation, oi iathei a
piivilegeu type, of "natuial attituue." In !"#$% !, we weie maue awaie only of a
uivision between natuial anu tianscenuental attituues, anu not of any inteinal
uivision oi hieiaichy within the natuial attituue itself. But now, in !"#$% !!, we leain

19S
Ibiu., 18u (my emphasis)
196
Ibiu., 181
94
that the natuial attituue is uiviueu into at least these two: the "natuialistic," which
takes its cues fiom natuial science, anu the "peisonalistic," which is closei to the
eveiyuay life anu eveiyuay woilu in which we naively, but meaningfully, exist. Thus
Busseil announces:

"|Thej 'natuialistically' consiueieu woilu is of couise not )5# woilu. Rathei, given piioi is the woilu
as the eveiyuay woilu, anu within this aiise man's theoietical inteiest anu the sciences ielateu to the
woilu, among which is natuial science unuei the iueal of tiuths in themselves."
197

Busseil auus immeuiately that "this piegiven woilu is investigateu D(,%) |my italicsj
with iespect to >$)+,#. Then animalia have theii tuin, human beings befoie all
otheis." Be that as it may, the scientific-theoietic woilu of <=3%%# 1$45#> is itself
"ieuuceu" out of the iaw mateiial of liveu, peisonal anu inteipeisonal, functionally
anu axiologically meaningful life, a life liveu in what Busseil now calls the @AB#=)
("suiiounuing woilu").
198

It is eviuent fiom vaiious supplemental sections
199
that in !"#$% !!, Busseil is
ueveloping his notion of "spiiit" thiough a thinking-thiough of the uistinction of
natuial anu humanthat is, cultuialsciences. Busseil's so to say concession to
natuial science, gianting it fiee ieign ovei the human soul in the foims of biology
anu psychology, has seemingly tiiggeieu a ceitain neeu to iegain foi humanity a
uignity anu singulaiity. Aftei all, it is we who uo phenomenologyoi, it is (> +% that

197
Ibiu.G 219. uiven Busseil's position that both the natuial anu human sciences aie theoietical, anu
that the natuialistic anu peisonalistic attituues aie coiielateu to them iespectively, the claim that the
lattei is piioi to "theoiy" is confusing, but peihaps just moie eviuence of Busseil's conflation of the
tianscenuental anu spiiitual attituues. (See Pait III below.)
198
Cf. .(4)(3>$,F, 2S4-4
199
Supplement XII, II, foi example, makes it veiy cleai the extent to which Busseil's conceptions of
"spiiit" anu "the peison" aie uevelopeu in the context of uistinguishing natuial fiom human sciences.
(!"#$% !!, SS1-82)
95
phenomenology occuis. Inasmuch as it is iegaiueu as a founueu stiatum of the
Bouy, itself a "uouble ieality" whose aspect as "mateiial thing" places it squaiely
within the "causal nexus" of "natuie," the human being is an object of natuial
science. But Busseil wants to auu to this pictuie by aiguing that theie is anothei
sense to the "human being," a non-natuialistic sense, that iegaius himhei as
"subject" of action, feeling, valuation, anu so on, iathei than as, say, thing oi animal.
But once again, Busseil piobably goes too fai in the piocess of compensation (if that
is what he is uoing). Foi fiom the peispective of the human sciences, natuial science
is itself, as a whole, nothing but a cultuial achievement, an accomplishment of
peisons acting in conceit. Busseil now completely %+22=$>)% the inuepenuent
integiity of the natuial sciences, which he elsewheie seemingly stiuggles to
maintain, anu, as we will see below, falls into a puie subjective iuealism.
As we have alieauy seen, Bouy anu soul, anu hence animality, aie excluueu
fiom the iealm of the stiictly spiiitual. Aumitteuly, ".Bouy anu soul aie ">$)+,# (>
)5# %#43>" %#>%#b piopeily speaking only accoiuing to the siue tuineu towaiu
physical natuie."
2uu
0n the siue "tuineu towaiu spiiit," Bouy is in fact the
"expiession" of spiiit, like the meaning of a woiu that is expiesseu by the letteis on
a page. But just as iueality is not simply locateu in the woius, neithei is spiiit
locateu, as is the psyche, in the living bouy. It is key to iealize that when we uiscuss
spiiit, we aie alieauy in the peisonalistic attituue. This is why, as Cobb-Stevens puts
it, spiiit is not simply giafteu on soul, like soul on bouy.
2u1
Spiiit is not simply
anothei founueu "stiata" on mateiial anu psychic natuie, in the sense that to

2uu
Ibiu., 298
2u1
Cobb-Stevens, 2S2-S
96
constitute it is alieauy to have shifteu out of (so to speak) the natuialistic, anu into
the "peisonalistic," attituue, foi which the psycho-physical composite stuuieu in
science simply uoes not appeai in this foim. It is peihaps foi this ieason that
Busseil says (ielatively) little about the inteiielation of the iegions of "spiiit" anu
"soul," but ouuly, this is ceitainly not tiue about the ielation of spiiit to E3"F.
Inueeu, Busseil's iemaiks on this paiticulai ielation aie some of the most
piovocative but also confusing anu contiauictoiy in all of his ontological
investigations. 0n the one hanu, it might seem as though Busseil wants to claim that
spiiit anu Bouy aie to be uistinguisheu in the stiongest of teims:

"What we finu then is ouiselves as the spiiitual Ego ielateu to the stieam of expeiiences'spiiitual'
heie is useu in a meie geneial sense, iefeiiing to the Ego that has its place piecisely not in
Coipoieality; e.g., I 'think' (43C()3), i.e., I peiceive, I iepiesent in whatevei moue, I juuge, I feel, I will,
etc., anu finu myself theieby as that which is one anu the same in the changing of these liveu
expeiiences, as 'subject' of the acts anu states."
2u2

But upon sciutiny, it appeais likely that the "spiiitual Ego" being iefeiieu to heie is
actually not human spiiit at all, but the tianscenuental ego. Still, the mixing of the
language of "spiiituality" with the "I think" in its non-Coipoieality is a clue of
uifficulties inheient in Busseil's conception of a "non-natuial" ieality that is
nonetheless uiffeient than tianscenuental subjectivity.
At any iate, Busseil iepeateuly states the view that Bouy has a uistinct iole to
play in the iealm of spiiit anu (what amounts to the same) cultuie. "Foi
phenomenology.the Bouy plays an expansive iole in the iealm of spiiit."
2uS
Foi one,
it is the "expiession" of spiiit in a most piovocative sense. It is that by which one

2u2
!"#$% !!, 1uS
2uS
Ibiu., 29S
97
giasps the humanity of a human being, the "peison theie, who uances, laughs when
amuseu, anu chatteis." Anu it is not the "appiehension of a spiiit fasteneu to a
Bouy," but the appiehension of the peison )5,3+C5 his bouy.
2u4
Thus I can say of
man, in this attituue, that he "5$% a Coipoieality, |hej has a bouy which is a physical
thing with such anu such qualities." Sometimes it is not cleai whethei Busseil is
speaking of soul oi spiiit, as in a neaiby section he speaks of the fact that "each
movement of the Bouy is, as Bouy, filleu with the soul thiough anu thiough. Bouy is
full of soul." Busseil's point is that a 2#,%3>$=()F emeiges thiough, say, a paiticulai
Bouy's movements. Busseil points out that this is tiue not only of the coipoieal
Bouy but of any "bouy" oi "mateiial thing," such as texts, which aie cultuial
expiessions of a uniquely significant kinu.
2uS
This is a useful clue that the ielation of
Bouy anu spiiit that Busseil is outlining heie is in fact a ielation of spiiit anu bouy
as (a), namely as <3)5 _o,2#, anu U#(<. That is, spiiit is ielateu to the mateiiality of
the bouy as well as to its soulish aspect, as U#(<7 The bouy as complex uuality-in-
unity is tiansfoimeu fiom a "natuial" complex to a "spiiitual" one thiough a change
in attituue, but in eithei case, it ietains its }anus-faceu natuie.
2u6

2u4
Ibiu., 2S2
2uS
Ibiu., 248-Su. 0ne may speak of ait-woiks oi ieligious aitifacts as well piesumably.
2u6
In all of this we aie focusing on inuiviuual spiiits. Busseil himself iecognizes what he calls
"peisonalities of a highei oiuei" oi, what amounts to the same thing, collective "spiiits," such as
nations, clubs, chuiches, families, anu the like. (See foi example: !"#$% !!G S77; oi, foi paiallel talk of
inuiviuual anu collective subjects, sees O+%%#,= XZXZ, 1SS.) This iesembles the Begelian notion of
"objective spiiit," but foi Busseil, communal subjectivity is founueu on the inteiactions of inuiviuual
subjects. 0ut of these inteiactions, emeigently peihaps, highei "wholes" oi oiganic unities that
ueseive the name of "peisons" appeai. Busseil seems to base this on the fact that we commonly
speak of the will, uesiies, attituues, etc., of gioups of people oiganizeu in coheient wholes, not only of
inuiviuuals. This is not meiely analogous oi figuiative language foi him. Now if tiue, it woulu
iauically altei oui conception of what counts as a "peison" anu coulu have ieal legal iamifications.
This woulu be ielevant to the cuiient uebate ovei the 0.S. Supieme Couit's iecent iuling on the legal
iights of "coipoiations" unuei the 0.S. Constitution. (See: J()(`#>% @>()#" ?7 Q/J)
98
Relateu to its sense as spiiitual expiession, the Bouy is the means by which
spiiit ".in its fieeuom moves the Bouy anu theieby can peifoim a woik in the
spiiitual woilu."
2u7
As Ricoeui notes, eveiything now is a "peifoimance" of spiiit.
2u8

But this actually points to one of the moie Platonist aspects of Busseil's
unueistanuing of the Bouy in the peisonal attituue, alieauy hinteu at above. The
Bouy is foi me to "use" as "oiganon of my will." Anu the Bouy in the spiiitual
attituue is meiely "mine"; I am not of the Bouy:

"It is absolutely out of the question that I am heie encounteiing oi intenuing myself as something in
the Bouy, as founueu in it. the Bouy is AF Bouy, anu it is mine in the fiist place as my 'ovei anu
against,' my 3<Lc#4), just as the house is my object, something I see oi can see, something I touch oi
can touch, etc. These things aie mine, but not as component pieces of the Ego."
2u9

Aumitteuly, this kinu of uesciiption then becomes haiu to squaie with what Busseil
calls the "unity of Bouy anu spiiit."
21u
But the unity of Bouy anu spiiit in paiticulai is
complex, in multiple senses (i.e. complicateu, compounueu) of that woiu:

"|The bouyj is at the same time a pait of natuie, inseiteu into the nexus of causality, anu the spiiitual
life, which we giasp thiough the Bouily expiession anu unueistanu in its nexus of motivation,
appeais, in viitue of its connection with the Bouy, to be conuitioneu itself by natuial piocesses anu to
be appeiceiveu as something of natuie. The unity of Bouy anu spiiit is a two-folu one, anu,
coiielatively, a two-folu appiehension (the peisonalistic anu the natuialistic) is incluueu in the
unitaiy appeiception of the human."
211

What this inuicates, peihaps, is that Bouy anu spiiit aie "one" only to the extent that
the lattei is appeiceiveu thiough the foimei, namely via the Bouy's appeaiing as an

2u7
!"#$% !!, 29S
2u8
Ricoeui, 7S
2u9
!"#$% !!G 22S. This language is alieauy in the eaily pait of the text: see "my mateiial Bouy," p. 111.
21u
Foi example, Ibiu., 2S9
211
Ibiu., 2S9
99
expiession of Spiiit. This itself occuis in the peisonalistic attituue, but it is with the
natuialistic auuition that we come fully to giasp spiiitual life as belonging to the
natuial causal oiueiwhich, without natuialistic inteifeience, is not in fact the
case. Foi spiiit is uefineu by motivation anu fieeuom, not natuial causality. The
bouy in this way is the "point of conveision fiom spiiitual causality to natuial
causality."
212

!!!+ O"046.).; ,2)4%.%92)(04 7)11)('4#)-. %1 !"#$% !!-!!!

07 !>),3"+4)(3>I 95#>3A#>3=3C(4$= K3>(%AG V>)3=3C(4$= .+$=(%A
Thioughout the !"#$% volumes, anu his philosophy geneially, Busseil makes
a fiim uistinction between phenomenology anu ontology.
21S
Sciences of (iegions of)
"beings" piesuppose a "tianscenuental sense."
214
Thus phenomenology is fiist in
methouological piioiity, being the "mateinal-giounu of all philosophical methou: to
this giounu anu to the woik in it, eveiything leaus back."
21S
Because of this cleai
piioiitization anu talk of a "giounu," elsewheie uesciibeu as the tianscenuental ego,
it becomes possible to think of Busseil as a kinu of "monist," namely a
25#>3A#>3=3C(4$= R3, ),$>%4#>"#>)$=T A3>(%). At the same time, Busseil's "giounu"

212
Ibiu., 299
21S
Cf. !"#$% !!!, 117: "Foi in itself.3>)3=3CF (% >3) 25#>3A#>3=3CF7b
214
Ibiu., 66-7
21S
Ibiu., 69. Busseil goes on to inuicate that phenomenology allows "ontologically founueu
investigation" to "unfolu its full powei" anu "ieceive its full ceitainty." But phenomenology is moie
funuamental, anu "owes nothing" to ontologies!
100
is not a "pait" of the "woilu"a "tag-enu" like Bescaites" non-tianscenuental
"cogito"anu theiefoie cannot be unueistoou in teims of an 3>)3=3C(4$= monism.
The iealm of woilu-ontology iemains ielatively unuei-thought in Busseil, anu
though no single consistent position can be teaseu out of !"#$% !!, in my view the text
comes closei to a foim of ontological uualism than Busseil woulu have wanteu to
aumit. Some of the eviuence foi this view has alieauy been fuinisheu above, but
moie will be pioviueu below. Nuch of the iemainuei of this chaptei is uevoteu to
uiscussing some of the unueilying philosophical issues anu piessuies which leau to
the uualistic position, as well as some of the ways in which Busseil's text seems to
veei away fiom such a iesult, geneially without success.
The chaige of "uualism" is an olu one as applieu to Busseil, anu it shoulu not
be banuieu about caielessly. Foi one thing, theie is a ceitain nebulousness in the
question of Busseil's uualism because of the question of B5(45 "uualism" one is
iefeiiing to. In my view, the kinu of uualism in Busseil, at least in !"#$% !L!!!, is that
specifically of natuie anu spiiit, not (foi instance) of bouy anu soul, oi of
consciousness anu ieality. We have alieauy seen how insepaiable Bouy anu soul aie
fiom one anothei; inueeu, Busseil stiesses the point when he claims that "what we
have to oppose to mateiial natuie as a seconu kinu of ieality is not the 'soul' but the
43>4,#)# +>()F of Bouy anu soul, the human (oi animal) subject."
216
Now even this
uichotomy, that between "thing" anu "animal"incluuing human being as

216
!"#$% !!, 146. This woulu seem to iule out a sepaiable 'soul-substance," but Busseil uoes not allow
this to pievent him fiom speaking, in the moue of imaginative vaiiation, of the "uepaituie" of the
"soul" (Ibiu., 1uu), which leaves only "ueau mattei" behinu. Beie Busseil's point is that it is the
soulish oi psychic uimension of the human oi animal being that makes it %+45, as opposeu to simply
"mateiial natuie."
101
psychophysical compositeis not technically a "+$=(%A, because "thing" anu
"animal" both go unuei the genus, so to speak, of "natuie." Finally, consciousness
anu ieality uo not compiise a uualism foi the ieasons alieauy inuicateu; the fiist is
the giounu of the seconu, anu thus they have no paiity. Theie is no ieality oi woilu
without consciousness; but theie is at least conceivably consciousness without
ieality oi woilu (cf. the woilu-annihilation expeiiment, which Busseil upholus in no
unceitain teims in both !"#$% !! anu the /2(=3C+# to the !"#$% volumes).
217

Rathei, >$)+,# anu %2(,() aie uualistic because neithei can be exhaustively
explaineu thiough the othei, anu they uo not oveilap. They aie both "absolutes,"
coiielateu to alteinative veisions of the natuial attituue, each ietaining piiue of
place in its iespective attituue.
218
This is not to say one cannot finu talk of an oveilap
between natuie anu spiiit in Busseil; but when Busseil speaks of this, of a
"spiiituality in natuie" foi example, he is typically iefeiiing to "animal natuie" anu
uoes not lose sight of the fact that such animality is a founueu stiatum on mateiial
natuie, oi, moie impoitantly, that such "spiiituality" is funuamentally outsiue of the
iealm of "cultuie" oi the peisonalistic attituue, in which the bouy becomes meie

217
!"#$% !!, SuS. Fiom the Epilogue (wiitten as late as 19SuS1): "the non-existence of the woilu evei
iemains thinkable." (!"#$% !!, 42u) Busseil heie uiaws the familiai lesson fiom this: ".the being of
tianscenuental subjectivity has the sense of absolute being, that only it is 'iiielative'.wheieas the
ieal woilu inueeu is but has an essential ielativity to tianscenuental subjectivity, uue, namely, to the
fact that it can only have its sense as being only as an intentional sense-foimation of tianscenuental
subjectivity."
218
To claim that Busseil is a 25#>3A#>3=3C(4$= A3>(%) is simply to affiim the fact that Busseil was
nevei uncleai about his piioiitization of "tianscenuental" oi "phenomenological" oi "puie"
consciousness ovei "ieality," which, taken "on its own" so to speak, lacks all sense anu "being" in the
fullest sense, anu is hence consciousness-uepenuent. Busseil's commitment to tianscenuental
subjectivity, which was fiist foimally intiouuceu (in piint) in !"#$% !, nevei waveieu. But foi Busseil,
it hau always been somehow pie- oi tians-ontological; "ontology" comes to have a iestiicteu sense in
Busseil, alieauy piefiguiing Beiueggei's uistinction between the "ontic" (beings) anu "ontological"
(foi Busseil, something like "tianscenuental consciousness," the souice of all meaningthough
falling shoit of "Being" in Beiueggei's sense).
102
oigan of spiiit. The foiegoing iemaiks aie nonetheless not without countei-
examples in the couise of !"#$% !! anu !!!. But we will examine all of these things in
moie uetail in the sections below.

E7 O+%%#,=M% *$)+,$=(%A
Busseil's opposition to scientific natuialism is legenuaiyso how can one
speak of his views as "natuialistic". The answei has to uo ultimately with the
paiallelism of phenomenology anu ontology; all that uiffeientiates them is the "shift
of view" that is biought about thiough the #23456 anu phenomenological ieuuction.
Thus it is entiiely possible in Busseil's fiamewoik to accept the meaning science
gives to "natuie," its "object of stuuy," while also claiming to finu the %3+,4# of this
meaning in tianscenuental subjectivity, which is ievealeu thiough the
phenomenological ieuuction. Anu this is just what Busseil uoes, as I will now tiy to
show.
As mentioneu in pait II of this chaptei, one of the impoitant featuies of
Busseil's concept of natuie is its tacit acceptance of the uefinition of natuie given by
those who coulu be uesciibeu as scientific "natuialists." In Bastui's woius, "|Inj
!"#$% !!.science is consiueieu as a uefinitive though inuiiect continuation of
peiception."
219
As 0veigaaiu notes, moieovei, Busseil claims elsewheie
22u
that the

219
Bastui, Fianoise. "Busseil anu the Pioblem of Bualism." 13+= $>" E3"F (> O+%%#,=($>
95#>3A#>3=3CFI K$> $>" *$)+,# R0>$=#4)$ O+%%#,=($>$G ;3=7 S;!T. Boiuiecht: Spiingei Netheilanus,
198S. Eu. Anna-Teiesa Tymieniecka. (p. 72) Beieaftei "Bastui." Bastui claims in this same quote that
the J,(%(% uoes the same thing, but this is a contioveisial point. The ielevant mateiial to inteipiet
incluues this telling line fiom the lattei woik: "the contiast between the subjectivity of the life-woilu
anu the 'objective,' the 'tiue' woilu, lies in the fact that the lattei is a theoietical-logical substiuction,
the substiuction of something that is in piinciple not peiceivable, in piinciple not expeiienceable in
103
natuial conception of the woilu is in no neeu of coiiection, a iemaik which
0veigaaiu iightly notes shoulu be taken "veiy seiiously."
221
This soit of affiimation
of the scientific conception is inueeu manifest thioughout Busseil's "eiuetics" of
natuie in !"#$% !L!!!, since he uefines natuie's essence piecisely in teims of that
which is the subject of "natuial science"; in othei woius, natuie is an ontological
iegion with a stiictly piesciibeu essence, known by the sciences alieauy at theii
own level:

".what unueilies natuial science is always an ("#$ 3D )5# #%%#>4# 3D >$)+,#, if only an implicit one.
Coiielatively, the consciousness which functions as natuial-scientific expeiience, anu thus also as the
thinking peitaining to natuial-scientific expeiience, has its essential phenomenological unity, anu
)5(% consciousness has its essential coiielate in natuie."
222

Busseil goes on to say in the quoteu passage that the task of phenomenology is
meiely to "biing.to claiity" the "natuial-scientific sense" alieauy so implicit in
natuial scientific consciousness itself. Anu latei on he states:
"To make all these things cleai anu to outline $ 2,(3,( the foim of a possible ueteimination of what is
in itself tiue of natuie, a ueteimination which is ielatively tiue anu ielatively necessaiy foi eveiy
stage of expeiiencethis is the theoiy of natuial science; as methou: the theoiy of natuial-scientific
methou."
22S

Yet in peihaps an even stiongei statement than all of the above, Busseil's ueclaies:

"But it must be unueistoou fiom within, fiom phenomenological souices, that this abstiaction fiom
pieuicates belonging to the spheies of value anu piactice is not a mattei of an aibitiaiy abstiaction,

its own piopei being, wheieas the subjective, in the life-woilu, is uistinguisheu in all iespects
piecisely by its being actually expeiienceable." (J,(%(%, 127)
22u
Busseil, Eumunu. O+%%#,=($>$ S!;G '#%$AA#=)# g#,H#I p+, 95l>3A#>3=3C(# "#, !>)#,%+<c#H)(?()l).
:#[)# $+% "#A *$45=$%%7 pB#()#, :#(=7 1921-28. Eu. Iso Kein. The Bague: Naitinus Nijhoff, 197S (p.
278)
221
0veigaaiu, Sien. O+%%#,= $>" O#("#CC#, 3> E#(>C (> )5# g3,="7 Boiuiecht: Spiingei, 2uu4
222
!"#$% !!, S-4
22S
Ibiu., SuS
104
left to one's own uiscietion, foi as such, it woulu in fact piouuce no iauically self-encloseu iuea of a
scientific uomain anu thus also no iuea of a science self-containeu a piioii. Yet we uo gain such an a
piioii closeu iuea of natuieas the iuea of a woilu of meie things."
224

The aigument that a "woilu of meie things" is an "abstiaction" foi Busseil $>"
)5#,#D3,# 4$> <# "3B>2=$F#" uoes not caiiy much watei, because an abstiaction is
not necessaiily uistoitive oi aibitiaiy, anu in the case of natuie Busseil makes it
cleai that such an "abstiaction" is in fact giounueu in the essence of natuie itself.
22S

The ieason foi emphasizing all of this heie is to establish what we have been
seeing inchoately all along, namely the implicitly "natuialistic" bent in Busseil
himself. Inueeu, consiuei the all-encompassing extension assigneu by Busseil to the
concept of mateiial natuie: "Natuie.in its foims of space anu time, encompasses all
factual iealities but also incluues, obviously on essential giounus, $== $2,(3,( 23%%(<=#
,#$=()(#% as well."
226
Anu again: "What we have heie is the one "0bjective" woilu,
with the one space anu the one time, in which "eveiything" is oiueieu2#,%3>% $%
B#==, who, in union with theii Bouies, leau theii peisonal lives."
227
Because all
iealities aie constituteu as highei "stiata" of mateiiality, whose basic causal
commeice uefines the natuial anu animal woilus, natuie in the puie, physicalistic
sense has the sense of being the substiate of any othei type of being whatsoevei.

224
Ibiu., 27
22S
O+%%#,= XZXZ, 1S2. Theie is, aumitteuly, some uissent on the question of how closely Busseil
auheies to the scientific notion of natuie. Thus Theouoiou, in a iecent aiticle aigues that ".in !"#$%
!!, natuie-things aie uesciibeu fiom a phenomenologically legitimate theoietical attituue that "3#%
>3) necessaiily $"32) the veiuicts of natuial scientific theoiies about what is 'meie natuie.'" See:
Theouoiou, Panos. "Peiceptual anu Scientific Thing: 0n Busseil's Analysis of "Natuie-Thing" in Iueas
II." In :5# *#B W#$,<33H D3, 95#>3A#>3=3CF $>" 95#>3A#>3=3C(4$= 95(=3%325F, volume S, eus. Buit
Bopkins anu Steven Ciowell. Seattle: Noesis Piess, 2uuS (p. 169) As the authoi fully aumits, howevei,
Busseil is uncleai fiom the beginning about this question, anu piesently this is the moie impoitant
fact.
226
!"#$% !!, Su; emphasis auueu
227
Ibiu., 219; emphasis auueu
105
"Natuie" has the sense of being the giounu of "all that is" because of the fact that
anything else that is peiceiveu, co-peiceiveu, oi appeiceiveu must be a highei
stiatum of a ieality that must be, at its most basic level, "natuial" in the sense of
"mateiial." Anu again, what is key heie is asymmetiy. Theie cannot be a puiely
spiiitual being, with no mateiial substiate, but theie can be anu of couise aie
mateiial things with no highei stiatum. All of this will make it veiy haiu to
unueistanu Busseil's suuuen ueclaiation of the "ontological piioiity of spiiit ovei
natuie" (the "Piioiity Thesis" as I will be calling it foi shoit).
Yet Busseil woulu suiely iesponu that all of this is supposeu to be pieuicateu
on the >$)+,$=(%)(4 attituue solely, not the 2#,%3>$=(%)(4. The uangei then becomes
that of uualism. It is heie that the actual iole of the Piioiity Thesis can be piopeily
asceitaineunamely to avoiu just such a uualism. Foi unuei the spiiitual attituue,
the natuial-scientific view anu its implicit natuialistic bias (which is somehow valiu)
can be assigneu a uecisively suboiuinate status
228
:

"It is the chaiactei of the human sciences to posit subjectivity as absolute, to acknowleuge natuie
only as the intuitively existing suiiounuing woilu, oi as iepiesenteu, thought, anu intenueu
suiiounuing woilu of peisons, anu to take mathematical 0bjective natuie, which pieviously was the
'tiue ieality,' only as (what in fact it meiely is) a theoietical though iational constiuction on the pait
of man as the subject of scientific activities."
229

Anu again:

"It is not the natuial sciences but the human sciences that leau into the 'philosophical' uepths; foi the
philosophical uepths aie the uepths of ultimate being."
2Su

228
See also O+%%#,= XZ\m, 192-S
229
!"#$% !!G S74
2Su
Ibiu., S76
106

Iionically, it is along these lines that commentatois like 0liich Nelle anu Steven
Ciowell in fact uevelop favoiably humanistic inteipietations of Busseil's ontology.
Natuie "matteis," foi Busseil, because it has significanceutility, beauty,
goounessD3, human beings. Fiom this point of view, a iespect foi human spiiit
emeiges inuiiectly as the last hope foi a iescue of the enviionment. Thus Nelle
iemaiks:

".it is cleai that natuie plays only a suboiuinate iole foi Busseil. Busseil's iuealistic conception of
the ielationship between natuie anu spiiit is iauically spiiit-centeieu. Natuie in itself anu
inuepenuent of spiiit anu its meaning-giving acts is fiist of all only an abstiaction anu seconuly a
meie substiate foi the meaning-giving acts anu goal-uiiecteu activities of spiiitual beings..
Piotection of natuie foi natuie's sake woulu theiefoie not make any sense to Busseil, anu any
natuialistic axiology anu ethics is nonsensical foi him."
2S1

In an inteiesting book-length stuuy of Busseil anu the bouy Bouu comes to a similai
conclusion, compaiing Busseil's view (favoiably, one might auu) to that of Plato
fiom the 95$#"3: "Foi, I woulu like to suggest, theie is much in this passage |95$#"3
66b-67bSj that shoulu ieminu us of Busseil, anu theie is much in Busseil's analysis
of the bouy that shoulu ieminu us of Plato, oi at least of a tiauition that sought to
put some soit of uistance (of whatevei type) between bouy anu whatevei can be
iuentifieu as that which we most tiuly aie."
2S2

Foi his pait, Ciowell celebiates Busseil's "uisenchantment" of natuie as a
tiiumph of ethical thinking. States Ciowell: "Ciitics of Busseil (e.g. Neileau-Ponty)
have suggesteu that the meaningless natuie of the natuialistic attituue is an

2S1
Nelle, 0lliich. "Natuie anu Spiiit." In !%%+#%, p. S4
2S2
Bouu, }ames. !"#$=(%A $>" J3,23,#()FI 0> /%%$F 3> )5# 9,3<=#A 3D )5# E3"F (> O+%%#,=M%
95#>3A#>3=3CF. Boiuiecht: Kluwei, 1997 (p. 119)
107
abstiaction, that genuine natuie is the piimoiuial iealm of an oiiginaiy logos, the
oiigin of meaning. To this sensibility, Busseil's iathei tiauitional gnosticism seems
out of place. But peihaps Busseil is iight. Busseil's ciitics seek to ievive a AF)5(4$=
conception of natuie."
2SS
Ciowell ciiticizes Neileau-Ponty foi suppiessing the
"absolutism of ieality" anu he opposes him unfavoiably to Levinas, who thankfully
"vinuicates the uisenchantment of natuie" founu in Busseil!
2S4
Ciowell inteipiets
Neileau-Ponty to be aiguing foi a view of natuie such that "natuie alieauy haibois
a ceitain sensuous meaningfulness, a ceitain mythical 'fulness' that eniaptuies anu
fascinates anu is not at all a 'meie' thing expeiience."
2SS
Be then obseives that
Neileau-Ponty's view is incompatible with Busseil's "phenomenological account of
natuie" in most of !"#$% !!, which itself signifies a "bieak" with the mythical fulness
of meaning "auumbiateu in the sensuous." Again, foi Ciowell, this bieak is
necessitateu by the uiscoveiy of the "ethical," which it is Levinas' gieat achievement
to have ieminueu us of: "Foi Busseil |as foi Levinasj it is the uestiny of this
sepaiation to leave natuie behinu altogethei, anu so it is impoitant to ask whethei
what lies at its oiiginthe ieveisibility of touchis sufficient to account foi the

2SS
Ciowell, Steven ualt. "the Nythical anu the Neaningless: Busseil anu the Two Faces of Natuie." In
!%%+#%, p. 82. Aiticle heieaftei iefeiieu to as "Ciowell." Ciowell means something specific by
"mythical." The mythical is boine out of a uesiie to suppiess the "absolutism of ieality" that foices
itself upon us as human beings. (Ciowell, 84)
2S4
Ibiu., 8S. Ciowell goes on: "Neileau-Ponty sought to tiace the oiigin of meaning to the element.
Bis elemental natuieas "wilu meaning," an "iueality that is not alien" to the fleshevinces a
mythical imagination." (Ciowell, 94) It is inteiesting to note that Ricoeui, who uisagieeu with
Neileau-Ponty's "existential" appiopiiation of !"#$% !! (see Ricoeui 41, 69), woulu not, with his
chaiacteiistic sense of moueiation, go this fai. In contiasting !"#$% ! anu !!, Ricoeui states, "the style
of !"#$% ! iequiies suboiuinating the union of consciousness with ieality thiough incaination |which
is what is uone in !"#$% !!j to its union with ieality thiough peiception." (Ricoeui, SS) 0f couise, the
"union" that Ricoeui speaks of may just be bettei spoken of as a "uisjunction"that is, !"#$% !
pioviues us with the uisjunction of subjective immanence anu objective tianscenuence, !"#$% !! anu
!!! with that of natuie anu spiiit. But the point is that Ricoeui sees an attempt at a fusion that is closei
to what Neileau-Ponty has in minu than what Ciowell uoes.
2SS
Ciowell, 94-S
108
iauicality of the bieak." Neileau-Ponty makes much of such "ieveisibility," as we
will see in subsequent chapteis. Be also will tiy to account foi the "iauical bieak" in
teims that can nonetheless explain how it is possible in the fiist place to have
iuentifieu with natuie; one cannot bieak fiom that to which one is not alieauy
attacheu. Neileau-Ponty's use of "paiauoxical thinking" will ultimately be employeu
in the seivice of this uifficult pioblem.

J7 :5# 9,(3,()F :5#%(%
The Piioiity Thesis is one of the most pioblematic positions auvanceu by
Busseil in the text. The piioiity of spiiit ovei natuie follows fiom the piivileging of
the "peisonalistic attituue," anu while it ceitainly ciicumvents uualism (by uint of its
veiy title), it iaises othei peiplexities. Foi one thing, it squaies bauly with the notion
that spiiit is somehow itself uepenuent on "ieality" as ueteimineu piimaiily by
mateiiality. Busseil can maintain this position 3, the Piioiity Thesis, but not, I think,
both. Consiuei the following claim: "In its spiiitual acts, the spiiit is uepenuent on
the soul. The spiiitual Ego is uepenuent on the soul, anu the soul on the Bouy..
Consequently the spiiit is conuitioneu by natuie."
2S6
Busseil even goes so fai as to
state outiight that spiiit "belongs to natuie," though what he means heie is not
cleai, as he also iefeis to natuie anu spiiit as "two iealities."
2S7

A seconu ieason anu ueepei ieason to suspect the Piioiity Thesis is that it
woulu appeai to commit Busseil to an ontological monism of a highly subjectivistic
soit. Busseil's own woius make the uangeis immeuiately eviuent:

2S6
!"#$% !!, 29S
2S7
Ibiu., 296
109

"The iealm of natuie is the iealm of the 'phenomenal'; that means heie the iealm of the ieal unities
constituteu in oi by means of 'piesentation.' The iealm of spiiit, howevei, is the iealm of the iealities
given in absolute manifestation (self-manifestation anu manifestation thiough compiehension),
iealities having behinu themselves only the puie Ego as the iiieal, absolute substiate of all
manifestations of ieality."
2S8

It is veiy possible that, as some wiiteis have commenteu, Busseil has in minu
something like a mouifieu (tianscenuentally puiifieu) monauological iuealism along
the lines of a Leibniz, whose veiy iuea of the monau he auopts, at least in pait, not
only in !"#$% !! but most memoiably in the J$,)#%($> K#"()$)(3>%. But the passage
just quoteu uoes not piesent us with a tianscenuental iuealism, insofai as it stiesses
the iealm of %2(,(); heie, we aie only at the level of the natuial attituue anu,
coiielatively, ieality. It goes without saying that the "uogmatic" iuealism of the
Leibnizian vaiiety anu the "tianscenuental" iuealism Busseil is aiming aie two
iauically uiffeient things, at least fiom Busseil's stateu peispective. The final
iefeience to the "puie Ego" is itself uncleai, uue to the ambiguities in this veiy
concept, uiscusseu alieauy above.

A ielateu confusion aiises ovei how Busseil inteipiets the supeiioiity of
spiiit in the following quote:

"Natuie is a fielu of ielativities thioughout, anu it can be so because these aie always in fact ielative
to an absolute, the spiiit, which consequently is what sustains all the ielativities. . That is to say, if
we coulu eliminate all the spiiits fiom the woilu, then that is the enu of natuie. But if we eliminate
natuie.theie always still iemains something: the spiiit as inuiviuual spiiit."
2S9

2S8
Ibiu7, SS7
2S9
Ibiu., S11
110
Be is saying now of "spiiit"a sectoi of constituteu iealitywhat he noimally says
only of tianscenuental subjectivity, foi example in the woilu-annihilation
expeiiment. I will fuithei auuiess these unsettling conflations below (section B).
Asiue fiom the othei pioblems with Busseil's aigument, the basic mysteiy at
the heait of his view as stateu in the Piioiity Thesis is this: how aie we to
unueistanu how scientists coulu have aiiiveu, simply fiom the spiiitual attituue, at
natuialistic conceptions of natuie anu mattei anu its absolute statusunless they
weie simply B,3>C about this, say out of a ceitain aiiogance. By uefining the
essence of natuie as puiely mateiial, anu natuie as the basis of ieality, Busseil
himself has ensuieu that the scientific conception of natuie coulu not tiuly be
supplanteu by anothei, except by iecouise to the seeming invention of a "new" anu
"uiffeient" "natuial attituue"a bifuication that ieinfoices iathei than softens his
uualistic stanu.

.7 12(,() $>" J3>%4(3+%>#%%
The Piioiity Thesis is so flaweu, in fact, that its veiy existence piesents a
piofounu heimeneutical mysteiy. What is it uoing in Busseil's philosophy at all. I
think the ieason becomes cleai upon some ieflection of what the supposeu
auvantage of spiiit ovei natuie is supposeu to lie in, namely %+<c#4)(?()F. The
peisonalistic attituue is subject-centeieu, integiating meaning anu subject-ielative
values, feelings, anu so on, into the matiix of peiception anu action. In this way, it
begins to tuin in the uiiection of phenomenology itself, especially when one
consiueis that phenomenology is a human, cultuial, anu hence "spiiitual" activity. It
111
is easy, in fact, to see Busseil's !"#$% !! concepts of the peisonalistic attituue anu
@AB#=)
24u
as ciucial anticipations of the life-woilu anu life-woilu
phenomenology.
241
The tiouble, howevei, is that in Busseil's own view, a huge gulf
sepaiates phenomenology fiom othei sciences, i.e., fiom ieality. Stiuggling with this
pioblem, Ricoeui offeis his best attempt to ieconcile spiiit anu tianscenuental
consciousness: ".'#(%) is |peihapsj nothing othei than the ego of phenomenology,
but without the light of the phenomenological ieuuction."
242
But if tiue, this woulu
have seiious consequences. Fiist of all, Busseil in fact takes pains to uistinguish the
human sciences fiom (tianscenuental) phenomenology thioughout his wiitings. If
spiiit anu tianscenuental ego aie ioughly equivalent, then the natuial attituue
woulu not have two sub-speciesnatuialistic anu peisonalisticbut woulu be
univocal. At least, the peisonalistic attituue woulu have to be sub-uiviueu into
"natuial" anu "tianscenuental" aspects. But as things stanu, the foimei option woulu
conceue the natuial attituue entiiely to the natuial sciences, given the authoiity
Busseil ceues them ovei the "natuial" woilu, while the lattei, moie plausible option
woulu nonetheless make the the neeu foi the ieuuction haiu to unueistanu. Boesn't
the peisonalistic attituue alieauy inteipiet the woilu as a woilu of sense, iathei

24u
Thomas Nenon concuis: "the !"#$% !! shows |sicj that the concept of @AB#=), B5(45 B3+=" <#
,#2=$4#" <F )5$) 3D )5# =(D#LB3,=" (> )5# \qM% $>" kqM%." (!%%+#%, x; emphasis auueu)
241
The woiu "U#<#>%B#=)" can, suipiisingly, be founu in !"#$% !!7 See, foi example: !"#$% !!, 187. In the
"Tianslatoi's Intiouuction" to the English-language veision of !"#$% !!!, Teu Klein anu William Pohl
claim that, in theii unueistanuing, the life-woilu is piesent fiom the beginning of that text as well.
(!"#$% !!!, viii-ix)
242
Ricoeui, 8u. Ricoeui iuentifies the "spiiitconsciousness" ambiguity as a cential mysteiy of !"#$%
!!oi in his moie blunt woius: "As we aie going to see, this pie-eminence itself |iefeiiing to the
Piioiity Thesisj is what poses the most embaiiassing question of !"#$% !!: that of situating what in
this woik Busseil calls spiiit ('#(%)) in ielation to that which his woiks geneially call 'consciousness,'
the subjective life of consciousness ieacheu by the phenomenological ieuuction." (Ricoeui, 76)
112
than of meie "things". 0ltimately, the natuial attituue itself is in neeu of a iauical
iethinking.
24S

The funuamental anu well-known ambiguities of the "life-woilu" aie iooteu
in the ambiguities of the spiiitual attituue anu the notion of "spiiit" itself. Spiiit is a
iealm of ieality, the iealm of peisons, cultuie, anu societies oi social stiuctuiesas
well as theii 5(%)3,(4$= (uiachionic) uimension; consciousness in the
"tianscenuental" anu "phenomenological" sense is none of these. The "puie Ego" of
!"#$% !! now appeais to be almost puiposefully ambiguous: at once having a foot in
"peisonhoou" anu anothei outsiue it. We have alieauy askeu whethei the "puie Ego"
is the same as the "tianscenuental Ego," as constituting consciousness itself, anu
ueciueu that it piobably has to be. 0n the one hanu, one wants to infei that when the
phenomenologist comes upon the puie Ego, heshe comes upon himselfheiself, as
tianscenuental ego, in the act of self-constitution anu self-ieflection. This woulu
essentially compiise a peifoimance of the ieuuction. (Busseil uoes aftei all call the
puie Ego the "iiieal, absolute substiate of all manifestation of ieality."
244
) But as we
have seen, Busseil uesciibes the Ego in teims of spiiit, anu as the "iulei of the soul,"
foi example, so its iole as a "ieal" component of the objective woilu sits uneasily (oi
too easily) alongsiue its "tianscenuentality."

24S
I suspect that this is why Baviu Caii, in his "Tianslatoi's Intiouuction" to the J,(%(%, uistinguishes
shaiply between the "natuial attituue" of !"#$% ! (anu theiefoie, I woulu say, !"#$% !! anu !!! as well),
which is still "theoietical," anu what he teims the "piimoiuial natuial attituue" of the life-woilu. See:
J,(%(%, xxxix. Between the natuial(%)(4 natuial attituue anu the peisonalistic (itself being vaguely
tianscenuental) attituue, theie seems to be >3 ),+# >$)+,$= $))()+"# in the !"#$% volumes. The task of
phenomenology as a phenomenology piecisely of the natuial attituue becomes much moie subtle
anu elusive than befoie, since it becomes a task of eluciuating the pie-theoietical woilu, what
Neileau-Ponty will foi his pait call the "tacit logos" of natuie. We will say moie about this in
subsequent chapteis.
244
!"#$% !!G SS7
113
A life-woilu connection uoes, howevei, allow us to ie-inteipiet Busseil's
Piioiity-Thesis-engenueieu "spiiitual monism" in the safei (oi moie familiai)
uiiection of ),$>%4#>"#>)$= monism, the stanuaiu Busseilian position that all ieality
is constituteu in anu by tianscenuental consciousness, the souice of all meaning anu
being. 0nuei this inteipietation, then, in elevating the "human sciences" above the
natuial sciences, what Busseil is in fact uoing is impiecisely expiessing his
conviction in the supeiioiity of 25#>3A#>3=3CF, as the stuuy of 43>%4(3+%>#%%, to the
stuuy of ,#$=()F, which, Busseil seems to feel, has been monopolizeu by the natuial
sciences. The elevation of the human sciences can be seen as a piotest against this
natuialistic bias, but to that extent it oveistates the case anu ultimately makes all of
peiceiveu mateiial ieality the piovince of subjective @AB#=)#>, which cannot have
been Busseil's intention. It becomes incieasingly appaient that the "pioblem of the
natuial anu human sciences" was one that became giafteu onto phenomenology
aftei it became known to Busseil thiough contact with the woiks of Bilthey. It tuins
out to be haiu to synthesize these veiy uiffeient types of uiscouise in a single
fiamewoik.
24S

Thus in light of the foiegoing, the J,(%(%M investigations into the life-woilu
may now appeai in a new light, namely as an attempt (itself aumitteuly gioping) at a
final solution to the ambiguity of spiiit anu consciousness. The tianscenuental

24S
What is at stake in all of this is moie than just the "paiauox of subjectivity," that is, what Busseil
latei calls the phenomenon of "ieal" egoity combineu with 'tianscenuental" egoity. Foi that pioblem,
auuiesseu at length in the J,(%(% (J,(%(%, 178-8S), conceins the uuality of empiiical anu tianscenuental
egos, not the specific pioblem of the ambiguous ontological status of the tianscenuental ego itself, a
tianscenuental ego both woiluly anu non-woiluly, so to speak, at the same time. In !"#$% !!,
consciousness belongs to Egos, anu these Egos aie pait of the "ieal" oiuei of the woilu, namely the
summit of its "spiiitual". Thus tianscenuental subjectivity can be saiu to both belong to the woilu anu
constitute it "fiom outsiue," so to speak.
114
ieuuction to the life-woilu pieseives what was ciucial in !"#$% !!'s uiscussion of the
@AB#=) anu the peisonalistic attituue, namely its involvement in the axiological anu
piactical spheies of meaningeven in assigning them 2,(3,()F ovei a conception of a
puiely "meaningless" natuie.
246

/7 :5# r+#%)(3> 3D )5# E3"F
Busseil's uepicts the living bouy oi animal oiganism as its own ontological
iegion, uistinct fiom puie "mateiiality" on the one hanu anu puie "spiiituality" on
the othei. Busseil elsewheie calls the bouy a "connecting biiuge" in this iespect.
247

Bowevei, these coulu actually be seen to iepiesent two veiy uiffeient claims, which
can nonetheless be easily conflateu. This is exactly what occuis in a iecent
(schematic) attempt to uevelop a iecent unifieu inteipietation, by Luis Rabanaque,
of Busseil's iuea of the living bouy. Rabanaque uiaws on both !"#$% !! anu O+%%#,=
XZXZ
248
to aigue that the bouy in Busseil can be unueistoou as a "thiiu noematic
iegion" between natuie anu spiiit (oi cultuie). 0n its own this is not contioveisial
(uepenuing, ciucially, on how one unueistanus the inteiielations of the "iegions," as
I will auuiess below), but the papei equally uiaws on the "connecting biiuge"
metaphoi between subjectivity anu physical thinghoou. The full quote fiom Busseil,
in which this metaphoi is useu, goes as follows:

246
But wheie exactly, then, uoes the life-woilu leave the iole of the human sciences anu the "spiiit"
specifically as such. This question is beyonu the scope of this chaptei oi uisseitation, but it may have
to uo with the "ontology of the life-woilu" that Busseil hints at but nevei fully uevelops in the J,(%(%.
(J,(%(%, 17S)
247
See fn 127.
248
Rabanaque, Luis. "The Bouy as Noematic Biiuge Between Natuie anu Cultuie." In: /2(%)#A3=3CFG
0,45$#3=3CFG /)5(4%I J+,,#>) !>?#%)(C$)(3>% 3D O+%%#,=M% J3,2+% (Eus. Pol vanuevelue anu Sebastian
Luft). New Yoik: Continuum, 2u1u
115

"We see theieby alieauy that, phenomenologically consiueieu, subjectivity (soulish spiiit) in the
woilu anu physical thinghoou in the woilu aie not two sepaiate anu exteinally ielateu gioups of ieal
occuiiences, but iathei that theie is piouuceu in the foim of Coipoieality, which in itself has its own
ueepest layei of being in sensibility anu fiee mobility, a connecting biiuge, which, thiough the
singulai spiiituality in natuie, can have a position in the iealm of 25F%(%."
249

The metaphoi of a biiuge in this context is a poweiful one because it seems to offei
a possibility of iesolving oi at least softening the otheiwise staik uispaiity between
physical thinghoou anu human spiiit. It is not suipiising that Busseil shoulu look to
animality to fill the iole of "missing iung" in the uieat Chain of Being-like lauuei he
has built. But in Rabanaque's ieauing, the "bouy f+$ bouy" is a "thiiu noematic
iegion" that "4$>>3) <# $%%(A(=$)#" to eithei natuie oi spiiit." In othei woius, the
bouy is somehow uiffeient, in an iiieuucible mannei, fiom egoic consciousness as
such anu physical thingliness as such. Fiist of all, Busseil himself states quite to the
contiaiy that the bouy is a pait of natuie ("animal >$)+,#," natuie in the "seconu
sense," etc.). Anu seconuly, Rabanaque seems to have tacitly combineu the notions
of a pluiality of noematic iegions on the one hanu anu an "integiateu" (his woiu)
totalitywith the bouy as "miupoint" between #[)#>%(3 anu 43C()3, shaiing in
"featuies common to <3)5 the lowei anu uppei iegions"on the othei. In uoing so
he pioves of couise the uictum that it is possible to be too faithful to a text. Foi the
iuea of the bouy as a "biiuge" between natuie anu spiiit, anu its being an iiieuucible
"thiiu noematic iegion" in auuition to the natuial anu the spiiitual, aie obviously
two veiy uiffeient, anu mutually incompatible, claims. In the fiist case, we might
have a case of ontological monisma sliuing scale of being, peihaps fiom the most

249
O+%%#,= XZXZ, p. 186 (my tianslation)
116
ineit to the most "enspiiit-eu." This woulu be ieminiscent of the Neoplatonism-
tingeu ontology of some ueiman Romantics, oi peihaps uistantly of Spinozism. But
if spiiituality anu physicality fuse oi blenu in the miuulein the bouy as "miupoint"
of extension anu thought, in Rabanaque's imagethen it woulu seem that the notion
of "noematic iegions" in the 2=+,$= must be uispenseu with altogethei. Foi in that
case mateiial thinghoou anu psychic egoity woulu not be two uistinct noematic
iegions at all in the fiist place, let alone leaving ioom foi a thiiu, the bouy.
The fiist, monistic view suggests a kinu of vitalism, oi panpsychism, that
Busseil expiessly iejects with iespect to Leibniz (anu Biuno).
2Su
Fuitheimoie, this
woulu be a case in which U#(<=(45H#() woulu uefine the whole continuum of which
extension anu thought aie meiely poles on eithei enu. Yet this woulu cleaily be
unacceptable to Busseil, as it woulu call into question the founuing-founueu
ielationship of the physical anu psychical, the lattei of which being founueu on the
foimei, as well as iemove the piivilegeu peich of the Caitesian "I think." The fact is
that Busseil "(" posit multiple iiieuucible (the Piioiity Thesis asiue) "ontological
iegions"two in paiticulai, natuie anu spiiit. The bouy falls in the foimei column.
0f couise, theie is one moie piovocative thought expeiiment to consiuei. In talking
about the ielation between the psyche anu the bouy, Busseil invokes the following
image:

"Let us imagine a consciousness. which woulu stanu in ielation to a locomotive, so that if the
locomotive weie feu watei this consciousness woulu have the pleasant feeling that we call satiety; if
the locomotive weie heateu, it woulu have the feeling of waimth, etc. 0bviously, the locomotive
woulu not, because of the make-up of such ielationships, become 'animate oiganism' foi this
consciousness. If, insteau of the thing that I at the time call my animate oiganism, the locomotive

2Su
Ibiu., 1S2
117
stoou in my consciousness as the fielu of my puie Ego, then I coulu not call it animate oiganism also,
foi it simply woulu not be an animate oiganism."

The image has intuitive appeal, but why. Busseil immeuiately goes on to explain the
ieason the locomotive anu my consciousness woulu not make up an animate
oiganism at this point:

".a consiueiable pait of the laige content-class belonging to the spheie of consciousness unuei the
title 'A$)#,($= 3D 43>%4(3+%>#%%' is so intimately at one with the mateiial animate oiganism that in the
intuitive givenness not meiely connection but piecisely unity is shown."
2S1

Not meiely connection <+) +>()F. This seems a veiy stiong statement inueeu. An
animate oiganism is alieauy moie than a mateiial thing in its essence. It has a
"stiatum" of the psychic, belonging to the whole of the oiganism "fiom the outset."
But ieally, all this means is that the animate oiganism is such that in it, its Bouy anu
soul aie one. We have gone thiough all of this alieauy. In spite of this "unity," theie
is also, still, a founueu-founuing ielation between the fiist anu seconu ("psychic")
stiatum; they'ie not equal, in this sense. This is what allows Busseil to speak of the
bouy as a "sensing physical thing" that is "coveieu oi filleu with feelings."
2S2
Its
mateiiality is piimaiy, its psychic uimension an auu-on, albeit one woven into the
essence of some beings, the "animate" ones. So unfoitunately, the unity of Bouy anu
soul fails to pioviue the neeueu eviuence of eithei a iauical union of oi a "miuule
iegion" between natuie anu spiiit.
2SS
Inueeu, it is aiguable that Busseil's tieatment

2S1
!"#$% !!!, 1u4
2S2
!"#$% !!, 1uS
2SS
Fuithei (inuiiect) eviuence of this is the unconvincing tieatment of "somatology" as its own
uiscipline in !"#$% !!!, foi example.
118
of the bouy is itself uualistic, having the two siues, mateiial anu psychical, but in
tiuth, this woulu piobably be to use the teim "uualistic" too loosely.
2S4

!F+ 8%"(4'.)%"

I hope to have shown that Busseil's acceptance of the natuial-scientific sense
of mateiial natuie as the absolute basis of ieality, the substiate upon which highei
stiata of ieality aie "founueu" in a uniuiiectional way, has seveie consequences that
ieveibeiate thioughout the !"#$% seiies anu maybe Busseil's philosophy as a whole.
It pushes the bouy anu living natuie into the puiview of the inheiently ieuuctive
"natuial sciences," all the while piecipitating a ciisis wheieby "spiiit" must be
iescueu fiom the clutches of biute mateiialismanu hence must be uualistically
sealeu off fiom "natuie" itself. Busseil's woilu is bifuicateu in such a way that the
+>()F of the woilu cannot be founu (> it, but only in the fact that both sets of iealities
aie 43>%)()+)#" in common thiough the ),$>%4#>"#>)$= #C3, i.e., 25#>3A#>3=3C(4$==F.
If the tianscenuental ego anu phenomenological monism fail, the woilu uoes not
have the iesouices to maintain inteinal cohesion. This view is highly Platonic in a
4#,)$(> veiy specific sense, that is, in iefeience to a split univeise whose unity is

2S4
Tayloi Caiman aigues that the _o,2#,8U#(< uistinction is uualistic. (See: Caiman, Tayloi. "the Bouy
in Busseil anu Neileau-Ponty." 95(=3%325(4$= :32(4%, vol. 27, No. 2, Fall 1999, p. 2u6. Beieaftei
"Caiman.") I uo agiee with both Caiman anu Bastui that Busseil's oveiall position is uualistic in
some impoitant sense. (Caiman, 2u8 anu Bastui, 7S)

119
pioviueu by something fiom "above," "paiticipating" in what is "below." In Busseil's
case, the tianscenuental ego is not a "thing" like the Foims, it is iathei an attituue, a
kinu of consciousness. But to call Busseil's view "tianscenuental Platonism," while
being moie accuiate, uoes not uiain the compaiison of its piesent ielevance.
But if !"#$% !! piomises moie than Busseil himself ueliveis, that is also
because it piomises so veiy much. It haibois the soits of feitile ambiguities that
have leu quite natuially to the ontological shift in phenomenology that took place
thiough Beiueggei, Saitie, anu Neileau-Ponty, among otheis. Anu ovei the J,(%(%
anu othei latei (at least among publisheu) wiitings, genetic oi static oi both, it has
the auvantage, iionically, of gieatei (>43>%(%)#>4F anu thus a gieatei sense of
23%%(<(=()F. Nuch of this possibility aiises out of Busseil's justly influential tieatment
of the bouy. The bouy hau alieauy been a majoi concein of Continental philosopheis
like Beigson, Naicel, anu Schelei (who was influenceu by Busseil, albeit), but
thiough the vehicle of !"#$% !! its place in the hoiizon of founuational philosophical
pioblems, at least in the Continental tiauition, was peimanently establisheu.
In all of this, Busseil of couise uoes not seem eithei to iecognize the tensions
in !"#$% !! as funuamental ones oi to iealize that the question of >$)+,# poses a
iauical pioblem foi the tianscenuental-phenomenological methou itself. As we have
seen, he piesents a kinu of "ontological gambit" uiiecteu against the >$)+,$=(%)(4 oi
physicalistic philosophei. If Busseil's gambit fails, it will have in the piocess
conceueu so much to natuial science anu, in the wake of the failuie of
tianscenuental phenomenology, theie woulu be only the natuialistic-physicalistic
option left. Something has cleaily gone wiong. At its best, the examination of the
120
bouy in !"#$% !! iaises the possibility of a iethinking of phenomenology anu the
natuial attituue, an uncoveiing of eviuence that shows poweifully that theie is a
kinu of ueep intei-connectivity anu oveilap of natuie anu spiiit. Theie is a ceitain
volatility in Busseil's hanuling of these concepts, a volatility that ieappeais in
inteimittent buists thioughout !"#$% !!. Thus, like intentional consciousness itself,
!"#$% !! as a text points necessaiily beyonu itself.
Foi his pait, Neileau-Ponty auopts many of Busseil's insights as his own but
goes with them in a uiffeient uiiection. We might put it this way: wheieas foi
Busseil natuie has to be explaineu in teims of its "constitution" in tianscenuental
consciousness, foi Neileau-Ponty, it is this veiy consciousness which neeus
explaining, in light of its obvious oiigination in the piimoiuial expeiiences of the
natuial liveu-bouy. The bouy becomes the site of a paiauox that will nevei be
"iesolveu," because it is uefinitive of the human conuition. 0ntologically, the bouy as
U#(< bluis the line of subjectivity anu objectivity in a way even moie uecisive than
(theoietical) intentionality, since it has no "uiiectionality," anu it is not simply the
"bouy-subject" (as Neileau-Ponty himself came to iecognize) but something like the
ciiss-ciossing oi inteitwining of being with itselfa knot at the heait of the
univeise. The intimacy of natuie anu spiiit allows philosophy, anu not just natuial
science, to have a say in uefining what it is, even while itself being susceptible to
having to ievise its own beliefs in light of these explanations. In Neileau-Ponty,
"natuialism" is uefeateu, paiauoxically, by becoming tiansfoimeu thiough a much
moie iobust uefinition of "natuie" than scientists have tiauitionally peimitteu. This
is no victoiy of a highei iuealism oi spiiitualism. Contiaiy to what some have
121
claimeu, Neileau-Ponty's philosophy uoes not "ie-enchant" natuie so much as
iemove any haiu, essentialist baiiieis between the vaiiousiealuivisions within
"being." It is in this sense piecisely a philosophy of "piomiscuity," to use Neileau-
Ponty's woiu, iathei than of iomantical unity.
Let us now tuin to Neileau-Ponty's own multi-faceteu appiopiiation of
Busseil's thought, !"#$% !! incluueu.

122
8209#-$ >2$--; M-$4-0'P,%"#6=. :$?0")( O99$%9$)0#)%" %1
<'..-$4)0" ,2-"%5-"%4%?6

"We know that Busseil nevei maue himself too cleai on these questions."
2SS

!+ !"#$%&'(#)%"

The question of what phenomenology isanu what its ultimate tasks aie
has nevei ceaseu to be poseu evei since its inception. Natuially, people have lookeu
to Busseil, the effective founuei anu pioneei of this philosophy, foi answeis to such
questionsbut while some finu them heie, otheis see only moie questions.
Neileau-Ponty was unique, in this iegaiu: he founu an answei, but it happens to be
one that continues to suipiise us because of its countei-intuitivity. 0n Neileau-
Ponty's ieauing, Busseil's questions aie ultimately those of human existence, the
paiauoxes of incainate subjectivity, the finituue of human knowleugenone of
which the "textbooks" at fiist suggest to be cential to the ueiman philosophei's
agenua. Neveitheless, it is unueniable that evei since Neileau-Ponty intiouuceu his
Busseil to the woilu, phenomenology has not been able to stop wonueiing ovei the
enigma that is the Neileau-PontyBusseil ielationship.

2SS
Neileau-Ponty, Nauiice. "The Philosophei anu Bis Shauow." (Beieaftei "PS.") In 1(C>%. Ti. Richaiu
N. NcCleaiy. Evanston, Illinois: Noithwestein 0niveisity Piess, 1964 (p. 16S)
123
The stakes aie as high as evei, as eviuent fiom a (ielatively) iecent account
like this one by Lestei Embiee:

"It is uaunting to iecall the histoiical eia in Ameiican phenomenology of oui youth that is best calleu
'Phenomenology anu Existentialism' if only because, in that gieat upsuige of eneigy, Busseil was,
incieuibly, ieau by so many as the fathei of existential phenomenology, a pateinity that still neeus
challenging."
2S6

Theie aie many, paiticulaily on the "Busseilian" siue (hopefully this soit of label
will mean less by the enu of this chaptei), who shaie Embiee's uisenchantment with
what they peiceive to be Neileau-Ponty's misappiopiiation of Busseilian
phenomenology.
2S7
Theie aie also those fiom the "Neileau-Ponty siue" of things
who lament the Fiench philosophei's constant iefeiences to Busseil, finuing them
unnecessaiy anu misleauing given the ultimately tians-phenomenological natuie,
they claim, of Neileau-Ponty's unueitaking. 0theis, of couise, stiess the inuissoluble
link between the two philosopheis.
It is ceitainly haiu to ueny that a significant link exists, but the piecise
ielation between Neileau-Ponty anu Busseil is an uncannily uifficult coue to ciack.
"Boes Neileau-Ponty get Busseil iight." is just the fiist of many questions that aiise.
0theis incluue: Is theie a "iight" Busseila "tiue" Busseil, at all. Shoulu Neileau-
Ponty's self-uesciibeu fiuelity to Busseil's iueas be tiusteu. Shoulu we see K#,=#$+L
93>)F as a kinu of O+%%#,=($>, finally, anu even O+%%#,= (oi one of possibly seveial
"Busseils") as a 2,3)3LK#,=#$+L93>)($>.

2S6
Quoteu in: Beinet, Ruuolf; Iso Kein; anu Euuaiu Naibach. 0> !>),3"+4)(3> )3 O+%%#,=($>
95#>3A#>3=3CF7 Evanston, Ill.: Noithwestein 0niveisity Piess, 199S (p. xi) I iepiouuce anu iesponu
to a fullei veision of the same quote below.
2S7
Foi example, Elizabeth Behnke, as uiscusseu fuithei below.
124
To stait at the enu anu woik backwaius, so to speak, my quick answeis to
these questions, iespectively, woulu be: yes, Neileau-Ponty gets something
piofounuly iight about Busseil, that is a paiticulai stiain of him that must be
sepaiateu caiefully fiom the iest; no, theie is no "tiue" Busseil, since many live
possibilities iemain open in his caveinous thought; yes, Neileau-Ponty's self-
unueistanuing as a phenomenologist of a Busseilian vein is giounueu in tiuth; anu
finally, yes, theie is a sense in which Busseil anu Neileau-Ponty aie iecipiocally
inteitwineu, such that, to use the lattei's woius when speaking of himself anu
Busseil, "it is not possible even in piinciple to ueciue at any given moment just what
belongs to each." (PS 1S9)
This is a lot to show, howevei, in a uisseitation chaptei, so I have limiteu my
goals piesently to these foui: Fiist, to biiefly sketch the histoiical backgiounu of the
ielationship; Seconu, to pioviue an oveiview anu ciitical assessment of a vaiiety of
positions taken on this ielationship in the iecent seconuaiy liteiatuie; Thiiu, to
show, thiough a stuuy of the ielevant texts, how I unueistanu Neileau-Ponty to ieau
anu appiopiiate Busseil; anu Fouith, to suggest ways in which his ielationship
2S8
to
Busseil exemplifies anu embouies ceitain Neileau-Pontian (but also, implicitly,
Busseilian) "figuies of thought." That is, I will want ultimately to showanu heie is
at least one clue as to why some ieaueis uon't accept Neileau-Ponty's ieauing of
Busseilthat Neileau-Ponty's inteipietation of Busseil follows the same pattein as

2S8
Busseil anu Neileau-Ponty uiu not have a peisonal acquaintance, so by "ielationship" I have of
couise been iefeiiing (anu will continue to iefei) thioughout this chaptei to the ielationship
between theii philosophies.
125
his geneial philosophy, such that to accept one is, to a laige uegiee, to accept the
otheioi at least to be piepaieu to uo so moie ieauily.
2S9

Neileau-Ponty uiu not begin his philosophical caieei stiictly as a
"phenomenologist," but he giauually giew into the iole. Be was inteiesteu in
Busseil as eaily as 19S4, but even as late as his fiist book, :5# 1),+4)+,# 3D E#5$?(3,,
his piimaiy focus seemingly lies elsewheie. Bowevei, ieauing Busseil (oi about
him, as thiough Eugen Fink's impoitant _$>)%)+"(#> aiticle of 19SS
26u
) eviuently
hau a gieat cumulative impact on him, such that, as one chioniclei notes, "|hisj
attention to Busseil incieases iathei than uiminishes ovei the couise"
261
of the
piogiession fiom :5# 95#>3A#>3=3CF 3D 9#,4#2)(3> (99), his well-known 194S
masteipiece, to :5# ;(%(<=# $>" )5# !>?(%(<=# (;!), which was left unfinisheu at the
time of the authoi's untimely ueath. 0nlike Eugen Fink, Naitin Beiueggei, Aion
uuiwitsch, anu othei stuuents of Busseil's, Neileau-Ponty uiu not have a peisonal
ielationship with Busseil, although he may have attenueu at least one of his
lectuies.
262
Complicating matteis fuithei, Busseil was cleaily only one of many
influences on the sponge-like Fiench thinkei. This is because Busseil's

2S9
An impoitant but uelibeiate omission fiom this uiscussion is any extenueu uiscussion of
heimeneutics foi its own sake. Foi example, I touch only inuiiectly the peiennial question of whethei
theie is in fact such a thing as a "coiiect" inteipietation of a woik, oi even whethei theie is such a
"woik" to begin with. (Besiues, Neileau-Ponty's is a case in which it is not the meaning of inuiviuual
texts that aie usually at stake but the tenuencies anu "innei logic" of the thinkei's coipus as a whole,
an even moie elusive animal.) These aie suiely questions that ueseive ieplies anu woulu have
significant beaiing on the piesent inquiiy, but they also lie just outsiue its necessaiily iestiicteu
scope.
26u
See: Fink, Eugen. "Bie phnomenologische Philosophie Eumunu Busseils in uei gegenwitigen
Kiitik." In: Fink, Eugen. 1)+"(#> `+, 95l>3A#>3=3C(# XZkqLXZkZ7 The Bague, Netheilanus: Naitinus
Nijhoff, 1966
261
The chioniclei is Teu Toauvine. See "Neileau-Ponty's Reauing of Busseil: A Chionological
0veiview." In: K#,=#$+L93>)FM% N#$"(>C 3D O+%%#,=. Eus. Teu Toauvine anu Lestei Embiee. Bouiecht:
Kluwei Acauemic Publisheis, 2uu2 (p. 228). Beieaftei "Toauvine." (The essay collection as a whole is
iefeiieu to heieaftei as "Reauing.") Toauvine's chionicle has been extiemely useful foi this section.
262
Ibiu., pp. 227-SS
126
phenomenology, laigely thiough the influence of Saitie, was only one of many
uominant philosophical options in 194us Fiance, when Neileau-Ponty foigeu the
coie of his philosophical vision.
26S

Neveitheless, Busseil's influence tuineu out to be the most uecisive in the
enu. In the "Pieface" of PP, Neileau-Ponty auopteu the funuamental Busseilian
insights anu concepts, woiking them into his own bianu of "existential"
phenomenology, anu he was the fiist so-calleu "outsiuei" to be gianteu piivate anu
in-uepth access to Busseil's aichives in Louvain, which weie at that time filleu with
ieams of unpublisheu mateiial that Neileau-Ponty happily uevouieu anu
communicateu, fiagmentaiily, to a wiuei ciicle of scholais anu intellectuals.
264

Neileau-Ponty's ieauing of Busseil is ciitical of some of Busseil's tenuencies,
paiticulaily what have been vaiiously labeleu anu iuentifieu as his iationalism,
iuealism, essentialism, anu founuationalism. Neileau-Ponty uislikeu each of these
"styles" of thinking, but he cleaily iegaiueu Busseil as "moie than the sum" of these
philosophical paits. It is also tiue, howevei, that each of the above labels can be
challengeu as oveily simplistic steieotypes when applieu to Busseil, as they all
apply chiefly (though by no means exclusively) to the eaily publisheu woiks of
Busseil uuiing his, piimaiily, "static phenomenology" peiioumost especially,

26S
Foi example, Alexanuie Kojeve hau memoiably ie-intiouuceu Begel to Fiench stuuents, incluuing
Neileau-Ponty. Beiueggei anu Schelei anu theii ciiticisms of Busseil weie also influential to
Neileau-Ponty, as weie Saitie's existentialism, Beigsonianism, (eventually) Naixism, anu othei
philosophiesto say nothing of the cential impact of uestalt Psychology on the young thinkei. 0n the
(mostly) negative siue, the influence of Fiench Neo-Kantianism shoulu be mentioneu. I will fuithei
auuiess Neileau-Ponty's consistent opposition to Kantianism in latei sections.
264
Accoiuing to Ban Zahavi, it was in fact !"#$% !!, the then-unpublisheu sequel to !"#$% !, that hau
hau the gieatest impact on Neileau-Ponty. (Zahavi, Ban. "Neileau-Ponty on Busseil: A Reappiaisal."
In K#,=#$+L93>)FM% N#$"(>C 3D O+%%#,=. Eus. Teu Toauvine anu Lestei Embiee. Bouiecht: Kluwei
Acauemic Publisheis, 2uu2. (p. 6heieaftei "Zahavi.") This iuea is suppoiteu inuiiectly by the way
Neileau-Ponty essentially ieconstiucts his own philosophy on the basis of "some lines" of !"#$% !! in
PS.
127
Busseil's !"#$% !, which we have examineu in the fiist chaptei. Neileau-Ponty
iecognizeu in Busseil's thought ovei time a uistinct philosophical matuiation, as
well as a movement $B$F fiom the style of !"#$% !. Neileau-Ponty thus uiviues
Busseil's thought into thiee uistinct peiious: logicist, iuealist (oi simply "miuule"),
anu existentialist phases.
26S
Neileau-Ponty siues with the thiiu, "existentialist"
phase in Busseil's thought, but the fact is that he nevei uenieu the complexity anu
even contiauictoiiness of Busseil's philosophy even at the enuthough given his
tempeiament anu penchant foi =M$A<(C+()6, he almost ceitainly aumiieu Busseil all
the moie foi this than not.

!!+ M-$4-0'P,%"#6=. D-40#)%".2)9 #% <'..-$4; O" 7%N%?$092)(04 :Q-$Q)-H 0"&
8$)#)R'-

07 !>),3"+4)(3>
To iaise the question of Neileau-Ponty's ielationship to oi ieauing of Busseil
is to uo so against the backuiop of a lively anu vigoious uebate, one that begins
eaily
266
anu continues to this uay. Beie I will examine the paiameteis of this uebate,

26S
Two uistinct places in which he auvances the iuea show how enuuiing it was in Neileau-Ponty's
minu: PP, p. S17, fn 274; anu, much latei, PSN 46 anu 48. See also fn46, below.
266
As of 1964, Euie iepoits accusations against Neileau-Ponty, foi example by Nauiice Natanson,
that hau alieauy begun to aiise ovei the accuiacy oi ieliability of Neileau-Ponty's citations of
Busseil's :5# J,(%(% 3D /+,32#$> 14(#>4#% (paiticulaily quotes to the effect that foi Busseil
"tianscenuental subjectivity is an inteisubjectivity"). Suiely }ames Euie was piesciently coiiect in
musing: "That Neileau-Ponty's inteipietation of Busseil has been anu will continue to be contesteu
is beyonu uoubt." See the Pieface of: Neileau-Ponty, Nauiice. :5# 9,(A$4F 3D 9#,4#2)(3>. Eu. }ohn
Wilu. Evanston: Noithwestein 0niveisity Piess, 1964 (pp. xvii-xviii, fn1u) The namesake essay
(actually a lectuie anu a uiscussion) fiom this volume is iefeiieu to heieaftei as "Piimacy."
128
beginning also, thiough a ciitique of some of the extant liteiatuie, to offei my own
inteipietation. The positions I will auuiess cannot necessaiily be placeu on a single
spectium, since theie is no single question that they all auuiess in the same way.
Some authois, foi example, uiscuss the extent of the influence of Busseil ovei
Neileau-Ponty, while otheis concentiate on the D("#=()F of Neileau-Ponty to Busseil
on given issues (oi as a whole). But my goal is not to analyze this uiscussion into
theii inuiviuual components but to pioviue a moie oi less holistic oveiview of the
uiscussion itself, foi all aspects of it aie ielevant to any geneial assessment of
Neileau-Ponty's ielationship to Busseil.
I have uiviueu vaiious views as eithei "stiong" oi "weak." Weak views, on
this uefinition, tenu to uownplay the philosophical association between the two
thinkeis, while stiong views tenu to emphasize anu attach gieat impoitance to it.
Some ieaueis, of couise, like Stephen Watson, combine both aspects in theii
consiueieu view. As a geneial iule, weak ieauings aie moie common than stiong
ones, foi a vaiiety of ieasons. I touch on some of the notable exceptions fiist
ielatively biiefly, since I geneially agiee with the stiong oiientation myself anu seek
to be offeiing one of my own as I pioceeu. That is, insteau of ieheaising positive
stiong accounts alieauy maue, I have ueemeu it moie impoitant finally to answei
weak ieauings insteau.
267

267
Ny placement of a tieatment of the seconuaiy liteiatuie fiist, befoie a uiiect analysis of the
piimaiy texts, is motivateu by my hope that it will be useful to have the context in which the
signficance of such an analysis can be uuly measuieu. The ieview is iestiicteu mostly to iecent
liteiatuie, both foi ieasons of limiteu space as well as to make it as cuiient as possible.
129
E7 :5# a1),3>C ;(#BbI p$5$?(G 1A()5G $>" E$,<$,$%
Ban Zahavi, while acknowleuging uiffeiences between the two thinkeis,
suipiisingly (given his stiong "Busseilian" cieuentials) stiesses the continuity
between them anu aigues that Neileau-Ponty's ieauing of Busseil is in many ways
piescient anu aheau of its times.
268
Foi his pait, A. B. Smith aigues that Neileau-
Ponty's iueas in PP aie funuamentally Busseilian, though stateu with a uiffeient
emphasis anu thiough uiffeient ihetoiic. Be also aigues that Busseil has the
iesouices to account foi the special signficance accoiueu by Neileau-Ponty to the
"bouily schema," against the view of Shaun uallaghei, foi example.
269
Both Zahavi
anu Smith have in common a vast commanu ovei the O+%%#,=($>$ aichives, anu
hence call upon mateiial that cannot be expecteu to be known by even some
auvanceu phenomenologists. The pivotal !"#$% !! has come to be incieasingly well-
known, of couise, but theie aie on this fiont uetiactois of the Stein- anu Lanugiebe-
euiteu volume we have befoie us touay.
27u

In auuition to Zahavi anu Smith, who wiite piimaiily on Busseil, theie is also
the case of a Neileau-Pontian who fully acknowleuges the piofunuity of the link
between the two philosopheis, namely Renauu Baibaias. Thus in the conclusion of
his book .# =Ms),# "+ 256>3AP>#, Baibaias states: ".Neileau-Ponty's ontology uoes

268
Text citeu above as "Zahavi." Foi an instance of his spiiiteu uefense of tianscenuental subjectivity
in Busseil, see foi example, Zahavi, Ban. O+%%#,= $>" :,$>%4#>"#>)$= !>)#,%+<c#4)(?()FI 0 N#%23>%# )3
)5# U(>C+(%)(4L9,$CA$)(4 J,()(f+#. Ti. Elizabeth A. Behnke. Athens: 0hio 0niveisity Piess, 2uu1
269
Smith, A. B. "The Flesh of Peiception: Neileau-Ponty anu Busseil." In N#$"(>C K#,=#$+L93>)FI V>
)5# 95#>3A#>3=3CF 3D 9#,4#2)(3>. Eu. Thomas Baluwin. New Yoik: Routleuge, 2uu7 (pp. 1-22) Note in
paiticulai the summaiy iemaik, ".I have suggesteu that theie is nothing ,$"(4$==F new in Neileau-
Ponty, as compaieu with Busseil. They occupy the same teiiain in philosophical space." (p. 2u)
27u
See foi example: Behnke, Elizabeth. "Neileau-Ponty's 0ntological Reauing of Constitution in
956>3A6>3=3C(# "# =$ 2#,4#2)(3>." In NR, p. S4; heieaftei E#5>H#. Behnke aigues that Stein hau
alieauy "steeieu" !"#$% !! in a iealistic uiiection, one moie congenial to Neileau-Ponty's intentions
than to Busseil's own.
130
not bieak with phenomenology; it is iathei phenomenology's most significant
achievement."
271
0f couise, Leonaiu Lawloi anu Teu Toauvine, in the
"Intiouuction" to theii English tianslation of the book uesciibe it as having as one its
main aims to "confiont Busseil's phenomenology" anu that it conceins the
"tiansfoimation of Neileau-Ponty's phenomenology into ontology." Impoitantly,
howevei, these iemaiks peitain to Baibaias himself, iathei than to Neileau-Ponty.
Foi Baibaias tacitly aumits that Neileau-Ponty uiu not fully effect the uesiieu
"tiansfoimation" himself, anu has benefiteu fiom his own effoits to finally uo so.
272

J7 ag#$Hb $>" aK([#"b ;(#B%I U#D3,)G N(45(,G K$"(%3>G #) $=7
Notwithstanuing the positions of the thiee eminent scholais just mentioneu,
the opposite view is iathei much easiei to finu. This is tiue of Neileau-Ponty's one-
time stuuent Clauue Lefoit, foi example, as well as Naich Richii, both of whom
speak of Neileau-Ponty's ultimate "bieak" with phenomenology.
27S
Still on the

271
:5# E#(>C 3D )5# 95#>3A#>3>. Tis. Teu Toauvine anu Leonaiu Lawloi. Bloomington: Inuiana
0niveisity Piess, 2uu4 (p. S12) Baibaias' full quote beais almost exact iesemblance to something
Neileau-Ponty hau wiitten befoie. Baibaias: "Also, Neileau-Ponty's ontology uoes not bieak with
phenomenology; it is iathei phenomenology's most significant achievement. It aims to iecognize
what Busseil hau foieseen, namely, 'a type of being which contains eveiything'; it aims to make a
ietuin fiom an objective woilu to a U#<#>%B#=) in whose continual flux aie boine Natuie anu the
objects of peiception, as well as constiuctions." Neileau-Ponty, fiom a lectuie on the "life-woilu":
".the ietuin fiom an objective woilu to a U#<%#>B#=) in whose continual flux aie boine Natuie anu
the objects of peiception, as well as the constiuctions thiough which we giasp them with Caitesian
exactness." (Neileau-Ponty, Nauiice. :5#A#% D,3A )5# U#4)+,#% $) )5# J3==PC# "# Q,$>4# XZt\LXZuq.
Ti. }ohn 0"Neill. Noithwestein 0niveisity Piess: Evanston, Illinois, 197u, p. 1u8. Beieaftei
"Themes.")
272
Ibiu., ix
27S
See: Lefoit, Clauue, 1+, +># 43=3>># $<%#>)#I /4,()% $+)3+, "# K#,=#$+L93>)F (Paiis: uallimaiu,
1978) anu Richii, Naic, "Le sense ue la phnomnologie uans U# ?(%(<=# #) =b(>?(%(<=#," in /%2,(), no. 66
(}une 1982), p. 12S. I get these citations by way of Bettina Beigo's "Philosophy as 9#,%2#4)(?$
0,)(D(4($=(%: Neileau-Ponty's Ciitique of Busseilian Constiuctivism." Piinteu as the "Afteiwoiu" of:
Neileau-Ponty, Nauiice. O+%%#,= $) )5# U(A()% 3D 95#>3A#>3=3CF. Eu. Leonaiu Lawloi with Bettina
Beigo. Noithwestein 0niveisity Piess: Evanston, Illinois, 2uu2, p. 178. This aiticle is iefeiieu to
heieaftei as "Beigo."
131
Neileau-Ponty siue (so to speak), theie aie the cases of uaiy Nauison anu N. C.
Billon, both of whom unueiplay the iole of the phenomenological ieuuction in
Neileau-Ponty.
274
Foi Billon, even the eaily Neileau-Ponty "unciitically
appiopiiateu" Busseilian teiminology foi uiffeient puiposes.
27S
Such sentiments
aie common among Neileau-Ponty scholais. In his book on Neileau-Ponty, foi
example, Lawience Bass aigues that Neileau-Ponty goes beyonu Busseil uefinitely
fiom phenomenology to "expiession"
276
, while Bubeit Bieyfus comments that
Neileau-Ponty's anti-uualism conflicts uiiectly with what makes the tianscenuental
ieuuction in Busseil possible
277
. Tayloi Caiman anu Fianoise Bastui, both fiom
veiy uiffeient peispectives, both agiee on a ceitain "uualism" in Busseil which
clashes with Neileau-Ponty's anti-uualist agenua. Aigues Caiman, foi example:

"0nlike Busseil, but like Beiueggei, Neileau-Ponty looks beyonu the subject-object uiviue to tiy to
gain insight into the conciete stiuctuies of woiluly expeiience. Inueeu, taking the pioblem of
embouiment seiiously, as Neileau-Ponty uoes, entails a iauical ieassessment of the veiy conceptual
uistinctions on which Busseil's enteipiise iests."
278

Foi his pait, Xaviei Tilliette ieinfoices this uiviue when he iemaiks that
".Busseil was not an instiuctoi of Neileau-Ponty as much as an initiatoi anu a

274
uaiy Nauison, :5# 95#>3A#>3=3CF 3D K#,=#$+L93>)FI :5# 1#$,45 D3, )5# U(A()% 3D J3>%4(3+%>#%%
(Athens: 0hio 0niveisity Piess, 1981), 194-S anu SS2-S, anu Naitin Billon, K#,=#$+L93>)FM% V>)3=3CF
(Bloomington: Inuiana 0niveisity Piess, 1988), 71-2, 12u (heieaftei "Billon"). Citeu by way of: Saia
Beinmaa, "Fiom Becisions to Passions: Neileau-Ponty's Inteipietation of Busseil's Reuuction."
(Beieaftei "Beinmaa.") In "Reauing" (pp. 127-148)
27S
Billon, p. 8S. Billon uoes howevei note on p. 87 the "usual" way in which, almost as a kinu of
A3"+% 32#,$>"(, Neileau-Ponty picks up anu uevelops a "seminal thought" of Busseil's.
276
Bass, Lawience. K#,=#$+L93>)FM% 95(=3%325F7 Inuianapolis: Inuiana 0niveisity Piess, 2uu8 (pp.
198-9)
277
Bieyfus, Bubeit. "Neileau-Ponty's Ciitique of Busseil's (anu Seaile's) Concept of Intentionality."
In N#,#$"(>C K#,=#$+L93>)F. Amheist, New Yoik: Bumanity Books, 2uuu (p. S7)
278
Caiman, Tayloi. "The Bouy in Busseil anu Neileau-Ponty." 95(=3%325(4$= :32(4%, vol. 27, No. 2, Fall
1999, p 2u6. Foi Bastui's similai but slightly moie nuanceu position, see: "Busseil anu the Pioblem
of Bualism." In 13+= $>" E3"F (> O+%%#,=($> 95#>3A#>3=3CFI K$> $>" *$)+,# R0>$=#4)$ O+%%#,=($>$G
;3=7 S;!T, eu. Anna-Teiesa Tymieniecka. Boiuiecht: Spiingei Netheilanus, 198S (pp. 6S-77).
132
ievealei," going on to auu that "Neileau-Ponty has tiaceu out new fuiiows,
conceineu to fiee up the implicit Busseil who iesembleu him like a biothei,"
279
an
inteiesting twist of couise in which O+%%#,= is saiu to iesemble K#,=#$+L93>)F, as
opposeu the othei way aiounu!
28u
Tilliette is ambiguous, howevei, about the issue
of Neileau-Ponty's oiiginality, as when he wiites, "In ieality, |Neileau-Pontyj uiu
not caiiy out uetaileu pioneei woik, but iathei pickeu out passages anu foimulas
that electiifieu his own meuitation. Be was not anu uiu not want to be a scholiast
noi even an histoiian of philosophy." Biu he caiiy out pioneeiing woik oi uiun't he.
In a iecent essay, Stephen Watson offeis something like an inteimeuiaiy
position, a "mixtuie" of the stiong anu the weak ingieuients.
281
0n the weakei siue,
he emphasizes the ciitical aspect of Neieau-Ponty's engagement with Busseil:
"Neileau-Ponty has given up on phenomenology as a stiictly founuational science in
oiuei to aiticulate phenomenology as pait of oui conceptual histoiy anu coheience,
a situateu knowing anu a situateu knowleuge."
282
Watson seems to suggest that
Neileau-Ponty's iauical iethinking of the iole of histoiy, factuality, anu geneially
the "ielation of stiuctuie anu sense,"
28S
while still peihaps "phenomenological" in a
loose sense, is sufficiently iauical to inuicate a piofounu uisengagement fiom the

279
Neileau-Ponty, Nauiice. :#[)% $>" .($=3C+#%. Eu. Bugh Silveiman anu }ames Baiiy, }i. Ti. Nichael
Smith et al. New }eisey: Bumanities Piess, 1992 (p. 162)
28u
We also must be caieful in following him as he continues this passage, howevei: "Be appioacheu
Busseil with ulteiioi motives, knowing by uivination what he woulu finu theie." (Citeu by way of
Lestei Embiee's Pieface to "Reauing," p. xiii) Tilliette aumits to have acquiieu this lattei insight
seconu-hanu fiom a foimei colleague of Neileau-Ponty, who knew him as of 19S8. Bis belief that
Neileau-Ponty chiefly biought out the hiuuen "implications" of otheis" thoughts is not incoiiect, but
if one uoes this at a masteily enough level, it becomes uncleai who is moie iesponsible foi the fully
uevelopeu thoughtthe oiiginal authoi oi the commentatoi.
281
Watson, Stephen B. "Neileau-Ponty's Phenomenological Itineiaiy Fiom Bouy Schema to Situateu
Knowleuge: 0n Bow We Aie anu Bow We Aie Not to 'sing the Woilu."" ^$>+% O#$", WinteiSpiing
Issue, 9.2, 2uu7. Amheist, NY: Tiivium Publications. (pp. SSS-S49)
282
Ibiu., S44
28S
Ibiu., S4S
133
oiiginal, moie positivistic veision of phenomenology that Busseil hau laiu out. "We
must concluue that on its own phenomenology is not explanatoiy |in the way
Busseil hau claimeuj. It attains no explanatoiy 'iole'ceitainly not that of
ueteimining oui conceptswithout being biought togethei with the facts anu theii
histoiy."
284
Watson's iich aigument, which itself combines histoiical fact anu
systematic analysis in tiacing Neileau-Ponty's ciitical bieak fiom elements of both
Busseil's anu his own eailiei phenomenology, neveitheless makes a compelling
inuiiect (anu, foi lack of a bettei woiu, peifoimative) case foi the inextiicability of a
compiehension of Neileau-Ponty's task without iefeience to Busseil as a kinu of
peimanent hoiizonmuch in the same way peihaps that Neileau-Ponty (citeu by
Watson) aigues foi the uialectical-ielational impoitance of science to
phenomenology.
28S
It is this that can be saiu to compiise the "stiong" element in
Watson's ieauing of the Neileau-PontyBusseil ielationship.

.7 Q3+, g#$H N#$"(>C%I /A<,##G E#5>H#G 1##<35AG E#,C3
In the iest of this section I will ueal at gieatei length with the "weak" views of
thiee phenomenologists of high iepute: Lestei Embiee, Elizabeth Behnke, anu
Thomas Seebohm. I quote these authois at length in oiuei to ueal with theii claims
in close uetail.

284
Ibiu., S4S
28S
Ibiu., S4u. The oiiginal citation is fiom Piimacy, 29. Watson also cites uuiwitsch's well-known
iemaik to the effect that the "life-woilu" in Busseil cannot be unueistoou apait fiom its polemical
ielation to the scientific attituue.
134
Foi Embiee's view, I will simply iepiouuce an expanueu veision of the quote
pioviueu at the outset of this chaptei:

"It is uaunting to iecall the histoiical eia in Ameiican phenomenology of oui youth that is best calleu
'Phenomenology anu Existentialism' if only because, in that gieat upsuige of eneigy, Busseil was,
incieuibly, ieau by so many as the fathei of existential phenomenology, a pateinity that still neeus
challenging. That was challengeu chiefly on the basis of what Neileau-Ponty confecteu in iefeience to
a book whose English title actually is :5# J,(%(% 3D )5# /+,32#$> 14(#>4#%7 No competent ieauei can
stuuy the piesent woik |an intiouuction to Busseil's phenomenologyj anu fail to compiehenu (a)
that Busseil's was fiom about 19uS thiough to the enu of his life a tianscenuental philosophy anu (b)
that Busseil's focus was in the philosophy of science. Existential phenomenology is not
tianscenuental anu, although not lacking in inteiest in science theoiy, is moie conceineu with human
existence."
286

Seveial things can be saiu to challenge these sentiments, though none uefinitive. Foi
example, on one ieauing, Neileau-Ponty uoes not ienounce the tianscenuental
attituue, anu at times in fact embiaces it explicitly.
287
0n this view, it is the
"absoluteness" oi "piioiity" of it that he challenges, not its iightful place in
phenomenological piaxis. Also, it is aiguable that Neileau-Ponty's intensive
engagement with the sciencesat least at the fiist-oiuei level (meaning, the
cieative inteipietation of its "iesults")not only matches but suipasses that of
Busseil himself.
288
Finally, to aigue that Busseil was conceineu with "science" as
opposeu to "human existence" might be a false uilemma, especially in Neileau-

286
Quoteu in: Beinet, Ruuolf; Iso Kein; anu Euuaiu Naibach. 0> !>),3"+4)(3> )3 O+%%#,=($>
95#>3A#>3=3CF7 Evanston, Ill.: Noithwestein 0niveisity Piess, 199S (p. xi)
287
See foi example the following passage on p. 6S of PP: "But now that the phenomenal fielu has been
sufficiently ciicumsciibeu, let us entei into this ambiguous uomain anu let us make suie of oui fiist
steps as fai as the psychologist is conceineu, until the psychologist's self-sciutiny leaus us, by way of
seconu-oiuei ieflection, to the phenomena of the phenomenon, $>" "#4(%(?#=F ),$>%D3,A% )5#
25#>3A#>$= D(#=" (>)3 $ ),$>%4#>"#>)$= 3>#." (italics auueu) Refeience pioviueu by Beinmaa (p. 129)
See also Teu Toauvine's aiticle, also in NR (pp. 71-94), entitleu "Leaving Busseil's Cave. The
Philosophei's Shauow Revisiteu." Toauvine aigues that the PS is an example of Neileau-Ponty's
"iefoimulating the ielation between the tianscenuental anu the munuane." (p. 71)
288
Anu he is no stiangei to the "philosophy of science" as such, eithei. See foi example what Neileau-
Ponty says about science in his /F# $>" K(>" (In :5# 9,(A$4F 3D 9#,4#2)(3>, ti. Caileton Balleiy. Eu.
}ohn Wilu. Evanston: Noithwestein 0niveisity Piess, 1964) pp. 1S9-61.
135
Ponty's case, but also, aiguably, in Busseil's. Embiee, one of the most eminent
scholais of phenomenology touay, is obviously awaie of all of this, so this is moie
than a mattei of lining up citations to piove one siue oi the othei. As I will tiy to
aigue latei, how one ieaus the Neileau-PontyBusseil ielationship is paitly a
function of one's ieceptivity to the kinu of "ambiguity"a C33" ambiguity, minu
you
289
nthat Neileau-Ponty wants to intiouuce to philosophy anu heimeneutics
alike.
Behnke begins a iecent essay by aiguing that "Neileau-Ponty's 'ieauing' of
Busseil is simultaneously a 'wiiting' of Busseila wiiting that appiopiiates anu
uevelops, but also uefoims anu occluues."
29u
It is inteiesting to note that Neileau-
Ponty himself enuoises the notion that it is a false uilemma to say that
"inteipietation is iestiicteu to inevitable uistoition oi liteial iepiouuction." (PS
1S9) Yet one wishes to ask how it is possible to uevelop someone's iueas by
"#D3,A(>C them. Boes not the notion of "uevelopment" piesuppose a ceitain lack of
completeu D3,A, anu hence a malleability oi "potentiality" that makes it haiu to
uefine in the fiist place. With this ominous phiasing, Behnke goes on to explain why
she faults Neileau-Ponty's appioach anu mannei of appiopiiation, as in this telling
quote:

"0n the whole, then, Neileau-Ponty's Busseil-ieauing is chaiacteiizeu by an inteipietive
engagement with the content of Busseilian texts iathei than a concein foi auopting a
phenomenological attituue, consulting expeiiential eviuence foi ouiselves, anu caiiying Busseil's
ieseaich tiauition fuithei. .Anu since Neileau-Ponty's ieauing of Busseil has hau a piofounu
influence on the way Busseil's woik has been ieceiveu in geneial, the oveiall effect has been to

289
Foi the expiession "goou ambiguity," see Piimacy, 11.
29u
"Neileau-Ponty's 0ntological Reauing of Constitution in 956>3A6>3=3C(# "# =$ 2#,4#2)(3>." In NR,
p. S1
136
peipetuate a climate of inteipietation in which Busseilian themes anu teims aie typically
appioacheu in light of ieceiveu philosophical pioblems anu ieceiveu ways of posing them, all at the
expense of the possibility of appiopiiating phenomenology as a living ieseaich hoiizon." (Behnke,
49-Su)

Reau closely, this emeiges as a paiticulaily stinging ciitique of Neileau-
Ponty, at least f+$ "phenomenologist." By not consulting "expeiiential eviuence foi
ouiselves" oi, what Behnke mentions just befoie, cleaving to "uesciiption" iathei
than "explanation" (Behnke, 49), Neileau-Ponty is peihaps not so much a
"phenomenologist" at all, but closei to a simple uogmatist, that is a metaphysician
who engages in "ieceiveu philosophical pioblems anu ieceiveu ways of posing
them." Behnke's sticking point is Neileau-Ponty's abanuonment of Busseil's stiict
methouological uiiectives, something neithei he noi I woulu entiiely uispute.
Behnke auus yet anothei uaik twist, howevei, by suggesting, like Embiee, that the
ieception of Neileau-Ponty $% a iepiesentative phenomenologist has uamageu
Busseil's legacy. 0bviously Behnke is not tiying to cast aspeisions on Neileau-
Ponty himself, but simply to uesciibe what she sees as a case of all-too-successful
appiopiiation (hei woiu) of Busseil's piogiam. But Neileau-Ponty has, in Behnke's
woius, peifoimeu a "uisseivice" to Busseil's woik.
291
Theie is peihaps a ceitain
assumption heie that Busseil's own self-uefineu piojectwithout inteivention by
Neileau-Pontyis vital on its own, a poweiful philosophical system oi
methouology that has been oveishauoweu by an infeiioi piouuct. Bowevei, it is not
cleai in this case that Neileau-Ponty woulu have maikeu out any soit of

291
Behnke singles out that "majoi element of Busseil's woik as a whole" that is "constitution."
(Behnke, 48) Behnke's iemaiks heie aie somewhat suipiising given hei intensive engagement with
Neileau-Ponty, paiticulaily ovei the issues of embouiment anu natuie, in iecent yeais. See foi
example: "Fiom Neileau-Ponty's Concept of Natuie to an Inteispecies Piactice of Peace." In 0>(A$=
V)5#,%I V> /)5(4%G V>)3=3CFG $>" 0>(A$= U(D#7 Albany: State 0niveisity Piess, 1999 (pp. 9S-116)
137
"uevelopment" of Busseil's thought, so much as wiong-heaueuly misconstiueu what
Busseil was finally up to.
These soits of sentiments stanu of couise in significant contiast with
Neileau-Ponty's unueistanuing of his own ielationship to Busseil's thought, which,
as we will see in the next section of this chaptei, is closei to the stiong views biiefly
coveieu above. It is in light of this self-inteipietation of Neileau-Ponty's that
Thomas Seebohm uevelops an inteiesting psychological hypothesis, suggesting that
Neileau-Ponty knew of the uistance at some level in his minu, but tiieu in any case
to "covei up" this uistance. Why woulu he uo this. Again, a long but iich quote:

"As in the case of Fichte anu Kant, the )323% seives as a covei-up of a ciitique, anu this ciitique has
the chaiactei of ueconstiuction. Fichte showeu with iespect to Kant, anu Neileau-Ponty with iespect
to Busseil, that what they believeu to be the last woiu in philosophy is built on 'unthought'
suppositions. These luik behinu the hiuuen contiauictions of the ciiticizeu position. The new task is
the iecognition anu explication of these piesuppositions, thus asking foi the possibility of the
ciiticizeu positions. A ueconstiuctive ciitique has, taken foi itself, the chaiactei of a moie oi less
complete iuptuie anu iauical iejection of the positions in question. But the goal is also to claim some
kinu of continuity."
292

Anu he auus elsewheie,

"Neileau-Ponty is in eveiy iespect honest in his attempts to 'save the face' of his honoieu mastei in
the light of the new uevelopments intiouuceu by him anu otheis."
29S

Thus Neileau-Ponty oveiplayeu the connection between himself anu Busseil in at
least one way: foi the (iionically) <#>#?3=#>) puiposes of uisguising ceitain jaiiing
uisciepancies between the two. (Neileau-Ponty eviuently wanteu to save Busseil's

292
Seebohm, Thomas N. "The Phenomenological Novement: A Tiauition without Nethou. Neileau-
Ponty anu Busseil." In NR (p. S9)
29S
Ibiu., p. SS
138
face by giving him a kinu of "face-lift"!) If it is being implieu that this kinu of face-
saving, well-intentioneu as it may be, is nonetheless countei-piouuctive, because foi
example it tenus to misleau ieaueis as to what Busseil ieally meant, then we come
full ciicle back to Behnke's ciiticism about legacy anu occlusion. The "face-saving"
hypothesis is tempting, given Neileau-Ponty's geneially non-confiontational style of
engaging fiienus anu enemies alike, but it faces a ieal uifficulty: why shoulu
Neileau-Ponty have felt obligeu to uiscuss Busseil in the fiist place, anu to the
extent that he uoes. 0ut of some stiange emotional attachment to Busseil, a man he
hau nevei met, anu whose woik he hau eveiy ieason to uownplay with iespect to
figuies like Beiueggei, Begel, anu otheis.
294
This uoes not seem wholly convincing.
If theie is any peisonal iesponsibility Neileau-Ponty woulu feel towaius
Busseil, it woulu piobably be as a giateful stuuent to a (viitual) teachei. Baving
benefitteu fiom ieauing Busseil's piivate meuitations in the Busseil aichives,
concealeu to most of the public, anu which often conflicteu with the tenuencies of
the publisheu woiks, Neileau-Ponty piobably felt incieasingly iesponsible to
ievivify Busseil in the eyes of a public that iemembeis him in a one-siueu way. This
is the uistinct impiession that I get as I ieau the opening of the PS. Be uiu not 5$?# )3
cite Busseil as often as he uoes, but not to have uone so woulu have eventually
appeaieu, to many, as a bit uishonest, given the iole Busseil plays in his own
thinking. Anu if it is tiue that Neileau-Ponty's thought is a kinu of "ueconstiuction"
of Busseil, Neileau-Ponty himself uoes not ieally give this inuication. Even when he

294
The iefeience to "ueconstiuction" shoulu not be ignoieu, as it goes to the issue of Neileau-Ponty's
mannei of inteipieting philosopheis, but we will come to this in the next section when we examine
PS in uetail.
139
claims to expose a contiauiction in Busseil himself,
29S
foi example, he quickly auus
that Busseil was at least semi-awaie of it anu moving towaius a satisfactoiy
iesolution of it, namely in the last phase of his philosophy. Neileau-Ponty is not
ueconstiucting so much as ,#43>%),+4)(>C Busseilfiom out of Busseil's own
wiitings, no less.
Bettina Beigo's inteipietation of the Neileau-PontyBusseil ielation builus
on something Neileau-Ponty himself comments on, namely a ceitain tension in
Busseil's thought, which, says, Beigo, "lies between the seaich foi a giounu, a
+>(DF(>C 2,(>4(2=#... anu, on the othei hanu, the conviction that the giounu.is
ultimately nevei wholly ieuucible anu so cannot seive as an epistemic founuation."
(Beigo, 1S9) 0n Beigo's view, Neileau-Ponty effectively chose siues (my woius) by
taking the "an-aichic phenomenological option." (Beigo, 16u) The tension Beigo
cites is ieal, yesbut she, unlike Neileau-Ponty, expiesses it heie in solely "static"
oi "synchionic" teims. Neileau-Ponty, insteau, pioviues a moie uiachionic account,
accoiuing to which Busseil's texts weie emeiging into a ceitain "an-aichism" quite
on theii own.
296
If this is tiue, then Neileau-Ponty's autonomy as a "choosei" is
uiminisheu; he is following Busseil's leau even in thinking against Busseil. That,
inueeu, is a fitting way to chaiacteiize the uepth of Busseil's influence ovei
Neileau-Ponty, if by a ciicuitous ioute. Beigo inteiestingly calls this influence into
question ovei the issue of Busseil's late text /,D$5,+>C +>" @,)#(=, a text that has

29S
See foi example: Neileau-Ponty, Nauiice. *$)+,#I J3+,%# *3)#% D,3A )5# J3==PC# "# Q,$>4#.
Compileu anu with notes fiom Bominique Sglaiu. Ti. Robei valliei. Noithwestein 0niveisity Piess:
Evanston, Illinois, 2uuS (p. 79)
296
0ne instance of Neileau-Ponty's position comes at the conclusion of a long assessment of
Busseil's thinking in PS: "0iiginally a pioject to gain intellectual possession of the woilu, constitution
becomes incieasingly, as Busseil's thought matuies, the means of unveiling a back siue of things that
we have not yet constituteu." (PS 18u)
140
been shown to have many paiallels with (oi anticipations of) Neileau-Ponty's
wiitings. But because Neileau-Ponty was not awaie of the text's existence, Beigo
concluues that the coinciuence says moie about Neileau-Ponty's inuepenuent tiain
of thought than Busseil's (>D=+#>4# on Neileau-Ponty. Bowevei, a thiiu option
seems to be that Neileau-Ponty was at some point "keyeu in" to a ceitain logic of
Busseil's thoughts, anu so coulu anticipate many of the things Busseil might have
saiu, without having actually hau acquaintance with them. I am not suie Beigo has
convincingly foiecloseu this possibility.

/7 J3>4=+"(>C :53+C5)%
Notwithstanuing its many twists anu folus, the Neileau-PontyBusseil
uebate's uominant unueicuiient is something like whethei Neileau-Ponty shoulu
be unueistoou as a "thing apait" fiom Busseil oi somehow a continuation, even a
meie echo, of the lattei. 0ne of Beigo's intiiguing iueas, uiawn fiom some accounts
of Lefoit, is that Neileau-Ponty is a peculiai soit of ieauei of philosopheis geneially,
one whose appiopiiation of otheis on uistinctly Neileau-Pontian teims is so
seamless as to make one believe that the souice authoi "ieally meant," all along,
what Neileau-Ponty says they meant. (Beigo, 1S8-9) 0f couise this might be saiu of
many philosopheis; I am suie, foi example, that Aiistotle's stuuents weie convinceu
by his tenuentious tieatment of the pie-sociatics. But I think the claim is that
Neileau-Ponty is paiticulaily effective in effacing 5(A%#=D fiom the equation, almost
in teims of a soit of "appiopiiation by stealth"as opposeu to an oveit Aiistotelian-
Begelian teleologism ("all of this leaus to AF theoiy.") An image that is biought to
141
minu is one of a planet (Neileau-Ponty) whose pull biings philosopheis (Begel,
Beiueggei, Beigson, Schelling, Schelei, Naix, etc.) anu non-philosopheis (0exkll,
Pioust, Fieuu, Czanne, valiy, etc.) alike into its oibit, ievealing them to be (oi
benuing them to become) just so many compliant moons. All of this may be tiue in
the case of the figuies just listeu, but it is not tiue, I woulu insist, with iespect to
O+%%#,=. It woulu go too fai to say Busseil is to Neileau-Ponty what a %)$, is to this
2=$>#), so peihaps a moie fitting image is that of the twin stais of the binaiy Siiius
stai system, woiking in tanuem to piouuce a potent luminosity in the night sky.

!!!+ M-$4-0'P,%"#6=. <'..-$4)0" ,2-"%5-"%4%?6; B6 >-N#

07 !>),3"+4)(3>
I woulu like to begin this section with a (seconu) epigiaph of soits, an eaily
(1947) quotation fiom Neileau-Ponty which sets the stage foi the iest of his
(piematuiely cuitaileu) philosophical caieei.

"When philosopheis wish to place ieason above the vicissituues of histoiy they cannot puiely anu
simply foiget what psychology, sociology, ethnogiaphy, histoiy, anu psychiatiy have taught us about
the conuitioning of human behavioi. It woulu be a veiy iomantic way of showing one's love foi
ieason to base its ieign on the uisavowal of acquiieu knowleuge. What can be valiuly uemanueu is
that man nevei be submitteu to the fate of an exteinal natuie oi histoiy anu stiippeu of his
consciousness."
297

297
See: "The Piimacy of Peiception anu Its Philosophical Consequences." (Ti. }ames Euie) In
"Peiception," p. 24. This was a talk (anu ensuing uiscussion) oiiginally iecoiueu in 1947, shoitly aftei
the publication of PP. Beieaftei "Piimacy."
142
In a ceitain way, this passage conveys the essence of Neileau-Ponty's philosophy of
man
298
: the enigmatic nexus of the innei life of consciousness anu the outei being of
Natuie, the ambiguous miuule-space in which human existence unfolus anu
(paitially) finus itself. In Neileau-Ponty's view, Busseil saw the same enigma, anu
incieasingly came to see that it coulu not be solveu thiough an appeal to "absolute
consciousness," a ieflective-constitutive "possession" of the woilu,
299
any moie than
it coulu be solveu by scientific natuialism anu its ueteiministic laws. Bence the
"existential" thiust of Neileau-Pontian phenomenology anu the peisistent Neileau-
Pontian claim that Busseil himself enteis "existentialism" in the thiiu, "life-woilu"-
themeu phase of his philosophy. But how uoes Neileau-Ponty get all of this fiom
Busseil, anu how uoes he pailay it into a new vision of "human ieality".
The cuiient section is one of two that ieconstiuct Neileau-Ponty's
philosophy as a "Busseilian" phenomenology. Because Neileau-Ponty geneially
wiites 2(#4#% anu not 2(#4#A#$= (a ieflection of his laigely becoming an essayist
between PP anu ;!), it is impoitant to examine this mateiial )#[) by )#[); but at the
same time, this appioach tenus to occluue the genuinely systematic way he engages
with the piincipal themes of Busseil's phenomenology, such as the two ieuuctions. I
have thus tiieu to combine both appioachestextual-histoiical anu thematic-
systematicby oiganizing the seconu section aiounu the same mateiial uiscusseu

298
Beie as elsewheie, I use "man" insteau of "humanity" only in oiuei to ieflect the style of the
souice authoi. I uo of couise use the lattei teim wheievei I am iepiesenting my own views alone.
299
"0iiginally a pioject to gain intellectual possession of the woilu, constitution becomes
incieasingly, as Busseil's thought matuies, the means of unveiling a back siue of things that we have
not yet constituteu." (PS 18u) See also Neileau-Ponty's waining in the same essay: "To think is not to
possess the objects of thought; it is to use them to maik out a iealm to think about which we
theiefoie aie not yet thinking about." (PS 16u)
143
in the fiist, only now by theme. Biffeient things become appaient thiough each
appioach.
Suu

E7 O+%%#,= (> 99
PP is uominateu by the pieoccupations anu methouological innovations of
phenomenology. Anu Neileau-Ponty makes it cleai in his famous "Pieface" that it is
Busseil's veision of phenomenology that he has chiefly in view.
Su1
Nost if not all of
the majoi issues in the BusseilNeileau-Ponty nexus, anu Neileau-Ponty's mannei
of inteipieting Busseil, aie piesent in at least geiminal foim in the shoit but
piegnant "Pieface." Neileau-Ponty enumeiates the thiee majoi themes of
Busseilian phenomenologythe phenomenological ieuuction, eiuetic ieuuction,
intentionalityanu, one by one, enuoises anu iepackages them in "existential"
teims. Thus we leain that the phenomenological ieuuction in fact "belongs to
existentialist philosophy."
Su2

Suu
In teims of texts, I will uiaw piimaiily on the "Pieface" to PP, the essays PS anu "Phenomenology
anu the Buman Sciences" (In :5# 9,(A$4F 3D 9#,4#2)(3>. Eu. }ohn Wilu. Evanston: Noithwestein
0niveisity Piess, 1964; heieaftei "PSN"), anu ;!. (Note: I will be citing fiom the 2$2#,<$4H euition of
the Smith tianslation of PP; amazingly, page numbeis of the haiucovei anu papeiback euitions foi
the most pait uo not align.)
Su1
Aftei all, he explicitly ielegates E#(>C $>" :(A# (Beiueggei being the othei majoi
phenomenological alteinative to Busseil, excepting Saitie, who himself appiopiiates Busseil anu
Beiueggei) to the status of a uetaileu uevelopment of Busseil's own philosophy. This stateu
piefeience foi Busseil ovei Beiueggei (anu Schelei) is iepeateu elsewheie, foi example, in PSN:
"Busseil, who uefineu philosophy as the suspension of oui affiimation of the woilu, iecognizeu the
actual being of the philosophei in the woilu much moie cleaily than Beiueggei, who uevoteu himself
to the stuuy of being in the woilu." (PSN, 94) Neileau-Ponty calls Beiueggei "uogmatic" in the same
passage. This attituue towaius Beiueggei suggests that Neileau-Ponty is, in a way, "taking Beiueggei
back" foi Busseil. Thus when Neileau-Ponty uses a teim like "being-in-the-woilu" oi "facticity" in
the "Pieface," it is always, iionically, to the benefit of Busseil. Against those who woulu aigue foi an
equal Busseil anu Beiueggei (at least the Beiueggei of E#(>C $>" :(A#) influence on the thinkei, I
think these inuications help uispel that impiession, though theie is aumitteuly much ioom foi uebate
on the mattei.
Su2
Lest we imagine this to be a veileu attack on Busseil, we neeu only consult a latei footnote latei in
which Neileau-Ponty uefines Busseil himself as "existentialist"in his last oi "thiiu" peiiou of
144
0n what basis uoes Neileau-Ponty aigue foi a specifically #[(%)#>)($=(%)
unueistanuing of phenomenology. In a footnote (one of many with ievealing
iemaiks about Busseil) latei in the book, Neileau-Ponty explains the link as
follows:

"Busseil's oiiginality lies beyonu his notion of intentionality; it is to be founu in the elaboiation of
this notion anu the uiscoveiy, beneath the intentionality of iepiesentations, of a ueepei
intentionality, which otheis have calleu existence." (PP 141n)

This "ueepei intentionality" is of couise what Neileau-Ponty vaiiously calls "motoi
intentionality" oi "opeiative intentionality," the spontaneous, pie-conscious (oi
"anonymous"anothei Busseilian woiu) intentionality of the bouy oiienteu
towaius its enviionment. Busseil himself hau a gieat ueal to say about such
"opeiative intentionality"it is in fact his iuea. Thus Neileau-Ponty isunuei this
meaning of "existence"meiely emphasizing a ceitain line of Busseilian
investigation.
0ne of the consistent themes of Neileau-Ponty's thinkingit is, in fact, one
of the funuamental piemises of his geneial philosophical outlookis his opposition
to "iuealism." The ieasonoi one of themis that of the "opacity" of the woilu to
consciousness. Iuealisms (speaking now especially of the "tianscenuental" iathei
than "phenomenalist" soit) manage to ienuei consciousness "tianspaient" to the

philosophizing, that is. Inueeu, this "tiipaitite" uivision of Busseil's thought becomes, as we have
alieauy seen, a iegulai motif in Neileau-Ponty's Busseil-inteipietation. Foi as in PP, in PSN Neileau-
Ponty singles out foi theii impoitance Busseil's "last ten yeais" (PSN 46), though he also claims that
"fiom the beginning to the enu of his caieei, Busseil tiieu to uiscovei a way between logicism anu
psychologism" (PSN 48)that is, between stiict logical necessity anu the puie contingency of facts.
Thus it is useful to note that alieauy in the "Pieface" Neileau-Ponty makes iefeience to Busseil as a
contiauictoiy philosophei. (PP viii)
145
woilu.
SuS
Neileau-Ponty's opposition to "iuealism" is theiefoie cleai, but whose
"iuealism" he is iefeiiing toKant's oi Busseil's, foi exampleis not. Theie aie
some who take it to be motivateu against Busseil
Su4
, but A. B. Smith, to take an
excellent iecent example, shows convincingly that it is only a Kantian (oi Neo-
Kantian) kinu of iuealismwhich Neileau-Ponty taigets iepeateuly thioughout PP
as the quintessential foim of "intellectualism"that thieatens to imply this kinu of
tianspaiency, namely by builuing it into peiception as a conuition of any soit of
expeiience at all.
SuS
Busseil's opposition to Kantian "humanist" constiuctivism in
fact paves the way foi Neileau-Ponty's own appieciation of peiception as an
"openness" to the woilu. (PP xix) We aie open to the woilu, but it is not encloseu
within us oi pie-fitteu to oui categoiial thought. This is exactly why the
ueteimination of the woilu thiough essences is always fiaught with peiil anu shot
thiough with contingency.
Su6
But it is also why Busseil's ietuin to the "things
themselves" is so impoitant anu ievolutionaiy.

SuS
".a logically consistent tianscenuental iuealism iius the woilu of its opacity anu its
tianscenuence." (PP xiii)
Su4
See, foi example, Beigo, 162: "It seems faii to concluue that Neileau-Ponty set about to cleai any
iuealist iesiuue fiom the path of the latei Busseil, anu, in so uoing, pusheu numeious concepts of his
own." Is this soit of chaiacteiization iight. I, at least, ceitainly uon"t ieau Neileau-Ponty as having
'set about' to ie-inteipiet Busseil; on my ieauing, he simply set about to philosophize, anu Busseil
gave this philosophizing its shape anu textuie.
SuS
Smith, A. B. "The Flesh of Peiception: Neileau-Ponty anu Busseil." In N#$"(>C K#,=#$+L93>)FI V>
95#>3A#>3=3CF 3D 9#,4#2)(3>. Eu. Thomas Baluwin. New Yoik: Routleuge, 2uu7 (pp. 1u-11)
Su6
Neileau-Ponty's stiong emphasis on "opacity" anu "contingency" uoes, of couise, expose him to
the uangeis of skepticism anu ielativism, both of which he confionts as necessaiy thieats to face. Be
siues with the skeptics like Bume anu Nontaigne up to a pointaiguing that they aie neveitheless
"too timiu in the ietuin to the positive aspect aftei theii skeptical ciiticisms." (Piimacy, 29) Be
auuiesses the challenge of ielativism anu the thieat of scientism exhaustively in PSN, which we will
come to below. (We might wish to keep in minu that the same "soft ielativism" that emeiges in
Neileau-Ponty may have begun to cieep into Busseil alieauy in the lattei's investigation into the
multiplicity of histoiical anu cultuial "life-woilus"the Zulu, etc.)
146
As a geneial iule, most of Neileau-Ponty's ueclaiations in the "Pieface" can
be seen to be in conflict with many featuies of, say, the Busseil of !"#$% !, though
much less so with the "genetic phenomenology" of Busseil's latei peiiou. Take, foi
example, Neileau-Ponty's statement that phenomenology is a "phenomenology of
oiigins," oi that it captuies meaning "as it comes into being." (PP xxiv) This is
nothing but Busseil's "1(>>C#>#%(%," as Neileau-Ponty himself ackowleuges. (PP xxi)
Anu while it is haiu to see Busseil saying "the woilu is not what I think, it is what I
live thiough" (PP xix) using just these woius, what uoes come to minu is Busseil's
intensive latei investigations into "passive synthesis"the pie-thetic constitution of
the woilu. That is, I "live thiough" the woilu even as I constitute it because I
constitute it "anonymously," much in the way I so oiient myself to the woilu
thiough "bouily intentionality."

J7 O+%%#,= (> K#,=#$+L93>)FM% U$)#, g3,H
It is only appiopiiate to begin heie with PS, which chionicles the lasting
philosophical significance of Busseil (anu his "shauow"). By itself it uemonstiates
much of what I am tiying to show in this chaptei, namely the insepaiability of
Neileau-Ponty's philosophical contiibution anu his ieauingappiopiiation of
Busseil.
The piece begins with some ciucial iemaiks on Neileau-Ponty's own
heimeneutical appioach to past philosopheis like Busseil, some of which have been
citeu alieauy above. Neileau-Ponty wains against oui being seuuceu into "ieuucing"
a philosophei stiictly to what he saiuto what is "objectively ceitifieu" of him.
147
Neileau-Ponty's "miuule way" in this paiticulai case is between "objectivism," on
the one hanu, anu puie aibitiaiiness, on the othei. Thus: an "objective" histoiy of
philosophy woulu "iob" gieat philosopheis of "what they have given otheis to think
about." Yet neithei shoulu we engage in "meuitation uisguiseu as a uialogue." Be
points out (as we inuicateu above) that it is a false uilemma to claim that
inteipietations of otheis' woik leaus eithei to "inevitable uistoition" oi "liteial
iepiouuction."
Su7

Neileau-Ponty then quotes favoiably fiom Beiueggei on the "unthought-of"
elements in philosopheis' woiks; in Busseil theie is an "unthought-of element in his
woiks which is B53==F 5(% anu yet opens up onto %3A#)5(>C #=%#." (PS 16u, my italics)
Note the paiauoxical "is wholly his" anu "onto something else." Neileau-Ponty is
tiacing out Busseil's own piocess of self-tianscenuenceanu theieby making
manifest what is latent, but of couise the full "manifestation" tuins out to be (moie
immanent in) the texts of K#,=#$+L93>)F. The bounuaiies of "self" anu "othei" aie
poious inueeu. The "unthought-of" in Busseil is theieby given voice in Neileau-
Ponty, but it is impoitant to iealize that theie is no cleai uiviuing line between
"unthought-of" anu "thought-of" in this, oi peihaps in any othei, case. Thus in
Busseil, existential phenomenology is half-thought, oi somewhat-thought, while in
Neileau-Ponty it is moie-fully-thought oi ie-thought.
Su8

Su7
PS 1S9-161. Both of these positions have the common piemise of "positivism"heie, anothei
woiu foi "objectivism"accoiuing to which, I take him to mean, theie is some fully ueteiminate anu
finisheu text befoie us, which we may eithei uuplicate oi uistoit, but nothing in between.
Su8
Reauing Neileau-Ponty on the "unthought," Beigo echoes the common view when she states that
"the question of Neileau-Ponty's ieauing. is a question of finuing the latencies in the text anu
ueveloping them such that they appeai to biing to light an unthought uimension." (Beigo 1S8-9)
Taken on its own, this is too simplistic. This becomes eviuent when one obseives the sheei volume of
148
As we have seen alieauy, Neileau-Ponty consistently maintaineu the belief
that Busseil evolveu ovei time into the "existential" Busseil of the "life-woilu"
philosophy. In iefeience to Busseil's iuea of the life-woilu Neileau-Ponty uiges:

"These late analyses aie neithei scanualous noi even uistuibing if we iemembei eveiything which
foietolu them fiom the stait. They make explicit that 'woilu's thesis' piioi to eveiy thesis anu theoiy,
this siue of unueistanuing's objectifications, which Busseil has always spoken of, anu which has
simply become in his eyes oui sole iecouise in the impasse into which these objectifications have leu
Westein knowleuge." (PS 18u)

Be knows that Busseil woulu piotest. Bence, latei on, we encountei this ievealing
phiaseology: "Willy-nilly, $C$(>%) 5(% 2=$>% $>" $443,"(>C )3 5(% #%%#>)($= $+"$4()F,
Busseil awakens a wilu-floweiing woilu anu minu." (PS 188-9, my italics) Busseil's
latei thoughtveiy much builuing on the eailieisuggests a new uiiection without
necessaiily fully taking it. Neileau-Ponty ievels in showing thiough libeial
quotations that in !"#$% !!, Busseil fieely giants ontological piioiity to mateiial
Natuie ovei Spiiit in one bieath, even as he piioiitizes tianscenuental
consciousness in anothei. (PS 164-S, 171) Fiom these anu othei hints he concluues
that: "Busseil's thought is as much attiacteu by the haecceity of Natuie as by the
voitex of absolute consciousness." (PS 16S) Neileau-Ponty then stiesses the mutual
"encioachment" (PS 176) anu iecipiocal Q+>"(#,+>C (PS 17S, 176-7) of uiffeient
oiueis of being, sensible anu iueal,
Su9
citing Busseil's own woius again to seal the
case. (PS 177)

quotations Neileau-Ponty uses in a way that employs theii liteial anu oveit meaning. 0ne is tempteu
to say that so many of Busseil's "latencies" manifest )5#A%#=?#% quite well!
Su9
It woulu of couise take a uetaileu stuuy of !"#$% !! (as unueitaken in Chaptei 2) to confiim
Neileau-Ponty's ieauing of it; but even a noteu Busseil scholai like Steven ualt Ciowell conceues
that theie is at least the appeaiance of this soit of paiauox in the text: "In the couise of his attempt to
149
PSN, an essay fiom 1961, offeis a moie piosaic but also thoioughly
ievelatoiy assessment of Busseilian thought anu his own self-ciicumsciiption
within its beith. It iepiesents the thinkei's matuie conclusions on one of the majoi
themes of phenomenology since its inception, namely its piecise ielation (oi non-
ielation, as the case may be) to the sciencesboth natuial anu "human."
S1u
It is
piimaiily psychology that Neileau-Ponty is conceineu with, not suipiisingly (given
his long engagement with uestalt psychology in paiticulai). The cential pioblematic
heie is the "paiauox" of essence anu fact. The essay is paiticulaily illuminating
because of the way it uemonstiates Neileau-Ponty's stiategy of stiiking a "miuule
way"thiough, anu not uespite Busseilbetween histoiicism anu ielativism, on
the one hanu, anu essentialism (anu, implicitly, ueteiminism), on the othei. What
Neileau-Ponty wants to maintain, anu claims that Busseil himself achieves even if
belateuly, is tiuth in the miust of inueteiminacy, essence within existence, anu,
stiikingly, "eteinity" along with "contingency." (PSN 92) In all of this, he views the
human sciences sympathetically (anu in fact all sciencestheie is no cleai
sepaiation maue heie between natuial anu human sciences ontologically speaking,
even if theii methouologies uiffei). The ieason foi this sympathetic view is that

ueteimine the iuea of natuie in !"#$% !!, Busseil encounteis an appaient "vicious ciicle". Aie
peisons "components of natuie," then, "suboiuinateu" to it, oi uoes the veiy constitution of natuie
piesuppose the non-natuial iealm of spiiit." See: Ciowell, Steven ualt. "The Nythical anu the
Neaningless: Busseil anu the Two Faces of Natuie." In !%%+#% (> O+%%#,=M% !"#$% !!7 Eus. Thomas Nenon
anu Lestei Embiee. Boiuiecht: Kluwei Acauemic Publisheis, 1996 (p. 81).
S1u
By the "sciences of man" Neileau-Ponty has piimaiily psychology anu, to a lessei uegiee,
sociology anu ethology in minu. Anothei lectuie couise entitleu "Phenomenology anu Sociology"
focuses on some othei aspects of the same pioblem, this time emphasizing the namesake science,
though it uses much of the same language as PSN, anu is much shoitei. 0f couise, what is aiguably
most impoitant of all foi Neileau-Ponty is the ielation of philosophy to 5(%)3,F. But although we call
histoiy one of the "humanities" as opposeu to "social sciences," it is piecisely the empiiical,
contingent factoi of histoiicality that makes it akin to the human sciences in Neileau-Ponty's sense.
This is also why he tieats the thieat of "histoiicism" along with that of "ielativism" as he opens the
essay.
150
human sciences, in theii own way, aie uoing piecisely the same balancing act, albeit
without the self-ieflective anxiety that philosophy biings with it. It is in this sense
that Neileau-Ponty ueclaies that theie is no cleai uiviuing line between the two.
(PSN 72) 0nce again he seems to be at ouus with Busseil, who insists on the
sepaiateness of tianscenuental phenomenology fiom all sciences, but Neileau-
Ponty tells a uiffeient stoiy that ielies, as usual, heavily on "evolutionaiy
uevelopments" within Busseil himself. Neileau-Ponty sees a buigeoning
iecognition in Busseil of the "iecipiocal envelopment" of psychology anu
phenomenology but also, moie bioauly, fact anu essence. Thus he makes seveial
uetouis to chionicle the stoiy of Busseil's "piofounu uevelopment" away fiom
absolute essentialism, foi example with the case of language
S11
. (PSN 8u)
In PSN, what is key to note in all of this is not just what Neileau-Ponty says
but why he is saying it: he uiaws Busseil into his own fight against the natuialism of
psychology anu the empiiical sciences, invokes him to make his own caseinueeu,
to uefenu his own 25#>3A#>3=3C(4$= $22,3$45 to the questions at hanu. It is in this
light that we can appieciate Neileau-Ponty's uesciiption of phenomenology itself as
a negotiateu mean between skepticism anu absolutism. Neileau-Ponty uoes not so
much want to mouify the phenomenological methou as biing it into living contact
with the iest of the intellectual conveisation:

"Busseil is seeking to ieaffiim iationality at the level of expeiience, without saciificing the vast
vaiiety that it incluues anu accepting all the piocesses of conuitioning which psychology, sociology,
anu histoiy ieveal. It is a question of finuing a methou that will enable us to think at the same time of

S11
Thus foi the latei Busseil, aigues Neileau-Ponty, "Theie is no question any moie of constiucting a
logic of language, a univeisal giammai, but iathei of finuing a logic alieauy incoipoiateu in the
woilu." (PSN 82)
151
the exteinality which is the piinciple of the sciences of man anu of the inteinality which is the
conuition of philosophy." (PSN S2)

Busseil theieby finus the "ioots of ieason in oui expeiience" (PSN S2)just as
Neileau-Ponty, we might auu, finus his own ioots in Busseil.
;! is the haiuest of Neileau-Ponty's woiks to assess in teims of its
ielationship to Busseil. Paitly this is because the woik is unfinisheu, with explicit
iefeiences to Busseil lying in a laige numbei of "Woiking Notes" whose piopei
inteipietation is anything but cleai
S12
; but also because its iefeiences oi allusions to
Busseil aie by now so inteiwoven in Neileau-Ponty's philosophical imagination
that they come anu go veileu oi unannounceu. This is not the case entiiely: the last
page of the final famous chaptei "The Inteitwiningthe Chiasm," foi example, has
fulsome piaise foi the ueiman founuei.
S1S

Nonetheless, at least two of the chapteis, the fiist anu thiiu"Reflection anu
Inteiiogation" anu "Inteiiogation anu Intuition"can be ieau fiuitfully as ciitical
meuitations on Busseil. }ust as one coulu easily say that PS ueals piimaiily with the
phenomenological ieuuction anu PSN with the eiuetic, the same, I think, can be saiu
foi chapteis 1 anu S of the ;!, iespectively. 0nce again it becomes cleai, when one
sees it this way, just how systematic Neileau-Ponty's ieauing anu ie-ieauings of
Busseil tiuly aie. The substance of the ;! chapteis will be biought out thioughout
the following section.

S12
I have tiieu piesently to avoiu the use of the fiagmentaiy "Woiking Notes" that accompany these
chapteis uue to theii inueteiminate natuie. I have also stayeu away fiom the impoitant but slightly
ovei-exposeu (no pun intenueu) notion of "the flesh." Theie is luckily plenty of iemaining ielevant
mateiial foi the piesent task fiom the iest of the text.
S1S
"In a sense the whole of philosophy, as Busseil says, consists in iestoiing the powei to signify, a
biith of meaning, oi a wilu meaning, an expiession of expeiience by expeiience." (vI 1SS)
152

!F+ M-$4-0'P,%"#6=. <'..-$4)0" ,2-"%5-"%4%?6; B6 >2-5-

07 :5# 95#>3A#>3=3C(4$= N#"+4)(3>
It is a biomiue by now that theie is no issue moie impoitant in Busseil's
thought than the phenomenological ieuuction (anu #23456).
S14
So suspicions have
aiisen ovei Neileau-Ponty's having supposeuly cuitaileu oi compiomiseu the puiity
of the ieuuction, chiefly anu most famously in the "Pieface" of PP:

".we must bieak with oui familiai acceptance of it |the woiluj, anu also, fiom the fact that fiom this
bieak we can leain nothing but the unmotivateu upsuige of the woilu. The most impoitant lesson
which the ieuuction teaches us is the impossibility of a complete ieuuction." (PP xv)

But these famous oi infamous sentences uo not, in Neileau-Ponty's eyes, inuicate a
bieak fiom Busseil. They meiely stiess consciousness' ".uepenuence on an
unieflective life which is its initial situation." (PP xvi) Accoiuing to Neileau-Ponty,
again, Busseil alieauy thematizeu this life as the pioblem of the "life-woilu," having
stiesseu the piimacy of facticity anu existence ovei the once- oi twice-iemoveu
appioaches of, say, scientific empiiicism, on the one hanu, anu Kantian iuealism, on
the othei. The point of the passage is to ieveal the paiauoxicality of the ieuuction,
namely, the fact that it is only thiough an act of )3)$= 43AA()A#>) )3 ,#D=#4)(?# =(D#
that the (A23%%(<(=()F 3D %+45 $ 43AA()A#>) is ievealeu. In this way, the ieuuction

S14
Again foi this chaptei, as foi the iest of this uisseitation, I am not making a uistinction, as
Neileau-Ponty uiu not, between the "phenomenological" anu the "tianscenuental" ieuuctions, but
iathei am tieating them as one.
153
gives us ovei to oui existential selfhoou. Anu this is why the phenomenological
ieuuction "belongs to existentialist philosophy."
I uon't think we shoulu unueivalue the fact that Neileau-Ponty #>"3,%#% the
phenomenological ieuuction. Inueeu, he iegaius it as cential to his philosophy. It is,
aftei all, the ieuuction that biings us to the "natuial attituue" befoie "natuialism"
anu its <=3%%# 1$45#>. (PS 16S) It is what allows us to "slacken the intentional
thieaus which attach us to the woilu" evei too tightly to see ouiselves. (PP xv) Be
latei uesciibes the ieuuction in similai teims as "the link, which is inueeu a
schism|,j establisheu by life between oui thought anu oui physical anu social
situation," auuing that it neveitheless "nevei leaus us in any way to negate time oi
pass beyonu it into a iealm of puie logic oi puie thought." (PSN 49) In othei woius,
then, Neileau-Ponty accepts even the "schismatic" aspect of the ieuuction
S1S
, so
long as it is not taken to maik a total uepaituie fiom the finituue of liveu hoiizons.
Neileau-Ponty's ieuuction consists in two movements: the movement "out
of" natuiethat is, the moment in which one bieaks out of one's "natuial"
conuition, the passive slumbei of eveiyuay life; anu the movement back into it, that
is, to a iecognition of one's finituue.
S16
Initially, thiough biacketing anu the shift
fiom the natuial attituue to the tianscenuental attituue, I "see" oi "gain possession
of myself"; ieflection shaipens my consciousness anu biings it into %#=D-

S1S
Inueeu, Neileau-Ponty insists elsewheie that "the sensible oiuei is <#(>C $) $ "(%)$>4#" (PS 167-8)
in oiuei to stiess the futility of teleological accounts of the woilu that binu the "innei" anu the
"outei" by a seciet "aim."
S16
0ne might call this a "ciicle of finituue" which, moieovei, beais obvious anu open affinities with
aspects of Begelian thought.
154
consciousness. But the self is not apait fiom natuie; in some way it cannot account
foi itself, it belongs to natuie even as it (appaiently) tianscenus it.
The seconu pait of this movement is what Neileau-Ponty thinks must be
ieasseiteu against ceitain tienusanu not just those of "tianscenuental Busseil":

".the essential uiffeience between my point of view anu that of a philosophy of unueistanuing is
that, in my view, even though consciousness is able to uetach itself fiom things to see itself, human
consciousness nevei possesses itself in complete uetachment anu uoes not iecovei itself at the level
of cultuie except by iecapitulating the expiessive, uisciete, anu contingent opeiations by means of
which philosophical questioning itself has become possible." (Piimacy 4u)

Closely tieu up with the phenomenological ieuuction is the uialectic of the
"natuial attituue" anu the "tianscenuental attituue." Neileau-Ponty's unueistanuing
of these attituues pieseives elements of both continuity anu uiscontinuity between
them, in keeping with the paiauoxical natuie of the ieuuction.
S17
0n the one hanu,
the ieuuction takes us beyonu natuial attituue, but this is only "half the tiuth." (PS
162) Neileau-Ponty's consiueieu juugment is that "It is the natuial attituue which,
by ieiteiating its own pioceuuies, seesaws in phenomenology. It is the natuial
attituue itself which goes beyonu itself in phenomenologyanu so it uoes not go
beyonu itself." (PS 164) The tianscenuental attituue is not abanuoneu oi ueclaieu
nonsense; but one attituue uoes not ielate to the othei as "false" to "tiue."
S18
In the

S17
Neileau-Ponty, Nauiice. :5#A#% D,3A )5# U#4)+,#% $) )5# J3==PC# "# Q,$>4# XZt\LXZuq. Ti. }ohn
0"Neill. Noithwestein 0niveisity Piess: Evanston, Illinois, 197u. (p. 1u8) Beieaftei "Themes."
Neileau-Ponty appiovingly speaks of the moment when "philosophy becomes the enteipiise of
uesciibing living paiauoxes."
S18
It is inteiesting in this iegaiu to note that Busseil hau alieauy been wiitingpiivatelyof ".#,
a),$>%`#>"#>)$=# !"#$=(%A+%b $=% 1F>)5#%(% ?3> >$)v,=(45#, +>" ),$>%`#>"#>)$=#, /(>%)#==+>C."
(Busseil's emphasis) See: Busseil, Eumunu. O+%%#,=($>$ SSS!;I p+, 95l>3A#>3=3C(%45#> N#"+H)(3>
R:#[)# $+% "#A *$45=$%% XZ\uLXZktT. Eu. Sebastian Luft. Boiuiecht: Kluwei, 2uu2, p. 1S (Beieaftei
"Busseil")
155
enu, we must embiace the "contiauictoiy chaiacteiistics"which, says Neileau-
Ponty, Busseil himself puiposefully assigns itof the ieuuction. (PS 161)
It is tiue that Neileau-Ponty cannot accept some of what Busseil iegaius to
be the consequences of the ieuuction, such as the piivilegeu peich of "absolute"
(ieflective) consciousness.
S19
Aftei all, the "incompleteness" of the ieuuction also
means the limiteuness, in that sense, of ieflective thought. But in ieauing the latei
Neileau-Ponty in paiticulai, it becomes incieasingly cleai to one that he has
essentially folueu the tianscenuental attituue, the stanu-point of 25#>3A#>3=3C(4$=
consciousness, onto that of self-consciousness oi "ieflection" as such. This is neithei
meie semantic sloppiness noi an obvious tiansgiession against Busseil himself. It is
a consequence of his iejection of the stiong uivision between psychology anu
philosophy, manifest thioughout PSN, foi example; ieflection is not meiely a
"natuialistic" psychic act, to be shaiply uelineateu fiom the heioic heights of the
tianscenuental ieuuction. uiven this ie-oiientation, Neileau-Ponty's attacks in ;! on
the "philosophy of ieflection," as he calls it (;! 4S), appeai to be uiiecteu not at
Busseil as such but at a kinu of iuealism that Busseil sometimes affiims, but which
stems moie oiiginally fiom Kant.
At fiist, this is aumitteuly not obvious. Take the following passages:

"A philosophy of ieflection, as methouic uoubt anu as ieuuction of the openness upon the woilu to
'spiiitual acts,' to intiinsic ielations between the iuea anu ()% iueate, is thiice untiue to what it means
to eluciuate: untiue to the visible woilu, to him who sees it, anu to his ielations with the othei
'visionaiies.'" (;! S9)

anu again:

S19
Neileau-Ponty ciitiques the annihilation of the woilu expeiiment (see, foi example, PS 17S-4) but
otheiwise gives even the uesciiption of the ieuuction in !"#$% ! a waim ieception. (See PSN S6)
156

".let us iepeat that we iepioach the philosophy of ieflection not only foi tiansfoiming the woilu
into a noema, but also foi uistoiting the being of the ieflecting 'subject' by conceiving it as 'thought'
anu finally foi ienueiing unthinkable its ielations with othei 'subjects' in the woilu that is common
to them." (;! 4S)

It may seem now that Neileau-Ponty, aftei yeais of "face-saving" aciobatics, is now
"finally" jettisoning Busseil foi goou. But the fact is that none of Neileau-Ponty's
ciiticisms heie aie new. Neileau-Ponty has alieauy iejecteu tianscenuental
iuealism in PP, with its assumptions of the "tianspaiency" of the woilu to ieflective
thought.
S2u
Inueeu, the ghost of the "Pieface" haunts this chaptei of the ;! in moie
ways than this: "It is essential to the ieflective analysis that it stait fiom a "# D$4)3
situation" (;! 44) anu "The seaich foi the conuitions of possibility is in piinciple
posteiioi to actual expeiience." (;! 4S) aie nothing moie than iestatements of the
"existential" tuin taken in PP anu alieauy uiscusseu above.
But a caieful ieauing of this chaptei ieveals that Neileau-Ponty's ieal taiget
is Kantian constiuctivism, which he gives cieuit to O+%%#,= foi pieicing thiough:

"This is what Busseil biought fiankly into the open. that is: eveiy effoit to compiehenu the
spectacle of the woilu fiom within anu fiom the souices uemanus that we uetach ouiselves fiom the
effective unfoluing of oui peiceptions anu fiom oui peiception of the woilu, that we cease being one
with the conciete flux of oui life in oiuei to ietiace the total beaiing anu piincipal aiticulations of the
woilu upon which it opens." (;! 4S)

Inueeu, Neileau-Ponty is not so much against "ieflection" (oi the tianscenuental
attituue) as he is against a ceitain philosophy 3D ieflection which effectively excises
all consiueiation foi the iole of the "pie-ieflective" in epistemological life. This is the

S2u
"A logically consistent tianscenuental iuealism iius the woilu of its opacity anu its
tianscenuence." (PP xiii)
157
heait of his opposition to Kant anu, inueeu, the Kantian inflections of Busseil's own
self-styleu "tianscenuental" phenomenology.
S21
A philosophy of ieflection by itself

".leaves untoucheu the twofolu pioblem of the genesis of the existent woilu anu of the genesis of the
iuealization peifoimeu by ieflection anu finally evokes anu iequiies as its founuation a 5F2#,L
,#D=#4)(3> wheie the ultimate pioblems woulu be taken seiiously." (;! 46)

This, in effect, is Neileau-Ponty's iuentification of the "limits of phenomenology"
anu a fulfilment of his piomise to make of phenomenology a "phenomenology of
phenomenology."
S22
But because the "founuation" Neileau-Ponty iefeis to is in fact
=#%% ueteiminate than ieflection, anu moie of an exploiation of its nevei-fully-
iecoveiable unuei-siue, it is not a ieplacement of what is pioviueu by the
"existential Busseil" but is in fact meiely a fuithei uevelopment of it. Neileau-
Ponty's uisagieement is with "puie coiielation" of "subject anu object," at least in an
iuealistic oi quasi-iuealistic constiuction (;! 47), anu again with the notion of a
"univeisal minu" (;! 49). But he sees Busseil as on the path of questioning these: "In
iecognizing that eveiy ieflection is eiuetic anu, as such, leaves untoucheu the
pioblem of oui unieflecteu being anu that of the woilu, Busseil. agiees to take up
the pioblem which the ieflective attituue
S2S
oiuinaiily avoiusthe uiscoiuance
between its initial situation anu its enus." (;! 46; compaie: PS 16S anu 179)

S21
Neileau-Ponty announces his position cleaily alieauy in the "Pieface" of PP: "Bescaites anu
paiticulaily Kant "#)$45#" the subject, oi consciousness, by showing that I coulu not possibly
appiehenu anything as existing unless I fiist of all expeiienceu myself as existing in the act of
appiehenuing it." (PP x) Neileau-Ponty calls )5(% the "iuealist ietuin to consciousness" which he
expiessly uisavows. See also: "Busseil's tianscenuental is not Kant's." (PP xv) It is of couise the
Kant of the fiist "Ciitique" that Neileau-Ponty has in minu in such iemaiks. Be is fai moie
sympathetic anu even inuebteu to the thiiu "Ciitique."
S22
Busseil's phiase, in fact. See Busseil, p. 176
S2S
Note the teiminology"ieflective" foi "tianscenuental."
158
Neileau-Ponty finally comes to the iueaby way of Schelling, it woulu
seem
S24
that philosophy as "ieflection" must ultimately give way to a thinking of
the iich miuule between the knowable anu the unknowable, the iueal woilu of
thought anu the ieal woilu of "wilu being." Foi this is the spiing of human spiiit, the
soil of the self. Remaiks Toauvine, "This state of continual beginning, of the neeu foi
continual ieexamination of the paiauoxical founuations of a ieflection that attempts
to giasp its own unieflective oiigins, coulu be consiueieu the oiienting theme of
Neileau-Ponty's own phenomenological methou." (Toauvine 24u) It can scaicely be
misseu that this soit of methou conveiges with Neileau-Ponty's own "ie-
examination" of Busseil, the oiigin of phenomenology itself, anu the (at least
hitheito) "un-ieflecteu."

E7 /%%#>4#% $>" )5# /("#)(4 N#"+4)(3>
Commentatois aie uiviueu ovei whethei Neileau-Ponty accepts the eiuetic
ieuuction, but the eviuence is plain that he was ueeply pieoccupieu by the
Busseilian notion of "essences" fiom fiist to last. It is tiue that he has little patience
foi the intuitionist iesonances of Busseil's g#%#>%45$+, which he heie calls a "myth"
(;! 11S-6) anu theie ieuesciibes as the "emeigence of tiuth in anu thiough the
psychological event." (PSN SS) What becomes cleai is that Neileau-Ponty is seeking
a miuule way between essentialism anu nominalism, anu he thinks Busseil, in the

S24
Schelling is uiscusseu in uetail in Neileau-Ponty's lectuies on "Natuie." (*$)+,#I J3+,%# *3)#% D,3A
)5# J3==PC# "# Q,$>4#. Compileu anu with notes fiom Bominique Sglaiu. Ti. Robeit valliei.
Noithwestein 0niveisity Piess: Evanston, Illinois, 2uuS, esp. pp. S6-S2) Foi an excellent tieatment of
Schelling's iole in Neileau-Ponty's latei philosophy see: Patiick Buike, "Cieativity anu the
0nconscious in Neileau-Ponty anu Schelling." In 145#==(>C *3BI J3>)#A23,$,F N#$"(>C%, eu. }ason N.
Wiith. Inuianapolis: Inuiana 0niveisity Piess, 2uuS
159
enu, was uoing exactly the same. This is why he cites the Busseilian uistinction
between "exact" anu "moiphological" essences (PSN 67), the unlikeness of
mathematics to phenomenology (PSN 67), Busseil's own stiict paiallelism between
the iealms of the eiuetic anu the empiiical anu a ianuom passage to this effect in
"Bie Philosophie als stienge Wissenschaft," (PSN 72) anu so on. Fuitheimoie:
"|Busseil'sj notion of an expeiienceu essence, oi an eiuetic expeiience, contains in
geim the consequences I have just uiawn fiom it." (PSN 72)
What Neileau-Ponty is communicating is a shift he sees in Busseil fiom a
puie philosophy of ieflectionan oiientation towaius the logical, theoietical,
tianscenuental, eiueticto a philosophy of existence (> B5(45G we finu out,
ieflection plays a ciucial but non-founuational
S2S
iole. It is in this light that Neileau-
Ponty unueistanus both the phenomenological anu eiuetic ieuuctions. To take the
lattei fiist, Neileau-Ponty explains that phenomenology is about not only "essences"
but also "facticity." This follows fiom phenomenology's being about "achieving
uiiect anu piimitive contact with the woilu." (PP vii) Iueality is now chaiacteiizeu in
puiely instiumental teims: the eiuetic ieuuction "pievail|sj ovei facticity" thiough
iueality, though the "pievailing" is foi the sake not of iueality but iathei foi a
giasping of the things themselvesthe "fish" that aie caught in the "fisheiman's
net." Suiely Neileau-Ponty is iight that we uo not ieach the )5(>C% by uwelling only
in #%%#>4#%. We may not ieach the things as completely as we wish, but theie is
something between absolute knowleuge anu total ignoiance. In this iespect it is

S2S
In a stiictly ontological sense, that isieflection is still foi Neileau-Ponty the founuation of the
activity of philosophy, since "unieflective expeiience is known to us only thiough ieflection." (PP
49) It is this soit of insight that sets the stage foi the latei notion of "hypei-ieflection."
160
helpful to iemembei that Busseil himself embiaceu a veision of the teim
"empiiicist," which must have meant that he piivileges facts ovei essences, but was
vaguely awaie of the fact that ieflection can only know essenceshence
engenueiing the most enuuiing epistemological paiauox of Neileau-Ponty's
meuitations.
S26

}ust what aie essences. Essences aie the mannei anu style of being only: the
13%#(> anu not the 1#(>. Anu just as theie is an essential "incompleteness" with
iespect to the phenomenological ieuuction, so theie is a limit also on imaginative
vaiiationthus theie is no puie #("3%, no "total vaiiation." Fuitheimoie, eiuetic
vaiiation is not just uone in phenomenology, but in all sciences. In one place
Neileau-Ponty aumits: "In piesenting the mattei as I have, I am pushing Busseil
fuithei than he wisheu to go himself." (PSN 72) Neileau-Ponty wants to aumit of a
"funuamental homogeneity" of the "inuuctive anu essential" moues of knowleuge,
which Busseil always maintaineu was impossible. But Busseil's own thinking,
incluuing his focus on the conciete anu liveu stieam of life, foices on us an
"inevitable uialectic of the concept of essence."
All of this allows Neileau-Ponty finally to say:

".we can say that the pioblem with which we weie conceineu at the beginning |of PSNjmust we
be foi fact oi foi essence, foi time oi eteinity, foi the positive science of man oi philosophy.was
bypasseu in the latei thought of Busseil. Beie he no longei consiueis essence as sepaiateu fiom fact,
eteinity fiom time, oi philosophic thought fiom histoiy." (PSN 9S)

S26
See PP S7fn44
161
F+ 8%"(4'&)"? D-14-(#)%".

I began this chaptei by suggesting an integial ielationship between Neileau-
Ponty's philosophy anu his ieauing of Busseil. I hope to have shown this thiough
the couise of my iecapitulation of anu commentaiy on this ieauing, but these may
now be supplementeu anu ieinfoiceu with some analogies. Thus, Neileau-Ponty
stanus to Busseil, I want to say, much as humanity, in Neileau-Ponty's Busseilian
philosophy, stanus to the "woilu," that is "the.pie-existent Logos" (PP xxiii) oi "that
jointing anu fiaming of Being which is being iealizeu thiough man" (PS 181). 0i
again, Neileau-Ponty is to Busseil as language (oi logosthe "theme of
philosophy") is to the "pie-language of the mute woilu" (;! 126), oi finally, as Spiiit
is to Natuie, the fiist finuing a voice in the seconu, the seconu finuing its uepth in the
fiist. The holistic vision that emeiges heieof man anu woilu, spiiit anu natuieis
only piefiguieu oi sketcheu in outline in Neileau-Ponty's wiitings, but it is
ueteiminate enough to show how Neileau-Ponty coulu have asciibeu so much of his
philosophy
S27
in my view valiulyto anothei philosophei, Busseil, who foi his
pait neveitheless went so much of the time in a contiaiy uiiection. Neileau-Ponty's
views of iecipiocity anu ieveisibility, iuentity anu uiffeience, paiauox anu the
"between"they aie all ielevant to anu implicit in his uevelopmentalanu
3,C$>(4appiopiiation of Busseilian thought.

S27
0bviously I uo not make a shaip uistinction between the philosophies of the "eailiei" anu "latei"
Neileau-Ponty. The mateiial piesenteu in the piesent chaptei alone affoiu, I think, ample (though
peihaps not sufficient) eviuence that this is so.
162
Is Neileau-Ponty finally, in the enu, just a meie "ieauei" oi "commentatoi" of
Busseil. This is the wiong question to ask. Shoulu Plotinus be ielegateu to being a
commentatoi of Plato anu Aiistotle. Shoulu Aveiios be uismisseu as a
commentatoi of Aiistotle. Suiely gieat philosophy can be uone thiough
commenting, biinging as it weie "new tiuths into being," as Neileau-Ponty himself
puts it. The commentatoi is not likely to be celebiateu as a tiailblazei, but without
goou commentatois, it is unlikely that any coheient "tiails" coulu be uisceineu fiom
the uense, sometimes contiauictoiy outpouiing of a thinkei like Busseil. All the
same, Neileau-Ponty uoes not meiely commenthe has the talent to uevelop, to
take fuithei anu iauicalize anu see the hiuuen implications of, the texts he analyzes.
The texts speak to him, anu he speaks back.
Neileau-Ponty's "veision" of phenomenology has been uisavoweu by ceitain
Busseilians, but it must be saiu that theii "Busseil," while consistent foi the most
pait with Busseil's own self-ueclaiations of the natuie anu consciously stateu
intentions of his own philosophizing, is not always easy to uefenu philosophically. A
naiiow inteipietation of Busseil, Neileau-Ponty woulu aigue, woulu fatefully tuin
its back on Busseil's own unueilying sensitivity to the inauequacies of his own
eailiei conceptions, as he himself suigeu foiwaiu. In othei woius, the "stiict
Busseilian" woulu fall well shoit of Busseil's own level, to say nothing of expanuing
on him! Some Busseilians have of couise embiaceu Neileau-Ponty, but selectively,
if only to uemonstiate that Busseil eithei anticipateu oi fully explicateu the same
things Neileau-Ponty uiscusses, anu peihaps in an even bettei way. Neileau-Ponty
woulu of couise have been happy to acknowleuge his uebt (egotism is not one of his
163
vices), but he woulu also insist that Busseil himself iemains too inconsistent foi us
to tiy to iely on him exclusively as the "voice of phenomenology." Theie aie too
many stiains in him, anu it is necessaiy to euitoiialize, to euit anu to biing to light
what is tiue anu false, necessaiy anu uispensable in his thinking.
Theie aie obvious but fateful consequences to this soit of ieauing of the
Neileau-PontyBusseil ielationship. If we accept Neileau-Ponty's ieauing of
Busseil, we implicitly ieject much of O+%%#,=M% self-inteipietationhis stateu
intentions, anu his fiaming of the tianscenuental-phenomenological pioject. But is
this not familiai heimeneutical teiiitoiy. It is inueeu an invoking of the
heimeneutic )323% of "knowing the philosophei bettei than heshe knew
himselfheiself." But even this is not so simple, since, on Neileau-Ponty's account,
Busseil $=,#$"F H>#B what Neileau-Ponty "knows" about Busseil, just not with the
same claiity oi univocity. It is to Neileau-Ponty's lasting cieuit that, uecaues befoie
Bonn Welton's :5# V)5#, O+%%#,=
S28
, the Fiench thinkei hau alieauy painteu a viviu
poitiait of the innei conflicteuness of Busseil's thought. Be hau alieauy iuentifieu
anu embiaceu "the othei Busseil," who he knew alieauy as the "pie-jection" (my
woiu, but Neileau-Pontian in spiiit) of himself. It is tiue that Neileau-Ponty uoes
not feel himself constiaineu by the histoiy of "tiauitional" inteipietation of
Busseil's woiks, oi by what Busseil may have believeu he himself was
accomplishing thiough his own philosophizing. But in this way Neileau-Ponty's
attituue towaius Busseil is much like that of a healthy chilu towaius its paient:

S28
See: Welton, Bonn. :5# V)5#, O+%%#,=I :5# O3,(`3>% 3D :,$>%4#>"#>)$= 95#>3A#>3=3CF.
Inuianapolis: Inuiana 0niveisity Piess, 2uuu.
164
auulation is balanceu by ciitical juugment, emulation by cieative initiative. Woulu
we want anything else.

In one place Neileau-Ponty nicely summaiizes his unueistanuing of the
meaning anu piogiess of Busseil's philosophy:

"Thus, a philosophy |Busseil'sj which seemeu, moie than any othei, bent upon unueistanuing
natuial being as the object anu puie coiielate of consciousness ieuiscoveis thiough the veiy exeicise
of ieflexive iigoi a natuial stiatum in which the spiiit is viitually buiieu in the concoiuant
functioning of bouies within biute being."
S29

Tiauitionally, the plausibility of Neileau-Ponty's ieauing of Busseil has been
thought to tuin on this: whethei one sees Busseil as a self-uiviueu, }anus-faceu
figuie, woiking piogiessively to an auequately tianscenuental-existential
conception of phenomenology, oi whethei one sees him iathei as a moie oi less
consistent 0lympian thinkei of absolute consciousness. But what I have tiieu to uo,
in my small way, is to say iathei that what makes Neileau-Ponty's ieauing plausible
is an acceptance of Neileau-Ponty's own style anu substance of thought. But this
biings out a kinu of special paiauox, wheieby the line between the two thinkeis
becomes wholly bluiieu, exactly as if we weie enteiing the "(>)#,A3>"#" Neileau-
Ponty wiites about in the latei woiks.
SSu
Foi if Neileau-Ponty is iight )5$) 5# (% R(>
%3 A$>F B3,"%T $ O+%%#,=($> )5(>H#,at least, a thinkei of Busseil's innei
thoughtsthen it tuins out that to accept Neileau-Ponty's "Busseil" unuei the
bannei of accepting 5(A (Neileau-Ponty) is to have $=,#$"F accepteu O+%%#,=. This

S29
Themes, p. 8S
SSu
Be uses the teim in ;! (48, 84) The teim is mentioneu alieauy at the time of PP, but in a slightly
uiffeient sense. See also the iefeience to "inteicoipoieality" in PS (168)
165
might foi some be haiu to believe, but then again, peihaps, in its own way, it may
only be the iauical fulfilment of the iuea of a "heimeneutic ciicle"!

166
8209#-$ S%'$; M-$4-0'P,%"#6=. M0#'$- :"#%4%?6 %1 I0#'$-

"We will show how the concept of Natuie is always the expiession of an ontologyanu its piivilegeu
expiession."
SS1

!+ !"#$%&'(#)%"
Some of Neileau-Ponty's most impoitant final wiitings, I woulu aigue, aie
founu in :5# ;(%(<=# $>" )5# !>?(%(<=#
kk\
, which Neileau-Ponty hau been woiking on
as a majoi statement of his philosophy at the time of his suuuen ueath. The goal of
the piesent chaptei is to convey some of the essential featuies of Neileau-Ponty's
ontology, as uevelopeu in the afoiementioneu woik, as well as his incieasingly
"uialectical" unueistanuing of natuie anu spiiit, all the while emphasizing the
"(semi-) >$)+,$=(%)(4" element theiein. Accoiuingly it will unueitake a uetaileu
examination of the *$)+,# lectuies of 19S6-196u (as they come uown to us, mostly
in the foim of meticulous stuuent notes), in conjunction with ;!, exploiing the ways
in which Neileau-Ponty thinks thiough the questions of being, consciousness, anu
theii iecipiocal ielationship with the help of an intensive investigation of "Natuie,"
paiticulaily in the biological sciences anu the histoiy of philosophy.
Neileau-Ponty's tieatment of "natuie" is to this uay little known, uespite the
fact that the *$)+,# lectuies collectively compiise a volume of ioughly equal length

SS1
fiom Bominique Sglaiu. Ti. Robei valliei. Noithwestein 0niveisity Piess: Evanston, Illinois, 2uuS.
(p. 2u4) Beieaftei uesignateu as "N" in all citations, anu "the *$)+,# lectuies" insiue the bouy.
SS2
Neileau-Ponty, Nauiice. :5# ;(%(<=# $>" )5# !>?(%(<=#7 Ti. Alphonso Lingis. Noithwestein
0niveisity Piess: Evanston, Illinois, 1969. Beieaftei ";!."
167
to ;!. It is tiue that the lectuies weie not intenueu to be publisheu as a book
piecisely in the foim we have them, but it is also tiue that Neileau-Ponty intenueu
to use much of the mateiial fiom them as paits of his publisheu wiitings, incluuing
sections of ;! itself.
SSS
Fiom a uetaileu examination of both texts I concluue that
Neileau-Ponty's often commenteu-upon iejection of uualismwhich of couise
haiuly uistinguishes him in the histoiy of philosophy both befoie anu aftei
Bescaitesis in fact most piopeily chaiacteiizeu as a philosophy of
complementaiity, one that seeks to unueistanu the piinciples of iuentity anu
uiffeience, both in the bioauest of ontological contexts as well as naiiowei ones
(such as the ontology of the bouy), in a way that uoes justice to the iole that each of
them plays in the stiuctuiation of Being, that is, the stiuctuie of the
"visibleinvisible" woilu. This uiscussion will also take us well into the fifth chaptei
anu uisseitation conclusion, which asceitain the "upshot" of Neileau-Ponty's
uialectic foi the phenomenological methou.
It is my view that Neileau-Ponty's phenomenology is "uialectical" but in a
wholly new sense, one that is uiiven by the exigencies of thinking the "natuial"
oiigins of subjectivity (in the sense of spiiit, oi human consciousness) fiom within,
anu of theieby iecasting the phenomenological pioject as one that inheies in
"ontology" in a bioauei sense. Fiom the couise anu piogiession of the *$)+,#
lectuies, one can see Neileau-Ponty's thought giow moie 3,C$>(4(%)conceineu

SSS
See foi example: N, xvi (fiom the "Tianslatoi's Intiouuction" by Robeit valliei). Some of the
mateiial uoes in fact make it into vaiious essays, such as "Beigson In the Naking" anu the alieauy
examineu "The Philosophei anu Bis Shauow," anu ceitain conceptsthe "flesh," foi exampleaie
uiscusseu in both texts in some uetail, as we will see below. See: Neileau-Ponty, Nauiice. "Beigson in
the Naking." Ti. Richaiu C. NcCleaiy. In 1(C>%. Evanston, Illinois: Noithwestein 0niveisity Piess,
1964. (pp. 182-191); Neileau-Ponty, Nauiice. "The Philosophei anu Bis Shauow." Ti. Richaiu N.
NcCleaiy. In 1(C>%. Evanston, Illinois: Noithwestein 0niveisity Piess, 1964 (pp. 1S9-181)
168
with the piinciple of "wholeness" anu its iealization in the "oiganic foims" of "life."
0f couise the "natuialism" Neileau-Ponty espouses is not the "natuialism"
embiaceu by scientifically-minueu mouein wiiteis, whose foim we also finu in
Busseil's wiitings, but anothei, moie at once phenomenologically-iooteu anu
iomantically-inspiieu kinu, which uevelops thioughout the *$)+,# lectuies
explicitly anu in the iest of Neileau-Ponty's othei woik implicitly. 0ntology will, it is
tiue, "take pieceuence," in a ceitain way, but >3) because it is the "founuation" of
phenomenology, in the way Busseil conceiveu phenomenology to be the founuation
of ontology. Neileau-Ponty's intention is not to inveit this oiuei of uepenuence, but
iathei to make phenomenology answei to its existential situation, which now comes
to mean, to beai the shauow of its natuial, wilu, anu pie-ieflective oiigins.

!!+ I0#'$- 0"& #2- :"#%4%?6 %1 #2- .$/01# T-(#'$-.

07 !>),3"+4)(3>I :5# *$)+,# U#4)+,#%G :5# ;(%(<=# $>" )5# !>?(%(<=#G $>" )5# 9,3c#4) 3D
aV>)3=3CFb

In the *$)+,# lectuies, Neileau-Ponty ueclaies, "The ontological pioblem is
the uominant pioblem, to which all othei pioblems aie suboiuinateu." (N 1S4) What
exactly is the ontological pioblem. Neileau-Ponty uoes not answei this question
uiiectly, but we have some telling clues. What Neileau-Ponty wants to avoiu, he
inuicates, aie at least thiee "isms": "Natuialism, humanism, theism. These thiee
woius have lost all cleai meaning in oui cultuie, anu they ceaselessly pass into one
169
anothei." (N 1SS) We have an even bettei specification of the pioblem in a ioughly
contempoianeous woiking note, in which Neileau-Ponty wiites:

"Necessity of a ietuin to ontologyThe ontological question anu its iamifications: the subject-object
question, the question of intei-subjectivity, )5# f+#%)(3> 3D *$)+,#. 0utline of ontology piojecteu as an
ontology of biute Beinganu of logos. Biaw up the pictuie of wilu Being, piolonging my aiticle on
Busseil. But the uisclosuie of this woilu, of this Being, iemains a ueau lettei as long as we uo not
upioot 'objective philosophy' (Busseil). An @,%2,+>CH=l,+>C is neeueu." (WN 16S, my italics)

The iefeience to Busseil is cleaily positive. What is neeueu is an alteinative
ontologycleaily inspiieu by Busseilian phenomenology, paiticulaily the "genetic"
vaiietyto that of objectivism. The "question of Natuie" is supposeu to fit iight into
this pioject. The pioblem, in shoit, is how to foige this new ontology, how to
oveicome the "stiabism" of Westein ontology since Bescaites (N 16S), but also, to
some extent, of phenomenology itself (N 72), which in its "iuealist" (i.e., Busseilian)
foim is still somewhat haunteu, we might say, by Bescaites' ghost.
;! has pioven to be a stumbling block foi some, as it can come acioss as a
cuiious amalgam of philosophy anu poetiy. At times highly esoteiic (especially
when the "woiking notes" aie factoieu in, some of which aie biilliantly cleai, otheis
all but insciutable), it leaves ieaueis with a ceitain sense of puzzlement, even
bewitchment, thiough its extensive use of metaphoi anu new teiminology. A goou
way to appieciate Neileau-Ponty's incieasingly nuanceu anu technical exploiations,
his new phenomenological ontology, is in fact to consult his investigations of natuie.
0f couise, these aie not at all sufficient in themselves to expose Neileau-Ponty's
ontological pioject, since they aie intenueu explicitly to be piepaiatoiy
SS4
to

SS4
Explains Neileau-Ponty: ".the ontology of Natuie as the way towaiu ontologythe way we
piefei because the evolution of the concept of Natuie is a moie convincing piopaeueutic, |since itj
170
something else, namely a fullei engagement with some of the themes Neileau-Ponty
is moie well known foi, incluuing peiception anu embouiment. Neileau-Ponty's
tieatment of )5#%# topics in the *$)+,# lectuies is inuiiect, foi example thiough the
stuuy of animal "@AB#=)#>" oi the stuuy of the ontological implications of theii
physiology.
Theie aie othei inteiesting uiffeiences between the two texts, when
compaieu siue-by-siue. Thus while ;! emphasizes uiscontinuity between past anu
piesent philosophy anu speaks of iauical ienewal (;! 8S, 16S), etc., the lectuies
ieflect the flip-siue, offeiing a ciitical commentaiy that establishes links to the past
anu seeks to "iectify" it. (N 186) Thiough a ciitical engagement with the
philosophical tiauition anu examination of the science of his uay, Neileau-Ponty in
the lattei text stiives foi a balancing of opposites anu, in effect, a new equilibiium,
between theoietical poles like "finalism" (teleology) anu "mechanism."
The multi-uisciplinaiy *$)+,# seminais covei a vast amount of teiiain,
exploiing no less than the scientific, theological, anu philosophical unueipinnings of
Westein notions of natuie, animality, uou, anu the human minu. Thiough an eaily
iejection of the views of Laplacea kinu of "stanu-in" foi mouein-scientific views
analogous to Augustine's iole at the stait of Wittgenstein's 95(=3%325(4$=
!>?#%)(C$)(3>%Neileau-Ponty ieveals himself in the *$)+,# lectuies to be a
champion of tempoiality, becoming, anu holicity, as against an (exclusive oi lop-
siueu) emphasis on spatiality, being, anu analyticity.
SSS
In this way he is woiking in

moie cleaily shows the necessity of the ontological mutation." (N 2u4) (It is not cleai fiom this pait
of the text what the authoi is iefeiiing to as the "ontological mutation.")
SSS
Take, foi example, N, 89; in his stating of Laplace's views, he is negatively also giving his own.
171
obvious conceit with "life philosophy" as well as figuies such as Beigson anu
Whiteheau, only now in a moie ueeply phenomenological iegistei that, once again,
comes moie significantly to the foie in ;!notwithstanuing those ieauings of the
text that, iathei unjustifiably in my opinion, uownplay its phenomenological
chaiactei. The contents of ;! in fact beai continuity in substance, if not always in
style, to :5# 95#>3A#>3=3CF 3D 9#,4#2)(3>
kku
anu its questions of minu anu bouy,
peiception anu ieflection, language, anu the natuie of phenomenology anu Busseil's
thought. Bowevei, the lattei text is moie intent than evei, it seems, to uesciibe the
ultimate natuie of ieality itselfoi at least, to uesciibe the task of "inteiiogation"
that ciicles aiounu this ontological ultimacy. The questions of "Being" anu "Natuie"
come to the foiefiont in the latei philosophy; the issues of peiception, embouiment,
inteisubjectivity, etc., aie tieateu as illustiative oi uisclosive of the uepths of Being
anu human involvement in it. The influence of Beiueggei is unmistakable, but foi
the most pait unspoken; this is piobably because it is moie so Beiueggeiian themes
(many of which aie anchoieu in Busseil) that Neileau-Ponty appiopiiates, anu less
so Beiueggeiian conclusions. It is also impoitant to iealize that Neileau-Ponty has
been inteiesteu in ontology, paiticulaily the natuie-spiiit question, fiom the fiist;
:5# 1),+4)+,# 3D E#5$?(3, is a kinu of (eviuently inauequate) phenomenological
ontology in its own iight.
SS7

SS6
Neileau-Ponty, Nauiice. :5# 95#>3A#>3=3CF 3D 9#,4#2)(3>. Ti. Colin Smith. New Yoik: Routleuge
anu Kegan Paul, 1962 (Beieaftei "PP.")
SS7
Neileau-Ponty, Nauiice. :5# 1),+4)+,# 3D E#5$?(3,. Ti. A.L. Fishei. Boston: Beacon Piess, 196S. Foi
a goou uiscussion of that text with iespect to Neileau-Ponty's philosophy of natuie, see: Toauvine,
Teu. K#,=#$+L93>)FM% 95(=3%325F 3D *$)+,#. Evanston: Noithwestein 0niveisity Piess, 2uu9
172
Aftei that eailiei woik, howevei, Neileau-Ponty took his point of uepaituie
moie explicitly fiom Busseil anu the phenomenological ieuuction, as we have
alieauy seen. 99 is essentially motivateu by the paiauox of peiception wheieby the
woiluthe thingsbecome ieally (anu not meiely "subjectively," as thiough a
iepiesentation) available to me, uespite the fact that they aie tianscenuent to me.
This specifically phenomenological paiauox maue it necessaiy to iethink the ieal
natuie of the "I-think" oi ego who peiceivesfai fiom being a uisembouieu 43C()3,
the "I" must be a bouy, the "bouy-subject," whose veiy being is woiluly in the same
sense that the woilu's is. Bouy anu woilu foim a ciicuit, a system of iecipiocity,
which, as we will see, Neileau-Ponty continues in the latei wiitings to meuitate on
intensively, though with iefeience to what he teims an essential "folu" oi "hollow"
in Being.
SS8

Bowevei, on its own, 99 is, in a ceitain iespect, lockeu in its own foim of
Busseil-inheiiteu subjectivism, peimitting the woilu to aiise in consciousness,
albeit pie-intentionally (oi thiough a ueepei "motoi" oi "opeiative" intentionality),
but not explaining at all how it is that this B3,=", oi tianscenuent Being, coulu anu
uoes give iise to 43>%4(3+%>#%%anu, moie basically, to 3,C$>(4 =(D#. That
phenomenology instiucts itself explicitly to avoiu this kinu of question uoes not
pievent Neileau-Ponty fiom bioaching it fulsomely anyway. Buponu uesciibes

SS8
Beie aie two of the many instances in which Neileau-Ponty makes use of this iuea, both taken
fiom woiking notes: "It is not the eye that sees (the eye thing). But it is not the soul. Theie is a 'bouy
of the minu' (valiy), something that is gatheieu in the appaiatus of vision anu hollows out the place
theie fiom which one sees. ." (;! 222); "Anu what ieplaces the antagonistic anu soliuaiy ieflective
movement (the immanence of the 'iuealists') is the folu oi hollow of Being having by piinciple an
3+)%("#, the aichitectonics of the configuiation.. Theie aie fielus in inteisection." (;! 227)
173
thusly the uiffeience in appioach to natuie that we finu between Neileau-Ponty's
eailiei anu latei philosophy:

"In the 95#>3A#>3=3CF 3D 9#,4#2)(3>, the ielation between natuie anu spiiit |#%2,()j, as the iecipiocal
founuation (Q+>"(#,+>C) anu the gateway to the enigma of the woilu, was uealt with by way of spiiit
(incainateu in natuie) iathei than natuiea postuie which ieiteiates the uuality of subject anu
object). In the |*$)+,#j couises at the College ue Fiance, the ielation between natuie anu spiiit is one
of iecipiocal envelopment, anu the gateway to this enigma is natuie iathei than spiiit."
SS9

If it is tiue that phenomenology abstains on piincipleu giounus fiom questions
about life oi being "befoie" consciousnessanu going against this, to some extent, is
the significance of an inquiiy into "Natuie" fiom Neileau-Ponty's phenomenological
vantage-pointthis uoes not mean it cannot contemplate the paiauoxical uistance
(unknowability, opacity, "uepth") of Natuie as the souice of life anu thought anu yet
also the continuity of consciousness with Natuie itselfoi, put uiffeiently, the
"piolongation" of consciousness in "the things" that Neileau-Ponty claims to
chaiacteiize vision, foi example. (;! 271) Neileau-Ponty spenus a goou ueal of time
thinking about both the activity oi "autopiouuction" of sense in anu by Natuie ()%#=D,
on the one hanu (this is most eviuent thiough the activities of oiganic life, whose
seemingly "miiaculous" uevelopmental piocesses uefy causal explanation), anu the
natuiality of human existence, as ievealeu thiough the "inteitwining" of bouy anu
woilu alieauy laiu out foi us; he fuithei consiueis the implications of this unity foi
the ieconceptualization of the questions of subjectobject anu inteisubjectivity (the
lattei of which we will be able to say little, unfoitunately, in the piesent chaptei).

SS9
Buponu, Pascal. .(4)(3>>$(,# K#,=#$+L93>)F7 Paiis: Ellipses, 2uu8. (p. 1SS; my tianslation)
Beieaftei "Buponu."
174
E7 .#D(>(>C a*$)+,#b
As we have alieauy seen, Neileau-Ponty is thoioughly opposeu to conceiving
Natuie as "object," incluuing lifeless "mass of mattei," anu so on. What it is, in itself,
is not the "in-itself" of the tiauition, stiictly opposeu to a "foi-itself," but iathei what
Neileau-Ponty calls (aftei Schelling) "wilu Being," oi the "baibaiic piinciple," which
is moie basic than the subject-object uistinction (similaily to the "flesh," a ielateu
notion, as we will see below). (;! 2uu) The "wiluness" of natuie is not such that it is
something that must be "molueu" oi "infoimeu" in a Kantian way in oiuei to be
maue sense out of, but iathei that it contains all potentialities, it is all things, but
without having become, qua Natuie itself, any of them. (N 212) At the outset of the
lectuies, Neileau-Ponty offeis seveial impoitant inuications peitaining to his
ueveloping concept of natuie. Beie I will quote them in full anu then comment on
subsequently:

"Theie is natuie wheievei theie is a life that has meaning, but wheie, howevei, theie is not a
thought; hence the kinship with the vegetative." (N S)

"Natuie is what has a meaning, without this meaning being positeu by thought: it is the
autopiouuction of meaning." (N S)

"|Natuiej has an inteiioi, it is ueteimineu fiom within; hence the opposition of 'natuial' to
'acciuental.' Yet natuie is uiffeient fiom man: it is not instituteu by him anu is opposeu to custom, to
uiscouise." (N S)

"Natuie is the piimoiuialthat is, the nonconstiucteu, the noninstituteu; hence the iuea of an
eteinity of natuie (the eteinal ietuin), of a soliuity. .It is oui soil |%3=jnot what is in fiont of us,
facing us, but iathei, that which caiiies us." (N S)

175
The sentiments expiesseu in these foui quotations aie cleaily meant to set the
uiiection of the investigations that aie to follow. To iecapitulate, they uesciibe
Natuie in the following positive anu negative teims: 1) possessing oi embouying a
meaning, 2) piouucing a meaning in oi out of itself, S) not having to uo with oi being
positeu by thought, 4) possessing an inteiioiity, S) being uistinguishable fiom the
aitificial, conventional, oi man-maue, 6) being eteinal anu piimoiuial, anu 7) lying
not "befoie" us but iathei "beneath" usanu, as Neileau-Ponty will also say, within
us. (N 212-S) These aie aumitteuly schematic piopeities, anu it is not yet cleai how
oi if they inteilock, but alieauy they ieveal quite a bit. Neileau-Ponty's conception
of Natuie is that of an ontological giounu (of soits) that is non-objective (cf. its
"inteiioiity") anu iauically piimoiuialanu thus pie-ieflective: ".a type of
englobing being in which we uiscovei ouiselves alieauy investeu piioi to all
ieflection." (N 84) That is, it is both "non-instituteu" (a iefeience to Busseil's notion
of 1)(D)+>C, institution oi establishment) anu #%%#>)($==F so (it is non-(>%)()+)$<=#).
But even moie impoitant, it is piesupposeu in eveiy institution, in eveiy human
pioject, inueeu, in embouiment anu peiception themselves. At times, Neileau-Ponty
singles out this piopeity of Natuie most, namely its haunting "piesence by absence,"
oi, tempoially speaking, its being a "peimanent past," always behinu us.
What Neileau-Ponty is tiying to get at heie is peihaps best seen thiough his
ciitique of Beigson, who he cleaily aumiies but also faults foi having misseu this all-
impoitant featuie of the natuial. Neileau-Ponty attiibutes this blinuness of
Beigson's to a ceitain "positivism." Neileau-Ponty begins his ciitique by
acknowleuging favoiably that "Beigson. posits consciously a paiauox inheient to
176
peiception: Being is anteiioi to peiception, anu this piimoiuial Being is conceivable
only in ielation to peiception." (N SS) But he goes on to ciiticize Beigson foi
"making of this piehuman a being with which we coexist." (N S8) Theie can be no
%(A+=)$>#()F of ieflection (oi "intuition") with Natuiea majoi point that Neileau-
Ponty will stiess again anu again, coming fiom the epistemological siue of the
question of Natuie. Neileau-Ponty's veiuict: "In Beigson, the official position of
positivism also iuins the iuea of Natuie." (N 7u)
Busseil, Neileau-Ponty claims, impioves on Beigson in this iegaiu, in a
passage that calls to minu what we have alieauy saiu about the continuity of woilu
anu consciousness:

"Busseil iehabilitateu the iuea of Natuie by this iuea of jointuie to a common tiuth that subjects
woulu continue but of which they woulu not be the initiatois. All that happens is not explaineu by
inteiioiity, oi by exteiioiity, but by a chance that is the concoiuance between these two givens anu is
assuieu by Natuie." (N 78)

That 45$>4# plays a pait in the "explanation" of the inneioutei stiuctuie of Being
once again unueiscoies that theie is no complete "logos," no complete explanation,
of Being, oi Natuie, in itselfnot, howevei, because it is just out of oui "finite"
human giasp, such that uou coulu unueistanu it wheieas "we" cannot, but because
theie is a "savage" piinciple of being that unueilies the essential polaiities
encounteieu in ieflexive thought, something connecteu with "the flesh," which we
will uiscuss latei on.
Neileau-Ponty is also inteiesteu in the "piouuctivity" of natuie:

177
"The concept of Natuie uoes not evoke only the iesiuue of what hau not been constiucteu by me, but
also a piouuctivity which is not ouis, although we can use itthat is, an oiiginaiy piouuctivity that
continues |to opeiatej beneath the aitificial cieations of man. It both paitakes of the most ancient,
anu is something always new. Natuie is, as Lucien Beii saiu in his aiticle ueuicateu to Begel in U$
C,$>"# #>4F4=326"(#, an untameu thing: 'Natuie is theie fiom the fiist uay.' Natuie is not exhausteu oi
useu up by the veiy fact that enuuies." (N 12S)

Thus, pait of what lenus opacity to natuie is its nevei-ceasing capacity foi invention
anu self-ienewal. This is something Beigson of couise was highly impiesseu with as
well (not to mention Whiteheau, who Neileau-Ponty favoiably comments on anu foi
whom the piinciple of "cieativity" is the "ultimate categoiy," highei even than
uivinity). As is cleai fiom the passage citeu above, the ielation of natuial
piouuctivity to human cieativity foi Neileau-Ponty iesembles that assigneu by
some of the ueiman Romantics to ait.
S4u
Like aitistic cieation, inueeu, Natuie's
"autopiouuction" of meaning is open, fluiu, anu always unfinisheua point
Neileau-Ponty makes thiough a iefeience to Beiaclitus: "Beiaclitus says that
natuie is a chilu at play; it gives meaning, but in the mannei of a chilu who is
playing, anu this meaning is nevei total." (N 84)
Finally, Neileau-Ponty's notion of Natuie shoulu be unueistoou in ielation to
that of "spiiit"minu, consciousness, language, thought. Towaiu the enu of the
*$)+,# couises he offeis the following telling iecap: "0ui subject: Regaiuing Natuie,
the concein was to stuuy it as an ontological leafanu in paiticulai, iegaiuing life,

S4u
Though I cannot exploie this connection fully heie, theie aie many othei inuications that Neileau-
Ponty is tuining to the ueiman Romantics wheie they left off in teims of the philosophy of natuie.
Above all, he wiites veiy glowingly about Schelling's conception of natuie, as we will see below. Anu
like the ueiman Romantics anu ueiman Iuealists, he cites Kant's thiiu J,()(f+# iepeateuly, anu in
much the same spiiit as they uo: in oiuei to uiaw it out beyonu itself, in oiuei to attain a moie
satisfactoiy iesult of Kant's inauguial investigations into the ieal natuie of life, the oiganism,
cieativity, anu teleology. Also, it is impoitant in this iespect to look at the way that Kant's thiiu
J,()(f+# somewhat challenges the fiamewoik of his own tianscenuental iuealism, in a way that
Schelling latei uoes moie uefinitively, anu in the way that Neileau-Ponty tiies to uo in ielation to
Busseil. Foi some iefeiences along these lines see: N, 8S, 84
178
the concein was to stuuy the unfoluing of the leaf of Natuie,#C$,"(>C )5# 5+A$>,
the concein is )3 )$H# 5(A $) 5(% 23(>) 3D #A#,C#>4# (> *$)+,#." (N 2u8, my emphasis)
Buponu helpfully captuies the sense in which the concept of "spiiit" (=M#%2,()) ties in
with that of what Neileau-Ponty is calling "the human," anu which Busseil has
iuentifieu with the "peisonal":

"The notion of spiiit habitually uesignates a figuie of being in which man iecognizes his oiiginality oi
his own piopei moue of being. It thus foims a netwoik with othei notions which also have the
function of naming the 'escape' of man fiom natuie: cultuie, histoiy, U3C3%, ieason." (Buponu, 7u)

Buponu fuithei explains the sense in which Neileau-Ponty's attituue towaius
Natuie vis--vis Spiiit shoulu be appieciateu histoiically: "|Neileau-Ponty inveitsj
the movement of the histoiy of mouein thought, which enteis philosophy via spiiit,
|anu staits fiomj natuie, in allowing himself the possibility of compiehenuing the
emeigence, the %+,C(%%#A#>) of spiiit." (Buponu 7u, my tianslation)
Neileau-Ponty's piincipal histoiical inspiiation conceining his conception of
Natuie appeais to be Schelling. Inueeu, Neileau-Ponty seems to iuentify at least
paitially with "iomantic natuialism" as opposeu to "scientific natuialism"a
uistinction he himself fitfully makes. (N 1SS) Thus he aigues that we must pieseive
the iuea of "savage natuie" fiom the Romantics, saving it foi example fiom Kantian-
humanist uesigns of a thinkei like his own contempoiaiy Neo-Kantian Lon
Biunschwig. (N SS) What Neileau-Ponty finus most impiessive about Schelling's
notion of Natuie aie the same things he tenus to emphasize in his own exploiations
of it, foi example its uesciiption as "wilu Being" that haunts consciousness as an
iiiecoveiable giounu, as well as the iuea of ".the subjective-objective that Natuie
179
will always be." (N 7u) What Neileau-Ponty finus in this iuea of the "subjective-
objective" is illustiateu by him with iefeience to a kinu of iecipiocity of the two
oiueis, subjective anu objective, in a quote that also helps to ieminu us of how fai
Neileau-Ponty is fiom abanuoning a phenomenological fiist-peison peispective foi,
say, thiiu-peison "iealism":

"We aie the paients of a Natuie of which we aie also the chiluien. It is in human being that things
become conscious of themselves; but the ielation is iecipiocal: human being is also the becoming-
conscious of things."
S41
(N 4S)

Scientific natuialism, as this teim is wiuely taken, of couise woulu ueny both of
these conclusions. It uoes not see the sense in which "we aie the paients of Natuie"
because it uenies any ontological oi constitutional iole to peiception (feaiing
iuealism), anu it uoes not think of human beings as the seat of Natuie's own
ieflexivity because it has tacitly accepteu the Caitesian piinciple of the puie
exteiioiity, anu hence ueauness, of natuial being. Theie is no "autopiouuction" in
Natuie, theie aie only causal-mechanistic piocesses goveineu by the "laws of
natuie," set in motion by the mysteiious buist of eneigy calleu the "Big Bang."
0f couise, theie is always the uangei of "anthiopomoiphizing" natuie,
making it into a kinu of intelligence of consciousness, which Neileau-Ponty is well
awaie of: "If Natuie is not an object of thought, that is, a simple coiielative of a
thought, it is ueciueuly not a subject eithei, anu foi the same ieason: its opacity, its
enveloping. It is an obscuie piinciple." (N 12u) Neileau-Ponty's "Natuie" is not,
theiefoie, like Begel's "Spiiit," that is, a "self" that finus itself ieflecteu back to itself

S41
Compaie: "Not only must Natuie become vision, but human being must also become Natuie." (N
47) Anu notice the phiaseology heie: "Becoming-natuie of man which is the becoming-man of
natuie." (N 18S)
180
in (oi as) natuie. Rathei, it is an "obscuie piinciple" that unfolus paitially in
consciousness, yet also paitially outsiue of itbecause it is moie "ancient" than
consciousness itself anu stanus in iiieuucible tension with it.
Schelling's philosophy of Natuie thus teaches Neileau-Ponty key lessons
about the limits of objective thought anu of ieflection, which objectify natuie but
must fail to captuie its uepths. Thus, invoking Schelling, Neileau-Ponty obseives:

"A poetic consciousness iecognizes that it uoes not possess its object totally, that it can unueistanu it
only by a tiue cieation, anu that it cieates claiity by an opeiation that is not ueuuctive but cieative.
Poetic consciousness, oveicome by its object, must get holu of itself again, but without evei being
able to sepaiate itself fiom its histoiy."
S42
(N Su)

The theme of non-coinciuence of ieflection anu object-of-ieflection is of couise a
majoi one in Neileau-Ponty's latei ontology (anu epistemology) geneially, lying at
the ioot of his conception of "hypei-ieflection" anu the methou of "inteiiogation."
What Neileau-Ponty finus, in othei woius, is that Schelling's is a "phenomenology of
pie-ieflexive Being" (N 41) that effects a "ieflection on what is not ieflection." (N
4S) Thus Neileau-Ponty's own paiticulai fascination with Schelling uoes not lie
simply with the lattei's anti-Caitesianism but also, one might say, with his anti-
Kantianism (anu anti-iuealism geneially).
S4S
Schelling, like Neileau-Ponty, uenies
that consciousness is coextensive with meaning. (Busseil, with genetic
phenomenology anu the concept of the "life-woilu" lying beneath the constiuctions

S42
These iueas ieappeai in iefeience to Whiteheau's philosophy. "It is this stubboinness that
subtenus all cieation: 'it belongs to the essence of the univeise to pass into a futuie.'" (N 121) In staik
contiast, theie is the uevastating assessment of Saitie's philosophy that it has "no place foi a
conception of Natuie oi foi a conception of histoiy." (N 7u) This follows fiom Saitie's uualism of the
in-itself anu foi-itself, of which Neileau-Ponty nevei tiies in ciiticizing.
S4S
See in this iegaiu Neileau-Ponty's inteiesting iemaik: "|Schelling'sj conception is the only
possible foim of iealism." (N Su)
181
of thought, hau suiely been heauing in this uiiection, Neileau-Ponty woulu auu, but
the seuuctions of an all-encompassing tianscenuental consciousness iemaineu.)
In my view, what is key to Neileau-Ponty's appieciation of Schelling is the
fact that the ueiman thinkei stoou at the summit ofanu he effects a ceitain
ieveisal ofa matuie tiauition of iuealist thinking, beginning at least with Kant anu
culminating in Begel's "System." That Neileau-Ponty unueistanus his own iole to
paiallel Schelling's in this iegaiu is eviuent fiom a passage like this one:

"Schelling staiteu fiom tianscenuental iuealism aiounu 18uu anu wonueieu how to iehabilitate the
iuea of Natuie in the fiamewoik of ieflexive philosophy. W#) )5(% 2,3<=#A 3D ),$>%4#>"#>)$= ("#$=(%A (%
$=%3 O+%%#,=M%7" (N 71; my emphasis)

In teims of Schelling's infamous ielation
S44
to Begel anu the lattei's "uialectical"
system, Neileau-Ponty's veiuict is accoiuingly favoiable to the foimei: "Schelling
thought this thesis of speculative philosophy at a highei level of iigoi than uiu Begel
because of his conception of the empiiical; the iuentity of the finite anu the infinite
is thought by him in a moie uecisive way."
S4S
(N 47)

J7 *$)+,# $>" )5# 14(#>4#% 3D U(D#
Because of its pie-ieflective anu non-objective chaiactei, Natuie is haiu to
investigate "fiontally," so to speak, which is what allows Neileau-Ponty to begin to

S44
Begel uiew copiously fiom the youngei Schelling but famously ciiticizeu the lattei in the pieface
of the 95#>3A#>3=3CF, albeit veileuly, calling Schelling's Absolute "the night in which all cows aie
black." Schelling woulu go on to heavily ciiticize Begelian philosophyoi at least its pietensions to
completenessthioughout his long caieei, well aftei Begel's own ueath.
S4S
Begel is of couise famous foi having iuentifieu a "tiue infinity" which incoipoiates finite
uiffeience into its make-up, as opposeu to the "bau infinity" that meiely negates the finite. Schelling's
thinking uoes not, howevei, allow infinity to have the "last woiu," so to speak, in $>F sense. It is in
this sense that he thinks theii "iuentity" moie thoioughly. (We will examine the theme of "iuentity
anu uiffeience" moie closely below.)
182
tiy lateial appioaches to it, incluuing the stuuy of the woik of the natuial sciences,
above all mouein (in his time, up-to-uate) biology. But how exactly uoes Neileau-
Ponty see as the link between biology anu his own philosophical investigation of
natuie. Be begins to explain it thiough the notion of "expeiience":

".Natuie is an all-encompassing something we cannot think staiting fiom concepts, let alone
ueuuctions, but we must iathei think it staiting fiom expeiience, anu in paiticulai, expeiience in its
most iegulateu foimthat is, science." (N 87)

What Neileau-Ponty means by "science" is bioauly encompasses all contiolleu,
obseivation-baseu pioceuuial uisciplines, incluuing psychology.
Neileau-Ponty's use of science is extiemely subtle anu sophisticateu. It
ceitainly uoes not consist of a simple appiopiiation of the "scientific methou," but is
insteau an inteiiogation of expeiiencethe uomain common to philosophy (at least
as phenomenology), science, anu even ieligion, ait, anu liteiatuie (Neileau-Ponty
famously tuins to painteis anu wiiteis foi inspiiation, anu the *$)+,# lectuies aie
no exception in this iegaiu, as uemonstiateu by an extenueu uiscussion of Pioust
theiein). Though he unueitakes an oveiview of the physical sciences, incluuing
ielativity theoiy anu quantum mechanics, of which we will say a bit moie latei on,
he piimaiily examines the ieseaiches of scientists who focus on animality anu
behavioi, familiai olu themes in Neileau-Ponty's woik.
Neileau-Ponty's methou is not inuuctive. Philosophy uoes not simply
geneialize fiom iesults, if this is inueeu what scientists uo; it inteipiets science
accoiuing to philosophical categoiies whose legitimacy uepenus not meiely on
183
exteinal veiification-pioceuuies but, we might say, also on phenomenological
authenticity. Philosophy anu science aie to be conceiveu as paitneis in a uialogue.
Inueeu, on science anu scientific consciousness, theie aie ways in which
Neileau-Ponty's position has in fact not changeu significantly fiom Busseil's (fiom
the latei peiiou especially). Take, foi example, the following iemaik:

"Science is not an unmotivateu instance. We have to psychoanalyze science, puiify it. Scientific
consciousness lives in the natuial attituue, as Busseil saiu, anu it ignoies Natuie because it is theie: it
is a nave anu unciitical enjoyment of the natuial ceitituue." (N 8S)

Anu again:

"The concein of the philosophei is to see; that of the scientist is to finu a footholu. . The philosophei
must see behinu the back of the physicist what the physicist himself uoes not see." (N 86-7)

In othei woius, the wai of philosophy anu science is a false one; even
Busseil's stiict uivision between eiuetic anu non-eiuetic uisciplines, as we have
seen, is believeu to be exaggeiateu by Neileau-Ponty. Scientific eviuence aius anu
instiucts the philosophei, even as philosophy puts scientific ieseaich into
peispective. Inueeu philosopheis, too, can be ieckless in theii own way, as Neileau-
Ponty makes cleai in his iebuke of Beiueggei's spuiious etymologies, concluuing
fiom this that ".it is uangeious to leave all fieeuom to the philosophei."
S46
(N 86-7)
The philosophy of Natuie is thus not a kinu of seciet knowleuge oi "supeiscience" to
iival science (N 2u4), in the way, peihaps, Beiueggeiian philosophy (oi "poetiy,"

S46
Theie is also heie a uialectic of the negative anu the positive with iespect to the piopei iole of
science. Foi example, one can finu Neileau-Ponty on moie than one occasion stiessing the negative
iole of science in helping to eliminate false oi empty possibilities. See: N, 1uu, 1u6.
184
.(45)+>C) might be a seciet knowleuge of (oi access to) Being that eluues scientific
anu metaphysical unueistanuing.
S47
Thus it is simply a mattei of having a "ieauing
of science itself as a ceitain (ieuuceu) ontology in the bioauei context of the ielation
with the most piimoiuial being," that is, with Natuie itself. (N 2u6)
0ne of the moie challenging sections (at least foi philosopheis!) of the
*$)+,# lectuies is its long assessment of the biology of his uay. A gieat ueal of
giounu is coveieu in a shoit amount of time, all the moie impiessive as Neileau-
Ponty is haiuly stingy with uetails.
S48
What is the point of this stuuy of animality,
accoiuing to Neileau-Ponty. The key lines in this iespect aie these:

"The oiganism is not uefineu by its punctual existence; what exists beyonu is a theme, a style, all
these expiessions seeking to expiess not a paiticipation in a tianscenuental existence, but in a
stiuctuie of the whole. The bouy belongs to a uynamic of behavioi. Behavioi is sunk into coipoieity.
The oiganism uoes not exist as a thing enuoweu with absolute piopeities, as fiagments of Caitesian
space. An oiganism is a fluctuation aiounu noims, which aie events enfiameu by a stiuctuie that
woulu not be iealizeu in anothei oiuei, but has ielations with these events." (N 18S)

What is key heie aie the specifically ontological implications of oiganic life. What
the woik of leauing biologists show, he finus, is that oiganisms exhibit a specifically
holistic anu non-localizable style: "The ieality of the oiganism supposes a non-

S47
Compaie with these iemaiks fiom a woiking note: "The seaich foi a 'wilu' view of the woilu
nowise limits itself to a ietuin to piecompiehension oi to piescience. .A ietuin to piescience is not
the goal. -the piescientific is only an invitation to compiehenu the meta-scientific anu this last is not
non-science." (;! 182) It is tiue that Neileau-Ponty himself, at one point, iuentifies his own "Being"
with Beiueggei's. But the methouological uiffeience has ueepei implications: by involving natuial
science, not to mention metaphysical thinkeis like Leibniz, Schelling, Whiteheau, anu Beigson,
Neileau-Ponty is unueimining the Beiueggeiian suspicion of natuialism the lattei inheiiteu,
aiguably, fiom ceitain featuies of Busseil's (anu Kant's) tianscenuentalist fiaming of
phenomenology.
S48
Though it woulu iequiie a ceitain amount of biological expeitise to ueteimine the contempoiaiy
valiuity of the science Neileau-Ponty ueals with, much of it conceins simple (though systematic)
obseivation of animal behavioi, in which inteipietation plays a significant iole.
185
Paimeniuean Being, a foim that escapes fiom the uilemma of being anu nonbeing."
(N 18S)
The piinciple of wholeness oi totality (which aie equivalent foi Neileau-
Ponty) is cential to Neileau-Ponty's ieflections on oiganic life anu inueeu ontology
geneially. Thus he explains:

"Bence the oiganicist iuea suppoiteu by |biologist u. E.j Coghill, accoiuing to which, inasmuch as we
analyze the oiganisms piecemeal, we finu opposeu only physiochemical phenomena, but when we
iise to the consiueiation of the whole of the oiganism, the totality is no longei uesciibable in
physiological teims; it appeais as emeigent. Bow aie we to unueistanu this ielation of totality of
paits as a iesult. What status must we give to totality. Such is the philosophical question that
Coghill's expeiiments pose, a question which is at the centei of this couise on the iuea of natuie $>"
A$F<# )5# B53=# 3D 25(=3%325F7" (N 14S; my italics)

Neileau-Ponty spenus a gieat ueal of attention on one paiticulai 1929 stuuy
by Coghill, on the axolotl lizaiu.
S49
The axolotl ".is a veiy long lizaiu, about seven
inches, which as a taupole lives in the watei, then, once it has foui legs, uevelops on
lanu." (N 14u) What is cuiious about the animal (which is ieally moie of a
paiauigmatic case than an anomaly) is the way that its anatomical uevelopments
mysteiiously (anu non-causally) paiallel its auapteu behaviois; theie seems to be no
stiictly causal-physiological explanation of the cooiuination. The lizaiu's
embiyology, iecounteu by Neileau-Ponty in painstaking uetail, ieally suggests, foi
Coghill anu Neileau-Ponty, that, "A 'iefeience to the futuie'.alieauy exists in the
embiyo. |Thusj We cannot uefine the animal by its immeuiate functioning: heie the
appaiatus has meaning only foi a futuie." (N 144) Foi example, the "oiuei of the
neivous cephalo-causal uevelopment envelops |i.e., anticipatesj swimming; theie is

S49
"This book |0>$)3AF $>" )5# 9,3<=#A 3D E#5$?(3,j has still not been exceeueu, but we haven't yet
measuieu all its weight." (N 14u)
186
the possible in the oiganism." This notion of "the possible," a "what it can uo" that "is
iealizeu at the same time" as the lizaiu uevelops physiologically, alieauy places us,
Neileau-Ponty points out, "beyonu the physiological uefinition of the oiganism by
its ieal functioning." (N 144) Neileau-Ponty sees heie the impoitance of a sense of
the )3)$=()F of the oiganism, one that is immanent alieauy in the oiganism's
behavioial as well as anatomical uevelopment, even in the eailiest phases. But he
uoes not want to suggest a simple teleology, foi ieasons that will become cleaiei as
we pioceeu.
It is useful in all of this to have befoie one's minu one of Neileau-Ponty's
favoiite images oi metaphois foi the kinu of wholeness oi totality that he has in
minu, namely that of the melouy. The melouy is a metaphoi foi the oiganism;
inueeu, Neileau-Ponty auapts it fiom famous biologist anu ethologist }akob von
0exkll, who says of the *$)+,D$H)3,his own explanatoiy notion foi oiganic
uevelopmentthat it is not an entelechy but a "melouy singing itself." (N 17S) What
is key about the melouy is this: "At the moment when the melouy begins, the last
note is theie, in its own mannei." (N 174) This is cleai enough: a "fiist note" of a
melouy is not the D(,%) note without the 43A2=#)# melouy's being at least implieu
even if not yet fully thought out, since the melouy may be in the miuule of being
cieateu!
SSu
(This of couise is one of the ieasons that Neileau-Ponty opposes
teleology oi "finalism": that it piesupposes a completeness that uoes not make
intelligible the impeifections of the piocesses of eithei natuial piouuctivity oi

SSu
Theie is a connection heie with the "flesh." See: "Then past anu piesent aie !>#(>$>"#,, each
enveloping-envelopeuanu that itself is the flesh." (;! 268)
187
aitistic cieativity.) Neileau-Ponty explains animal behavioi exactly in teims of the
melouy, in the following passage:

"Behavioi cannot be unueistoou if we unueistanu it moment by moment. Ceitainly we still finu
sufficient conuitions fiom moment to moment, but then we uo not giasp the ielation of meaning.
Each pait of the situation acts only as pait of a whole situation; no element of action has a sepaiate
utility in fact." (N 17S)

It is of couise chaiacteiistic of Neileau-Ponty to fuse ait anu science in this
inimitable way!
Foi his stuuents to gain a toeholu in this notion of wholeness, Neileau-Ponty
suggests that peiception is helpful: "We finu mouels of this iuea of totality in the
woilu of peiception." Foi example,

"Psychology uoes easily what science finus uifficult to uo, namely to allow foi an oiganizing piinciple
within totality. In effect, peiception uoes not give us the things, but what we see. In the phenomenal
milieu, nothing impeues the whole fiom being othei than the sum of the paits without being foi all
that a tianscenuent entity.b (N 1SS)

It is cleai that Neileau-Ponty is iefeiiing to the thesis of uestalt psychology, with
which he iegaineu inteiest at the time of his latei woik. But what is key foi us heie
is that we can see what soit of conception of totality inteiests Neileau-Ponty: one
that is non-tianscenuent anu yet also non-immanent (if one means by this entiiely
engulfeu by the sum of the paits). The same iuea applies at the level of oiganic life.
The oiganism uoes not embouy a timeless Platonic Foim, oi even an Aiistotelian
one, but this uoes not mean that its uevelopment oi its behavioi can be explaineu in
ieuuctive, nominalistic, oi mechanistic-causal teims. Thus theie is a ".tiuth of the
whole that uoes not signify a tiuth of the uetail." (N S1) But though the animal has a
188
"why," as it weie, this "why" is an open, gioping, anu incomplete one. Neileau-Ponty
calls on Begel's image of the cyclone to illustiate what he has in minu: "Begel
alieauy compaieu life to a cyclone. The cyclone is nothing othei than watei, but its
foim is not explaineu by watei." We must not seek an oiganic totality "behinu the
obseivable phenomena" (N 1S2), any moie than we woulu seek to ieuuce the whole
to its "inuiviuual components." Thus Neileau-Ponty concluues, "The oiganism
woulu not be a tianscenuent totality, any moie than it woulu be a totality by
summation."
SS1

The fact that oiganic totality is not anchoieu in a positive piinciple, such as
"life" (vitalism) oi an entelechy (Aiistotelianism), iesonates thioughout the *$)+,#
lectuies in a numbei of ways. Thus Neileau-Ponty's concept of "life" is essentially a
ieaction against vitalist positivismagain, as typifieu by Beigsonas well as, as
always, scientific natuialism. Thus he pionounces that ".it is not a positive being,
but an inteiiogative being which uefines life." (N 1S6) Inueeu, Neileau-Ponty
iepeateuly stiesses this "negative piinciple" within the oiganism. (N 1SS) What
uoes he mean by this. The "negative piinciple," he explains somewhat obliquely, "is
less iuentity-with-self than non-uiffeience-with-self. This absence becomes a factoi
only by negation of its own negation." But unlike what is founu in Begel, the "uouble
negation" nevei becomes iesolveu into a "conciete whole," such as Life, uou, Spiiit,
oi .#, E#C,(DD. In the case of a Begelianism, Neileau-Ponty obseives ciitically,

SS1
Theie aie seveial stunning "holistic" metaphois anu images in ;!, foi example that of miiiois
facing one anothei, in which we finu ".a couple moie ieal than eithei of |the miiiois inuiviuuallyj."
(;! 1S9)
189
"Life woulu be Spiiit-in-itself, anu Spiiit woulu be life foi-itself. But life is not yet Spiiit in-itself. We
finu in Begel the same ietiospective illusion as in Aiistotle. To giasp life in the things is to giasp a
lack in the things as such." (N 1S7)

What Neileau-Ponty seems to mean is heie 1) that the oiganism lacks an "in-itself,"
anu hence (obviously) cannot be the "in-itself" of Spiiit, anu 2) that this "lack"
constitutes (oi is a conuition of) what it means to be "alive." This negativity is
inteitwineu with a ceitain inteiioiity; foi theie is ".a natuial negativity, an
inteiioiity of the living oiganism." (N 21u) But this is not to say that life is a "foi-
itself," a consciousness. }ust as Natuie was saiu to be neithei subject noi object, the
same holus foi the oiganism as such. (We might iecall that Busseil stiuggleu with
this veiy issue in !"#$% !!, when uiscussing animality anu the soul.) But this
inteiioiity has to uo with the symbolic uepth of living beings, a meaning-
geneiativity which is ieflecteu in the stiuctuie of behavioi (anu the quasi-inteiioiity
of the @AB#=)
kt\
), not in the piesence of a (substantial) "consciousness." Compaiing
machines anu animals (excepting the limit-case as it weie of the simplest of
oiganisms, which Neileau-Ponty calls "animal-machines"), the philosophei

SS2
In auuition to oiganic holism, Neileau-Ponty assigns a paiticulai impoitance to the concept of the
@AB#=), as uevelopeu by legenuaiy ethologist }akob von 0exkll. (N 167) The untianslatable teim
(which we, following Keisten, hau eailiei tianslateu as "the suiiounuing woilu" in iefeience to
Busseil's notion in !"#$% !!), is uefineu best thiough Neileau-Ponty's own uesciiptions of it anu its
significance. Be uesciibes it as "|maikingj the uiffeience between the woilu such as it exists in itself,
anu the woilu as the woilu of the living being." That is, it is beyonu the uistinction of the "objective"
anu the "subjective." Essentially, it is the woilu of an animalan animal =(D#Lwoilu, in effect. "The
@AB#=) is the woilu implieu by the movement of the animal, anu that iegulates the animal's
movements by its own stiuctuie."
SS2
(N 17S) Anu again: "|Itj exists foi the behavioi of the animal, but
not necessaiily in its consciousness; it is the enviionment of behavioi as 'opposeu to the geogiaphical
enviionment.'" (0exkll himself labels the "@AB#=)" of highei animals the "'#C#>B#=)." (N 172)) The
@AB#=) is key to the explanation of animal behavioi because ".between the situation anu the
movement of the animal, theie is a ielation of meaning which is what the expiession @AB#=)
conveys." (N 17S) Anu finally: "The notion of the @AB#=) no longei allows us to consiuei the
oiganism in its ielation to the exteiioi woilu, as an effect of the exteiioi woilu, oi as a cause. The
@AB#=) is not piesenteu in fiont of the animal like a goal; it is not piesent like an iuea, but as a theme
that haunts consciousness." (N 178)
190
concluues: "Theie is no opeiating meaning within the machine, but only within the
living thing." (N 16S) The machine is puie exteiioiity in ielation to life, a meie
simulacium, while on the siue of puie inteiioiity woulu lie piesumably a fully
uevelopeu anu ieflective egoic consciousness. Neileau-Ponty's biief but fascinating
commentaiy on machines anu life culminates in a peiceptive iemaik on aitificial
intelligence. Theie is a ceitain "bau faith," he aigues, in the mouein zest foi cieating
aitificial oiganisms:

"We aie amuseu to give biith to a phenomenon of life, anu we ueny that this phenomenon iefeis to
an authentic phenomenon, even though it is inteiesting only to the extent that it is an imitation of life.
It is in this way that Nalebianche woulu not have beaten a stone as he beat his uog, saying that the
uog uiun't suffei." (N 166)

!!!+ >2- .$/01# T-(#'$-. 0"& 2+# 34%456# $7" /+# !784%456#9 >%H0$&. 0 I-H
7)04-(#)(04 :"#%P,2-"%5-"%4%?6

07 !>),3"+4)(3>
What is the place of Natuie in a geneial ontology. Bow uoes what Neileau-
Ponty is uoing in the *$)+,# lectuies infoim his uetaileu investigations of the
"visible" anu the "invisible," the "sensible" anu "sentient," "touching" anu "toucheu"
that we finu in ;!, the much bettei known woik. The existence of the *$)+,#
lectuies poses a ceitain heimeneutical challenge foi those seeking to piece togethei
Neileau-Ponty's matuie ontology. This is because many of the teims that have
become familiai to us fiom an acquaintance with Neileau-Ponty's latei woik, such
191
as "flesh," "chiasm," "ieveisibility," anu so on, appeai only spaisely in his lectuie
couises on natuie, lectuies which employ anu auopt the woiking teiminology of the
sciences anu, in some cases, the histoiy of philosophy. Even in the *$)+,# lectuies,
howevei, we can finu the same soits of insights that uiive Neileau-Ponty's
ontological vision in the moie well-known woik. The puipose of the piesent section
is to uiscuss the basic iueas of this ontology in a way that weaves the *$)+,# lectuies
anu ;! togethei, oi at least unueistanus them as possessing a common fiont.
Theie aie seveial poweiful iueas which uominate Neileau-Ponty's matuie
thinking, anu almost all of them can be consiueieu as ways to unueistanu the
"iuentity anu uiffeience" of the two oiueis of beingsensible anu sentient, objective
anu subjectiveanu of couise the "uimensionality" openeu up by theii beautiful but
often baffling style of commeice. I will tiy to show in the following seveial sections
how Neileau-Ponty's key concepts aie baseu on this unueilying "iuentity-anu-
uiffeience" theme anu a coiiesponuing type of uialectic that emeiges theiefiom.
This will open up a uiscussion that will eventually take us thiough to the enu of this
uisseitation.

E7 N#?#,%(<(=()F
The founuation of Neileau-Ponty's uialectic is the phenomenon, oi concept
(it is in fact both), of "ieveisibility." In my own ieauing, theie aie two funuamental
points of iefeience foi Neileau-Ponty iegaiuing this concept, the one histoiical anu
the othei systematic. The foimei is the minu-bouy pioblem as inheiiteu by
Bescaites, while the lattei is the phenomenon of self-sensing, the obseivation of
192
which Neileau-Ponty boiiows fiom Busseil (but expanus in ways we will see
below). We will ueal with the lattei point of iefeience fiist.
Neileau-Ponty's classic phenomenological example of ieveisibility is
Busseil's own obseivation of the ieveisibility of touch, oi the phenomenon of the
"left hanu touching the iight hanu."
SSS
Neileau-Ponty notes, like Busseil, that to
"touch" something, when that something happens to be anothei pait of one's bouy,
is also to be "toucheu" by that something. "Subject" heie becomes "object," anu vice-
veisa. The most uiamatic case is that of hanus touching one anothei; but Neileau-
Ponty extenus this phenomenon of "ieveisibility" beyonu the sense of touch to
incluue vision, which explains the title of his piojecteu woik anu the iepeateu
iefeiences to, foi example, the "stiange auhesion of the seei anu the visible." (;!
14u) Busseil hau initially uistinguisheu touching fiom vision by noticing that while
touch is ieveisible, vision is not. That is, we cannot see ouiselves seeing in the way
we can touch ouiselves touching. But Neileau-Ponty questions the valiuity of this
uistinction on two counts. Fiist, vision coulu not tiuly "see" the woilu if the woilu
uiu not "auheie" to its glance; anu seconu, even in self-touching, theie is no
complete coinciuence of sensing anu senseu"non-coinciuence" is in fact one of
Neileau-Ponty's funuamental iueas, anu it applies as tiuly to this case as to any
othei. As he explains in one chaiacteiistic passage:

"To begin with, we spoke summaiily of the ieveisibility of the seeing anu the visible, of the touching
anu the toucheu. It is time to emphasize that it is a ieveisibility always imminent anu nevei iealizeu
in fact. Ny left hanu is always on the veige of touching my iight hanu touching the things; but I nevei

SSS
Neieau-Ponty's iefeiences to this tiope anu to ieveisibility aie fiequent. Some of the most
inteiesting in the texts we aie examining incluue the following: N 217; N 224; ;! 272; ;! 141-2; ;!
147, 148; ;! 4 1S4, 1SS; ;! 22S.
193
ieach coinciuence; the coinciuence eclipses at the moment of iealization, anu one of two things
always occuis: eithei my iight hanu ieally passes ovei into the ianks of the toucheu, oi it ietains its
holu on the woilu, but then I uo not ieally touch ()my iight hanu touching, I palpate with my left
hanu only its outei coveiing." (;! 148)

Thus while it is tiue that we cannot tiuly "see ouiselves seeing," in that the eye
cannot benu its vision back upon itself, neithei, finally can touch.
SS4
Anu to the
extent that eithei sense is ieveisible, it is ieveisible in this complex manneithat
is, with a combination of iuentity anu uiffeience. As foi the ielation of touch anu
vision to one anothei, Neileau-Ponty notes that while they aie in some sense
incommensuiable (we will see below that he makes similai iemaiks conceining all
of the senses taken togethei), they aie nonetheless uniteu in one aesthesiological
nexus, ienueiing back to us a unifieu woilu: "Since the same bouy sees anu touches,
visible anu tangible belong to the same woilu." (;! 1S4)
Reveisibility is, of couise, a phenomenon we notice fiist of all with iegaiu to
the bouy, which foi its pait is ".inteiposeu |not asj a thing, an inteistitial mattei, a
connective tissue, but a %#>%(<=# D3, ()%#=D." (;! 1SS) The liveu bouy is thus always
alieauy "awaie" of itself anu the woilu, which, thiough its @AB#=), is "piesent"
befoie it immanently anu not meiely as an exteinality. But Neileau-Ponty's
uiscouise about the "bouy-subject," while legitimate in its own iight, hau tenueu to
obscuie the "woilu" siue of this (liteial) equation. The woilu, natuie, the sensible
these aie the complementaiy poles to the bouy, the minu, anu sentience. Theiefoie
what we finu above all in the latei wiitings is Neileau-Ponty's pailaying the insight

SS4
Reveisibility is thus, in the woius of Bastui, "nevei finisheu anu always in the making." See:
Bastui, Fianoise. "Neileau-Ponty anu Thinking fiom Within," ti. Paul B. Nilan. Piinteu in K#,=#$+L
93>)F (> J3>)#A23,$,F 9#,%2#4)(?#. Eus. Patiick Buike anu }an van Bei veken. Bouiecht: Kluwei
Acauemic Publisheis, 199S (p. 26) Beieaftei iefeiieu to as "Bastui."
194
of ieveisibility anu the bouy into a geneial ontological piinciple, using it to meuitate
on the ieflexive uepths of Being as a whole, the subjectivity-objectivity !>#(>$>"#, as
such:

"To touch is to touch oneself. To be unueistoou as: the things aie the piolongation of my bouy anu
my bouy is the piolongation of the woilu, thiough it the woilu suiiounus me." (;! 2SS)

This move towaius geneialization is accompanieu by a moie ontologically geneial
(though somehow still thickly cainal) language than we finu in his piioi
phenomenological analyses. This language which may even come close to sounuing
like a new "metaphysics." Insteau, it is intenueu to be taken as a way to fiame the
iesults of phenomenology in a coheient oi systematic way. As I will aigue below (as
I have alieauy begun to uo in Chaptei S), Neileau-Ponty's objection to his own piioi
ieseaiches is uiiecteu piincipally to theii lack of balance, not to theii iauical
misguiueuness.
SSS

As I ieau it, theie aie basically thiee funuamental lessons oi themes Neileau-
Ponty takes fiom ieveisibility. The fiist is that of the unity oi "chiasm" of subject
anu object, touching anu toucheu, sentient anu sensible, etc.; the seconu is, in
appaient opposition to the fiist, "non-coinciuence"; anu the thiiu is the inteiplay of
iuentity anu uiffeience, chiasm anu non-coinciuence, that piouuces the paiauoxical
"sameness without iuentity" (;! 261) that we expeiience with iespect to the woilu
as well as othei people (foi example, in the paiauigmatic case of a shaking of hanus).

SSS
The case of Beiueggei is a goou one foi the sake of compaiison; his own "_#5,#" fiom
BaseinBeing to BeingBasein is not entiiely unlike Neileau-Ponty's own tuin fiom the bouy-subject
to the stiuctuies of being itself, though in Neileau-Ponty's case it is moie of a mattei of munuane
self-coiiection than it is in Beiueggei's.
195
Aftei all, the phenomenon of ieveisibility coulu not become known to us if it weie
meiely a uiffeience oi meiely an iuentity. Cleaily the sensible anu the sentient aie
not simply )B3 but iathei in some way 3># (oi else how coulu they be ieveisible anu
simply "tiaue places".), anu yet they $,# two, since if they weie simply 3>#, they
coulu not piouuce an expeiience oi the "uistance" of minu anu things. This
inteiciossing of iuentity anu uiffeience also helps to explain why Neileau-Ponty
speaks of the "inuivision" (;! 2u8, 2SS) of Being in the same bieath as its "self-
splitting." Fuithei, it is embouieu in Neileau-Ponty's iecipiocal expiessions
"uiffeience without contiauiction" anu "iuentity without supeiposition." (;! 1SS)
As I mentioneu above, Neileau-Ponty also uevelops his basic ontological
iueas in explicit iefeience to the histoiy of philosophy, especially mouein
philosophy anu the minu-bouy pioblem as it emeiges in Bescaites. This becomes
abunuantly cleai in the *$)+,# lectuies, wheie Bescaites emeiges as his main
philosophical "iival"though haiuly in the Nanichean teims this teim coulu be
taken in.
SS6
Neileau-Ponty states Bescaites' uifficulty (which is also his own) in the
following teims:

"Theie is an extiaoiuinaiy uifficulty in thinking accoiuing to both the fiist anu the seconu oiuei
|physical anu mentalj at the same time. It is uifficult to conceive the soul anu the bouy as one anu the
same thing, while at the same time thinking of them as uistinct. @>(3> $>" "(%)(>4)(3> $,#G 53B#?#,G
<3)5 ,#f+(,#"G F#) )5#F $,# +>)5(>H$<=# <3)5 $) )5# %$A# )(A#7" (N 17-8, my emphasis)

This quote iefeis to Neileau-Ponty's iuea of non-coinciuence, as well as that of
inteitwininghence, the Caitesian pioblematic teaches us the same lessons taught

SS6
It is inteiesting to note in this iegaiu that N. C. Billon piesents Neileau-Ponty's philosophy as a
"ciitical assessment of Caitesianism" thioughout his woik, K#,=#$+L93>)FM% V>)3=3CF. (Bloomington:
Inuiana 0niveisity Piess, 1988) (The quoteu phiase is fiom p. 6 of that woik).
196
by the phenomenon of self-sensing. Caitesian uualism has to be ieplaceu with
anothei, moie flexible anu uialectical mouel. Accoiuingly, Bastui asseits that
Neileau-Ponty's "entiie philosophical unueitaking leu him to piomote a kinu of
thought which woulu no longei oppose inteiioiity anu exteiioiity, the subject with
the woilu, stiuctuies with living expeiience."
SS7
(Bastui 2S)

J7 Q=#%5
The notion of the "flesh" (45$(,) is meant to convey the commonality of both
"oiueis of being," subjective anu objective, while iefusing to synthesize them into a
soliu oi substantial "this." It is not a 4$+%$ %+( oi a Spinozistic "substance," much less
a neutial "substiate" of being. It has ".no name in tiauitional philosophy" since it is
neithei subject noi object but something else entiiely, a kinu of "element" (;! 146)
oi the site of an ontological exchange that ()%#=D comes close to uefining what
Neileau-Ponty means by "wilu being."
SS8
This becomes cleaiei when Neileau-Ponty
aligns the flesh with the iuea of "life" he is ueveloping in the *$)+,# lectuies:

SS7
Bastui also uses one of Neileau-Ponty's moie inteiesting tiopes, that of naicissism, thiough
which to unueistanuanu subveit oui own potential A(%+>"#,%)$>"(>C ofNeileau-Ponty's basic
insight into the way the "seei anu the visible" ielate. Thus while at fiist it seems as though the
naicissist is "egocentiic" in the way he sees 5(A%#=D in the 3<c#4) (think of Naicissus staiing into the
ponu), nonetheless this is not the "seconu, moie piofounu meaning of naicissism," which is the
"feeling |that one isj lookeu at by things, by an inveision of the look that tiansfoims subjective
activity into ontological passivity, so that vision no longei has an iuentifiable authoi, so that vision
becomes geneial visibility." (Bastui Su) This notion that it is not only we that look at things but
things that =33H $) +% is one of the most oiiginal anu challenging of Neileau-Ponty's thoughts, though
it can be seen to follow logically fiom the notion of "ieveisibility."
SS8
The flesh can be imagineu as a fielu of "assemblage" anu "uehiscence" of sentience anu sensibility,
similai peihaps to watei oi aii (hence the notion of "element"), in the sense of peimitting anu
facilitating foims of cieation anu uestiuction, coming-togethei anu coming-apait.
197
"It is not that life is a powei of being oi a spiiit, but iathei, that we install ouiselves in peiceiveu
beingbiute being, in the sensible, (> )5# D=#%5 wheie theie is >3 =3>C#, )5# $=)#,>$)(?# 3D )5# (>L()%#=D
$>" )5# D3,L()%#=D, wheie peiceiveu being is eminently in being."
SS9
(N 21u, my emphasis)

Inueeu, what Neileau-Ponty is getting at with this concept of the flesh is often best
unueistoou lateially, thiough othei, ielateu notions, incluuing "natuie" oi "wilu
Being," as we can see fiom the following (uense) "woiking note":

"Solution: iecaptuie the chilu, the altei ego, the unieflecteu within myself by a lateial, pie-analytic
paiticipation, which is peiception, +#<#,%45,#()#> by uefinition, intentional tiansgiession. When I
peiceive the chilu, he is given piecisely in a ceitain uiveigence (cait) (3,(C(>$)(>C 2,#%#>)$)(3> 3D )5#
+>2,#%#>)$<=#) anu the same foi my altei ego, anu the same foi the pie-analytic thing. Beie is the
common tissue of which we aie maue. The wilu Being." (;!, 2uS)

This passage ieveals that foi Neileau-Ponty we aie always alieauy, in peiception,
sepaiateu off fiom ouiselvesoi fiom something, as it weie, with which we aie still
connecteu, with which we shaie a togetheiness, anu of couise which is also the veiy
site of oui conjunction, since it makes possible the expeiience of thingsoi
"phenomena"in consciousness. Thus it seems what flesh, wilu being, the "common
tissue" oi "element," etc., aie tiying to name, is piecisely the phenomenon of
iuentity-anu-uiffeience of sensible anu sentient oiueis, a piimoiuial inteitwining
that expiesses itself, paiauoxically, in a ceitain "sepaiation." The flesh tuins out to
be an inevitable coiollaiy to ieveisibility itself; it is the flesh that "is" ieveisible,
moving between the "flesh of the bouy" anu the "flesh of the woilu."
S6u
That the flesh

SS9
In one place he even equates the flesh with Natuie. Be tells himself: "Bo a psychoanalysis of
Natuie: it is the flesh, the mothei." (;! 267) Neileau-Ponty bioaches the concept of the flesh towaius
the enu of his thiiu *$)+,# lectuie, itself contempoianeous with the wiiting of the uiaft of ;!. Inueeu,
some of his most ievealing thoughts on the flesh occui in these lectuies.
S6u
Fieu Evans makes much the same point when he obseives: "The flesh holus seeis anu the visible
togethei (they aie of the same flesh), while still iespecting theii uiffeience anu keeping them apait
(as iespectively, the flesh of the bouy anu the flesh of the woilu)." Evans, Fieu. "Chiasm anu Flesh."
198
is at the heait of ieveisibility also explains why Neileau-Ponty calls the flesh the
"miiacle that is the sense oigan." (N 2u9) As we have seen, the sense oigan, foi
example the skin in its tactility, uemonstiates this ieveisibility in a paiauigmatic
way.
The iuentity, as it weie, of inteitwining anu sepaiation (%6C,6C$)(3>) is
paiallel with that of uistance anu pioximity, which uefines oui stiange intimacy
with things, even as they iemain outsiue what in Busseilian pailance is calleu the
"spheie of immanence." Inueeu, Neileau-Ponty takes the notion of an "immanent
tianscenuency" of things in consciousness to its logical conclusion:

"By uefinition peiception puts us in the piesence of a uefinitively opaque teim. In othei woius, the
Natuie that we peiceive is as uistant anu as close as possible, anu foi the same ieasons. Theie is
nothing between me anu the Natuie that I peiceive. When I peiceive a thing, I cannot conceive of a
peiception inteiposeu between me anu the object." (N 118)

Be ieiteiates the same iuea in the ;!:

".this uistance is not the contiaiy of this pioximity, it is ueeply consonant with it, it is synonymous
with it." (;! 1SS)

Anu in a similai vein:

vision uoes not completely blenu into visible; nonetheless we aie close to it, palpation, gaze envelops
things, clothes them with its own flesh. (;! 1S1)

In: K#,=#$+L93>)FI _#F J3>4#2)%. Eus. Rosalyn Bipiose anu }ack Reynolus. Stocksfielu: Acumen, 2uu8
(p. 191) Beieaftei "Evans."
199
It is impoitant to iealize that "uistance" is in this sense a ciucial concept
S61
insofai
as it is piecisely such uistantiation that is uenieu, oveilookeu, suppiesseu, anu
"foigotten" by both flat-natuialistic anu iuealistic ontologies. But Neileau-Ponty's
innovation is to unueistanu, in a ueeply Beiaclitean way, this uistance as
constitutive of anu uefining of its seeming opposite, pioximity, in the matiix of
peiception. We $,# what we see, which also means, once again, that what we see
%##% +% as well, in a way that tianscenus meie metaphoi. Peiception is of couise
equivalent to the bouy, U#(<, in the sense that to peiceive is to be coipoieal, anu
vice-veisa. Thus Neileau-Ponty obseives, ".The thickness of the bouy, fai fiom
iivaling that of the woilu, is on the contiaiy the sole means I have to go unto the
heait of things, <F A$H(>C AF%#=D $ B3,=" $>" <F A$H(>C )5#A D=#%5." (;! 1SS) In this
way the bouy is not simply the "bouy-subject" of the 95#>3A#>3=3CF 3D 9#,4#2)(3>,
but that pole of the "bouy-woilu" ciicuit now having been nameu the "flesh"; inueeu,
it is the "flesh of the bouy."
S62

In stiessing the entwinement of sensibility anu sentience ovei Caitesian-
style uualism, Neileau-Ponty becomes acutely awaie of the neeu to stiess theii
uiffeience as well, yet of couise without lapsing back into uualism. To expiess the
complexity of this ielationship, what Neileau-Ponty seaiches foi is a kinu of
uialecticbut what kinu of uialectic emeiges. To begin with, it cannot be a uialectic
of "synthesis," since it must incluue non-coinciuence, somehow, at its coie. Yet non-

S61
The iuea of "uistance" has been emphasizeu iecently in a woik by Renauu Baibaias: .#%(,# $>"
.(%)$>4#I !>),3"+4)(3> )3 $ 95#>3A#>3=3CF 3D 9#,4#2)(3>7 Ti. Paul B. Nilan. Stanfoiu 0niveisity Piess,
2uu6
S62
Compaie: "The woilu seen is not 'in' my bouy, anu my bouy is not 'in' the woilu ultimately: flesh
applieu to a flesh, the woilu neithei suiiounus it noi is suiiounueu by it." (;! 1S8)
200
coinciuence is a function, iionically, of a ceitain iuentity of seei anu seen. As
Neileau-Ponty explains in a woiking note:

"The veiy pulp of the sensible, what is inuefinable in it, is nothing else than the union in it of the
'insiue' with the 'outsiue,' the contact in thickness of self with self.The absolute of the 'sensible' is
this stabilizeu explosion i.e. involving ietuin."
S6S

That such a "coinciuence" is incomplete, nevei-finisheu, always-in-the-making, etc.,
helps to explain why facticity alone cannot explain existence, that is, why
tianscenuence oi self-uistantiationwhich aie the twin bases of the possibility of
ieflection anu the "tianscenuental attituue" as a ieflective stanceaie equally
necessaiy ueteiminants of the existential situation.

.7 !"#>)()F $>" .(DD#,#>4#G )5# V># $>" )5# K$>FI .(A#>%(3>% 3D K#,=#$+L93>)FM%
.($=#4)(4

The unity oi "chiasm" of minu anu woilu, spiiit anu natuie, geneiates a sense
of a kinu of "pie-establisheu haimony" (;! 1SS) as well as a sense of piimoiuial, but
stiictly unthematizable, mutual belonging, of the two nonetheless-uistinguishable
oiueis. Neileau-Ponty tieats this haimony usually as a biute fact of soits, though he
uoes at times unueistanu it as expiessing a ueepei logic of iecipiocity: ".since
vision is a palpation with the look, it must also be insciibeu in the oiuei of being
that it uiscloses to us; he who looks must not himself be foieign to the woilu that he
looks at." (;! 1S4) Neileau-Ponty expiesses this iuea of haimony in many waysfoi

S6S
;! 268. Elsewheie Neileau-Ponty iefeis to this "explosion" as the "uehiscence" oi "64$,)" that
maiks the flight of being fiom itselfwhich is neveitheless, as Begel says, a ietuin to itself. See also:
"The tiue philosophy |is toj appiehenu what makes the leaving of oneself be a ietiiing into oneself,
anu vice veisa.uiasp this chiasm, this ieveisal. That is the minu." (;! 199) Relateuly, elsewheie
Neileau-Ponty uesciibes the flesh as an "anonymity innate to myself." (;! 1S9)
201
example, with iegaiu to natuie within anu without: "By the natuie in us, we can
know Natuie, anu iecipiocally it is fiom ouiselves that living beings anu even space
speak to us."
S64
(N 2uS) Cential to this notion is the ultimate continuity of the
visible anu the invisible: "The supeificial pellicle of the visible is only foi my vision
anu foi my bouy. But the uepth beneath this suiface contains my bouy anu hence
contains my vision. Ny bouy as a visible thing is containeu within the full spectacle."
(;! 1S8) Again, this is a continuity "inteiiupteu," but not befoie it makes itself
known $% a continuity. Thus I woulu wholly agiee with Fieu Evans that ".the
uiiection of tiuth Neileau-Ponty speaks of, even if it can nevei be fulfilleu in
piinciple, uoes seem to put a piemium on peiceptual anu epistemological
conveigence iathei than uiveigence." (Evans, 191)
0f couise, the notion of the flesh has geneiateu many contioveisies anu
misunueistanuings, one of them being that Neileau-Ponty is a monist anu that the
flesh is, as alieauy alluueu to negatively above, a kinu of ontological substiate.
Neileau-Ponty ceitainly is a >3>L"+$=(%); he uoes not use the woiu, now associateu
with stiains of "Eastein" (especially Buuuhist) philosophy, but I think this much can
be aumitteu. Foi example, he makes cleai in one place: "Theie is no intelligible
woilu, )5#,# (% the sensible woilu."
S6S
(;! 214) Yet fiom this alone it uoes not follow
that Neileau-Ponty is a monist. Bis point in this quote, foi example, is that the
"invisible" is 3D this woilu, it is "that which inhabits this woilu, sustains it, anu
ienueis it visible, its own anu inteiioi possibility, the Being of this |visible, sensiblej

S64
Compaie: ;! 99 ".the homogeneity of the measuieu anu the measuiing implies that the subject
makes common cause with space."
S6S
In some places, "Natuie" is equateu (oi aligneu) with the "sensible." See, foi example: "The
sensible, Natuie, tianscenu the past piesent uistinction." (;! 267)
202
being." (;! 1S1) 0i stateu in othei teims: "Neaning is (>?(%(<=#, but the invisible is
not the contiauictoiy of the visible: the visible itself has an invisible innei
fiamewoik (A#A<,+,#), anu the in-visible is the seciet counteipait of the visible, it
appeais only within it." (;! 21S) What we see heie is a kinu of ieflexivity that is
totally foieign to, say, Spinoza's monistic system, though to be faii, Spinoza's "uual
attiibute" theoiy is not wholly incompatible with Neileau-Ponty's intentions. The
mattei is highly complex, chiefly because Neileau-Ponty is tiying to ie-uiaw the
teims of this veiy uistinction between "monism" anu "uualism."
It is impoitant, howevei, to uo some uisambiguation at this stage. Theie aie
actually two uiffeient kinus of questions with iespect to the question of "monism."
Theie is monism (oi pluialism) of )F2#% of beingSpinoza may not fit this categoiy,
but Beikeley, }ames, oi Quine uoanu a monism of just how A$>F beings theie aie,
that is, just one (a cosmic whole, substance, etc.) oi many (monaus, Aiistotelian
substances, etc.). Regaiuing this lattei question of monism oi pluialism, what is
ieally key foi Neileau-Ponty is the piinciple of a unity (> the many. Evans put it this
way:

"What |Neileau-Pontyj offeis is.closei to what we might call a 'unity composeu of uiffeience' iathei
than a collection of sepaiate, meiely exteinally ielateu entities oi a unity foimeu thiough uomination
by one of the elements of that unityhe eschews, in othei woius, both pluialism anu monism."
(Evans 191)

Neileau-Ponty illustiates the iuea of unity-in-many thiough the expiession "total
pait," that is, a pait of a whole which, even as it is a pait, captuies the whole, as it
weie, "paitially." As an example of what Neileau-Ponty means by "total pait," let us
203
consiuei what he says about the case of the senses (the quote is long but veiy
impoitant in illustiating what Neileau-Ponty is getting atpossibly a tiuly
ievolutionaiy new contiibution to the ancient puzzle of the one-anu-the-many):

"Each 'sense' is a 'woilu,' i.e. absolutely incommunicable foi the othei senses, anu yet constiuing a
%3A#)5(>C which, thiough its stiuctuie, is fiom the fiist 32#> upon the woilu of the othei senses, anu
with them foims one sole Being. . The 'Woilu' is this whole wheie each 'pait,' when one takes it foi
itself, suuuenly opens unlimiteu uimensionsbecomes a )3)$= 2$,). Now this paiticulaiity of the
coloi, of the yellow, anu this univeisality aie not a 43>),$"(4)(3>, aie )3C#)5#, sensoiiality itself: it is
by the same viitue that the coloi, the yellow, at the same time gives itself as a 4#,)$(> being anu as a
"(A#>%(3>, the expiession of #?#,F 23%%(<=# <#(>C.What is piopei to the sensible (as to language) is
to be iepiesentative of the whole, not by a sign-signification ielation, oi by the immanence of the
paits in one anothei anu in the whole, but because each pait is )3,> +2 fiom the whole, comes with
its ioots, encioaches upon the whole, tiansgiesses the fiontieis of the otheis." (;! 218)

These poweiful statements essentially compiise the heait of Neileau-Ponty's
answei to the question of the ielation of the manyfoi example, many subjects, oi
multiple oiueis of beingto the one oi the whole, anu what he says of the senses, oi
of colois, applies to many othei things, fiom the cooiuinateu anatomicalbehavioial
uevelopment of oiganisms, alieauy lookeu at, to the "becoming of a painting" out of
many stiokes of the biush anu even to sexuality.
S66
It is impoitant to stiess all of this
because of Neileau-Ponty's own iemaik, quoteu above, that the piinciple of
"totality" might be the cential one in all philosophy.
This quasi-holistic appioach is chaiacteiistic of how Neileau-Ponty ueals
with issues of opposition anu uialectic. Foi it in fact goes specifically to his
unueistanuing of what constitutes the "complementaiity" of opposites. "Theie aie

S66
Theie is something analogous in Neileau-Ponty's uesciiption of what Natisse's methou of
painting anu the "bouy of behavioi" in the oiganism have in common: "Thieaus aie tieu up, which
come fiom eveiywheie, anu which constitute inuepenuent foims, anu the same time, he finus that
these thieaus iealize something which has a unity." (N 1S4) Elsewheie: "Thus the sexual is
coextensive with the human not as a unique cause, but as a uimension outsiue of which nothing
exists." (N 282)
204
two 'siues' of an expeiience, conjugateu anu incompossible, but complementaiy.
Theii unity is iiiecusable; it is simply as the invisible hinge on which two
expeiiences aie aiticulateu$ %#=D )3,> $2$,)7 |my emphasisj .contiauiction,
unueistoou as inteiioi to Natuie, must be assumeu. We must aumit the iuea of an
opeiating negation in Natuie..."
S67
(N 6S-66) Neileau-Ponty's use of the teim
"complementaiity," is not, I believe, acciuental. I believe it is a uelibeiate iefeience
to Bohi's theoiy of quantum mechanics by the same name, a subject to which he
uevotes a goou amount of attention in the *$)+,# lectuies themselves. (N 89-1uu) In
a sense, he applies what is tiue of sub-atomic paiticles, in paiticulai the symmetiical
applicability of mutually incompatible wave-theoiy anu coipusculai theoiy to the
uesciiption of elementaiy paiticles, to being itself: ".the two maps aie complete,
anu yet they uo not meige into one. The two paits aie total paits anu yet not
supeiposable." (;! 1S4) (Note again the iuea of a "total pait.")
In an inteiesting kinu of conveigence, Busseil scholai Sebastian Luft has
expiesseu the view that Busseil's philosophy as a whole, with its twin poles of the
"Caitesian Way" to the ieuuction anu the "Life-Woilu" methou, can itself be
summaiizeu in teims of two incommensuiable anu yet complementaiy "maps":

"Thus, the inteipietation |I piesentj attempts to oveicome the common asseition that theie is a
'contiauiction' between Busseil's Caitesian position anu his account of the life-woilu. I have tiieu to
show that a philosophical thematization of the life-woilu is not possible without a tianscenuental
question as to its oiigin in (intei-)subjectivity. In Busseil's eyes, both agenuas aie coiielative. At the
same time, I woulu like to insist that Busseil's Caitesian account of the subject anu his life-woilu
ontology piesent two uistinct anu in this sense, sepaiate piogiams. They aie piojects Busseil
puisues with uiffeient aims: Wheieas the 'Caitesian Busseil' puisues a path of scientific giounuing
anu founuationalism, the 'life-woilu Busseil' is inteiesteu in what can been calleu a heimeneutics of
the woilu of eveiyuay life. Both piojects aie set squaiely against each othei, not in the sense that

S67
The notion that Being contains its own negation ties in with the seconu of Neileau-Ponty's lessons
leaint fiom the ieveisibility of touchthat is, the impossibility of puie coinciuence oi a simple
"iuentity of opposites." (;! 2Su-1)
205
they contiauict oi cancel each othei out, but in that they puisue two uiffeient agenuas. They aie
locateu on two uiffeient 'maps.' 0ne can puisue one while completely neglecting the othei.
S68

In this way, a uistinctly Neileau-Pontian concept (piesumably inuepenuently
aiiiveu at by Luft) iionically comes usefully to uefine the caieei aic of Busseil
himself.

!F+ 8%"(4'.)%"

Neileau-Ponty begins the *$)+,# couises, as we have seen, with an
investigation into the histoiy of philosophy. Be latei shifts his inteiest to an
examination of contempoiaiy science. But these 2,(A$ D$4(# unconnecteu uiscouises
aie, as is customaiy in Neileau-Ponty's singulaily syncietic appioach, uniteu in a
common puipose. The conjunction is ievealeu in telling woiking note, in which the
philosophei speaks of what is to be uiscusseu in ;!:

"I must theiefoie show in the intiouuction that the being of science is itself a pait oi aspect of the
objectifieu Infinity |of Bescaitesj anu that the VDD#>5#() of the @AB#=) is opposeu to both of these |i.e.,
Caitesian ontology anu sciencej. Whence the chapteis on Bescaites, Leibniz, Westein ontology,
which inuicate the histoiico-intentional anu ontological implications of the being of science."
S69
(;!
176)

S68
Luft, Sebastian. "Busseil's Theoiy of the Phenomenological Reuuction: Between Life-Woilu anu
Caitesianism." In N#%#$,45 (> 95#>3A#>3=3CF S4, 2uu4 (p. 226)
S69
Relateuly: "I claiify my philosophical pioject by iecouise to Bescaites anu Leibniz." (;! 177)

206
Neileau-Ponty's notion of Natuie is "polymoiphous." Phenomena such as life anu
animality, wholeness anu oiganic foim, giowth anu cieativity, "natuial" oiigins anu
piocessesthese aie all phenomena that ieveal uiffeient clues about the non-fully-
constitutable coie of the woilu anu of oui own humanity. Natuiality uoes not
exhaust the meaning of Being, but it uoes enciicle all beings in its beith, anu
ultimately, no one evei fully bieaks away fiom it, just as Neileau-Ponty alieauy
obseiveu about the "natuial attituue" of Busseil. Thus it is fitting to enu with the
following quotation, which neatly summaiizes Neileau-Ponty's attituue towaius
natuie anu its place in ontology:

"Natuie. By examining it, we have ietiieveu eveiything, not that eveiything is in natuie, but because
eveiything is oi becomes natuial foi us. :5#,# $,# >3 %+<%)$>)($= "(DD#,#>4#% <#)B##> 25F%(4$= *$)+,#G
=(D#G $>" A(>"7 |my emphasis.j We passeu between causal-iealist thinking anu philosophical iuealism,
because we founu in biute, savage, veitical, piesent Being a "(A#>%(3> that is not of iepiesentation
anu not that of the In-itself." (N 212)

207
8209#-$ S)Q-; M-$4-0'P,%"#6 0"& <'..-$4 %" #2- U'-.#)%" %1 #2-
,0$0&%N %1 /'3C-(#)Q)#6 0"& I0#'$-

!+ !"#$%&'(#)%"

Neileau-Ponty's embiace of "paiauox" is iauical, both in the sense that it
goes to the heait of his philosophical pioject anu in the sense that it is veiy thoiough
inueeu. It coulu be aigueu that post-Kantian Continental philosophy, especially in
the twentieth centuiy, has come to take a moie favoiable view of paiauox than uiu
its pieuecessois; one may think heie of Kieikegaaiu's famous embiace of the
"absolute paiauox" of Chiist, Naicel's "Nysteiy of Being," Beiueggei's "heimeneutic
ciicle" anu paiauoxical "always alieauy," even aspects of Ricoeui's heimeneutics of
iuentity (as eviuenceu in the title of one of his majoi woiks, V>#%#=D $% 0>3)5#,). The
uiffeience is that Neileau-Ponty maue of paiauox a cential thematic in its own iight.
That the human minu is leu to expiess oi eluciuate its situation in paiauoxical
teimssomething Neileau-Ponty steaufastly maintainsis a momentous fact foi
someone who aigues, as Neileau-Ponty uoes, foi the intimacy of subjectivity anu
Being itself. Foi it means that Being, anu not only consciousness, is contiauictoiy on
the insiue. Boes this mean Neileau-Ponty iejects the law of non-contiauiction.
Neileau-Ponty's application of this law (which he iaiely ueals with in just those
teims) goes as fai as the intelligibility of Being to iational thought goes; but he is
208
willing to conceue (anu in fact insists) that Being in its piimoiuiality is ineffable anu
even necessaiily soanu that, accoiuingly, iational thinking ("ieflection," "the
tianscenuental attituue") is less than ultimate.
If tiuth is unavailable to us thiough concepts, howevei, it is neveitheless
$?$(=$<=F unavailable. It uoes not meiely eluue us, it eluues us <#4$+%# () %+,,3+>"%
+% anu penetiates us to the coie. Noieovei, theie is a way in which thought can
unueistanu itself anu employ its conceptsthiough "uialectical" anu "hypei-
uialectical" thinkingthat seives to biing the "contiauictions" of unieflecteu Being
into a fiuitful ielationship with ieflectivity. The iesult of this exchange aie the
paiauoxes of philosophy, whose iigoious expiession is no less challenging than any
mannei of "pioblem-solving" that we coulu auopt.
By "Being" Neileau-Ponty uoes not mean to say anything uiffeient than
"expeiience" as known in "peiceptual faith." Being, which can be equateu to a laige
extent with what we have been calling "Natuie" ("wilu Being"), is expeiienceu anu
"liveu-thiough," inueeu it may be "life" itself (oi again "time," the %(># f+$ >3> of
liveu-expeiience as such) whose piimoiuial unity-in-uiffeience conceals a tiuth,
even a "logos" oi language, that ieveals itself, in the paiauoxes of thought, piecisely
$% concealeu. The sayability anu intelligibility of coie expeiientiality anu what it
uiscloses is pieseiveu, theiefoie, paitially anu as if in tiace-like outline, in the foim
of the paiauoxes of being, expeiience, time, minu, fieeuom, anu so onanu these in
tuin give life to philosophical thought, which aiise anu must ietuin to the uepths
they open up. Paiauox is thus, in Neileau-Ponty, both "pioblem" $>", as it weie,
"solution." It is the question anu the answei, the "mysteiy of being" as well as the
209
explanation of the mysteiy. In this way, paiauox is not intentionalit uoes not
"point beyonu itself" to a telos, a puipose, a foim, oi a plan. Its finality is equally a
function of its oiiginalitytheie is only the Beginning, as it weie, the biith that
eluues time by cieating it.
Philosophy is theiefoie misunueistoou by those, (>4=+"(>C O+%%#,=, who think
of it as an essentially "pioblem-solving" enteipiise. Neileau-Ponty's conception is
closei in this case to that of the latei (ciica 95(=3%325(4$= !>?#%)(C$)(3>%)
Wittgenstein, in that he woulu agiee that philosophy is bettei useu foi the puipose
of "uissolving" philosophical puzzles than solving them. But Neileau-Ponty woulu
not think of paiauoxes as linguistic confusions, iathei as moments of "contiauiction"
oi "ciisis" signifying the bieak uown anu limits of signification befoie the
unsignifiable veiity at the heait of the being of the woilu. Neileau-Ponty anu
Wittgenstein aie peihaps equally insistent on the centiality of language to thought
anu even human expeiience. In the case of the foimei, of couise, one must always
keep in minu his famous thesis of the "piimacy of peiception," a piimacy that
ultimately expiesses a "faith" in Being that is its own meaning oi meaning-fount,
fiom which language anu its "iueal" meanings aiise anu, ovei time, also uissolve.
This is anothei way of saying that foi Neileau-Ponty, theie is still, aftei all, an
"absolute," a "ieal" that cannot be uemaicateu so much as liveu, anu it is piomiseu in
the simplest act of peiception, which, thiough the "phenomenon," piomises
uisclosuie of the woiluthe fiist contiauiction (subjectivity anu objectivity) that
the peiceptual faith haimonizes in its effoitless way. Neileau-Ponty is to this extent
210
a "iealist"though the "ieal" can nevei be known puiely as the ieal, but only that
which escapes language linguistically, so to speak.
The latei Wittgenstein is of couise notoiiously mute about metaphysical
questions, but foi Neileau-Ponty, the knowable unknowability of Being is the
oveiiiuing theme of all ieflection, while the stiuggles of philosophy itself aie taken
as symptomatic not of pathological habits of linguistic behavioi but, at theii best anu
most authentically appioacheu, of the iigois of thinking thiough the uialectical
stiuctuie of phenomena.
In this final, culminating chaptei of the piesent uisseitation, my focus is
mostly on Neileau-Ponty, but I also biiefly examine anu compaie Busseil's
appioach to paiauox to Neileau-Ponty's thiough the foimei's famous uiscussion in
the J,(%(%
kmq
of the "paiauox of subjectivity." Funuamentally, I will show that while
foi Neileau-Ponty paiauox itself plays a funuamental iole in explicating the
meaning of phenomenology, foi Busseil, phenomenology is piecisely a means to
solve paiauoxesa methou to enu all philosophical uisputes, in fact.
S71
In this way
Busseil iepiesents the mainstieam, one might say, of philosophy in the "Westein"
philosophical tiauitionas well as, impoitantly foi the themes of this uisseitation,
the implicit paiauigm of "scientific thinking," which sees itself in similaily "pioblem-
solving" teims. Theie is, of couise, an inteiesting way in which even Busseil

S7u
Busseil, Eumunu. :5# J,(%(% 3D /+,32#$> 14(#>4#% $>" :,$>%4#>"#>)$= 95#>3A#>3=3CFI 0>
!>),3"+4)(3> )3 95#>3A#>3=3C(4$= 95(=3%325F7 Ti. Baviu Caii. Evanston: Noithwestein 0niveisity
Piess, 197u. Beieaftei "J,(%(%."
S71
See: Busseil, Eumunu. />4F4=32$#"($ E,()$>>(4$ 0,)(4=#. In: J3==#4)#" g3,H%, vol. 6. Ti. Thomas
Sheehan anu Richaiu E. Palmei. Boiuiecht: Kluwei Acauemic Publisheis, 1997
211
embiaces something like the centiality of "paiauox"but only in the sense of its
being a "ieveisal of common sense"; this is a case of simple homonymy.
Neileau-Ponty's incieasingly sophisticateu ieliance on uialectic becomes
entiiely explicit in :5# ;(%(<=# $>" )5# !>?(%(<=#
km\
, in which he enuoises it
wholeheaiteuly, while tiying to uistinguish it fiom its Begelian (anu even Saitiean)
veisions. Thus I biiefly examine this philosophical appiopiiation anu the ways in
which Neileau-Ponty uoes anu uoes not conceive of philosophy as a uialectic.
Finally, anu ielateuly, I look at Neileau-Ponty's use anu analysis of the notion of
"ieflection," along with "hypei-ieflection," his label foi the philosophical attituue
once philosophy has been tiansfoimeu fiom a pioblem-solving to a self-
pioblematizing (anu theieby "self-iecoveiing") enteipiise.
S7S

!!+ M-$4-0'P,%"#6=. ,2)4%.%926 %1 ,0$0&%N

07 V?#,?(#B 3D K#,=#$+L93>)FM% N#D#,#>4#% )3 9$,$"3[
The seeu of Neileau-Ponty's appioach to paiauox, anu Being as a paiauoxical
phenomenon that is (quasi-)intelligible in thought thiough a movement of

S72
Neileau-Ponty, Nauiice. :5# ;(%(<=# $>" )5# !>?(%(<=#7 Ti. Alphonso Lingis. Noithwestein
0niveisity Piess: Evanston, Illinois, 1969. Beieaftei "vI7"
S7S
Note: Neileau-Ponty achieves gieat luciuity when it comes to his matuie epistemological views. In
fact, he speaks moie cleaily foi his own positions than any paiaphiase coulu uo. Foi this ieason, I
iely in this chaptei moie than I have to this point on lengthy uiiect quotations fiom the souice
himself. This is paiticulaily the case foi ceitain sections fiom the vI, especially chaptei 1, "Reflection
anu Inteiiogation."
212
contiolleu contiauiction (uialectic), aie to be founu alieauy in this uense anu
staitling passage, which is woith quoting in full, fiom :5# 9,(A$4F 3D 9#,4#2)(3>
km]
:

"It is tiue that we aiiive at contiauictions when we uesciibe the peiceiveu woilu. Anu it is also tiue
that if theie weie such a thing as a non-contiauictoiy thought, it woulu excluue the woilu of
peiception as a simple appeaiance. But the question is piecisely to know whethei theie is such a
thing as logically coheient thought oi thought in the puie state. This is the question Kant askeu
himself. 0ne of Kant's uiscoveiies, whose consequences we have not yet fully giaspeu, is that all oui
expeiience of the woilu is thioughout a tissue of concepts which leau to iiieuucible contiauictions
S7S

if we attempt to take them in an absolute sense oi tiansfei them into puie being, anu that they
neveitheless founu the stiuctuie of all phenomena, oi eveiything which (% foi us. . I wish only to
point out that the accusation of contiauiction is not uecisive, (D )5# $4H>3B=#"C#" 43>),$"(4)(3>
$22#$,% $% )5# ?#,F 43>"()(3> 3D 43>%4(3+%>#%%. |my emphasisj . Theie is a vain foim of contiauiction
which consists in affiiming two theses which excluue one anothei at the same time anu unuei the
same aspect. . Theie is the steiile non-contiauiction of foimal logic |veisusj the justifieu
contiauictions of tianscenuental logic. The objection with which we aie conceineu woulu be
aumissible only if we coulu put a system of eteinal tiuths in the place of the peiceiveu woilu, fieeu
fiom its contiauictions." (Piimacy 18)

That we cannot put up such a system of "eteinal tiuths" is less a ciiticism of
Busseilian methou, peihaps, which aiguably alieauy pioblematizes the question of
"eteinity" thiough its embiace of oiiginaiy tempoiality, than of classical
metaphysical thought, paiticulaily its anti-paiauoxical anu anti-uialectical
chaiactei. The above-quoteu passage states all of the funuamental themes of
paiauoxical thinking that Neileau-Ponty woulu continue to ueepen anu that, finally,
come to a staitlingly fiesh new expiession in his latei wiitings. Neileau-Ponty
makes it cleai that he is not inteiesteu in the steiile contiauiction of "A anu not A"
foi its own sake. It is only unuei ceitain conuitions, foiceu upon us by the exigencies
of liveu expeiience, that theie aiise the "justifieu contiauictions" of philosophy,

S74
Neileau-Ponty, Nauiice. "The Piimacy of Peiception anu Its Philosophical Consequences." Ti.
}ames N. Euie. In :5# 9,(A$4F 3D 9#,4#2)(3>. Eu. }ohn Wilu. Evanston: Noithwestein 0niveisity Piess,
1964. Beieaftei "Piimacy."
S7S
Compaie: "Eveiy attempt at eluciuation biings us back to the uilemmas." (vI 11) It is inteiesting
that one of the eaily woius he uses foi his methou is in fact "eluciuation." (See, foi example: vI 2S)
213
beginning alieauy with the awakening of ieflection fiom the oblivion of oui puie
"peiceptual faith," Neileau-Ponty's teim of ait foi the conuition of natuial
consciousness anu, inueeu, the natuial attituue:

"We see the things themselves, the woilu is what we see: foimulae of this kinu expiess a faith
common to the natuial man anu the philosopheithe moment he opens his eyes; they iefei to a
ueep-seateu set of mute 'opinions' implicateu in oui lives. But what is stiange about this faith is that
if we seek to aiticulate it into theses oi statements, if we ask ouiselves what is this B#, what %##(>C is,
anu what )5(>C oi B3,=" is, we entei into a labyiinth of uifficulties anu contiauictions. What
Augustine saiu of timethat it is peifectly familiai to each, but that none of us can explain it to the
otheismust be saiu of the woilu." (vI S, my emphasis on lattei)

Neileau-Ponty is wiuely known as a philosophei of "ambiguity," as I have
mentioneu, but less so as one of "paiauox." Yet the contiauictions of philosophy aie
oiganizeu, uialectical, anu fit a pattein. Ambiguity, in Neileau-Ponty's philosophy,
appeais to me as a moie inchoate-sounuing veision of what he means by "paiauox";
oi alteinately, it has a uiffeient uiscuisive function. That is, to say (foi example) that
the human being is an "ambiguous" phenomenon is to ueny, in essence, vaiious
stiictly uelineateu anu one-siueu uesciiptions of himhei oi his oi hei expeiience
("intellectualism," "empiiicism," "natuialism"). But it uoes not cleaily pose an
alteinative view. Since Neileau-Ponty has no monolithic alteinative, the alteinative
is something like "paiauox" oi "justifieu contiauiction"that is, $ =3C3% 3D $A<(C+()F.
Neileau-Ponty's iepeateu positive invocations of paiauox, paiauoxical thinking,
uilemmas, contiauiction, anu uialecticity aie constant thioughout his wiitingsbut
initially only in the backgiounu, almost like an aftei-thought. This changes as
Neileau-Ponty seeks to emphasize that honest ieflection can no longei pietenu to
uo philosophy in the mannei that tiauition has imagineu it up to this pointthat is,
214
with the tacit assumption that it can (> ,#D=#4)(3> maintain a holu on the paiauoxical
tiuth, so effoitlessly inhabiteu by eveiyuay pie-ieflective life.
It is impossible to mention all the ways in which Neileau-Ponty embiaces
paiauox oi all of the countless paiauoxes he mentions, but it is woith noting that his
main pieoccupationpeiceptionwas explaineu by him as funuamentally
paiauoxical alieauy in the 95#>3A#>3=3CF 3D 9#,4#2)(3>, in this case with iespect to
immanence anu tianscenuence, the paiauox mentioneu as cential to
phenomenology.
S76
Be iepeats the same iuea of the paiauoxicality of peiception in
9,(A$4F anu iefeis to the "inteinal paiauox of my peiception" in vI
S77
, wheie he also
speaks of the "paiauoxes of vision" anu the "figuieu enigmas, the thing anu the
woilu."
S78
The essay "The Philosophei anu Bis Shauow," uevoteu to Busseil, also
stiesses enigmas of peiception as well as the hiuuenievealeu uuality of things.
S79
In
anothei place we can finu a iefeience to the "feitile contiauiction of human
consciousness."
S8u
In the "Netaphysical in Nan," Neileau-Ponty chaiacteiizes the
task of metaphysics as one of inquiiing into paiauoxes, which, he explains in a
footnote, he even outiight calls contiauictions:

S76
Neileau-Ponty, Nauiice. :5# 95#>3A#>3=3CF 3D 9#,4#2)(3>. Ti. Colin Smith. New Yoik: Routleuge
anu Kegan Paul, 1962. Beieaftei "PP." (p. 42S) Note also the woiuing he uses in the same passage,
fuithei uown: "At the level of being it shoulu nevei be intelligible that the subject shoulu be both
>$)+,$>% anu >$)+,$)+%, infinite anu finite. But we ieuiscovei time beneath the subject, anu if we
ielate to )5# 2$,$"3[ 3D )(A#G )53%# 3D )5# <3"FG )5# B3,="G )5# )5(>CG $>" 3)5#,%, we shall unueistanu
that <#F3>" )5#%# )5#,# (% >3)5(>C )3 +>"#,%)$>"." (my emphasis)
S77
;!, 11
S78
Ibiu., 4
S79
Neileau-Ponty, Nauiice. "The Philosophei anu Bis Shauow." Ti. Richaiu N. NcCleaiy. In 1(C>%.
Evanston, Illinois: Noithwestein 0niveisity Piess, 1964 (pp. 167-8)
S8u
Neileau-Ponty, Nauiice. 1#>%# $>" *3>L1#>%#. Ti. Bubeit L. Bieyfus anu Patiicia Allen Bieyfus.
Noithwestein 0niveisity Piess, 1964. p. 96 Beieaftei "SNS"
215
"I have the iight to consiuei the contiauictions of my life as a thinking anu incainate subject, finite
anu capable of tiuth, $% +=)(A$)# $>" ),+# |my emphasisj because I have expeiienceu them anu
because they aie inteiconnecteu in the unquestionable peiception of a thing oi in the expeiience of a
tiuth. I can no longei intiouuce a 'tianscenuence in immanence' behinu me as Busseil uiu (even
tianscenuence qualifieu as hypothetical), foi I am not uou, anu I cannot veiify the co-existence of
these two attiibutes in any inuubitable expeiience."
S81

Anu in one of Neileau-Ponty's lessei known essays on Nontaigne
S82
, in the
beginning of the essay, he chiues Bescaites foi tiying to "solve" paiauox insteau of
accepting it, a veiy telling sentiment. (Nontaigne, 2u1)
Bue to the limiteu focus of this uisseitation I have hau mostly to biacket the
question of inteisubjectivity, but heie, too, Neileau-Ponty thinks in teims of
paiauox. In Soibonne lectuies, it seems that Neileau-Ponty accepts that theie is a
"contiauiction" in the fact that I cannot expeiience othei people, yet natuially uo
expeiience them, in the couise of life.
S8S
Theie is also a "contiauiction" of selfothei
at the heait of inteisubjectivity as well. (Toauvine, 248). Inteiesting heie is the
methouology of simply accepting a contiauictoiy situation anu pioceeuing fiom
theie. In the "Pieface" of 99 he uiscusses the "paiauox anu uialectic" of the "Ego anu
the Altei." (99 xiii) Among othei things, "the othei" is paiauoxical as an "I" that is
"not I" (not me), as well as an "othei" that is "not othei" (foi I cannot be myself
without the othei). All human soliuaiity, anu all human violence, one might say,
stem essentially fiom the same souice, the 2$,$"3[ of the othei (oi
inteisubjectivity).

S81
"The Netaphysical In Nan." In: SNS (p. 96)
S82
Neileau-Ponty, Nauiice. "Reauing Nontaigne." Ti. Richaiu C. NcCleaiy. In 1(C>%. Evanston, Illinois:
Noithwestein 0niveisity Piess, 1964 (pp. 198-21u). Beieaftei "Nontaigne."
S8S
Refeience founu in: Toauvine, Teu. "Neileau-Ponty's Reauing of Busseil: A Chionological
0veiview." In K#,=#$+L93>)FM% N#$"(>C 3D O+%%#,=. Eus. Teu Toauvine anu Lestei Embiee. Bouiecht:
Kluwei Acauemic Publisheis, 2uu2 (pp. 227-286). Beieaftei "Toauvine."
216
Neileau-Ponty's acceptance of paiauoxeven contiauiction, in the sense we
have seencan be gleaneu inuiiectly as well, foi example thiough his commentaiy
on othei philosopheis. We have alieauy seen this with Kant anu Nontaigne. But in
his alieauy-examineu ciitique of Beigson fiom the *$)+,# lectuies, foi example, he
comments, "We cannot iepioach Beigson foi this contiauiction, but he uoes not give
it the place that it meiits."
S84
In Beigson's voice Neileau-Ponty in one place iemaiks
favoiably that: "Beie, peiception is contiauiction iealizeu."
S8S
0i again, on Coghill's
expeiiment, also uiscusseu in Chaptei Foui:

"Coghill goes fuithei. Be shows that the matuiation of the oiganism anu the emeigence of behavioi
aie one anu the same thing. Foi the axolotl, to exist fiom heau to tail anu to swim aie the same thing.
This uouble phenomenon, B5(45 $A3+>)% )3 $ 2$,$"3[G "#?#=32% $) )5# %$A# )(A# (> )B3 43>),$"(4)3,F
"(,#4)(3>%. ." (N 144, my emphasis)

Neileau-Ponty even calls the axolotl lizaiu itself a paiauox! (N 144-S). Finally, in his
ciitical commentaiy on uuioult's conciliating appioach to Bescaites, also in the
*$)+,# lectuies, he comments that "The contiauiction |of the two oiueis, subjective
anu objectivej is constitutive of the human. The uomain of the human is always
equivocal..." (N 129)

S84
fiom Bominique Sglaiu. Ti. Robeit valliei. Noithwestein 0niveisity Piess: Evanston, Illinois, 2uuS.
Beieaftei the "*$)+,# lectuies" in the bouy of text oi "N" in citations.
S8S
Ibiu., p. S7
217
E7 9$,$"3[ $>" )5# a9#,4#2)+$= Q$()5b
If the basic paiauox of peiception is the question of tianscenuence-anu-
immanence, as we have seen uesciibeu above, the fact is that in peiceptual faith, this
is not a pioblem as such:

"The 'natuial' man holus onto both enus of the chain, thinks $) )5# %$A# )(A# that his peiception
enteis into the things anu that it is foimeu this siue of his bouy. Yet coexist as the two convictions uo
without uifficulty in the exeicise of life, once ieuuceu to theses anu to piopositions they uestioy one
anothei anu leave us in confusion." (vI 8)

Neileau-Ponty inteiestingly calls oui natuial ceitituue "unjustifiable": an
"unjustifiable ceitituue of a sensible woilu common to us that is the seat of tiuth
within us."
S86
It is "unjustifiable" of couise because it is piimoiuialpiesupposeu in
any justification (especially the justification of the "skeptic," which we will see
pointeu out below).
Neileau-Ponty also calls peiceptual faith "openness upon being." (vI 88) But
openness entails not only access but occlusion: access to woilu exists siue by siue
with occultation (inaccess): ".these two possibilities, which the peiceptual faith
keeps siue by siue within itself, uo not nullify one anothei." (vI 28) We have alieauy
of couise visiteu this notion of a siue by siue "contiauiction" in which the siues
neveitheless uo not nullify each otheiNeileau-Ponty has calleu this
"complementaiity," aftei the same notion in quantum mechanics (with whose
lessons he continues to be pieoccupieu). Thus "complementaiity" anu "paiauox"

S86
See also: vI 14 "insoluble antinomies" in peiceptual faith.
218
("contiauiction") aie closely inteitwineu, anu togethei they begin to ieveal new
folus in Neileau-Ponty's upuateu conception of "uialectic."
As we saw in the *$)+,# lectuies, Neileau-Ponty continues to iegaiu the
phenomenon of wholeness oi totality as a clue to not only the stiuctuie of being but
also the inability of thought to think Being otheiwise than paiauoxically. Totality is
of "anothei oiuei" he states in one place, in this case in teims of binoculai
peiception. (vI 7) }ust as one eye sees anu so uoes the othei, even as neithei by itself
sees the "miiacle of totality" anu uepth piesenteu in peiception (vI 8), so
philosopheis aie tiappeu in one-siueu ways to giasp Being: ".'objective' anu
'subjective' |shoulu bej iecognizeu as two oiueis hastily constiucteu within a total
expeiience, whose context must be iestoieu in all claiity." (vI 2u) Note that it is the
43>)#[) whose claiity is to be iestoieu, not the total expeiience ()%#=D. The expeiience
is alieauy claiifieu, iionically, thiough the contiauictions to which it gives iise in
philosophy, foi these aie "complementaiy" uesciiptions of the whole itselfwe
have alieauy seen how Neileau-Ponty uisposes of the "pioblem of the one anu the
many" in this way.
As a totality, "the peiceiveu woilu is beneath oi beyonu this antinomy |of
being-object anu being-subjectj." (vI 22) It is this fact which calls foi a ".ie-
examination of the notions of 'subject' anu 'object.'" Says Neileau-Ponty, "Eveiy
question, even that of simple cognition, is pait of the cential question that is
ouiselves, of that appeal foi )3)$=()F |my emphasisj to which no objective being
answeis..." (vI 1u4) Against Busseil's fiaming of phenomenology as a "iigoious
science," Neileau-Ponty offeis, "Philosophy is not a science, because science
219
believes it can soai ovei its object anu holus the coiielation of knowleuge with
being as establisheu, wheieas philosophy is the set of questions wheiein he who
questions is himself implicateu in the question." (vI 27) But even if philosophy is not
able to giasp its "object" in self-coinciuent ieflection (not least because the
ieflection must take account of itself as a factoi), it can anu mustas we will see, in
iegaius to "hypei-ieflection"take stock of its situation anu finu expiession foi the
inexpiessible "totality" in which it finus itself always alieauy. "Such is the total
situation that a philosophy must account foi. It will uo so only by aumitting the
uouble polaiity of ieflection |ieflection anu peiceptionieflecteu anu unieflecteuj
anu by aumitting that, as Begel saiu, to ietiie into oneself is also to leave oneself."
(vI 49)
The winuing mannei in which philosophy uoes anu uoes not have a way to
auuiess the contiauictoiily self-unifieu "subjective-objective" ieality of the pie-
ieflective peiceptual situation leaus Neileau-Ponty to offei a twist on the Saitiean
notion, ueiiueu by that authoi as a moibiu imaginal constiuct iuentical to the "uou"
notion of Chiistianity, of the "In-Itself-Foi-Itself." 0f couise it is Begel who
announceu his system as one in which "substance" becomes "subject" (tying the
lattei to the histoiical auvent of Chiistianity). Neileau-Ponty finus a way to steei
between Saitie anu Begel on this point, while also tiying to maintain a uistance
fiom Kant's negativistiuealist inteipietation of the Tianscenuental Bialectic:

"The tiuth of the Saitiean In-Itself-foi-itself is the intuition of puie Being anu the negintuition of
Nothingness. It seems to us on the contiaiy that it is necessaiy to iecognize in it the soliuity of myth,
that is, of an opeiative imaginaiy, which is pait of oui institution, anu which is (>"(%2#>%$<=# D3, )5#
220
"#D(>()(3> 3D E#(>C ()%#=D. With this uiffeience, we aie inueeu speaking of the same thing." (vI 8S, my
emphasis; check)

J7 9$,$"3[ $>" 95(=3%325F
Neileau-Ponty's notion of paiauox oi contiauiction can easily be
misunueistoou anu caiicatuieu. 0ne coulu always aigue with a "pio-paiauox
position" that it "peimits eveiything"
S87
oi is too schematic anu abstiact, allowing all
binaiies to be swalloweu up within it, but that is piecisely why Neileau-Ponty's
phenomenological methou, which at least stiives to be tiue to expeiience, is so
impoitant. Bialectical logic is a logic of the things themselves.
S88

Neileau-Ponty's piioiitization of paiauox shapes the way he unueistanus the
natuie of the philosophical enteipiise. Be appiovingly states that "philosophy |at its
bestj becomes the enteipiise of uesciibing living paiauoxes."
S89
Philosophy simply
"inteiiogates" the peiceptual faith. 0i, even moie piecisely, "philosophy is the
peiceptual faith questioning itself about itself." (vI 1uS) In anothei place Neileau-
Ponty comments: "Philosophy believeu it coulu oveicome the contiauictions of the
peiceptual faith by suspenuing it in oiuei to uisclose the motives that suppoit it."
(vI Su) Neileau-Ponty thus also speaks of the "ieflective vice of tiansfoiming the

S87
Foi uiscussion of such a ciitique fiom a contempoiaiy philosophei, see: Sainsbuiy, R. N.
9$,$"3[#%. New Yoik: Cambiiuge 0niveisity Piess, 199S (pp. 1S6-7)
S88
In suppoit of this iuea, see foi example on N 94-S, wheie Neileau-Ponty expiessly iejects the
notion of iefuting ueteiminism with a "uogmatic inueteiminism" which, as it weie, "logically
uispioves" ueteiminism, showing something "contiauictoiy" in it. See also fiist full paiagiaph on 92.
Also note the following iemaiks: "We want theiefoie to open logic without consiueiing it simply as a
simply foimal way of uefining physical ieality." (vI 166)
S89
0'Neill. Noithwestein 0niveisity Piess: Evanston, Illinois, 197u (p. 1u8) Beie he also cites Beiaclitus
anu calls foi an "open Being"one of many such auspicious iefeiences to the mastei philosophei of
paiauox himself.
221
openness of the woilu into an assent of self with self, the institution of the woilu
into an iueality of the woilu, the peiceptual faith into acts oi attituues of a subject
that uoes not paiticipate in the woilu." (vI S1) The implicit ciitique of Busseil in
these woius is eviuent; notice also the appeal once again to the "opacity" of the self
to self which must accompany the ieflective flight fiom peiceptual faith.
We will ievisit the issue of Neileau-Ponty's ieconception of the task of
philosophy in the futuie section on ieflection.

!!!+ <'..-$4 0"& ,0$0&%N

Busseil iecognizes plenty of "paiauoxical enigmas" in his own piesentation
of phenomenology.
S9u
Bis appioach to them is typical of philosophical tiauition,
howevei, stemming all the way back to Aiistotle's K#)$25F%(4% (Book III), in seeking
to iemove these enigmas in the name of tiuth anu claiity.
S91
Busseil nevei questions
the notion that the paiauoxes, which appeai only "at fiist |asj insoluble" (J,(%(%, 17S)
neeu to be "iesolveu" once anu foi all, lest his own pioject of tianscenuental
phenomenology fail. Busseil coulu not, foi example, be moie explicit about how he
feels about paiauoxes when he ciiticizes the sciences in the "Epilogue" to !"#$% !!
(!"#$% !!, 427-8), wheie he claims that theii iesulting "paiauoxes" aie piecisely the

S9u
J,(%(% 174
S91
Aiistotle, J3A2=#)# g3,H% 3D 0,(%)3)=#. Ti. }onathan Baines. Piinceton 0niveisity Piess, 1971. (pp.
1S72-1S84)
222
ueleteiious iesult of being "unphilosophical" in the iequiieu sense. When piopei
pioceuuies aie taken, "In such a case theie cannot be any uncleai, pioblematic
concepts 3, $>F 2$,$"3[#%."
S92
(!"#$% !!, 428, my emphasis)
All of this becomes peitinent in the J,(%(% when Busseil confionts his own
philosophy anu its $22$,#>) paiauoxes, those which ciitics hau on seemingly goou
giounus pointeu out. In this text, the paiauox Busseil pays the gieatest attention to
is teimeu memoiably by him the "paiauox of subjectivity." Bow is it, the paiauox
goes, that the entiie woilu is constituteu by only one 2$,) of the woilu, namely the
pait that consists of human subjectsthat is, "ieal" human beings, the "community"
of monaus as they aie elsewheie uesciibeu. 0f couise, veiy much the same paiauox
was on Busseil's minu even in !"#$% !:

"Thus, 3> )5# 3># 5$>" 43>%4(3+%>#%% (% %$(" )3 <# $<%3=+)# in which eveiything tianscenuent anu,
theiefoie, ultimately the whole psychophysical woilu, becomes constituteu; anu, 3> )5# 3)5#, 5$>",
consciousness is saiu to be a %+<3,"(>$)# ,#$= #?#>) B()5(> )5$) B3,=". Bow can these statements be
ieconcileu." (!"#$% ! 124)

The "solution" to the paiauox (a "paiauox which can be %#>%(<=F ,#%3=?#""J,(%(%
18u) takes a familiai foim in the J,(%(%. Busseil meiely ieaffiims the uistinction he
has by now maue long ago anu many times since, namely between empiiical-ieal
human subjects, each of whom $=%3 tianscenuentally co-constitutes the woilu (along
with othei human subjects), anu )5# tianscenuental subjectivityinteisubjectivity
foi whom inuiviuual, paiticulai egos aie meiely "phenomena," ego-poles of
noematic-noematic a piioii coiielativity of constitution.

S92
Busseil follows this by announcing that he sees spieau out befoie him the "piomiseu" lanu. (!"#$%
!!, 429)
223

"Concietely, each 'I' is not meiely an ego-pole but an 'I' with all its accomplishments anu
accomplisheu acquisitions, incluuing the woilu as existing anu being-such. But in the epoch anu in
the puie focus upon the functioning of the ego-pole, anu thence upon the conciete whole of life anu of
its intentional inteimeuiaiy anu final stiuctuies, it follows #3 (2%3 that nothing human is to be founu,
neithei soul noi psychic life noi ieal psychophysical human beings; all this belongs to the
'phenomenon,' to the woilu as constituteu pole." (J,(%(% 18S)

Busseil's solution, in othei woius, comes uown to a uistinction between "ieal" anu
"phenomenal" senses in which we can unueistanu the "I" of the human subject.
Theie is heie a tiuly iiiesolvable paiauox of subjectivity only if we aie foiceu to
unueistanu the tianscenuental "I" as iuentical, without qualification, with the ieal
"I." This issue tiuly is cential to Busseil's enteipiise. "If the paiauox.weie
insoluble," Busseil explains, "it woulu mean that an actually univeisal anu iauical
#23456 coulu not be caiiieu out at all, that is, foi the puiposes of a science iigoiously
bounu to it." (J,(%(% 18u). Foi phenomenology woulu ieuuce to psychology. It is
inteiesting to iemembei that Neileau-Ponty uenieu 2,#4(%#=F the possibility of a
"iauical" oi univeisal #23456, which shows fiom a ceitain angle why he uiu not have
to woiiy about Busseil's veision of the "paiauox of subjectivity."
The uistinction as philosopheis between Busseil anu Neileau-Ponty can be
illustiateu thiough contiasting statements they make on theii ultimate task.
Busseil's ielentless goal is to unueistanu, anu to him this means, to a laige extent,
fiaming things eiueticallythat is, seeing them in theii conceptual foim:

"Fiom the beginning the phenomenologist lives in the paiauox of having to look upon the obvious as
questionable, as enigmatic, anu of hencefoith being unable to have any othei scientific theme than
that of ),$>%D3,A(>C )5# +>(?#,%$= 3<?(3+%>#%% 3D )5# <#(>C 3D )5# B3,="nD3, 5(A )5# C,#$)#%) 3D
#>(CA$%n(>)3 %3A#)5(>C (>)#==(C(<=#." (J,(%(% 18u)

224
0f couise Neileau-Ponty, in accepting the ieuuction, paiallels Busseil when he says
that philosophy "uispossesses humanity.by inviting it to think of itself as an
enigma." (vI S) But he follows this up with the uistinctly un-Busseilian sentiment:
"This is the way things aie anu nobouy can uo anything about it." (vI 4)
In contiast to Busseil, that is, foi Neileau-Ponty the obviousness of the
woilu, oi iathei the "peiceptual faith" with which we take the woilu anu oui
ielation with it, in theii essential oneness, foi gianteu, is, stiictly speaking, beyonu
intelligibility. It is inteiesting in this iegaiu that Busseil can tacitly conceue this
point, at least in a ceitain limiteu iespect, yet without accepting its consequences.
Thus he wiites,

"Not even the single philosophei by himself, within the epoch, can holu fast to anything in this
elusively flowing life, iepeat it always with the same content, anu become so ceitain of its this-ness
anu its being-such that he coulu uesciibe it, uocument it, so to speak (even foi his own peison alone),
in uefinitive statements." (J,(%(% 178)

It is moie than appaient that Busseil thiives on the self-image of being a
"paiauoxical" philosophei in the sense of militating against common opinion anu the
"natuialistic" anu "iealistic" biases of the common man anu the scientist. But foi his
pait, Neileau-Ponty shows little patience foi iesting content with this soit of stiict
ieveisality. Consiuei foi example his iemaiks on the ways people inteipiet the new
physics: "Thus the 'stiange' notions of the new physics aie stiange. only in the
sense that a paiauoxical opinion suipiises common sense, that is, B()53+)
225
(>%),+4)(>C () (> "#2)5 $>" B()53+) 45$>C(>C $>F)5(>C 3D ()% 4$)#C3,(#%7"
S9S
(vI 17, my
emphasis) This, in essence, is exactly what I have aigueu goes on in !"#$% !! with
iespect to that text's hybiiu mixtuie of anti-natuialism anu tacit natuialism, which
conspiie to occluue asking the meaningful questions of natuie left to Neileau-Ponty
(anu otheis) to iaise. With a ciitical tone, Neileau-Ponty summaiizes Busseil's
attituue towaius philosophy anu paiauox alike in the following mannei:

"Thus, with the coiielation between thought anu the object of thought set up as a piinciple, theie is
establisheu a philosophy that knows neithei uifficulties noi pioblems noi paiauoxes noi ieveisals:
once anu foi all, I have giaspeu within myself, with the puie coiielation.the tiuth of my life, which is
also the tiuth of the woilu anu of the othei lives." (vI 48)

!F+ >2- ,0$0&%N %1 D-14-(#)%"

07 :5# N#D=#4)(?# 0))()+"#
The complex, ambiguous ielationship between Neileau-Ponty anu Busseil,
which we have examineu at length in Chaptei S anu elsewheie, becomes once again
stiongly appaient in Neileau-Ponty's iemaiks on ieflection. Consiuei the following
quote:

S9S
Neileau-Ponty makes similaily ueiogatoiy iemaiks on the supeificial veision of "paiauoxical"
thinking in the *$)+,# lectuies. See: N 1u8, 114 . The iefeiences heie aie to the "paiauoxes"
geneiateu by ielativity theoiy.
226
"Thought cannot ignoie its appaient histoiy, if it is not to install itself beneath the whole of oui
expeiience, in a pie-empiiical oiuei wheie it woulu no longei meiit its name; it must put to itself the
pioblem of the genesis of its own meaning." (vI 12)

0n the one hanu, this is the veiy task of Busseil's genetic phenomenology in its
moie matuie phases, a "questioning-back" of thought <F thought. But Neileau-Ponty
places a ceitain emphasis on "expeiience," which, in its puie pie-ieflective foim,
thought cannotwithout incuiiing ceitain piegnant contiauictions that must stay
with it as ieminueis of its uistance-in-pioximity fiom the oiigintiuly access:

"Thiough the conveision to ieflection, which leaves nothing but iueates, 43C()$)$, oi noemata
subsisting befoie the puie subject, we finally leave the equivocations of the peiceptual faith, which
paiauoxically assuieu us that we have access to the things themselves anu that we gain access to
them thiough the inteimeuiaiy of the bouy, which theiefoie openeu us up to the woilu only by
sealing us up in the succession of oui piivate events." (vI Su)

The "solution" to the antinomy, notes Neileau-Ponty, is "iueality," foi which "the
woilu is numeiically one with my 43C()$)+A anu with that of the otheis insofai as it
is iueal (iueal iuentity, beneath the seveial anu the one)." But this is not a genuine
solution, inasmuch as it is actually ueployeu as a "3"C# of the actual pioblem:

"This movement of ieflection will always at fiist sight be convincing: in a sense it is impeiative, it is
tiuth itself, anu one uoes not see how philosophy coulu uispense with it. The question is whethei it
has biought philosophy to the haiboi, whethei the univeise of thought to which it leaus is ieally an
oiuei that suffices to itself anu puts an enu to eveiy question. 1(>4# )5# 2#,4#2)+$= D$()5 (% $ 2$,$"3[
|my emphasisj, how coulu I iemain with it." (vI S1-2)

It is cleai by now that the "peiceptual faith" is anothei name foi the "natuial
attituue," conceiveu now in its fullest, anu not fully eluciuatable, uepths. Anu
ieflection, as I have maintaineu all along, is what Neileau-Ponty means by the
227
"tianscenuental" attituue
S94
, anu cleaily, it cannot foi him pull effectively
consciousness out of its immeision in the woilu, its pie-ieflective home: "Anu if I uo
not iemain with |peiceptual faithj, what else can I uo except ie-entei into myself
anu seek theie )5# $<3"# 3D ),+)5." (vI S1) The pioblem with "philosophies of
ieflection" is that they tiy to "compiehenu" the self-woilu bonu by "unuoing" it fiist,
then falsely tiying to ie-fabiicate it: ".the ieflection iecupeiates eveiything except
itself as an effoit of iecupeiation, it claiifies eveiything except its own iole. The
minu's eye too has its blinu spot." (vI SS) Fuitheimoie, "ieflective
thought.peifoims all its opeiations unuei the guaiantee of the totality that it
claims to engenuei" (vI SS), wheieas cleaily the totality exceeus it.
It is cleai that the "ieflective attituue" applies to Bescaites, Kant, Busseil, anu
even Begel in uiffeient ways. The moment of iecoveiy oi iecupeiation iepiesenteu
by ieflection, anu ultimately the self-inteiiogation of thought in the natuial attituue
that Busseil iuentifies as the phenomenological ieuuction, is pioblematic, inueeu
paiauoxical
S9S
, insofai as it contains a moment of uisiuption oi "non-coinciuence"
S96

which we have seen befoie: "What is given is not a massive anu opaque woilu, oi a

S94
If theie still is any uoubt about this, Neileau-Ponty's own woius shoulu put it to iest: "With one
stioke the philosophy of ieflection metamoiphoses the effective woilu into a tianscenuental fielu; in
uoing so, it only puts me back at the oiigin of a spectacle that I coulu nevei have hau unless,
unbeknown to myself, I oiganizeu it." (vI 44)
S9S
0'Neill. Noithwestein 0niveisity Piess: Evanston, Illinois, 197u (p. 1u6): Reuuction "involves a
paiauox."
S96
Neileau-Ponty makes the point that philosophy is moie oi less a tianslation. 0ne might go so fai
as to say that the pioblems of tianslation aie coextensive, foi Neileau-Ponty, with those of his style
of philosophy, which effects a "tianslation" of the "mute" sense of natuiebeing into the language of
concepts (i.e., language in its piopositional-cognitive iole). Foi a poweiful anu ielevant examination
of the issue of tianslation fiom within the phenomenological-heimeneutical tiauition see:
vanuevelue, Pol. :5# :$%H 3D )5# !>)#,2,#)#,I :#[)G K#$>(>CG $>" *#C3)($)(3>. Pittsbuigh: 0niveisity of
Pittsbuigh Piess, 2uuS

228
univeise of auequate thought; it is a ieflection which tuins back ovei the uensity of
the woilu in oiuei to claiify it, <+) B5(45G 43A(>C %#43>"G ,#D=#4)% <$4H )3 () 3>=F ()%
3B> =(C5)7" (vI SS, my emphasis) Neileau-Ponty's veiuict:

"This whole ieflective analysis is not false, but still nave, as long as it uissimulates fiom itself its own
mainspiing, anu as long as, in oiuei to constitute the woilu, it is necessaiy to have a notion of the
woilu as pie-constituteuas long as the pioceuuie is in piinciple uelayeu behinu itself." (vI S4)

Neileau-Ponty uoes consiuei challenges to this point of view. Foi example,
he auuiesses the key challenge that says that 53B ieflection gets to its peich is
iiielevant, as the piocess is like a lauuei that can be kickeu away; but he notes on
the contiaiy that in that case, "theie |woulu bej no longei the oiiginating anu the
ueiiveu" anu hence no "philosophy of ieflection," stiictly speaking, at all. (vI SS) In
othei woius, the "lauuei" is built into the uefinition of ieflectivity in ielation to
something like "fiist-oiuei (unieflecteu) expeiience."
Yet he uoes not enuoise quietism, eithei. "It is a question not of putting that
peiceptual faith in place of ieflection, but on the contiaiy of taking into account the
)3)$= %()+$)(3>, which involves iefeience fiom the one to the othei." (vI SS, my
emphasis) (Recall that we have seen this iefeience to the "total" situation above.)
This is of couise exactly what sets up the pioblematic of >$)+,#namely, the
pioblem of a totality that cannot, in teims of spiiit, fully envelop itself, but which
knows itself to be bonueu, iooteu, anu even ensconceu theiein. That bonu is of
couise exactly what makes possible the "tiuth"even as the "tiuth" in this ueepei
ontological sense (ueepei than linguistic-conceptual tiuth) uevolves into
contiauictoiy concepts when we attempt to expiess it linguistically-logically. The
229
unity of this bonu, a pie-ieflective unity that tianscenus, finally, the uistinction
between "iuentity" anu "non-iuentity" that pieoccupies the ueiman Iuealists, is
iiiecoveiable: ".the ielation between a thought anu its object.contains neithei the
whole noi even the essential of oui commeice with the woilu.which we shall heie
call the openness upon the woilu (3+?#,)+,# $+ A3>"#)."
S97
(vI SS)

E7 aOF2#,LN#D=#4)(3>b
So what uoes Neileau-Ponty oppose to ieflection, puie anu simple, without
"ieplacing" ieflection (the tianscenuental attituue) with "peiceptual faith" (the
natuial attituue). Bis answei is "Bypei-ieflection." Bypei-ieflection is thus, I woulu
piopose, a kinu of "thiiu attituue" to match the "thiiu way" Neileau-Ponty mentions
elsewheie: a "natuial-tianscenuental" attituue if you will, which comes to being an
awaieness of what Beiueggei calls "iauical finituue."
S98
In Neileau-Ponty's pailance,
what neeus to be giaspeu is, as usual, the piimacy of peiception.

"To founu the lattei |peiceptionj on the foimei |ieflectionj, anu the "# D$4)3 peiception on the
essence of peiception such as it appeais to ieflection, is to foiget the ieflection itself as a uistinct act
of iecoveiy. In othei woius, we aie catching sight of anothei opeiation besiues the conveision to
ieflection, A3,# D+>"$A#>)$= )5$> (), of a soit of 5F2#,L,#D=#4)(3> (%+,L,6D=#[(3>) that woulu also take
itself anu the changes it intiouuces into the spectacle into account. It accoiuingly woulu not lose sight
of the biute thing anu the biute peiception anu woulu not finally efface them, woulu not cut the

S97
It seems that foi Neileau-Ponty, quantum mechanics shows that theie is no "iepiesentation of
ieality" thiough measuiement, exactly in the same way (peihaps) that thought itself (as ieflection)
cannot "ietiieve" natuie. (N 94-S) But it is not simply a mattei of its being "unable" to ietiieve it, in
the way "uou" (an intellectus aichetypus) foi example, coulu. It is veiy impoitant that even uou coulu
not ietiieve it, because Natuie itself is in viitue of itself iiiecoveiable, a "peimanent past."
S98
In some senses, it coulu also be conceiveu as an answei to Foucault's ciitique of the
"tianscenuental-empiiical uoublet" fiom :5# V,"#, 3D :5(>C%. See: Foucault, Nichel. :5# V,"#, 3D
:5(>C%I 0> 0,45$#3=3CF 3D )5# O+A$> 14(#>4#%. New Yoik: vintage Books, 1994 (p. S18)
230
oiganic bonus between the peiception anu the thing peiceiveu with a hypothesis of inexistence."
S99

(vI S8)

The task foi philosophy, by implication, is to think the woilu of tianscenuence in its
tianscenuence, uifficultly anu even impossibly, using "the significations of woius to
expiess, beyonu themselves, oui mute contact with the things, when they aie not yet
things saiu." We might call this the "paiauox of ieflection": "The ieflection finus
itself theiefoie in the stiange situation of simultaneously iequiiing anu excluuing an
inveise movement of constitution." (vI 4S)
4uu

Neileau-Ponty finus in his notion of "hypei-ieflection" a way to ciitique
Busseil's iuealistic inteipietation of phenomenological methou.
4u1
What the notion
that eveiy tianscenuental ieuuction is also an eiuetic ieuuction means (a Busseilian
piinciple we have quoteu elsewheie), foi him, is that we cannot captuie the
"conciete flux" of existence. To ieflect in Busseil's staik, tianscenuental sense is to

".uisengage fiom the things, peiceptions, woilu, anu peiception of the woilu, by submitting them to
a systematic vaiiation, the intelligible nuclei that iesist. It theiefoie by piinciple leaves untoucheu
the twofolu pioblem of the genesis of the existent woilu anu of the genesis of the iuealization
peifoimeu by ieflection anu finally evokes anu iequiies as its founuation a 5F2#,L,#D=#4)(3> wheie the
ultimate pioblems woulu be taken seiiously." (vI 4S-6)

S99
Compaie: 4S ieflection: "|asj ieflection, ie-tuin, ie-conquest, oi ie-coveiy, it cannot flattei itself
that it woulu simply coinciue with a constitutive piinciple alieauy at woik in the spectacle of the
woilu."
4uu
Compaie to Neileau-Ponty's uesciiption of philosophy as conceining the "fai-off as fai-off." (vI
1u2)
4u1
Seebohm mentions that theie aie hints of "paiauox" anu "contiauiction" in Neileau-Ponty's
methouology, but claims (I think coiiectly) that it has moie to uo with the "what" than the "how."
See: Seebohm, Thomas N. "The Phenomenological Novement: A Tiauition without Nethou. Neileau-
Ponty anu Busseil." In K#,=#$+L93>)FM% N#$"(>C 3D O+%%#,=. Eus. Teu Toauvine anu Lestei Embiee.
Boiuiecht: Kluwei Acauemic Publisheis, 2uu2 (p. 66)
231
Note that even heie Neileau-Ponty uoes not stiictly speaking oppose eithei the
eiuetic oi phenomenological ieuuctions; he simply wants to push fuithei anu
ueepei, in an effoit to be ),+=F tiue to the "things themselves" anu theii paiauoxical
(because accomplisheu thiough uiffeience) unity with +%. As Langei points out
helpfully, Neileau-Ponty's latei pioceuuie of thinking the oiigin, using ieflection to
go beyonu it, is iauically paiauoxical only in a way that matches oui own (i.e.,
humanity's own) paiauoxical being-in-the-woilu in the fiist place.
4u2
(Langei 16S-6)
Inueeu, once again, as we have come to expect, Neileau-Ponty finus the ieveisal of
the Busseilian impulse in Busseil's own phenomenological impeiative: "In
iecognizing that eveiy ieflection is eiuetic anu, as such, leaves untoucheu the
pioblem of oui unieflecteu being anu that of the woilu, Busseil simply agiees to
take up the pioblem which the ieflective attituue oiuinaiily avoiusthe
uiscoiuance between its initial situation anu its enus." (vI 46) Even in an eailiei
essay, Neileau-Ponty makes a similai point, saying, with what Neileau-Ponty
inteipiets as the matuie Busseil: "We must, iathei, become awaie of this paiauox
that we nevei fiee ouiselves fiom the paiticulai except by taking ovei a situation
that is all at once, anu insepaiably, both limitation anu access to the univeisal."
4uS

"Bypei-ieflection" becomes anothei name of philosophy itself. It takes
account of uimensions of faciticity, spatiality anu tempoiality, anu iueality alike,
spaiing no uimension of existence in its iay of iegaiu. (vI 46) Beie is the "thiiu
uimension" wheie the antinomies of ieflective analysis aie, in a sense, lifteu. But

4u2
Langei, Nonika N. K#,=#$+L93>)FM% 95#>3A#>3=3CF 3D 9#,4#2)(3>I 0 '+("# $>" J3AA#>)$,F.
Tallahassee: The Floiiua 0niveisity Piess, 1989. (164-S)
4uS
Neileau-Ponty. "Phenomenology anu the Sciences of Nan." Ti. }ohn Wilu. In :5# 9,(A$4F 3D
9#,4#2)(3>. Eu. }ohn Wilu. Evanston: Noithwestein 0niveisity Piess, 1964. (p. 82)
232
hypei-ieflection takes place thiough, anu not outsiue of, ieflection itself; in oiuei to
see that which "ueliveis |the thinkeij ovei to peiception anu to phantasms.he must
,#D=#4). But as soon as he uoes so, beyonu the woilu itself anu beyonu what is only 'in
us,' beyonu being in itself anu being foi us, a thiiu uimension seems to open up,
wheiein theii uiscoiuance is effaceu." (vI 29)
Bow uoes all of this squaie with Neileau-Ponty's notion of a silent Logos of
the woilu. That is, he ueclaies in many places vaiiations of this thought: "Theie is a
Logos of the natuial aesthetic woilu, on which the Logos of language ielies." (N
212)
4u4
What is key to see is that Neileau-Ponty uoes not want to ueny intelligibility
to the giounu oi "mainspiing," he simply wants to ueny that it is completely
isomoiphic, as it weie, with human unueistanuing. In this way it is akin to the
being-in-itself-anu-foi-itself Neileau-Ponty spoke of befoie. Alieauy in "In Piaise of
Philosophy," Neileau-Ponty obseives that "man contains in silence all the paiauoxes
of philosophy."
4uS
That is, humanity's own being has a uialectical logic that can be
expiesseu in woius, but only obliquely. Neileau-Ponty's unueistanuing of the
tightly wounu unity of contiaiies in Being actually, in his eyes, seives to pieseive as
opposeu to wounu the intelligibility of Being. Thus he iemaiks (vI 268) that !"#$% !!
tiies wiongly to "(%#>)$>C=# knots, since uisentanglement uestioys intelligibility!
Caitesian uualism, foi instance, has incieaseu "intelligibility" of paits at the expense
of making entiiely unintelligible the wholethat is, the whole being that is alive,
embouieu, thinking, anu sensing. Bypei-ieflection iestoies the "sense" of this whole,

4u4
See also vI, 14S: "minu oi thought" is "sublimation of the flesh."
4uS
Neileau-Ponty, Nauiice. !> 9,$(%# 3D 95(=3%325F $>" V)5#, /%%$F%. Evanston: Noithwestein
0niveisity Piess, 1988 (pp. 6S-4)
233
even though, at the same time, this is a "sense" that eluues the logic of non-
contiauiction.
Neileau-Ponty's thought on ieflection anu the paiauoxical peiceptual faith
pieceuent to it has matuieu since 99, though subtly. Notice what he says in the
eailiei text about the issue:

"It will peihaps be maintaineu that a philosophy cannot be centeieu aiounu a contiauiction, anu that
all oui uesciiptions, since they ultimately uefy thought, aie quite meaningless. The objection woulu
be valiu if we weie content to lay baie. a layei of pielogical oi magical expeiiences. Foi in that case
we woulu have to choose between believing the uesciiptions anu abanuoning thought, oi knowing
what we aie talking about anu abanuoning oui uesciiptions. . |Thusj we must ietuin to the 43C()3,
in seaich of a moie funuamental U3C3% than that of objective thought." (PP 42S)

In a slight but impoitant contiast to these statements, the Neileau-Ponty of the ;! is
moie comfoitable living in the absence of anothei, ueepei, non-objective "Logos."
This is not to say theie is no such logos, oi that "wilu Being" lacks meaning in its
wiluness (we have alieauy seen that Natuie foi Neileau-Ponty autopiouuces its
own meaning), only that the uistance between ()% meaning anu the "meanings" of the
iueal, ieflective oiuei is in a ceitain sense unbiiugeable, anu that heiein lies the
ultimate paiauox of ieflection: that while theie is a meaning without thought, just as
theie is tianscenuence without immanencethese tiuths can only be appieciateu
thiough thought, immanently. Consciousness is bonueu to its unconscious oiigin;
we aie piivilegeu to know the uepths of oui ignoiance.

234
F+ M-$4-0'P,%"#6=. ,0$0&%N)(04 >2)"V)"? !" D-40#)%" #% :#2-$ /#64-. %1
>2)"V)"?; 7)04-(#)(J /V-9#)().5WU')-#).5J 0"& M6.#)().5

07 K#,=#$+L93>)F $>" O#C#=($> .($=#4)(4
Neileau-Ponty's unueistanuing of "paiauox" anu "philosophy" alike is ueeply
infoimeu by his ieauing anu iesponse to the "uialectical" philosophy of Begel. Bugh
Silveiman explains the piecise sense in which Neileau-Ponty's philosophy is a
"uialectic":

"|Neileau-Pontyj veiy much sees himself as pait of a histoiical succession in which the uiscoveiy of
subjectivity anu the uiscoveiy of histoiy tuin into a uialectic of existence anu uialectic. But.his
uialectic is not of a Begelian soit. Bis uialectic is such that he finus the philosophei encounteiing
what is alieauy theie; his uialectic is one of expeiience anu philosophy becoming that expeiience,
philosophy inteiiogating what is anu finuing itself theie in what is inteiiogateu. Bis uialectic is moie
of a tension between existence anu uialectic, an ambiguity between the two."
4u6

The notion of a uialectic which incluues "($=#4)(4 as one of the teims of the uialectic
itself is chaiacteiistic of the soit of ieflexively self-ciitical enueavoi Neileau-Ponty
launches in especially his latei peiiou. 0nlike Begelian uialectic, Neileau-Pontian
uialectic has no "goal" othei than its own movement, which is not haphazaiu but
puiposefully self-inveitingbut one cannot even say this much, it tuins out,
without affixing an essence to what eluues essential uesciiption:

4u6
Silveiman, Bugh. "Is Neileau-Ponty Insiue oi 0utsiue the Bistoiy of Philosophy." In J5($%A%I
K#,=#$+L93>)FM% *3)(3> 3D Q=#%5. Eus. Fieu Evans anu Leonaiu Lawloi. State 0niveisity of New Yoik
Piess. Albany: 2uuu (p. 1S8)

235
"|The uialectic isj 1#=DLA$>(D#%)$)(3>, uisclosuie, in the piocess of foiming itself. . The uialectic is
inueeu all this, anu it is, in this sense, what we aie looking foi. If nonetheless we have not hitheito
saiu so, it is because, in |thej histoiy of philosophy, it has nevei been all that unauulteiateuly; it is
because the uialectic is unstable (in the sense that the chemists give to the woiu), it is even
essentially anu by uefinition unstable, so that it has nevei been able to foimulate itself into theses
without uenatuiing itself, anu because if one wishes to maintain its spiiit it is peihaps necessaiy to
not even name it." (vI 92)

Neileau-Ponty foimally enuoises the methou of uialectic in chaptei 2 of ;!, entitleu,
"Reflection anu Inteiiogation." (vI 89) (The chaptei itself is a sustaineu iesponse to
Saitie's E#(>C $>" *3)5(>C>#%%.) Neileau-Ponty goes on to give a uetaileu account of
what he means by the "instability" (quoteu above) of uialectic, its natuie of
subveiting, meuiating, anu tiansfoiming, not foi the sake of iesting in one finalizeu
thesis, but foi the sake of expiessing the innei natuie of Being itself. Beie moie than
anywheie else, Neileau-Ponty's auoption of a ceitain iauical Beiacliteanism, one
that bieaks away fiom both Platonic anu Busseilian containeis (which oppose an
existential Beiaclitean flux to an iueal Paimeniuean oiuei, so to speak) becomes
cleai. Inueeu, he all but says so himself by appiovingly pointing out that Beiaclitus
alieauy showeu the way, "opposite uiiections coinciuing in the ciiculai movement."
(vI 92)
As we examineu befoie, Neileau-Ponty's thought embiaces a paiauigm of
opposition that he calls "complementaiity"; it is a uialectic that iefuses, we might
now say, to iemain "static" by ciesting into any foim of synthesis of hoiizons. It is in
this spiiit that I ieau Neileau-Ponty's iemaikable inteitwining of his ciitique of
Saitiean ontology anu his own buigeoning uialectical methou:

"Bas not oui uiscussion consisteu in showing that the ielationship between the two teims |Being anu
Nothingnessj (whethei one takes them in a ielative sense, within the woilu, oi in an absolute sense,
236
of the inuex of the thinkei anu what he thinks) coveis a swaim of ielations with uouble meaning,
(>43A2$)(<=# $>" F#) >#4#%%$,F )3 3># $>3)5#, R43A2=#A#>)$,()FG $% )5# 25F%(4(%)% %$F )3"$FTG $>" )5$)
)5(% 43A2=#[ )3)$=()F (% )5# ),+)5 3D )5# $<%),$4) "(453)3AF D,3A B5(45 B# %)$,)#"." (vI 92, my
emphasis)

We alieauy saw in the pievious chaptei examples of Neileau-Ponty's
suspicion of the Begelian foim of uialectic, albeit inuiiectly, with iegaiu specifically
to his appioval of Schelling's effoit to bieak away fiom Begelianism. In this iespect
Neileau-Ponty ievealingly iuminates:

"Position, negation, negation of the negation: this siue, the othei, the othei than the othei. What uo I
biing to the pioblem of the same anu the othei. This: that the same be the othei than the othei, anu
iuentity uiffeience of uiffeience----this 1) uoes not iealize a suipassing, a uialectic in the Begelian
sense; 2) is iealizeu on the spot, by encioachment, thickness, %2$)($=()F----"
4u7
(vI 264)

What is most of note foi us heie in his self-compaiison with Begelian uialectic anu
his iejection of an ultimate teleology, a "suipassing."
4u8
Neileau-Ponty is caieful to
iuentify what he calls a "tiap in the uialectic" anu the "bau uialectic" (vI 94) that
ensues, iionically echoing Begel's own teiminological style ("bau infinity," etc.). As
against these, Neileau-Ponty, chaiacteiistically auvances a new foim of thinking
calleu "hypeiuialectic":

"What we call hypeiuialectic is a thought.that is capable of ieaching tiuth because it envisages
without iestiiction the pluiality of the ielationships anu what has been calleu ambiguity. The bau

4u7
Compaie, also in an obvious iefeience to Begel: "Against the uoctiine of contiauiction, absolute
negation, the #()5#,83,LLTianscenuence is iuentity within uiffeience." (vI 22S)
4u8
In othei iespects, of couise, many of Neileau-Ponty's uialectical obseivations miiioi Begel's
methou stiongly, incluuing the Begelian piinciple of the conveigence of opposites at theii extiemes
(most famously, the conveigence of "Being" anu "Non-Being" in "Becoming"). Thus in the *$)+,#
lectuies, foi example, we can see the way he shows how the effoit to pieseive ueteiminism in
physics enus up going iionically towaius the occult (N 92), oi again how science moves towaius
iuealism in the name of iealism (N 91). In anothei place he obseives that possibility anu necessity
aie closely aligneu, since necessity is just one of many possibilities. (N 88) Similaily, iigoious theism
thieatens to become pantheism (since uou is the same as Being itself), anu so on anu so foith.
237
uialectic is that which thinks it iecomposes being by a thetic thought, by an assemblage of
statements, by thesis, antithesis, anu synthesis; the goou uialectic is that which is conscious of the
fact that eveiy )5#%(% is an iuealization, that Being is not maue up of iuealizations oi of things saiu, as
the olu logic believeu, but of bounu wholes wheie signification nevei is except in tenuency." (vI 94)

Neileau-Ponty's ciitique of Begel thus lies in the lattei's not being thoiough enough
oi authentic in thinking uialectically. Thus "the only goou uialectic is hypeiuialectic."
(vI 94) Bypeiuialectic, the "goou" uialectic, is calleu this because it ciiticizes anu
sees beyonu itself. Neileau-Ponty emphasizes "piocess" anu piocessuality again anu
again. Neileau-Ponty's "goou" uialecticity is thus a movement of thought anu the
mannei in which thought must puisue the whole without pietenuing to have a giasp
of it unilateially:

"The point to be noticeu is this: that the uialectic without synthesis of which we speak is not
theiefoie scepticism, vulgai ielativism, oi the ieign of the ineffable. What we ieject oi ueny is not the
iuea of a suipassing that ieassembles, it is the iuea that it iesults in a new positive, a new position. .
What we seek is a uialectical uefinition of being that can be neithei the being foi itself noi the being
in itselfiapiu, fiagile, labile uefinitions." (vI 9S)

E7 K#,=#$+L93>)F $>" 1H#2)(4(%A8r+(#)(%A
Neileau-Ponty's views on philosophy, ieflection, anu uialectic iaise
impoitant questions about the extent to which Neileau-Ponty has effectively "given
up" on philosophy as noimally unueistoou, at least as a knowleuge-acquiiing
enteipiise foi example, anu whethei his inteipietation of phenomenology, which
begins in peiceptual faith anu enus in the iecognition of its own futile attempts to
iepiouuce this faith in linguistic-conceptual teims, is quietistic. This is not the case if
by "quietism" we mean the position that nothing can be accuiately saiu of being oi
the tiuth. It is tiue that Neileau-Ponty believes that ".the 'object' of philosophy will
238
nevei come to fill in the philosophical question, since this obtuiation woulu take
fiom it the uepth anu the uistance that aie essential to it." (vI 1u1) But we can anu
uo speak about this situationpeihaps a clue as to the mysteiy of the
"intelligibility" of a Natuie that makes itself unknown to the piogiams of
intelligibility imposeu upon it eiuetically by "giasping" thought.
Relateu to the "quietism" chaige is that of "skepticism." Neileau-Ponty
himself has to woiiy about skepticism, of couise, because he has openeu himself to
the ciiticism of his position that aigues that it (Neileau-Ponty's stance on
philosophy) effectively amounts to a veision of skepticism. The kinu of skepticism,
namely, that thiows its hanus up anu ueclaiing that philosophy iesolves meiely to
"uniesolvable paiauoxes." 0ne might call this "Caineauean skepticism," aftei the
famous Acauemic who woulu lectuie one uay foi a position, the next uay against it,
uemonstiating the futility of philosophizing (unuei one stanuaiu inteipietation) in
the fiist place. This kinu of skepticism eventually uevelopeu into the canonical
Pyiihonian view of the uniesolvability of "equipollent" views in philosophical
uisputes, a view that iesembles Neileau-Ponty's up until one iealizes that Neileau-
Ponty goes fuithei than the skeptic by $DD(,A(>C a ceitain equipollence (> )5# ),+)5
()%#=D. In othei woius, Neileau-Ponty makes a metaphysical claimsuppoiting
himself on the wings of a pie-ieflective faithabout Natuie, though aumitteuly
without the "uogmatic" suppoit of, say, an "infallible" fiist piemise. Neileau-Ponty's
"metaphysics" is still, in this iegaiu, "post-metaphysical."
Stiict Pyiihonism asiue, the fact is that while Neileau-Ponty is vigoiously
anti-uogmatical, even to the point of embiacing an infinite uialectics, he is ceitainly
239
not skeptical insofai as "skepticism" is a negativistic appioach to philosophical
pioblems that uenies only what it can fiist iuentify as meaningful in the fiist place.
The skeptic in this sense is, in Saitie's teims, in "bau faith," playing (now in
Wittgenstein's language) the language-game of philosophy in oiuei to unueimine
philosophy. Thus Neileau-Ponty explicitly opposes skepticism foi negating oi
calling into the question the existence of the woilu (anu of tiuth) to peiceptual faith
as the effoitless pie-ieflective confiuence in the woilu )5$) #?#> )5# %H#2)(4
2,#%+223%#%. (vI 9S) Inueeu, Neileau-Ponty conceins himself with iefuting (oi
uefusing) skepticism fiom the beginning of the ;!.
4u9
Latei he questions at least
Caitesian skepticism foi tacitly piesupposing the "positivity of the psychic." (vI 9S)
0ne might call this a classically "phenomenological" ciitique of the "psychologistic"
assumptions of the skeptic, who must implicitly auvance a metaphysics of solipsistic
iuealism to giounu hishei points.
Neileau-Ponty's attituue towaius philosophy is not uismissive but iathei,
one might say, both celebiatoiy anu iionic. Be unueistanus philosophy to be $) D(,%)
a kinu of effoit to ieplace peiceptual faith with a web of statements anu concepts,
with an iueal oiuei, wheieas theie is nevei ieally any question of ieplacing the
woilu$>" 25(=3%325F ()%#=D 4$> "#)#,A(># )5(%G )33. The woilu is something
expeiienceu, while philosophy is to captuie moments of this expeiientiality, this
piimoiuial contact with tiuth, in pait but not in whole. That which unites us to the
woiluintentionality is one name foi itis that which sepaiates us fiom it as well.

4u9
See vI 4, 6; 9S
240
Anu language, which we ask to uispel the mysteiy of being, is just as much pait of
this mysteiy, an expiession theieof:

"Fai fiom haiboiing the seciet of the being of the woilu, language is itself a woilu, itself a beinga
woilu anu a being to the seconu powei, since it uoes not speak in a vacuum, since it speaks 3D being
anu 3D the woilu anu theiefoie ieuoubles theii enigma insteau of uissipating it." (vI 9S)

In the enu, howevei, it cannot be uenieu that theie is a ceitain kinship
between iauical Pyiihonian skepticism anu Neileau-Ponty's pioceuuieespecially
in the spiiit of openness pieacheu famously by the oiiginal Pyiihonists, fiom whom
the teim "skepticism" (liteially "seaiching") ueiives. The link, as explaineu by
Neileau-Ponty himself, is summeu up thusly: "If |skepticismj multiplies contiasts
$>" 43>),$"(4)(3>%, it is because ),+)5 "#A$>"% ()." Anu thus Nontaigne, a skeptic
who Neileau-Ponty aumiies, as we have alieauy seen, "begins by teaching that all
tiuth contiauicts itself; peihaps he enus up iecognizing that 43>),$"(4)(3> (% ),+)5."
(Nontaigne 198, my emphasis)

J7 K#,=#$+L93>)F $>" KF%)(4(%A
Is Neileau-Ponty a mystic. Is theie a ieligious uimension to this thought.
Theie is ceitainly a meuitative, almost piayei-like quality of Neileau-Ponty's latei
uiscouise, not to mention iespect foi the ineffable unity of being, a staple iuea of
mysticism acioss cultuies, fiom Taoism to the Neoplatonically-tingeu mysticism of
the "Abiahamic" ieligions. Neileau-Ponty's iejection of contiaiies (neithei
intellectualism noi empiiicism, neithei iealism noi iuealism, etc.) iesembles the
methou of "negative theology" anu the ">#)(G >#)(" ("not this, not that") methouology
241
of the @2$>(%5$"%, while his embiace of an iuentity-of-opposites ciosses the final
baiiiei of classical logic (in Neoplatonism, =3C(%A3% as opposeu to *3+%) that stanus
in the way of a philosophical expiession (which must also occluue oi "obtuiate")
what one might call the "0ne."
Neileau-Ponty's lack of spiiitualistic iefeiences, howeveiat least
compaieu to his inteiest in ait, liteiatuie, politics, psychology, anu the sciences
betiay a ueeply seculai minu. At the same time, even heie theie lies a paiauox. Foi
Neileau-Ponty states in one place: "Foi me, philosophy consists in giving anothei
name to what has long been ciystallizeu unuei the name of uou."
41u
The ambiguity
of the statement speaks eloquently foi itself: Neileau-Ponty's "philosophy" is puie
ieligionin a mannei ieligion itself uoes not think. In this spiiit, I am tempteu to
call Neileau-Ponty a "methouological mystic," oi a thinkei with tenuencies towaius,
but no ieal ties to, a philosophical mysticism, peihaps like Beiueggei anu
Wittgenstein in the last centuiy, but unlike, say, Simone Weil, Emmanuel Levinas, oi
Nuhummau Iqbal.
0f couise, theie is no shoitage of ieligious imageiy, intenueu as such oi not,
in Neileau-Ponty's wiitings. We have alieauy seen his iefeience to "miiacles," foi
example the "miiacle of the sense oigan," "the miiacle of totality," etc. Theie aie
othei such iefeiences as well, almost to the point of invoking a "celebiatoiy"
attituue towaius existence akin to Chiistian Neoplatonist Pseuuo-Bionysius the

41u
Neileau-Ponty, Nauiice. :5# K#,=#$+L93>)F N#$"#,. Lawloi, Leonaiu anu Teu Toauvine, eus.
Noithwestein 0niveisity Piess, 2uu7 (p. 24u)
242
Aieopagite.
411
It also cannot be ignoieu that his metaphysics of "flesh" has a cleai
symbolic connection to the "flesh" of Chiist, the man (visible) who, moieovei,
wasis uou (invisible). 0i again, theie aie the invocation of peiceptual D$()5, the
ultimate AF%)#,F of the woilu anu being (PP xxiii), "pie-establisheu haimony," giace
anu the "gift" of vision, anu finally, to moie inuiiect anu esoteiic iefeiences, such as
the iepeateu use of "uepth" to uesciibe the absolutea classically gnostic
(valentinian) uesciiption of the uivine, accoiuing to Elaine Pagels.
412

But I think that uaiy Nauison goes too fai when he claims we can only
appieciate Neileau-Ponty in a Chiistian context.
41S
It is tiue that his attituue seems
ultimately to be one of giatituue, humility, anu wonuei befoie Being. But this is also
tiue of plenty of seculai philosopheis, not to mention mystics fiom othei ieligions.
Also, theie is a way in which Nauison's claim might also be too weak, in auuition to
being too stiong. Foi viitually any philosophei wiiting in the Chiistian Westeven
an atheist like Saitiecan be saiu to be inuelibly maikeu by the uialectics of
Chiistianity. By itself this illumines veiy little.
Theie aie ceitainly those besiues the piesent authoi who have iuentifieu a
uistinct affinity between Neileau-Pontian phenomenology anu ceitain mystical
schools; a case in point is New Yoik 0niveisity Bebiew Stuuies piofessoi Elliot R.
Wolfson, who uses Neileau-Ponty's thought to illumine the Kabbalah. Comments
Wolfson in the "Piologue" to his monumental woik U$>C+$C#G /,3%G E#(>C:

411
Foi example, the "miiacle" of the many-anu-the-onein iefeience to painting anu biology. (N
1S4) The most ielevant Pseuuo-Bionysian text is piobably :5# J#=#%)($= O(#,$,45F. (ueneial Books
LLC, 2uu9)
412
Pagels, Elaine. :5# '>3%)(4 '3%2#=%. New Yoik: Ranuom Bouse, 1979 (p. S2)
41S
Nauison, uaiy. :5# 95#>3A#>3=3CF 3D K#,=#$+L93>)FI :5# 1#$,45 D3, )5# U(A()% 3D J3>%4(3+%>#%%.
Athens: 0hio 0niveisity Piess, 1981 (p. 222-S)
243

"I shall laboi.moie on the pathways of Neileau-Ponty's thinking, as in his thought I finu an affinity
with the unueistanuing I have ueiiveu fiom the stuuy of kabbalistic liteiatuie anu consequently feel
it is legitimate to use his jaigon to foimulate heimeneutical anu phenomenological suppositions in
ieauing these souices."
414

In anothei place he notes, "Sensible beings, oi what we peiceive to be such, aie |foi
Neileau-Pontyj 'iauiations of veibal essences'a notion that iesonates with a
cential imaginal mouality of }ewish esoteiicism." (xxiii) Wolfson astutely obseives,
moieovei, that foi Neileau-Ponty's ontological phenomenology, as foi }ewish
mysticism, theie is a cential uialectic of ievealing anu concealing, which in the lattei
stems fiom the essential natuie of the "effably ineffable" gouheau, /(> 13D, anu in the
foimei expiesses itself in teims of the attempt of philosophy to giasp the paiauox of
peiceptual faiththe lifewoilu:

"In the ieconquest of the lifewoilu, we thus uiscein a mutuality of ostensibly conflicting impulses: the
uige to uncovei, on the one hanu, anu the uiscoveiy that eveiy uncoveiing is a coveiing ovei, on the
othei. As it happens, in English, the woiu 'iecovei' uncoveis the paiauox, foi it means both 'to
expose' anu 'to conceal.'"
41S
(xxiii)

The question of Neileau-Ponty anu his "methouological mysticism" has much
to uo with a question of attituue anu affect. Neileau-Ponty is as enthialleu by a kinu
of numinosity of natuie, the hiuuen-anu-ievealeu souice of being anu the miiacles
of cieativity anu totality, just as suiely as the Sufi mystic is fixateu on the majesty
anu mysteiy of the one ineffable uou. Theie is in Neileau-Ponty a wonuei at the

414
Wolfson, Elliott R. U$>C+$C#G /,3%G E#(>CI _$<<$=(%)(4 O#,A#>#+)(4% $>" 93#)(4 !A$C(>$)(3>. New
Yoik: Foiuham 0niveisity Piess, 2uuS (p. xxi) Wolfson's massive volume was the winnei of the
National }ewish Book Awaiu by the }ewish Book Council.
41S
See also: Wolfson elsewheie comments on Neileau-Ponty's "mystical tone" in vaiious citeu
passages. (xxvi)
244
"miiacle" of expeiience, as if it weie a wonueifully (though impeifectly) cooiuinateu
uance, involving gieat success anu even "knowleuge" of a kinu that neveitheless
cannot be explaineu in teims of ieflection alone. Neileau-Ponty iecognizes the way
in which human beings (anu subjectivity) aie essentially "of" the same stuff (the
"flesh") as the woilu, oi "Natuie," anu that theiein lies a clue to the funuamental
compatibility anu even oneness of self anu woilu. But theie is also a iauical bieak, a
'uehiscence,' oi sepaiation, which somehow, in a paiauoxical mannei, makes this
ielationship possible. That is, theie is not meiely oneness, but a multiplicity
constituting onenessthus theie is wholeness, the ultimate theme of all philosophy.

F!+ 8%"(4'.)%"

In his aiticle, "Phenomenology anu Bypei-Reflection," Teu Toauvine nicely
summaiizes his own (anu to a laige extent mine as well) appioach to Neileau-
Ponty's latei wiitings:

"Bespite his ongoing ciitical examinations, Neileau-Ponty piesents phenomenology in a positive
light thioughout his latei wiitings. This is not to ueny that Neileau-Ponty iecognizes, anu
incieasingly accentuates, ceitain paiauoxical tensions of the phenomenological methou. But these
tensions inevitably point us back to the contiauictoiy inteitwining of immanence anu tianscenuence
that is the peiceiveu woilu."
416

416
Toauvine, Teu. "Phenomenology anu Bypei-Reflection." In K#,=#$+L93>)FI _#F J3>4#2)%. Eus.
Rosalyn Bipiose anu }ack Reynolus. Stocksfielu: Acumen, 2uu8 (pp. 28-9)
245
Foi Neileau-Ponty, philosophy is not a mattei of "solving" a pioblem, but of
unueistanuing the pioblem as its own tiuth. (This is uiffeient, of couise, than
unueistanuing ),+)5 as a pioblem, peihaps a moie chaiacteiistic postuie foi iauical
"postmoueinism" than the "peiceptually pious" Neileau-Ponty.) When Neileau-
Ponty states a pioblem, it is stateu veiy much as something to be fuithei ueepeneu,
to be exploieu (the "absolute is uepth"), etc. Towaius auuiessing an issue in biology,
foi example, he says appiovingly, as if hungeiing to leain fiom the lesson of anothei
uiscipline: "Let's say fiist that the expiessions employeu by the new school of
biology aie >3) %3=+)(3>%: the notions of fielu anu giauient aie )5# (>"#[ 3D $ 2,3<=#A,
not iesponses." (N 1S1, my emphasis) Contiaiy to Behnke, I uon't believe Neileau-
Ponty abanuoneu "uesciiption" foi "explanation"
417
; on the contiaiy, he shows why
a piopei uesciiption, attentive to the paiauoxical nuances of the tiuth maue
available to us, A$H#% R+=)(A$)#T #[2=$>$)(3>% A33). Explanation is the goal, one
might say, of ieflection; hypei-ieflection, by contiast, comes back to uesciiption by
way of self-uesciiption oi a iauical, uncompiomising embiace of the finituue of
ieflection itself.
It also may seem that Neileau-Ponty is moie iauical anu subveisive than
Busseil (foi example, by "thiowing out" the univeisalistic oi tians-histoiical
pietensions of philosophy once anu foi all), but this, as we have seen, can be tuineu
aiounu. Busseil's intentions aie, in the enu, ievolutionaiy anu "subveisive" in a way
that Neileau-Ponty's aie not. Foi Busseil seeks a "iauical ieshaping of oui whole

417
Behnke, Elizabeth. "Neileau-Ponty's 0ntological Reauing of Constitution in 956>3A6>3=3C(# "# =$
2#,4#2)(3>." In K#,=#$+L93>)FM% N#$"(>C 3D O+%%#,=. Eus. Teu Toauvine anu Lestei Embiee. Bouiecht:
Kluwei Acauemic Publisheis, 2uu2 (p. 49)
246
way of looking at the woilu" (J,(%(% 17S), while Neileau-Ponty instiucts us simply to
"ieleain to look at the woilu."
418
Peihaps Neileau-Ponty is the moie conveisative of
the two thinkeis aftei all.

418
Noie piecisely: "Tiue philosophy consists in ieleaining to look at the woilu." (PP xxiii)
247
8%"(4'.)%"

We have now ieacheu the enu of oui investigations. In this concluuing
section I will offei some wiuei ieflections on both some of the systematic
philosophical lessons to be leaineu fiom the Busseil-Neileau-Ponty encountei.

!+ M-$4-0'P,%"#6 Q).PXPQ). <'..-$4
In this uisseitation we have seen how Busseil anu Neileau-Ponty
unueistanu anu apply the phenomenological methou anu how they inteipiet its
iesults. In paiticulai, we have seen how Neileau-Ponty ieconsiueis anu mouifies
the basic Busseilian piogiamwhile somehow, I have aigueu, iemaining tiue to
funuamental aspects of it. Be iemains "tiue" to Busseil at least in the sense of
embiacing the Busseilian centialization of living consciousness anu the
phenomenological ieuuction that biings this consciousness anu its woilu-ielation to
active awaieness (ieflection).
Although we uiu not examine Busseil's so-calleu "latei peiiou" in much
uetail, we uiu ieview !"#$% !!, which, thiough the notions of the "peisonalistic
attituue" anu the @AB#=), alieauy contains much of the coie of the life-woilu
philosophy that was to latei emeige. Thioughout his wiitings Busseil uisplays an
ambivalence, as Neileau-Ponty points out, iegaiuing the natuial attituue in
paiticulai: is it left behinu, somehow, in the tianscenuental ieuuction, oi is it meiely
illumineu theiein. Bo we come thiough the ieuuction to know ouiselves as
"natuial" consciousnesses moie fully, oi uo we iealize ouiselves as self-split
248
between highei anu lowei levels, the lattei of which is subsumeu in the moie
compiehensive (because inteisubjective anu oiienteu towaius the univeisal)
foimei. I have aigueu that we woulu be iemiss to unueistanu Busseil as an entiiely
consistent thinkei with a pieueteimineu agenua; on the othei hanu, one cannot
ignoie his peisistently iationalistic oiientation anu piefeience, if you will, foi the
iealm of "iueas."
It is too easy, howevei, to assign Neileau-Ponty the labels of "anti-
essentialist," "anti-iationalist," etc. Rathei, Neileau-Ponty sees the same thing, as it
weie, that Busseil uoes; he knows the woilu to be a phenomenal fielu oi milieu, not
an impeimeable 0bject sepaiable fiom its manneis of "givenness," anu he knows
consciousness to be inteitwineu with the woilu thiough its bouy anu its intuitive
giasp of the woilu's (inexactly) eiuetic stiuctuie. But Neileau-Ponty also, ciitically,
sees the matiix of being-anu-consciousness (oi, simply, "Being," the ontological
"totality") to be, in a ceitain sense, ineffable. As a whole, Being cannot be piopeily
thoughta Kantian point fiom the lattei's "Tianscenuental Bialectic"but neithei
uoes "ieason" have "autonomy" such that it may tame the foims of expeiience into
an iuealistic template of ueteiminacy. Anu the "whole" is not a iegulative iuea, such
that a uivoice between theoiy anu piactice becomes the only way to accommouate
it. Rathei, thought is 2$,) of the whole, it is 2$,) of "natuie," even if it is that pait that
has the meaning of what is $L2$,) anu "contiaiy" to natuiea contiaiiness enuemic
to natuie itself.
This kinu of teiiitoiy obviously lenus itself to compaiisons with Begelian
uialectic, with which it is not unielateu even foi Neileau-Ponty. Begel, famously,
249
unueistanus the spiiit to know itself thiough its iuentification with a "highei foim"
of natuie, namely the cultuial woilu anu the uomains of ait, ieligion, anu
philosophy. As I ieau him, Neileau-Ponty, by contiast, unueistanus what Begel
means by "self-knowing spiiit" to be itself a foim of alienation fiom its own natuie,
though at the same time a necessaiy one that holus natuie anu spiiit alike in a
tension that stems fiom an oiiginaiy "unity of opposites," which can no longei be
thought #[4#2) 2$,$"3[(4$==F, anu which leaves its legacy of lasting ambiguity in the
human expeiience.
Thus foi Neileau-Ponty, Natuie is neithei the object of thought noi a subject,
noi even theii coinciuence in a highei synthesis, but iathei the paiauoxical "uepth"
("the absolute") anu "otheiness" (which is nonetheless paiauoxically inclusive) of
the human spiiit. By itself this is not a Busseilian view, but it is the culmination of a
systematic meuitation Neileau-Ponty iefeis to fiom veiy eaily on as the
"phenomenology of phenomenology"a ieaching of the limits of what is thinkable
in subjective oi constitutional teims, limits which ieveal the uepenuence of spiiit on
a pie-ieflective natuie which is also, at the same time, piecisely not amenable to
theoieticization along the lines of a scientific "natuialism." In this way, Neileau-
Ponty's philosophy pieseives the sense of consciousness ievealeu in the
"tianscenuental" attituue anu thiough the tianscenuental epoch anu ieuuction, but
without going so fai as to allowing thought to "take possession of the woilu." The
tianscenuental attituue becomes subsumeu in the 2$,$"3[ 3D >$)+,#in a
wholeness oi totality, that is, which can only be thought as an "unthinkable."
250
All of this exposes a signficant fault line between Busseil anu Neileau-Ponty.
Foi Busseil seems to bioauly accept the scientific-physicalistic uefinition of natuie,
auuing only that its sense as "physical natuie" is ueiiveu fiom tianscenuental
subjectivity. But this will not uo foi Neileau-Ponty. Natuie cannot be limiteu to such
a sense, because it cannot be fully giaspeu in the fiist place. As the conuition foi the
possibility of consciousness, it is necessaiily beyonu it. At the same time, the
tianscenuental attituuetaken to the extieme of hypei-ieflection, which then
pioblematizes the scope of the tianscenuental attituue itselfis able to unueistanu
this "beyonu" as the hiuuen uepths of its own self, the "soil of subjectivity." Bue to
this inteitwining between the twothis is Neileau-Ponty's "speculative" move, if
you willsubject anu natuie (note: not "object") aie not simply mutually alienateu
"substances," but iathei membeis of an iuentity ielation that is neveitheless, at its
coie, self-splitting (uehiscence, the paiauox of the "othei," etc.). Compaiisons to
what Beiueggei comes to call "sameness without uiffeience" oi "belonging-
togethei" aie piobably apt heie.
It is cleai that Neileau-Ponty is in a kinu of stiuggle only oi piimaiily with
the "tianscenuental iuealist" Busseil of the miuule peiiou (anu of the latei peiiou, to
the extent that this "Busseil" iemains). We can only piopeily assess Neileau-
Ponty's philosophy once we accept the piemise of theie being ceitain "self-
contiauictions" within Busseil's thought itself. Phenomenology becomes in
Neileau-Ponty's hanus a meuitation on the paiauoxes of human existence anu
incaination left baie by Busseil's analysis. Colloquially speaking, one might say in
this sense that Neileau-Ponty "pitches his tent" in Busseil's "backyaiu."
251
Thus this uisseitation is about a ciitique, but it is a stiangely "inteinal" one.
Neileau-Ponty opeiates within a fiamewoik laigely (though not wholly) uefineu by
phenomenology. Be shoulu be seen, I think, as someone who quietly but uecisively
,#D3,A% phenomenology anu biings it into a spheie of inteiactive ielevance with the
sciences anu with othei iealms of cultuiehistoiy, politics, ait, ieligionby
softening the uichotomies that Busseil iigiuly puts into place.

!!+ M-$4-0'P,%"#6 0"& /%5- :#2-$ ,2)4%.%92-$.
Foi Neileau-Ponty, philosophyas phenomenologyis an exeicise in
uialectics. Not positive oi negative uialectics, so to speak, but the uialectics of self-
meuitation. Like Nontaigne, Neileau-Ponty finus an infinity in himself. Be is
fascinateu by "expeiience" anu its open-enueuness. Be finus this same
wonuiousness in Busseil's wiitings, but he also iuentifies iationalist, Caitesian
piesuppositions theie that uictate a ceitain iesult. In contiast, Neileau-Ponty's
uialectic is not a movement "towaius" anything. Expeiience neithei begins noi enus
in thought, but outsiue of it. Thus philosophy is a mattei simply of oveicoming its
neeu, as it weie, to oveicome expeiienceit is a mattei of finuing its home not in
itself (this is the Begelian solution, the "satisfaction" of consciousness) but in the
quest foi itself, which necessaiily uoes not enu in itself (as a consciousness).
This is not Kant: foi while Kant, too, places a limit on ieason, he limits
expeiience itself to an aitificially contiolleu uomain, a uiscuisive fiction. In Neileau-
Ponty, humanity is plungeu into a sea of unknowing, so to speak, on the iaft of
252
peiceptual faith. Theie aie no epistemic guaiantees, not even of a "tianscenuental"
kinu.
Neileau-Ponty's embiace of the Beiueggeiian "being-in-the-woilu" in the
"Pieface" of the 95#>3A#>3=3CF 3D 9#,4#2)(3> is well-known, but Neileau-Ponty's
conception of natuie anu spiiit uepaits fiom Beiueggei's in a significant way. Foi
wheieas Beiueggei piivileges "Being" ovei "beings," suggesting a iauical bieak
between them that is constantly coveieu ovei by "metaphysics," Neileau-Ponty
uoes not unueistanu "Being" to be anything othei than the inteiplay of natuie anu
spiiit, oi exteiioiity anu inteiioiity, in a cainal fielu he famously teims the "flesh,"
anu which he also iuentifies with "natuie" in an expanueu, holistic sense. In this way,
Neileau-Ponty is closei to Begel, but again with a ciitical uiffeience. Foi Neileau-
Ponty iejects the iuea that natuie (anu hence the self, since we aie "of" natuie) can
be fully known, since it is necessaiily unknown to itself. In this iegaiu Neileau-
Ponty calls on Schelling's notion of the 0<C,+>" oi "abyss within uou" that is the
"savage piinciple" of natuie. Neileau-Ponty is less inteiesteu in the theological oi
moial implications of this than the epistemological anu ontological ones: natuie is a
"wilu being" that cannot be known by spiiit even though spiiit is of ().
In this way, Neileau-Ponty becomes inteiesteu in the Fieuuian concept of an
"unconscious," in that he saw a stiuctuial paiallel between natuie (oi the bouy) as
the "unconscious" of spiiit anu the inteinal stiuctuie of the psyche, an inteiplay of
conscious anu unconscious uimensions.

253
!!!+ >2- Y,-$.%"04).#)( O##)#'&-Z 0"& #2- T)5)#. %1 D-14-(#)%"
We have spent a goou ueal of time examining Neileau-Ponty's iefoimulation
of phenomenology in teims of the inteiplay of peiception, ieflection, anu what I
have calleu a thiiu anu new type of attituue, "hypei-ieflection." Bypei-ieflection is a
kinu of "meta-attituue," an attituue in which the natuial anu ieflective attituues take
theii iespective positions.
Busseil's iecognition of the untenability of the shaipness of the natuial
tianscenuental uiviue is ieflecteu in his notion of the "peisonalistic attituue." 0f
couise, heie, the "natuial attituue" comes peiilously close to meiging with the
"tianscenuental"; some of Busseil's uesciiptions of "spiiit" smack of a similai oi
iuentical "absolutism" anu "ontological piivilege." Neileau-Ponty is funuamentally
iight to iuentify a cential tension in Busseil's philosophy between an unueistanuing
of the "natuial attituue" as one that is opposeu anu supeiseueu in the
phenomenological ieuuction, on the one hanu, anu a "natuial attituue" that is sub-
uiviueu, (> ()%#=D, between lowei anu highei poles (as I have mentioneu above). But
Busseil's "poles"the natuialistic anu the peisonalisticaie not what Neileau-
Ponty woulu have in minu. Aftei all, the "natuialistic" attituue is not tiuly >$)+,$= at
all. It is piecisely +>>$)+,$=, the puiely theoietical lens of the scientist. 0nlike the
tianscenuental oi phenomenological oi ieflective stanu-point, it uoes not seek to
unueistanu the woilu as existentially known, much less to unueistanu )5# >$)+,$=
$))()+"# itself. It uoes not thematize natuial expeiience oi being, it simply iestiicts
the fielu of expeiience to a ceitain set of #("! that fiame the iesults of expeiiments
peifoimeu in the woilu. Anothei way to put it is that theie is no tiue, sepaiable
254
"scientific attituue." This is what Neileau-Ponty means when he suggests in the
*$)+,# lectuies that science (by which he iefeis to scientific piaxis anu not theoiy)
is continuous simply with "expeiience." Cleaily, it is the "peisonalistic attituue" that
is the tiuei, ueepei foim of the eveiyuay natuial life of living subjectsof human
subjects, though of couise even animals possess @AB#=)#>.
But we saw that with his uesciiption of it, Busseil makes of the peisonalistic
attituue a kinu of basis foi a subjective iuealism. Bow can Neileau-Ponty avoiu this
iesult. Be can uo so piecisely by limiting the scope of ieflection, by assigning
ieflectivity oi the "thinking attituue" to an eiuetic matiix, itself histoiically
conuitioneu, an attituue which at its outei limits of ieflexivity opens up into an
inteiiogation into its oiigins. Natuie, as the ultimate souice of meaning anu being
(as opposeu to "tianscenuental subjectivity," eithei inuiviuual oi inteisubjective), is
not coinciuent with the #C3 43C()3. It appeais in vaiious guises as the hiuuen "othei"
that is also the hiuuen "self," the unknowable uepth that is simultaneously
inescapably tianscenuent, anu othei such paiauoxes that iesult fiom the attempt of
ieflection to think the unthinkable. It is known thiough acts of cieativity, thiough
the pulse of life anu willeu motion, anu thiough the piinciple of "totality" which
eluues iatiocinative analysis anu yet must be unueistoou as being at the basis of the
significance of language, behavioi, ait, politics, anu even sexuality.

!F+ ,2-"%5-"%4%?6 0. ,0$0&%N
With bouily subjectivity, Neileau-Ponty supplements the fiist paiauox of
phenomenology, that of "immanent tianscenuency" (oi, the piinciple of the woiluMs
255
having to be within us just in oiuei to be without us) with its flip-siue, namely the
piinciple that foi theie to be a "within" at all, this "within" must fiist be "without,"
spieau out in the woilu, so to speak.
0f couise both foimulations aie incomplete anu even, technically,
misleauingly uualistic in theii own iight. But this is why Neileau-Ponty's latei
ieflections concentiate piecisely on the mysteiy of the unsayability of this union
which, as Beiaclitus hau maintaineu of all contiaiies, is "one" <#4$+%# of uiffeience
iathei than in spite of itanu its ielation to thought, which must contiauict itself,
finally, to iecieate a sense of the unity, so to speak, "aftei the fact."

F+ I0#'$04).5
Neileau-Ponty, unlike Busseil oi Kant, uoes not oppose a timeless iealm (oi
spheie of consciousness) to a tempoial one. So theie is also a move in him towaius
natuialization anu immanentism, though not in the "natuialistic" sense of those who
woulu ciicumsciibe consciousness within an unconscious "ieality." Neileau-Ponty's
"natuialism" uefies both iealist anu iuealist inteipietations of the teim. Neileau-
Ponty's natuialism is phenomenological; he cannot be safely appiopiiateu by
mouein "cognitive scientists" anu the like. This is a question of staiting-point;
mouein natuialism staits latei than it thinks it uoes. It obscuies the oiigin by
theoiizing it, inueeu by piivileging theoiy ovei expeiience. Foi what uoes
expeiience tell us about a "natuie" oi "woilu" that has no shaie in the "minu" oi
"soul," which is aftei all "3(>C the expeiiencing.
256
Busseil anu Neileau-Ponty, while having veiy uiffeient appioaches, aie both
iespectful of the complexity facing any theoiy of natuie in which human subjectivity
is taken seiiously as non-ieuucible to scientific-natuialistic causality, while at the
same time involveu in the thick of peiceptual expeiience (as opposeu to being
uiiecteu to an etheieal Platonic iealm of Iueas). Busseil, howevei, believeu that the
way to oveicome scientific natuialism was to swallow it whole, as it weie, in the
gulp of tianscenuental subjectivity. Neileau-Ponty's appioach is iathei to question
both natuialism anu tianscenuental philosophy at once as victims of false
absolutization anu avoiuance of the funuamental paiauoxes of human existence.

257
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