Here are select October 2013 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on criminal law and

jurisprudence:
1. REVISED PENAL CODE
Conspiracy; concept; proof of conspiracy need not rest on direct evidence. Accused-appellants Dukilman,
Ronas and Evad argue in their respective briefs that conspiracy, insofar as they were concerned, was not
convincingly established. Dukilman hinges his argument on the fact that he was not one of those arrested
during the rescue operation based on the testimony of Inspector Ouano. On the other hand, Ronas and Evad
base their argument on the fact that they had no participation whatsoever in the negotiation for the ransom
money. The Supreme Court held otherwise. Although Dukilman was not one of those apprehended at the
cottage during the rescue operation, the testimony of Police Inspector Arnado sufficiently established that he
was one of the four people apprehended when the police intercepted the Tamaraw FX at the Nichols Tollgate.
Likewise, the testimony of Police Inspector Ouano sufficiently established that Ronas and Evad were two of
those who were arrested during the rescue operation. It has been held that to be a conspirator, one need not
participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the
exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. Once conspiracy is shown, the act
of one is the act of all the conspirators. Further, proof of the conspiracy need not rest on direct evidence, as the
same may be inferred from the collective conduct of the parties before, during or after the commission of the
crime indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense. The
testimonies, when taken together, reveal the common purpose of the accused-appellants and how they were all
united in its execution from beginning to end. There were testimonies proving that (1) before the incident, two
of the accused-appellants kept coming back to the victims house; (2) during the kidnapping, accused-
appellants changed shifts in guarding the victim; and (3) the accused appellants were those present when the
ransom money was recovered and when the rescue operation was conducted. Seeing that conspiracy among
Gambao, Karim, Dukilman, Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas and Evad was established
beyond reasonable doubt based on the proffered evidence of the prosecution, the act of one is the act of all the
conspirators.People of the Philippines v. Halil Gambao, et al, G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013.
Murder; treachery. The Supreme Court (SC) found that the qualifying circumstance of treachery
was properly appreciated by the lower courts. There is treachery when the offender commits any of
the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof that tend
directly and especially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense that
the offended party might make. The SC has ruled that treachery is present when an assailant takes
advantage of a situation in which the victim is asleep, unaware of the evil design, or has just
awakened. It has been established by the prosecution, and even confirmed by the defense, that the
victims were sleeping when they were shot. To be precise, it was Emeterio who was asleep when he
was shot, considering that the women were able to cry for help before the rapid firing that silenced
them. In any case, it was clear that the women were in no position to defend themselves, having
been rudely awakened by the shooting of their companion. The fact that they shouted for help also
showed their loss of hope in the face of what was coming rapid gunfire from long firearms. Thus, it
has been established that appellants killed Emeterio, Porferia and Analiza. Appreciating treachery as
a qualifying circumstance, the crime is properly denominated as murder. People of the Philippines v.
Ricardo Dearo, Paulino Luage and Wilfredo Toledo, G.R. No. 190862, October 9, 2013.
Rape; delay in reporting the crime. The failure of AAA to report her ordeal is not unique in her case.
Many victims of rape would choose to suffer in silence rather than put the life of their loved ones in
danger. It is well entrenched that delay in reporting rape cases does not by itself undermine the
charge, where the delay is grounded in threats from the accused. Delay in revealing the commission
of a crime such as rape does not necessarily render such charge unworthy of belief. This is because
the victim may choose to keep quiet rather than expose her defilement to the harsh glare of public
scrutiny. Only when the delay is unreasonable or unexplained may it work to discredit the
complainant. People of the Philippines v. Florentino Galagar, Jr., G.R. No. 202842, October 9, 2013.
Rape; medical examination as corroborative evidence; the examining physician is expected to testify only on
the fact that he examined the victim and on the results of the examination. The Supreme Court did not give
credence to appellants imputation that the examining physician was unsure as to what caused AAAs
hymenal lacerations. It must be stressed that the examining physician was presented to testify only on the fact
that he examined the victim and on the results of such examination. He is thus expected to testify on the nature,
extent and location of the wounds. Dr. Arnulfo Imperial (Dr. Imperial) found, among others, that AAA
suffered hymenal lacerations. This refers to the location and nature of the wounds suffered by the victim. Dr.
Imperial could not be expected to establish the cause of such lacerations with particularity because he has no
personal knowledge of how these hymenal lacerations were inflicted on AAA. He could only surmise that
the lacerations could have been caused by activities like cycling, horseback riding or the insertion of [a] hard
object into the vagina of the victim such as the penis. In any case, a medical examination is not even
indispensable in prosecuting a rape charge. In fact, an accuseds conviction for rape may be anchored solely on
the testimony of the victim. At best, the medical examination would only serve as corroborative
evidence. People of the Philippines v. Marciano Cial y Lorena, G.R. No. 191362, October 9, 2013.
Rape; statutory rape; elements. Rape of a minor under 12 years of age is statutory rape. The elements
of statutory rape are that: (a) the victim is a female under 12 years or is demented; and (b) the offender has
carnal knowledge of the victim. Neither the use of force, threat or intimidation on the female, nor the females
deprivation of reason or being otherwise unconscious, nor the employment on the female of fraudulent
machinations or grave abuse of authority is necessary to commit statutory rape. In statutory rape, there are only
two elements that need to be established, to wit: 1) carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse; and 2) that the
woman is below 12 years of age. In this case, the prosecution satisfactorily established the fact of carnal
knowledge. It is likewise beyond dispute that AAA was only 11 years of age at the time she was raped. Her
Certificate of Live Birth showed that she was born on November 26, 1992. The lower courts therefore
correctly held appellant guilty of the crime of statutory rape and imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. People of the Philippines v. Rodolfo De Jesus y Mendoza, G.R. No. 190622, October 7, 2013.
2. SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act; chain of custody; a 45% difference in the reported weight of the drugs
from the time of the arrest to the time of the receipt by the laboratory for testing implies tampering of evidence.
The Court of Appeals said that the chain of custody of the seized drugs does not appear to be unbroken. The
Supreme Court (SC) held otherwise. The PDEA report to the Provincial Prosecutors Office, the booking sheet
and arrest report, the Certificate of Inventory, and the laboratory examination request all put down the seized
shabu as weighing 0.4 gram. The forensic chemist reported and testified, however, that the police actually
submitted only 0.2204 gram of shabu for laboratory testing, short by 0.1796 gram from what the police
inventoried. It therefore suffered a loss of 45% or nearly half of the original weight. The prosecution has three
theories: only two chemists served the entire region giving rise to possible error; the police and the crime
laboratory used different weighing scales; and the failure of the laboratory to take into account the weight of
the sachet container. But these are mere speculations since none of those involved was willing to admit having
committed weighing error. Speculations cannot overcome the concrete evidence that what was seized was not
what was forensically tested. This implies tampering with the prosecution evidence. Hence, because of the
compromised evidence, the SC did not affirm the conviction of Pornillos. People of the Philippines v. Jovi
Pornillos y Hallare, G.R. No. 201109, October 2, 2013.
3. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Criminal case; when appeal is to be taken. Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that an appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment or from
notice of the final order appealed from. In this case, the judgment convicting the petitioner of the crime of
Estafa was promulgated on March 25, 2009. Instead of filing a notice of appeal within fifteen (15) days from
the promulgation or notice of judgment, the petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a motion to
lift warrant of arrest and to reinstate bail bond three (3) months later. It was only in November 2010 or more
than a year later since the RTC denied her motion that the petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) her
motion to admit notice of appeal. At that point, her judgment of conviction has already attained finality and
cannot be modified or set aside anymore in accordance with Section 7, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Thus, the CA did not commit any reversible error in denying the petitioners motion
inasmuch as by the time the petitioner filed the same, the appellate court was already bereft of any jurisdiction
to entertain the motion. Anita Ramirez v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 197832, October 2, 2013.
Here are select September 2013 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on criminal law and
procedure:
1. REVISED PENAL CODE
Estafa under Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code; elements. In order to constitute estafa under
Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code, the act of postdating or issuing a check in payment of
an obligation must be the efficient cause of the defraudation. This means that the offender must be
able to obtain money or property from the offended party by reason of the issuance of the check,
whether dated or postdated. In other words, the Prosecution must show that the person to whom the
check was delivered would not have parted with his money or property were it not for the issuance of
the check by the offender. The essential elements of this crime are the following: (a) a check is
postdated or issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check is issued; (b) lack
or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (c) damage to the payee thereof. People of the
Philippines v. Gilbert Reyes Wagas, G.R. No. 157943, September 4, 2013.
Estafa under Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code; what the law punishes is fraud or deceit, not the
mere issuance of a worthless check. In this case, the Prosecution established that Ligaray had released
the goods to Caada because of the postdated check the latter had given to him; and that the check
was dishonored when presented for payment because of the insufficiency of funds. In every criminal
prosecution, however, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. In that regard, the Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable doubt
that it was accused Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check. Firstly, Ligaray
expressly admitted that he did not personally meet the person with whom he was transacting over
the telephone. Even after the dishonor of the check, Ligaray did not personally see and meet
whoever he had dealt with and to whom he had made the demand for payment, and that he had
talked with him only over the telephone. Secondly, the check delivered to Ligaray was made payable
to cash this type of check was payable to the bearer and could be negotiated by mere delivery
without the need of an indorsement. This rendered it highly probable that Wagas had issued the
check not to Ligaray, but to somebody else like Caada, his brother-in-law, who then negotiated it to
Ligaray. Relevantly, Ligaray confirmed that he did not himself see or meet Wagas at the time of the
transaction and thereafter, and expressly stated that the person who signed for and received the
stocks of rice was Caada. It bears stressing that the accused, to be guilty of estafa as charged,
must have used the check in order to defraud the complainant. What the law punishes is the fraud or
deceit, not the mere issuance of the worthless check. Wagas could not be held guilty of estafa
simply because he had issued the check used to defraud Ligaray. The proof of guilt must still clearly
show that it had been Wagas as the drawer who had defrauded Ligaray by means of the check.
Thus, considering that the circumstances of the identification of Wagas as the person who
transacted on the rice did not preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake, the proof of guilt did not
measure up to the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt demanded in criminal cases.People
of the Philippines v. Gilbert Reyes Wagas, G.R. No. 157943, September 4, 2013.
Evident premeditation; requisites. In order for evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the time when accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act
manifestly indicating that he has clung to his determination; and, (3) sufficient lapse of time between
such a determination and the actual execution to allow the accused time to reflect upon the
consequences of his act. In this case, the courts below based their finding of evident premeditation
on the entries in the Dispatch Logbook, the alleged pretense made by the appellant and cohorts that
they were going to conduct a police operation regarding illegal drugs, as well as the telephone call
made by the victim to his friend Reyes before the incident. To the Supreme Courts mind, however,
these circumstances do not constitute clear and positive evidence of outward acts showing a
premeditation to kill. At most, these circumstances are indicative only of conspiracy among the
accused. Settled is the rule that when it is not shown how and when the plan to kill was hatched or
how much time had elapsed before it was carried out, evident premeditation cannot be considered. It
must appear not only that the accused decided to commit the crime prior to the moment of its
execution but also that this decision was the result of meditation, calculation, reflection or persistent
attempt. Notably, even the Office of the Solicitor General admitted that the lapse of time from the
moment the victim was fetched until the shooting cannot be considered sufficient for appellant to
reflect upon the consequences of his act. People of the Philippines v. SPO1 Alfredo Alawig, G.R. No.
187731, September 18, 2013.
Qualified rape; knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of the victim. Knowledge of the offender
of the mental disability of the victim during the commission of the crime of rape qualifies and makes
it punishable by death. However, such knowledge by the rapist should be alleged in the Information
since a crime can only be qualified by circumstances pleaded in the indictment. In this case,
appellants knowledge of the mental disability of AAA at the time of the commission of the crime of
rape was properly alleged in the Amended Information. As found by the lower courts, the
prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was aware of the mental retardation of
AAA. Appellant testified that he knew AAA and that he even used to reside with her and her
relatives. He was treated as a member of their family. In fact, he regarded AAA as his niece. His
boarding house was also a few minutes away from the residence of AAA. He also admitted that
AAA was known to be mentally retarded in their community. The low intellect of AAA was easily
noticeable to the trial court from the answers she gave to the questions propounded to her in the
course of her testimony. Further, the Supreme Court stressed that from the filing of this case until its
appeal, appellant did not assail AAAs mental disability and even admitted knowledge of her
intellectual inadequacy. Thus, appellants knowledge of AAAs mental disability at the time of the
commission of the crime qualifies the crime of rape. Appellant is therefore guilty of the crime of
qualified rape. People of the Philippines v. Jojie Suansing, G.R. No. 189822, September 2, 2013.
Rape; the lack of lacerated wounds in the vagina is not a defense. In an effort to secure his exoneration
from the charge of rape, Rivera pointed out that the records were bereft of evidence to prove that
AAA suffered vaginal lacerations. The Supreme Court held that the lack of lacerated wounds in the
vagina, however, does not negate sexual intercourse. Laceration of the hymen, even if considered
the most telling and irrefutable physical evidence of sexual assault, is not always essential to
establish the consummation of the crime of rape. In the context used in the Revised Penal Code,
carnal knowledge, unlike its ordinary connotation of sexual intercourse, does not necessarily
require that the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured. Accordingly, granting arguendo
that AAA did not suffer any laceration, Rivera would still be guilty of rape after it was clearly
established that he did succeed in having carnal knowledge of her. At any rate, it has been
repeatedly held that the medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for
rape. Expert testimony is merely corroborative in character and not essential to a conviction. People
of the Philippines v. Christopher Rivera y Royo, G.R. No. 200508, September 4, 2013.
Self-defense; burden of proof in self-defense. Appellant faults the Court of Appeals (CA) when it imposed
on him the burden of proving the elements of self-defense. He claims it was PO3 Ventinilla who
acted in self-defense and, therefore, it was incumbent upon the latter to establish such fact. He
avers that his defense is denial as found by the trial court. Obviously, appellant was confused. It
must be noted that he was the only witness who testified on the circumstances surrounding the
tragic death of the victim. It was he who supplied the necessary evidence showing that there was
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Contrary to the undisputed finding of Dr. Bernales that
there are more than one assailant in view of the multiple bullet wounds on the body of the victim,
appellant insists it was only PO3 Ventinilla who killed the victim. However, neither PO3 Ventinilla nor
the victim could be resurrected from their graves to controvert appellants version of the story.
Besides, in the Counter-Affidavit of SPO4 Miraples, appellants co-accused, he stated therein that
appellant acted in self-defense when the victim allegedly went berserk. More important, in his
Answer to the administrative complaint filed by the victims widow, appellant interposed self-defense
by alleging that it was the victim who initiated the attack through unlawful aggression. Hence, the CA
committed no error in imposing upon him the burden of proving the elements of self-defense. People
of the Philippines v. SPO1 Alfredo Alawig, G.R. No. 187731, September 18, 2013.
2. SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Section 3(e) offense; elements. In all, the petitioner failed to
demonstrate that the Sandiganbayan committed reversible errors in finding him guilty of the violating
section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. For the aforecited provision to lie against the petitioner, the following
elements must concur: 1) The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or
official functions; 2) He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence; and 3) That his action caused undue injury to any party, including the
government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his functions. Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when the
accused acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa, as when the accused
committed gross inexcusable negligence. Jovito C. Plameras v. People of the Philippines,G.R. No.
187268, September 4, 2013.
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Section 3(e) offense; elements. As correctly observed by the
Sandiganbayan, certain established rules, regulations and policies of the Commission on Audit and
those mandated under the Local Government Code of 1991 were knowingly sidestepped and
ignored by the petitioner which enabled CKLEnterprises/Dela Cruz to successfully get full payment
for the school desks and armchairs, despite non-delivery an act or omission evidencing bad faith
and manifest partiality. It must be borne to mind that any procurement or acquisition of supplies or
property by local government units shall be through competitive public bidding. The petitioner
admitted in his testimony that he is aware of such requirement, however, he proceeded just the
same due to the alleged advice of the unnamed DECS representative that there was already a
negotiated contract a representation or misrepresentation he willfully believed in without any
verification. As a Governor, he must know that negotiated contract can only be resorted to in case of
failure of a public bidding. As it is, there is no public bidding to speak of that has been conducted.
Intentionally or not, it is his duty to act in a circumspect manner to protect government funds. To do
otherwise is gross inexcusable negligence, at the very least, especially so, that petitioner acted on
his own initiative and without authorization from the Provincial School Board.Jovito C. Plameras v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 187268, September 4, 2013.
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Section 3(e) offense; elements. The same thing can be said about the act
of petitioner in signing the sales invoice and the bank draft knowing that such documents would cause the
withdrawal by CKL Enterprises/Dela Cruz of the corresponding amount covered by the Irrevocable Domestic
Letter of Credit. It must be noted that any withdrawal with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) must be
accompanied by the appropriate document evidencing deliveries. In signing the draft and sales invoice,
petitioner made it possible for CKL Enterprises/Dela Cruz to withdraw the entire P5,666,600.00 without any
delivery of the items. As the records would bear, the CKL Enterprises Invoice dated 16 April 1997, contains
the signature of the accused as customer. Above the customers signature is the phrase: Received and
accepted the above items in good condition. The significance of the customers signature on the invoice is
that it initiates the process of releasing the payment to the seller. This is all that the LBP needs in order to
release the money alloted for the purchase. Unfortunately, despite receipt of payment, it was almost a year
after when delivery of the items was made on a piece meal basis-some of which were even defective. The
Supreme Court, therefore, was not persuaded that petitioner deserves to be exonerated. On the contrary,
evidence of undue injury caused to the Province of Antique and giving of unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference to CKL Enterprises/DelaCruz committed through gross inexcusable negligence was proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Jovito C. Plameras v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 187268, September 4, 2013.

Chain of custody rule; legal effect of failure to prove chain of custody. The chain of custody rule is a method
of authenticating evidence which requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient
to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. In this case, the Supreme
Court found reasonable doubt on the evidence presented to prove an unbroken chain of custody. First, it is not
clear from the evidence that the marking, which was done in the police station, was made in the presence of the
accused or his representative. Thus, there is already a gap in determining whether the specimens that entered
into the chain were actually the ones examined and offered in evidence. Second, the prosecution failed to duly
accomplish the Certificate of Inventory and to take photos of the seized items pursuant to the law. There is
nothing in the records that would show at least an attempt to comply with this procedural safeguard; neither
was there any justifiable reason propounded for failing to do so. Third, the Supreme Court found conflicting
testimony and glaring inconsistencies that would cast doubt on the integrity of the handling of the seized drugs.
The material inconsistency of who actually received the specimens in the Crime Laboratory creates a cloud of
doubt as to whether the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved. The gaps in the
chain of custody creates a reasonable doubt as to whether the specimens seized from the accused were the
same specimens brought to the laboratory and eventually offered in court as evidence. Without adequate proof
of the corpus delicti, the conviction cannot stand. People of the Philippines v. Freddy Salonga y
Afiado, G.R. No. 194948, September 2, 2013.
3. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Arraignment; purpose. Arraignment is indispensable in bringing the accused to court and in notifying
him of the nature and cause of the accusations against him. The importance of arraignment is based
on the constitutional right of the accused to be informed. It is at this stage that the accused, for the
first time, is given the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is only imperative
that he is thus made fully aware of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the
nature of the imputed crime. Letecia I. Kummer v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 174461,
September 11, 2013.
Arraignment; the need for arraignment where the complaint or information is amended. The need for
arraignment is equally imperative in an amended information or complaint. This, however, pertains
only to substantial amendments and not to formal amendments that, by their very nature, do not
charge an offense different from that charged in the original complaint or information; do not alter the
theory of the prosecution; do not cause any surprise and affect the line of defense; and do not
adversely affect the substantial rights of the accused, such as an amendment in the date of the
commission of the offense. Further, an amendment done after the plea and during trial, in
accordance with the rules, does not call for a second plea since the amendment is only as to form.
The purpose of an arraignment, that is, to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, has already been attained when the accused was arraigned the first time.
The subsequent amendment could not have conceivably come as a surprise to the accused simply
because the amendment did not charge a new offense nor alter the theory of the prosecution.
Applying these rules and principles to the prevailing case, the records of the case evidently show
that the amendment in the complaint was from July 19, 1988 to June 19, 1988, or a difference of
only one month. It is clear that consistent with the rule on amendments, the change in the date of the
commission of the crime of homicide is a formal amendment it does not change the nature of the
crime, does not affect the essence of the offense nor deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet
the new averment, and is not prejudicial to the accused. Further, the defense under the complaint is
still available after the amendment, as this was, in fact, the same line of defenses used by the
petitioner. Letecia I. Kummer v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 174461, September 11, 2013.
Preliminary investigation; the conduct of preliminary investigation belongs to the public prosecutor. The well-
established rule is that the conduct of preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the
existence of probable cause is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor. The prosecution of
crimes lies with the executive department of the government whose principal power and
responsibility is to see that the laws of the land are faithfully executed. Thus, the rule is that the
Supreme Court (SC) will not interfere in the findings of the Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary on
the insufficiency of the evidence presented to establish probable cause unless it is shown that the
questioned acts were done in a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment evidencing a clear
case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The party seeking the
writ of certiorari must establish that the DOJ Secretary exercised his executive power in an arbitrary
and despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of discretion must be
so patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. In the present case, there was no clear evidence of grave
abuse of discretion committed by the DOJ when it set aside its March 23, 2000 Resolution and
reinstated the July 28, 1998 Resolution of the public prosecutor. The DOJ was correct when it
characterized the complaint for attempted murder as already covered by two (2) other criminal
cases. As to the other complaints, the SC agreed with the DOJ that they were weak and not
adequately supported by credible evidence. Thus, the CA erred in supplanting the prosecutors
discretion with its own. Evidently, the conclusions arrived at by the DOJ were neither whimsical nor
capricious as to be corrected by certiorari. Even on the assumption that the DOJ Secretary made
erroneous conclusions, this error alone would not subject his act to correction or annulment by the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari. After all, not every erroneous conclusion of law or fact is an
abuse of discretion. Rosalinda Punzalan, Randall Punzalan and Rainier Punzalan v. Michael
Gamaliel J. Plata and Ruben Plata, G.R. No. 160316, September 2, 2013.
Here are select September 2013 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on criminal law and
procedure:
1. REVISED PENAL CODE
Estafa under Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code; elements. In order to constitute estafa under
Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code, the act of postdating or issuing a check in payment of
an obligation must be the efficient cause of the defraudation. This means that the offender must be
able to obtain money or property from the offended party by reason of the issuance of the check,
whether dated or postdated. In other words, the Prosecution must show that the person to whom the
check was delivered would not have parted with his money or property were it not for the issuance of
the check by the offender. The essential elements of this crime are the following: (a) a check is
postdated or issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check is issued; (b) lack
or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (c) damage to the payee thereof. People of the
Philippines v. Gilbert Reyes Wagas, G.R. No. 157943, September 4, 2013.
Estafa under Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code; what the law punishes is fraud or deceit, not the
mere issuance of a worthless check. In this case, the Prosecution established that Ligaray had released
the goods to Caada because of the postdated check the latter had given to him; and that the check
was dishonored when presented for payment because of the insufficiency of funds. In every criminal
prosecution, however, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. In that regard, the Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable doubt
that it was accused Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check. Firstly, Ligaray
expressly admitted that he did not personally meet the person with whom he was transacting over
the telephone. Even after the dishonor of the check, Ligaray did not personally see and meet
whoever he had dealt with and to whom he had made the demand for payment, and that he had
talked with him only over the telephone. Secondly, the check delivered to Ligaray was made payable
to cash this type of check was payable to the bearer and could be negotiated by mere delivery
without the need of an indorsement. This rendered it highly probable that Wagas had issued the
check not to Ligaray, but to somebody else like Caada, his brother-in-law, who then negotiated it to
Ligaray. Relevantly, Ligaray confirmed that he did not himself see or meet Wagas at the time of the
transaction and thereafter, and expressly stated that the person who signed for and received the
stocks of rice was Caada. It bears stressing that the accused, to be guilty of estafa as charged,
must have used the check in order to defraud the complainant. What the law punishes is the fraud or
deceit, not the mere issuance of the worthless check. Wagas could not be held guilty of estafa
simply because he had issued the check used to defraud Ligaray. The proof of guilt must still clearly
show that it had been Wagas as the drawer who had defrauded Ligaray by means of the check.
Thus, considering that the circumstances of the identification of Wagas as the person who
transacted on the rice did not preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake, the proof of guilt did not
measure up to the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt demanded in criminal cases.People
of the Philippines v. Gilbert Reyes Wagas, G.R. No. 157943, September 4, 2013.
Evident premeditation; requisites. In order for evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the time when accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act
manifestly indicating that he has clung to his determination; and, (3) sufficient lapse of time between
such a determination and the actual execution to allow the accused time to reflect upon the
consequences of his act. In this case, the courts below based their finding of evident premeditation
on the entries in the Dispatch Logbook, the alleged pretense made by the appellant and cohorts that
they were going to conduct a police operation regarding illegal drugs, as well as the telephone call
made by the victim to his friend Reyes before the incident. To the Supreme Courts mind, however,
these circumstances do not constitute clear and positive evidence of outward acts showing a
premeditation to kill. At most, these circumstances are indicative only of conspiracy among the
accused. Settled is the rule that when it is not shown how and when the plan to kill was hatched or
how much time had elapsed before it was carried out, evident premeditation cannot be considered. It
must appear not only that the accused decided to commit the crime prior to the moment of its
execution but also that this decision was the result of meditation, calculation, reflection or persistent
attempt. Notably, even the Office of the Solicitor General admitted that the lapse of time from the
moment the victim was fetched until the shooting cannot be considered sufficient for appellant to
reflect upon the consequences of his act. People of the Philippines v. SPO1 Alfredo Alawig, G.R. No.
187731, September 18, 2013.
Qualified rape; knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of the victim. Knowledge of the offender
of the mental disability of the victim during the commission of the crime of rape qualifies and makes
it punishable by death. However, such knowledge by the rapist should be alleged in the Information
since a crime can only be qualified by circumstances pleaded in the indictment. In this case,
appellants knowledge of the mental disability of AAA at the time of the commission of the crime of
rape was properly alleged in the Amended Information. As found by the lower courts, the
prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was aware of the mental retardation of
AAA. Appellant testified that he knew AAA and that he even used to reside with her and her
relatives. He was treated as a member of their family. In fact, he regarded AAA as his niece. His
boarding house was also a few minutes away from the residence of AAA. He also admitted that
AAA was known to be mentally retarded in their community. The low intellect of AAA was easily
noticeable to the trial court from the answers she gave to the questions propounded to her in the
course of her testimony. Further, the Supreme Court stressed that from the filing of this case until its
appeal, appellant did not assail AAAs mental disability and even admitted knowledge of her
intellectual inadequacy. Thus, appellants knowledge of AAAs mental disability at the time of the
commission of the crime qualifies the crime of rape. Appellant is therefore guilty of the crime of
qualified rape. People of the Philippines v. Jojie Suansing, G.R. No. 189822, September 2, 2013.
Rape; the lack of lacerated wounds in the vagina is not a defense. In an effort to secure his exoneration
from the charge of rape, Rivera pointed out that the records were bereft of evidence to prove that
AAA suffered vaginal lacerations. The Supreme Court held that the lack of lacerated wounds in the
vagina, however, does not negate sexual intercourse. Laceration of the hymen, even if considered
the most telling and irrefutable physical evidence of sexual assault, is not always essential to
establish the consummation of the crime of rape. In the context used in the Revised Penal Code,
carnal knowledge, unlike its ordinary connotation of sexual intercourse, does not necessarily
require that the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured. Accordingly, granting arguendo
that AAA did not suffer any laceration, Rivera would still be guilty of rape after it was clearly
established that he did succeed in having carnal knowledge of her. At any rate, it has been
repeatedly held that the medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for
rape. Expert testimony is merely corroborative in character and not essential to a conviction. People
of the Philippines v. Christopher Rivera y Royo, G.R. No. 200508, September 4, 2013.
Self-defense; burden of proof in self-defense. Appellant faults the Court of Appeals (CA) when it imposed
on him the burden of proving the elements of self-defense. He claims it was PO3 Ventinilla who
acted in self-defense and, therefore, it was incumbent upon the latter to establish such fact. He
avers that his defense is denial as found by the trial court. Obviously, appellant was confused. It
must be noted that he was the only witness who testified on the circumstances surrounding the
tragic death of the victim. It was he who supplied the necessary evidence showing that there was
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Contrary to the undisputed finding of Dr. Bernales that
there are more than one assailant in view of the multiple bullet wounds on the body of the victim,
appellant insists it was only PO3 Ventinilla who killed the victim. However, neither PO3 Ventinilla nor
the victim could be resurrected from their graves to controvert appellants version of the story.
Besides, in the Counter-Affidavit of SPO4 Miraples, appellants co-accused, he stated therein that
appellant acted in self-defense when the victim allegedly went berserk. More important, in his
Answer to the administrative complaint filed by the victims widow, appellant interposed self-defense
by alleging that it was the victim who initiated the attack through unlawful aggression. Hence, the CA
committed no error in imposing upon him the burden of proving the elements of self-defense. People
of the Philippines v. SPO1 Alfredo Alawig, G.R. No. 187731, September 18, 2013.
2. SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Section 3(e) offense; elements. In all, the petitioner failed to
demonstrate that the Sandiganbayan committed reversible errors in finding him guilty of the violating
section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. For the aforecited provision to lie against the petitioner, the following
elements must concur: 1) The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or
official functions; 2) He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence; and 3) That his action caused undue injury to any party, including the
government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his functions. Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when the
accused acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa, as when the accused
committed gross inexcusable negligence. Jovito C. Plameras v. People of the Philippines,G.R. No.
187268, September 4, 2013.
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Section 3(e) offense; elements. As correctly observed by the
Sandiganbayan, certain established rules, regulations and policies of the Commission on Audit and
those mandated under the Local Government Code of 1991 were knowingly sidestepped and
ignored by the petitioner which enabled CKLEnterprises/Dela Cruz to successfully get full payment
for the school desks and armchairs, despite non-delivery an act or omission evidencing bad faith
and manifest partiality. It must be borne to mind that any procurement or acquisition of supplies or
property by local government units shall be through competitive public bidding. The petitioner
admitted in his testimony that he is aware of such requirement, however, he proceeded just the
same due to the alleged advice of the unnamed DECS representative that there was already a
negotiated contract a representation or misrepresentation he willfully believed in without any
verification. As a Governor, he must know that negotiated contract can only be resorted to in case of
failure of a public bidding. As it is, there is no public bidding to speak of that has been conducted.
Intentionally or not, it is his duty to act in a circumspect manner to protect government funds. To do
otherwise is gross inexcusable negligence, at the very least, especially so, that petitioner acted on
his own initiative and without authorization from the Provincial School Board.Jovito C. Plameras v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 187268, September 4, 2013.
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Section 3(e) offense; elements. The same thing can be said about the act
of petitioner in signing the sales invoice and the bank draft knowing that such documents would cause the
withdrawal by CKL Enterprises/Dela Cruz of the corresponding amount covered by the Irrevocable Domestic
Letter of Credit. It must be noted that any withdrawal with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) must be
accompanied by the appropriate document evidencing deliveries. In signing the draft and sales invoice,
petitioner made it possible for CKL Enterprises/Dela Cruz to withdraw the entire P5,666,600.00 without any
delivery of the items. As the records would bear, the CKL Enterprises Invoice dated 16 April 1997, contains
the signature of the accused as customer. Above the customers signature is the phrase: Received and
accepted the above items in good condition. The significance of the customers signature on the invoice is
that it initiates the process of releasing the payment to the seller. This is all that the LBP needs in order to
release the money alloted for the purchase. Unfortunately, despite receipt of payment, it was almost a year
after when delivery of the items was made on a piece meal basis-some of which were even defective. The
Supreme Court, therefore, was not persuaded that petitioner deserves to be exonerated. On the contrary,
evidence of undue injury caused to the Province of Antique and giving of unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference to CKL Enterprises/DelaCruz committed through gross inexcusable negligence was proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Jovito C. Plameras v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 187268, September 4, 2013.

Chain of custody rule; legal effect of failure to prove chain of custody. The chain of custody rule is a method
of authenticating evidence which requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient
to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. In this case, the Supreme
Court found reasonable doubt on the evidence presented to prove an unbroken chain of custody. First, it is not
clear from the evidence that the marking, which was done in the police station, was made in the presence of the
accused or his representative. Thus, there is already a gap in determining whether the specimens that entered
into the chain were actually the ones examined and offered in evidence. Second, the prosecution failed to duly
accomplish the Certificate of Inventory and to take photos of the seized items pursuant to the law. There is
nothing in the records that would show at least an attempt to comply with this procedural safeguard; neither
was there any justifiable reason propounded for failing to do so. Third, the Supreme Court found conflicting
testimony and glaring inconsistencies that would cast doubt on the integrity of the handling of the seized drugs.
The material inconsistency of who actually received the specimens in the Crime Laboratory creates a cloud of
doubt as to whether the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved. The gaps in the
chain of custody creates a reasonable doubt as to whether the specimens seized from the accused were the
same specimens brought to the laboratory and eventually offered in court as evidence. Without adequate proof
of the corpus delicti, the conviction cannot stand. People of the Philippines v. Freddy Salonga y
Afiado, G.R. No. 194948, September 2, 2013.
3. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Arraignment; purpose. Arraignment is indispensable in bringing the accused to court and in notifying
him of the nature and cause of the accusations against him. The importance of arraignment is based
on the constitutional right of the accused to be informed. It is at this stage that the accused, for the
first time, is given the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is only imperative
that he is thus made fully aware of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the
nature of the imputed crime. Letecia I. Kummer v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 174461,
September 11, 2013.
Arraignment; the need for arraignment where the complaint or information is amended. The need for
arraignment is equally imperative in an amended information or complaint. This, however, pertains
only to substantial amendments and not to formal amendments that, by their very nature, do not
charge an offense different from that charged in the original complaint or information; do not alter the
theory of the prosecution; do not cause any surprise and affect the line of defense; and do not
adversely affect the substantial rights of the accused, such as an amendment in the date of the
commission of the offense. Further, an amendment done after the plea and during trial, in
accordance with the rules, does not call for a second plea since the amendment is only as to form.
The purpose of an arraignment, that is, to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, has already been attained when the accused was arraigned the first time.
The subsequent amendment could not have conceivably come as a surprise to the accused simply
because the amendment did not charge a new offense nor alter the theory of the prosecution.
Applying these rules and principles to the prevailing case, the records of the case evidently show
that the amendment in the complaint was from July 19, 1988 to June 19, 1988, or a difference of
only one month. It is clear that consistent with the rule on amendments, the change in the date of the
commission of the crime of homicide is a formal amendment it does not change the nature of the
crime, does not affect the essence of the offense nor deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet
the new averment, and is not prejudicial to the accused. Further, the defense under the complaint is
still available after the amendment, as this was, in fact, the same line of defenses used by the
petitioner. Letecia I. Kummer v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 174461, September 11, 2013.
Preliminary investigation; the conduct of preliminary investigation belongs to the public prosecutor. The well-
established rule is that the conduct of preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the
existence of probable cause is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor. The prosecution of
crimes lies with the executive department of the government whose principal power and
responsibility is to see that the laws of the land are faithfully executed. Thus, the rule is that the
Supreme Court (SC) will not interfere in the findings of the Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary on
the insufficiency of the evidence presented to establish probable cause unless it is shown that the
questioned acts were done in a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment evidencing a clear
case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The party seeking the
writ of certiorari must establish that the DOJ Secretary exercised his executive power in an arbitrary
and despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of discretion must be
so patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. In the present case, there was no clear evidence of grave
abuse of discretion committed by the DOJ when it set aside its March 23, 2000 Resolution and
reinstated the July 28, 1998 Resolution of the public prosecutor. The DOJ was correct when it
characterized the complaint for attempted murder as already covered by two (2) other criminal
cases. As to the other complaints, the SC agreed with the DOJ that they were weak and not
adequately supported by credible evidence. Thus, the CA erred in supplanting the prosecutors
discretion with its own. Evidently, the conclusions arrived at by the DOJ were neither whimsical nor
capricious as to be corrected by certiorari. Even on the assumption that the DOJ Secretary made
erroneous conclusions, this error alone would not subject his act to correction or annulment by the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari. After all, not every erroneous conclusion of law or fact is an
abuse of discretion. Rosalinda Punzalan, Randall Punzalan and Rainier Punzalan v. Michael
Gamaliel J. Plata and Ruben Plata, G.R. No. 160316, September 2, 2013.
Here are select August 2013 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on criminal law and
procedure:
1. Revised Penal Code
Crime of Open Disobedience; elements. The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) did not gravely abuse its
discretion in dismissing Criminal Case No. 46400 for lack of probable cause. The dismissal ought to
be sustained since the records clearly disclose the unmistakable absence of the integral elements of
the crime of Open Disobedience. While the first element, i.e., that the offender is a judicial or
executive officer, concurs in view of Atty. Frias position as Branch Clerk of Court, the second and
third elements of the crime evidently remain wanting. To elucidate, the second element of the crime
of Open Disobedience is that there is a judgment, decision, or order of a superior authority made
within the scope of its jurisdiction and issued with all legal formalities. In this case, it is undisputed
that all the proceedings in Civil Case No. 03-110 have been regarded as null and void due to Branch
203s lack of jurisdiction over the said case. Hence, since it is explicitly required that the subject
issuance be made within the scope of a superior authoritys jurisdiction, it cannot therefore be
doubted that the second element of the crime of Open Disobedience does not exist. Proceeding
from this discussion, the third element of the crime, i.e., that the offender, without any legal
justification, openly refuses to execute the said judgment, decision, or order, which he is duty bound
to obey, cannot equally exist. Indubitably, without any jurisdiction, there would be no legal order for
Atty. Fria to implement or, conversely, disobey. The Law Firm of Chavez Miranda and Aseoche, et al
v. Atty. Josejina C. Fria, G.R. No. 183014, August 7, 2013.
Extinguishment of criminal liability by the death of the accused prior to final judgment; effect of death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction on his civil liability ex delicto. Article 89, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code states that, Criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the convict,
as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is extinguished only
when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. Given the foregoing, it is clear that the
death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as
his civil liability ex delicto. Since the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex
delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case. Undeniably, Amistosos
death on December 11, 2012 preceded the promulgation by the Supreme Court (SC) of its Decision
on January 9, 2013. When Amistoso died, his appeal before the SC was still pending and
unresolved. The SC ruled upon Amistosos appeal only because it was not immediately informed of
his death. Amistosos death on December 11, 2012 renders the SCs Decision dated January 9,
2013, even though affirming Amistosos conviction, irrelevant and ineffectual. Moreover, said
Decision has not yet become final, and the SC still has the jurisdiction to set it aside. People of the
Philippines v. Anastacio Amistoso y Broca, G.R. No. 201447, August 28, 2013.
Rape; the absence of laceration and semen; complete or full penetration of the complainants private parts not
necessary. With regard to the results of the medical examination, the Supreme Court ruled that the
absence of laceration and semen does not preclude the fact that rape has been committed. In the
crime of rape, complete or full penetration of the complainants private part is not at all necessary.
Neither is the rupture of the hymen essential. What is fundamental is that the entry or at the very
least the introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum is proved. The mere
introduction of the male organ into the labia majora of the complainants vagina, consummates the
crime. Likewise, the absence of semen in AAAs vaginal area would not preclude a finding of rape.
The presence or absence of spermatozoa is immaterial because the presence of spermatozoa is not
an element of rape. Moreover, it has been held that the absence of spermatozoa in the vagina could
be due to a number of factors, such as the vertical drainage of the semen from the vagina, the
acidity of the vagina or the washing of the vagina immediately after sexual intercourse. People of the
Philippines v. Apolinario Manalili y Jose, G.R. No. 191253, August 28, 2013.
2. Special Penal Laws
Ill-gotten Wealth; E.O. No. 1, Series of 1986; the mere holding of a position in the Marcos administration did
not necessarily make the holder a close associate of Marcos. There are two concurring elements that must
be present before assets or properties can be considered as ill-gotten wealth, namely: (a) they must
have originated from the government itself, and (b) they must have been taken by former President
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates by illegal means. As can be gleaned
from the above, evidentiary substantiation of the allegations of how the wealth was illegally acquired
and by whom was necessary. For that purpose, the mere holding of a position in the Marcos
administration did not necessarily make the holder a close associate within the context of E.O. No.1.
Indeed, a prima facie showing must be made to show that one unlawfully accumulated wealth by
virtue of a close association or relation with President Marcos and/or his wife. It would not suffice,
then, that one served during the administration of President Marcos as a government official or
employee. In this case, the Republic particularly insists that Luz Bakunawa served as the Social
Secretary or the Assistant Social Secretary of First Lady Marcos, and mentions several other
circumstances that indicated her close relationship with the Marcoses. However, Luz Bakunawa
maintains that she was not First Lady Marcos Social Secretary, but a mere member of the staff of
the Social Secretary; and that the assets of the Bakunawas were honestly earned and acquired well
within the legitimate income of their businesses. Thus, the Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the
Sandiganbayan that the evidence of the Republic was able to establish, at best, that Luz Bakunawa
had been an employee in Malacaang Palace during the Marcos administration, and did not
establish her having a close relationship with the Marcoses, or her having abused her position or
employment in order to amass the assets subject of this case. Consequently, Luz Bakunawa could
not be considered a close associate or subordinate of the Marcoses within the context of E.O. No. 1
and E.O. No. 2. Republic of the Philippines represented by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government v. Luz Reyes Bakunawa, et al, G.R. No. 180418, August 28, 2013.
Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs; chain of custody. The Supreme Court here held that while there were
indeed five sachets of suspected shabu sold to the poseur-buyer, there were still more broken links
in the chain of custody. In this case, one broken link was that of the turnover of the seized items from
the buy-bust team to the police investigator, SPO1 Doria. PO2 Dizon testified that after he placed
the marking on the five sachets of suspected shabu, he turned them over to SPO1 Doria and the
specimens were submitted to the crime laboratory for examination. However, SPO1 Doria did not
testify before the trial court so as to shed light on this matter. Still another broken link was that
involving the transfer of the drug specimens from SPO1 Doria to the crime laboratory. P/Sr. Insp.
Perez testified that the request for laboratory examination and drug specimens were first received by
PO2 Bagaoisan, the Duty Desk Officer. The latter then called her to physically receive the same.
However, P/Sr. Insp. Perez stated that she did not actually see if it was SPO1 Doria who transmitted
the specimens. She merely relied on the stamp of PO2 Bagaoisan. Furthermore, PO2 Bagaoisan
was not presented in court to prove that it was indeed SPO1 Doria who delivered the drug
specimens to the crime laboratory. In view of the evident breaks in the chain of custody, very serious
doubts arise as to the identity of the seized illegal drugs in this case. Apparently, there can be no
absolute certainty if the sachets of shabu seized from the informant were the very same drugs
handed by accused-appellant, or, later on, the same drugs transmitted to the crime laboratory and
eventually presented before the trial court. Accused-appellant was thus acquitted of the crime
charged. People of the Philippines v. Rogelia Jardinel Pepino-Consulta, G.R. No. 191071, August 28,
2013.
Illegal Sale Of Dangerous Drugs; elements. For the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs to prosper, the
following elements must be proved: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and its payment. What is material is the proof
that the transaction actually took place, coupled with the presentation before the court of the
prohibited or regulated drug or the corpus delicti. The prosecution duly established the identity of
accused-appellant as a drug seller or pusher, through the testimonies of PO2 Ibaez, the poseur-
buyer, and PO3 Allauigan, as back-up officer. PO2 Ibaez testified that it was to accused-appellant
that he handed the marked Php100.00 bill for the shabu that he bought on March 23, 2007; and that
accused-appellant was the one who took out of his coin purse a plastic sachet containing shabu.
Both PO2 Ibaez and PO3 Allauigan identified accused-appellant as the one they arrested during
the buy-bust operation. Indeed in the instant case, all the elements constituting the illegal sale of
dangerous drug are present. The sale of shabu was consummated. The alleged inconsistencies in
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are mere minor matters, which do not detract from the
fact that a buy-bust operation was conducted. People of the Philippines v. Ryan Blanco y
Sangkula, G.R. No. 193661, August 14, 2013.
RA 3019, Sec. 3(e); elements. The elements of the crime charged under section 3(e) of RA 3019 are as
follows: 1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official
functions; 2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; and 3. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or
gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
functions. Here, the Supreme Court held that the Sandiganbayan correctly found the concurrence of
the three elements. First, petitioner, being the city engineer of Cebu, is undisputedly a public officer.
Second, the failure of petitioner to validate the ownership of the land on which the canal was to be
built because of his unfounded belief that it was public land constitutes gross inexcusable
negligence. In his own testimony, petitioner impliedly admitted that it fell squarely under his duties to
check the ownership of the land with the Register of Deeds. Yet he concluded that it was public land
based solely on his evaluation of its appearance, i.e. that it looked swampy. Moreover, the undue
injury to private complainant was established. The cutting down of her palm trees and the
construction of the canal were all done without her approval and consent. As a result, she lost
income from the sale of the palm leaves. She also lost control and use of a part of her land. The
damage to private complainant did not end with the canals construction. Informal settlers dirtied her
private property by using the canal constructed thereon as their lavatory, washroom, and waste
disposal site. Antonio B. Sanchez v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 187340, August 14, 2013.
3. Criminal Procedure
Consolidation of Criminal Cases; when consolidation of cases is not advisable. As can be gleaned from the
summary of charges in the Neri case and the Abalos case, the inculpatory acts complained of, the
particulars and specifications for each of the cases are dissimilar, even though they were allegedly
done in connection with the negotiations for and the implementation of the NBN Project. Due to this
variance, the prosecution witnesses listed in the pre-trial order in the Neri case are also different
from the list of the peoples witnesses lined up to testify in the Abalos case, albeit some names
appear in both the pre-trial orders. This can be easily seen by a simple comparison of the list of
witnesses to be presented in the cases consolidated. A consolidation of the Neri case to that of
Abalos would expose petitioner Neri to testimonies which have no relation whatsoever in the case
against him and the lengthening of the legal dispute thereby delaying the resolution of his case.
What is more, there is a significant difference in the number of witnesses to be presented in the two
cases. In fact, the number of prosecution witnesses in the Neri case is just half of that in Abalos.
Awaiting the completion in due course of the presentation of the witnesses in Abalos would
doubtless stall the disposition of the case against petitioner as there are more or less 35 prosecution
witnesses listed in People v. Abalos who are not so listed in People v. Neri. In the concrete, this
means, in the minimum, awaiting the completion of the testimonies of 35 additional witnesses,
whose testimonies are unrelated to the charges against him, before the case against petitioner may
finally be disposed of, one way or another. Also, petitioner will be exposed to an extra 35 irrelevant
testimonies which even exceed those relating to his case, since the prosecution only has roughly
about 26 witnesses for his case. Further still, any delay in the presentation of any of the witnesses in
People v. Abalos would certainly affect the speedy disposition of the case against petitioner. At the
end of the day, the assailed consolidation, instead of contributing to the swift dispensation of justice
and affording the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their cases, would achieve
the exact opposite. Romulo L. Neri v. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 202243,
August 7, 2013.
Intervention of Private Prosecutor In Perjury Case. Even assuming that no civil liability was alleged or
proved in the perjury case being tried in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), it is nonetheless
erroneous for the trial court to consider the intervention of the offended party by counsel as merely a
matter of tolerance. Thus, where the private prosecution has asserted its right to intervene in the
proceedings, that right must be respected. The right reserved by the Rules to the offended party is
that of intervening for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability born of the criminal act and not
of demanding punishment of the accused. Such intervention, moreover, is always subject to the
direction and control of the public prosecutor. In the light of the foregoing, the MTC committed no
grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners motion to exclude Atty. Macam as private
prosecutor. Lee Pue Liong a.k.a. Paul Lee v. Chua Pue Chin Lee, G.R. No. 181658, August 7, 2013.
Probable Cause; concept. Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the
knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted. In order to arrive at probable cause, the elements of the crime charged should be
present. Masayuki Hasegawa v. Leila F. Giron, G.R. No. 184536, August 14, 2013.
Preliminary Investigation; only evidence to support a finding of probable cause, not a conviction, needed for
preliminary investigation. All elements of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code were sufficiently averred in the complaint-affidavit in this case
and were sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime may have been committed and
petitioner may have committed it. Respondent, an office worker, claimed that she and her friend
were taken at gunpoint by two men and forcibly boarded into a vehicle. They were detained for more
than 24 hours. Whether or not the accusations would result in a conviction is another matter. It is
enough, for purposes of the preliminary investigation that the acts complained of constitute the crime
of kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The Investigating Prosecutor, however, ruled that the
kidnapping and serious illegal detention charge is a mere fabrication. The Supreme Court said that
the Investigating Prosecutor has set the parameters of probable cause too high. Her findings dealt
mostly with what respondent had done or failed to do after the alleged crime was committed. She
delved into evidentiary matters that could only be passed upon in a full-blown trial where testimonies
and documents could be fairly evaluated in according with the rules of evidence. The issues upon
which the charges are built pertain to factual matters that cannot be threshed out conclusively during
the preliminary stage of the case. Precisely, there is a trial for the presentation of prosecutions
evidence in support of the charge. The validity and merits of a partys defense or accusation, as well
as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the
preliminary investigation level.Masayuki Hasegawa v. Leila F. Giron, G.R. No. 184536, August 14, 2013.
Here are select April 2013 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on criminal law and
procedure:
1. REVISED PENAL CODE
Conspiracy; conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused-appellants before, during and after the
commission of the crime which indubitably point to a joint purpose, concerted action and community of
interest. Spouses Betty and Monico were among the ten accused convicted by the trial court for
kidnapping a certain Albert Yam for ransom. Although Betty and Monico did not participate in
actually abducting Albert, it was in their abandoned house where Albert was brought to by the eight
other accused. Also, Betty and Monico twice visited the safehouse where Albert was brought, with
Betty serving food for Albert and Monico assisting the latter in climbing up and down the stairs. The
Supreme Court considered them as co-conspirators. In a conspiracy to commit the crime of
kidnapping for ransom, the place where the victim is to be detained is logically a primary
consideration. In the case of Betty and Monico, it can be reasonably inferred that the house fitted the
purpose of the kidnappers. Alberts detention was accomplished not solely by reason of the restraint
exerted upon him by the presence of guards in the safehouse, but by the circumstance of being put
in a place where escape became highly improbable. In other words, Betty and Monico were
indispensable in the kidnapping of Albert because they knowingly and purposely provided the venue
to detain Albert. The spouses ownership of the safehouse, Monicos presence therein during
Alberts arrival on the evening of April 7, 2002 and Bettys visits to bring food reasonably indicate
that they were among those who at the outset planned, and thereafter concurred with and
participated in the execution of the criminal design. The conviction of Betty and Monico was
affirmed. People of the Philippines v. Betty Salvador y Tabios, et al, G.R. No. 201443, April 10, 2013.
Rape; the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim. The accused was
charged and convicted for raping his 13-year old daughter. On appeal, the accused reiterated his
defense that the testimony of the victim was highly incredible and illogical. The Supreme Court
disagreed with the contention of the accused. The victim was able to describe in detail how accused
mounted her, undressed her, and successfully penetrated her against her will, one night in April
1998. The testimony being frank, probable, logical and conclusive, the Court gave credence to it.
There is a plethora of cases which tend to disfavor the accused in a rape case by holding that when
a woman declares that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape
has been committed and, where her testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be
convicted on the basis thereof. Furthermore, the Court has repeatedly declared that it takes a certain
amount of psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which would put her own
father to jail for the rest of his remaining life and drag the rest of the family, including herself, to a
lifetime of shame. For this reason, courts are inclined to give credit to the straightforward and
consistent testimony of a minor victim in criminal prosecutions for rape. Hence, the Supreme Court
sustained the conviction of the accused. People of the Philippines v. Edmundo Vitero, G.R. No.
175327, April 3, 2013.
Robbery with homicide; all felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated
into felony of robbery with homicide. The accused were charged with the crime of robbery with
homicide, after accosting sisters AA and BB along a street in Olongapo City one evening, taking the
bag of AA which contained money and fatally stabbing BB. On appeal, the accused argued that
robbery was not sufficiently proved and that they should only be convicted for homicide. The
Supreme Court ruled that in robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to
commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent
to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before,
during or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the
circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to
be taken into consideration. The actions of the three accused, from the deprivation of the AA of her
personal belongings by one of the accused to the stabbing of the victim BB by the other two accused
are clear and indubitable proofs of a concerted effort to deprive AA and BB of their personal
belongings, and that by reason or on the occasion of the said robbery, stabbed and killed victim
BB. People of the Philippines v. Welvin Diu y Kotsesa, et al., G.R. No. 201449, April 3, 2013.
Self-defense; no self-defense where there is no unlawful aggression. The accused alleged that he stabbed
the victim out of self-defense, i.e., after the latter took hold of a soldering iron, but was nonetheless
convicted for the crime of homicide. That the victim indeed attempted to attack him using the
soldering iron was however belied by two witnesses of the prosecution. The Supreme Court did not
give credence to the allegation of self-defense and affirmed his conviction. For the first element of
unlawful aggression to be present, jurisprudence dictates that there must be an actual physical
assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person. It presupposes actual,
sudden, unexpected or imminent danger not merely threatening and intimidating action. It is
present only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to ones life. Having failed to
prove that the victim attacked him with the soldering iron, the accused cannot be said to have acted
in self-defense when he stabbed the victim. Sergio Sombol v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
194564, April 10, 2013.
2. SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
P.D. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law); presentation of sales invoice or receipt provides proof of a legitimate
transaction which is disputable. The accused was charged with violation of P.D. 1612, otherwise
known as the Anti-Fencing Law, after he was found, in a buy-bust operation, to have possessed 13
of the 38 Firestone tires stolen from the owner AA. In his defense, accused alleged that he bought
the tires from a certain store named Gold Link, as evidenced by a sales invoice issued in his name.
The Supreme Court ruled that the defense of legitimate transaction is disputable and has in fact
been disputed in this case. The validity of the issuance of the receipt was disputed, and the
prosecution was able to prove that Gold Link and its address were fictitious. Ong failed to overcome
the evidence presented by the prosecution and to prove the legitimacy of the transaction. Thus, he
was unable to rebut the prima facie presumption under section 5 of P.D. 1612. Jaime Ong y Ong v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 190475, April 10, 2013.
R. A. 6426; Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972; the crime of unlawful sale of marijuana necessarily includes the
crime of unlawful possession thereof. The accused invoked on appeal his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him because the trial court convicted him
for the crime of unlawful possession of marijuana under section 8 of R.A. 6426, although the
information had charged him for unlawful sale of marijuana under section 4 of R.A. 6426. The
Supreme Court held that the crime of illegal sale of marijuana implied prior possession of
the marijuana. As such, the crime of illegal sale included or absorbed the crime of illegal possession.
The right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was
not violated simply because the information had precisely charged him with selling, delivering, giving
away and distributing more or less 750 grams of dried marijuanaleaves. Thus, he had been
sufficiently given notice that he was also to be held to account for possessing more or less 750
grams of dried marijuana leaves. People of the Philippines v. Chad Manansala y Lagman, G.R. No.
175939, April 3, 2013.
R.A. 9165; Dangerous Drugs Law; chain of custody must be proved for a charge of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs to succeed. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction of the accused where the prosecution
failed to prove the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs alleged to have been sold by the
accused to the poseur buyer. Although the police officer testified that he had marked the sachet of
shabu with his own initials following arrest of the accused, he did not explain, either in his court
testimony or in the joint affidavit of arrest, whether his marking had been done in the presence of the
accused, or done immediately upon the arrest of the accused. Nor did he show by testimony or
otherwise who had taken custody of the sachet of shabu after he had done his marking, and who
had subsequently brought the sachet of shabu to the police station, and, still later on, to the
laboratory. Given the possibility of just anyone bringing any quantity of shabu to the laboratory for
examination, there is now no assurance that the quantity presented here as evidence was the same
article that had been the subject of the sale by the accused. The indeterminateness of the identities
of the individuals who could have handled the sachet of shabu after the police officers marking
broke the chain of custody, and tainted the integrity of the shabu ultimately presented as evidence to
the trial court. People of the Philippines v. Alberto Gonzales y Santos aka Takyo, G.R. No. 182417,
April 3, 2013.
R.A. No. 9165; Dangerous Drugs Law; presence of the barangay captain or any elected official
notrequired during the buy-bust operation, but only during the physical inventory conducted immediately
thereafter. The accused argued on appeal that the trial court failed to consider the procedural flaws
committed by the arresting officers in the seizure and custody of drugs as embodied in Section 21,
paragraph 1, Article II, of R.A. 9165. Among others, accused alleged that the barangay captain, was
not present during the alleged buy-bust operation. He was only asked to sign the inventory of the
seized items shortly after his arrival at the scene of the buy-bust operation. Thus, he has no personal
knowledge as to whether the drugs allegedly seized from the accused were indeed recovered from
them. The Supreme Court ruled that it is enough that the barangay captain is present during the
physical inventory immediately conducted after the seizure and confiscation of the drugs and he
signs the copies of the inventory and is given a copy thereof. Also, the barangay captain, not only
positively identified both accused, but also identified the items contained in the inventory receipt.
Such testimony clearly established compliance with the requirement of Section 21with regard to the
presence and participation of the elected public official. People of the Philippines v. Gerry Octavio y
Florendo and Reynaldo Cario y Martir, G.R. No. 199219, April 3, 2013.
R.A. 9165; Dangerous Drugs Law; where noncompliance of the chain of custody rule is justified. The
accused argued that the chain of custody of the illegal drug, which was confiscated upon her arrest,
was not strictly followed. Specifically, the illegal drug was marked only in the police station, not in the
place where the buy-bust operation took place. The prosecution explained that the police officers did
not have the opportunity to mark the illegal drug in the place where accused was arrested because
the latter had become hysterical and had caused a commotion. The Supreme Court ruled that while
the procedural guidelines laid out in section 21(1), Article II of R.A. 9165 were not strictly complied
with, the integrity and the evidentiary value of the illegal drugs used in evidence in this case were
duly preserved in consonance with the chain of custody rule. The arresting officer was justified in
marking the seized plastic sachet of shabu at the police station, instead of at the scene of the buy-
bust operation because he had no choice but to immediately extricate himself and the accused from
the crime scene in order to forestall a potentially dangerous situation. Thereafter, the arresting officer
turned the illegal drug over to the investigating officer, who then had it tested in the Crime Laboratory
Office of the Manila Police District. Substantial compliance with the procedural aspect of the chain of
custody rule does not necessarily render the seized drug items inadmissible. The conviction of the
accused was affirmed.People of the Philippines v. Lolita Quesido y Badarang, G.R. No. 189351, April
10, 2013.
R.A. 9165; Dangerous Drugs Law; where seized items deemed admissible in evidence despite failure of
arresting officers to comply strictly with the procedural requirements relative to the seizure and custody of the
drugs. The accused argued on appeal that the trial court failed to consider the procedural flaws
committed by the arresting officers in the seizure and custody of drugs as embodied in section 21,
paragraph 1, Article II, of R.A. 9165. Among others, accused allege that no photograph was taken of
the items seized from them. In dismissing the appeal of the accused, the Supreme Court held that
even if the arresting officers failed to take a photograph of the seized drugs as required, such
procedural lapse is not fatal and will not render the items seized inadmissible in evidence. What is of
utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as
the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. For as long
as the chain of custody remains unbroken, as in this case, even though the procedural requirements
provided for in section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not faithfully observed, the guilt of the accused will
not be affected. People of the Philippines v. Gerry Octavio y Florendo and Reynaldo Cario y
Martir, G.R. No. 199219, April 3, 2013.
3. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Appellate review; the trial courts factual findings are accorded great respect and even conclusive effect; these
factual findings and conclusions assume greater weight if they are affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The
accused were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide, after accosting sisters AA and BB
along a street in Olongapo City one evening, taking the bag of AA which contained money and
fatally stabbing BB. On appeal, the accused attacked the credibility of AA as a witness by citing the
alleged inconsistencies in her testimony. In finding against the accused, the Supreme Court
reiterated the doctrine that findings of the trial court on such matters involving the credibility of
witnesses cannot be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been
overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition of the case.
AA is more than just an eyewitness, she is a surviving victim of the crime. Her testimony, as
described by the RTC, was categorical and straightforward. AA had positively identified all the
accused. There is therefore no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. People of
the Philippines v. Welvin Diu y Kotsesa, et al., G.R. No. 201449, April 3, 2013.
Information; aggravating and qualifying circumstances must be alleged. In this case, accused was
convicted by the trial court for carnapping with homicide, aggravated by the circumstance that the
offense was committed by a member of an organized or syndicated crime group under Article 62 of
the Revised Peanal Code, as amended by RA 7659, although the said aggravating circumstance
was not alleged in the information. As a result, on appeal, the Supreme Court held that since there is
no allegation in the information that accused was a member of a syndicate or that he and his
companions had formed part of a group organized for the general purpose of committing crimes for
gain, which is the essence of a syndicated or organized crime group, the same cannot be
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance against him. The Supreme Court thus modified the
judgment by not considering the said aggravating circumstance. People of the Philippines v. Arnel
Nocum, et al, G.R. No. 179041, April 1, 2013.
Information; aggravating and qualifying circumstances must be alleged. Under Rule 110, Section 8 of the
Rules of Court, all aggravating and qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the information. This
new rule took effect on December 1, 2000, but applies retroactively to pending cases since it is
favorable to the appellant. People of the Philippines v. Arnel Nocum, et al, G.R. No. 179041, April 1,
2013.
Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act; requirements under R.A. No. 6981. A certain Kenny Dalandag
was admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the Department of Justice (DOJ) under R.A.
6981, otherwise known as The Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act, in connection with the
prosecution of the crime of murder filed against 196 accused in what became aptly known as the
Maguindanao massacre. Petitioner, one of the accused, wrote to respondent Secretary of Justice
Leila De Lima and Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Richard Fadullon to request the inclusion of
Dalandag in the informations for murder considering that Dalandag had already confessed his
participation in the massacre through his two sworn declarations. After the DOJ denied his request,
petitioner filed a case for mandamus seeking to compel respondents to include Dalandag in the
informations. The RTC denied the petition. In affirming the decision of the RTC, the Supreme Court
held that there is no requirement under R.A. 6981 for the prosecution to first charge a person in
court as one of the accused in order for him to qualify for admission into the Witness Protection
Program. The admission as a state witness under R.A. 6981 also operates as an acquittal, and said
witness cannot subsequently be included in the criminal information except when he fails or refuses
to testify. The immunity for the state witness is granted by the DOJ, not by the trial court. Should
such witness be meanwhile charged in court as an accused, the public prosecutor, upon
presentation to him of the certification of admission into the Witness Protection Program, shall
petition the trial court for the discharge of the witness. The Court shall then order the discharge and
exclusion of said accused from the information. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr. v. Sec. Leila De Lima, as
Secretary of the Department of Justice, et al, G.R. No. 197291, April 3, 2013.

Here are select March 2013 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on criminal law and
procedure:
1. REVISED PENAL CODE
Rape; medical examination of victim not indispensable to prove rape. An inconclusive medical report does
not negate the finding that the accused (Penilla) raped AAA. A medical examination of the victim is
not indispensable in a prosecution for rape inasmuch as the victims testimony alone, if credible, is
sufficient to convict the accused of the crime. In fact, a doctors certificate is merely corroborative in
character and not an indispensable requirement in proving the commission of rape. People of the
Philippines v. Gilbert Penilla y Francia, G.R. No. 189324, March 20, 2013.
Rape; moral character of the victim is immaterial. Accused Penillas insistence that he was then a virile
young man of twenty-three years, lusted after by a separated and older woman, loses significance in
light of the dictum that in rape cases, the moral character of the victim is immaterial. Rape may be
committed not only against single women and children but also against those who are married,
middle-aged, separated, or pregnant. Even a prostitute may be a victim of rape. Correlatively and
more importantly, the libidinousness of the victim here, AAA, which is not accepted as a common
attribute, should have been proven outside of the incident on the midnight of 22 October
1999. People of the Philippines v. Gilbert Penilla y Francia, G.R. No. 189324, March 20, 2013.
Rape; when absence of physical resistance unavailing as a defense. Accused-appellant makes much of the
fact that AAA did not cry for help given that the area where they lived was densely populated, the
houses thereat were literally only divided by thin walls, and any commotion could easily be heard.
Penilla likewise points out that AAA did not put up a fight. In this regard, Penilla asseverates that the
prosecutions story was silent on any physical struggle suggestive of rape. The Supreme Court
found no credence in Penillas arguments. People of the Philippines v. Gilbert Penilla y Francia, G.R.
No. 189324, March 20, 2013.
Rape; when absence of physical resistance unavailing as a defense. Physical resistance need not be
established in rape when threats and intimidation are employed, and the victim submits herself to
her attacker because of fear. Failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance does not make voluntary
the victims submission to the perpetrators lust. Besides, physical resistance is not the sole test to
determine whether a woman involuntarily succumbed to the lust of an accused; it is not an essential
element of rape. Rape victims react differently. Some may offer strong resistance while others may
be too intimidated to offer any resistance at all. The use of a weapon, by itself, is strongly suggestive
of force or at least intimidation, and threatening the victim with a knife, much more poking it at her,
as in this case, is sufficient to bring her into submission. Thus, the law does not impose upon the
private complainant the burden of proving resistance. People of the Philippines v. Gilbert Penilla y
Francia, G.R. No. 189324, March 20, 2013.
Rape; when the delay of the victim in reporting the commission of rape unavailing as a defense.Relying on a
tired defense, Penilla insists that AAA belatedly reported to the barangay authorities that she had
been raped. For Penilla, this delay belies her cry of rape. The Supreme Court disagreed. Indeed,
jurisprudence is replete with holdings that delay in revealing the commission of a crime such as rape
does not necessarily render such charge unworthy of belief. This is because the victim may choose
to keep quiet rather than expose her defilement to the cruelty of public scrutiny. Only when the delay
is unreasonable or unexplained may it work to discredit the complainant. People of the Philippines v.
Gilbert Penilla y Francia, G.R. No. 189324, March 20, 2013.
Qualified Theft; determination of imposable penalty. Perusal of the records of this case would show that
the trial court imposed the penalty as prescribed in Article 310 (Qualified Theft) which is two degrees
higher than those specified in Article 309 (Penalties for Theft). The Supreme Court held that this is
erroneous considering that the penalty prescribed in Article 310 would apply only if the theft was
committed under any the following circumstances: a) by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of
confidence, or b) if the stolen property is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle, or consists of
coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or c) if
the property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other
calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. None of these circumstances is present in the
instant case. Thus, the proper imposable penalty should be that which is prescribed under Article
309. In this case, the amount of the timber involved is P57,012.00. Since the amount exceeds
P22,000.00, the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods should be imposed in
its maximum period plus an additional one (1) year for each additional P10,000 pesos in excess of
P22,000.00 or three more years. Thus, the correct imposable maximum penalty is anywhere
between eleven (11) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor to thirteen (13) years
of reclusion temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty is one degree
lower than that prescribed by the law. In this case, the minimum penalty should be prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods, which is anywhere between two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Efren S. Almuete v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
179611, March 12, 2013
2. SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
Anti-Money Laundering Act; freeze order cannot be issued for an indefinite period. The Court of Appeals
(CA), via its September 20, 2005 resolution, extended the freeze order over the Ligots various bank
accounts and personal properties until after all the appropriate proceedings and/or investigations
being conducted are terminated. By its very terms, the CA resolution effectively bars the Ligots from
using any of the property covered by the freeze order until after an eventual civil forfeiture
proceeding is concluded in their favor and after they shall have been adjudged not guilty of the
crimes they are suspected of committing. These periods of extension are way beyond the intent and
purposes of a freeze order which is intended solely as an interim relief; the civil and criminal trial
courts can very well handle the disposition of properties related to a forfeiture case or to a crime
charged and need not rely on the interim relief that the appellate court issued as a guarantee against
loss of property while the government is preparing its full case. The term of the CAs extension, too,
borders on inflicting a punishment to the Ligots in violation of their constitutionally protected right to
be presumed innocent because the unreasonable denial of their property comes before final
conviction. Ret. Lt. Gen. Jacinto C. Ligot, et al v. Republic of the Philippines represented by the Anti-
Money Laundering Council, G.R. No. 176944, March 6, 2013.
Anti-Money Laundering Act; freeze order cannot be made effective for more than six months unless extended
by the court upon motion of the Republic. A freeze order is both a preservatory and preemptive remedy
and meant to have a temporary effect; it was never intended to supplant or replace the actual
forfeiture cases where the provisional remedy which means, the remedy is an adjunct of or an
incident to the main action of asking for the issuance of an asset preservation order from the court
where the petition is filed is precisely available. Thus, as a rule, the effectivity of a freeze order may
be extended by the CA for a period not exceeding six months. Before or upon the lapse of this
period, ideally, the Republic should have already filed a case for civil forfeiture against the property
owner with the proper courts and accordingly secure an asset preservation order or it should have
filed the necessary information. Otherwise, the property owner should already be able to fully enjoy
his property without any legal process affecting it. However, should it become completely necessary
for the Republic to further extend the duration of the freeze order, it should file the necessary motion
before the expiration of the six-month period and explain the reason or reasons for its failure to file
an appropriate case and justify the period of extension sought. The freeze order should remain
effective prior to the resolution by the CA, which must resolve this kind of motion for extension with
reasonable dispatch. Ret. Lt. Gen. Jacinto C. Ligot, et alv. Republic of the Philippines represented
by the Anti-Money Laundering Council, G.R. No. 176944, March 6, 2013.
Anti-Money Laundering Act; requisites for issuance of freeze order. Based on section 10 of R.A. 9160, as
amended by R.A. 9194, there are only two requisites for the issuance of a freeze order: (1) the
application ex parte by the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) and (2) the determination of
probable cause by the Court of Appeals (CA). Ret. Lt. Gen. Jacinto C. Ligot, et al v. Republic of the
Philippines represented by the Anti-Money Laundering Council, G.R. No. 176944, March 6, 2013.
Anti-Money Laundering Act; requisites for issuance of freeze order. The probable cause required for the
issuance of a freeze order refers to such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet, prudent or cautious man to believe that an unlawful activity and/or a money laundering
offense is about to be, is being or has been committed and that the account or any monetary
instrument or property subject thereof sought to be frozen is in any way related to said unlawful
activity and/or money laundering offense. In other words, in resolving the issue of whether probable
cause exists, the CAs statutorily-guided determinations focus is not on the probable commission of
an unlawful activity (or money laundering) that the Office of the Ombudsman has already determined
to exist, but on whether the bank accounts, assets, or other monetary instruments sought to be
frozen are in any way related to any of the illegal activities enumerated under R.A. 9160, as
amended. Otherwise stated, probable cause refers to the sufficiency of the relation between an
unlawful activity and the property or monetary instrument which is the focal point of section 10 of RA
No. 9160, as amended. Ret. Lt. Gen. Jacinto C. Ligot, et al v. Republic of the Philippines
represented by the Anti-Money Laundering Council, G.R. No. 176944, March 6, 2013.
Anti-Money Laundering Act; requisites for issuance of freeze order. From AMLCs verified allegations in
its ex parte application and the Ombudsmans complaint, it can be gleaned that Lt. Gen. Ligot
himself admitted that his income came from his salary as an officer of the AFP. Yet, the
Ombudsmans investigation revealed that the bank accounts, investments and properties in the
name of Lt. Gen. Ligot and his family amount to more than P54,000,000.00. Since these assets are
grossly disproportionate to Lt. Gen. Ligots income, as well as the lack of any evidence that the
Ligots have other sources of income, the CA properly found that probable cause exists that these
funds have been illegally acquired. Ret. Lt. Gen. Jacinto C. Ligot, et al v. Republic of the Philippines
represented by the Anti-Money Laundering Council, G.R. No. 176944, March 6, 2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale of shabu; elements. To secure a conviction for illegal sale of shabu, the
prosecution must prove the presence of the following essential elements: (a) the identities of the
buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment for the thing. It is necessary to establish that the transaction or sale actually
took place, and to bring to the court the corpus delicti as evidence. PO1 Bernardo gave a detailed
account of the transaction commencing from the introduction made by the confidential informant
between him, as the poseur-buyer, and accused-appellants to the time the sale was consummated
until the latter were arrested and several additional plastic sachets containing white crystalline
substances, which later tested for shabu, were found in their possession six from Zenaida and one
from Myrna. That the sale actually took place and that several sachets were recovered from the
accused-appellants were clear from the testimony of PO1 Bernardo in court. The credibility of PO1
Bernardo was put to test on cross-examination but his statements were consistent all throughout that
the Supreme Court was convinced that his testimony, supported by evidence, was reliable. People
of the Philippines v. Zenaida Soriano y Usi, and Myrna Samonte y Hiolen, G.R. No. 189843, March 20,
2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale of dangerous drugs; elements. The only elements necessary to
consummate the crime of illegal sale of drugs is proof that the illicit transaction took place, coupled
with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. In buy-bust
operations, the delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the sellers receipt of the marked
money successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction between the entrapping officers and the
accused. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were
inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimonies on the
operation deserve faith and credit. The Supreme Court has held that when police officers have no
motive to testify falsely against the accused, courts are inclined to uphold the presumption of
regularity accorded to them in the performance of their official duties. People of the
Philippines v. Judge Rafael R. Lagos, et al, G.R. No. 184658, March 6, 2013
Dangerous Drugs Act; illegal sale of dangerous drugs; elements. In the present case, there is no
contention that the members of AIDSOTF who conducted the buy-bust operation were motivated by
ill will or malice. Neither was there evidence adduced to show that they neglected to perform their
duties properly. Hence, their testimonies as to the conduct of the buy-bust operation deserve full
faith and credence. Respondent judge harps on the fact that it was the CI who had personal
knowledge of the identity of the seller, the initial offer to purchase the ecstasy pills, and the
subsequent acceptance of the offer. It is clear from the testimonies of PO2 Frando and the other
arresting officers that they conducted the buy-bust operation based on the information from the CI.
However, the arrest was made, not on the basis of that information, but of the actual buy-bust
operation, in which respondents were caught in flagrante delicto engaged in the illegal sale of
dangerous drugs. Due to the investigative work of the AIDSOTF members, the illegal sale was
consummated in their presence, and the elements of the sale the identity of the sellers, the
delivery of the drugs, and the payment therefor were confirmed. That the CI initially provided this
information or tip does not negate the subsequent consummation of the illegal sale. People of the
Philippines v. Judge Rafael R. Lagos, et al, G.R. No. 184658, March 6, 2013
Dangerous Drugs Act; presentation of an informant not required for the prosecution of drug
cases.Respondent Judge Lagos erred in requiring the testimony of the CI. Respondent judge based
his ruling on a 2004 case, People v. Ong, the facts of which purportedly mirror those of the present
case. However, the Supreme Court (SC) held that there is no basis for this conclusion, as Ong
involved a conviction based on the lone testimony of one apprehending officer, Senior Police Officer
(SPO1) Gonzales. The SC found then that SPO1 Gonzales was merely the deliveryman, while the
CI was the one who acted as the poseur-buyer. In this case, one of the witnesses, PO2 Frando, was
a buy-bust team member who also acted as the poseur-buyer. He participated in the actual sale
transaction. His testimony was a first-hand account of what transpired during the buy-bust and thus
stemmed from his personal knowledge of the arrest in flagrante delicto. Requiring the CI to testify is
an added imposition that runs contrary to jurisprudential doctrine, since the SC has long established
that the presentation of an informant is not a requisite for the prosecution of drug cases. The
testimony of the CI is not indispensable, since it would be merely corroborative of and cumulative
with that of the poseur-buyer who was presented in court, and who testified on the facts and
circumstances of the sale and delivery of the prohibited drug. Informants are usually not presented in
court because of the need to hide their identities and preserve their invaluable services to the police.
Except when the accused vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and there are material
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the arresting officers, or there are reasons to believe that the
officers had motives to falsely testify against the accused, or that it was the informant who acted as
the poseur-buyer, the informants testimony may be dispensed with, as it will merely be corroborative
of the apprehending officers eyewitness accounts. In the present case, the fact of the illegal sale
has already been established by testimonies of the members of the buy-bust team. Judge Lagos
need not have characterized the CIs testimony as indispensable to the prosecutions case. People
of the Philippines v. Judge Rafael R. Lagos, et al, G.R. No. 184658, March 6, 2013
Dangerous Drugs Act; failure of the police to strictly comply with chain of custody rule excused where
integrity and evidentiary value of the drugs seized are preserved. As regards the failure of the police to
strictly comply with the provisions on chain of custody under section 21 of R.A. 9165, it is settled that
the failure to strictly follow the directives of this section is not fatal and will not necessarily render the
items confiscated from an accused inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In the present case, the succession of events
established by evidence shows that the items seized were the same items tested and subsequently
identified and testified to in court. Thus, the Supreme Court held that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the drugs seized from the petitioner were not compromised. Moreover, the police officers
explained during trial the reason for their failure to strictly comply with section 21 of R.A.
9165. Benedicto Marquez y Rayos v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 197207, March 13, 2013.
Dangerous Drugs Act; liberal application of chain of custody rule observed where school personnel took initial
custody of dangerous drugs. The antecedents of this case involve a unique feature in the sense that the
person who had initial custody of the dangerous drugs was not a police officer or agent, but a
guidance counselor a person who was not expected to be familiar with the niceties of the
procedures required of law enforcers in the initial handling of the confiscated evidence. Contrary to
the petitioners claim, Bagongons failure to mark the seized sachets should not in any way weaken
the prosecutions case, more so since she was able to prove that she was also the person who
handed the seized sachets to the police when the latter arrived. Drug peddling in schools is
prevalent; the scenario attending this case is likely to be repeated many times. To impose on
teachers and other school personnel the observance of the same procedure required of law
enforcers (like marking) processes that are unfamiliar to them is to set a dangerous precedent that
may eventually lead to the acquittal of many drug peddlers. The evidentiary value of the seized
specimen remains intact as long as the school personnel who had initial contact with the drug/s was
able to establish that the evidence had not been tampered with when he handed it to the police, as
in this case. Benedicto Marquez y Rayos v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 197207, March 13,
2013.
3. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Circumstantial evidence; when circumstantial evidence sufficient for conviction. Under section 4, Rule 133
of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction when the concurrence of the
following factors obtain: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such
as would prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt. These circumstances and facts must be
absolutely incompatible with any reasonable hypothesis propounding the innocence of the
accused. People of the Philippines v. Gerald Soriano alias Pedro, G.R. No. 191271, March 13, 2013.
Circumstantial evidence; when circumstantial evidence sufficient for conviction. In the case at bar, the
prosecution failed to establish the existence of an unbroken chain of circumstances that lead to no
other logical conclusion but the guilt of the accused. The only circumstances cited to implicate the
accused in the crime are the following: (a) he passed through the shortcut to Wao around 3:00 p.m.
on 31 December 1998; (b) Vicky did not see anyone else use that road from 3:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.
on that day; and (c) the soiled garments confiscated from him were identified to have been the same
ones he was wearing then. To an unprejudiced mind, the fact that Soriano was the only one whom
Vicky saw pass through the shortcut to Wao from 3:00p.m. to 5:00 p.m. does not logically lead to
any conclusion regarding his participation in the raping and killing of AAA. It is a mere conjecture
that can be refuted by other equally conceivable and rational inferences. The circumstances
presented by the prosecution do not form a solid and cohesive narrative that proves with moral
certainty its contention that accused perpetrated said heinous acts. People of the Philippines v.
Gerald Soriano alias Pedro, G.R. No. 191271, March 13, 2013.
Credibility of Witness; factual findings of the trial court are accorded great weight and respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal. The Supreme Court (SC) in this case found no cogent reason to disturb the
factual findings of the lower courts. It is well-settled that factual findings of the trial court, especially
on the credibility of the rape victim, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed
on appeal. After a careful review, the SC was convinced that the testimony of AAA positively
identifying Pielago as the one who molested her is worthy of belief. The clear, consistent and
spontaneous testimony of AAA unrelentingly established that Pielago inserted his right hands
forefinger into her vagina and anus while she and her younger brother, CCC, were in his custody.
Being a child of tender years, her failure to resist or struggle while Pielago molested her would all the
more prove how she felt intimidated by her Kuya. Mike Alvin Pielago y Ros v.People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 202020, March 13, 2013
Criminal Information; what controls is not the title of the information or the designation of the offense but the
actual facts recited in the information. It is well-settled that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused is
entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. In this respect, the
designation in the information of the specific statute violated is imperative to avoid surprise on the
accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. In the instant case,
the designation of the offense in the information against Pielago was changed from the crime of acts
of lasciviousness in relation to section 5(b) of R.A. 7610 to the crime of rape by sexual assault
penalized under Article 266-A(2) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353. It cannot be
said, however, that his right to be properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him was violated. The information was worded as follows: x x x commit an act of
lasciviousness upon the person of [AAA], a minor being four (4) years old, by kissing the vagina and
inserting one of his fingers to the vagina of AAA, x x x. Indeed, in order to obtain a conviction for
rape by sexual assault, it is essential for the prosecution to establish the elements that constitute
such crime. Article 266-A(2) of the Revised Penal Code explicitly provides that the gravamen of the
crime of rape by sexual assault which is the insertion of the penis into another persons mouth or
anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into another persons genital or anal orifice. In the instant
case, this element is clearly present when AAA straightforwardly testified in court that Pielago
inserted his forefinger in her vagina and anus. Jurisprudence has it that testimonies of child-victims
are given full weight and credit, since when a woman or a girl-child says that she has been raped,
she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed. Thus, AAAs
unrelenting narration of what transpired, accompanied by her categorical identification of Pielago as
the malefactor, established the case for the prosecution. Mike Alvin Pielago y Ros v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 202020, March 13, 2013