Petras - Authoritarianism and Democracy in The Transition

Authoritarianism and Democracy in the Transition to Socialism
Author(s): James F. Petras and Frank T. Fitzgerald

Source: Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 15, No. 1, Transition to Socialism (Winter, 1988), pp.
93-111
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Authoritarianism and Democracy
in the Transition to Socialism
by
James F. Petras and
Frank T. Fitzgerald*
Every regime intent on effecting a transition to socialism inevitably
confronts the necessity to utilize both authoritarian and democratic
measures. On the one hand, recent historical experiences provide ample
evidence that neither local bourgeois and imperial interests nor their
military and police protectors can be expected to peacefully allow
themselves to be divested of privileges. Regimes that shy from utilizing
authoritarian measures against such opponents can expect to find their
transitions aborted, often in the most bloody fashion. On the other
hand, any transition to socialism worthy of the name must entail an
extension of popular democratic control over state and society and of
the democratic freedoms of speech, assembly, and petition. A regime
that fails to extend democracy may enhance its chances for survival, but
does so, typically, at the cost of compromising the democratic essence of
its socialist project.
These issues of authoritarianism and democracy in the transition to
socialism are mystified by two opposing, yet equally demagogic,
perspectives. One sacrifices the need for democratic practice in the name
of security. Typically, the regime unduly expands its definition of
political enemies, and unduly extends the measures designed to deal
with the exceptional circumstances of direct and serious threat to its
survival. In short, the emergency and the measures put in place to deal
with it become the norm. Democracy is judged an expendable luxury,
impugned as a lower form of political practice, or redefined to include
authoritarian centralized rule. The other perspective rejects the use of
*James F. Petras teaches at the State University of New York at Binghamton and has
authored many articles and books, including the recent Latin America: Bankers, Generals,
and the Struggle for Social Justice. Frank T. Fitzgerald teaches at the College of Saint
Rose and has authored several articles and the forthcoming book, Politics and Social
Structure in Revolutionary China.
LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 56, Vol. 15 Na. 1, Winter 1988 93-111
? 1988 Latin American Perspectives
93
94 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
necessary authoritarian measures in the name of democracy. Typically,
the regime unduly narrows the way in which it defines its enemies, and
fails to deal decisively with the very real threats to its survival. Failing to
specify appropriate political, military, and social policies for sustaining
itself in the face of opposition, the regime often naively expects its
enemies to abide by the democratic rules of the game. As necessary
authoritarian measures are shunned, democracy is often ahistorically
judged appropriate for all times and places.
Clearly, these issues of authoritarianism and democracy cannot be-
and in the past, largely have not been-discussed independently of
political and social context. Eighteenth century revolutionary demo-
crats, as well as nineteenth and twentieth century anticolonialists, liberal
democrats, and socialists, have at one time or another supported
varying degrees of democracy and authoritarianism according to the
context. It is sheer demagoguery devoid of historical substance, then, to
wave the flag of democracy, as some writers do, in every place and point
in history, particularly in periods of large-scale, long-term change from
one social system to another, when invasion by an imperial military
power is imminent. On the other hand, it is a perversion of democracy to
extend and institutionalize authoritarian practices beyond the context
that evoked them, and to claim that the new autocratic polity constitutes
a higher form of governance.
In discussing these issues of authoritarianism and democracy, it is
necessary to distinguish two distinct but interrelated phases in the
transition to socialism: (1) establishing thefoundation of the new social
system, and (2) building the
participatory
institutions for the normal,
long-term operation of the system. Each of these phases defines the
extent to which authoritarian or democratic practices are necessary or
inappropriate. In moving from one phase to the other, a process of
conversion must take place. If the tasks of each phase are accomplished
and the process of conversion is successful, a securely founded,
democratic socialist society can be created. But, as everyone knows, the
success of the process is not guaranteed. The transition to socialism can
go awry in many ways and at many points.
In this essay, we will analyze both of these phases of the transition to
socialism and their interconnections. Our analysis will be based on, but
by no means limited in relevance to, key recent Latin American
experiences in Chile, Jamaica, Cuba, and Nicaragua. The first section
will focus on the need for authoritarian practices in establishing the
foundation of the new society. The second section will focus on the need
Petras, Fitzgerald / AUTHORITARIANISM AND DEMOCRACY 95
for democratic practices in building participatory institutions. The third
section will attempt to draw out the implications of our argument for
recent debates on authoritarianism and democracy.
ESTABLISHING THE FOUNDATION
FOR SOCIALISM: THE
AUTHORITARIAN IMPERATIVE
Establishing the foundation for socialism requires organizing and
mobilizing the beneficiaries of the new society and displacing its
adversaries. The latter, made up most immediately by local bourgeois
and imperial interests and their military and police protectors, have
never given up their privileges without resistance. Building the foun-
dation of the new society, then, necessarily entails profound social and
political polarization, intense conflict, and frequent resort to force.
Neither the forces threatened with large-scale, long-term displacement
nor the regime and its supporters share a common set of values or
interests that allows their differences to be resolved in an electoral,
parliamentary framework.
Concretely, the necessity for authoritarian practices in the foun-
dation-establishing phase can perhaps best be observed in their absence.
In Chile between 1970 and 1973, Salvador Allende and his Unidad
Popular (UP) government pursued a policy of realizing socialist reforms
through the electoral, parliamentary system; and, in Jamaica between
1972 and 1980, Michael Manley and his People's National Party (PNP)
attempted to construct "democratic socialism" through existing state
institutions.1 Both governments made consequential efforts to redis-
tribute wealth, income, and political power. Both nationalized or placed
significant limits on the perogatives of domestic and international
capital. Both extended new benefits and legal protections to workers
and peasants, while creating or emboldening popular mass organi-
zations, which began to play an active role in workplace and community
decision making. Internationally, both turned to the nonaligned
movement and took leadership in the struggle for a new international
economic order. Both, unfortunately, failed to take authoritarian
measures sufficient to defend themselves, and both failed to establish the
foundation of a new socialist society.
In the absence of decisive authoritarian measures, opposition forces
violated the norms and procedures of the legal system, engaging in
extralegal violence and illegal economic transactions (Smirnow, 1979:
100-156; Manley, 1982: 169-174; Kaufman, 1985: 187-191). Capitalists,
bankers, and merchants held back on investments, illegally sent money
abroad, hoarded goods, and speculated on the black market to
undermine the economy. This was followed by propaganda directed at
the populace blaming the economic problems on the regime's incom-
petence. Worse still, with their imperial backers, they funded, organized,
and encouraged a host of antiregime activities, including violent
paramilitary attacks on loyal civilians. The terrorists were aided and
abetted by opposition politicians, who not only opposed the regime in
parliament but who openly encouraged antiregime activity in the streets,
in the military, and among civil servants. In addition, in both countries
military and police remained subject to imperial influence and funding,
and most senior civil servants retained ties with their patrons among the
foreign and domestic rich and were well-placed and ideologically
oriented to block effective implementation of many of the regime's
programs. In the end, with political violence beyond control and the
economies of both countries in shambles, their transitions were blocked.
In Chile, Allende and tens of thousands of his supporters were subjected
to a bloodbath at the hands of the military, a coup initially supported by
the Christian Democrats and other supposedly democratic parties
(Sobel, 1974: 145). In Jamaica, Manley and his associates were
overwhelmed by the Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) in the 1980 election.
But were there alternatives? Did either regime have the political
wherewithal to take the authoritarian measures necessary to block the
opposition? The answer is yes.
In Chile, Allende was elected in September 1970 with a plurality of
36.3 percent. In the April 1971 municipal elections, which were
conducted as a plebiscite on the new government, the UP received 50.9
percent, an effective majority of the vote. With the golpista sector of the
military still weakened and smarting from the aborted coup of October
1970, and with substantial support among large numbers of enlisted
men and even senior officers, the time was ripe for major initiatives. The
Socialist Party within the UP saw this, and, in keeping with the UP
program and the provisions of the law, called for a plebiscite to disband
the bicameral Congress and replace it with a unicameral Popular
Assembly. If successful, this would have ended blockage of the new
government in the old Congress and would have enabled the new
government to restaff the judiciary. Allende pushed this notion in the
opposition-dominated Congress, where it predictably lost, but he did
not initiate a plebiscite. Forces within the UP, most particularly the
Communist Party, which was committed to an alliance with the "middle
class" as represented by the opposition Christian Democrats, opposed a
plebiscite and Allende conformed. A critical opportunity was lost.
After this, the initiative steadily shifted into the hands of the
opposition, which coalesced (the Christian Democrats and the National
Party) and increasingly engaged in a campaign of political and
economic sabotage that reached its peak in the "employers' strike" of
October 1972. The wide participation of industrialists, shopkeepers,
truck operators, and professionals in this debilitating strike, which went
on for 20 days and cost U.S. $300 million in lost production, clearly
signalled the fallacy of an alliance with the "middle class." On the other
hand, the response to the strike of workers and peasants, who
galvanized their workplace and community organizations to keep the
economy producing, showed the depth of their commitment to the
government, their class consciousness, and their capacity for struggle
(Henfrey and Sorj, 1977; Winn, 1986). Instead of building support on
the basis of the newly formed worker and municipal councils, however,
Allende granted the opposition concessions and quieted its nerves by
inviting the military into his cabinet. A similar scenario was played out
the next summer, and none other than Augusto Pinochet was appointed
commander of the army.
Allende's belief that the military would respect democracy was
perhaps his greatest weakness (Debray, 1971). From the beginning, the
new government tread softly with the military, and even hoped to coopt
it with expanded political and economic responsibilities. Moreover, the
government failed to cleanse the officer corps of antidemocratic
elements and failed to allow supporters to organize politically among
the ranks. When leftists outside the UP coalition attempted to organize
among the majority of democratically inclined enlisted men, they were
summarily ousted. Nor did the government respond to the mass
demands of July 1973 to organize a popular militia. Instead, in the
fateful year of the coup, the government allowed the right wing-
controlled military to search for and confiscate arms from those
workplace and community organizations that had proven to be the
government's only reliable base. The erroneous notion that the military
shared a common belief in the supremacy of civilian control and that it
respected the conception of democracy as a good in itself proved fatal.
In Jamaica in 1972, Michael Manley and the PNP won 56 percent of
the vote on a platform that promised honest government, improved
economic management, and moderate social reforms. In this election,
the PNP found its strongest base of support among a broad array of
social classes ranging from the working class to the middle class, to the
wealthy. Yet the popular hopes generated by the electoral success and
the early institution of quite moderate reforms set off a process of social
polarization. In these years, the Jamaican economy was wracked by the
international economic crisis and the machinations of the transnational
aluminum companies, but the new government's reforms cushioned the
living standards of workers, peasants, and the poor. In the 1976 election,
the PNP won with a similar majority, but with a very different
following. Middle- and upper-class support had eroded, while support
from workers, peasants, and the urban poor had surged to make the
PNP victorious in an election that clearly posed the alternatives of
capitalism or socialism.
As in Chile in 1971, with this electoral victory, a critical juncture had
been reached. Perhaps the most salient issue in Jamaica at the time was
whether to seek economic help from the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) or whether to break with the IMF and follow the Emergency
Production Plan (EPP), which was drawn up right after the election
(Kaufman, 1985: 130-139). Seeking IMF funding, of course, involved
accepting a severe austerity program leading to severe cuts in the
standard of living of the PNP's strongest supporters, and the inevitable
erosion of political support. Although the EPP posed problems of its
own, it would have radically shifted the balance of forces by mobilizing
and devolving much more power to the PNP's mass base and by deeply
cutting into the remaining perogatives of capital and the middle class.
The PNP leadership went back and forth on this issue, first rejecting
IMF austerity and then accepting it. The result was not an improved but
a worsened economy, in addition to austerity (Kaufman, 1985: 191-192).
Furthermore, choosing the IMF path failed to mollify capital and the
middle class, while austerity and the PNP's zig-zagging disillusioned the
masses. By the time the PNP attempted to correct its course in 1980 by
breaking with the IMF, it was too late. Not only had many former
supporters lost confidence in the PNP, but the opposition had been
emboldened by the PNP's indecision and the consequences of its choice.
In 1980, the opposition JLP demagogically exploited the PNP's
submission to the international bankers with slogans like "IMF = It's
Manley's Fault," and was swept to victory with nearly 59 percent of the
vote (Kaufman, 1985: 192). The JLP and other opposition elements,
including perhaps the CIA,2 prepared the way for victory with
destabilizing street violence, incendiary rhetoric, false news reports, and
a coup attempt. The security forces, which the PNP had failed to
transform, openly allied with the JLP and harassed the PNP campaign
effort. Rather than calming the opposition, the PNP's failure to clamp
down only emboldened it to heighten the conflict.
In both Jamaica and Chile, socialists failed to recognize the gravity of
the challenge to their democratic mandate. They failed to assert their
authority by strengthening democrats and purging rightists in the
military and civil service to ensure order, by assuming executive power
and temporarily recessing or reforming parliament in order to pass
essential legislation, and by institutionalizing and providing resources
to workplace and community organizations to implement programs.
Both regimes banked on an alliance with the "middle class," and
restrained themselves in the hope of cementing such an alliance. They
continued the politics of democratic pluralism, even after the bourgeoisie
and its allies had declared violent class war. By not restricting the
political participation of those who would, and eventually did, destroy
it, and by not expanding the participation of those who were its primary
defenders, the Chilean and Jamaican socialists undermined the transi-
tion to socialism.
It is ironic that some left-liberal commentators argue that Allende
and Manley went too far and too fast, and that they should have
sacrificed major sectors of their programs in order to continue in office.
This ignores the fact that the compromises they did make only
emboldened the opposition, and the fact that the initial reforms
engendered tremendous energy and support from increasingly class-
conscious and organized workers, peasants, and poor.3 The opposition
could not be stopped with compromises, and supporters could not be
denied basic changes necessary to improve their everyday life. Once the
popular social movements experienced their newly won political power,
they had to be either institutionalized or repressed by force.
The real problem was that changes in civil society were not
accompanied by structural changes in the state. The question of the rate
or scope of socioeconomic change was less important than the need for a
coordinated shift in the organization of state power. In fact, greater
changes in state power would have allowed for a more measured tempo
in social transformation.
This proposition can best be illustrated .by examining the con-
temporary Nicaraguan experience.4 There, after eight years of revolu-
tionary power, a mixed economy5 and a plural democracy still operate.
Nicaragua differs from Chile and Jamaica in that the Sandinistas have
transformed the state and empowered mass organizations. As a result,
they have effectively limited economic sabotage by private capitalists
and destabilizing efforts by opposition forces. As in Chile and Jamaica,
the Nicaraguan socialists have attempted to maintain an alliance with
the "middle class," but only on terms consistent with the new social
foundation, only so long as middle-class behavior conforms to what the
Sandinistas call "the logic of the majority" (Brundenius, 1985: 21).
Private capitalists who do not produce run the risk of expropriation,
and, although a wide range of political opposition is accommodated
within the political framework laid down by the revolutionary regime,
the Sandinistas have not failed to use authoritarian measures, from
censorship to arrest, against serious attacks against the regime (Gilbert,
1985: 169-177). As a result, much of the opposition not willing to
function within the legal framework has been displaced to places like
Miami or to contra bases in neighboring countries. The revolutionary
regime is thus still under threat, but the decisiveness of the Sandinistas in
dealing with the illegal acts of the opposition inside the country has so
far enabled them to transform civil society in a relatively gradual and
orderly fashion.
Although the foundation of the new society is not fully secured in
Nicaragua, it has been for many years now in Cuba. That process too
required authoritarian measures, emanating from a transformed state
and allied mass organizations (Morley, 1980: 387-424; Fitzgerald, 1985:
94-96). Even more so than in Nicaragua, the Cuban oppositionists who
relied on violent and illegal activities departed, not infrequently
subordinating themselves to U.S. intelligence agencies. The economy
was rapidly nationalized and the benefits distributed to the masses. As
we shall see in the next section, the Cuban revolutionaries overstepped
some critical boundaries in the process of establishing the new basis of
rulership, but they did secure the foundation of the new society, an
accomplishment that would not have been possible without resort to
exceptional measures.
CONVERSION TO PARTICIPATORY
INSTITUTIONS: THE DEMOCRATIC IMPERATIVE
Although some restrictions are imperative in the early phase of the
transition to socialism, in the process of establishing the foundation for
the transition to socialism, it is essential that political boundaries be
delineated and respected. Clear boundaries must be established between
those political and social forces that defend the old regime and those
that back the new, between those that cooperate with foreign inter-
vention and those that defend the nation against such aggression. These
boundaries serve the functions of restricting the participation of those
who would destroy the new regime and of encouraging the participation
of those who accept the new regime, but who may differ on policies,
institutional practices, and procedures. These boundaries are crucial for
the conversion to participatory institutions that are fully democratic.
Without clear boundaries, the tendency is to lump together democratic
critics and enemies of democracy and to fail to recognize that, in
establishing the foundation, but especially after it has been securely
established, the interests and opinions of democratic socialists will differ
in a variety of matters.
For the same reason, temporal boundaries must also be established
and respected. These make clear that the necessary politically restrictive
measures are time-limited in nature. For the democratic regime under
military or political attack, authoritarian practices are the order of the
day and must remain in force so long as survival is in question. But the
fact that these are exceptional measures-to be jettisoned as soon as the
new foundation is secured and the emergency ended-must be openly
stated. Authoritarian practices must be defined as reflecting a specific,
exceptional situation. Authoritarian necessities must not be turned into
virtues and built into the basic conception of socialism. These conditions
are necessary to prepare the groundwork for conversion to full
democratic participation and rulership immediately upon the ending of
the emergency.
It is precisely with this process of conversion that twentieth century
socialist revolutionaries have had the most difficulty. One of the
differences between the American Revolution and contemporary social-
ist revolutions is not over the initial period of authoritarianism,6 which
all of them share, but over the establishment of boundaries and the
process of conversion. The American revolutionary leadership, for
example, more or less delineated the political elements (empire loyalists)
to be excluded from effective participation (to be sure, many non-
loyalists, including women, blacks, Indians, immigrants, etc., were also
excluded) and recognized the temporal limits of its repressive measures.
Upon the new foundation (an independent republican nation-state
based on private property), political participation to debate and discuss
policies was granted. In contrast, contemporary socialist regimes
typically operate with elastic boundaries.
Cuba, at least up to 1970, offers a good example. Even after the
decisive defeat of internal counterrevolutionary forces and the defeat of
the counterrevolutionary returnees at the Bay of Pigs, and even after the
guarantee of no further invasions wrenched from U.S. imperialism in
resolving the missile crisis, the revolutionary leadership kept Cuba on an
emergency footing and maintained a high level of centralized and
authoritarian control (Fitzgerald, 1985: 112-124). As the 1960s prog-
ressed, restrictions were maintained. Channels, such as political and
scholarly journals through which socialists could debate issues such as
forms of representation, strategies of economic development, market,
and plan, were unduly controlled. Politicomilitary defense organi-
zations, such as the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution and
the Revolutionary Armed Forces, which were allied to the government
and directed from the top, took over increasing responsibility for
mobilizing the population and economic resources, while potentially
participatory organizations, such as the trade unions, withered away
(Bengelsdorf, 1985: 164-213; Fuller, 1985: 435-438; Perez-Stable, 1985:
149-156). The Party was unified and interlocked with the state.
Centrally directed politicomilitary organizations, instead of represen-
tative or democratic participatory organizations, inhabited political and
economic spheres. The relationship between leaders and followers was
defined in authoritarian-mobilizational terms, rather than in terms of
democratic debate.
The revolutionary leadership failed to establish temporal boundaries,
and projected authoritarian practices, initially invoked to establish and
secure the foundation of the new society, as the norm rather than the
exception. They expanded political boundaries and introduced the
politics of amalgamation: dissent and debate were conflated with the
(previous) military activities of the (already defeated) counterrevolution.
Those who did not agree with how or why they were being mobilized
were often treated as enemies, whose continued existence justified
continued authoritarianism. Ideologically, the revolutionary leadership
violated the language of politics and invoked the imagery of permanent
war. Further, it legitimated elastic boundaries with reified conceptions
of the revolutionary classes and their social interests. Different and
competing revolutionary classes, strata, a?Cd groups, and their specific
immediate interests were obscured by conceptions of The Working
Class and The Peasantry and their Historic Interests. Reified and
teleological notions served to justify monolithism-the opposite of
democratic pluralism;n
Many have used and abused the term pluralism in discussing the
issues of democracy and socialism. Pluralism refers to the existence of a
variety of competing interests, ideas, and policies among a variety of
political forces seeking to influence decision-making structures. Liberals
and conservatives, however, associate pluralism with a specific set of
socioeconomic interests in a given social order and with a particular
distribution of political power. They define the minimal conditions for
"pluralist politics" by the presence of capitalist property-owning groups
that defend property interests, profits, and so forth, by private control of
the media, and by political structures subject to the influence of
unequally distributed economic resources.
Unfortunately, many socialists agree with this view and commit two
opposing types of errors. On the one hand, some socialists accept the
liberal-conservative conception of political pluralism, and permit
property-owning groups and their allies to dominate strategic positions
within the economy, state, and society, positions they can exploit to
destroy democracy. In both Chile and Jamaica, socialists attempted to
elicit the cooperation of private capitalists in their economic develop-
ment plans. The capitalists responded by massively transferring capital
out of the country, running down plant and equipment, and working in
tandem with international capital and the U.S. imperial state to
destabilize and erode the popular base of the democratic-socialist
regime. Subsequent to the downfall of the regime, the liberal and
conservative "defenders" of pluralist democracy supported a military
dictatorship in Chile and an authoritarian parliamentary regime in
Jamaica. On the other hand, some socialists reject the idea of pluralism
altogether. By failing to distinguish between the ideologically loaded
liberal-conservative conception of pluralism and a notion that recog-
nizes a plurality of interests within a collectivist society, these socialists
contribute to the installation of a monolithic political regime.
A more adequate conception of pluralism is evidenced in the efforts
of Nicaragua's Sandinistas to fashion a political framework for socialist
transition. The Sandinistas have transformed the state apparatus,
initiated a dynamic public and cooperative sector, and encouraged the
rapid growth of autonomous and semiautonomous mass organizations.
They have designed and implemented an electoral system that accom-
modates a broad range of competing political parties, some to their right
and some to their left (Latin American Studies Association, 1985).
Moreover, the top Sandinista leadership did not arrogate to itself the
task of codifying the foundation of the new society in a new constitution.
Constituent as well as legislative powers were granted to the National
Assembly, where the Sandinista majority debates and negotiates with
representatives of all other political parties (Instituto Historico Centro-
america, 1985).
The Sandinistas have defined the political boundaries and have
allowed and encouraged wide-ranging democratic participation within
these boundaries. They have also clearly delineated and openly stated
the temporal boundaries of authoritarian practices. In a characteristic
statement about La Prensa, the opposition newspaper that was
ultimately shut down, censor Nelba Blandon, for example, has said that
"when the danger to Nicaragua from armed attacks by ex-Somoza
guardsmen disappears, La Prensa would again be allowed to commit
the sin of publishing lies" (Nichols, 1985: 193). Depending on how the
U.S.-contra war against Nicaragua proceeds, the Sandinistas may have
to widen or be able to narrow the range for authoritarian measures. But
what is notable at present is that, even in this period of military defense,
democratic civilian organizations are debating issues and programs and
are infusing the processes of establishing the foundation of the new
society and building participatory institutions with a democratic
pluralist ethos.
In the 1960s, this was not done in Cuba. By 1970, however, it became
clear to the Cuban leadership that the system had to be reformed, that a
conversion to more participatory institutions had to be achieved. This
realization was induced by growing popular discontent, which mani-
fested itself in heightened absenteeism and lessened productive effort,
and by a variety of deepening economic problems (Fitzgerald, 1985:
120-124). Yet the direction and extent of change was largely determined
by the revolutionary leadership, which had already accommodated itself
to centralized practices. The conversion to participatory institutions has
been substantial, but it is important to underline the extent to which
restrictive practices continue. The conversion to democratic practices
remains incomplete.
Perhaps the best example of this is the structure and functioning of
the Organos de Poder Popular (OPP) (Bengelsdorf, 1985: 225-327;
Fitzgerald, 1985: 302-310), which are elected assemblies that have been
in existence at the national, provincial, andmunicipal levels since 1976-
1977. The OPP provide the population with a formal structure through
which criticism can be voiced and solutions proposed to economic and
social problems. This is especially the case at the municipal level, where
OPP delegates are responsible for the administration of local social
service and economic units. Also at this level, OPP delegates are subject
to direct popular nomination, election, and recall, all of which doubtless
help to keep them responsive to local popular concerns.
Yet, at the higher levels of the OPP structure, where the responsi-
bilities become greater in importance and scope, the extent of democracy
diminishes. The provincial and national OPP assemblies, for example,
are elected not directly by the population but by the municipal delegates.
Moreover, officially constituted "nominating committees," not the
population itself, nominate the candidates for the higher positions.
These nominating committees are made up of representatives of state-
and Party-allied mass organizations, under the chairpersonship of a
representative of the Party. These committees must nominate 25 percent
more candidates than the available vacancies, and the municipal
delegates may reject the lists of nominees in whole or in part (Gonz'alez
Mendoza, 1986). Nevertheless, this structure gives the Party a great deal
of control over who is elected to higher OPP positions (Fitzgerald, 1985:
303-307).
Although Party members do not necessarily predominate at the
municipal level, they do at the provincial and especially at the national
level. This predominance of Party members at the higher levels of OPP
is clearly a major mechanism for Party control of OPP decisions. Party
members in OPP positions remain under Party discipline and are duty-
bound to attempt to persuade non-Party delegates to follow the Party
line. If this does not work, matters are to be taken through the Party
structure all the way up to the National Assembly, if necessary, where
compliance with the Party line is assured (Castro, 1974). Thus the big
decisions and the power to control lesser decisions taken at lower levels
remain in the hands of the Party, that is, of the top revolutionary
leadership.
The conversion to participatory institutions is also inhibited in ways
the leadership never intended. Currently, the Cuban politicoadmini-
strative apparatus is occupied by a considerable number of individuals
who rose to and were socialized to their positions of responsibility
before the authoritarian-mobilization system was reformed. By habit,
and for other reasons that we cannot go into here (Fitzgerald, 1985:
354-370, 390-412), such individuals are, according to the former head of
the Central Planning Agency, "impregnated with the old centralizing
and in many cases bureaucratic habits" (Perez, 1979: 14). Such
individuals have difficulty adapting to the participation envisaged by
the revolutionary leadership. The conversion to democratic partici-
patory institutions in Cuba is thus inhibited by the authoritarian ethos
implanted in the 1960s.
While noting the continuing restrictions that operate in Cuba-a
legacy of the real and continuing military threats and actual attacks
launched from Washington, D.C.-the important point is the historical
direction that the revolution is taking: its movement away from a
decision-making system informed by an authoritarian ethos toward
structures that have been opened up to truly mass participation.
Moreover, the social foundation of the regime has effectively operated
to allocate the benefits of economic growth in a very egalitarian fashion
(Brundenius, 1981: 102-151). The social foundation has democratized
the benefits of the revolution. Yet full democratic political participation
remains to be realized.
Although, for purposes of analytic clarity, we have distinguished the
foundation-establishing and the institution-building phases of the
socialist transition, these phases, in fact, interpenetrate one another. If
clear political and temporal boundaries are not instituted in the
foundation-establishing phase, then authoritarian practices threaten to
carry over into the institution-building phase, become identified with
the basic notion of socialism, and block the development of a
democratic socialist pluralism. On the other hand, if the authoritarian
imperative of the foundation-establishing phase is not recognized or
acted upon, then the very chance to build democratic participatory
institutions upon a socialist foundation will be jeopardized. In this
regard, the Nicaraguan practice of combining national defense and
pluralism, building participatory institutions, and operating with a
realistic understanding of state power, presents a major breakthrough in
conceptualizing the transition to socialism.
CONCLUSIONS
The basic theoretical error of the Allende and Manley regimes that
translated into practical disaster was the idea that "democracy is a good
in itself." This rather vacuous phrase translates into the notion that the
procedures and institutions of a parliamentary electoral system operate
independently of class relations, class conflict, and imperial penetration.
By assuming that shared values of political democracy override partisan
class interests, these regimes provided space for the right wing to recruit
coup-makers within the military, while preventing democratic military
forces from acting ... politically; they negotiated compromises with the
bourgeoisie, which utilized concessions to make new demands and
transformed tactical negotiations into transitional demands oriented
toward a strategic rupture with the existing democratic socialist regime.
The Right had no illusions about democracy being a "good in itself." It
was good insofar as it safeguarded their basic interests, but it was to be
discarded or disrupted when it eroded their prerogatives. The tragic
mistake of the Manley and Allende regimes, which sought to radically
reform society without transforming the state, is being repeated today
by a group of democratic theorists who abjure social reform in the name
of a "realistic democracy." "Realists," such as O'Donnell (1986) and his
coauthors, tacitly recognize the impotence of political regimes con-
strained by the military and the international bankers, yet loudly
proclaim the preeminent "democratic" virtue of these compromised and
weakened regimes.
The transition to socialism raises several basic issues concerning the
relationship between political power and class relations, more particu-
larly between state, regime, and class conflict. Many contemporary
democratic practitioners in Latin America have reverted back to a 1940s
political version of democracy, emphasizing legalistic and formalistic
criteria rather than examining the historical process and class and
institutional relations that constrain the operation of elections, presi-
dents, and parliaments. These democrats operate within the boundaries
established by the military, the international banks, and the local
bureaucratic and propertied elites; and they formulate policies that
"manage" conflicts, social pacts to contain class conflict, and political
formulas that subordinate social movements to elite negotiations and
bargaining (Petras, 1986).
The deep structural affinity between these democratic theorists and
practitioners and the Reagan administration is located in their unac-
knowledged acceptance of bourgeois hegemony as the precondition for
contemporary "resurgent democracies." The fundamental absence of
any analysis of the class relations that underpin these electoral regimes
undermines the theoretical and practical utility of these arid conceptions
of democratic transition. In contrast, the Reagan administration
understands perfectly well that class and property relations are central
in defining its view toward political regimes. ITence the administration is
able to support "death-squad democracies" in Guatemala, El Salvador,
and Honduras, as well as state terrorist regimes in countries like Chile,
and civilian regimes based on the traditional military and international
banks in Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil. By factoring out imperial and
class ties, these democrats contribute to the ideological obfuscation
engendered by the Reagan administration, which has become quite
adept at using formalistic electoral formulas to defend propertied,
military, and imperialist interests.
The significant issues are those concerned with the profound
connection that exists between class relations and political power, the
deep structural linkages that define the scope and depth of political and
social transformation (Wood, 1986). Regimes that wish to succeed in
transforming social relations must transform the state or end up
reproducing the existing pattern of social relations. The notion of "state
autonomy," which has been extended to include what its proponents call
"state-centered" approaches, divorces the state from the matrix of class
relations and contributes to "classless" conceptions of politics, as can be
seen in the recent work of Laclau and Mouffe (1985). Such theorists fail
to recognize that state "autonomy" has not prevented bourgeois class
power from destroying "autonomous" states and instituting very
nonautonomous bourgeois dictatorships.
The difference between the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions and
the demise of the Allende and Manley regimes is rooted in the
theoretical issue of the relationship between class and state. The
Nicaraguans have reorganized the state and created the social and
military organization to sustain a pluralist regime. The United States
and the local bourgeoisie reject the state and class basis upon which the
pluralistic party-electoral system functions. They want to have their
own army-the contras-and their political organizations in control of
the civil bureaucracy in order to create their version of a pluralistic
bourgeois democracy. Debates over socialism and democracy in the
period of transition have as their primary focus precisely this problem:
the necessity to transform the existing state apparatus in order to
achieve durable and consequential socioeconomic reforms and to
institutionalize a popular democratic political system.
NOTES
1. The literature on Chile under Allende is vast, that on Jamaica under Manley less so.
Our analyses of these cases are largely consistent with Smirnow (1979) and Sweezy and
Magdoff (1974) on Chile, and with Kaufman (1985) on Jamaica. Although some have
questioned the socialist potential in Jamaica, Kaufman (1985: 233) has correctly
concluded that "dramatic and profound changes were possible in Jamaica. Neither the
existing situation of dependency nor the desire to preserve and extend democratic
institutions prevented such a transformation. These changes could be inaugurated within
the perspective of a democratic road to socialism.... The possibility was ushered in by the
politicization of the 1974-1976 period and the massive vote for the PNP on the basis of its
pledge to build a democratic socialist Jamaica. There was an embryonic movement of
change. There was tremendous power, creativity, good will, initiative, and courage waiting
to be unleashed and directed."
2. We say "perhaps"because, as Manley(1982: x) has pointed out, "no 'smokinggun'
has been found." On the other hand, Manley (1982: 223-237) has compiled a "Destabili-
zation Diary" that displays the typical CIA modus operandi. Of course, in Chile, the gun
was found blazing (Petras and Morley, 1975).
3. The capacity of the masses in both Chile and Jamaica has been often overlooked,
and adequate histories of these mass mobilizations have yet to be written. Beginnings have
been made by Espinosa and Zimbalist (1981), Henfry and Sorj (1977), Raptis (1974), and
Winn (1986) on Chile, and by Feuer (1984) and Kaufman (1985) on Jamaica.
4. The best compilations of materials and analyses on the trajectory of Sandinista
Nicaragua are by Harris and Vilas (1985) and by Walker (1985).
5. While liberals may be soothed by the continuance of the mixed economy in
Nicaragua, socialists should be aware that this constitutes not a strength but a weakness
for the Sandinistas. The persistence of the mixed economy is explained by the low level of
socialization of the Nicaraguan economy, and is clearly a weakness imposed on the
Sandinistas by a horrendous legacy of exploitation (Wheelock, 1983: 83-103). As Lapper
(1986) makes clear, the mixed economy is nothing more than a "headache" for the
Sandinistas.
6. This fact is typically overlooked by knee-jerk democrats and civil libertarians who
cannot conceive of legitimate conditions for limiting democracy. For a useful discussion of
legitimate authoritarianism in liberal democratic regimes, written from a liberal viewpoint,
see Rossiter (1948).
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Authoritarianism and Democracy in the Transition to Socialism

Author(s): James F. Petras and Frank T. Fitzgerald

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