Ben Black The Effects of Diversionary Actions in Maoist China 1

Political power, declared Mao Zedong, the leader of the Peoples Republic of
China (PRC) from its founding until his death in 1976, grows out of the barrel of a
gun. (Columbia.edu). This extreme ideology acutely described Maos approach to
governance and his thought process in undertaking the challenge of maintaining the
Chinese Communist Party power. Under the leadership of Chairman Mao, the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) maintained its public support by enacting a wide
range of campaigns to mobilize the population and to keep the middle kingdom in a
constant state of revolution. In the process, he created one of the starkest examples
of the rally-round-the-flag effect in human history. In critiquing the theory,
particularly in light of the events and effects of the latter, this paper will analyze two
such campaigns in the context of the diversionary theory: the Korean War and the
Cultural Revolution.
When considering the Maoist Era of China (roughly 1949-1976), it is
essential to first examine the effect that Mao Zedong, as an individual, had on the
course of the entire country. In the study of international relations, bargaining
theory operates under an often-faulty unitary actor assumption. This means that
when identifying a range where potential bargains could be found between two
states, it is assumed that the state as a whole has a unitary set of preferences. In
truth, this is hardly ever the case; the populations of most states hold a multitude of
preferences. However, in Maoist China, the unitary actor assumption is largely
accurate. First, the Chinese population had little to no means of conveying their
preferences to the leaders of China. Most important, however, Mao Zedong - a single
Ben Black The Effects of Diversionary Actions in Maoist China 2
actor on the international stage-set the domestic and foreign policy of China, and the
people unquestioningly followed his lead. Either by fear or honest agreement, Mao
held incredible sway. Michael H. Hunt, Professor Emeritus of International History
at the University of North Carolina wrote of Mao: He is central to understanding the
CCP story in the influence of foreign-policy institutions and procedures, and the
impact of contemporary intellectual and political currents, he is still likely to occupy
an important, even dominant place (Hunt 204).
In 1949, the Peoples Republic of China remained in its infancy, having been
founded only within the year. The CCP was transitioning from fighting a civil war to
governing a country. The two goals of the newly founded government were to
squash remaining domestic dissent and revive the war-torn economy (Saich 39).
According to former Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, Mao assured Joseph Stalin
(who was hesitant to support the liberation of South Korea) that if Kim Il-Sungs
North Korea invaded, the Americans would not intervene (Jian 87). Maos sentiment
rested on the grounds that it would be an internal conflict in Korea and the United
States would have no reason to intervene. Interestingly, this policy of internal
conflict being a strictly domestic concern remains a cornerstone of Chinese foreign
policy and forms the PRCs present stance on Tibet and Xinjiang (as well as the
rationale for their neutrality regarding Crimea). This lingering policy towards
internal conflicts is a vivid example of Maos influence over the formation of the
Chinese dogma.
In order to achieve the CCPs first goal of eliminating dissent, several
campaigns were enacted to accompany Chinas involvement in the Korean War.
Ben Black The Effects of Diversionary Actions in Maoist China 3
These included the Campaign for the Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries in
addition to mobilization between 1950 and 1953 against corruption, private
businessmen, and landowners. Additionally, Mao took many diversionary actions
during this period, including implementing a Soviet-style five-year plan to focus the
entire country on a clearly defined set of goals and expectations (Saich 44).
All of these actions, coupled with the Peoples Liberation Army crossing the
Yalu River and joining the Korean War, effectively focused the populations attention
away from the brewing economic catastrophes and social changes. The vast
majority of the Chinese population was focused on Maos anti-western campaign,
which united the country against the United States and other U.N. forces advancing
through the Korean Peninsula. Jack S. Levy of the University of Minnesota describes
diversionary theory as when a leader takes actions meant to distract popular
attention away from internal social and economic problems (Levy 259). While the
Korean War and the concurrent domestic campaigns accomplished Levys definition
of diversionary actions, dissent to Maos decisions arose within the leadership, and
held an unexpected amount of clout in the government. The most powerful organ of
the Chinese Communist Party, and therefore the PRC as a whole, is the Politburo,
which collectively disagreed with Maos decision to repel the United Nations forces
(Goncharov 180).
The Politburo (which consists of 25 members), as well as the military leaders
of the Peoples Liberation Army, strongly felt that China was no match for the U.S.
military-particularly so soon after the end of the revolution. Those who argued
against intervention also held that it could leave room for increased dissent from a
Ben Black The Effects of Diversionary Actions in Maoist China 4
war-weary population. Mao argued that a Sino-American confrontation was
inevitable and that Korea was a far more advantageous theater for it to occur than
Taiwan. Although Mao eventually chose to intervene and that decision was his
alone, the dissent that it created amongst his closest advisers and fellow party
officials set a precedent in the young nation. For example: Zhou Enlai, the Premier of
the PRC, warned the United States in early October 1950 that advancing passed the
38
th
parallel would mean a Chinese intervention (Goncharov 182). Zhou was
against Chinese involvement in Korea, and went to great lengths to prevent it
without directly coming into conflict with Mao.
Although there is no public opinion data on the PRC in the 1950s, the lack of
organized opposition lends to the conclusion that Maos use of diversionary conflict
and campaigns eliminated or silenced most public dissent. However, the Chairmans
policies and decisions fermented an unexpected amount of disagreement amongst
the party leadership. Mao took countless other actions to keep China in a constant
state of revolution, including land reforms and the Hundred Flowers Campaign of
1956. During the latter campaign the CCP allowed citizens to publicly express their
grievances regarding government policies. This lasted less than a year until the
Anti-Rightist Campaign began, which saw nearly all of those who spoke out killed or
imprisoned (Chung). Lewis Coser, a prominent sociologist, hypothesized that:
Disintegration of the group, rather than increase in cohesion, will be the result of
outside conflict (Levy 272). Maoist China seems to run awry of traditional
diversionary theory, perhaps due to the fact that Mao also utilized domestic conflicts
Ben Black The Effects of Diversionary Actions in Maoist China 5
as opposed to solely employing outside conflicts as diversionary actions; thus,
making Coser and Levys findings possibly inapplicable.
Further evidence of Chinas unorthodox displays of the diversionary theory
occurred more than a decade after the Korean War. Beginning in 1966, Mao and the
CCP embarked on an unprecedented social and political upheaval of the PRC. The
Great Cultural Revolution aimed to oust many of Maos political enemies from the
party and the government, in addition to creating a resolute support base in the
students and youth of China. By focusing on youth, Mao molded what is known as
his personality cult, which consisted of people who knew nothing but Communist
rule, and were willing to turn against their superiors in his name. In July of 1966
Mao addressed the importance of youth in the movement: I say to you all; youth is
the great army of the Great Cultural Revolution! It must be mobilized to the full
(Schram). Amy Oakes, Associate Professor of Government at the College of William
and Mary, argues that the key to understanding the relationship between domestic
and international conflict is found through the use of policy substitutability,
meaning that international conflict is only one potential option for leaders who face
domestic unrest (Oakes 13). In beginning the Cultural Revolution, Mao chose an
alternative option to respond to civil unrest and a growing number of political
enemies: domestically mobilizing the masses to combat those whom he saw as
creating the dissent.
In August of 1966, Mao and the CCPs Central Committee authorized the Red
Guard, a group of students that were steadfastly loyal to Mao Zedong Thought. Red
Guards were willing to turn against their family, friends, and even their parents if
Ben Black The Effects of Diversionary Actions in Maoist China 6
they thought those individuals harbored reservations in regards to the CCPs
governance of China (Saich 57). Wang Rongfen, then a student at Beijings Foreign
Languages Institute said: The Great Cultural Revolution is not a mass movement,
but one man moving the masses with the barrel of a gun (Schoenhals). Initially, the
campaign was highly successful. Dissenting intellectuals were arrested, children
even reported their parents if they overheard them speaking ill of the CCP, and
Maos political enemies were ousted. In 1968 Liu Shaoqi, who had been President of
the PRC since 1959 and earned the title of Maos policy nemesis, was labeled a
rightist traitor and removed from his post, soon after which he died while under
house arrest (Dir. Williams).
The Cultural Revolution resolved Maos domestic problems without the need
to initiate a costly, and possibly more volatile foreign conflict. In this way, war was
not, as Oakes described, the option that the CCP chose; instead, Mao initiated
another sequence of domestic diversionary actions to quell dissent and build
support for his regime. In an interview that he gave in 1969, Chris Milton talked
about the three previous years he had spent studying in China at the onset of the
Cultural Revolution; We (students at the university) wanted to have public
denunciations (sessions where people would violently lambast a suspected
rightist) of some playwrights and newspaper editors who were being criticized for
reactionary writings (Milton 7). The eagerness of students who formed the Red
Guard to defend the CCP and pursue with violent intentions those who would
question its legitimacy further exemplifies the initial successes of the Cultural
Revolution.
Ben Black The Effects of Diversionary Actions in Maoist China 7
After roughly four years of successful undertakings by Maos Red Guards,
previously trusted high-level officials of the PRC and CCP, began to become the focus
of Maos purges. Most famously, Lin Biao was accused of plotting to assassinate
Mao, and Lin and his family became the unfortunate victims of a plane crash in
Mongolia. This came as a surprise because Lin had been announced as Maos self-
declared successor and was considered to be his closest advisor (Knight).
Furthermore, the Red Guards had expanded to the point where their leaders no
longer responded to direction from Mao or the CCP leadership, requiring the
Peoples Liberation Army to restore order. The end of the Cultural Revolution is
traditionally associated with Maos death in 1976. A series of power struggles
between the Gang of Four and various other prominent CCP officials ensued until
Deng Xiaoping emerged as the paramount leader in 1978 (Dir. Williams).
Despite its initial successes in uniting the country and diverting the
population from socio-economic problems, the Cultural Revolution proved
disastrous for CCP authority and in ensuring clearly defined leadership of the PRC.
In this case, diversionary action eventually decreased public support for the regime
and increased internal power struggles. It also further depressed the social and
economic conditions, with three years of negative Gross Domestic Product growth
occurring between 1966 and 1976 (UNdata.org). Although any data from the PRC is
highly unreliable during this time period, a reported negative growth represents
extremely poor conditions for the majority of the Chinese People.
Several scholars, including Michael Hunt, argue that Maoist China (mostly
attributed to the efforts of Premier and diplomat Zhou Enlai) practiced a uniquely
Ben Black The Effects of Diversionary Actions in Maoist China 8
realist or rationalist foreign policy. Although it is now known that the Politburo
often disagreed, the PRC appeared to make only carefully calculated and unitary
foreign policy decisions under the leadership of Chairman Mao (Hunt 246). It could
be argued that this was a direct result of the diversionary actions that the PRC chose
to take being most often domestic campaigns. China benefited from a rational actor
foreign policy due to the absence of a need for diversionary international conflict to
increase support and eliminate dissension, as these outcomes were achieved by
domestic campaigns and mobilization of the masses to the same political ends. A
rally-round-the-flag effect was also successfully achieved through careful calculation
of who would be the target of a campaign. Specific political adversaries, wealthy
(and therefore powerful) land and business owners, and rightist members of the
intelligentsia all became the enemy against which the masses could rally around the
CCPs leadership.
In order to properly analyze these events, it is particularly essential to
identify the findings of Dr. Oakes: that international conflict is only one option
available to leaders who face domestic unrest. The Diversionary Theory of war is
also applicable to internal actions and campaigns, or a combination of international
conflict and domestic propaganda. Maoist China is a prime example of the use of the
Diversionary Theory to control the population and ensure its support - perhaps in a
more secure way than engaging in international conflict. Despite its successes, Mao
Zedongs use of domestic maneuvering of the masses as opposed to diversionary
international war resulted in countless leadership challenges and instances of
dissent. It is also paramount to recognize that the actions taken by the PRC between
Ben Black The Effects of Diversionary Actions in Maoist China 9
1950 and 1976 would be staunchly rejected by the international community and
viewed as a ghastly display of human rights violations by 21
st
century international
norms.
Time period and other circumstantial information must be taken into
account when analyzing the precursors and outcomes of diversionary actions. Levy
writes, Diversionary actions are more likely to occur under some domestic and
internal conditions than others, but these conditions have yet to be analyzed (Levy
282). Maos use of a perpetual proletarian revolution may be a hallmark of
Communism, but the CCP utilized these ideals to remain in power and eliminate
nonconforming voices. Although Maoist China ultimately exposed flaws in the
Diversionary Theory, it also exemplified that there remain unexplored uses of
diversionary actions. Among several is the use of domestic conflict to serve the
diversionary purpose of international conflict in the early decades of the Peoples
Republic of China.










Ben Black The Effects of Diversionary Actions in Maoist China 10


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