Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 102406 June 17, 1994
SAMPAGUITA GARMENTS CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (SECON I!ISION" #n$ EMILIA B.
SANTOS, respondents.
Armando V. Ampil for petitiner.
Emilia E. Andres & Henry Isorena for private respondent.

CRU%, J.:
If in a labor case, an employee is absolved of an offense that led to her dismissal and is
ordered reinstated, will her subsequent conviction in a criminal prosecution for the same
offense affect the administrative decision?
The offense subject of the two cases is theft, claimed to have been committed by private
respondent Emilia B. Santos, an employee of petitioner Sampauita !arments "orporation.
It was alleed in both cases that on #pril $%, $&'(, Santos attempted to brin out of the
company premises, without authori)ation or permission, a piece of cloth belonin to the
petitioner.
1
Sampauita dismissed her on this round. She filed a complaint for illeal dismissal but the
labor arbiter sustained the company.
2
*owever, his decision was reversed by the +,-",
which ordered her reinstatement with bac. waes from the time of her illeal suspension until
her actual reinstatement.
&
/eantime, the petitioner had also filed a criminal action aainst Santos for the same offense
in the /unicipal Trial "ourt of "aloocan "ity. #fter trial, she was found uilty and sentenced to
an indeterminate penalty of $ month and $ day of arresto mayor as minimum to % months of
arresto mayor as ma0imum.
4
This decision was affirmed by the -eional Trial "ourt of
"aloocan "ity.
'
In !.-. +o. '&121, this "ourt dismissed the petition for certiorari aainst the decision of the
+,-" for lac. of a showin that it was tainted with rave abuse of discretion.
6
In !.-. +o. $33&2&, this "ourt saw no reversible error in the decision of the "ourt of #ppeals
sustainin the petitioner4s conviction by the /unicipal Trial "ourt as affirmed by the -eional
Trial "ourt.
7
The decisions in both cases became final and e0ecutory and the correspondin entries of
judment were eventually made.
Subsequently, Santos moved for the e0ecution of the +,-" decision. The petitioner opposed,
invo.in her conviction in the criminal case. *owever, the +,-" sustained her on the round
that its decision had been affirmed by this "ourt and had lon become final and e0ecutory.
Sampauita then came to this "ourt for relief.
It is asserted by the petitioner that, in view of the private respondent4s conviction, the decision
of the +,-" callin for her reinstatement and the payment to her of 561,&3'.33 in bac.
waes should not now be enforced. 7therwise, she would in effect be undeservedly rewarded
when she should instead be punished for her offense.
7n the other hand, the private respondent arues that the decision of the +,-" is
independent of the criminal case and in any event can no loner be modified or reversed after
havin become final and e0ecutory on #uust (, $&&3.
8e hold for the petitioner.
It is true that once a judment has become final and e0ecutory, it can no loner be disturbed
e0cept only for the correction of clerical errors or where supervenin events render its
e0ecution impossible or unjust.
(
In the latter event, the interested party may as. the court to
modify the judment to harmoni)e it with justice and the facts.
9
There is no dispute in the case at bar that the decision of the respondent +,-" orderin the
private respondent4s reinstatement with bac. waes had indeed become final and e0ecutory.
Even so, we find, in liht of the subsequent developments, that the +,-" was not correct in
sustainin the implementation of that decision.
In Heirs of Francisco Guballa, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals,
10
this "ourt held that 9the power of
the +,-" to issue a writ of e0ecution carries with it the riht to loo. into the correctness of the
e0ecution of the decision and to consider supervenin events t!at may affect suc!
e"ecution.#
The affirmance by the -eional Trial "ourt and the "ourt of #ppeals of the private
respondent4s conviction for theft is justification enouh for the +,-" to e0ercise this authority
and suspend the e0ecution of its decision. Such conviction, which was also upheld by this
"ourt in !.-. +o. $33&2&, is a supervenin cause that rendered unjust and inequitable the
decision mandatin the private respondent4s reinstatement, and with bac. waes to boot.
The Solicitor !eneral arees that reinstatement is no loner feasible in view of the
subsequent conviction of the private respondent and the already strained relationship
between her and the petitioner. *e suests instead the rant of separation pay to the private
respondent.
8e disaree. Even this award is not justifiable because Santos was found uilty of a crime
involvin moral turpitude and so is disqualified from this benefit under the rulin in $%&' v.
(%)C.
11
That case laid down the rule as follows:
8e hold that henceforth separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in
those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious
misconduct or those reflectin on his moral character. 8here the reason for the valid dismissal
is, for e0ample, habitual into0ication or an offense involvin moral turpitude, li.e theft or illicit
se0ual relations with a fellow wor.er, the employer may not be required to ive the dismissed
employee separation pay, or financial assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the
round of social justice.
# contrary rule would, as the petitioner correctly arues, have the effect of rewardin rather than
punishin the errin employee for his offense. #nd we do not aree that the punishment is his
dismissal only and that the separation pay has nothin to do with the wron he has committed.
7f course it has. Indeed, if the employee who steals from the company is ranted separation pay
even as he is validly dismissed, it is not unli.ely that he will commit a similar offense in his ne0t
employment because he thin.s he can e0pect a li.e leniency if he is aain found out. This .ind
of misplaced compassion is not oin to do labor in eneral any ood as it will encourae the
infiltration of its ran.s by those who do not deserve the protection and concern of the
"onstitution.
The same rationale e0ists for not enforcin the respondent "ommission4s award of bac.
waes in favor of the private respondent.
"onformably to *enp!il Corporation v. (%)C
12
and subsequent
cases,
1&
the only award to which the private respondent may be entitled is for the amount of
5$,333.33, to be paid to her by the petitioner as a penalty for effectin her dismissal without
complyin with the procedural requirements laid down in Sections 2 and ; of -ule <I=, Boo.
=, of the 7mnibus -ules Implementin the ,abor "ode.
The contention that the petition should be dismissed for lac. of the certification on forum>
shoppin required under "ircular +o. 2'>&$ is not well ta.en. The petition was filed on
?ecember ;, $&&$, before the circular too. effect on @anuary $, $&&2.
The private respondent4s conviction of the crime of theft of property belonin to the petitioner
has affirmed the e0istence of a valid round for her dismissal and thus removed the
justification for the administrative decision orderin her reinstatement with bac. waes.
+evertheless, the petitioner is still subject to sanction for its failure to accord the private
respondent the riht to an administrative investiation in conformity with the procedural
requirements of due process.
8*E-EA7-E, the petition is !-#+TE? and the order of e0ecution dated #pril $, $&&$, is
SET #SI?E. The petitioner is instead required to pay the private respondent an indemnity of
5$,333.33 for its arbitrariness in effectin her dismissal.
S7 7-?E-E?.
&avide, +r., ,ellosillo, -uiason and .apunan, ++., concur.