The

transatlantic
economic disaster

MU
4)
CO

The stagnating seventies saw a steady

haemorrhaging of support for Keynesian
economic propositions amongst bourgeois
economists compared with the buoyant
sixties . With the elections of 1979 and
1980 this trend penetrated state policy
making in a strident form in both Britain
and the United States. Now, with over
three years of Thatcher's monetarist
experiment and nearly two years of
Reaganomics behind us, the end of the
recession has been indefinitely postponed
on both sides of the Atlantic . Simon
Mohun looks at the results of theoretical
departures in practice .
Conventional macroeconomic wisdom, as taught to undergraduates,

CAPITAL AND CLASS

6 focuses on how - by judicious use of

fiscal and monetary policies - governments can determine and control the
level of aggregate demand in pursuit of
growth, price stability, a balance in external payments and, of course, full employment . As undergraduates progress
with their study of macroeconomics,
they discover a debate as to whether
monetary or fiscal policy is more effective in the pursuit of these goals . From
the late sixties on, the drift in the debate
has been toward regarding fiscal policy as
not terribly effective, and towards seeing
monetary changes as the primary causal
factor in the determination of overall
economic activity and hence employment .
Next, undergraduates learn that this
apparently technical issue is not amenable to straightforward resolution because it is inextricably intertwined with a
rather different set of issues . These are
concerned with whether government
economic policy should be active and
discretionary, contingent on particular
situations, or whether policy should be
passive, relying upon predetermined
rules regardless of the particular situation . An active policy stance might say
that the government should continually
alter its taxation and expenditure policies, for example, in order to maintain
full employment ; this is occasionally
called `fine tuning' the economy . A
passive policy stance might say that the
money supply, appropriately defined,
should be increased by the same fixed
percentage amount each year .
Equally undergraduates will probably
hear, as they plough through formal
models of increasing sophistication and
complexity, that the activist/non-activist
debate depends upon whether the components of private sector expenditure
(consumption, investment and net exports) are believed to be stable . Stability
is understood here as not meaning never
changing, but rather involving the con-

ception that destabilising changes in the

aggregate generate changes in prices
which in turn, smoothly and automatically, give rise to self-correcting
changes in quantities . This is just a
generalisation of the idea that if the
demand for a good exceeds its supply, its
price will rise, choking off demand and
encouraging more supply until a situation
of equality between demand and supply
is reached . In other words the debate
turns on whether you believe the market
mechanism overall is a stable, equilibriating mechanism or not . On top of all
this, whichever position is taken, macroeconomic theory is rounded out with the
advice of practical men (almost never
women) as to the degree of trust that
should be placed in the very feasibility of
government policies having any stabilising effect at all in a complicated world
of varying and unpredictable time lags .
So undergraduates enter their final
examinations knowing that economists
tend to divide into two camps : the fiscal
and activist camp, generally called
Keynesian, and the monetary nonactivist camp, generally called Monetarist . The spiritual home of the former is
somewhat schizophrenically divided between the two Cambridges (and perhaps
New Haven) ; the latter is deeply rooted
in Chicago, with some tender offspring in
Liverpool and parts of London . Deserters
from the Keynesian camp have flocked
towards Chicago in the last decade and
an increasing number have stopped en
route in Pittsburgh . Here they have discovered good theoretical reasons, called
`rational expectations', why within an
equilibrium framework government activist policies are self defeating .
So, conventional economic ideology
now asserts first that prices are flexible
and markets automatic stabilising devices,
and second, that variations in the rate of
growth of the money supply are both the
proximate and the ultimate cause of vari-

BEHIND THE NEWS

ations in the inflation rate (and hence
nominal GNP) .' Further if prices are not
flexible, so that markets do not work
properly, it can only be because of
monopolistic influences . Since unemployment (excess supply of labour) is
caused by real wages (price of labour)
being too high, then if the real wage does
not fall it is because trades unions prevent it from falling ; so trades unions must
be prevented from acting in ways which
maintain too high a real wage . (But an
undergraduate examination answer must
be wary of becoming too political - politics is a different subject) .
Throughout the fifties and sixties it
certainly seemed as if full employment
was an objective of government policy,
and if inflation was perceived as threatening the full utilisation of productive
capacity, then full employment could be
maintained by the introduction of incomes policies . The only trouble was that
the latter either did not work at all, or if
they did then the pent-up frustrations
released on their demise vitiated the effects they had had . And by the midseventies inflation had reached double
digits . A full employment policy was
then deemed impossible to put into effect
until inflation was brought under control,
and this was to be done by controlling the
amount of money in the economy . So in
1976 the Callaghan-Healey Labour
administration in Britain explicitly subordinated employment policies to the
setting of monetary targets ; the reduction of inflation was the major priority,
although an incomes policy was also used
to try to control wages . (Bourgeois politicians have never been very clear
whether the linkage is from the money
supply to prices, or from wages to prices ;
while their economic advisers talk of the
former, they find the latter easier to
understand) .
From 1979 onwards this policy thrust
was sharpened . The Tories abandoned

incomes policy in favour of the more

efficacious `trade union reform' and
tightened monetary policy considerably .
This latter policy centred on the control
of `sterling M3' (cash plus positive current and deposit account bank balances),
and the `Medium Term Financial Strategy' comprised a series of targets over
four years for the steady reduction in the
rate of sterling M3 growth . Associated
with this was a policy of strict cash limits
on all public sector expenditures in order
to reduce the budget deficit, or Public
Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR),
as a proportion of output (GDP) .
But the Tories have found it very
difficult to cut back on major spending
programmes . During the election they
committed themselves to honouring the
Clegg findings on public sector pay
comparability in a short-term political
manoeuvre running quite counter to
their economic philosophy ; defence expenditures increase in cash terms at
double the planned rate ; local authorities
had partial success in resisting central
government pressure to cut current expenditure (and hence jobs), preferring
to cut back on (notional) capital expenditure programmes ; large subsidies were
paid to British Leyland and funds were
provided to buy the miners off ; and
escalating unemployment forced up unemployment benefit and social security
expenditure . At the same time as expenditures were increasing, tax revenues
were falling, partly because of recession
(the unemployed no longer pay income
tax) and partly because of the `incentive
restoring' income tax cuts introduced in
Howe's first budget . With expenditures
rising and revenues falling faster than
anticipated the Government was forced
into a massive expansion of its own borrowing to cover the defecit . In order to
persuade lenders to part with their
money, interest rates had to be increased
over and above the already high levels

CAPITAL AND CLASS

8 resulting from the attempt to control

sterling M3 . (A fall in the supply of
money relative to the demand creates
excess demand for money, forcing the
price of money - the rate of interest up .) .
High interest rates had two effects .
First, sterling became more attractive for
foreigners to hold . International confidence in sterling has been growing since
the nadir of 1976 and the IMF stand-by
credits, encouraged in turn by the sound
monetarism of Callaghan and Healey,
the election of the Tories, and the UK's
growing oil exports during a period of
sharp oil price rises . The increase in the
sterling exchange rate depressed the
price of imported goods relative to the
price of domestically produced goods
and increased the price of British exports .
While average earnings rose by nearly 21
per cent in 1980 much of the increase in
demand was spent on imports, the
import-penetration ratios for manufactures and semi-finished goods increased,
and domestic manufacturing was severely.
depressed .
The second effect of high interest
rates was that it became very expensive
for firms to finance current activities and
stocks . In the face of depressed domestic
demand, import competition, unprofitable exports, and financial pressures on
cash flow positions, a major collapse of
manufacturing occurred . Less fortunate
firms went bankrupt (there were 4537
company liquidations in England &
Wales during 1979 and 6891 in 1980) ; the
more fortunate engaged in masssive destocking in order to bolster their cashflow positions ; and unemployment
increased dramatically .
To a considerable extent the Tories
had come to see their mix of economic
policies as a mistake by the end of 1980 .
First of all, their control over the money
supply had been less than a brilliant
success ; in 1980-81, for instance, sterling

M3 grew by 18 per cent, as against a

target range of between 7 and 11 per
cent . In part, this was due to structural
changes in the financial system (the ending of the 'corset' restriction upon bank
deposits enabled banks to increase their
lending and thereby increase sterling
M3) . But it was also due to distress
borrowing by industry, as firms attempted
to maintain cash-flow positions, and to
the attractiveness of interest bearing
deposits for large wealth holders . Thus
the high interest rates which were supposed to control the growth of sterling
M3 actually served to stoke the growth
rate of the chosen monetary indicator .
The second general mistake was to
combine a restrictive monetary policy
with a loose fiscal policy which drove up
interest rates and the exchange rate more
than had been intended .

Both mistakes began to be corrected

during the course of 1981 . First, the
importance of sterling M3 was reduced ;
instead of one indicator having primary
importance, a range of indicators is now
being used ; seen as particularly important
are the exchange rate and the general
level of interest rates . Here the real rate
of interest is what is important, i .e . the
nominal interest rate as compared to the
present and expected rate of inflation .
Secondly, the 1981 and 1982 budgets
were fiscally restrictive . In particular in
1981 the burden of direct taxation was
substantially increased through a deliberate failure to up-rate tax allowances in
line with inflation, and in 1982 national
insurance contributions were increased .
Matching this increase in taxation (including the introduction of taxation of
unemployment benefits) more determined efforts were made to reduce public
expenditure . Continued pressure has
been exerted on local authorities which
has gone some way towards transforming

BEHIND THE NEWS

them into bodies whose primary function
is mere administration of programmes
whose extent has been previously determined by central government . Efforts to
reduce government expenditure also involve a quasi-incomes policy in the public
sector enforced via cash limits, and continuing price rises in the nationalised
industries, in order to reduce their borrowing and dependence on subsidies,
both of which figure in the PSBR . The
reduction of the size of the public sector,
via privatisation wherever possible, also
forms part of the strategy . Ideally, as has
been much canvassed recently, such
privatisation would be stretched to include financing higher education via loans
rather than grants and the National
Health Service through private insurance
rather than general taxation . But it remains to be seen whether the Tories have
the political strength to attempt this .
As a result of all this, the combination
of restrictive monetary policy and loose
fiscal policy of 1979-81 has been transformed into the present mix of restrictive
monetary policy and restrictive fiscal
policy . In the halcyon days of
Keynesianism this was called `deflation' .
Its intended extent can be gauged from
the declared aim of reducing the PSBR
from 5 .7 per cent of GDP in 1980-81, to
3 .5 per cent in the current financial year,
2 .75 per cent in 1983-84 and 2 per cent in
1984-85 . There is no doubt that these
targets are ambitious . Their realisation
would have been helped by a rapid
growth in GDP, but by June 1982 the
index of manufacturing production had
fallen to its lowest level for fifteen years 1
and was still approximately 14 per cent
below its level at the time of the last
General Election .
Not surprisingly severe contraction in i
production has been reflected in the
unemployment figures . The September
1982 figures show that 3 .34 million or 14
per cent of the working population were

out of work . Adult unemployment 9

(seasonally adjusted and excluding
school leavers) stood at 3 .04 million, the
highest total since the Second World
War . Additionally, government employment and training schemes covered
543,000 people the previous month,
keeping total unemployment figures an
estimated 315,000 below what they would
otherwise have been . But the real situation is even worse : the 1980 General
Household Survey showed that in that
year 11 per cent of unemployed men and
43 per cent of married women seeking
work were not registered as unemployed .
Overall 17 per cent of the jobless were
not registered with the Department of
Employment, either because of ineligibility for benefit or because of the negligible prospects of finding a job . Thus,
assuming these figures have changed
little, one person in six or 4 million people
are currently unemployed .
Government
spokesmen
have
frequently said that the underlying trend
in unemployment is slowly improving .
During the winter of 1980-81 the average
monthly increase in unemployment
peaked at over 100,000 . This rate of increase slowed throughout 1981 to an
average of 13,000 a month between
February and April this year . But since
the spring the trend has again worsened .
In the first quarter of 1982 the rate of
increase was 20,000 ; in the second
quarter 30,000 ; and in the third quarter
42,000 .
To the extent that the Government
understands this at all the cause is
ascribed to the trades unions ; real wages
are too high relative to `our' competitors .
The large increase in wages in 1980,
combined with the rising exchange rate,
meant that UK labour costs per unit of
output rose by 55 per cent from 1978 to
the end of 1980 compared with the rest of
the world ; and despite `the new realism'
sweeping the country these costs were

CAPITAL AND CLASS

10

still 38 per cent above the 1978 level at

the end of 1981 . Imports now account for
a third of total expenditure, and the trend
is upwards . Average annual productivity
growth (output per worker hour in
manufacturing) has been lower than that
in France, West Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, Belgium and Japan by a
large margin ; only in the US has it been
lower still . In this situation falling real
wages and falling inflation rates are held
to be the key to restoring the competitive
position of British industry ; and falling
nominal interest rates, induced by a
falling PSBR, are to encourage the
revival of investment.
So thoughout the summer of 1982,
the Government has attempted to slowly
reduce short term interest rates (through
money market operations) while maintaining the effective exchange rate
(measured against a trade weighted
basket of currencies) roughly constant .
Were the effective exchange rate to fall,
import prices would rise precipitating
further domestic inflation, as happened
in the autumn of 1981 . Short term
interest rates have indeed fallen ; wage
settlements have been relatively low ; the
restructuring of manufacturing industry
has seen short run productivity
increases ; and the annual inflation rate
has steadily fallen from 12 per cent in
December 1981 to less than nine percent
currently and will perhaps decline to less
than 7 per cent by the beginning of 1983 .
Yet the prospects for some sort of
recovery in output are extremely
gloomy . Despite claims that the trough
of the recession was reached in spring
1981, despite the Tories' belief that what
goes down must come up, despite their
disclaimer that although the precise
mechanism may not be clear, recovery
will happen `naturally, just as day follows
night", it just does not seem to be
happening . Searching for an explanation
Government apologists have adopted the

maxim `when in doubt, blame a

foreigner' . The US economy is in
recession, the West German economy is
depressed, world trade is depressed .
More specifically, US interest rates are
too high and declining too slowly . The
problem lies with the policies being
pursued by the Reagan administration,
under the tutelage of that well known US
government economist, Rosy Scenario .

When Reagan came into office in

January 1981 he was full of praise for
Conservative economic policies in the
UK . But instead of single-mindedly
pursuing the goal of lower inflation as a
prelude to faster growth, Reagan announced his determination to pursue
both goals simultaneously . The virtues of
supply-side economics would avoid the
more painful repercussions of Thatcher's
laudable strategy . The programme had
four main ingredients which were seen as
mutually reinforcing . First, there were to
be sharp cutbacks in the rate of growth of
Federal spending - the annual rate of
increase of 16 per cent in nominal terms
was to be halved . Defence was to escape
the axe - and the re-arming of the US is
in fact seeing the share of defence spending rising from 24 per cent to 32 per cent
of the Federal budget between 1981 and
1984 . Basic social security payments,
Medicare and veterans' benefits were also
to be excluded on the grounds that they
went to the `truly needy' . Facing the axe
then were other welfare programmes and
various Federal subsidies and regulations
supporting the `inefficient' . But this was
not enough given the scale of the reduction proposed - so indexation of
social security payments remains under
threat, although Congress will only allow
minor pruning in 1982, an election year .
The second element of the programme concerned cuts in direct taxation
in both the personal and corporate

BEHIND THE NEWS

sectors . Thus the range of marginal taxation on incomes was to be reduced from
its January 1981 range of 14 to 70 per
cent, to 10 to 50 per cent by January
1984 . In the corporate sector, a new
system for writing off the costs of business investment was to be introduced
under the self-explanatory title of Accelerated Cost Recovery . This was the real
supply-side heart of the programme : the
reduction in personal taxation and the
increase in depreciation allowances so
restoring the incentive to work, save and
invest that a balanced Federal budget
would be possible by 1984, notwithstanding a lower level of taxation .
The third part of the Reagn programme was clear backing for the activities of the Federal Reserve (the 'Fed',
the rough US equivalent of the Bank of
England) in reducing the rate of growth
of the money supply, halving 1980 growth
rates by 1986 . The final strand concerned
de-regulation : 'excessive' government
regulation and report requirements that
protected inefficient businesses and
'penalised the efficient' were to be swept
away . As detailed by the US Treasury
Department, the overall programme was
aimed at achieving the following results :
(see table)
The promised outlook could not have
been happier - simultaneous increases in
growth and reductions in both inflation
and unemployment . Unfortunately, but
hardly surprisingly, it was never made
clear precisely how this was to be
achieved . The supply-side programme
was to encourage incentives so that
aggregate output would increase . Yet
the reduction in demand triggered by
eliminating the budget deficit by 1984
would more than outweigh any increase

increase in GNP (1972 prices)

increase in consumer price index
Unemployment rate :

in demand resulting from tax cuts be- 11

cause of the sheer scale in the cut in the
Government's own demand for goods
and services, together with the elimination of demand previously financed by
axed transfer payments (mainly discretionary welfare payments) . And to
the extent that incentives to save worked,
demand would fall still further . So supply
side economics was to generate an expansion in output, and monetary znd
fiscal conservatism was to reduce the
demand for output . How was the gap to
be filled?
The supply-side rejoinder was that
investment demand would increase as a
result of the stimulating effect of corporate incentives . Yet in quantitative
terms the tax cuts were essentially cuts in
personal income taxes, and it was not
clear how these could have the effect of
financing corporate investment- particularly in view of a widespread suspicion
that accelerated defence expenditures
would quickly mop up spare capacity in
the capital goods sector . An alternative
answer, also supply-side orientated, was
that as the Federal deficit disappeared
interest rates would fall quickly and faster
than the inflation rate . Declining real
interest rates would be the stimulus to
corporate investment, private housing
expenditure and spending on consumer
durables . The problem here was that the
Fed was projecting rates of growth of the
money supply well below those required
to support the administration's desired
expansion in money GNP . Either there
would have to be an astonishing increase
in the velocity of circulation of money
(the speed at which money changes
hands) or nominal interest rates would
have to be much higher for the Fed to
1981
1 .1
11 .1
7 .8

1982
4 .2
8 .3
7 .2

1983
5 .0
6 .2
6 .6

1984
4 .5
5 .5
6 .4

1985
4 .2
4 .7
6 .0

1986
4 .2
4 .2
5 .6

CAPITAL AND CLASS

12

CSE
ANNUAL
CONFERENCE
1983
In recent years the annual conferences of
the CSE have concentrated on discussions
of socialist strategy in Britain . In 1983,
we want to continue many of the themes
of these discussions, but to emphasize
international perspectives . Many of the
issues that confront socialists today are
worldwide in scope, like the present
economic crisis and the threat of nuclear
war . At the same time, governments and
ruling classes in nearly all countries have
adopted policies of economic retrenchment and political repression . To develop
an effective socialist response, even in the
particular context of any one country, we
need to exchange experiences and discuss
common strategies .
We invite all CSE members and other
readers of Capital & Class to come to the
1983 Conference, and to contribute
papers . We are particularly looking for
contributions which deal with international issues, or analyse parallel developments and experiences between
countries ; and we hope that many of our
readers from outside Britain will be able
to participate . The planning of the conference programme is now under way :
please send all offers of papers, suggestions and enquiries to CSE Conference
Committee, 25 Horsell Rd ., London N5
1XL .
Further information will appear in the
next issue of Capital & Class and in the
CSE Newsletter .

meet its targets . A third answer was that,

since inflation reduced the real value of
peoples' monetary assets, a reduction in
inflation would mean that people do not
need to save as much, and hence a consumer boom would be engineered .' The
difficulty here is that Reagan was placing
much emphasis on the need to increase
savings from their level of less than 5 per
cent of post-tax incomes which was low
by international standards ; the official
projection was for an increase by 1984 to
just over 7 per cent . A final possibility
was that declining inflation would increase the relative competitiveness of the
US economy internationally, and the
gap could be closed by rising foreign
demand for US exports . But the Reagan
administration quickly established its
commitment to freely floating exchange
rates ; under this regime a relative fall in
the US inflation rate would translate
simply into a rising exchange rate, with
price effects thereby predominating over
the required output effects . Twist and
turn as one might, there seemed no way
that Reagan's economic programme
could work from the outset . All that
seemed likely, to almost all but the
White House, was a reduction in demand
and a falling inflation rate : old-fashioned
deflation rather than supply-side nirvana .
By January 1982 budget deficits of
more than $150 billion were being forecast for 1983 and 1984 - the combined
result of escalating projections for defence expenditure, actually escalating
unemployment and mandatory welfare
payments and the projected decline in
tax revenue following from the Economic
Recovery Act of August 1981 . The immediate outlook for Fiscal 82 (October
81 to September 82) was even worse . In
summer 1981 the White House Office of
Management and the Budget was forecasting a deficit of $42 .5 billion - by
summer 1982 the official forecast had
risen to $198 .9 billion . Yet the goal

BEHIND THE NEWS

remained a balanced Federal budget by
1984 . Not surprisingly interest rates had
by now climbed to record levels relative
to inflation and, in a below-the-belt blow
to supply-side principles, Reagan was
forced to approve a three year $98 .3
billion dollar tax bill in August 1982 .
Despite the fact that this was dubbed a
tax `reform' rather than a tax increase,
little now remained of the plan to cut
taxes dramatically, eliminate the deficit
entirely and organise the largest ever
peacetime increase in real defence
spending in US history .
During autumn 1982 after tax incomes
will have been increased by around $45
billion, partly because of the July round
in the original personal tax cut programme and partly because social security
pension payments are being increased by
7 .4 per cent . This will stimulate some
growth in the US economy, but it will be
concentrated in consumer and service
sectors . It remains to be seen what will
happen to such interest sensitive industries such as cars, capital goods and
housebuilding . As economic activity
slowly picks up there will be growing
demand for bank credit from both private
and corporate sectors which will compete with the government's need for
credit to finance its deficit in the face of
the Fed's restrictive monetary policies .
Either interest rates will rise sharply
again, choking off any recovery, or the
Fed will have to relax its monetary
position, which will depend on what is
happening to the rate of inflation . The
Administration itself believes that savings will rise sufficiently that all credit
demands will be satisfied without pressure being imposed upon either monetary
targets or interest rates - but Rosy
Scenario has little credibility outside the
White House .
Meanwhile, back in the real economy,
the third quarter of 1981 saw the peak of
capital expenditures ; capacity utilisation

in US factories is now running at just 13

over 70 per cent ; investment will decline
by more than 4 per cent this year, and
will probably continue to decline well
into 1983 . (This will make next year the
fourth depressed year of capital expenditures in a row - machine tool orders fell
by 42 per cent in the first quarter of 1982,
for example) . Further, import penetration is approaching 20 per cent in
passenger cars, steel products, electrical
components and farm machinery ; it
stands at between 20 and 30 per cent in
industrial inorganic chemicals, metal
cutting machine tools, food processing
machinery and metal forming machine
tools ; it has reached nearly 35 per cent in
footwear, 45 per cent in textile machinery, and 60 per cent in radio and
television receivers . In no sector was it
more than 10 per cent during the sixties .
Finally unemployment, at 9 .8 per cent in
July 1982, is already at the highest level
for forty years . From a British standpoint, current developments in the US
economy carry a heavy sense of deja vu .
Nevertheless, US interest rates have
begun to decline . Indeed since mid-July
the falls have been dramatic (2 percentage points on long bonds, 3 per cent on
prime bank loans, and up to 6 per cent on
Treasury Bills) . This development has
been encouraged by the Fed, with an
accompanying nudge from the Wall St .
guru Dr Kaufman of Solomon Brothers,
who - reversing his previous prediction
triggered a speculative surge by announcing that rates would not rise to new
record highs because the real economy
was so weak . Since August the real cost
of credit in most industrial countries has
not in fact been especially high in historical terms . However, it is very high for a
period of recession ; it is also high relative
to the falling inflation rate induced by
deflation and mass unemployment . This
means that firms are hardly interested in
borrowing for investment today when it

CAPITAL AND CLASS

14 will be cheaper to-morrow . Above all, it

is high relative to the very low returns
which the private sector is earning on its
assets . Thus the UK Chancellor remarked in his last budget statement that :
`Since 1960 the real purchasing power of
the average citizen has risen by over twothirds, but the real rate of return on
capital has fallen by five-sixths' .'
This phenomenon is not confined to
the UK - it is shared in differing degrees
by all the major industrialised economies .
So too is increasing unemployment - the
OECD forecast had been that unemployment among member states would
rise to between 25 and 26 million by mid1982 . By the end of 1981 it had already
reached 26 .4 million and the projection
for the end of this year is now almost 32
million . The ur .der 25 year olds comprise
a 40 per cent and rising share of the
jobless, around a third of whom have
been registered out of work for a year or
more . Last, and generally least considered, there are the 500 million plus
unemployed in the Third World . What
we have is a major recession on a scale
that can only be compared with 1929-33 .
In such a situation, the British Government's emphasis on reducing real
wages and the US emphasis on constructing incentive mechanisms for improving on an awful productivity record
are hardly going to help . In a world
recession it makes little sense for everyone to become more competitive with
everyone else . Furthermore, the issue is
not one of trying to formulate a more
efficacious mix of fiscal and monetary
policies - it is one of understanding how
the mechanisms of inflation and disinflation have been working throughout
the seventies and early eighties in order
to produce the devalorisation and restructuring currently underway in all the
major industrialised economies . Within
this framework a subsidiary issue is to
understand now how state economic

policy controls the economy but rather

the mechanisms whereby the reverse is in
fact the case . Marxists have some way to
go in this area . At the end of 1982,
however, there is little doubt that a
fundamentally irrational world will continue to confound and confuse the
rational expectations of bourgeois
economists and policy makers alike .

Notes
1 . The more theoretically interesting
but less practically important nonWalrasian general equilibrium ideas are
ignored here .
2 . Leon Brittan, as reported in the
Financial Times .
3 . This was Nigel Lawson's explanation
of why we should not see the 3 .5 billion
increase in taxation in the 1981 UK
budget as contractionary .
4 . For a survey of the evidence see S .
Hargreaves-Heap in Capital & Class 12,
and of the theoretical controversies see
J . Weeks in Capital & Class 16 .

Phil Blackburn Ken Green

and Sonia Liff

Science and technology

in restructuring
scientific and technological research and development be redirected towards socialist aims? Our interest in this
question led us to examine various political programmes for a
transition to socialism, particularly the Alternative Economic
Strategy, to see how they deal with such redirection within their
other proposed policies . However, despite the importance of
scientific and technological research to a programme for socialist industry, health care etc ., mentions of science and technology in these programmes are few and far between . This
paper tries to explore the role of science and technology in the
current crisis and the issues that have to be addressed if the
redirection of research and development is to be given serious
consideration in a socialist programme .
Recent interest in science and technology by the Left
has, for the most part, been an aspect of analyses of the labour
process .' These focus on the way scientific and technological
changes are used by individual capitals to increase their control
over labour in order to intensify work . The process involves
'deskilling', seen as an attack on the autonomy of craft
workers, and therefore their power to resist intensification .
Such routinisation and standardisation of work, it is argued,
lays a basis for Tayloristic and Fordistic techniques of the
increased pacing of work, whether by bureaucratic/supervisory
or mechanical means in order to increase the intensification of
HOW CAN

15

CAPITAL AND CLASS

labour power, hence increasing the production of surplus
value . In a period of crisis, it is clear that these efforts to
intensify work will be stepped up . However, what is not clear is
the precise role of scientific and technological change within
the process of restructuring . We will argue that to confine our
interest in scientific and technological changes to the level of
the labour process would be to miss the broader, more farreaching changes entailed by restructuring, of which changes at
the level of the labour process form only one part .

16

Restructuring

We analyse restructuring as a dynamic process of restoring

relative stability to capitalist economies . The continued reproduction of the capitalist mode of production needs to be
guaranteed by changes in the whole social formation . In the
present crisis, capitalist restructuring must confront three
major problems if the basis is to be laid for a further sustained
period of accumulation (a new upswing in the `long wave') .
These problems are : the `crisis of Fordism', the crisis of overproduction/underconsumption and the balance between 'productive' and `unproductive' labour .
The crisis of Fordism
We derive this idea from the work of Aglietta . 3 He
argues that the last sustained period of accumulation (from the
1940s onwards) was based on the diffusion of Fordism throughout the mass production sectors of capitalist economies . The
potential surplus value-generating capacity of this form of the
labour process crucially depended on the active construction of
`economies of scale' . Fordism, therefore, is more than a form
of work organisation based on assembly line-paced fragmented
tasks carried out by detailed workers ; it has also involved :
i) commoditization of the means of consumption . This
entailed a transformation of domestic labour processes in such
a way as to open up markets for profitable production of
consumer goods aimed at the individual household (factory
produced clothing, processed food, `white goods', carpets
etc .) . Of particular significance in this transformation was the
provision from the 1930s of standardised housing and `domestic
infrastructure' (gas and electricity) .
ii) homogenization of this consumption based around
standardised, mass-produced commodities - the classic notion
of mass production . The economies which this form of production allow also act to undermine the economic viability of
domestically produced alternatives .
iii) an extension of these consumption norms to more

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

and more sections of the working class as a result of increased
wages gained through collective bargaining, the growth of the
social wage, and the extension of facilities for consumer credit .
The present crisis is, therefore, the result of a combination of factors which might be summed up as 'the limits to
Fordism' . These include : the resistance of workers to Fordist
work organisation (through increased absenteeism, turnover,
strikes, sabotage etc .) ; limits to the commodization of consumption (due to the labour intensive nature of service work in
medicine, education, administration etc .) ; diminishing productivity returns from ever increasing requirements for fixed
capital, particularly in 'maturing' industries, with rapidly rising
costs of energy and raw materials ; and the costs of distribution
over the large markets required by Fordist production .
The crisis of overproduction/underconsumption

The declining rate of profit in manufacturing industry

due to the limitations of Fordism has been exacerbated by the
attempts of individual capitals and, latterly, state-imposed
wage restraint policies, to lower real wage increases . In addition to the hardship which low wages imposes on a sizeable
proportion of the working class such actions have led to a
general crisis of demand deficiency and overcapacity . These
exist simultaneously as individual capitals attempt to maintain
accumulation or, as the crisis deepens, even to maintain the
value of their capital by decreasing their wage costs . Real wage
cuts, followed by labour shedding, occur as individual capitals
pursue their own short term interests .
The balance between `unproductive' and
`productive' labour

While its precise role is contentious, most Marxist writers

agree that the growth of the state sector, being underwritten by
taxation of surplus value, has acted to exacerbate the crisis in
accumulation from the late 1960s onwards . A growing labour
intensive service sector was originally beneficial to capital
because it supplies pre-requisites to accumulation : socialised
health and education for the assured reproduction of labour
power ; systems of social control ; the re-distribution of wealth
ensuring the maintenance of effective demand ; the maintenance of infrastructural services (in transport, energy and communication) . However, the balance between these indirect
benefits to accumulation which 'unproductive' labour contributes to capital and the total costs which this increasing 'social
wage' inflicts on capital's accumulation tips towards the latter
as accumulation slows down .
C&C 78 - B

17

CAPITAL AND CLASS

18

Given the extent of the crisis, the process of capitalist

restructuring, if it were to be successful, would have to overcome these complex and inter-related barriers to accumulation .
One thing is clear ; although the crisis is perceived by capital as a
crisis of the economy, the resolution of the crisis is not possible
solely at this level . Restructuring must involve wholesale social
changes at the cultural, political and economic levels . What
particular options capital, either as individual units or via state
agencies, chooses to pursue is problematic . Given the uncertainties and contradictions which exist, furthermore, there
will be different constraints on state action in different
countries . As such, a functionalist approach to restructuring
which analyses state policies in terms of the pursuit of an
unambiguous plan of restructuring is inappropriate . Such an
account would relegate political action to a resistive role,
ignoring the strongly positive role played by reformist social
democratic parties after the last slump . A restructuring successful for capital is more likely to take place in Britain as a
result of some historical combination of Tory monetarism and
reflationary social democratic strategy rather than either of
these forming a successful restructuring strategy on its own . It
is quite easy to envisage some versions of the Alternative
Economic Strategy being implemented by a Left government
as the expansionary phase of capitalist restructuring (particularly if it has popular appeal as an alternative to the austerity of
monetarism) without changing the organisation of production
and consumption sufficiently to favour increased control by a
mobilised working class . One of the political implications of
this view, then, is the need for Left political programmes (like
the AES) to take the broader process of restructuring seriously
as a problem when starting from a strategy based on Keynesian
reflation .

Science and
Technology in
restructuring
production

There are four main areas of scientific and technological

development which are currently receiving high priority worldwide from capitalist firms and states - microelectronics and
associated technologies, information technologies, biotechnologies and energy and materials technologies . Details of
these technologies are to be found in the appendix to this
paper . We should emphasise then, that although 'microelectronics' is receiving considerable attention and is the subject of great interest on the Left,' it is not the only technology
that requires consideration .
There are several major ways in which scientific and
technological developments may affect capitalist production

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

and may circumvent barriers to accumulation . These are :
a)
Economising on constant capital - saving on the use of
energy, raw materials, components and machinery . This will
either be at the individual enterprise level (eg . cheaper metals
and machines) or at the level of national capital (eg . cheaper
grid energy) . Savings must also be conceived in relation to the
different parts of the collective worker : savings in execution
(eg . new micro-based machines) and in conception (new office
and management information technologies) . It is particularly
important here to consider the relations between the capital
goods (Department 1) and consumer goods (Department 2)
sectors . A massive cheapening of the commodities produced in
Department 1 has considerable effects in both Departments 1
and 2 by cheapening fixed capital and thus reducing the value of
consumption goods and hence the value of labour power overall . Robot assembly of machinery and the use of computer aids
to design and management - especially in the area of small
batch production - are crucially important here . In addition,
the cheapening of constant capital in total (by using new
machines and new energy, materials and information technologies) and the speed-up of turnover time (by the use of
information technologies in the financial sectors) will cheapen
commodities and labour power in both Departments and will
raise the production of relative surplus value and offset the
effects of increased organic composition of capital .
(b)
Economising on labour power - this includes altering
skill structures or reducing the total number of workers so as to
reduce the overall value of the collective workers' labour
power . This is not reducible to 'deskilling' but may be achieved
by :
i)
altering the product (fewer components) .
ii)
altering the process (lower skills required) .
iii)
increasing the possibilities for concentration of production and associated services, leading to economy through
'rationalisation' .
iv)
reducing the porosity of the working day .
(c)
Economising on constant capital and on labour power
may not occur in isolation but will often be combined so as to
offer radically new techniques of production allowing :
i)
integration of previously separated processes .
ii)
removal of 'restrictive practices' .
iii)
increased mobility of manufacturing, regionally or internationally .
iv)
increased shiftwork .
v)
increased opportunities for 'self-regulation' (eg . autonomous workgroups, contract labour) .

19

CAPITAL AND CLASS

(d)
Economising on the time taken to realise the value of the
product - either by better transport systems (eg . new energy
saving technologies), by better distribution systems (automated warehousing) or more efficient banking systems (computerisation) and better communication systems (information
technologies) .
The recent debates on restructuring have not only added
to this list of where technology `fits in' but have also led to a
reassessment of the significance of the state . They have emphasised that its role is not merely one of repressive support for
capital : the state has an interventionist role in supporting new
technologies in their development phases and in restructuring
labour power and its reproduction by re-organising state institutions for education and training, health care and social
services (thus affecting household arrangements and family
structures) . The role of the state in subsidising research and
development and in formulating appropriate procurement and
investment policies to stimulate suitable industries, needs to be
explored before any view of the longer term nature of capital's
strategies in these areas can be formed . Given the enormous
potential for new infrastructures that new technologies provide
(eg . system X, fibre optics, satellite/cable TV) the state's role is
particularly important . The state also has a role in `trying out'
new forms of labour organisation - in the defence and atomic

20

How new
consumption
patterns can be
envisaged and
created by
progressive
agricapital!!
Every7vwaey
TPo,snwRICAr
takes otorkof
Mee LIFE

Likinaabedrnomrd
barbaonouse.With
akacreg den,a
2 cars . . . .

t i

a, adrvhath'O'siaegg'dflCeat .

"'an r malespk
h~gi.t
fer eaarsoiurs~ON:'d'

His first! years are

the most important,
Trial,
don't Th nk
youshocldgeta D,
ry's
aruAStMnhi
ScwOIADe . .

r .

l
t

It

...Life!, thherIIObY.
wIy .find ceps
eco
eD
n OIlY k

am SICK of not being a

PRiliwal nyseif . . .of being
00000!0 by the media to Serve
,earwfactur.d food!
I

I m SIM Of MPNes0 ..OM OWTARMTI,

cans, packets, instant hdixftfroi
dried THIS, dehydrated THAT.. . I have
resolved to MCYOCj food
self'

7n Kngof
MAiMSfariaUSf
Waft en Tr

ed0'IMEw
the money . . .
8 you're such
a (1000 as a

URTAINLY Ma e!
-Rlatuust reinforces
the idea that "also
waRR~ OIRMARL
are solely WONNNY
ITSPOnsibuiries .

sorsbreooea :e:
N
Nr

ere's a boo of
INSTANT Dinner
par' y packs,
darn-q~ we've
been dd
a commercial
for them .

CAS30 MET
I-

r?

(0, b,
Len's See' INDRFDIENiS :
Kisonstituted FARTDI05f.
AIl
Edible
esryrop
aerST
SOIIdL.MONOSODIUM
OW TOMATe!

Tn h trc(OnnO
s mlna0eofher
es,"A .
000pr

rE

final IPeveryone
did mat'!

Well youlonow

you realise tnsh,lhat by

doingthis,youaffecta
toy of people. . .

You'll deprive many

lava

to
vmsk,
+r ;e o
employment i in me
factories where "FI foods
are made . . .
ter alone the bidChemists wrNCmkoct
lee food . . .

putINPS
.codl
111
01
..and,ultimately,Ma me
005Rrice,, who marl
me stiff!

Seawaf D.I.Y. a home Deep Freezes

.
SF-Is
have seen pursing people outof
work
foeHOos.
foo prordi
.
0 ARTIFICIAL
0
food . .you o ingrprom
omose
me natural RAW In redlents,
DS eli ' . .om
so mar people on
DOLE
neataREAO
EE
KIT ;' Nmm!
can at Ra4 nave meir time
la, DOVY in me
010NIFIFO
kik hen .
t,
No! The OYemmen
should mar et 'a. . .now yKReeT to
mmugh the $(IA .

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

21

industries in particular - which act as models for other

industries .'
In the case of information technologies, these offer the
possibilities of fundamental changes in all industries responsible for the generation, transmission and reception of print
and visual images . As such they are particularly appropriate to
the automation of the labour-intensive service sector . Where
this white-collar work is funded by state expenditure, labour
displacing information technologies form a technological
arsenal to attack the growth of unproductive labour . However,
like the other new technologies described in the appendix, the
potential increases in productiveness which information technologies can offer to capital cannot be realised to more than a
limited extent without wholesale transformations in the forms,
nature and provision of those services . Strategies of capital
which focus on the supply of machinery and of infrastructure
are not the only ones that need some exploration . We will go on
to describe possible capitalist processes of transformation in
the next section .

We need to try to relate what is going on in the commodity

production sphere, where capitals are re-organising and attacking labour organisation, with what is going on in other spheres .
In particular we need to consider the sphere of subsistence
where commodities are being purchased, consumed and utilised to regenerate labour power and labourers themselves .
Usually and quite correctly, emphasis is put on how capital tries
to counteract the falling rate of profit by attempting to redress
the balance between itself and organised labour . This is usually
described in terms of `point of production' class struggles where
industrial capital and industrial labour power contest over
redundancies, work-place organisation and wage levels . However, capitalist production processes, as well as being labour
processes for the production of exchange value, are also labour
processes for the production of use values . These are concrete
goods and services which are physically consumed either in
other capitalist production processes or by the non-capitalist
sector or by individual labourers . Restructuring then cannot
just be about the restructuring of the capitalist commodity
production process, narrowly conceived, nor about the rationalisation of different industrial sectors and their geographical
relocation . There must also be some restructuring of consumption, of the means of subsistence . The rate of profit can be
restored by altering the relations between labour and capital in
production only so long as the `consumers' are prepared (or

Restructuring of
Consumption

CAPITAL AND CLASS

22

made prepared through the restructuring of choices and the

basis on which these are made) to purchase the goods and
services made available . So the commodities produced in
capitalist labour processes must therefore be use values which
satisfy the requirement of some consumer, as well as being
exchange value to satisfy capital . Although obvious, the significance of capitalist labour processes as use value producing
processes is often ignored .
Human beings have physiologically and socially determined needs for food, drink, for covering, for shelter, for tools,
for cultural and social inter-action, for leisure and mobility, for
care of infants, the sick and the old . There is, however, an
infinite number of forms in which these needs can be expressed
and satisfied . Marxists have always maintained that the specific
use values that satisfy them are historically contingent . The
need for food, for example, says nothing about the particular
foods, cooking requirements, or social arrangements of food
growing, of distribution, preparation and consumption which
are historically observed, and which are determined not only
by availability but by prevalent techniques, economic structures and household arrangements . But capital is not indifferent to these historical determinations . Capitalist firms, by
advertising and offering credit facilities to customers, nowadays create demand, by organising consumers' needs in ways
towards which their profitable commodities can be directed .
The history of industry in the 1930s (particularly the American
automobile industry), as Aglietta shows, is a graphic example
of this . American requirements for transport, accentuated by
the particular development of US urbanisation, were directed
and channelled into private car consumption, the purchase of
which was closely tied to the radical re-organisation of component production and assembly introduced by Ford and
elaborated by Sloan of General Motors to provide a strategic
route for solving the crisis of the 1930s .
So the close connections which exist between on the one
hand the extension of capitalist relations of production and
their continued reproduction as aspects of the accumulation
process, and, on the other, the structure of consumption of the
working class, cannot be stressed too much . As Aglietta describes it, writing about the US of the 1930s :
The separation of workers from the means of production
that is the origin of the wage relation beings about a
destruction of the various modes of traditional consumption and leads to the creation of a mode of consumption
specific to capitalism . A social norm of working class
consumption is formed, which becomes an essential

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

determinant of the extension of the wage relation, as a
fundamental modality of relative, surplus value . Through
the social consumption norm the mode of consumption is
integrated into the condition of production ."
For our analysis, the crucial idea is that continued reproduction of capitalist relations of production (the preservation
of wage labour) does not just depend on altering those relations
within the factory, which a narrow labour process perspective
might suppose ; it requires alterations in the mode of consumption of the working class to confirm its subordinate position in
the wage labour-capital relationship more tightly than before .
The focus on reproduction and accumulation must thus make
some sense of the changed structure of working class consumption . Further accumulation depends on changed patterns of
working class consumption compatible with new relations and
processes . The crisis may be one of accumulation and its
principal aspect may be the power of labour built on the
successes of the previous boom, but, insofar as capital labour
relations need to be restructured, such restructuring cannot
just imply each capital getting control over its own labour force
so as to extract more surplus value . The patterns of use value
consumption of the working class as a whole may also be in
need of transformation .
The 1930s and the 1940s were a period of substantial
restructuring in the consumption sphere - the period comprised a combination of Keynesianism, the collectivisation and
extension of the welfare system, unprecedented infrastructural
provision, the rapid fall in the cost of consumption products
presaged by Fordism and the, by now, general use of electric
powered machinery for cheaper machine making . What about
the 1980s and 1990s? What approaches to viewing capital's
long-term strategy for consumption restructuring are there?
Aglietta focusses attention on the production of collectively consumed use values, economies in the provision of
which he sees as necessary to reduce the value of the social
reproduction of labour power, as a major strategic requirement
for the preservation of the wage relation . The conditions of
accumulation can only be re-established by a fundamental
restructuring of that wide variety of services which come under
the heading of social welfare . These must be, in some fashion,
reorganised so as to reduce the price of the service commodities
they provide ; this will lower the value of labour power sufficiently to allow a higher rate of surplus value to be gained in
both Departments 1 and 2 . The reorganisation of these services, argues Aglietta, will involve major transformations of
the labour processes that provide them . He calls the necessary

23

CAPITAL AND CLASS

24

transformation 'neo-Fordism' ('a major revolutionisation of

the labour process that tends to replace the mechanical principle of fragmented labour disciplined by hierarchical direction
with the informational principle of work organised in semiautonomous groups disciplined by the direct constraint of
production itself')' all based on the further extension of automation and computerisation - in short information technologies applied to health care, education, personal social services, public transport etc . From this perspective then, and
focussing on the wider range of anticipated technological
developments that we are dealing with here, technological
changes in health care (various bio-technologies), education
(various information technologies), in pollution control and
health and safety (both bio-technologies and information technologies), in transport (new energy technologies) can only be
seen as `appropriate' for capital if they can be integrated with
the strategic requirement we have referred to .
It is clear that such developments as computerised diagnostic services can cheapen some skilled medical services, that
new bio-technologies can cheapen the cost of drugs, that
sophisticated interactive teaching machines can increase
teachers' productivity ; but, as we have tried to emphasise,
these labour process changes do not exhaust the potential of
new technologies . New service commodities are also possible .
Whereas it might be too ambitious to see spare part surgery and
in vitro fertilisation as major new service use values establishing
completely new consumption patterns (at least in the medium
term future) this might not be the case with, say, education use
values .
One might see educational services going the same way
as say public transport did in mid-century USA, following
`self-service' paths .' Private manufacturing capital, utilising the
potential of information and communication technology, can
offer commodities for sale and substitute part of some currently
offered public service . For example there is a potential market
for home computer education kits, initially perhaps supplementing only adult education classes or children's books
and games ; but there may be a future for a more extensive
invasion of the public education system - with local education
institutes and hardware/software manufacturers offering educational and training packages for home use . In short, the
restructuring of social welfare service consumption may involve the privatising of collective consumption . Such a strategy
- effectively involving the introduction of new microelectronically-based products ('the video age') - requires a
consideration of potential state initiatives in establishing such

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

things as effective regulation of satellite communications,
accustoming children to computer systems, encouraging the
state sector itself to utilise new communication technologies to
provide a demonstration effect, and so on .

To sum up, capital's strategic requirement to economise

on the production of the services necessary for the reproduction of labour power could be achieved by some combination of two methods :
a)
within the public sector, increased use of more productive capital goods (teaching machines, medical equipment)
though with some use of sub-contracting of labour intensive
services to private capital .
b)
the by-passing of state-provided services by establishing
new consumer patterns based on individual consumption
(privatisation) or new micro-based and bio-based use values .
The extent to which these two `scenarios' might be
realised does not depend on the technological developments
themselves . What happens will crucially depend on the political
struggles that take place within the public sector where most
welfare services are provided . Will we see an extension and
substantial rationalisation of the nascent two-tier system of
services provision, as now exists in terms of private medicine/
schooling, with limited `safety net' facilities ensured by a run
down public sector? For some sectors, in some countries (eg .
health care in the USA) it is conceivable that an entire `welfare
branch' can be subjected to the changes required . It seems
likely that those aspects of existing health care which are not
readily 'technologisable' will be left up to the safety net or
pushed back to `households' or the `community' ; while those
forms of medicine most easily performed and most linked with
the production of surplus value (that is, not the old and
chronically sick) will be the site of fundamental restructuring .
In other countries, however, where the service is state pro-

25

The restructuring of
water production
and consumption :
health care and
education to follow?

CAPITAL AND CLASS

vided, how will restructuring take place? Through state encouragement of privatisation? It is worth pointing out that
there are real contradictions within a restructuring policy which
does not tackle the wider aspects of welfare care . A `return to
the community' policy will imply that many women (given the
current domestic division of labour) who have been undertaking waged work in these, or other sectors, would have to
return to unwaged domestic work . This would happen through
the contraction of job opportunities, the inability of voluntary
services to cope and the incompatibility of extended domestic
work with current working conditions . Since this would imply a
drop in household income it is difficult to see this as wholly
compatible with restructuring aimed at raising consumption
norms .

26

Science,
Technology and
oppositional
strategies

So far our discussion of restructuring has concentrated on

assessing the characteristics of the crisis and on providing
means to better interpret capital's strategies . We feel that it is
also important to consider how labour can struggle, not merely
to react to the more extreme effects of the process of restructuring currently underway but to change the direction of
the restructuring of capital-labour relations towards the
interests of labour . We want to consider some of the problems
faced by the working class both in its position as producer and
consumer by the scientific and technological aspects of restructuring . We think that the foregoing description of the
restructuring debate has emphasised one of the novel features
of this debate, namely, its successful attempt to breach the
theoretical divisions between the analyses of production and
consumption : we intend to indicate some possible implications
of this for strategists of class struggle .
Again, in line with our attempt to broaden out the
debate around science and technology we do not intend to put
emphasis solely on traditional `point of production' strategies .
There are a number of reasons for this . The first group of
reasons refers to the appropriateness of craft-based struggles to
the changes going on . We would argue that there are a number
of factors in the current situation which undermine these
strategies . The most important of these are :
the possibility that 'deskilling' will occur not through
a)
direct confrontation with craft workers but rather through
unemployment followed by the introduction of new employment often using different sections of labour (women,
workers in different geographical locations etc . ) ;
that the service sector, where many changes can be exb)

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

pected, have no craft union traditions ;
that the expertise required to contest change of a subc)
stantial technological kind is concentrated in technical workers
who, while becoming more unionised in recent years, have
generally failed to ally themselves to broader working class
movements .
The second set of objections to concentrating on craft
strategies refer to their sectarian nature . Strategies for controlling labour supply through, for example, apprenticeships
and closed shops with restricted conditions of access, or for
ensuring a supply of work through, for example, demarcation,
has succeeded but at the expense of less well organised sections
of labour . 9 Many Left analyses have failed to take seriously the
real differences of interests between sections of the working
class . We feel that the way to tackle this is to concentrate on
new forms of democratic decision-making within which these
differences can be resolved rather than concentrating on
further developing competitive strategies .
Finally, in view of the radical cross-sectoral implications
of the new technologies, we would argue that it is impossible to
pose successful oppositional strategies at the level of occupational group or, often, even at the level of a particular firm or
industry . One of the most innovative political developments of
recent years has been the emergence of workers' plans within
large firms in particular industries . This type of strategy emphasises wide grass roots involvement in the construction of
alternative corporate plans . The plans incorporate alternative
decision-making criteria in the design of products, organisation
of production and R&D policy which are oriented to the
provision for social need, democratic control of production and
participation in choices associated with the process of research
and development .
The joint Trade Councils' publication State Intervention
in Industry 10 has suggested ways of extending the sort of plans
associated with shop stewards' movements in Lucas Aerospace
and Vickers . Using local trades councils as a base, they argue
that the involvement of community groups, women's groups,
anti-racist organisations, the organisations of the unemployed,
pensioners groups, constituency Labour parties and other
socialist organisations would allow wider participation in the
construction of the policies for social need than would plans
constructed from within individual firms .
While supporting such suggestions, there are problems
to face in the case of many mature industries where research is
not carried out so intensively as in younger, high technology
industries . In many of these firms R&D as such is actually

27

CAPITAL AND CLASS

Contributions to
Political Economy
EDITED BY
John Eatwell
Murray Milgate
Giancarlo de Vivo
Contributions to Political Economy

Cambridge journal of Economics

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Contributions to Politcal Economy publishes articles on the theory and history of
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means of a joint subscription with the Cambridge journal of Economics or separately .
All communications (including books for review) should be addressed to : The
Editors, Contributions to Political Economy, The Marshall Library, Sidgwick Avenue,
Cambridge, CB3 9DD, England .

Contents
R . Tarling and F . Wilkinson : The movement of real wages and the development of
collective bargaining in the U .K . : 1855-1920
D .J . Harris : Structural change and economic growth . A review article
J . Robinson : The current state of economics
P . Groenewegen : Thomas De Quincey : 'Faithful disciple of Ricardo?'
R . Green : Money, output and inflation in classical economics
G . de Vivo : Notes on Marx's critique of Ricardo
Published for the Cambridge Political Economy Society by Academic Press

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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

carried out in the firms of their capital goods suppliers, many of
which may be foreign based or owned . They may, in fact, be
used to being hit by R&D in the form of new technology rather
than having the advantage of in-house R&D work which is
more accessible to intervention . This implies the need for a
wider framework of struggle uniting work and communitybased organisations and involving state action at local and
national levels . We would therefore see it as important to look
again at transitional strategies to see how they can deal with
questions of science and technology and how far they can
incorporate democratic decision making . What we intend to do
is to take the example of the labour movement's Alternative
Economic Strategy" and follow through some of the implications of our analysis .
The feature of the AES on which it seems appropriate to
concentrate is that of planning agreements . It is through this
system the decisions are to be made regarding the quantity and
variety of products and services . If substantial restructuring is
on the agenda, with major changes in consumption as well as in
production made likely by new technologies, then it is important to be aware of the range of choices with which such
planning agreements would have to deal - the design and
nature of products, investment in new processes, research and
development policies and the possibilities for developing new
working practices . The cross-sectoral complexity of these
choices inevitably required state involvement and action .
There are in existence a large number of mechanisms whereby
the state can intervene in the decisions of the sort planning
agreements would have to deal with .
As far as science and technology are concerned, intervention of the State level has taken several forms . Firstly,
regulatory activity - this takes place usually by a form of
licensing on the part of the state after a new product (or
occasionally process) has come into existence (examples here
include regulation of drugs, adherence to technical standards,
control of health and safety) . The limitation of this form of
control is of course that it is a negative one, that is it can only
`ban' particular products after they have come into existence,
although indirectly it may also have the effect of dampening
innovation and research in particular areas . Secondly, in some
areas the state has acted as the sponsor of new technology . This
has been particularly important to the military sector . However, it has also become increasingly important in areas where
the scale of production and therefore the effects on an
economy are large, eg . aerospace, and steel . State-industry
partnerships have been formed as a means of protecting these

29

CAPITAL AND CLASS

30

national key sectors from the effects of world competition .

Forms of periodic restructuring of industries and sectors have
also been carried out by the state (usually by nationalisation)
due to their strategic or economic importance .
Such intervention is already being extended in OECD
countries as a technological part of counter-cyclical economic
policies . 12 This has been described as `backing winners' and
involves making deliberate choices to channel state investment
into specific projects for the development of new industries or
sectors based on developments and innovations in science and
technology . `Winners' here, of course, refer to particular
industries or sectors based on infant or emergent technologies
likely to be important in world markets . Potential `winners'
include biotechnology, office automation, robotics, marine
technology, microelectronic components .
The intention in discussing these existing forms of state
intervention is not, of course, to suggest that we can spot
`socialist winners' as much as to point out the availability of
various mechanisms for directing science and technology at the
level of the state . These mechanisms may prove useful to a Left
government, either in their present form or after substantial
democratisation to allow intervention in the process of restructuring now taking place, redirecting scientific research and
technological development towards socialist relations of production and consumption . Forms of state regulation and
sponsorship may be further augmented by politically-motivated
state procurement policies which would act to favour particular
social criteria of utility . We might see a preference given to
such things as : products with low energy needs, suppliers using
co-operative production organisation, or computer-based capital goods with skill-enhancing software . The development and
use of such techniques would, by contesting capital's ability to
structure markets, begin to challenge market criteria of resource allocation in production and open up space at lower
levels for the extension of workers' control over both the
products and the organisation of production .
In addition to state bodies there are a number of semistate bodies associated with particular sectors of production
which could form a starting point for intervention in research
and development, encouraging the diffusion of new technologies, organising retraining schemes and providing
technological information for particular industries . Little
Neddies, research associations and Industrial Training Boards
could be made more accountable, being given the role of
assisting in the construction of workers' plans, assembling
information on the availability and experience of using new

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

techniques of production, of democratic organisation and of
occupational hazards . This could begin to break down the
divisions between technical and manual workers and the ability
of management to appropriate and direct technical expertise .
Integrating production and consumption
Of course we are well aware of the political arguments
against a naive utilisation of existing state institutions and
mechanisms for socialist ends ; so we would insist on the
necessity of democratisation of such institutions as a central
part of any alternative political strategy . But there is a further,
more substantial political issue that is, in effect, the `novel'
subject matter of this paper . All these existing forms have a
tendency to deal with production in isolation from consumption . The state as consumer does influence production as
discussed above and workers's plans do have the potential to
involve consumers . However, the orthodoxy has been to leave
consumer influence to the market . It is assumed that they have
their say by `choosing' to buy or not to buy a particular product .
However, as we have argued this is obviously a structured
choice based on price, marketing and availability, to say nothing
of monopoly provisions where the consumer has virtually no
influence . For example, electricity consumers can only influence the form of production indirectly through their parliamentary representatives . In order to prioritise social need, it is
crucial that we find ways of involving direct consumers and
those who live in areas which will be affected by industrial
development . Aaronovich discusses the potential for the
development of democratised local and regional planning
authorities ." This could provide a useful starting point for
greater involvement in specific and technological decision
making . However much work needs to be done to develop
structures through which different levels of planning may be
co-ordinated .
While the validity of consumer involvement in industry
has yet to gain general acceptance, the approach within the
`welfare state' sectors is rather different . While bodies like
Community Health Councils and parent-teacher associations
are often far from models of grass roots democracy, their
existence is significant as a recognition of the need to combine
the views of consumers and `producers' . `Fight back' campaigns over welfare cuts suggest that workers and consumers
are far more likely to see common interest here than is the case
in most disputes over industrial closures . Furthermore, the
establishment of health, education and other social provisions
within the state rather than the private sector was based on a

31

CAPITAL AND CLASS

32

prioritization of social need rather than profit . These sectors,

therefore, appear to present greater opportunities to raise
questions of the redirection of planning within democratic
forms than market-oriented sectors such as manufacturing .
While there is a tendency to separate out social and
economic policies they are inter-related in complex ways .
Changes in educational provision over science and technology
could give people a better basis from which to assess decisionmaking in those areas . Child care facilities and provisions for
the care of the chronically sick, disabled and elderly are vital in
enabling women both to go to work and gain access to a wider
range of jobs . Apart from those effects on the workforce, the
state sector obviously has a massive influence on the private
sector in terms of purchasing policy . These factors are important since they indicate significant ways in which the state sector
can affect democratisation in the private sector . This is crucial
in the context of relatively slow change in a mixed economy as
proposed by the AES .
Although the state sector appears to have potential for
democratic change it also presents significant difficulties . There
are moves towards privatisation in all areas of the welfare state
and an increasing emphasis on high technology capital goods in
the health and education sectors . In addition, these areas are
dominated by professional groups which traditionally have
been resistant to accountability or sharing expertise . All these
issues represent serious problems for attempts to democratise
scientific and technological decision-making in the state sector .
This leads us back to the problems of how to incorporate forms
of democratic decision making over such choices into a
planning system . It may be that multitudinous references to
`workers control' within an AES refer to a mechanism for
changing the existing relations of production . However, it
seems to us the use of the term has a rhetorical ring about it and
serves as an embellishment rather than a central component of
the strategy . Consideration is rarely given to the forms of
worker's control, the level on which they should operate (firm,
sectorial, state) or to ways of extending control to consumers or
community groups affected by planning decisions . We think it
is insufficient for planning to take the form of a consultative
structure unless strong measures are taken to ensure parity
between the parties involved in the planning process . This must
involve some independent means by which groups can contest
expertise (whether technical or managerial) assumed by
management . If some ultimate form of managerial decision
making remains, such participation and consultation could
only be considered democratic if a broad consensus of views

SCIENCE

exists, otherwise one has to specify whose views are to be taken

most notice of. It is obvious that conflicts will emerge in many
areas . Nuclear energy workers and miners are likely to disagree
over a workers' plan for energy . Steel workers' and car
workers' idea of a transport plan is likely to differ from those of
Friends of the Earth . Unskilled women workers may disagree
with male craft workers in the same industry over priorities for
changes in working practices . 15 Consumer groups may conflict
with producer groups over import controls which may support
home industries but raise prices . These examples could be
multiplied endlessly yet few of those who enthusiastically
endorse `democratic control' have been prepared to face up to
such potential areas of conflict .
The problem of expertise is a complex one to which
careful thought must be given . One critical question is the
effect of the division of labour on the development of workers
plans . The internal `knowledge economy' of capitalist relations
of production is such as to disenfranchise many detail workers
on the shop floor from participation in the conceptual and
skilled work of white collar and technical workers . This applies
especially to the 'unskilled/semi-skilled' workers who have
been used to populate labour intensive segments of massproduction industries . This applies particularly to women,
working often on a part-time or even full-time basis in addition
to domestic and child care labour which is demanded of them .
`Democratisation of the workplace' or `workers' control' is not
possible without beginning to confront such issues . Furthermore, the technical division of labour itself has involved a
privileging of these technical and managerial workers, often on
sexual and racial lines, which is likely to be a significant factor
often overlooked in discussions of the process of democratic
determination of social need . Essentially what we have to
confront is the narrow technocratic and top-down mode in
which many social programmes are formulated . If we are to
support the AES we are committing ourselves to a continual
struggle to flesh out its strategies by pulling them down from
the level of the state and tying them into local and grass roots
organisation (multiple mixed metaphors notwithstanding!) .
This struggle must go beyond the usual call to consult with the
usual list of groups representing women, blacks, environmentalists etc . Instead it must be prepared to develop models
such as joint shop stewards committees and community centres
as forums within which differences can be raised and broadlybased policies developed .
While we feel these problems are extremely important
and have been insufficiently considered in the past we want to
C5C

is -

AND

TECHNOLOGY

33

CAPITAL AND CLASS

end by stressing the positive possibilities offered by a
reassessment of the role of science and technology within
socialist strategies . As far as radical critiques of science and
technology are concerned the advances of contemporary
thinking in this area have been to stress the qualitative aspects
of science and technology ; thus to talk about more science and
technology, more research and development investment, is as
limited as suggesting that the problem of the National Health
Service is purely one of lack of finance! It is not just a case of
trying to achieve a redistribution of investment or state
expenditure, nor an extension of nationalisation, but an
attempt to affect the quality of health not just the quantity of
medicine . Similarly, the quality of production is not measured
purely in terms of the levels of productivity, investment or
R&D but in terms of the type of goods produced for what social
needs, in what sort of productive arrangements - division of
labour, conditions of work, relations of accountability, control
of expertise, distribution of skills and the like .
Thus we feel that to concentrate solely on the role of
technical change in creating 'deskilled' jobs and unemployment would be short sighted . Scientific and technical change
can provide new use values and vast productivity gains which,
at least potentially, could provide gains for the working class .
These gains will only come about if we struggle to find forms of
organisation which will allow democratic decision making over
both the design of new use values and the relations of the
distribution of wealth . A number of groups, particularly those
working around questions of energy and of health are beginning to do this . But it is critical that union strategies and more
broadly based economic strategies also begin to confront these
questions .

34

Appendix :
Chips, Satellites,
Bugs, Spare
Parts,
Windmills and
Nodules

These are the areas of scientific research and technological

development receiving high priority world-wide : 16
`Chips'

Microelectronics and associated technologies - this includes the development of the silicon chip itself (increasing its
power, simplifying the programming of it to reduce the high
costs of software) and its application to a huge variety of
consumer products, particularly electronic ones like TV accessories and home computers . Microelectronics components are
also being incorporated into machinery for use in metalworking industries (in welding, forming, painting and assemt
ling mass-produced and small batch goods) as well as into other

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

industries which involve routine packing activities or simple
materials handling (robotics is particularly important here) .
`Satellites'

Information technologies - this includes the

development of new computers, new transmission systems
(including lasers, optical fibres, satellites, electronic
telecommunications systems) for the manipulation, storage,
transmission and retrieval of the spoken and written word as
well as of drawings and pictures . These are being developed in
a wide variety of industries and services - office work,
professional services, post and telecommunications, printing
and publishing . Different aspects of labour processes can be
linked together through the computerisation of design,
draughting, production planning and production control using
computer-aided design (CAD) and computer-aided
management (CAM) . This allows greater integration of
conception and execution linking with machinery
developments mentioned above . It leads to such new
production methods as computerised numerical control of
machine tools (CNC), and flexible manufacturing systems
(FMS) . There are also new methods of distribution of goods
(automated warehousing, computerised retailing) and of financial information (an extension of computerised banking and
insurance services) ; additionally, there is the development of
technologies to provide general information of interest to both
business and individual consumers (viewdata, cable TV) and
last, but certainly not least, to the military and state (such as
computerised personal records) .
`Bugs'

Biotechnologies - considerable research is underway

into new techniques for the manufacture of drugs, as well as
synthetic fibres, fertilisers, raw foodstuffs and synthetic fuels .
This research involves genetic engineering of biological
material and, more especially, the systematic use of biological
materials to assist chemical processes ; the material is produced
by selective breeding of micro-organisms or new cloning
techniques .
`Spare Parts'

There are rapid advances in techniques of human body

engineering (organ replacement) and of obstetrics (test-tube
fertilisation) though, in the medium-term developments in
reproductive techniques are likely to have the most economic
significance for animal breeding .

35

CAPITAL AND CLASS

`Windmills' and `Nodules'

36

Energy and materials technologies - there is continuing

research into nuclear power (towards fast breeders and fusion) ;
increased research on energy and raw materials to be obtained
from coal, and into renewable sources of energy such as solar,
wind, ocean, thermal, biomass . Research into conservation
technologies is linked to the use of microelectronics for better
process control which can reduce energy usage in industry and
in transport . Research in materials conservation involves exploring the potential of complexes of inorganic and organic
materials ; there is considerable development in obtaining
materials from difficult terrains, particularly from the sea bed
(manganese nodules, deep sea oil drilling) .

Notes

A shorter version of the first three sections of this paper was presented
at CSE Annual Conference, 1981 . A version of the last section was
presented at a meeting of the Group for Alternative Science and
Technology Strategies of which we are members . We would like to
acknowledge the valuable comments and criticisms of GASTS members as well as those of members of the CSE Restructuring Group and
of Capital and Class Editorial Board .
1.
See, for example, Andrew Zimbalist (ed.) Case Studies in the
Labour Process (Monthly Review Press, 1980) ; Les Levidow and Bob
Young (eds .), Science, Technology and the Labour Process Volume 1
(CSE Books, 1981) ; Mike Hales, Living Thinkwork: Where do labour
processes come from? (CSE Books, 1980) .
2.

See Sam Aaronovitch and Ron Smith, The Political Economy

of British Capitalism (McGraw-Hill, 1981) Chapters 12 and 13 and the
books etc . referred to in those chapters .
Michel Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation : the US
Experience (New Left Books, 1979)
3.

4.
There have been many analyses of `new technology' (usually
taken to mean microelectronics and information technologies) by
labour movement and socialist organisations . See, in particular, CSE
Microelectronics Group, Microelectronics : Capitalist Technology and
the Working Class (CSE Books, 1980) ; Ursula Huws, Your Job in the
eighties : A Woman's Guide to New Technology (Pluto Press, 1982) .
Despite its obvious importance we are not able to include in our
5.
analysis a discussion of the role of military technological development
in restructuring . Though we should note that it is not sufficient to see
the `spin-off from state-supported military research merely in terms of
the specific products and technical processes which are generated .
There are a number of examples of spin-offs in the forms of organisation of labour process as well whose significance needs to be explored,
For example : According to Phillip Kraft the forms of organisation
developed to program and operate computers (in particular specific

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

types of sexual division of labour) have their origins in the US military
interest in the computer industry as part of Korean war effort . Also,
according to David Noble the general use of NC machine tools, as
machines which more readily permit a mental/manual division (a
division not present in rival contemporary machines equally technically efficient), was only made possible when the US airforce decided
to purchase such machines for use by its subcontractors in the mid
1950's . See Andrew Zimbalist (ed .) op cit.
6.
7.

Michel Aglietta, op cit, p .152 (emphasis in original) .

ibid, p.167 .

8.
By `self-service' we are referring to the historical phenomenon
of the last 100 years whereby `households', rather than use labourintensive services (public transport, laundries etc .) have purchased
material goods (cars, washing machines) to operate themselves ; thus,
`paid employment (becomes) concentrated in technical and managerial occupations in manufacturing industry, while services are
produced outside the formal economy, through direct labour, using
capital machinery installed in the household' (Jonathan Gershuny,
After-Industrial Society : The Emerging Self-Service Economy (Macmillan, 1978)) .
9.
For elaboration of this, see Richard Hyman and Tony Elger,
`Job Controls, The Employer's Offensive and Alternative Strategies',
Capital and Class 15, Autumn 1981 p .115-149 .
10 .
Coventry, Liverpool, Newcastle, North Tyneside Trades
Councils, State Intervention in Industry: A Workers' Enquiry (Coventry
etc. Trades Councils, 1980) .
11 .

In particular we refer to CSE London Working Group, The

Alternative Economic Strategy (CSE Books, 1980) .

12 . See OECD, Technical Change and Economic Policy (OECD,

1980) .
13 .
Sam Aaronovitch, The Road From Thatcherism (Lawrence and
Wishart, 1981) .
14 .

At least in the CSE London Working Group's version .

15 .
This must certainly be the case in the printing industry! See
Cynthia Cockburn, `The Material of Male Power' ; Feminist Review, 9
p . 41-59 (1981)
16. Material on the developments summarised here can readily be
found in the technical and scientific weeklies like New Scientist,
Technology Week and in The Economist as well as in the computer
press and daily newspapers. There are many well known books and
reports on developments in `chips', in information technology and in
energy technologies . For more information on biotechnologies see
Office of Technology Assessment, The impacts of genetics : applications
to micro-organisms, animals and plants (OTA, 1981) and Advisory
Council for Applied Research and Development et.al, Biotechnology
(HMSO, 1980) .

37

Lysiane Cartelier
Translated by Tony Millwood

The state
and wage labour
This paper is a critical analysis of the concept of the State under
capitalism . In part I existing Marxist theories of the state are
criticised for their functionalism in separating different instances such as economics and politics . In part II an alternative
view of the State as constituting the wage relation is suggested .
The wage relation is seen not as an exchange relation between
equivalents but as a relation of submission . That is, the possibility of exchange is explained by state control as the mode of
socialisation .
point for this enquiry is a feeling of dissatisfaction with the treatment of the State in modern marxist
theory, in particular with the way it is understood indirectly
through its role, a role which is dictated in the main by the
conditions of social reproduction .
This procedure is inadequate - if it is not incorrect - for
the following reason : having posited the State as (relatively)
external to the process of production, it is then reintroduced by
means of the functions (economic, political, . . .) which it is
required to fulfill and which derive from the production
process . To make its externality the basis for an understanding
of the State, and to adopt a functionalist approach in identifying its role are both open to criticism, as they lead to a tendency
to view the State as having been `parachuted' into a marxist
THE STARTING

39

CAPITAL AND CLASS

40

theory of society which does not require a theory of the State at

the outset .
This defect in the way the existence of the State is established is probably due to the separation of the political and the
economic into separate instances, with the State as part of the
political sphere and displaying a tendency to become ever more
involved in the economic base following an implicit or explicit
law of the working of capitalism .
From here the main question that is generally asked is
not `why the State?', because it has already been established as
a separate instance, but `what does the capitalist State do?' .
Taking the category `capital' as a starting point, the analysis
goes on to locate the State in relation to capitalist accumulation, with the State being seen as playing a part in the
perpetuation of capitalist relations of production . Certain
necessary functions are performed by the State, and the capitalist State is characterised as a class State since it is at the
service of the dominant class or one of its fractions .
To argue that the reproduction of the capitalist system
cannot be fully assured simply by capitalist relations of production and that it requires the State is inadequate for the following reasons :because the State is only introduced into the analysis at
(i)
the point where it is required in the understanding of the
operation of the capitalist system . It is introduced by
default, where the need for a certain form of
intervention is identified because, without it, one could
not understand why certain processes or events occur .
The argument that the system cannot reproduce itself
without the State involves an implicit theory which is
more keynesian than marxist .
(ii)
because it is circular : reproduction requires the State and
the State is involved in reproduction . Even if this reasoning is not false, it does not help us understand the
existence of the State .
(iii) because it is tautological . When it is charactersed by its
interventions, the State can be described as a class State
only in the narrow sense that it places itself at the service
of the dominant class . It is a class State only in the sense
that it is part of a structure in which there is a dominant
class,' which is tautological so long as the mechanisms by
which class domination take a State form are not
specified .'
It is not so much the answers to the question posed that
are inadequate as the question itself . If we start from the
requirements of accumulation in order to understand the State

STATE AND WAGE LABOUR

through an interpretation of its functions, we shall always be
bound to say that the capitalist State is the State belonging to
the capitalists (or to one of their fractions) since it is the
organiser of their economic and political hegemony .'
We need rather to begin with the question `why the
State?' and to analyse it in the light of a theory - as yet not
developed - of the fundamental unity of the different
instances, so as to avoid `parachuting' the State at some point
into the relations of production .
That is why any attempt to reflect on the nature of the
State as a historically specific form of class domination must
start by viewing the State as a manifestation of a specific set of
social relationships before seeing it as an expression of domination . The question we regard as pertinent-'why the State?'is only such if we see it neither as an enquiry into the origin of
the State, nor an investigation of the relationship between man
and society in general . We do not intend to locate our enquiry
in the philosophical tradition which, since Rousseau, counterposes the possibility of the State to a state of nature with no
such political organisation . Nor are we concerned with the
debates among anthropologists on the question of `Society
versus the State" or over the distinction between the State and
power . For us, the individual cannot be understood without the
social and the social implies the State, or at least a form of
central authority which takes its place .
Our argument proceeds as follows . In the first part we
will seek to show that the failure of current theorisation of the
State may be traced to the preoccupation of its authors with its
externality and articulation . This leads us to propose, in the
second part, a view of the State which is both less economistic
and rejects the dichotomy between the economic and the
political, and which sees the State as constituting the means by
which individuals are socialised into society's commodity
relationships .

The aim of this part is to show that an analysis which starts from
the category `capital' in order to understand the capitalist State
cannot avoid the double deficiency of taking a functionalist
view of the role of the State and being unable to grasp the basis
for its existence . These two defects illustrate the inadequate
articulation between the State form and capital which in our
view condemns this particular paradigm . This does not mean
that the articulation capital/State needs better definition by
refining the concept of `relative autonomy', nor does it mean
substituting for capital another basic explanatory principle

41

][The
externality of the
State and the
Reproduction of
Capital : the
Limitations of
Functionalist
Approaches to
the State.

CAPITAL AND CLASS

42

(such as wants, power, etc . ) . It is a question rather of changing

the approach to the one we shall attempt to describe later .
A . The need to go beyond the articulation of
State and capital

From the marxist point of view we need to go beyond the

articulation of State and capital because it is unable to provide a
theoretical foundation for the role of the State as a substitute
for capitalists, a manager of society on their behalf . This is true
as much of those authors who characterise the State in terms of
the biased nature of its interventions' as of those who proceed
from this model to examine the nature of the capitalist State . 6
Economic policies can be analysed in terms of services
rendered to capital, and this is an essential element in a theory
of the capitalist State which sees it as the State of capital . It is
however necessary to go further and to consider the following
question : why is it not adequate to understand the reproduction of capitalist relations in terms of the divisions of society
into classes, class struggle and the process of accumulation?
Why is it necessary to make appeal to an external element,
which can only be the State, and moreover a State which
necessarily becomes vested with an active role in this process of
reproduction?
What concerns us is not so much the idea that the State is
the only agency which can be given this role, but rather the
notion of there being a `required role' which follows from the
identification of a vacuum in the process of reproduction which
must be filled . Let us look more closely at the `required role'
and then at why it is always filled by the State .
The theory which understands the State in terms of
necessity supposes that it is able to accomplish the functions
that are required of it : it supposes that what is necessary for the
functioning of the system will in fact occur . When the analysis
incorporates the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall
the State is seen as regulator of the process of accumulation .' .
Having separated the realm of politics from that of commodity
production, the political is brought back as part of a solution to
problems that arise in the sphere of production . Whether it is a
question of managing labour power as a particular commodity
or of forcing the `bearers' of labour power to engage in wage
labour, or simply counteracting the effects of the law of the
tendency of the rate of profit to fall, we are always brought
back to the same functionalist paradigm in which the State is
defined in relation to the accumulation process and its requirements . In following this procedure the same laws of
operation are assumed to operate in both spheres since in one

STATE AND WAGE LABOUR

sphere - that of the State - we find those elements necessary for
the regulation of accumulation .
We may put this point slightly differently : if we assert
that the reproduction of the system requires the intervention of
an external element this amounts to asserting also that this
external element follows, in the last analysis, the same laws of
operation, if the idea of State action is to have any sense . But to
what, then, is the State external?
To say that there is a required role for the State amounts
to introducing a law of its operation, which for some authors is
that of the tendency for the rate of profit to fall and for others is
the need to regulate the process of accumulation . Without such
a law how would it be possible to conceive the following as
theoretically (and not empirically) possible :
(i)
a specification of all the principles of causation (economic and political) which constitute the needs of the system
and which are required for its expanded reproduction ;
(ii)
the existence of the means for translating these needs
into State actions ;
(iii) the guarantee that they will be effectively met by the
State (notwithstanding the difficulties and concessions that the
class struggle is bound to impose) .
As well as the theoretical uncertainties which cast doubt
on the existence of a law such as the tendency for the rate of
profit to fail' we would also note that this functionalist perspective, insofar as it emphasises the separation of the economic and the political also reinforces the counterposition of
State/economic base, State/civil society, public/private,
political/technical distinctions which have rightly been criticised as methodologically false .
Finally we should note the obvious contradiction which
occurs when we invoke, in the same argument, the idea of the
regulation of society and that of class struggle . The notion of
regulation implies mastery and control and seems to us incompatible with that of class antagonism .
When the State is invoked to play its required role in the
process of reproduction - and whatever the judgement one
makes as to its ability to meet these requirements - we are
presented with another series of problems . Beyond the question of deciding who determines that the State should intervene
in the process of accumulation is another, more fundamental
question which concerns the very nature of the capitalist State :
why is it the State and not another organ which appears
specifically designed to respond to the needs of the accumulation process? In what ways is the State different from an
enlightened employers' association?

43

CAPITAL AND CLASS

44

We would agree with the authors quoted earlier that

whenever the interests of every capitalist do not coincide with
that of the class as a whole the system needs a means of social
regulation . Why does this take the form of regulation by the
State? Even if we leave aside the difficulties noted above we
cannot be satisfied with the answer given by the authors
mentioned above which is summed up in the notion of externality . For Ameeruddy et al it is the separation of the
reproduction of labour power from the sphere of commodity
exchange that explains State intervention for the socialisation
of labour . As such State intervention and the State itself are
quite distinct from an intelligent capitalist .
For de Brunhoff it is the externality of the State that is
sufficient to explain State management of the reproduction of
labour power . The same is true for Poulantzas, even though the
term `relative autonomy' is preferred to that of externality .
In each case it is the notion of the impossibility of the
system being able to reproduce itself without the State and the
need thus for the State that both provides the justification for
the State's existence and an explanation of the specific forms
taken by State intervention . This amounts, in short, to arguing
that because it is necessary State intervention occurs ; because it
occurs the State exists ; and it is because it exists that it is able to
act thus .
Let us conclude by summarising what we regard as inadequate in the model which examines the articulation between State form and capital . The externality of the State
cannot enlighten us as to its nature because it is unable to show
why on theoretical grounds the State would be better able than
ierce or a `super capitalist' to identify and
a Chamber of Cc
pursue the long term interests of the capitalist class as a whole .
While it is correct not to reduce the State to an individual
capitalist how can we be sure that, from a theoretical point of
view the State will function well for capital and better than an
individual capitalist?
The notion of the impossibility of the capitalist system
reproducing itself without the capitalist State leads to the State
being thought of as an adjunct to the accumulation process,
and this is fundamentally a keynesian position regardless of
how the argument may superficially be adorned . The functionalism of this approach culminates in the idea of the State being
the conscience of capital - a social subject in itself, even if this
conclusion is not intended by those who have developed the
approach . If we do not wish to regard the State as the subject of
capital, or its instrument or even as its substitute we must not
posit from the outset its externality . We need another model to

STATE AND WAGE LABOUR

that of externality/articulation .
B . Elements of an alternative approach to the State form
If we break with the view that the State responds to the
needs of capital then we must go beyond a theory of accumulation which devolves to the State the primary functions of
financing the social and private costs that capitalists cannot or
will not bear themselves .
One of these costs is that of the reproduction of the
workforce, which in much marxist work is seen as being borne
by the State since the time legislation was brought in to regulate
the length of the working day in order to protect the survival of
an overexploited proletariat . This approach is carried into the
modern period to provide a sort of 'marxist theory of public
goods' which explains the degree of health and education that
the State provides to the workforce in order to maintain it in a
suitable condition to serve the interests of capital . This approach is not far from that which criticises capitalism for its
inability to meet human needs, thus giving to the State a role
which is governed by the needs that it is required to meet .
An initial step in constructing a less instrumentalist and
less economistic view of the State is to not give a privileged
position to the notion of costs that the State may meet . This is
why it is useful to break with the classical marxist notion of
labour power as a particular commodity because it is this that
underlies the `costs of reproduction' model .' For our starting
point we accept the usual distinction between labour and
labour power, and the emergence of the domestic sphere which
is external to that of commodity production and is not governed by the law of value and which produces workers who are
not commodities but who are also not yet a social labour force .
To understand the next stage, that is, the transformation
of labourers into social labour which works within the constraints of the law of value, we need to go beyond the notion
that the State is simply a form of external coercion which forces
the bearers of labour power to engage in wage labour . What is
more useful we believe is to examine directly the role of the
State in constituting the wage labour relationship . There is a
further point whose implications we should note . Before seeing
the State as an expression of class domination it is useful to
examine the State form . Our hypothesis is that the State is only
intelligible when related to the commodity, which is the social
form of private labours, which distinguishes it not only from a
neutral principle of social organisation but also a surrogate
employers' organisation .
The appearance of commodity production implies the

45

CAPITAL AND CLASS

46

fundamental distinction between owners and non-owners of

means of production . The latter have no role to play in
commodity-producing society . They are from an economic
point of view non-subjects, they cannot be socialised as such,
and will only become so through the wage labour relationship
(hereafter WLR) . As the mode of socialisation of non-owners,
wage labour takes on specific social forms which make possible
generalised commodity production .

We are not proposing to construct a general theory of

socialisation, which would to us be a false objective . Nor are we
supposing the existence of individuals outside the State or
existing prior to the State and which the State comes to socialise
- as if there is no socialisation before capitalism or outside it .
We describe as 'statist' the kind of subordination that is contained in the WLR and we define as `State' the sum of the
means of integration of non-owners into commodity relations
(the principal capitalist form of socialisation) . That is why we
regard the historic transformation of the WLR and of the State
as mutually supporting . Beneath the institutional paraphernalia that today makes up the State and which appears to
place it in a position external to capitalist relations we find what
for us is the main principle by which to understand it, namely,
the consolidation and adaptation of the WLR as a relationship
of socialisation/subordination .
This can be summed up in the proposition that the State
is constitutive of the WLR and leads to an emphasis on the
mode of socialisation that is peculiar to the capitalist mode of
production . That proposed by classical political economy - the
invisible hand - is unsatisfactory, as is that of Marx which sees
exchange as sufficient to transform goods into commodities
and to socialise human activities while failing to show how they
have become social labour .
Exchange should not be thought of as an automatic or
neutral phenomenon into which dispossessed producers are
inevitably pressed . We need to consider what historically
makes exchange possible, and from what labour and goods
derive their exchangeability which, when exchange has taken
place, makes them into labour power and commodities . The
answer lies in the WLR which must be understood as constituting the social in commodity producing since it is the
relationship of subordination and not one of the exchange of
equivalents .

The WLR is also a specific relationship of subordination

in that it socialises the dispossessed producers through the
measurement of their activity as workers, permitting their
involuntary inclusion in commodity relations . This is not just

STATE AND WAGE LABOUR

any form of authority but the capitalist form par excellence .
Finally we should note another way in which the question
of the State can be approached ." It seems that the WLR also
merges historically with the State as monetary exchange becomes generalised in commodity producing societies under a
money form which is both social and as such an early form of
authority . Our hypothesis is rediscovered to the extent that it is
not so much labour as that which is exchanged for the wage
which is the expression of the State . Individual labours, although not commodities, are related one to the other as
fractions of the total value produced, and are thus compared as
numbers, that is in relation to money and/or the new State
form . This is another way of saying that under capitalism
individual workers are socialised as `measured workers' . The
wage labour force becomes the mode of evaluating and socialising individuals .
To bring out more clearly our notion of the State as
constitutive of the WLR it is useful to specify how the WLR is a
means of mobilising labour peculiar to capitalism ; how it is a
means of social differentiation ; and how it transforms individuals who are the bearers of potential labour power into
social use values for capital . We must understand first how the
category `labour' originates . We then need to set out how this
form of socialisation which is also a form of subordination
expresses a relationship of authority, which is the basic form of
the State or its surrogate .
In the remainder of this paper we shall not go much
further than to provide illustrations of the hypothesis through
an examination of the conditions for the existence of social
subordination in the history of socialisation . Ultimately our
rejection of the separation of the economic and the political
must rest on a theoretical understanding of their unity but this
we have not yet developed . This is the central difficulty facing
our project . Not only is the theory of their unity still to be put
together but we might also ask whether such an effort would be
worthwhile . The concept `State' connotes power, domination,
hierarchy, etc ., while `accumulation' belongs to the realm of
political economy, which is that of the quantifiable . Are we
justified in seeking to bridge the two? If the proposition that 2 is
smaller than 5 has a meaning, is the same true for the proposition that 2 is subordinated to 5, or dominated by it? To admit
the validity of this procedure we must believe in the possibility
of building a unified theory of the State and capital where it
would make sense to consider both within the same order of
relationships .

47

CAPITAL AND CLASS

48

Z The
Capitalist State
as Constitutive
of the Wage
Labour
Relationship

We know that in the history of capitalism the WLR has a

primary importance among the various possible means of
mobilising labour . Without going into the historical reasons for
this we have also argued that the WLR is the principal means of
socialisation in capitalist society, even if we do not regard this
as the quasi-automatic and undifferentiated process that Marx
described in his Chapter on Primitive Accumulation . It is by a
critical review of Marx's work that we shall attempt to characterise the WLR as a particular form of social discipline, so as to
clarify the form of authority contained in this kind of
subordination . It is in fact the specificity of this kind of subordination which makes the capitalist State incapable of being
assimilated into other forms of authority .
A . The WLR as the specifically capitalist mode of
socialisation and the WLR as the minimal form of the State .
(i)
The distinction between the principle of subordination
and the type of subordination .
In his chapter on Primitive Accumulation Marx argues
that the violent expropriation of independent producers made
them into a potential proletariat, that the State was a part of
this process with the enactment of savage legislation, leaving
no alternative to the dispossessed but prison/execution or
manufacturing . Thus already Marx makes the distinction between the principles governing accumulation and the role of
the State and the confusion between the principle of subordination and the type of subordination . Both are problematic . The State is already being considered as an adjunct to a
process external to it, and wage labour is considered an
inescapable form of subordination .
The distinction needs to be made between the reality of
subordination, which is explicable only in terms of violence,
and the type of subordination which can take several forms .
Expropriation is insufficient in itself to constitute the expropriated as wage earners . It makes them into potential sellers
of themselves, in the sense of there arising from here onwards
the possibility of others using their time or their efforts . If
brutal expropriation is sufficient to explain the subordination
of producers it does not ipso facto make them into wage
labourers obliged to sell their labour power as a commodity .
History could equally have made them into agricultural slaves
as in ancient Rome or into personal servants who are paid a
wage, a form of slavery found particularly in early capitalism
but different from the capitalist wage labour force proper .
History and theory might have produced other real forms of the
subordination of labour to that of wage labour .

STATE AND WAGE LABOUR

We can therefore clarify the question of the State as
follows : it is not a question of understanding why the WLR was
imposed instead of slavery but rather of understanding how this
relationship was imposed as a social relationship, and thus as a
form of socialisation .
It was imposed in this way rather than, for example, as a
multitude of direct relationships between wage earners and
their employers requiring no general principle of authority
other than that exercised by each capitalist over his own
particular workforce . This also helps us understand how we are
able to talk about a proletariat which is not simply a collection
of propertyless individuals but constitutes instead the working
class . This particular form of subordination involves the State
as an entity distinct from a collection of capitalists, and is more
specific than the general notion of subordination which is
adequately explained simply in terms of violence .
(ii) The social conditions for the existence of wage labour as
the specifically capitalist mode of socialisation
Marx himself realises that the distinction expropriated/
expropriators is not in itself sufficient to explain wage labour
when he says that `it is not sufficient that we find on one side the
material conditions of work in the form of capital, and on the
other men who have nothing to sell but their labour power . Nor
is it sufficient that they are obliged by force to sell themselves
voluntarily ."' In order for the various independent activities to
be transformed first into social labour and then into labour
power as a commodity in the manner that Marx, in spite of the
above quotation, finally thinks is necessary, several other conditions must be met, and if these are not elaborated we are left
with the assumption of the inevitability of exchange . Nothing
in Marx's description of primitive accumulation enables us to
assert that
the private activities of independent producers become
labour simply as a consequence of their spoliation" ;
that a specific division of labour occurs corresponding to
violence which forms potential labour into a commodity ;
that different elements are brought together which make
possible the `exchange' between the potential performance of labour in return for a portion of the value created
in the form of a wage .
It is not sufficient to assert that propertyless producers
are obliged to become `free labour' because nothing else is
open to them . Primitive accumulation is the moment when
expropriation brings in the conditions for the development of
commodity-socialisation which is illustrated in the following
ways :
c&c18-o

49

CAPITAL AND CLASS

50

the appearance of the category `work' in the modern

sense, as distinct from the notion of activity or occupation
which characterised the tasks performed by independent
producers ;
the need to reintegrate the despoiled producers into
society and to make them into economic subjects of
commodity-society and to socialise them into workers ;
the appearance of a specific type of discipline, that of
capitalist wage labour, which is a general and not an
individual form of subordination .
It is precisely because labour becomes the dominant way
that producers are socialised that Marx describes wage labour
as the `unique historical condition' which marks the transition
from simple commodity production to the capitalist mode of
production .
(iii)

The WLR as the form of the State

The WLR as a relationship of social subordination is the
basic form of the State (or its surrogate) in that it is the primary
capitalist form of social organisation and thus the primary
expression of social authority. More precisely, it is the basic
form of the State for the following reasons :
because it is a means of social differentiation which
deepens the antagonism between owners and nonowners of the means of production .
because in transforming the bearer of potential labour
power into use-values for capital it expresses what has
recently been termed the `prescriptive model with a
social function"' This is corroborated by a look at that
other form of capitalist socialisation which appears at the
same time as wage labour, that can be described as social
security/prison/execution . Although it is secondary it is
also a means by which individuals are situated with reference to labour since it converts non-labourers into social
deviants, thus contributing to the strengthening of the
WLR as the dominant form of social discipline . Historically the development of the WLR goes hand in hand
with savage legislation directed against the poor,
vagrants and more generally all those who refuse to
engage in wage labour .
Finally, if the State is constitutive of the WLR to the
extent that initially it is merged with the same it then takes on
progressively the role of forming individuals into social beings .
From this perspective the major feature of the modern period
seems to us to be the massive public intervention in the
production and reproduction of a potential workforce . This is

STATE AND WAGE LABOUR

seen as the penetration of the State into many areas of social
life which carries with it the strengthening of the type of
subordination inherent in the WLR . The generalisation of
commodity production brought with it the extension of the
WLR . This extension brought with it in the modern age of mass
production necessary forms of consumption of the social product which itself required high wages and various forms of
indirect payments derived from insurance and social security to
provide relief in the event of the loss of wages . The appearance
of new social forms to regulate individuals' living conditions
which is reflected in the development of various centrallycontrolled means of collective consumption is the result of
modern wage labour, in the double sense of subordination to a
certain work process and obeying a certain mode of consumption . Is the choice facing the modern wage-earner very different from that of the expropriated producer in the time of
primitive accumulation? The latter had the choice between the
capitalist wage labour force, death or imprisonment . The
modern worker has to opt for capitalist wage labour and
economic death . This evolution is less an expression of change
in the relationship of exploitation than a shift of the latter
towards the `ideal collective capitalist' which is the State . What
consequence follow from the hypothesis we have advanced?
B. Some consequences of this approach .
(i)
One of the things that immediately follows is not to
regard capital as the pivotal category in the analysis of the State
form . This does not mean that we need to search elsewhere for
another key category, nor should we abandon the idea of
capitalist relations of production as the unifying principle of the
social formation . But it does mean that we need to reinterpret
the economic role of the State in terms other than the need to
meet the contradictory requirements of capitalists and workers .
By seeing the State as constitutive of the WLR we avoid having
to see any correspondence between the needs of capitalists and
workers, a view which can be justified only by economic reductionism .
If the capitalist State transforms workers into use
values for capital it is not because capital dictates its needs, nor
because the State would be better able to meet them but
because, by being an expression of the WLR it does not allow
any other means for the reproduction of labour power than that
imposed by the level and the form of the wage . This reproduction is necessarily the reproduction of labour power for
capital as the levels of wages and the mode of consumption
which result are strongly determined by capital as well as by
class struggle .

51

CAPITAL AND CLASS

52

(ii)
The fact of the means of production being privately
owned did not automatically determine the means whereby
workers would become available but rather required a particular kind of socialisation . Henceforth the WLR cannot be
conceived as an exchange relationship for, in capitalist society
any exchange relationship involves the exchange of values . But
labour power cannot be a value since it is not produced by
labour but is the result of the worker's consumption of use
values created outside the sphere of commodity production
whithin the domestic sphere . The WLR is a particular means of
socialisation in that it formalises the non-ownership of property
and reveals in this way its central characteristic as a relationship
of subordination . It is as such and as the capitalist mode of
mobilising labour that the WLR is the form of social organisation, the capitalist form of social authority .
To see the WLR as the foundation for the State avoids
seeing the State as first outside the realm of value, and then
brought in at a later stage at the invitation of political economy .
The WLR is not external to the realm of value since part of the
value created is conceded to the workers in the form of the
wage so that it can subsequently engage in the production of
value . If the wage labour force is not external to the realm of
value then neither can the State be .
We just need to extend this analysis in order to
understand which forms of domination other than economic
exploitation are perpetuated by the State . We still need to
examine the violence inherent in the values and the practises of
public services, and to look at the relationship between the
workforce and collective consumption managed by the State .
(iii) There is finally a question that we will not answer . To see
in the State the incarnation of the social and to stress the
non-automatic and specific characteristics of wage labour implies that there may be other forms of socialisation to this one .
Is the idea of the State as being a form of domination a relevant
one if socialisation is to be found other than through wage
labour? Furthermore can the State be understood independently of the idea of class? Can a State be conceived which is
not a class State (outside capitalism of course) and, more
generally, does the marxist notion of class exhaust that of
exploitation and oppression? We simply raise the question .
We cannot conclude this piece of work because it is part
of a much broader attempt to understand the State and this
only constitutes a first step . We have simply sought to lay the
basis for a less economistic perspective of the State and one
which is less dichotomistic, and doesn't result in the State being

STATE AND WAGE LABOUR

parachuted into an argument from which, at the start, it is
absent . Having done this we hope we have raised some ideas
that could form the basis of further work which does not result
in seeing the State as a necessary response to the needs of
capital . We hope also to have cut short the sterile debates
around the notion of relative autonomy which has served to
obscure some real problems . To pose the question of the State
in terms of relative autonomy is unhelpful for it perpetuates the
counterposition of State and `material base', and reinforces the
separation of the economic and the political into separate
'instances', each with their own specific functions . There is an
urgent need to direct attention not on what the State is not but
rather on what the State is .

1
On this point see Simon Clarke 'Marxism, sociology and
Poulantzas' theory of the state', Capital and Class No . 2, Summer
1977 .
2
This aspect is mentioned by F . Engels although he does not
develop the point, in The Origins of the Family, Private Property and
the State .
3
We are referring here to the theses of the State Monopoly
Capital school .
4
To take the title of a recent influential work by P . Clastres .
5
This is true of the StaMoCap school and of others such as S . de
Brunhoff, Etat et Capital (Maspero, 1977) and J . Holloway and S .
Picciotto, 'Capital, Crisis and the State', Capital and Class Summer
1977 .
6
A . Aumeeruddy, B . Lautier and R . Tortajada 'Labour power
and the State' Capital and Class Autumn 1978 which, in spite of a
promising start does not escape the criticism we are making .
7
See J . Holloway and S . Picciotto in the reference cited earlier
and N . Poulantzas in `La Crise de l'Etat', (P .U .F . 1977) . This position
is we believe implicitly adopted in the work of de Brunhoff and
Aumeeruddy et . al . cited above .
8
These theoretical doubts are such as to invalidate this particular
law . These have been extensively discussed and we shall simply list the
main ones : doubts concerning the transformation of values into prices ;
doubts concerning the generation of a uniform rate of profit and the
meaning of a structure of profit rates, doubts about different meanings
of the concept of the rate of profit : general rate, required rate, average
rate, etc . . .
9
Can we be sure that labour-power is a commodity for is it not
the result of concrete labours carried out independently one from the
other? See C . Dangel and M . Raybaud, 'Le role de 1'etat dans la
reproduction de la force de travail', Memoire de D .E .A ., Nice 1977 .
Why should labour power be a particular commodity possessing the
use-value of being able to create exchange value, other than to be able

53

Notes

CAPITAL AND CLASS

54

to solve in advance the theory of the commodity? See on this point J .

Maunoury 'Theorie marxiste de la valeur et normes sociales de valorisation - un essai critique' Working paper, Nice, 1978 . On labour power
as not being a value, see B . Lautier and R . Tortajada `Ecole, force de
travail etsalariat' PUG-Maspero 1978 .
10
C . Benetti and J . Cartelier, 'Marchandise, Salariat et Capital',
forthcoming .
11
K . Marx Capital, Vol . 1 Ch . on Primitive Accumulation .
In reading the work of certain historians it is striking to note
12
that before capitalism the notion of work does not seem to exist as
such . Individuals are 'busy' all day doing various things that they carry
out, or cease, without any notion of labour, even free, that must be
performed within a certain time . The notion of leisure and rest after
work also does not seem to exist . One has the impression of there being
a continuum of activities and occupations which do not follow any
rhythm other than that dictated by the personal preoccupations of
those who undertake them . See E . Leroy Ladurie Montaillou, Penguin
Books . The same can be said for certain so-called primitive societies
where there is no linguistic distinction between 'work' and 'play' . See
M . Sahlins Stone Age Economics Tavistock Press .
13
To take M . Aglietta's term which he applies to the modern
mode of consuming commodities that we believe can be extended to
include the capitalist mode of mobilising labour . M . Anglietta
`L 'occident en desarroi ruptures', Dunod, 1978 .

The Fall and Rise of the

Asiatic Mode of Production
STEPHEN P. DUNN
Stalin and leading Soviet writers denied the existence of the Asiatic
Mode of Production, Marx's description of a form of society where
the State owns the means of production and intervenes extensively
in all forms of social life . Stephen Dunn looks at changing Soviet
reactions to the concept .
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The Foundations of the

South African Cheap Labour System
NORMAN LEVY
Dr Levy traces the historical development of the mechanisms that
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the recruitment organizations, the Chamber of Mines - and the
origins of the racially descriminatory legislation which characterises
the present day Apartheid system .
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John Martin

56

The conflict
in Northern Ireland:
Marxist interpretations
Two major schools of thought within Marxist analyses of
Northern Ireland are identified : the `anti-imperialist', which
argues that imperialism is responsible for sectarian division and
conflict in Northern Ireland, and thus sees national independence as a necessary precondition for socialism ; and the
`revisionist', which emphasizes internal factors in the development of the `Northern Ireland problem' and views imperialism
and the British presence as largely progressive . The relative
strengths and weaknesses of these two approaches are assessed .
It is argued that in spite of several serious shortcomings, the
`anti-imperialist' approach is the more satisfactory of the two,
in that, by directly challenging existing social relations in
Northern Ireland it proposes a meaningful strategy for the
advancement of socialism in Ireland .

Introduction

AT FIRST sight the present conflict in Northern Ireland appears

to present a startling refutation of many of the most important

principles of Marxism . Political debate is dominated by national and religious questions, and the various sections of a
polarized proletariat are apparently more willing to ally with
their bourgeois co-religionists so as to engage in sectarian
warfare, rather than co-operating in a united struggle to improve their living conditions as a class . This picture has led a

N . IRELAND : MARXIST THOUGHT

group of Marxists to the conclusion that, `Irish Marxism is . . .
in danger of extinction, politically and intellectually . It's prospects for survival, let alone development seem slim' (Bew et al,
1979, p .1) . Marxist attempts to analyse the `Northern Ireland
problem' can be usefully divided into two broad, but clearly
distinguished schools of thought, which parallel in some way
the sectarian division in society . These two contrasting approaches, which I shall label `anti-imperialist' and `revisionist'
differ over such fundamental issues as the nature and importance of imperialism in Ireland, today and in the past, the role of
the British state, the nature of the present crisis in the six
counties, and the most appropriate strategy for the growth of
socialism in the country as a whole .
The purpose of this article is to assess the strengths and
weaknesses of these two approaches in terms of explanations
they offer of the present conflict, and the strategies they
propose socialists should adopt in their attempt to intervene in
this conflict .

The traditional `anti-imperialist' analysis of Ireland can be said

to derive from the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, though it
owes much more to the writings of Connolly . Much is often
made by Irish Marxists of the statements by Marx, Engels, and
Lenin on the desirability, indeed necessity of Irish independence . These statements, however, are generally quoted without reference to the historical conditions in which they were
formulated . Whilst Marx did, from the mid 1860's onwards,
advocate Irish freedom from Britain, he did so `not from considerations of "justice for Ireland", but from the standpoint of
the interests of the revolutionary struggle of the oppressor, i .e .,
British, nation against capitalism .' (Lenin, 1973, p .214) . Certainly neither Marx nor Lenin believed any nation had an
automatic right to self-determination . Marx was less concerned
with the consequences of independence in Ireland itself, than
with it's impact on the balance of class forces in Britain and
Europe (1978, p .404) . Marx believed Irish self-determination
would help advance the cause of socialism in England in two
ways . Firstly, he argued, an independent Ireland would immediately experience an agrarian revolution, which would lead
to the downfall of the English aristocracy not only in Ireland
but also in England . Secondly, it would remove a very important source of division among the English working classes, and
thus hasten their radicalisation (ibid, pp .406-7) . Similarly,
Lenin supported such actions as the 1916 uprising, not because
he believed the Irish people had a `right' to independence, but

57

The
'Anti-Imperialist'
school

CAPITAL AND CLASS

58

as it was part of an international struggle against imperialism

(1973, p .260) .
Connolly's writings, particularly those on the relationship between nationalism and socialism, and on the nature of
sectarianism in Ulster have been very influential among Irish
Marxists . According to Connolly, Irish Independence from
Britain would be illusory unless it was accompanied by a social
revolution, thus he argued that, `If you remove the English
army tomorrow and hoist the green flag over Dublin castle,
unless you set about the organisation of the socialist Republic
your efforts would be in vain' (1973a, p .124) . Whilst political
independence represents a first requisite for socialism (ibid,
p .145), the domination of the country by England would
continue unless real, i .e . economic independence was also
achieved . It follows from this that socialism will be impossible
in Ireland until the whole country is free from Britain, and that
the struggle for national liberation must be part of a wider
struggle for socialism . Connolly considered the Protestants of
Ulster to be an `integral part of the Irish nation' (1972, p .8),
who would, as they suffered the same exploitation as Catholics,
join in a united battle against the British and Irish bourgeoisie
(ibid, p .39) . Popular Protestant opposition to Home Rule was,
he believed, a result of the `skilful use by the master class of
religious rallying cries' (ibid, p .31), which would be overcome
by teaching Protestant workers Irish history (ibid, 1973b,
p .151) . Nowhere in Connolly's writings is there any evidence of
an awareness that the Protestant working class, or any other
class in Ireland, had a material interest in the preservation of
the union with Britain (B&ICO, 1972a, p .1 .)
Connolly's teachings are today best represented in the
works of de Paor (1970), McCann (1980) and Farrell (1976) .
These authors accept Connolly's synthesis of nationalism and
socialism, but while they agree with many of his arguments
about sectarianism in the North of Ireland, they differ from him
in recognising the real interest the Protestant bourgeoisie had
in rejecting claims for Irish Home Rule . Their basic argument
is as follows .
The natural conflict in any capitalist society is between
the native bourgeoisie and proletariat . The development of
such a conflict in the North of Ireland has been distorted by the
operation of British Imperialism, which has sought to divide
the working class and the country, so as to further the ends of
the British ruling class, thus it is argued that it is the constant
presence of Britain which, `keeps the sterile quarrel of Orange
and Green alive' . . . (de Paor, 1970,p .xx) According to these
writers the Northern Ireland `state' was an artificial creation

N . IRELAND : MARXIST THOUGHT

`arbitrarily carved out of the province of Ulster' (ibid, p .xv),
which was established on the basis of an alliance forged between the Unionist bourgeoisie, who need to retain the union
with Britain in order to safeguard their imperial markets
(Farrell, 1976, p .19 : McCann, 1980, p .122), and the British
ruling class who wished to continue the occupation of the six
counties for economic, political, and strategic reasons (Farrell,
1976 . pp .325-6) .
To ensure the support of the Protestant working class for
their campaign against Irish independence, and to inhibit the
emergence of a united Labour movement, the British and
Unionist ruling classes pursued a number of divisive strategies .
Orangeism was fostered as the dominant ideology among the
Protestant masses ; this involved emphasing pre-existing divisions in society, and arousing, if not actually creating, fears
among the Protestant community about the intentions of the
catholic minority and the nature of the `Southern' regime (de
Paor, pp .xvii, and 62) .
At the same time a material base for this ideology was
created by the pursuit of an active programme of discrimination, particularly in employment, by the Northern bourgeoisie
in favour of the Protestant working class, which gave this class
an interest in protecting their relatively `secured and well-paid
jobs' (Farrell 1976, p .199) . The failure of the Northern Ireland
labour movement can thus only be understood `against the
background of religious discrimination in employment which
divided the working class' (ibid, p .11) . Both the ideology of
Orangeism, and the practice of discrimination were institutionalised in the form of the Stormont statelet following
partition .
The material base for sectarian politics is said to have
begun to erode in the early 1960's due to the entry of monopoly
capital into Ireland . McCann and Farrell argue that the multinationals had no real interest in maintaining discriminatory
employment policies, and also that they desired better relations between the two parts of Ireland, and between the
Governments of `Southern' Ireland and Britain (McCann,
1980, p .124) . Far from bringing about the disappearance of
Orangeism, however, this has assumed a `virulent life of its
own' (Farrell, 1976, p .11) and was transformed from being a
mere tool of the Unionist bourgeoisie `to become the dominant
force in Northern Ireland' (ibid, p .331) . The rise of the Civil
Rights Movement, and the loyalist reaction to it, led to the
emergence of a `struggle against imperialism, for national
liberation' . If this struggle in the North could be linked to
economic discontent in the rest of Ireland, it could lead to a

59

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60

socialist revolution throughout the country, and possibly in

Britain as well . Consequently, the first step towards socialism is
the overthrow of the British state in the six counties, and the
unification of the whole country (ibid . p .p . 330-5) .
The greatest weakness of the approach outlined above is
it's treatment of the Protestant working class . In the works of
de Paor, McCann and Farrell this class is portrayed as a collection of dupes, continuously and relatively easily manipulated
by evil capitalists for their own ends . Since the 1960's Protestant workers seem to have been in an even worse position than
before . Whereas formerly they supported the Unionist bourgeoisie because of the preferential treatment afforded them,
their actions are now said to be determined by a redundant and
baseless ideology . Indeed in this analysis the ideology of
Orangeism undergoes a remarkable transformation, from a
simple reflex of economic advantage to the determinant force
in society . As Nairn has pointed out, (1981, p .231), the argument that the partition of Ireland was the result of an imperialist conspiracy largely ignores the importance of the uneven
development of capitalism within the island . Although Farrell
accepts such a process did occur in the nineteenth century, by
concentrating on the effects of this on the `Ulster' and British
ruling classes he fails to appreciate the extent to which all
Northern Protestants had gained deep economic, social and
political, as well as religious reasons for rejecting the campaign
for Home Rule . As a consequence of this these anti-imperialist
writers are forced to assert that if it were not for discrimination
the Protestant and Catholic working classes would be united . If
even every allegation of discrimination was true, however, it
could not produce `so prodigous a result' (Whyte, 1978, p .261) .
By treating the Protestant proletariat as prisoners of various
fractions of the bourgeoisie, Farrell and McCann are unable to
adequately account for the development of the class alliance on
which the statelet was founded .
Some of these arguments, particularly those on the relationship between monopoly capital and sectarianism in
Northern Ireland, have been challenged in the recent publication by O'Dowd et al (1980) . The basis of this work is a detailed
study of the impact of Direct Rule since 1972 . O'Dowd et at
concluded that the direct management of Northern Ireland by
the British Government has done little to resolve the deep
divisions in society .
This failure they attribute not to the actions of the IRA/
INLA (Irish National Liberation Army) but to the nature of
sectarianism and sectarian division in the North of Ireland, and
the basic function of a capitalist state . According to these

N . IRELAND : MARXIST THOUGHT

writers sectarianism cannot be treated as a superstructural
phenomena, sectarian division is a `material reality which has
been constituted and re-constituted throughout the history of
capital accumulation and class struggle in Ireland as a whole'
(1980, p .25) . In their study of regional policy O'Dowd et al
argue there is little evidence to support the claim that the
multi-nationals operate in a progressive manner, rather they
found that `Just as Courtaulds do little to undermine apartheid
in South Africa ( . . . ), so also they do little to reduce sectarianism in Dungannon' . Indeed the `modernising forces' associated
with the entry of monopoly capital into Ireland `far from undermining sectarian division . . . construct it in a contemporary
form' (ibid, p .63) . As the restructuring of the Northern Ireland
economy has, if anything, actually widened the socio-economic
gap between the two communities (ibid, pp .30-68), the Protestant working class continues to have a strong material interest
in the preservation of British rule, and their actions in the
present crisis cannot simply be dismissed as a product of their
submission to a groundless ideology . This analysis also provides a better understanding of the actions of the British state in
Northern Ireland today . As `sectarian division is a class
phenomenon' the British state must recognise and work within
pre-existing divisions in society, as to do otherwise would
involve the state in an impossible task, the transformation of
class division (ibid, pp .24-25) .
The primary role of the state in a capitalist society, that
of reproducing `the conditions within which capitalist accumulation can take place' (Cockburn, 1977, p .51) means that it is
structurally impossible for the British state to perform the
progressive role most commentators ascribe to it .
Surprisingly, within the `anti-imperialist' school there
has been no real analysis of the concept of imperialism, and the
term is used in a very broad and somewhat confused manner .
For de Paor the essence of imperialism is the `exercise of
responsibility in the affairs of other people, however wellmeaning' (1970, p .xx) ., i .e . it has no economic significance
whatever . In the works of McCann and Farrell imperialism is
discussed exclusively in terms of the military, economic and
political domination of the North of Ireland by Britain, without
regard to the changing nature of capital accumulation and class
struggle, either in Ireland or at an international level . The
recent debate on the meaning of `modern' imperialism conducted by such people as Amin (1977), Emmanuel (1972) and
Frank (1971), has made little impact on Irish Marxists and
certainly none of the concepts utilised by these authors in their
study of monopoly capital have been applied to Ireland in a

61

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62

systematic way . Indeed there has not even been any attempt to
analyse development in Ireland in terms of Lenin's (1978)
writings on imperialism . It is simply assumed that as Britain
continues to occupy a part of Ireland, British imperialism must
remain a major force in society . No attempt has been made to
assess just what the interests of the British state in Ireland
today actually are, or how these might have changed over the
last sixty years .
The `anti-imperialist' school has made very few advances
on the works of Connolly . In general Connolly's followers have
been content to simply echo his teachings, rather than evaluating and up-dating them in the light of the many changes
which have taken place in both Britain and Ireland since his
death in 1916 . The only significant development within this
school has been that of accepting Northern Ireland, rather than
Ireland as a whole as a basic unit of analysis, which has only
served to weaken this approach even further .

N . IRELAND : MARXIST THOUGHT

Since the renewal of civil strife in 1968 there has existed a
second major strand of Marxist writings on Northern Ireland
which offer very different `explanations' and `solutions' . The
term `revisionist' as used in this essay simply refers to those
Marxists writing on Ireland who have questioned, and rejected
many of the basic tenets of the traditional, i .e . anti-imperialist
approach, and no other significance should be attached to it .
This revisionist approach is largely made up of the works of the
British and Irish Communist Organisation (B&ICO), Boserup
(1972), Nairn (1977, 81), Probert (1978), and Bew et al (1979) .
A basic source of agreement among these authors is their
belief that imperialism is not of crucial importance in Ireland
today, and indeed never was (B&ICO, 1972, p .75 : Boserup,
1972, p .183 : Probert, 1978, p .46 : Nairn, 1981, p .323 : Bew et al,
1979, pp .24-25) . Rather than the external forces, emphasis is
placed on internal factors, in particular the uneven development of Irish capitalism in the nineteenth century, in explaining
the emergence of the two distinct communities in the North,
and the sectarian politics which accompanied this . This uneven
growth is variously attributed to different systems of land
tenure in the two parts of the country (B&ICO, 1972, p .4 :
Boserup, 1972, pp . 159-60), the existence of a number of modes
of production within Ireland (Probert, 1978, p .36 : Bew et al,
1979, p .31), or the natural consequence of capitalist development (Nairn, 1981, p .229) . This process is said to have given
the Protestant population, through the industrialisation of
Ulster, a material interest in rejecting attempts to unify the
country .
As imperialism is not a major force in society there is no
possibility of the campaign being waged by the IRA and INLA
developing into a struggle for socialism in Ireland . On the
contrary, this struggle actually inhibits the growth of `socialist
politics' by perpetuating divisions within the working class, and
by driving Protestant workers into the arms of their Orange
bosses (B&ICO, 1975, p .56 : Boserup, 1972, pp . 159 and 188 :
Probert, 1978, p .147 : Nairn, 1981, p .232 : Bew et al, 1979,
pp .220-1) . Not surprisingly, as these writers disagree so fundamentally with the `anti-imperialist' approach on the nature of
the conflict in the North, they also propose markedly different
`solutions' . Rejecting the idea that the Northern Ireland `state'
should be destroyed and the country united, a variety of
strategies are advanced . For both Probert (1978, p .149) and
Bew et al (1979, p .221) the only hope of a progressive solution
is through uniting the working class within a reformed Northern Ireland `state' . Nairn contends that the rights of the Protestants of Ulster to self-determination must be recognised by

The Revisionist
school

63

CAPITAL AND CLASS

64

all concerned as a first step towards socialism . Boserup accepts

this point, and also argues that Irish Marxists should enter into
a `tactical' alliance with British Imperialism (1972, ppl87-8) .
The B&ICO see the way forward in the form of a united British
and Irish working class (1975, p .55) .
The earliest, and in many ways still the most extreme
form of this approach is that expounded by the B&ICO in a
series of pamphlets over the past ten years . According to this
group the uneven development of capitalism, based on the
so-called `Ulster custom' system of land holding gave rise to
two nations within Ireland, the Protestants of Ulster, and the
Catholics of the rest of the island . As the Protestant population
constitute a separate nation (the B&ICO never seem to be sure
whether the Protestants are part of the `British nation' or are an
independent nation, either way they are not part of the Irish
nation) they have a democratic right to self-determination
(1975, pp . 2-4) . It is the denial of this right by the Irish nation
which is to be held responsible for the divisions among the
working class in Northern Ireland (1975b, p .50) . The `South' of
Ireland is portrayed as being virtually a theocracy, and thus the
Protestants of the North, by refusing to be incorporated into
such a regime, have played an essentially progressive role, and
this community is said to have been in the `vanguard of
bourgeois civilisation in the world' (ibid, p .47) .
This thesis has been criticized from many sources . As
Whyte has pointed out (1978, p .263) the claim of the Protestants of `Ulster' to constitute a distinct nation is a very weak
one . Of course the opposition by Northern Protestants to the
campaign for Home Rule in the period 1885-1921 was not
conducted on the grounds of their right to self-determination,
but as a denial of this right to the people of Ireland as a whole
(Patterson . 1980, p .147) . Furthermore, the significance of the
`Ulster custom' is the industrialization of Ulster, and thus
providing a socio-economic base for this new `nation' has been
greatly undermined (Solow, 1971, pp .24-45) . Finally, while
recent studies of the South of Ireland have shown that Protestants could have justifiable fears about the extent of clerical
influence in that state, the claim that it is almost a theocracy
lacks any substantial supporting evidence (White, 1975 : Whyte,
1980) .
In his book, The Break-up of Britain (1981) Nairn agrees
there exist `two potential national communities and states in
Ireland' but argues that due to the inability of the Protestants of
Northern Ireland to construct a strong Ulster nationalism there
are not two nations corresponding to these two communities .
The failure of an Ulster nation to emerge is said to arise from

STATE AND WAGE LABOUR

the `double isolation' of the Protestant community, and the
economic development of the `province' . The Northern Protestants have found themselves caught in between Britain and
Ireland, being objectively part of Ireland but wishing to be
British, and although they are very suspicious of the intentions
of the British Government towards them, they have put a
British sense of identity before a specifically `Ulster' one .
Ironically the economic strength of this community, which has
enabled them to force Britain to intervene on their behalf, has
only increased their dependence on the union with Britain, and
thus has further retarded the rise of a Protestant nation (1981,
pp .237-41) .
Nairn accepts Farrell's point that the `national question'
must be resolved in Ireland before the emergence of socialism
is even possible, but this should mean granting Protestants the
right to self-determination, not the establishment of a united
Ireland (ibid, pp .244-6) . In spite of all the difficulties involved,
Nairn argues the most likely development in the future will be
towards the formulation of a `more than nominal Ulster nationalism ' (ibid, p .241), leading to an independent `Ulster' .
Indeed the Protestants of Ulster must have `self-determination
forced down their throats' if they are ever to adopt progressive
politics (ibid . p .399) .
Nairn criticizes those who highlight the difficulties entailed in establishing an `independent Ulster' yet it is these very
difficulties which undermine the viability of his proposed
`solution' . Nowhere are we told why forcing the right of selfdetermination down the throats of the Northern Protestants
should push their politics in a progressive direction, and in
reality the complete opposite would occur . The most likely
outcome of an independent six county state would be economic
collapse and civil war . Even if the Protestants were to win such
a war, it would result in an even more sectarian state resting on
a rapidly declining economic base - hardly the most conducive
conditions for the growth of `progressive' politics. Nairn himself makes the point that monopoly capital has an interest in
preventing a civil war in Northern Ireland, which he describes
as a `scenario of total capiitalist disaster' (ibid, p .237), and it is
difficult to see why Britain should create a situation in which
such a conflict would probably be unavoidable .
The central concern of Bew et al's analysis is the relationship between the Stormont `state' and relations within the
Protestant bloc . On the basis of the work of Balibar (1977),
Bew et al argue that the basic role of a capitalist state is to
`hinder the unity of the dominated classes' (1979, p,212), so as
to `maintain the conditions for the exploitation of the proC&C,9-E

65

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66

letariat' (ibid, p86) .

The state functions as an arena in which a number of
contending bourgeois strategies to this end can be devised and
operationalized . The particular form taken by the state in a
society is determined by the character of the bourgeois strategy
which becomes dominant at any one time . In the context of
Northern Ireland the sectarian nature of the Stormont regime
was a consequence of the triumph of the `populist faction' for
the ruling class within the `state' apparatuses . The Northern
bourgeoisie are said to have been forced to concede a portion
of `class power' to the `Orange section of the working class' so
as to retain their hegemony over this class (ibid, p .49) . The
`state thus proved very responsive to the needs of the Protestant
community, largely through the spending of considerable sums
of public funds, whilst simultaneously pursuing an exclusivist
policy towards the Catholic minority . Such a strategy had the
double advantage of integrating the Protestant working class
into the dominant class alliance, and deepening divisions within
the class as a whole . (ibid, p .68-92) .
Although this programme proved quite successful for
long periods of time, Protestants cannot be treated as unproblematically supporters of their bourgeois co-religionists
(ibid . p .218) . Significant sections of this class have apparently
escaped from bourgeois control on several occasions, most
notably in the late 1950's, when they are said to have been
deeply influenced by the secular ideology of the Northern
Ireland Labour Party (NILP), (ibid, pp .131-2) . For Bew et al
the only possible way progress can be made in Northern Ireland
is by winning the Protestant masses once again from sectarian
politics, a process they see as being made even more difficult by
the actions of the IRA (ibid, pp .220-221) .
This analysis can be criticized on a number of grounds .
The significance of increased Protestant working class support
for the Northern Ireland Labour Party in the late 1950's and
early 1960's is greatly exaggerated . From 1949 at least, the
NILP had been an explicitly unionist party, maintaining a very
strong line on the `union', whilst ignoring Catholic grievances
about discrimination and repression (Rumpf & Hepburn, 1977,
p .205) . The actions of the Protestant working class in this
period represent less an adventure into secular politics, than an
attempt to extract more from within their own exclusivist class
alliance, and it was very successfully treated as such by the
Unionist Government of the day . In their study of Northern
Ireland Bew et al appear to confuse the terms state and government, the latter narrowly defined in parliamentary term.
Throughout their work there are references to the `Northern

N . IRELAND : MARXIST THOUGHT

Ireland state', and even to 'inter-state' relations between the
governments of Northern Ireland and Britain . They are thus
able to present the introduction of Direct Rule in March 1972
as signifying `the death of the (NI) state' (ibid, p .162) . Of
course Northern Ireland did have its own parliament for over
half a century (1921-72), albeit with limited powers, but there
was never a separate Northern Ireland state . Since partition the
state in the North of Ireland has been the British state, whether
in the shape of a devolved Unionist government, or a `Direct
Rule administration (O'Dowd et al, 1980, p .27) . The collapse of
the Stormont regime cannot, therefore, represent the qualitative break Bew et al attribute to it .
Overall however, the revisionist school has, by challenging many of the assumptions which form the basis of the
anti-imperialist approach, stimulated a much needed debate
within Irish Marxism, and has thus made a vital contribution to
it's further development . This is particularly true as regards the
Protestant working class, who had formerly constituted a
virtual blind spot among Irish Marxists . By focusing attention
on the complexity of this class's politics in Northern Ireland,
the revisionist school has highlighted an important deficiency in
the anti-imperialist approach, which has generally tended, with
a mixture of contempt and idealism, to look upon Protestant
workers as `deluded lackeys' who will, one day, recognise their
`real interests' and join with the Catholic minority in a joint
struggle for independence . Nevertheless the pressupositions of
the revisionist model contain a number of shortcomings, most
notably its treatment of the role of Britain, and imperialism in
Ireland . In a recent article Smyth has argued that Britain's role
in Ireland cannot be reduced to a series of more or less planned
`external' interventions, as do, for example, Gibbon (1975),
and Bew et al (1979) . British intervention was both constant
and planned, and proved decisive in the development of capitalism in Ireland, and the `peculiar' class structure which arose
on the basis of this . By concentrating on the internal reasons
for the emergence of sectarianism and sectarian division, the
revisionist approach largely ignores the extent to which the
Irish social formation, in which Nationalist and Unionist politics have a firm material base, was a product both of internal
conflicts and conflict with Britain (1980, pp .40-2) .
Imperialism in the works of the revisionist school is
considered to be either a progressive force, or unimportant in
contemporary Ireland . In their treatment of the impact of
monopoly capital in Ireland Boserup, Nairn and Probert differ
very little from McCann and Farrell, apart from the fact that
the former writers are even more convinced of its progressive

67

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68

tendencies . Once again we are told the multinationals had no

`vested interest of their own in maintaining sectarian employment patterns' (Probert, 1978, p .76), or in the survival of the
Northern Ireland `state' (Nairn, 1981, p .232) . Indeed the interests of monoply capital are seen as being incompatible with
those of the Orange system, and hence demanded a revolutionary `recasting of the entire political economic and ideological
structure' (Boserup, 1972, pp .169-70), which promises to
undermine the'social and political archaism' of the `province'
(Nairn, 1981, p .243) . As the state in a capitalist society functions in such a way as to further the class interests of the
dominant fraction of the bourgeoisie, one can only assume the
actions of the British state in the North of Ireland are also by
definition, progressive . Taking this argument to its logical conclusion it would appear that the representatives of the British
ruling class, and the multinationals have been co-operatiing for
years in an effort to create a united Irish working class!
Nowhere do Boserup, Nairn or Probert explain why the
multinationals should have no interest in perpetuating sectarian
division, neither do they provide any evidence to support this
contention . Even a cursory glance at the history of capital
accumulation clearly shows that `modernization' cannot be
simply regarded as a progressive force, indeed this process has
been inextricably linked with the structural underdevelopment
of large areas of the world (Frank, 1972) . The capitalist mode
of production does not require a liberal-democratic political
system in order to survive and flourish, it has shown itself
compatible with a wide variety of political arrangements, from
social democratic to authoritarian, populist and fascist
(O'Dowd et al, 1980, p .22), and just as the develoment of the
`West' is dependant on the underdevelopment of the `South',
so too the existence of parliamentary democracies in the
`advanced world' is closely associated with dictatorial regimes
in many countries of the `Third World' . Far from treating them
as obstacles to be brushed aside, monopoly capital has found it
beneficial to support and maintain, `archaic social structures' so
as to further their own interests (Mandel, 1972, p .475 : Hoogvelt, 1975, pp .96-108) .
We have already seen that there is little or no evidence
that multinational corporations have undermined sectarian
division in Northern Ireland . There is some evidence that they
have contributed to its maintenance . Bew et al found that the
multinationals experienced few difficulties in conforming to the
`practices of old capital', and were quite satisfied with the
nature of the Stormont regime, (1979, p .189) . However, the
marginal significance Bew et al attribute to imperialism leads

N . IRELAND : MARXIST THOUGHT

69

them to ignore the consequences of this on the actions of the

British state in Northern Ireland today, and can thus describe
Direct Rule as a `distinct improvement on the regime it replaced', (Morgan and Purdie, 1980, p .169) . In so doing they fail
to recognise not only the centrality of the British state in the
North of Ireland since partition, but also the constraints placed
upon that state's operations by virtue of the central role in
capital accumulation, that of ensuring the reproduction of the
conditions under which such accumulation can take place . In
Northern Ireland the state must reproduce sectarianism and
sectarian division, if it were to do otherwise it would cease to be
a capitalist state .
In conclusion I would like to say a few words on the opposing
strategies proposed by these two schools of thought for the
advancement of socialism in Northern Ireland . It is in dealing
with this issue that the shortcomings of the revisionist model
become most evident . One of the main reasons for Bew et al's
pessimism about the future of Irish Marxism lies in its alleged
subordination to nationalist, i .e . bourgeois, ideology . (1979,
p .37) . However it is the arguments of the revisionist school,
such as those on the role of Britain, and imperialism in Ireland
today, and on the nature of the present conflict which appear as
little more than echoes of the claims of the British Irish
bourgeoisie . By accepting the claims of the British state to be
acting in a progressive manner, those within the revisionist
school fail to recognise, let alone challenge, the central role the
British state plays in Northern Ireland, that of reproducing
sectarianism and sectarian division . None of the `solutions'
advocated by this group, such as a reformed Northern Ireland
`state', an independent `Ulster', or a `tactical' alliance with
British imperialism, pose any threat to the `dictatorship of the
bourgeoisie' (Balibar), and if implemented, would only serve
to provide the bourgeoisie with a with a firmer base from which
to continue their rule . The anti-imperialist school, inspite of its
many weaknesses, in particular its persistent failure to analyse
seriously the ideology and activities of the Protestant working
class, does at least support a strategy which directly threatens
the British state's maintenance of existing social relations in
Northern Ireland . Overall, it is clear that both sets of 'interpretations' contain serious faults . Of the two, the anti-imperialist
approach is the more satisfactory, and should provide a useful
starting point for further research by Marxists on Ireland .

Conclusion

CAPITAL AND CLASS

70

Note

I would like to thank the editors of Capital and Class, Christina

Loughran, and especially Liam O'Dowd for their valuable help and
advice during the writing of this essay .
References
Amin, S . (1977) Imperialism and Unequal Development (Harvester
Press) .
Balibar, E . (1977) On the Dictatorship of the Proletariat (NLB) .
Bew et al . (1979) The State in Northern Ireland, 1921-72 (Manchester
University Press) .
Bew et al . (1980) Some aspects of Nationalism and Socialism in Ireland, 1968-78 . In, Morgan A . and Purdie, B . 1980, Ireland : Divided
Nation, Divided Class (Inklinks) .
Boserup, A . (1972) Contradictions and Struggles in Northern Ireland,
Socialist Register .
B&ICO . (1972a) Connolly and Partition (Athol Books) .
B&ICO . (1972b) The Economics of Partition (Athol Books) .
B&ICO . (1975a) The Two Irish Nations (Athol Books) .
B&ICO . (1975b) Imperialism (Athol Books) .
Cockburn, C . (1977) The Local State (Pluto Press) .
Connolly, J . (1972) The Reconquest of Ireland (Dorset Press Ltd) .
Connolly, J . (1973a) Selected writings . ed . P . Beresford Ellis . (Pelican
Books) .
Connolly, J . 1973b) Selected Political Writings ed . Owen Dudley and
Bernard Ransom . (J. Cape Ltd) .
de Paor, L . (1970) Divided Ulster (Pelican Books) .
Emmanuel, A . (1972) Unequal Exchange (Monthly Review) .
Farrell, M . (1976) Northern Ireland : The Orange State (Pluto Press) .
Frank, A .G . (1971) Sociology of Development and The Underdevelopment of Sociology (Pluto Press) .
Gibbon, P . (1975) The Origins of Ulster Unionism (Manchester
University Press) .
Hoogvelt, A . (1978) The Sociology of Developing Societies (Macmillan) .
Lenin, V . (1973) On Britain (Lawrence & Wishart) .
Lenin, V . (1978) Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (Progress Publishers) .
McCann, E . (1972) War and an Irish Town( Pluto Press) .
Mandel, E . (1972) Marxist Economic Theory (Merlin Press) .
Marx, K . and Engels, F . (1978) Ireland and The Irish Question (Lawrence & Wishart) .
Nairn, T . (1981) The Break-up of Britain (NLB) .
O'Dowd et al . (1980) Northern Ireland: Between Civil Rights and Civil
War (CSE Books) .
Patterson, H . (1980) Class Conflict and Sectariani sm : The Protestant
Working Class and the Belfast Labour Movement, 1868-1920 (Blackstaff Press) .
Probert, B . (1978) Beyond Orange and Green (Academy Press) .
Rumpf, E . and Hepburn, A .C . (1977) Nationalism and Socialism in
Twentieth Century Ireland (Liverpool University Press) .
Smyth, J . (1980) Northern Ireland : Conflict without Class, in ,






N . IRELAND : MARXIST THOUGHT
Morgan, A . and Purdie B .
Solow, B . (1972) The Land Question and the Irish Economy, 18701903 (Harvard University Press) .
White, J . (1975) Minority Report: The Protestant Community in the
Irish Republic (Gill and Macmillan) .
Whyte, J.H . (1978) Interpretations of the Northern Ireland Problem :
An Appraisal Economic and Social Review, vol . 9 No .4 .
Whyte, J .H . (1980) Church and State in Modern Ireland, 1923-1979,
(Gill and Macmillan) .

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72

Liam O'Dowd, Bill Rolston

and MikeTomlinson

From Labour
to the Tories : The
ideology of containment
in Northern Ireland
Bipartisanship :
Containing the
Crisis

last decade both Labour and Tory governments

have gradually evolved a politics and ideology of `containment'
in Northern Ireland . Initially this was not the result of carefully
laid `Irish policies', but rather a series of ad hoc and partially
planned responses to the threatened breakup of the Stormont
statelet . Gradually, however, as Direct Rule has become more
patterned and centralised, the outlines of `containment ' have
become clearer and indeed have been crucial to the bipartisan
policy . In this paper we attempt to assess the development of
this policy under the Tories since 1979, with particular reference to its ideological aspects .
The more general ideological separation of `politics' and
`economics' has been given an Irish twist by bipartisanship . The
`Northern Ireland problem' is seen as essentially political (and
military) : this is what makes it distinctive . Economically,
Northern Ireland is seen as unexceptional in British terms,
albeit as one of the sicker limbs of the 'sickman of Europe' .
There are many `political' analyses of Northern Ireland (see
most recently the many, and frequently pessimistic, contributions in Rea, 1980), fewer of the `economic' crisis (see for
example Morrissey, 1981) . Few relate the two elements, except
in rather economistic terms, for example, estimating the effects
of the `troubles' on unemployment (see Rowthorn, 1981) . The
relationship of `politics' and `economics' is particularly sigOVER THE

N IRELAND : CONTAINMENT

CAPITAL AND CLASS

74

nificant in analysing Tory policy because it has attempted two

apparently incompatible things at once . On the one hand, it has
sought to separate `politics' from `economics' by reducing the
role of the state in the economy ; on the other, it has linked
`economic' policy to the politics of a revitalised British nationalism ; `getting the economy right' is fundamental to forging a
new role for Britain internationally, based on national unity
and social discipline at home and on `principle', efficiency and
military strength abroad . It would be strange indeed if these
departures did not affect the political and ideological management of Northern Ireland, raising new questions and contradictions in the policy of `containment' .
For fifty years Partition insulated the Irish question from
British politics, thus removing a potent threat to constitutional
politics and parliamentry democracy (see O'Dowd et al, 1980) .
The eruption in the North in the early 1970s threatened, but did
not breach, this insulation in the long run . Having effected
certain `reforms', both the Labour and Tory parties evolved a
common Northern Ireland policy which rested on three main
planks :
a.
continuous reiteration of the wish of the majority of the
population to remain within the United Kingdom . This of
course meant that the problem was an internal British one with
no imperial or colonial dimensions ;
the root of the `problem' was to be found exclusively
b.
within Northern Ireland in the intractable political division
between Protestants and Catholics ;
the British state is a neutral arbiter providing a framec.
work for political agreement when the natives come to their
senses .
While Labour and the Tories disagreed on many points
of emphasis in the final analysis they shared this ideology of
`containment' . Significantly, perhaps, it was the military which
provided the clearest formulation of this ideology . In the words
of an ex-GOC, `a hard military casing' has to be maintained
around Northern Ireland to contain the `explosive military
mixture within, a mixture which will continue to exist into the
foreseeable future more or less as before' (Hackett, 1979) . This
has been refined considerably within Northern Ireland by
attempts to confine the confict to ever smaller territorially
delimited areas of Catholic disaffection . Of course, the ideology of containment allows for occasional eruptions which blow
a hole in the `casing' . Thus, the Ulster Workers' Council strike
of 1974, Paisley's protests, occasional large-scale bombing of
soldiers and civilians (especially in Britain), the killing of
famous people and the H Block hunger strikes, all affect the

N IRELAND : CONTAINMENT
management of the `crisis', but do not challenge the principle of
`containment', even if they indicate weaknesses in it . By contrast, plastic bullet deaths, the killing of policemen or civilians
in Northern Ireland, scarcely rate a mention in the national
United Kingdom media ; they demonstrate the success of 'containment' rather than its failure .
There are other measures of its relative success . International criticism of the British government's management of
the Northern Ireland conflict has been very muted, at least at
government level . Periodically, intense criticism has surfaced,
notably among Irish Americans and Southern Irish politicians,
but these are exceptions which prove the rule . Perhaps even
more significantly, there is a sense in which `containment', in
the form of Direct Rule, has gained a minimal level of acceptance among the Catholic and Protestant population here as a
`second best', or as a lesser evil than some alternative scenarios .
This view has a material basis which becomes increasingly
substantial as the United Kingdom state plays an ever more
central role in the management of the local economy . Ironically,
then, this `acceptance' is based to a large degree on the failure
of the British state to insulate Northern Ireland from Great
Britain at the level of day to day administration and the
economy .
The political parties within Northern Ireland see 'containment' differently, at least in their overt political ideology .
For the Unionists the history of British `intervention' since the
late 1960s has been one of appeasement, occasionally reversed
or limited by Loyalist pressure . Thus, the suspension of Stormont, the refusal to accept the Loyalist Convention report
(1975), Sunningdale, Anglo-Irish talks, a failure to implement
draconian security policies (see Smyth, 1981), all amount to a
policy of undermining the Unionist position and even the place
of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdim . The SDLP
(Social Democratic and Labour Party) on the other hand and
the Irish (especially Fianna Fail) governments have tended to
see `containment', particularly since Sunningdale, as a maintenace and even strengthening of the Unionist veto on a political settlement (see SDLP, 1980) . Republicans largely see it as
a catalogue of repression of Catholic areas ; British policy is
eptitomised by the army, police, Ulster Defence Regiment and
prison officer. Nearly all local groupings are critical of government economic policy to the extent that they systematically
concern themselves with public expenditure, unemployment,
investment, etc . Yet criticism of economic policy alone is
scarcely a basis for political consensus in a polarised society,
and in any case is seen to be largely outside of local control . The

75

CAPITAL AND CLASS

76

fragmented nature of local response to British policy, outlined

rather crudely above, is another important reason for the
success of the bipartisan containment policy in that none of the
alternatives seem viable .
All of this is not to suggest that `containment' has simply
frozen the Northern Ireland crisis, or that it has been merely
`imposed' by British civil servants, generals and politicians .
After all, the policy has some built-in constraints on British
government action . Belfast is unlikely to be turned into
another Beirut in order to `smash the terrorists' . Various
British politicians would like an even greater degree of insulation of the Northern Ireland problem ; there are signs of the
`contagion' spreading to Britain ; in addition, it does drain the
British exchequer, albeit not to a dangerous degree .' The
parameters of `containment' have been shaped by the struggle
in Northern Ireland over the last fourteen years . The content
and dynamics of British management constitute a more incoherent and complex process than that suggested by the above
account . While the British government holds the levers of
economic, political and military power in Northern Ireland, its
policy has been influenced by the often contradictory pressures
of local politicians, as well as by the IRA and loyalist paramilitaries . The question which this paper poses is whether Tory
policy since 1979 has effected any change in the parameters or
the content of `containment' .

Labour Direct
Rule

In the short space of this article perhaps the best way of

approaching an answer is by examining ideologies in the first
instance . To addre the specificity of Tory management, it is
useful to compare it with the preceding labour administration
under Mason . The outlines of Mason's approach had their
origins under the Rees adminstration since 1974 . The failure of
Sunningdale and the Convention, largely due to paramilitary
pressure and polarisation, had weakened Labour faith in constitutional solutions, and especially in selling any compromise
settlement to the Protestant working class . On the other hand,
neither talks with the IRA (under Whitelaw) or powersharing
for the SDLP seemed to be delivering Catholic assent . Rees
abolished special category status and began a process of criminalisation, carried on with gusto by Mason, which culminated
in the H Block hunger strike . Likewise, there was a spectacular
build-up of local and overwhelmingly Protestant security forces
in a process termed 'Ulsterisation' : 10,955 indigenous security
personnel in 1971 and 19,287 in 1980 (figures derived from
Ulster Year Books for the period in question) . The other side of

N IRELAND : CONTAINMENT
this policy was the attempt to bolster stability by economic
initiatives to improve the employment prospects of both
Catholic and Protestant working class. Examples of these
included the setting up of Strathearn Audio in Catholic West
Belfast (1974) and De Lorean (the former defunct, the latter
practically so) and huge subsidisation of the shipyards . Indeed,
Mason visited the shipyards immediately after the failure of
Protestant workers to back the Paisley stoppage of 1977 in
order to announce more government help .
Mason formulated the new approach in the crudest and
most direct terms . Revelling in the role of Northern Ireland
`supremo', his aim was to make Direct Rule work . 'Unemployment ' and `terrorism' were designated as the two principal
enemies . Northern Ireland Office (NIO) pronouncements
were of two main kinds : on the one hand, there were the
weekly tallies of `terrorist' arrests, sentences and arms discoveries, on the other, there were details fo industrial promotion trips abroad (of the `selling' of Northern Ireland), jobs
promoted and jobs saved by governement policy . `We have
created a package of financial inducements which is one of the
best in Western Europe', boasted Mason in 1979 . He also
claimed substantial progress in defeating `terrorism', his optimism perhaps dampened somewhat towards the end of his
reign by the Provisionals' publication of the secret Document
37 in which the British Army noted the ability of the IRA to
continue guerrilla operations for generations to come . In addition, Mason deplored the anachronistic and `irrelevant' squabbling of local politicans . Constitutional talks with these politicians were desultory and little prospect was held out for new
initiatives. Instead, the Mason administration created a facade
of regional corporatism . There were frequent consultations
with the local branch of the CBI, the Northern Ireland Committee of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions and various
pressure groups . All of this provided the climate for arguments
about `parity' with the rest of the United Kingdom . Claims for
equal wage levels and even equal levels of unemployment with
the rest of the United Kingdom could be made and entertained
at government level . Under Lord Melchett, one of Mason's
ministers, funding for community action flowed, and legal
reform in certain aspects of women's rights (although not gay
rights, this having to wait for Tory legislation in the wake of a
European Court of Human Rights decision in 1981) materialised in the form of the Matrimonial Causes Order (1978) and
the Domestic Proceedings Order (1980) .
Underlying the whole approach were substantial increases in public expenditure . The most direct result of this was

77

CAPITAL AND CLASS

78

a dramatic increase in public sector employment after 1974 . At

a time when employment was declining in manufacturing and
agriculture, public sector employment grew by over 23%,
mainly in health and social services, education and the security
forces . Much of the increase was in female (often part-time)
employment ; by 1979 females in the public sector accounted
for 47% of total female employment, compared with 28% of all
males in civil employment . 56% of the expansion in male public
sector employment in this six year period was accounted for by
increases in the police and prison service (O'Dowd, 1982) .
Although only 3% of the manufacturing workforce was in
nationalised industries (Harland and Wolff, and Shorts) by
1979, 45% of employment in this sector was directly subsidised
by government (NIEC, 1981 : 23) . This understates the dependence of private employment on state expenditure . The construction industry, for example, a key barometer of economic
activity, is dominated by the self-employed and a large number
of small companies . In 1981 60% of building arose directly
from state expenditure and much of the remainder was indirectly influenced by it (NIEC, 1981 : 22) . Relatively stable
under Labour, building employment fell dramatically between
1979 and 1982 as a result of Tory cuts .
Under Rees and Mason, therefore, `containment' assumed a particular form, involving criminalisation, 'Ulsterisation' and relatively high levels of public expenditure on which
the Northern Ireland economy became ever more dependent .
In part this policy was a response to both the restructuring of
the local economy and the political and military struggle . On
another level, however, Mason represented a crude version of
Labour economism . In a period when the Labour government
was already being foced to implement cuts, Mason claimed to
have won a good deal for Northern Ireland . For example, state
expenditure on housing in the United Kindgom overall dropped
by 25% between 1974/5 and 1979/80, wheras in Northern
Ireland it rose by 36% in the same period . In treating Northern
Ireland as a `special case', Mason could point to the supposed
connection between unemployment and political violence (an
argument later resurrected by Labour to explain Toxteth and
Brixton) . He argued that unemployment reduced the possibility of an end to violence and a political settlment, a view
shared most strongly by one of his `reformist' ministers, Lord
Melchett . Yet the Mason administration alienated both the
Northern Ireland nationalists and the Dublin government . It
continuously asserted Northern Ireland's status as a `region' of
the United Kingdom . Under pressure from Loyalists on
security, Mason attacked the Republic over extradition and a

N IRELAND : CONTAINMENT

79

lack of cooperation in the battle against `terrorism' . He even

insisted on squiring the Queen on a visit to Northern Ireland to
mark her `jubilee' . Yet, when Labour left office, unemployment in Northern Ireland had doubled, and the IRA remained
undefeated and the basis had been laid for the H Block Crisis .
The Mason period was to help precipitate a discussion in the
Labour party on its Irish policy, especially as in several respects
Mason's approach was indistinguishable from that of the Tory
opposition, which found little to quibble about in his tough law
and order approach and his commitment to Unionist
consitutionalism .

The continuities and discontinuities became immediately clear

with the appointment of Atkins as Secretary of State . The
commitment to abiding by the majority's wishes to remain in
the United Kingdom and to defeat `terrorism' was reiterated .
Yet, in his first speech in Northern Ireland after his appointment (30 .5 .79 .) Atkins introduced a theme that was to be
hammered home forcefully in ministers' statements in the preliminary phase of Tory Direct Rule (see statements of Shaw,
22 .11 .79 ; Atkins, 27 .3 .80 ; Rossi, 27 .3 .80 ; Rossi, 14 .5 .80 ;
Rossi, 17 .11 .80 . ) 2 : Northern Ireland could not escape the harsh
medicine of Tory cuts . In fact, Atkins redefined `parity with the
rest of the United Kingdom' in just these terms, turning one of
the themes of the Mason period into a two-edged sword . The
full effects of this became clear when public sector employment
in Northern Ireland began to fall in several areas, while remaining static in others (NIEC, 1981 : 40) . This reversed a trend
apparent since the early 1960s at least, affecting the one employment growth area in Northern Ireland . As redundancies
accelerated (15,000 in 1980, 23,500 in 1981 ; see NIEC 1982),
unemployment reached new peaks with growing proportions
of young people under twenty and of long-term unemployed .
In another significant reversal of Mason's policies Atkins immediately initiated talks with local politicians on devolved
government, although little was to emerge until Prior introduced his `rolling devloution' Bill in 1982 . The Tory administration began to emphasise the ideology of self-help and of
less reliance on the state . The policy in Northern Ireland
specifically, however, must first be assessed against the background of Tory ideology generally before examining its specific
effects on `containment' policy in Northern Ireland .
Since 1979 Thatcher has set out to smash the ideological
consensus of post-war British politics . At its core, Tory ideology claims to have a formula for arresting and eventually

Thatcherism in
Northern
Ireland

CAPITAL AND CLASS

80

reversing the `decline of Britain' . The Tories are not seeking to

rebuild the Empire, but rather to create a new role for Britain,
economically, politically and militarily, which fits the realities
of the more diffuse imperialist world system in the late twentieth century . This policy is being pursued on two broad fronts
firstly and principally between the `state' and the `economy',
(that is, between `politics' and `economics') . Cuts in public
spending and employment, the lifting or lessening of restrictions on capital, whether in respect of investment controls,
urban planning laws or taxation, the privatisation of public
services, the selling off of parts of nationalised industry, all
reflect the policy of `lessening the involvement of the state' .
The aim is to make Britain `competitive' again in the context of
newly restructured global capitalist economy . The second
element in the policy is, rather ironically perhaps, the creation
of a `strong state', based on law and order at home and a strong
defence profile within a new military division of labour abroad .
These two sometimes contradictory aims are however
reconciled at the ideological level, through the promulgation of
what has been termed an authoritarian populism . The Tories
have developed a modernised version of British nationalism
rooted in `national unity and sovereignty' which has helped to
relegate internal Labour debates on an alternative programme
to something of a popular sideshow . The renewed sense of
national purpose advanced is based on a need for `social discipline' . In economic policy, mass unemployment has been the
central instrument of discipline,' helped by rigid pay policies in
the public sector and `cash limits' . Here the trade unions have
been designated as `principal enemies' of Britain's economic
recovery . On the second front, a whole barrage of laws and
practices have been instituted to police sections of the population who might threaten law and order at home . These
groups range from young blacks (through the Criminal Justice
Act), the unemployed (through taxing of unemployment benefit), workers (through legislation on strikes, closed shops, etc . ),
to youth generally (through training programmes and detention
centres) . For the Tories, however, the `terrorist' typifies the
most extreme threat to law and order, although little new was
required in terms of anti-terrorist legislation .
Abroad, a new image of a strong Britain was portrayed .
At one level Thatcher insisted on standing up for Britain's
rights in the EEC, on another she proclaimed the necessity of
standing up to the Russians by modernising Britain's 'independent' nuclear deterrent . This strong defence policy has been
legitimised by demonstrations of British power and efficiency .
These prove that Britain is the leading exponent of counter-

N IRELAND : CONTAINMENT
insurgency and special elite forces, as shown by the SAS who
can smash embassy sieges or plane hijackings at home while
helping foreign governments to do the same . Similarly the
`Falklands' showed that Beritish sea power can still rule the
waves, at least in the South Atlantic . Meanwhile, the more
rigorous side of a national unity, based on efficiency and discipline, is softened by the new lease of life given to Royalism by
royal jubilees, marriages and births . The new monarchism is
only strengthened by periodic threats to royal security which
constitute morality tableaux about the need to strengthen law
and order generally .
It is not just the content of the new Tory ideology which
is important, however, but also the way in which it is promulgated . The mode is confrontationist . Ideology is publicised
through a series of confrontations with the trade unions (especially trade union leaders), strikers, `terrorists', with the
EEC or with the Argentinians . An image of consistency and
adherence to principle in the national interest is developed in
contradistinction to the vacillation and temporising of post-war
British governments . The Tories claim to be on the popular
side against small, unrepresentative groups at home, or forces
abroad, which challenge the `national interst' . This may even
mean foregoing short-term `political' popularity in the interest
of long-term economic and political recovery . Importantly,
however, the Tory version of British nationalism is far from a
mere `fortress Britain' mentality . It explicitly recognised that
the national government cannot control the forces of international capital, but rather must accommodate to it within a
framework of national unity and social discipline .
The shift in ideological management by the Tories would
seem, on the surface at least, to potentially threaten bipartisan
`containment' policy in Northern Ireland . Yet Northern Ireland as such accounted for relatively little in Tory ideology,
except in one major respect . Northern Ireland trade unions,
rendered ineffectual by long-term unemployment, the continual threat of more, and a membership divided on sectarian
lines, did not constitute a plausible `enemy' for Tory Direct
Rulers . The exception was the IRA . The hunger strike provided an ideal setpiece for Thatcher, where, despite the wavering of some of her ministers and intense international pressure,
she faced down the `terrorist' demands . Yet, in general, the
Tories merely continued Mason's security policies . There were
some significant shifts, however, in political and economic
management which reflected broader Tory policy . Cuts in
public expenditure were linked to a renewed search for devolved government . One of the characteristics of Tory policy
C&C 18 - F

81

CAPITAL AND CLASS

82

has been the ideological effort expended in `decentralising'

responsibility for government cuts away from central government to local government and various state agencies . In this
sense, a vaccum existed in Northern Ireland ; there was no
locally elected administration to take responsibility . This posed
a problem given the likely (short-term?) effects on the local
economy and the high level of criticism (albeit conflicting) of
Direct Rule anyway . Furthermore, Tory ideology seemed to fit
badly with the centralisation and bureaucracy of Direct Rule .
While the election manifesto of the Tories promised more
powers for local authorities in the North, the blatent sectarianism of these bodies precluded this option . The alternative was
to go for a revised form of devolved government .
In the process of implementing this policy, the Tories
have gradually come to reverse the relationship which the
Mason administration posited between `economics' and 'politics' . To Labour's two dominant issues - the economy and
`terrorism'- Prior has added another : `the necessity for political
progress' . In fact, political progress is a prerequisite for
progress on all fronts . ` . . .the defeat of terrorism, the recovery
of the economy and the establishment of effective political
institutions go together and support one another . An end to the
political deadlock of recent years offers the best hope of a
sustained improvement in the economy and in security' (Prior,
5 .4 .82 .)
This emphasis has the merit of fitting in with the Tory
ideology of self-help in the economic sphere while manifesting
a recurrent theme of Direct Rule : the Northern Ireland problem is `your own fault' exclusively . At a more specific level,
whereas Mason saw local politicians as a luxury the province
could not afford in the short term - consulting with unions,
employers and pressure groups instead - Prior has droped the
facade of regional corporatism with the exception of his
relationship with the NIEC (Northern Ireland Economic
Council') . It would be difficult, for example, to imagine Prior
mobilising trade union support against Paisley in the way that
Mason attempted during the 1977 protests . While `regional
corporatism' is dropped, the Tories have encouraged a type of
`micro corporatism' based on local areas . Thus Enterprise
Carrickfergus, Enterprise Lisburn, and, most optimistically of
all, Enterprise Strabane are praised by ministers . Thus, it suits
Adam Butler (16 .2 .82) to imply that these exercises in self-help
can reverse a process of decline reflected in the loss of over
2,000 synethetic fibres jobs in Carrickfergus and a 47% male
unemployment rate in Strabane . Another example of this approach is represented by Belfast's Enterprise Zone (one of

N IRELAND : CONTAINMENT

83

eleven in the United Kingdom), although here the unions have

been reluctant to participate in the experiment, describing the
policy as `papering over the parlour when the house is falling
down' (John Freeman' cited in Belfast Telegraph, 25 .10 .80 .)'
As regards unemployment the record is disastrous, with
over 20,000 jobs lost in manufacturing alone in 1981 (see
Belfast Bulletin, 1982) and only 3,700 jobs `promoted' in the
same year, significantly only 350 of them arising from inward
investment (NIEC, 1982 : 9) . In addition, the upsurge of jobs
arising out of American investment (predicted in 1978 after a
seven year lull in investment from that source) now looks
decidedly shaky, with the demise of the De Lorean spectacular
and questions surrounding the new Lear Far jet operation,
which promised over 1,000 jobs . The Tories' response, as well
as stressing the need to `improve Northern Ireland's image
abroad" and to reach a political settlement, has been to restructure the industrial development bodies under a new Industrial Development Board (IDB) loosely modelled on the
Southern Irish Industrial Development Authority . Under the
managment of Saxon Tate, who as vice-chairman of Tate and
Lyle has had more of a reputation for lay-offs than job creation
in the recent past, the IDB pursues a problematic role . The
contradictions of `job promotion' in Northern Ireland have
been illustrated recently by the success of the Republic in
attracting the Hyster Company (manufacturers of fork lift
trucks) to Dublin even though the company already has one
successful plant in Cragavon, an executive (Herman Steepman, managinig director of the Cragavon plant) on the newlyformed IDB, and was under strong pressure to locate in Antrim
to replace the now-closed British Enkalon factory . Also indicative of Tory management is the fact that, despite the policy
of no help for lame ducks, Prior has continued to subsidise the
shipyards with their overwhelmingly Protestant workforce .
With few orders and heavy losses it accounts for 25% of all
Department of Commerce expenditure in the current financial
year . It survives as `the symbol of industrial Belfast' (Prior,
12 .5 .82 .), a euphemism which would not be lost on working
class Catholics who have long seen it as a bastion of Protestant
privilege .

The above account of Tory management in Northern Ireland is

not to be construed, however, as something simply imposed by
the NIO . Rather, it is in part a reaction to local pressures .
While it has maintained the `containment' policy, it has done so
with emphases significantly different from that of Labour . At

Local Pressures

84

times both local pressures and the new emphases have posed
serious contradictions for the containment itself .
At the ideological level, the hunger strikes posed the
most serious challenge to `containment' . Although the outcome was generally to Thatcher's satisfaction, the issue was
often in doubt . Here the battle ground was principally in two
areas never sympathetic to British `containment' policy : Irish
America and the Irish Republic . In the former, the propaganda
struggle was so intense that the local Controller of BBC Northern Ireland complained of the unwillingness of NIO officials
to contribute to broadcasts on the subject .
`They were broadcasting to America - under pressure .
They were briefing American and foreign journalists .
They were not briefing home journalists' (Hawthorne,
1981 : 12)
Ulster Commentary, a long-standing government publication on business and politics, was discontinued and its staff
transferred to producing Fact Sheets on the `dangerous criminals' in H Blocks .' Of course, American propaganda was a
two-edged sword ; as Prior was to recognise later, it did little to
encourage the American investor (now the only major source
of potential foreign investment) to come to Northern Ireland .
Yet, for a time everyone was on the American trail, released H

N IRELAND : CONTAINMENT
Blocks protestors, Loyalist politicians and NIO officials, in
effect internationalising the Northern Ireland problem in a way
especially inimical to the `containment' policy .
The problem of the Irish Republic was different . Irish
governments had become increasingly critical of the failure of
successive British administrations to restore some form of
power-sharing . In part, apparently foreseeing the developing
H Blocks crisis, and in part seeing cross-border economic cooperation as a palliative to the Northern Ireland economic
crisis, Thatcher embarked on the Anglo-Irish summits with
Haughey . They proved to be exercises in sustained ambiguity,
delivering little in the way of institutionalised cooperation . The
gains for the Tory government were considerable, however .
Internationally, they conveyed the impression of cooperation
between the British and Irish governments in solving the
Northern Ireland question . Haughey, in his own political self
interest, committed to reading more into the process than was
there, was effectively neutralised (perhaps willingly to some
extent) on the H Block issue . Cross-border security was tightened further and some small-scale cooperation over energy and
joint EEC schemes (especially in the area of tourism) were
negotiated . At all times, however, the process seemed compatible with the new-style nationalism being propagated by the
Tories . As in the `Falklands' crisis, Thatcher was willing to
engage the cooperation of other states (in this case the Irish
Republic) in confirming British sovereignty in a disputed area .'
The agreements were explicitly not between North and South 9 ,
but between the United Kingdom, `all 56 million of us' (to
quote Allison, 27 .4 .81 .), and the Irish Republic . On another
level, it recognised the utility of inter-governmental cooperation in an island often seen by transnational organisations, like the EEC and large corporations, as a single geographical unit .
There were also some contradictory elements in the
process, however . It encouraged both the Irish government
and the SDLP to press for further recognition that Northern
Ireland was not merely an internal British problem or containable within the confines of Northern Ireland itself . The
SDLP in any case had become incresingly disenchaned with the
prospects for a return of powersharing, given Unionist opposition and what they saw as an increasingly pro-Unionist policy
within the North . The failure of the Anglo-Irish agreements to
deliver anything tangible to non-Unionists is implicitly recognised in the possibility that the whole spectrum from the
Provisionals to the SDLP may boycott the new assembly
proposed by Prior . (This in turn suggests that the Irish govern-

85

CAPITAL AND CLASS

86

ment and SDLP hopes of outflanking the Provisionals via the

Anglo-Irish agreements has failed .) These proposals contain
no required powersharing, no Council of Ireland, and appear
mainly directed to avoid setting up a firm target for Unionists
(particularly Paisley) to attack . Thus, Prior guarantees no
concrete concessions to constitutional nationalists, although
clearly he would prefer to avoid antagonising them in pursuance of the long-term aim of marginalising the Provisionals . 10
The Unionists have always been among the strongest
supporters of `containment' insofar as it involved treating
Northern Ireland as an internal British problem . (They largely
reject, of course, the other two elements of `containment', the
`political primacy' of Catholic/Protestant division and the
`neutrality' of the British state .) They have been divided on the
degree of power which should be devolved to Northern Ireland
and on the precise measures that should be implemented to
smash the Provisionals and exclude the `enemies of state' from
`high places' . Furthermore, the Democratic Unionist Party
(DUP) in particular has a rather different conception of the
relationship of politics and economics than that contained in
the new Tory ideology . For them, every question is reducible to
its potentiality for undermining the `Protestant' dominance of
Northern Ireland . Thus, the Anglo-Irish summits were attacked
by Paisley in his `Carson Trail' protests as a conspiracy and a
sell-out of Protestant interests . In addition, he favours Israelitype raids into the Irish Republic rather than cross-border legal
and security force cooperation . Even the choice between a
cross-border gas pipeline and a connection with North Sea gas
(via Scotland) is portrayed as a choice between strengthening
and weakening the Union . In the continuing sharp battle
between Paisley of the DUP and Molyneaux of the Official
Unionist Party (OUP) for political control of Unionism (what
Hume of the SDLP has termed their `virility contest for control
of the Unionist family') Paisley follows the line of conditional
loyalty to the British Parlkiament, a policy which allows him
scope to criticise the whole range of government policy from
`security' to the `economy' . In this he has the support of a
devolutionist wing of the OUP, who nevertheless disagree with
his methods . The dominant wing of the OUP, however, led by
Molyneaux, Powell and Smyth, see devolution as giving the
game to Paisley, and accordingly weakening the link . Thus,
they favour `integration' with the United Kingdom : `Ulster
should be treated like Lancashire' . In this they have been
increasingly supported by the right wing of the Tory Party, and
perhaps by Thatcher herself behind the scenes . Furthermore,
many of them are convinced of the correctness of the Tories'

N IRELAND : CONTAINMENT
economic policy, even if it has done little for Northern Ireland .
There is an echo here of the class divisions in Unionism . The
OUP leaders fear the economic-political consequences of
Paisley-style populism . They recognise that the coherence of
Northern Ireland's traditional industrial base is gone for ever
and that a semi-autonomous Northern Ireland dominated by
Paisley would be beleagured economically and politically .
Despite their support for `containment' in some
respects, Unionists have been reluctantly forced to recognise
the periodic internationalising of the Northern Ireland
problem . Although opposed to the EEC in principle, for
example, they have been forced to recognise it as a source of
funds, even funds jointly administered by British and Irish
governments . They have also been forced to debate the use of
plastic bullets in the European Parliament, a long step from
their successful policy of precluding discussion of the internal
affairs of Northern Ireland in the British Parliament until the
late 1960s! The OUP have appealed to both the European
Court of Human Rights and Amnesty International on behalf
of Loyalist rights to `security', although these have been rather
pale shadows of similar Republican moves . Various elements
within Unionism favour cross-border cooperation, provided it
is non-institutionalised and confined to economic and security
matters, although they are always open to attacks from Paisley
for consorting with `enemies of the state' . `Modernising'
Unionists, however, such as Craig and McCartney, are even
prepared to go a bit further and encourage Garrett Fitzgerald's
version of Anglo-Irish cooperation, provided it strengthens the
position of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom . At
the ideological level, one of the main strengths of `modernising'
unionism is that it appears to fit well with Thatcherism . Her
authoritarian populism strikes a responsive chord in Orange
populism with its commitment to a `Great' Britain, and a strong
state, united against its enemies, suffused with popular adulation of the monarchy . Prior and Gowrie's recognition of the
existence of Irish nationalist aspirations in Northern Ireland
can even be swallowed by right wing Tories and Official
Unionists, if nationalism's militant expression is crushed and its
`political expression' is permanently denied access to real political power .

Translated to Northern Ireland, Tory authoritarian populism

becomes a sectararian populism of sorts . It is somewhat removed from Paisley's variety in that the latter incroporates
elements of rather archaic anti-popery and a willingness to

87

Conclusion

CAPITAL AND CLASS

88

raise private `armies' to enforce `the Queen's writ' . Nevertheless, in many respects Tory ideology in Northern Ireland
welds together elements of Paisleyism and Official Unionism .
After all, local security is increasingly in the hands of a Protestant police force and Ulster Defence Regiment, the Ulster
Defence Association (the largest Loyalist paramilitary group)
remains unproscribed, enforced powersharing and imposed
cross-border political links appear to be off the agenda . The
basis for this policy was laid under the Mason administration,
although under the Tories it has been tied to a revitalised
British nationalism which is adding new political and ideological dimensions to sectarian divisions in Northern Ireland .
The contradictions are sharper than under Labour, however,
when sectarian division was being modernised and refurbished
in a period of growing state intervention and public expenditure behind an exaggerated rhetoric of Labourism . Under
the Tories `containment' is pursued in a context of contraction
in both the public and private sectors . Ironically, this means
reducing the British state's direct contribution to the Northern
Ireland economy at a time when British unity is being stressed .
It is a point which does not escape the Paisley wing of Unionism
and, combined with exercises in `international cooperation'
with the Irish Republic, lends credence to his doctrine of
`conditional loyalty' .
Although Labour Direct Rule presided over a rapidly
declining industrial base, the fully-fledged Tory policy of
`making Britiain competitive' has even more disastrous implications for a local economy with over 120,000 unemployed
(22%) : more than the total left in manufacturing industry . The
Northern Ireland economy is now more `open' than ever before
with the contraction of agricultural employment and the collapse of local capital . The accelerating dynamics of international capital is mirrored in the fact that the Northern Ireland
linen industry lasted for two hundred years, the synethic fibres
industry for twenty and De Lorean for two . `Containment'
certainly lacks a neat economic basis . While we have detailed
here its ideological success, it must be recognised that the
success is not total ; there is what might be called seepage at
several points . There is a sense, for example, in which
Northern Ireland has become a laboratory for the `strong state'
- a series of trials for dealing with political dissent . The
Northern Ireland crisis has already prompted significant erosions of civil liberties in both Britain and the Irish Republic, not
to mention Northern Ireland itself (see Rolston and Tomlinson, 1982) .
The effects within Northern Ireland are even more far-

N . IRELAND

89

reaching . Ten years of Direct Rule, informed by Labour and

Tory versions

of 'containment', has presided over 2,500 deaths,

an unparalleled depth of sectarian division and repression, a

series of failed constitutional experiments, an unprecedented
unemployment rate, and the first decennial decline in population since the late nineteenth century, due to mass emigration . It is surely time for a fundamental reappraisal of 'containment', a policy which has served the stability of British (and
possibly Southern Irish) politics well, but has failed miserably
to address the visions enshrined at the root of the Northern
Ireland statelet .

1 . The cost should not be underestimated, however. One measure

of it, chosen at random, is that between 1971 and 197834,981,578 was
paid out by the NIO in criminal injury claims arising from the
'troubles', and 234,487,561 in criminal damage claims (figures from
Ulster Year Books for the years in question) .
Quotations from NIO ministers are from the daily press releases
2.
supplied by the Northern Ireland Information Service at Stormont .
The date of the press release is given here in each case .
Talking of wage claims by workers in Northern Ireland, Adam
3.
Butler said (25 .1 .82) : 'Of course, one of the consequences of high
unemploymnet is that the importance of having a job ranks more
highly in a man's consideration . Hopefully the prospect of retaining
that job, and the need to ensure more jobs for future generations, will
weigh heavily with him in contemplating present action' .
4.
The Northern Ireland Economic Council is a consultative body
made up of employers, trade unionists and civil servants . It is the only
regular source of published comment and analysis on the Northern
Ireland economy . By and large, it has been critical of Tory economic
policy and has questioned Tory claims that public expenditure in
Northern Ireland is over 30% higher on average than in Britain .
5.
The government has just announced the prospective establishment of a second Enterprise Zone in Northern Ireland, this time in an
as yet unspecified area west of the Bann .
6.
' . . .the activities df the paramilitaries, and indeed the recent
tensions created by extremist politicans on both sides of the sectarian
divide, have made it very difficult to attract such (inward) investment .
Unless we can improve the image of the province, or until the province
takes its own image into its own hands, ordinary men and women in
Northern Ireland will continue to lose their jobs" (Lord Gowrie,
11 .2 .82 .)

Notes

CAPITAL AND CLASS

90

7.
In addition the NIO staff were busy churning out booklets for
foreign consumption, such as H Blocks : the Reality (1980), H Blocks:
the Facts (1980), Day to Day Life in Northern Ireland Prisons (1981)
and H Blocks : What the Papers Say (1981) and the Foreign Office
invested over f100,000 in an hour-long documentary purporting to tell
the 'real facts' of Northern Ireland to Northern American audiences .
8.
Her degree of success in gaining Haughey's acquiescence on
Northern Ireland made her all the more irritated when he stepped out
of line on the :'Falklands' crisis itself . Haughey's action here may be
read as evidence of the Irish government's growing disenchantment
with the Anglo-Irish process, a fact confirmed by parliamentary statements and ministerial summonses in July 1982 .
9.
Gowrie is the only NIO minister who referred to 'cross-border'
or 'North-South' cooperation ; see for example, 5 .5 .82 .
10 .
The Prior administration, and notably Lord Growrie, himself
an Irish citizen, has been more explicit in recognizing the two traditions in Northern Ireland . This recognition has been largely rhetorical,
however, and has masked pro-Unionist moves on a practical political
level .

References
Hackett, General Sir J . (1979) 'Containing the Explosive Mixture',
Hibernia, 9 .8 .79 .
Hawthorne, J . (1981) Reporting Violence : Lessons from Northern
Ireland, ,(BBC)
Morrissey, M . (1981) 'Economic Change and Political Strategy in
Northern Ireland', Economic Bulletin, 8
NIEC, (1981) Employment Patterns in Northern Ireland, 1950-1980,
Report 23
NIEC, (1982) Economic Assessment, Report 28
O'Dowd, L . (1982) 'Regionalism and Social Change in Northern
Ireland', in Kelly, M ; O'Dowd, L ; Wickham, J (eds) Power, Conflict
and Inequality, (Turoe Press/Marion Boyars forthcoming)
O'Dowd, L ; Rolston, B ; Tomlinson, M . (1980) Northern Ireland :
Between Civil Rights and Civil War, (CSE Books)
Rea, D . (ed) (1982) Political Cooperation in Divided Societies, (Gill
and Macmillan)
Rolston, B ; Tomlinson, M. (1982) . Spectators at the "Carnival of
Reaction"? Analysing Political Crime in Ireland', in Kelly, M et al
(eds), op cit.
Rowthorn, B . (1981) 'Northern Ireland : An Economy in Crisis',
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 5(1)
SDLP, (1980) Local Government in Northern Ireland : a Portrait of
Future Regional Government?, Belfast, February
Smyth, C . (1981) 'Counting the Cost of Paisley Politics', Irish Times,
21 .11 .81 .

Willi Semmler

Theories of competition
and monopoly
A NUMBER of US Marxists characterise the contemporary stage

of capitalism as that of monopoly capitalism . These analysts,

including Baran, Sweezy, Steindl, O'Connor and Sherman,
distinguish between two stages of capitalist development : the
stage of free competition and the stage of monopoly capitalism .
They maintain that competitive capitalism revealed an inherent
tendency towards the formation of monopolies at the end of
the 19th Century as evidenced by the growth of large units of
capital . Monopolies are now a general phenomenon (see Baran/
Sweezy 1966, p18) . The market prices of monopolised commodities were raised and `the equal profit rates of competitive
captialism (were) turned into a hierarchy of profit rates, highest
in the most completely monopolised industries, the lowest in
the most competitive', (Sweezy, 1968, p285) .
From these observations the theorists of monopoly
capitalism conclude, first, that the law of value as a law of
regulation of exchange values in competitive capitalism is no
longer valid . They argue that monopoly prices cannot be derived
from values as was previously possible (Sweezy, 1979) . Accordingly, prices become an arbitrary phenomenon and the law
of value is valid only for the economy as a whole . For prices a
law no longer exists . Or, as Sweezy expresses it : `No reasonably
general laws of monopoly price have been discovered because
none exist' . (Sweezy 1970, p271) . The second conclusion is that

91

CAPITAL AND CLASS

92

monopoly prices and a hierarchy of profit rates between

monopolised and non-monopolised industries, or between large
and small firms, lead to stagnation and increasing instability in
the monopoly stage of capitalism .
This view of contemporary capitalism has become very
popular, especially since the publication of Baran and Sweezy's
book, `Monopoly Capital' in the 1960s . However, many other
Marxists have felt that the notions of competition and monopoly
used by these authors are based more on the orthodox theory
of perfect/imperfect competition than on the notions of competition worked out by Marx in his economic writings . As a
result the following questions have been raised :
Have the theories of monopoly capitalism correctly
interpreted the Marxist (and the classical) notion of competition
and can 20th Century Capitalism be adequately interpreted as
`a stage of monopoly capitalism'?
Is it correct to refer to writers who followed Marx,
such as Lenin, Hilferding, Bucharin and Varga, as the
forerunners of the theory of monopoly capitalism, or does this
neglect important streams of thinking in Marxist theory?
Is there sufficient empirical evidence of monopoly
prices persistently above prices of production and a persistent
hierarchy of profit rates, to support their position?
If differential profit rates between or within industries
really exist can they not be explained on the basis of the
classical and Marx's own theory of competition? Is a new
framework really necessary?
Don't we need to distinguish between the notion of
monopoly, which refers to market power, and the socioeconomic power of large units of capital (or in other terms
between monopoly power and corporate power?)
In the first part of this paper I will compare the neoclassical and classical theories of competition with Marx's own
theory and that of Marxist writers that followed him . In the
second part, I will discuss the empirical evidence on monopoly
prices, monopoly profit rates and a hierarchy of profit rates .
The third part asks whether the empirical `fact' of differential
profit rates contradicts the theoretical position of classical and
Marxist political economy . In the last part of the paper, I will
return to the difference between so called `monopoly power'
and `the power of large units of capital' .

Neoclassical
Theory

Neoclassical economists often consider the classical theorists to

be the founders of neoclassical general competitive analysis,
(Arrow/Hahn 1971, p2, and Stigler 1957) . There are of course

COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY

some elements in classical theory, particularly in Smith's work
The Wealth of Nations, which lend themselves to the neoclassical conception of economic life (see Smith 1974, Chapter
VII) . Competition in Smith's sense meant `free competition' :
everyone should act according to their self interests . There
should be no barriers to economic activities . The market is the
place where individuals and their interests are co-ordinated
and disturbances eliminated . The fundamental mechanism that
produces an efficient allocation of resources is the supply and
demand mechanism . Moreover, this mechanism is considered
to be the only economic institution that can guarantee freedom,
equality and justice for the individual .
Neoclassical writers extended this aspect of Smith's
theory of a market system by formulating several conditions
under which efficient resource allocation and an optimum level
of social welfare would be realised . The main conditions
necessary for a perfectly working competitive market system
are seen as : profit maximising producers and utility maximising
consumers ; a sufficiently large number of market agents ; no
externalities among their activities ; perfect mobility of
resources between industries ; and perfect foresight . Given
these preconditions the competitive process guarantees that
prices converge towards equilibrium prices . This allows a
continuing exchange of commodities between market
participants . Not only is the existence of equilibrium prices
guaranteed by the market system, but the elimination of
disturbances and an optimal allocation of resources is brought
about by competition .
These characteristics of the standard neoclassical view of
competition require some qualification . First, this theory of
competition can be seen as a `quantity theory of competition' .
(Weeks, 1978) . The intensity of competition in the market, for
example, among producers, is measured by the quantity of
firms in the industry . It is assumed that the larger the number of
firms the closer to the optimum level the results will be .
Second, a central and major assumption is that prices and
quantities converge towards an equilibrium driven by
competitive forces . Disequilibrium between supply and
demand will be eliminated by price and quantity reactions and
exogenous distortions of the market mechanisms will disappear
in the course of time . A change in the technique used by
producers and a change in their structure will, after a short
adjustment time, lead to a new competitive equilibrium .
Equilibrium will not be brought about by a violent equalisation
of disequilibrium (by a crisis, Marx assumed) but is a result of a
continuous and smooth process of convergence . A third

93

CAPITAL AND CLASS

94

-- No . 1, Spring 81 : Wallisch-Prinz, The Positivist Dispute ; Parker,

Neopositivism and Dialectics ; Jones, Technocratic or Critical L6

Analysis; Krueger and Silvers, Student Protest ; Wexler, Critical
Social Psychology ; Lichtman, Accumulation, Time and Aging . _
No .,,e
2 Fall 81 : Brown Antipsychiatry and the Lft
; Wl
exer,
Intimacy : The End of Society ; Jones, Critique of Empathic
,uads
Reason : Kohut's Narcissism ; Krueger, Disappearance of the T
Subject; Kuehn ,,
Expe rience as Mediation ; Koebrich The
Unconscious and Society . We welcome manuscripts which
e
treat issues in psychology from a critical social perspective .
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99

COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY

characteristic of the neoclassical view is the exclusion of
uncertainty, risk and expectation - all factors which are very
important elements in the capitalist mode of production .
Once these idealised market conditions are accepted as
prerequisities for perfect competition and the achievement of a
social welfare optimum, deviations can consequently be considered as leading to `imperfect', `restricted' or 'monopolisitc'
competition . Deviations are caused by (1) industrial concentration which allows a greater share of the market for leading
firms, (2) coalitions, agreements and collusion among participants in the market, and (3) a limited mobility of resources
between different industries (market entry and exit barriers) .
All three factors allow leading firms to influence prices and
quantities by witholding production and raising prices . Thus
once the theory of perfect competition is accepted, the notion
of monopoly or oligopoly power is determined in advance by
the assumptions and treated as an anomaly . Deviations from
`competitive prices' and the existence of differential profit rates
are then left to be accounted for by a theory of `imperfect
competition' .

Although neo-classical economists trace their theoretical roots

back to Smith, classical political economy (Smith, Ricardo)
developed a notion of competition and long-run equilibrium
that is different from the neoclassical theory of perfect competition . The main features of classical political economy are the
concept of reproduction and social surplus, a concept of a
centre of gravity for market prices, and a particular notion of
`equilibrium' . These three features are closely related to the
particular concept of competition found in classical political
economy . Classical political economy assumed that once the
technical conditions of production (i .e . the real wage and
workers per unit of output) are given, the system of production
generates a surplus product that can be distributed among the
remaining classes of society . Since in classical theory workers'
consumption is regarded as a necessary part of the social reproduction, the surplus is defined as : Surplus product = social
product - (replacement of means of production + necessary
consumption) . Competition determines the distribution of the
surplus product, not the size of it .
The values of commodities are seen as determined by
their costs of reproduction . The costs of reproduction of commodities are the centre of gravity for market prices, around
which actual prices fluctuate . Adam Smith called this centre of
gravity natural prices . These are composed of the rewards of

95

The Classical
Theory of
Competition

CAPITAL AND CLASS

96

the factors of production (wages, profits, and rent) . The natural

prices of commodities and factors of production, in Smith's
sense, which together form the centre of gravity for the movement of market prices, are independent of supply and demand .
Natural prices are the long-run effects of competition, which,
according to Smith, determine `the natural employment of
each factor of production' . It is assumed that rates of return on
factors of production are equalised as a result of the tendency
of factors to move from areas of low to high returns .
Assuming equalised prices of production and abstracting
from the existence of landed property, Smith's natural prices
may be expressed as vertically integrated wages and profits .
Thus we can write the price of the commodity i as : pi = wi + rri,
where wi and rri are the vertically integrated wages and profits .
This is also called the adding up theory of prices . Relative
prices are then given by the following relation :
Pi _ wi + 'rri
Pj wj + rrj
For Ricardo, the centre of gravity for market prices is
determined by the direct and indirect labour required for the
production of commodities . Relative prices are thus considered
to be a function of the labour embodied in the commodities .
We can express this price determination in the following way :
Pt
= f (,` r )
PJ
where Ai, .\

AJ

represent the labour embodied in the com-

modities, (Shaikh 1976) . Ricardo, especially in his later

writings, also analysed how relative prices are influenced by
changes in the distribution of income between labour and
capital . This labour embodied theory was a good first approximation of a theory of value and of the determination of a
centre of gravity for market prices . However, the classical
theory of price determination should not be interpreted as one
containing an equilibrium price in the sense of the general
equilibrium theory . It is a centre around which actual prices
(market prices) fluctuate . It is not assumed that prices react to
excess supply and demand and converge on an equilibrium .
Classical political economy sees prices as being determined by two elements (Deleplace 1981) . Firstly, natural prices
determine the centres of gravity around which market prices
fluctuate . Then, secondly, supply and demand (the only law
that is fundamental in neo-classical economics) determine the

COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY

fluctuations . This latter element plays a lesser role in classical
theory than in modern competitive equilibrium theory .
Demand and supply, like other forces (e .g . random events,
speculation, restricted mobility of capital or temporary monopolies), cause deviations from the centre, but they do not
determine the centre of gravity itself . It is the failure to grasp
this two step process found in classical economics that marks
the neoclassical theory of competition and price formation .

Compared with Smith and Ricardo, Marx had a very much

more elaborate and differentiated concept of competition . For
Marx competition is the result of the self-expansion of capital
and is related not only to the circulation of commodities but
also to production, realisation and distribution of surplus value .
In production the result of competition between capitals is to
produce surplus value . In circulation, competition of capitals
means extending the market share and improving the conditions of realisation of surplus value . Competition between
different sectors of capital is related to the distribution of
surplus value and tends to equalise rates of profit across all
sectors . For Marx, the regulating centres for market prices are
prices of production, given by (1 + -rr) (c + v), where c and v
represent constant and variable capital, and rr the average rate
of profit . Since prices of production can be derived from values,
market prices are in the last instance regulated by socially
necessary labour time . For Marx competition has two distinct
tasks, that of equalising prices within sectors which leads to the
emergence of different rates of profit within them, and that of
promoting the mobility of capital so as to form an average rate
of profit across different sectors . Competition does not bring
about a smooth process of adjustment and convergence toward
equilibrium prices, but disequilibria and deviations from the
centre of gravity .
Within each industry we can see the existence of differential rates of profit because of the deviation of market
prices from prices of production, following from the fact that
production techniques are not the same for all firms in an
industry . Firms with better techniques can capture surplus
profits . Thus within a single industrial sector, differential profit
rates are quite normal and the existence of differential profit
rates does not contradict Marx's theory of competition . They
do not imply, nor are they identical with, `decreasing competition', `imperfect competition' or monopoly power .
Competition between capitals also means that market
prices are regulated by prices of production and the actual
C&C18-G

97

Marx's theory of
competition and
disequilibrium

CAPITAL AND CLASS

98

profit rates are regulated by the social average . Whereas differential profit rates among capitals within one industry always
exist without any tendency towards equalisation of profit rates,
the question arises as to how long it will take for market prices
to adjust towards prices of production . Another related question is how long it will take for industry profit rates above or
below average to disappear and approach the social average
rate of profit . Marx's answer is that the time required to adjust
supply to demand, market prices to prices of production, and
profit rates to the social average, depends on the concrete
conditions of production and circulation of commodities . The
time required to build up new capacity in industries where the
profit rate is above average, to withdraw money capital from
fields of employment with low profit rates, to produce and
circulate commodities - that is the turnover time of capital - is
different in each industry .
The amount of capital that is necessary to produce at the
socially necessary cost of production also differs between industries . At one level restrictions on the mobility of capital can
be overcome by the credit system, but they nevertheless exist
and are different in each industry . In Marx's theory, these
restrictions on capital and mobility inhibit the tendency towards
equalisation of profit rates between sectors . Thus, supply and
demand may play a certain role in the formation of differential
profit rates . For example, the demand for a commodity increases and the commodity cannot be reproduced immediately
- as a result the market price will rise above the price of
production and an above average profit rate will appear .
Marx then did not assume that profit rates will be
equalised in all spheres of production . The process of competition between capitals produces differential profit rates as
well as an equalisation tendency . As Marx puts it : ' . . . the
average rate of profit does not obtain as a directly established
fact, but rather is to be determined as an end result of the
equalisation of opposite fluctuations', (Marx, Capital Vol III,
p368) . Within the general body of his theory, Marx thus
analyses three main causes of differential profit rates . The first
arises from the differences of productivity of different capitals
within an industry, leading to the emergence of surplus profits
for more efficient capitals and lower profits for the least
efficient capitals . The second occurs when access to the conditions of production is restricted and the entry of new capital,
or the exit of old established capitals, is limited . The third arises
as a result of disequilibrium of supply and demand .

COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY

In the literature which develops a theory of two stages of
capitalist development three causes are posited as the reasons
for the genesis of monopoly capitalism and monopoly profits :
the concentration of production within industries (combined
with centralising of capital across industries), increasing constraints on the mobility of capital because of a high proportion
of fixed capital in certain sectors, and the collusive behaviour of
corporations and trusts .
In the last quarter of the 19th century Engels was already
describing the genesis of trusts and corporations in European
countries . But Hilferding was the first Marxist to systematically
analyse the changing character of capitalism when, in his book,
Finance Capital, he posited that increasing concentration in
production and circulation, together with the formation of
trusts and cartels, marked out a new stage for capitalism . At the
same time he analysed in detail the barriers to capital mobility
across industries, arguing that increasing organic composition
and the accumulation of fixed capital were the most important .
As he saw it, competition was decreasing because competition
between big capital encouraged collusion and the formation of
cartels through which the production and distribution of income
became organised . He saw national cartels as being unstable,
for they would be overcome by trusts and cartels operating on a
world scale . In this way, according to Hilferding, the laws of
motion of capitalism are replaced by regulation . Power becomes
the dominant force in the economy . Concentraton, entry
barriers, and collusion result in monopoly prices, monopoly
profits, and disruption of the tendency towards equalisation of
profit rates . Marx's theories of competition and differential
profit rates are no longer discussed . They are regarded as
obsolete .
Lenin (1965), by referring to the empirical results of
Hilferding, also analysed the replacement of free by monopoly
competition . He, however, considered the capitalist mode of
production as one of self-expansion and accumulation of
capital . He positied that competition is not abolished by concentration but renewed on a higher level, (see also Weeks
1978) . Thus Lenin speaks not only of increased monopoly, but
also of monopolistic competition . Concentration and oligopolisation of industries imply not increased stability but rather
the increased instability of capitalism . Bucharin (1973) another
writer in the twenties, extended Lenin's theory but at the same
time limited it to national capitals on the world market . For
him, competition and rivalry existed only among capitals of
different nations .
Thus, in the early part of the twentieth century, we can

99
Theories of
competition and
monopoly after
Marx

CAPITAL AND CLASS

see different streams in the discussion of the monopolistic stage
of capitalism . One stream emphasises the abolition of competition . Power, especially regarding prices and profits, becomes the dominant force in the economy, bringing about a
persistent hierarchy of profit rates . The other stream keeps
Marx's theory alive, holding that - regardless of the genesis of
monopolies - capitalism is regulated by the self-expansion and
competition of capital . Monopoly profit is related to special
cases (Varga 1968) and, in the long run, is threatened by
competition from other capitals .
Later economists, such as Dobb, Kalecki, Lange,
Sweezy, Steindl and Sherman pick up only one tradition in
Marxian literature by concluding that concentration leads to
the emergence of a persistent hierarchy of profit rates . They no
longer refer to Marx's theory of competition and profit rate
differentials and, in essence, have adopted a neoclassical rather
than Marxist view of competition, within which `imperfect
competition' explains the replacement of the tendency for
profit rates to equalise by a hierarchy of profit rates . Not only
do these theoretical positions neglect a very important stream
of thinking in the earlier literature, the empirical evidence in
support of them is ambiguous as well . A number of empirical
studies of monopolistic and oligopolistic pricing and profit,
differential profit rates, their causes and persistence, have been
made and the next section gives a short survey of their methods
and results . In the following section we will come back to
Marx's theory of competition, by looking at whether it is
contradicted by these empirical studies .

100

Empirical
evidence

There have been a large number of econometric studies of the

effect of monopolisation on the rate of profit, though these
have nearly all been conducted within a neo-classical framework . Nevertheless, an attempt will be made to see what light
they can cast on the debate within marxian economics .
The studies assume that the degree of monopolisation
within an industry is determined by the following factors :
the degree of concentration in the seller market, which is
l.
a measure of the number of independent firms in the market
and their capacity to influence the market prices of
commodities :
the height of entry barriers to industries, which is a
2.
measure of the mobility of capital between industries ; and
the degree of collusion between firms within one industry
3.
or across industries, which is a measure of the extent to which
competition has been eliminated .

COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY

Profits are measured in three different ways . There is the
P-C,

price-cost margin,

where P is the price of comP

modities and C the competititive cost (including a competitive
PC' which
profit rate) . Then there is the profit margin
C

relates profits to the cost of production . Finally, there is the

Tr-T

profit rate,

ar-T

or

' where it is the mass of profit, T is

tax, A is assets, and E is equity . All three measures are

problematic . The profit margin and the price-cost margin do
not measure the profit rate . The profit rate may be above or
below the profit margin . Even with the same profit margins,
profit rates might be different because of industries' different
capital-output ratios . The profit rate is itself an ambiguous
measure of the monopolisation of industries . On the one hand
the cost of maintaining a monopolistic position (such as excess
capacity) may increase the cost of production . Then the
empirically measured profits will differ from real profits . On
the other hand, in the course of time monopoly profits are
generally captialised by firms . This has an effect on assets .
Consequently, if monopoly profits persist over time, the profit
rates of monopoly firms converge towards an average .
Concentration ratios measure the market share of a
certain number of the largest firms within an industry . Those
published by the US Department of Commerce as an approximation for the degree of oligopolisation in industries are too
rough to measure monopoly . The ratios are therefore generally
adjusted for industry groups, for regional markets, for the
distribution of firm size within industries, and for the proportion of imports and exports within industries (see Shepherd
1970) . Yet after all these adjustments, concentration ratios
remain a very rough measure of monopoly because other kinds
of concentration (vertical or conglomerate) which increase
market power within an industry are not considered .
Entry barriers is a concept that was first introduced in
the 1950s by Bain . Four types are referred to in the literature:
product differentiation ; economies of scale ; the absolute cost
advantages for established firms in comparison with new competitors ; and the large minimum capital required to produce
competitively . Product differentiation is measured by the
advertising expenditures of firms . Economies of scale are
measured by the minimum efficient scale of production (the
smallest amount at which all economies of scale are realised) .
Absolute cost advantages can be calculated if the cost of credits,
raw materials, and patents are compared for firms or industries .

101

CAPITAL AND CLASS

102

Capital requirements are usually measured by the amount of

investment in industries or by the capital-output ratios .
Collusion, the cooperative behaviour of capitalists within
industries or across industries, is the most difficult variable to
measure . Since it involves all kinds of formal and informal
agreements among firms, data is largely unavailable . Some
authors have used the number of firms found guilty of cooperative conduct in the US under the Sherman Act, but these
cases can not reveal the real extent of collusion among firms .
The empirical studies have employed four types of
regressions.
1
In earlier studies a very simple type of regression was used
to measure the dependence of profit rates on market power .
Market power is measured by concentration ratios . The
hypothesis is that concentration leads to collusion, and collusion
to higher profit margins or profit rates . Cross-sectional and
time series studies for the 1930s, 40s and 50s usually reveal a
significant positive relation between concentration and profit
rates (see Bain, 1951 ; Schwartzman, 1957 ; Mann, 1966 ; Stigler,
1963 ; Collins & Preston, 1970), although the correlation coefficients are sometimes very low (see Bain) . According to Bain's
results, concentration leads to higher profit when the concentration ratio for eight firms is greater than 70%, and according
to Stigler's results when the concentration ratio for four firms is
greater than 60% .
The methodology and data base employed in these
studies were in the main very weak . Moreover these studies
could riot explain the possible persistence of higher profits due
to concentration in the seller market (see Brozen, 1971 ;
Demsetz, 1973a and 1973b) . It has been argued that competition and rivalry, even among big companies, make the profit
rates of oligopolies converge towards a normal one . Indeed,
once the data employed by Mann and Stigler are reexamined
after including more industries and extending the time period,
profit rates are no longer found to be affected by concentration
(see Brozen, 1971a, 1971b, and 1973) . Furthermore, the persistence of high profit rates has been found to be due, not to
market power but to the higher productivity of firms in
concentrated industries (see Demsetz, 1973a & 1973b) .
Demsetz has shown in numerous studies that a significant
relation between profit rates and concentration ratios exists
only for large firms - those with assets above $50,000,000 . He
therefore concluded that differential profit rates reflect not
market power but the efficiency of large corporations in
concentrated industries .
Multiple regressions have been used to measure the
2.

COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY

dependence of profit rates on barriers to entry . One approach
has been to run one regression for industry groups with a high
level of concentration, and another regression for groups with
low concentration . This is in order to separate the effect on
profit rates of entry barriers from that of concentration . A
number of studies conducted in the 1960s and 70s revealed a
significant positive correlation between high profits (profit
margins or profit rates) and entry barriers (Bain, 1956 Mann,
1966 ; Comanor & Wilson, 1967 ; Stonebraker, 1976 ; Ornstein,
1973 ; Qualls, 1972 & 1974) . They also demonstrated that it is
only when there are high entry barriers that high concentration
ratios have an effect over time on prices and profits . (Potential
competitors could otherwise enter the market and bring down
the profit rate to the average .) If market barriers are low,
concentration ratios do not show any significant positive relation to profit rates ; if there are high entry barriers, high concentration ratios have a significant effect on profit rates (Qualls,
1972 ; Mann, 1966 ; Stonebroker, 1976) .
It has also been shown that there is a large dispersion of
profit rates in industry groups with high entry barriers (see
McNally, 1976) . This is associated with an extension of the
concept of entry barriers to a more general notion . Firstly, it
has been suggested that, when oligopoly groups are threatened
by new entrants, they develop counter-strategies, such as increasing production . Barriers to entry are thus no longer seen
as structural determinants of oligopolistic markets (like economies of scale, heavy capital requirements and concentration),
but as an outcome of the activities of oligopolistic firms themselves . This has been argued since the 1950s by people like
Harrod, Modigliani, Sylos-Labini and Lombardini, and it has
recently been repeated by Caves and Porter (1977) . However,
the strategies and activities of large firms are difficult to
measure, and there are no empirical studies of this .
The second way in which the concept of entry barriers
has been extended is that not just entry barriers but also exit
barriers might cause differential profit rates . Firms might stay
industries with profit rates below the average if there are exit
barriers might cause differential profit rates . Firms might stay in
development, high minimum efficient scale of production and
heavy capital requirements . In an empirical paper Caves and
Porter (1976) showed a significant negative correlation between
exit barriers and profit rates . Since the exit barriers are
measured in almost the same way as entry barriers were before,
the concept of entry barriers has become very ambiguous .
In West Germany, I have found that during the period of
stagnation in the 1970s, profit rates in industries were not
correlated with concentration . Rather they were highly neg-

103

CAPITAL AND CLASS

104

atively correlated with the wage share and capital-output

ratios, the latter being an indicator for the organic composition
of capital (see Semmler, 1979) . This can be explained by capital
not being able to leave the industries even if profit rates are
low : in a period of stagnation and declining demand, entry
barriers turn out to be exit barriers and for some time profit
rates may be below rather than above the average . (This point
was made by Hilferding in Finance Capital .)
These results do not contradict those of earlier studies,
since those related to the more prosperous period of the 1950s
and 60s . Heavy capital requirements and high capital-output
ratios may be barriers to entry, but in a period of stagnation and
declining demand they are also barriers to exit . Thus these
barriers are, in fact, barriers to the mobility of capital . (The
steel industry in the 1970s is a good example of how heavy
capital requirements act as a barrier to the mobility of capital .)
Another type of regression has tried to measure the
3.
effect of collusion on profit rates . In order to distinguish the
effect of collusion from that of other factors, these studies
employ concentration ratios and industry growth rates, as well
as an indicator for collusion, as independent variables . The
results are surprising . Ash and Seneca (1976) found that collusion may be a result of low profits rather than a cause of high
profits . However, since the cooperative activities of firms are
secret, these results may not be very convincing (see Fras &
Grees, 1977) .
4.
Since the rate of profit might be significantly influenced
not only by market power but also by other industry variables
we find a fourth type of regression . In addition to concentration,
these test the influence of supply and demand conditions on the
rate of profit . Proxies for entry barriers might also be included . For
the most part, the hypothesis being tested is that the rate of profit is
more influenced by conditions for the production and realisation of profit than by concentration and entry barriers . These
studies demonstrate that profit rates are significantly related to
productivity, capital-output ratios and unit wage costs in industries (see Bodoff, 1973 and Schwartzman, 1956) and to
growth and demand conditions of industries (see Ornstein,
1973 ; Hall & Weiss, 1974 ; and Winn & Leabo, 1974) . When the
effect of concentration and entry barriers is also taken into
account in multiple regression equations, industry supply and
demand conditions are shown to have a dominant effect on
profit rates (see Ornstein, 1973 and Winn & Leabo, 1974) .
Studies for other countries have demonstrated the same results
(for France, see Deleplace ; for Germany see Sass, 1975 and
Semmler, 1979) . However, these results are convincing only if

COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY

we assume barriers to the mobility of capital .
Finally a few studies discuss the relation between profit
rates and the size and growth rates of firms . None of these
reveals an unequivocal dependence of profit rates on firm size
(see Marcus, 1969 and Ornstein, 1973) . It is usually taken that
medium-sized firms have the highest profit rates and growth
rates (see Stekler, 1963) . However, other studies reveal that it
is not profit and growth rates, but the variance and stability of
profit and growth rates that differ for groups of firms of different
size . Smaller firms may have the same profit rates as big firms,
but their profit rates are more unstable and vary strongly in the
course of the business cycle (see Singh & Whittington, 1968 and
Eatwell, 1971) .
1 Let us now turn to the question of whether the results
of the empirical studies on causes of differential profit rates
contradict the Marxian theory of competition outlined earlier
in this article . As shown above, one type of empirical study was
concerned with differentials in industry supply and demand
conditions and their consequences for differential profit rates .
Studies available from the U .S ., France, Canada and Germany
reveal a remarkable influence of productivity, capital-output
ratio, wage share, share of exports to sales and growth rates, on
differential profit rates . Those differentials of profit rates can
be explained easily by the Marxian theory of competition .
According to this theory, supply and demand are never equal .
Differences in profit rates caused by differences in productivity,
capital-output ratio, wage share and growth rates of industries
may be explained by differences in time to adjust supply to
demand - that is to say, the time to build up new capacity, to
produce and circulate commodities where the profit rate is
high, and to reduce capacity and withdraw capital from industries with low profit rates . The circuit of capital takes time,
and this period of time varies among industries . Thus, disequilibria between supply and demand caused by those natural
restrictions on capital mobility cause deviations of market prices
from prices of production . This seems to be the reason that
empirical tests reveal a strong relation between supply and
demand conditions of industries and differentials of profit rates .
Another type of study refers not to those natural causes
2.
of restricted capital mobility but to the monopolization of
industries, concentration, entry barriers and collusion - the
main reasons for differential profit rates . Most of the recent
studies have revealed that there is no persistence of profit rate
differentials solely due to concentration . High entry barriers
(product differentiation, large-scale production, absolute cost

105

Modern studies
and Marxian
Theory

CAPITAL AND CLASS

106

advantages, heavy capital requirements, high capital-output

ratios, and entry-preventing strategies of oligopoly groups)
which deter new competitors and allow entry-preventing pricing
are necessary preconditions for a decreasing internal competition in industries . High profits are revealed only when high
concentration is correlated with high entry barriers . On the
other hand, unconcentrated industries with homogenous commodities, small-scale production, low capital requirements,
low capital-output ratios, numerous firms and an ease of entry
result in a profit rate below the average, according to the
empirical literature . But these results should be questioned in
light of several considerations :
First of all, these empirical results do not mean that there
is a stable and persistent hierarchy of profit rates in the long
run, or even in the course of the business cycle . Studies for the
seventies have revealed that entry barriers turn out to be exit
barriers in periods of stagnation and declining demand . Largescale production, high capital requirements and high capitaloutput ratios are synonymous with a high proportion of fixed
capital in industries . Large capital losses will be the result if the
capacity has to be adjusted to declining demand . The rate of
profit will fall when capital is unable to adjust sufficiently
quickly by vacating a particular industry . Not concentration
and entry barriers specifically, but barriers to capital mobility
in general seem to be the reason for differential profit rates .
Mobility barriers are different across industry . For industries where the period of adjustment is longer the profit rate
will stay above or below the average much longer than in
industries with low capital requirements and ease of entry . The
mobility of capital 1 the period of adjustment towards an
average profit rate are different . This is confirmed by the
empirical tests of concentration and entry barriers . The empirical data can be interpreted in such a way that the profit rates
in industries with heavy capital requirements fluctuate much
more slowly than in so-called `competitive industries' . Industries with fewer suppliers and high entry barriers may require
a longer adjustment time to reach an average profit than other
industries . But, nonetheless, their profit rate is regulated by the
average rate of profit . (This conclusion can also be drawn from
empirical observation of price movements in so-called oligopolized sectors where the price movements are much slower
than in competitive sectors) . On the other hand, the degree of
concentration, large scale capital requirements, and capital
output ratios, do not remain constant in the face of capital
accumulation and growth . Industries with a small scale of
production, low capital requirements, and low capital-output

COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY

ratios can develop into large-scale, capital intensive industries .
This happened in most consumer goods industries and even in
the service sector in the post-war period . Those industries now
have high entry barriers and profit rates above the average .
However, a small number of firms, high entry barriers,
and the possibility of collusion, does not mean that the competition among capitals is abolished . As Marx and a certain
stream in the post-Marxian literature assume, regardless of
concentrated and centralized capital, capitalism is regulated by
the self-expansion and accumulation of independent units of
capital . Competition among capitals in production, realization
and distribution of surplus value cannot be abolished by concentration and entry barriers . In production, the aim of capital
is to produce surplus profit by inventing new methods of production, increasing the productivity of labour, and decreasing
the cost of production . In circulation, the purpose is to improve
the conditions of realization of surplus value by extending the
market share . Intersectoral competition, carried out at the
level of investments, is related to the distribution of surplus
value . The principle of competition is to cheapen the commodities by changing methods of production and capital
accumulation .
While fewer independent units of capital in production
and heavy capital requirements interdependence among capitals . Product differentiation also has a very ambiguous effect
on competition . If the product is differentiated, a monopolistic
position can arise, but at the same time new products can be
invented as substitutues for old products by new capitalists .
These two considerations lead us to conclude that concentration and entry barriers might decrease competition temporarily in the market and market prices can rise above prices
of production temporarily . Since entry barriers are also exit
barriers, monopoly profit is related to special conditions and
cases, and may, for example in the case of strong exit barriers,
turn into heavy losses, (see the U .S . car and steel industries at
the end of the '70s) . Moreover, in the long run it is threatened
by the self-expansion of, and competition with, other capitals .
3 . Differential profit rates among firms are to be found in
many studies . But there are no studies that can support the
hypothesis that the profit rate varies only with firm size . Rather,
they demonstrate differences in the variance and stability of
profit rates among small and big firms . This finding is also
consistent with empirical results about price changes in
`oligopolistic' and `competitive' sectors during the business
cycle . 'Oligopolistic prices' show more rigid and stable prices
than the sectors with small firms, where prices fluctuate very

107

CAPITAL AND CLASS

108

much in the course of the business cycle . The smaller dispersion

of the profit rates of big corporations in comparison to small
firms, is only an expression of the fact that the profit rates of the
big firms are much closer to the average rate of profit whereas
the profit rates of the small firms fluctuate much more around
the average rate of profit (see Clifton, 1977) . Moreover, differentials in profit rates among firms in a particular industry and
between firms within concentrated and unconcentrated industries do not contradict the Marxian theory of competition
and prices of production as the center of gravity . Within industries, there are always capitals with lower or higher costs of
production because of different techniques used by different
firms within one industry . At the same market price, or price of
production, the firms have different cost prices, and thus
different profit rates . Thus, different rates of profit among
firms is not not necessarily a sign of monopoly power .
4.
Many studies reveal differences in price-cost margins
(P-C
P - C

), in profit margins ( C
)' or in mark-ups
P
(MC + W) (1 + A) among industries or firms (MC = material
cost, W = wages, (1 + A) = mark-up) . In linear regressions,
concentration and entry barriers are correlated with price-cost
margins profit margins or mark-ups (see Qualls, 1972 and
1974) . But, nonetheless, significant positive results are not
equivalent to differentials of profit rates due to concentration
P - C - rK = PP C C = rK'
and entry barriers . Since p
CX and
Px '
(MC + W) (1 + A) = MC + W +!KwhereKisthecapitalx
X
output ratio, differences in price-cost margins, profit margins
and mark-ups might reflect only differences in the capitaloutput ratios or in the organic composition of capital among
industries or firms . Since, in concentrated industries or industries with high entry barriers, the capital-output ratios are
mostly higher (see Ornstein/Weston, 1973), the firms or industries might have the same profit rates, but different pricecost margins, profit margins or mark-ups . Moreover,
calculated mark-ups by firms - since Kalecki a sign of
monopolistic stage of capitalism and imperfect competition do not contradict the classical theory of prices of production
and the center of gravity concept . The mark-up over prime cost
- in Kalecki's theory a measure of the degree of monopoly
power - might only be another expression for the uniform
profit
rate .
The
mark-up over prime cost is
A =
r K
MC+ w x Thus, the mark-up must be different in

COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY

109

industries where the capital-output ratio (K) is different,

x
whereas the profit rate r may be the same in all industries . The
mark-up is equal to profit rate only if we assume one-year
turnover, and thus equate stock and flow (see also Brody
1974 :89) . Thus, we can conclude that empirical observations
about different mark-ups in so-called oligopolized and nonoligopolized industries and different changes in mark-ups in
the long run or in the course of the business cycle do not
confirm increasing market power or profit rates in so-called
oligopolized sectors, and do not contradict the classical and the
Marxian theory .
Summing up, we can say that the numerous econometric
studies conducted mostly by orthodox economists do not provide clear cut support for the monopoly capital hypothesis,
wherein, oligopolized industries and/or large scale firms should
show profit rates persistently above average profit rates . Indeed,
as the studies show, differential profit rates can exist for a
considerable time, but whereas differential profit rates among
firms clearly can be expected from the Marxian theory of
competition, differential profit rates between different industries do not contradict the Marxian theory .

Institutional changes in the structure of capital do not

necessarily mean that firms have extended their power over all
markets where they operate and can now control their external
environment . However it can be said that large corporations as large units of capital - have extended their power over
production processes . Yet, assuming these kinds of institutional
changes does not mean that we get into conflict with the
Marxian theory of competition . In the following I want to put
forward four tentative hypotheses that may help to initiate a
further discussion of large corporations .
1.
It is obvious that large corporations cannot be considered
as `powerless' single-product firms located in certain industries
and regions, and limited in their economic mobility . The large
corporations, as multi-product and multi-plant corporations,
are large scale units of capital and have many production
processes in many industries and regions at their disposal .
What Marx analysed in Vol . I of Capital as the power of capital
over the production process and the disposal of workers over
the production process and the disposal of workers and means
of production has been realized with the growth of large scale
firms . However the power over production processes has,
according to Marx, another expression : it is the disposal over

Monopoly
Power and
Corporate
Power

CAPITAL AND CLASS

110

large financial resources (money capital) . Multi-plant and

multi-product corporations have such resources at their disposal
and can increase their money capital almost independently
from monetary policy of central banks . Moreover, this allows
them to allocate capital to different industries and countries
and to shift resources from one industry to another and from
one region and country to another . Moreover, with their
financial power, they can resist the unionization of industries or
firms and resist wage and other demands of unions .
It follows that those large units of capital, which organize
production across industries, regions and countries, are more
powerful than single monopolies, which are located only in one
industry and are a result of a certain market structure . We can
therefore say that neither the `locus nor the nature of the
economic power from which these contemporary problems
stems has anything to do with the market, let alone a monopoly
position in the market .' (Clifton 1979, p .3) There are many
ways in which these large units of capital can escape the constraints of the monetary and fiscal policy . In addition to the use
of their independent financial power to escape from monetary
constraints these include : the use of the method of transfer
pricing to minimize tax burdens ; shifts in productive capital or
money capital from high to low wage countries ; and variations
in the rate of production in different countries or regions when
threatened by a labor unrest (see Clifton 1979, p .3) . These
large corporations as units of large capital obviously possess
economic power beyond market power . This power rarely has
anything to do with market structure and the degreee of concentration of industries where they operate ; it has more to do
with aggregate concentration, absolute size, and power over
production processes .
Analysis of the changes in the structure and power of the
2.
large units of capital does not lead to rejection of the Marxian
theory of competition, value and prices of production . According to Marx, the units of capital - represented, for example,
today by multi-plant and multi-product corporations - are
concerned with the reproduction and self-expansion of capital .
Self-expansion of capital - the growth of the firm - is (as widely
accepted) the aim of large corporations . For the Marxian theory
of competition, the competitive fights of capitals are a result of
the self-expansion of capital . Fewer units of capital does not
imply decreased competition and decreased rivalry . Concentration and centralization of capital also does not mean less
mobility of capital, as maintained in the post-Marxian theory of
monopoly . On the contrary, we can see that historically, as the
units of capital have become larger, the mobility of capital -

COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY

especially of money capital - has increased . The large units of
capital, i .e ., modern corporations, are independent centres of
financial power ; they can shift money capital quite easily (see
Clifton 1977) from one region to another and from one industry
to another when the competitive fight of capitals makes such
actions necessary . The traditional notion of `monopoly', however, only refers to a market structure which differs from
`perfect competition' in that it has fewer units of production
and less mobility of physical resources leading to less competition and more monopoly power . But, in the Marxian sense,
less `perfect competition' does not mean less competition .
Thus, large units of capital do not imply that the degree of
competition and rivalry decrease . Competition is the result of
self-expansion of capital . One of the main fields where the
battle of competition is fought is `cost competition', or, as Marx
put it, competition is a battle for `cheapening the commodity'
(see Shaikh 1978) .
According to the theory of monopoly, which is oriented
3.
to the market structure of industries, more monopoly power
means monopoly prices and monopoly profit rates . From
monopoly as a general phenomenon (see Baran/Sweezy 1966,
Ch . I) it follows that the theory of value has to be rejected
because laws of prices can no longer be analyzed . We cannot
necessarily draw these conclusions if we look at monopoly from
the point of view of large units of capital or large corporations .
The existence of corporate power, or power of large units of
capital, does not necessarily mean that there will be prices
which persistently deviate from prices of production and that
there will be a hierarchy of profit rates . As shown in many
recently published articles, the pricing procedure of large corporations does not contradict the classical and the Marxian
theory of process of production as center of gravity of market
prices . The pricing method of large corporations or oligopolies
in industries is oriented toward long-run normal cost, long-run
normal output and long-run prices . Administered prices,
mark-up pricing and target rate of return pricing can be seen as
different, but only slightly varying, methods to calculate a
long-run centre of gravity for prices which guarantee an average
rate of return on investment for large corporations or their
operating divisions, and thus guarantee a steady rate of the
self-expansion of capital . The recent discussion on pricing
methods of oligopolies or large corporations (see, for example,
Coutts/Godley/Noodhaus, Eichner, Clifton) show that pricing
methods observed for oligopolized industries or for corporations do not contradict the classical and Marxian theory of
gravity centre but, on the contrary, are quite consistent with it .

111

CAPITAL AND CLASS

112

4.
These two different concepts - the concept of monopoly
power and the concept of the power of the large units of capital
- lead to different political implications . The concept of
monopoly power or market power implies that the market
structure has to be controlled and regulated by the state (antitrust policy for regulating the market shares of firms) . If we
refer to the power of large units of capital - a power beyond
market power and a competition beyond firm competition in
industries - the aim of the policy should be the control and
regulation not of market shares but of the financial resources,
investment and production of the large corporations . This
concept of regulating economic power, which is widely discussed in Europe, especially among trade unions in Italy,
Germany and France, goes beyond the traditional anti-trust
policy .

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COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY

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Epstein, E .M . (1979) Firm Size and Structure : Market Power and
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COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY

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XLI, 1977 .

117

A SOCIALIST

>-

GK IN
CAPITALIST
BRITAIN?
THE LEFT in England has rarely given a

LU

4<
Cie
FF~~~

high priority to involvement in local

government . There are honourable and
even heroic exceptions, the most notable
being Poplar in the 20s and Clay Cross in
the 70s . In recent years, however, there
has been a significant revival of interest and
activity around local government issues on
the Left . This is more than a localised
phenomenon . In most of the major conurbations : London, Manchester, the West
Midlands, Sheffield, Leeds, the younger
generation of the Left of the Labour Party
have made city or county councils their
target for control, with varying degrees
of success . Where the Left has achieved a
majority, however precarious, it often has
created new policy units within the town
and country halls staffed by committed
socialists sympathetic to the Labour
group's programme. Employment policy
has been in high priority for these Labour
groups and in three authorities new,
committed officers have been recruited to
Economic Policy Units/groups/Departments to elaborate and implement interventionist strategies to save and create
jobs .
Both the councillors and officers involved in this work are embarking on an
experiment which, though unlikely to
make a significant dent on Thatcher's
unemployment figures, could generate
important ideas and examples for future
socialist economic strategies . It is for this
reason that the Capital and Class editorial
collective believe it is important to monitor

CAPITAL AND CLASS

118 and to generate debates on these experiments from an early stage . We hope this
will be useful both to the comrades involved and to the socialists engaged on
other fronts. In this issue, we have produced an `interim report' on the first five
months of the GLC's Economic Policy
Group . We hope this will be followed by
reports on Sheffield and the West
Midlands . At this stage we are presenting
the policies and intentions of those in the
GLC in their own terms rather than
from a critical point of view . We feel
this is the best way to start the discussion .
The report is based on the Economic
Policy Group's reports as agreed by the
Industry and Employment Committee of
the GLC (these are publically available
from County Hall, London SE1) and on
discussions with councillors and members
of the EPG .

THIS SUMMER a grim new `sight'

greeted tourists as they walked over
Westminster Bridge . A vast white banner
strung across the riverside roof of the
Greater London Council's County Hall
announces the hundreds of thousands of
Londoners who are on the dole . This
month, August 82, the numbers are
379,539 . The banner is pointed accusingly
towards the Houses of Parliament,
towards the Government . For the Labour
GLC is under no illusion that the high
unemployment figures are a `regional
problem' caused and solved at a regional
level . The recession and the restructuring
taking place in its wake, are an international process, exacerbated by
government policies ; not to be halted or
reversed by regional or local action alone .
What then you might ask can socialists
achieve as far as job creation is concerned
through a regional authority with limited
powers? How can they save or create
jobs against the rough grain of government policy and international restruct-

uring . Won't any financial initiatives they

take outside the government's highly
controlled interest rate structure be
clobbered by Heseltine? If a socialist
policy for transport, an area over which
local authorities can - or used to - have
some control is seriously undermined,
how much less hope is there of a socialist
local authority having any influence on
unemployment, a problem which is so
clearly the result of national and international forces, and over which local
government has traditionally exercised
minimal powers . You would be right to
be cynical if socialists at the GLC based
their work on the belief that socialism
can be achieved through a strategy of
controlling the municipalities, just as
similar criticisms could be made of people
who generalise from their trade union
base or their womens movement involvement to a strategy for socialism through
trade union action alone, or exclusively
through feminism . Members of the GLC's
Economic Policy Group and the councillors with whom they work, see themselves as engaged on one particular front
This front, London's County Hall, is
a front which has its own peculiar
trenches : fifteen miles of corridors, eight
different restaurants for different types
of people as well as different tastes ; and a
rigid hierarchy of grades and functions .
It has its own particular weaponry : the
financial resources and political authority
of an elected part of the state . And the
Left are under bombardment from representatives of the enemy with which
some of them, at any rate, had not come
into direct combat before : notably top
local government officials . Though these
do not constitute a united, or by any
means entirely hostile, force .
Moreover, the terrain has shifted
dramatically from that to which socialists
had been accustomed between 1968 and
the late 70s . That is, the strength and
confidence of the Labour movement has

SOCIALIST GLC?

been significantly, though not totally,

undermined . So for that matter has much
of the Labour movement's traditional
sources of political strength . The Left
did not win control at County Hall as a
consequence of an upsurge in the strength
and confidence of the Labour movement .
Labour's (precarious) success was the
result mainly of Tory unpopularity,
though the cheap fares policy undoubtedly had an influence . The Left's
dominant position (again, precarious)
within the Labour group was achieved
after ten years or so of deft organising in
local Labour parties and Borough Labour
groups culminating in a concerted effort
to be selected as candidates for winnable
GLC constituencies . The Left that carried
out this takeover was itself the product of
the struggles of the late '60s and early
'70s but its organised base in the 1980s is
limited to constituency party activists like
themselves, the diffuse network of
feminists, black and other radical organisations plus a small layer of committed
trade unionists . This gap between the
strength (however limited) of the left's
political position and its industrial and
social weakness is a major problem
running though the work of the GLC's
Industry and Employment Committee
(IEC) and the Economic Policy Group
(EPG) .
This report on the first five months of
the EPG's work with the IEC will try to
suggest the specific ways in which the
Left's limited local political power over
economic policy can be used to strengthen
and revitalise socialist politics more
broadly, without any assumption that it
is the only, or the most important way .
We will describe these ways under several
headings :Firstly, the ways in which a Left local
authority can contribute to the defence of
labour, that is the defence of jobs, of
skills and of trade union organisation, in
the face of a fierce restructuring by

capital .
119
Secondly, the contribution the GLC
hopes to make in the area of economics
to labour's ability to pose a credible
socialist alternative and way out of capitalism's crisis .
Thirdly, the way that the experience
of power, however limited and momentary, within the existing political system
can be used to give greater practical
substance to a strategy for socialist
democracy, in a parliamentary democracy . Under all these headings there is
some experience which we can analyse,
but in general we will report on strategies
and hopes rather than achievements and
failures . We hope to give some idea of
how councillors and the EPG would
assess the success or failure of their
work, of what the conditions are for success and failure and of the problems that
are constantly raised but to which the
comrades concerned would not claim to
have a definitive answer .

The defence of labour

To contribute to the defence of
labour is perhaps the most daunting and
yet the most fundamental of the tasks
just listed . For it is not simply a matter of
backing up the trade unions in their day
to day defence against the unemployment produced by management's minor
cost cutting exercises . It is defence
against a massive wave of restructuring
that has left previously strong trade
union organisation in a state of despair .
The only comparison which will convey
the force of the tide that is washing away
the jobs and trade union organisation of
London's manufacturing industry is with
the de-industrialisation of London in the
late nineteenth century, the decimation
of London's new manufacturing industries which produced `outcast London' .
In one sense the impact of the present
depression is even worse, because the

CAPITAL AND CLASS

120

decline is from a greater height . From

1,523,000 jobs in London's manufacturing industry in 1951 there are now
around 650,000 . This is nearly a full
circle back to the number of 1861 when
there were 469,000 . Between 1971 and
1981 employment in manufacturing declined by 37% - 400,000 jobs had gone .
This is part of a national process effecting
all major conurbations . As far as London
is concerned the strength of the wave
began to build up in the 50s and 60s .
From this period onwards, the major
corporations established their new and
competitive factories outside cities, away
from high land prices - having stripped
its assets - away from overburdened
transport facilities, and away from
organised labour . Increasingly it has
been the uncompetitive declining plants
or sectors which have remained . And as
the recession has really begun to bite,
sharpened by high interest rates and cuts
in public spending, it is these plants and
sectors which have collapsed . (Friend
and Metcalfe 1981) .
The real force of these trends hit the
Economic Policy Group, from the
moment they started work in March
1982 . Requests for help from workers
facing major redundancies or complete
closure came in thick and fast . First,
there were workers from Staffa Engineering, where some months previously
the multi-national holding company,
Brown and Sharpe had moved the work
from Leyton, East London to Plymouth
as part of its international restructuring,
aided by a government development
grant . 400 skilled jobs were to go . A few
of the remaining workers with some support from local management wanted to
create a new company . Then there were
workers from Associated Automation, a
GEC owned company in West London .
GEC was rationalising its telecommunications division, moving all work on
relays to another site and running down

production of mechanical pay telephones . The Willesden factory was to

close, 300 skilled and semi-skilled jobs
were to go . The workers and local
management wanted to buy the factory
and start a co-operative . Women
workers from Lee Cooper Jeans were the
next group . Lee Cooper was moving
production to Cornwall as part of a
rationalisation of production, 200
women would lose their jobs . Next, a
West London T&GWU officer contacted the GLC to say that his members
at Thorn EMI were in danger of losing
their jobs with the closure of an M .O .D .
factory where EMI produced components for missile systems . All these
came in one week . It proved to be a
typical week . What could be done in
these circumstances to help save jobs and
to maintain or extend trade union
organisation?
First, it is important to remember that
there was no recent experience in the
history of the GLC or indeed most local
authorities, of intervening on the side of
labour to save jobs . True, local
authorities have increasingly been trying
to do `something about unemployment' ;
Employment Committees, Economic
Development Units, local authority advice centres for small businesses, cooperative development agencies with
local authority funding, have been popping up everywhere, in Labour and Tory
controlled authorities alike . But except
in a few cases, intervention in plant
closures and redundancies are treated as
outside the remit of local policy . Local
authorities see themselves as responsible
simply for trying in a small way to clear
up the mess left by economic decisions
which they assume to be unavoidable or
outside their influence . They might promote their areas as a place in which to set
up a factory, in the hope of attracting the
`foot loose' companies that are supposedly wandering around the country .

SOCIALIST GLC?
Or they might give special concessions,
cheap factories, advice and small grants
to small businesses . They will seek to
grease market mechanisms in the hope
that these mechanisms might operate in
favour of their locality, but they will not
intervene . This, roughly, had been the
policy of the GLC under the Tories .
They had established the London Industrial Centre in order to advise small
business and promote London as a place
to invest : for instance under the Tories
80,000 per year was spent on promotion
of London in the United States . (The
Labour GLC put a stop to this kind of
promotion and has now wound down the
London Industrial Centre completely) .
The first problem then, in responding to
workers facing redundancies was lack of
the mechanisms and the people with the
experience of intervening on the side of
labour to save jobs . All five of the
members of the Economic Policy Group
immediately became involved with the
workers who contacted them during the
first few weeks . But five people - two of
whom are job sharing- is not a task force
of a sufficient scale to make the intervention that is necessary in more than
two or three cases. Merchant banks
working for capitalist interests, would
apply a task force of that size or more for
each case .
The next step in the face of closures
and redundancies has been for the EPG
to see what chance there is of reversing
management decisions, through trade
union action . If there has been any possibility of this, for example as seemed an
initial possibility at Staffa and at Thorn
EMI, the next step along with moral and
publicity support for a trade union campaign, is to work with the stewards on a
negotiating plan that would both be the
focus of the campaign and the proposal
to put to management . The intention is
that the GLC should back up and
strengthen the bargaining position of the .

trade unions . This does not always mean

very much however, especially where the
company concerned is a vast multinational corporation for whom GLC
money is chicken feed . For GLC money
to make a difference and for GLC- trade
unions conditions on the financial support to be monitored in such circumstances, there would need to be very
strong shop stewards co-ordination
throughout the corporation as well as
strong support from regional trade union
organisations . In Brown and Sharpe
there was no such combine wide coordination to save Staffa and official
support for the workers' industrial action
by the main union concerned, the
AUEW was not sustained . As a result
the occupation by the Staffa workers
failed and the factory jobs will be lost . At
Thorn EMI, officials of the main union
involved, the T & GWU, took the initiative in resisting the closure but the
factory organisation did not show the
militant spirit shown by the Staffa
workers and the combine wide organisation at Thorn EMI is weak .
The GLC can do something to help to
strengthen the trade union campaign ; for
instance it can fund meetings and information bulletins, etc . across multiplant combines during a campaign
against a closure, as the Newcastle City
Council did during a campaign against
the closure of a Vickers factory on Tyneside . Councillors and officers can also
help to strengthen the confidence of the
workers involved . The fact of political
support and the possibility of some
financial support undoubtedly helps to
lift the sense of hopelessness which overcomes workers facing the threat of
redundancy . Thus, Councillors and EPG
members stress that it is important to
ensure that workers' relationship with
GLC is the one which encourages self
confidence among the workers, rather
than gratitude and dependance . This is

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122

affected by small practical things like the

GLC representatives meeting the
workers on their home ground rather
than always at County Hall and talking
directly with stewards as well as to full
time trade union officials . At the very
least GLC officers and councillors must
make the limits of the GLC's power very
clear to the stewards so that there is no
danger of a repeat on a local level of the
kind of debilitating reliance workers
have placed on Labour governments . In
these ways, local authorities can help
increase the possibility of trade union
action, but cannot substitute for a trade
union fight-back where it is lacking .
So far the GLC has been involved in
two types of defensive job saving exercises . The first type involves saving some
jobs out of a bankruptcy that would
otherwise have led to total collapse ; and
enabling the trade unions to gain some
control over the future management of
the company . The instance of this type
was the rescue of 120 out of 400 jobs at
Austinsuite, a vast furniture factory in
the East End of London . The company
was with the Receiver, and given the cost
of the huge factory, likely to be taken
apart rather than sold as a working operation . The GLC, concerned to save jobs
in an industry already decimated by the
recession, offered to buy the factory at
1 .25m and provide an 18 months revenue grant based on 20 per job per week
on condition that plans for the future of
the business was negotiated with the
unions and the GLC . A buyer with a
track record in the furniture industry
that was acceptable to the unions, was
interested and the factory was reopened . The final deal requires the
revenue support to be given in quarterly
payments subject to trade union and
GLC satisfaction that the new management was abiding by its employment
commitments . Moreover the whole deal
was based on an agreement that the

workers as a collective would receive a

share of the profits as soon as the company was made viable, if they so wished .
The factory trade union organisation has
a place on the Management board along
with the national union (FTATU) . The
logic behind this latter idea is that the
unions' national resources will be available to back up the shop stewards in their
negotiations over the unfamiliar issues of
investment, finance and production
which will come up on the Board .
2 million of ratepayers money is a lot
for a local authority to contribute to an
industrial deal, as the Evening Standard
lost no time in pointing out . 'GLC
gambles with Rates' was how it described
the deal . It is a risk, as is any intervention
by labour against the workings of the law
of value ; depending on labour's
strength, every gain, every job saved,
can prove temporary . To the Evening
Stardard, however, the risk is that of
having a socialist local authority setting
the pace over what in their view, should
be purely commercial deals . What is the
risk
for
the
calculation
of
ordinary ratepayer, the working class
family in the East End of London, for
example, where the furniture industry is
based? First, although some of the
money used in the deal comes from such
families, the greater proportion comes
from businesses and from the wealthier
suburbs of outer London (Bromley, the
Tory borough who challenged the Fares
Fair policy, for example) . Second, the
deal is conditional on jobs being saved .
On the GLC's calculations, for every
20 per job given by the GLC, 160
of wealth is produced, a high proportion
of which will go to East End families, and
back into the East End economy .
A deal like this is admittedly defensive, and only partially successful at that
but in the present economic circumstances defence of jobs and trade union

SOCIALIST GLC?
organisation is a precondition for any
further advance . The Austin deal illustrates the particular importance of
Labour's political power in a local
authority at a time when labour is
industrially weak . In past recessions
when Labour has lacked or failed to use
its political strength, bankruptcies have
enabled the dynamic, competitive sections of capital to restructure without
any pressure from labour . By contrast, in
an Austin type deal the labour movement was able to use its political control
over finance to provide the conditions
for continuing trade union strength
throughout the period of restructuring .
This political control provides a form of
protection against pressures which trade
unionism alone is unable to resist . In this
way then, the economic policies of a left
local authority can be a particularly useful defensive instrument for the labour
movement, especially at a time of capitalist restructuring . That at least is a
hypothesis that could be drawn from the
first few months of the GLC's new
economic policy, to be tested against the
experience of the next two and a half
years . (The GLC elections will be in May
1984) .
The second type of case where the
GLC has intervened to save jobs is that
of a closure by a multi-plant, even multinational corporation, where trade union
organisation is so weak, or the management so mighty that neither the industrial nor political bargaining power
available, can reverse management's
decision . Here the problem was how the
GLC could help the workers concerned
to retain some form of collective strength
and prevent the further fragmentation of
the labour movement in London,
through creating a new enterprise . Two
cases out of the initial requests for GLC
help fell into this category . These cases
were the Associated Automation factory
at Willesden and the Lee Cooper Jeans

factory in Romford, at the very outer

reaches of Greater London .
At Associated Automation the
unions had fought redundancies more or
less successfully with political campaigns
and industrial action for several years .
But at the end of 1981 Weinstock made a
further determined effort to close the
factory . Shop stewards' co-ordination
across GEC was not in the end strong
enough to prevent the movement of
AA's work . Weinstock was determined
to be rid of the plant and was prepared to
sit out any industrial action . He could
afford to, sitting as he does on 1,000
million . In the end the AUEW branch,
supported by AUEW-TASS representatives, decided that in the circumstances
they were not going to be able to force
Weinstock to change his mind and their
only chance of retaining their jobs was
for them, as workers organised through
their trade unions, to buy the factory and
machinery . Initially, they will take over
some of GEC's old markets for electromechanical telephone systems . These
did not produce high enough profits for
GEC but the workers reckon that they
can provide the viability for the new
enterprise for the next two years . In the
longer run though, the workers recognise that they will have to identify new
markets and work on the design of new
products . They have kept the best of the
old design team some of whom have
rejected highly paid jobs with GEC in
order to work on new products for the
workers' factory . All of this depends on
finance being available without the
higher interest rates charged by commercial banks and on help in securing
markets, for example, with British
Telecom . As in the case of Austin's the
GLC is prepared to buy the property and
also in this case provide some initial
start-up capital . The end result - in
August 82 - is that 182 jobs look like
being saved for the time being, with the

123

CAPITAL AND CLASS

124 new co-operative . The trade union

organisation remains intact and its links

with the district trade union organisation
are strong . The shop stewards concerned
recognise however that jobs are by no
means secure ; they are still partially
dependant on GEC, and on the banks ;
and they are still vulnerable to the
uncontrollable pressures of the market .
The internal organisation of production
is more democratic but this simply
provides a base from which to resist
external pressures as strongly as in the
past they resisted management .
At Lee Cooper a group of workers
has salvaged something from the closure
on a smaller scale . In the face of
management's determination to close,
the women working for Lee Cooper felt
powerless . The unions had never been
allowed to recruit, so there was no tradition or organisation . However, eleven
women machinists were determined to
keep something going . They formed a
co-operative to make children's clothes,
especially for families on the huge local
estate, Harold Hill - one of the largest
housing estates in Europe . They intend
to design and sell the clothes in a way
which enables parents, as consumers, to
have a greater influence over the product
than traditional market mechanisms
allow . Samples will be discussed
throughout the estate and consumers
themselves will have some stake in the
co-op . The GLC has provided the initial
funding, arranged for clothing industry
experts to be available and helped to put
pressure on the local authority to make
well placed premises available at a
peppercorn rent . It has also helped to
ally the new co-operative with the trade
unions . All the women involved joined
the Tailor and Garment Workers Union
for the first time in their lives, and union
officials are giving the co-operative considerable support .
Like the workers at Austinsuite,

these two groups of workers were trying

to defend their livelihood and collective
strength in the face of capitalist reorganisation . However, unlike the
workers at Austins neither they nor the
GLC had the power to extract concessions from the particular company
carrying out the restructuring . Austins
was a single plant enterprise gone
bankrupt, GEC and Lee Cooper are
multi-plant corporations rationalising to
improve their already powerful competitive position . At GEC's Associated
Automation and Lee Cooper's Harold
Hill factory the only alternative was to
identify a strategy for organising the
available productive resources, including
the worker's own skills and energies, as
much in the interests of labour as the
market pressures would allow . In these
cases, then, the GLC through its financial powers, and its political authority
with other public sector bodies, provided
a means of protecting these workers
while in response to capitalist restructuring, they restructured in the interests
of labour . This goes beyond the traditional defences of the trade union
movement, but nevertheless a condition
for its success is a close alliance between
the new workers' enterprise, the GLC
and the trade unions .

Illustrating the socialist alternative

This brings us to the next heading ; the
contribution of the GLC's economic
policy to demonstrating that there is an
alternative to the present policies of
government and management . This is
not separate from the GLC's defensive
work ; the best strategies for defence of
labour's interests contain some of the
principles of socialist production . And,
to win support for such principles, they
must be applied to the needs of working
people as workers, parents, consumers

SOCIALIST GLC ?
and users of social services in the face of
the present recession and crisis . Socialist
principles must point to a way out of that
crisis for working class people . For it is
not merely a crisis of `the system', it is a
crisis for people's lives and futures too,
and people are in no position to accept
the reassurance that, 'it will be all right
under socialism' . Through the GLC it is
possible both to put forward arguments
and propaganda for socialist answers to
the economic problems which now dominate peoples lives, and to illustrate these
arguments with working examples of
what these answers could mean in
practice .
From the socialist vision of a mode of
production based on the direct association of workers to meet each other's
needs and the needs of children, the old
and the sick, GLC Councillors derive the
following working principles for the
GLC's industrial strategy in capitalist
London .
1 The principle of bringing wasted
assets - human potential, land, finance,
technological expertise and resources into production for socially useful ends .
2 The principle of extending social control of investment through social and cooperative ownership and increased trade
union powers .
3 The principle of development of new
techniques which increase productivity
while keeping human judgement and
skills in control .
The method of putting these principles
into practice is closely related to the
principles themselves . Two features of
that method so far stand out : first the
importance of popular involvement in
identifying the social needs, wasted resources and the choice of technologies
referred to in these principles . The GLC
is encouraging what it describes as
`popular planning' with trade unions and
in community based organisations . The
aim of this is to produce both immediate

plans to save or create jobs, to be implemented by the GLC, and longer term
perspectives to guide struggles against
government and management . Popular
planning is an attempt to generalise the
approach the Lucas Aerospace workers'
plan for socially useful production . The
aim is to encourage shop steward committees, trades councils and community
based campaigns to move beyond their
traditionally defensive positions to put
foward proposals for jobs to meet social
needs . The GLC is providing support for
this process by funding research, educational and organisational resources to
help workplace and community groups
develop their proposals for socially useful
production or services . For instance, the
EPG is working with Adult Education
Institutes, the WEA and trade union
education departments, on a programme
of education for popular planning .
Moreover the GLC is providing funds for
local trade union and community research and resources centres . In all this
the intention is to help to strengthen
workplace and community organisations
and increase their self confidence in a
way which cannot be reversed by a change
in political control of the GLC .
The second and related point concerns the GLC's approach to technology .
Technological innovation is fundamental
to at least two of the principles suggested
above . But the GLC's Industry and Employment Committee does not endorse
the view that new technology is somehow
inherently progressive, or that there is
even such a thing as the new technology .
Rather they recognise that there are
several different directions in which
technology could develop, according to
different social and economic objectives .
The Industry and Employment Committee has defined its objectives in a
general way but the implications for the
choices of technology will be developed
through the popular planning process re-

125

CAPITAL AND CLASS

126

ferred to above . For this to be possible

facilities and expertise on technological
matters need to be made far more accessible to working class people who in the
past have been excluded from judgement between different technologies .
An important initiative already underway to meet this need is the creation
of several technology networks, some
based on geographical areas such as
North London and others based on
product areas such as energy . These networks will harness the often underused
facilities of London's polytechnics and
universities, for the use of trade unionists
and others who wish to develop employment plans either as bargaining positions
in their own company or as the basis of a
co-operative or municipal enterprise .
The networks will for instance develop a
`product bank' of prototypes of new
products of a socially useful kind that
would be available for such groups .
A recent report agreed by the GLC's
Industry and Employment Committee
summarised its criteria for socially useful
production and technology :- `Socially
useful products are such as to conserve
energy and materials (bQth in manufacture and in use) ; their manufacture,
repair and recycling are carried out by
non alienating labour ; and their production and the products themselves
should assist human beings rather than
maiming them' .
On this definition socially useful production is in effect socialist production,
but that does not mean that we have to
wait for a socialist society before we can
campaign for and even achieve
technology and investment policies based
on the criteria of socially useful production . In fact, at a time when socialism
has lost any specific and hopeful meaning
to the majority of working class people,
illustrations of what socialist production
could mean, play a much more important
part in socialist strategy than ever before .

Some first examples

The process of popular planning and
establishing the technology networks is
only just beginning to develop, but three
illustrations of socially useful production
and services are already being explored
with workers and users concerned .
First, discussions are going on in one
locality between tenants groups, shop
.stewards from the Direct Labour
Organisation, trades council delegates
and councillors, to develop an employment plan to meet local heating needs ; a
plan for `jobs from warmth' . These discussions which will involve tenants surveying their own heating needs and trade
unionists identifying available building,
designing and engineering skills are a
pilot initiative which, it is hoped, will
contribute towards London wide plans
for jobs to meet public sector heating
needs . Some of these plans could be
backed by GLC funding, e .g ., a municipal heat pump factory, others by borough
funding, e .g ., expansion of Direct
Labour Organisations ; and generally
they will strengthen the campaigns of
tenants groups and buidling and engineering workers and contribute to the
argument for national policies based production for social need .
Another issue where municipal enterprise with worker and user control in
London could set an example for national
policy is cable television : the wiring up of
London . A proposal has been passed by
the GLC that councillors and officers
should discuss with management and
workers at British Telecom the possibility of a public sector lead on cables
television for London . Already work is
in progress on a plan for the wiring up of
London . The plan is likely to emphasise
that the cables should be of an interactive kind so that people can feed in, as
well as receive, information and ideas .

SOCIALIST GLC?
The cable network would be discussed
and where possible shaped by the popular planning process : that is it would be
needs led rather than market led .
A third area where discussion is
beginning, with added impetus from the
creation of a GLC Women's Committee,
is that of domestic labour, in particular
child care . Domestic production or reproduction is seen by the Industry and
Employment Committee as an area of
economic activity, a sector in which the
GLC ought to invest, to create worthwhile jobs which meet social needs,
especially those of the women at present
carrying the burden of private unpaid
domestic labour . Already a group of
women in South London have drawn up
some proposals for child care centres in
their locality . These would also provide
food and laundry facilities . Employers
would be pressed to contribute to their
funding, according to the number of
employees making use of them . The
GLC might be asked to provide the starting capital . In West London the GLC has
already funded a new co-operative
laundrette which has special facilities for
old age pensioners and for people with
children .

GLEB : An improvement on NEB?

The GLC's main means of implementing all these plans is the Greater
London Enterprise Board (GLEB) . This
is very much a hybrid organisation, an
expression of the tensions inherent in
trying to carry out a socialist local
economic policy in Tory Britain . Its
architects, the authors of Labour GLC
manifesto, in particular Michael Ward,
the Chairman of the present Industry
and Employment Committee, have tried
to learn from the failings, from labour's
point of view, of the National Enterprise
Boards (Joint Trades Councils 1981) .

However, within the limits of a local

authority, constrained by national legislation they have not always been able to
carry these lessons all the way through .
Moreover the GLEB's limited resources
- around 30 million a year but always
vulnerable to legislative changes- means
that it can do little more than support
exemplary initiatives .
It is worth listing some of the failings
of the NEB and summarising the way
that the GLC intends that the GLEB
should overcome them . The first problem
was the autonomy of the National Enterprise Board from political control . Of
course even if the NEB had been under
more direct political control this would
have made little difference to its behaviour, given the politics of the cabinet
at that time . From the point of view of a
socialist government or local authority
however, the fact that politics was not in
control was a grave failing . Each of the
three local authorities carrying out highly
interventionist industrial policies has
adopted a different solution to the problem . It will be interesting to compare
results . Shefield City Council has decided
not to have an enterprise board but
always to intervene directly . The West
Midlands County Council, like the GLC
has established an enterprise board partly
so that it can respond quickly to industrial
cases unencumbered by the procedures
of local government and partly because it
wants to be able to take equity in private
companies and this would be illegal for
the Council itself. The West Midlands
however have attempted to solve the
problem of political control by giving
Labour councillors a majority on the
Board . The GLC decided against the
latter option for GLEB . There are councillors on the board of GLEB . Instead
they have developed several practical and
formal mechanisms by which to ensure
that the GLEB works as the means of
implemeting the industrial strategy

127

CAPITAL AND CLASS

128 agreed by the politicians . For instance at

a practical day-to-day level, since no
adequate socialist strategy can be developed separate from implementation,
the Enterprise Board and the Economic
Policy Group will work closely together
in `project teams' .
At a more formal level there are legal
mechanisms which the GLC can use to
ensure that the GLEB carries out the
plans agreed by the politicians . Ironically
there is a section of existing legislation
which is especially handy here : Section
137 (1) which requires that GLC expenditure under this heading (the heading used for the 30 million which will be
spent annually by GLEB) should be
spent in the `interests of all or some of
people of London' .
This enables the Council, instead of
handing money to GLEB to invest
according to purely market criteria like a
conventional merchant bank, to specify
the social priorities on which it wishes the
GLEB to take its decisions . Detailed and
legally binding guidelines have been
drawn up based on the kind of principles
outlined earlier in this article . A social
basis for investment appraisal has been
drawn up providing for higher financial
support according to whether the enterprise is based on some form of social
ownership and control, on how many
employees are blacks or women, how
many apprenticeships are created, how
high are the wages paid, and how long
the jobs are maintained . This form of
investment appraisal is a radical innovation to public sector investment
decisions and would be worth examining
in more detail when there is more experience of its application .
This issue of finance raises the second
weakness of the NEB from a socialist
point of view : the high rates of return
which it required, albeit over a longer
period than most conventional financial
institutions . This suited the kind of

reorganisation to restore companies to

profitability which the NEB saw as its
purpose, but the GLC intends to
innovate and reorganise in a way which
will be of social benefit to the labour,
without necessarily being commercially
profitable in the case of each and every
project . The GLEB legally has to charge
commercial rates of interest for its loans
but where it calculates that the social
benefits justify it, it will provide a grant
to wipe out or reduce these interest
charges .
A further failing of the National
Enterprise Board was that the Board itself was dominated by representatives of
capital : financiers, private industrialists
made up the majority, and the 'representatives' of labour were leading trade
unionists appointed in a purely individual
capacity under no pressures to be accountable for decisions in which they
participated . The GLEB seeks to remedy
this within the limits of the working
relationship it has to have with those
sections of capital concerned to rebuild
London's industrial base . Private industry
is represented on the board but its representatives are in a minority . The trade
unions are represented by three trade
unions accountable to the Council of
South East Regional TUC . This by itself
does not of course guarantee that the
interests of labour will be met in the
decisions of the GLEB, neither will the
West Midlands solution of a board
dominated by Labour councillors . The
ability of the board to act according to a
socialist strategy rather than to bail out
capital, will depend finally on three
factors :First and most fundamentally on
whether the shop floor trade union
movement supported by full time
officials, is able to gather the strength to
make sure that all the provisions for
social priorities in GLEB investments
are exploited to the full . If it is always

SOCIALIST GLC?
management who take the initiative in

doing a deal with GLEB, if the trade

unions fail to develop positive bargaining
positions of their own, both for the deals
themselves, and in monitoring how they
work out in practice, then however
socialist inspired are the GLEB
guidelines and investment appraisal
techniques, they will make little
difference to the GLEB's day to day
practice .
Secondly, much will depend on the
people responsible for the day to day
work of the GLEB, how far they are able
to build on, encourage and open the
door to whatever trade union or
community initiatives exist in any
particular case . As we have seen in the
case of Austin's, Associated Automation
and Lee Cooper, the GLC's control over
investment funds can be an important
addition to the defensive armoury of the
labour movement but only if these funds
are handled by people who know the
direction in which to fire .
The determination of the politicians
to keep the aspirations of their socialist
employment strategy uppermost as they
supervise GLEB is the essential back up
to these two factors . If all else fails it is
the politicians who have to act to prevent
GLEB becoming another NEB . Although the left is in a majority in the
GLC its hold is precarious . This has inevitably led to cautious tactics . Symbolic
of this caution, and reluctance to take on
conflict except where absolutely necessary are the excessively high salaries of the
Chief Executive of GLEB, and the main
Directors (though at 35,000 and 22,000
respectively they are not especially high
by private sector standards) . This partly
reflects a reluctance to take on the
powerful County Hall personnel department and Staff Association . On the other
issues of policy, the politicians have
proved tough . For instance they were
uncompromising on the guidelines and
C&C18-I

objectives of GLEB in their negotiations

with the first person to be appointed as
Chief Executive of GLEB . This led to his
withdrawal from the job .
In sum then on GLEB : while the
GLEB itself could not be described as
prefiguring socialist production except
perhaps in its methods of investment
appraisal and its unit responsible for
municipal and co-operative enterprise, it
has the potential to support, sustain and
protect such prefigurative and defensive
projects, if the political and industrial
initiative is there to create them .

Towards Socialist democracy?

Hovering above all these attempts at
industrial intervention, is the clash between the limited democracy that exists
and the kind of democracy that is needed .
This brings us to the third heading of this
report back : the problem of how a socialist majority - however precarious within a parliamentary democracy can
contribute to a strategy for socialist
democracy . This sounds a bit grand for
what can be said at this stage, but it is
worth putting it down as a marker a gai1 .s t
which to judge the experiences of the
remaining years of the Labour GLC .
Two aspects of socialist democracy
are especially relevant . The first is the
principle best expressed by Marx in his
discussion of the Paris Commune . One
of the features of the Commune he held
out as a model of a truly socialist republic
was the fact that `The Commune was to
be a working, not a parliamentary body,
executive and legislature at the same
time' (Marx 1968) . This would mean that
freedom of opinion and discussion would
not degenerate into deception and
rhetoric as they do in bourgeois parliaments and councils, for `the parliamentarians would have to work themselves,
would have to execute their own laws,
they themselves would have to test their

129

CAPITAL AND CLASS

130

results in real life ; they would have to be

directly responsible to their constituents'
(Lenin 1969) .
The experiences in County Hall
revealed a most sharp division between
the `legislature' and the executive ; between elected politicians and appointed
officers . A division which, had it been
strictly adhered to, would have kept
power firmly in the hands of the executive, the non-elected senior officers .
Fundamental to this division was the
principle that Councillors should not be
brought into the preparation of a committee report (note : these reports usually
become Council policy) until a final draft
is agreed between all officers concerned .
Councillors are presented with the
final package . In theory they can then
question the assumptions, options and
arguments behind it, but by then the
package is tightly wrapped and only a
Councillor who is very familiar with the
background will be able to suggest a different direction . And even more rarely
would a Councillor go away and write his
or her own report .
One of the important distinctive
qualities of the new generation of Labour
GLC Councillors is that they try to be
working Councillors, rather than parliamentarians . Many of them have previous
experience of local government and
many of them work fulll time, eking a
meagre living out of `attendance allowances'- less than half the salaries of many
senior officers . Even then they found it
difficult to overcome the barriers which
divide them from administering what in
theory are their policies . One barrier is a
strict hierarchy determining how Councillors communicate with officers, and at
what stage, in the preparation of a report .
Councillors on the Industry and
Employment Committee have begun to
break these barriers down by drafting
reports and carrying out research with
officers ; and as a result they are in a

better position to test their policies as

they are implemented (as well as being
able to make sure it is their policies which
are being implemented) . Committee
meetings themselves however, still degenerate into parliamentarism, partly
because of the behaviour of some of the
Tories, but fundamentally because whatever progress has been made, the local
state cannot be transformed by a precarious majority of socialist councillors,
and a few officers politically sympathetic
with their policies .

Obstacles to socialist democracy

The EPG, the Police Unit, the
Womens Support Unit and the Ethnic
Minorities Unit have all created little
pockets where policy and implementation closely interact . However the
power of the top echelon of County
Hall's corporate management can in
general make sure that these remain only
pockets . One reason for this is the power
base of these senior officers : the rigidly
hierarchical promotion structure . For
someone to improve their grade and
therefore their salary they have to conform with the rules and conventions set
down and interpreted by the permanent
corporate management, not by the politicians who come and go . Several councillors would argue that only the break
up of this permanent, highly centralised,
corporate management, and its hierarchies, and the spread of recallable,
politically appointed officers throughout
the administration would be a lasting step
in the direction of a working assembly .
The second obstacle to change is the
small voting majority of the Labour
group and the left within it, and the fact
that the government is ready and eager
to pounce on the Labour GLC, at the
first sign of weakness and disarray .
Unless national political trends are

SOCIALIST GLC?
reversed dramatically in the next year or
two, it is unlikely that the Labour GLC
will be able to complete the reforms
which it has begun . But its attempts to do
so will produce many lessons for a future
socialist government . A socialist government will be up against far more powerfully protected divisions between the
legislature and the executive than a
socialist GLC . Yet the proposals so far
advanced by the left to deal with this
problem at a national level : more political appointments at senior levels, a committee of MPs in every Ministry, have in
fact virtually been put in to effect at the
GLC and proved inadequate .
Although socialist Councillors can do
something to dismantle the existing
machinery of the State their effectiveness
will depend considerably on the preparedness of the labour movement in
industry and in the localities to take
political power away from the existing
state .

Popular Power and Parliamentary

democracy
This brings us to the second aspect of
socialist democracy : the growth of
popular power - political power based in
the workplaces and the localities - and
the destruction of the State as a separate
institution over and above the rest of
social and economic life . Will this popular power develop only from the workplaces and localities or should it be
stimulated and encouraged by socialist
representatives within the elected
councils of the existing State?
The presence of socialists in positions
of political power who are committed to
support and listen directly to the
demands of workers and oppressed
groups, usually give such groups a confidence to put forward their highest
hopes . One only has to look at the brief
period when Tony Berm was Minister of

Industry : at all the plans and proposals

drawn up by shop stewards, on his encouragement, for proof of this point . The
GLC had little such impact initially as far
as industry and employment was concerned, because workers had never considered the GLC as likely to be a source
of support over industrial issues . However, if the potential role of the Enterprise Board becomes more widely known
as a result of some real success in saving
or creating jobs, then expectations and
demands will be raised . The problem
then, a problem not solved by Benn and
the left under the last Labour government, is how that initial confidence and
release of creativity (e .g . in the form of
alternative plans and proposals) can gain
a momentum of its own rather than
remain reliant on the limited power of
the left within parliament or the Council
Chamber . This depends on several conditions, few of which are under the
control of the GLC ; but a condition
which is, is worker's awareness of the
limits as well as the possibilities involved
in GLC support, and therefore their
awareness of the extent to which they
will have to exert industrial pressure on
their management or on government .
One contribution to this awareness will
be through the educational programme
the GLC will be carrying out in close
collabroation with trade union and community activists . The material for this
programme on the GLC's economic policy will encourage those involved, to
consider how best to use GLC or GLEB
support in order to strengthen their
power vis-a-vis management and the
government, rather than to see the
GLEB as the source of salvation .
A further problem faced by the
GLC's economic strategy is the state of
the London labour movement . The
recession has already brought about a
severe fragmentation and demoralisation . The defeat of Fares Fair policy has

131

CAPITAL AND CLASS

132

undermined some hopes that a Labour

GLC could provide a significant boost .
However the GLC could still make a
contribution to overcoming the weaknesses of London labour by supporting
and encouraging the London-wide initiatives which are necessary not only to
make the most of the Enterprise Board
but also to create a positive campaign for
jobs against government policy . There
are problems and pitfalls in this use of the
local state - and we must keep reminding
ourselves that the GLC is part of the
State, whatever its `relative autonomy' :the first danger is that the popular involvement which the GLC is encouraging
ends up little different from the forms of
participation which Cynthia Cockburn
criticised so justifiably in `The Local
State' (Cockburn 1977) . She described
how the participation took place on the
Council's terms, that is it was used as a
means of keeping tabs on and where
necessary ameliorating, local feeling, and
legitimating council policy, rather than
as a means of strengthening the independent and collective power of local
working people . There is little danger of
this taking place in a conscious manipulative way by the present GLC, given the
politics of leading Councillors . But there
is always a danger of sapping the energy
of trade union and other groups by
assuming they must orbit around the
GLC, that the GLC is somehow the
centre of the London Labour movement
- a bit like mediaval scientists assumed
the earth was the centre of the universe
and the sun must orbit around the earth .
It is always a temptation to believe that
your base is the centre of things . The
popular planning process has so far
avoided this trap . It has sought to
support, generalise and learn from trade
union, tenants, black organisations and
womens groups who have developed
their own employment plans and
campaigns .

For instance Tower Hamlets, Brent

and Islington trades councils are now
working with shop stewards, and local
community struggles to develop plans for
socially useful production and services .
In the coming year the GLC hope to be
working with shop stewards on an industrial sector basis to develop alternative plans for their industry, as part of an
overall industrial strategy for London,
and as positive bargaining and campaigning demands in the workplace . The
emphasis is on starting from workers'
existing organisations and initiatives and
then encouraging the kind of alliances
necessary to go beyond a purely defensive trade unionism . In general councillors try to avoid creating structures
which are dependant on the GLC . This
does not preclude forums where different
groups involved in popular planning can
exchange ideas and experiences, but as
far as possible these will be organised by
the groups themselves . The regular
quarterly assembly and co-ordinating
committee set up through the GLC's
Womens Committee have established a
precedent here . Although Councillors
attend, and the GLC provides mailings
etc ., they are to be organised by the
womens groups themselves . Part of their
job is to monitor and influence the work
of the Women's Committee . In the field
of Industry and Employment the main
function of this popular involvement will
be to generate the trade union initiatives
and pressure which is a preconidition of
the GLC's success in meeting both the
defensive and exemplary tasks set out
earlier in this article . In this sphere the
measure of how far socialists use Council
Chamber democracy to strengthen
moves towards socialist democracy will
be whether in two or three years time the
Enterprise Board is responding mainly
to workers proposals for saving and
creating jobs or whether it has become a
soft touch for private companies in n< :d

SOCIALIST GLC?
of bailing out .
If the industrial and employment
policies of the GLC are successful there
will be conflict and backlash . Socialists
working within the GLC have to work at
two levels at once . They have to do their
best to make some real material gains, to
save or create as many secure and fulfilling jobs as possible . For this they need a
determined optimism, otherwise they
will not test all the options . On the otherhand they have to prepare for the defeat
of many of their policies in the short
term . They have to be able to use that
defeat politically to learn the lessons for
new advances rather than allow it to
demoralise the labour movement in
London . This requires a degree of
pessimism whose basis is constantly
explained in order that the obstacles
which their experience reveals can be
identified and in the future overcome .

C . Cockburn The Local State 1977

A . Friend and A . Metcalfe Slump City
1981
K Marx and F Engels Selected Works
1968
Lenin Selected Works 1969 .
Joint Trades Councils State Intervention
in Industry : A Workers Inquiry.

Second edition 1982 .

133

Judy Wajcman

Working women
A review ofthree recent books on women in the workplace

GIRLS, WIVES, FACTORY LIVES

by Anna Pollert, Macmillan (London : 1981) 3 .95
WOMEN ON THE LINE
by Ruth Cavendish, Routledge & Kegan Paul (London: 1982)
5 .95
WOMEN, WORK AND THE LABOUR MARKET
edited by Jackie West, Routledge & Kegan Paul (London:
1982) 4 .95
SLOWLY, PAINFULLY, in fits and starts, socialist feminism has

begun to get a theoretical grasp on sexual divisions in employment and their relationshop to sexual divisions within the
family .' But until very recently contempory writings about
work and industry in which workers are allowed to speak for
themselves broadcast only male voices .'
That has begun to change . Women workers are
beginning to find a voice in the sociology of work . Empirical
studies are now emerging which attempt to use the theoretical
insights so far developed to inform their analysis of women's
wage labour . This article reviews three important books in
which this has taken place.
Both Anna Pollert and Ruth Cavendish have written
books on women factory workers based on research carried out
in the 1970s. Girls, Wives, Factory Lives is a detailed study of a

CAPITAL AND CLASS

tobacco factory in Bristol, whilst Women on the Line is an

account of the author's experience of working on the assembly
line in an anonymous loccation . Work, Women and the Labour
Market is a collection of articles, edited by Jackie West, which
have the same empirical approach . All three books set out to
explore what Pollert calls: `the relationship between class and
sex in terms of the labour process as it is lived' . In this they
succeed to varying degrees.

Girls, Wives,
Factory Lives

The question which Pollert's book is primarily concerned to

answer is : what is distinctive about the consciousness of women
factory workers? In her attempt to find out, Anna Pollert spent
three months in a factory employing mainly young single girls,
gathering information and conducting informal interviews . She
was prevented by management from getting a job in the factory
and describes how uncomfortable it was operating as a middleclass researcher of working-class women . Indeed, she justifies
her minimal involvement in the women's home, community
and social lives largely on the basis of her feelings of awkwardness . From my own experience of participant observation in a
factory I can well identify with those feelings . But doing participant observation always raises ethical problems, which are not
overcome by restricting its scope to within the factory walls.
And this restriction gives rise to its own problems, to which I
shall return later.
The book is broadly divided into three . The first part
situates the factory in the tobacco industry, as well as describing its labour force and labour process. Owned by the Imperial
Group, an expanding multinational, the factory was to become
victim to Imperial's corporate strategy involving contraction of
the tobacco section. Of particular significance was the employers' strategy of increasing profitability within the factory
through productivity schemes and regrading. These tended to
reflect and reinforce women's inferior pay and job grades
relative to those of the few men at the factory. Pollert ends this
section discussing the processes whereby `women's work' is
systematically undervalued .
The second part of the book deals with the ideology and
experience of women workers. Having reviewed the literature
in this area, the author describes the stereotyped self-image
accepted by the women at the factory. These, as she sees it, are
derived from the men's images of the women:
Steven (chargehand) : some women have to work . But 90
per cent it's pin money . They don't have to work .
Steven again : With this women's lib, equal pay, women

WORKING WOMEN
are talking themselves out of work . Now, with a man,
he's got a family to keep, he's more reliable . I meaan,
men don't leave to have babies do they? But the women
do!
Ida: I think a married man needs a job more than we do .
Pam: I expect to be supported by my husband if I'm
married, but if I was earning as much as him - he
wouldn't feel he was supporting me - he'd be downgraded .
Given a sexual hierarchy at the workplace in which all
supervisory postions were held by men, Pollert argues that the
women understood control over them as male control. The
women were arware that the supervisors got paid more than
they did and Pollert cites this as evidence of class consciousness, albeit limited. This differential, however could as easily
be accounted for by the sexual hierarchy to judge from the
women's own stated attitudes to the secondary nature of
women's wages.
After this section there are a couple of interesting
chapters on working-class girls and older women respectively .
Following Willis' study of the transition from school to work of
working-class boys, Pollert discusses the preparation of
working class girls for marriage instead. The girls see themselves as doing a `temporary stay' at the factory before marriage . They fail to confront the reality of their own future as
long-term unskilled wage workers. Instead of warning the girls
that work might not be temporary, the older women sympathised with their focus on marriage as life's `solution' reinforcing
their identification with the roles of housewife and mother . The
older married workers and the familiar burden of their housework are the subject of a separate chapter appropriately subtitled `the temporary stay continues' .
The third and most substantial part of the book is about
struggle at the workplace - the women's resistance and incorporation, the extent of their involvement in trade unions and in
a strike which the author witnessed. She describes how `in the
context of their general powerlessness over the labour process,
the women created their own shop-floor culture' . This
discussion of women's daily resistance on the factory again
parallels Willis' work on male shop-floor culture. Where it
differs is in the extent to which factory politics become sexual
politics by virtue of authority being vested in men for the
exercise over women. The girls' response to the male supervisors is one that purports to take advantage of their own
femininity . However, as Pollert shows, by colluding in their
self-presentation as sex objects and therby competing with

CAPITAL AND CLASS

each other, the girls were distracted from the possibility of
solidarity :
Val: You've got to be blue eyes in a factory, you know
what I mean? Your face has got to fit or else that's it . . .
Well, mine didn't fit, that's for sure . I get into trouble.
There's certain people can get away with murder . But
with others-when you go into the office to the foreman,
well he looks at you as though you were nothing. As
though he could spit on you.
Instead, the use of feminine guile to challenge male
authority only served to further individualise and divide them
from each other. Lacking any collective organiational express
ion the girls' resistance remained symbolic only . It had no
material effects on control within the factory.
In a useful chapter on the part played by the TGWU, to
which ninety per cent of the workers belonged, Pollert's study
goes some way towards accounting for the womens' apparent
passivity. She outlines how the shop stewards, all of whom
were men, discouraged the women's involvement in union
affairs. Themselves party to the view that the union was a
`man's world', the stewards promoted this attitude amongst the
women. At best the women received a double message - that
they had a duty to be good unionists and good housewives :
Vera : My husband's branch secreary of his union - the
AUEW .
Anna' P: Does he get you down to your own union
meeting?
Vera : Oh no! He wouldn't do that . See- he's got a lot of
work - a hell of a lot, I dn't know how he keeps up . See,
he needs me - 'come.
Unable to fulfil such conflicting expectations - because,
for example, union meetings were held outside work-time- the
women blamed themselves and felt personally inadequate for
being `bad trade unionists' . The younger, unmarried women
were simply `vague and thoroughly bored with union business' .
Given the absence of strong shop-floor organisation and successful management co-option (shop stewards were regularly
promoted to foremen) the women's reluctance to stand for
union positions was not surprising . They had also learnt from
previous struggles that their shop stewards and union officials
could not be relied on for support.
All these failings were perfectly encapsulated in the
union's handling of a one-day strike, and in its acceptance of
the eventual closure of the factory. Remote from decision
making and starved of information the women were instructed
rather than consulted throughout . Inevitably, Pollert con-

WORKING WOMEN
cludes that collective workplace experience does not necessarily enhance classconsciousness.
The book ends stressing the potentialities of women
worker's contradictory experience and consciousness - `the
collisions between women's sexual oppression and their ex
ploitation as workers' . It seemed to me that the optimism of the
conclusion did not sit comfortably with the author's own data
and analysis . If anything comes out of her study it's that workplace experience did nothing for them . These working-class
women doing unskilled manual work did not as a result develop
a collective identity .
Frustrated with academic Marxist and feminist theory, Ruth
Cavendish left her job as a polytechnic lecturer to take a
working-class job. She was `looking for a new way of being
involved politically, where I might have daily contact with
working-class women' . She was also hoping that the experience
would help her think about the nature of differentiation within
the working class and, more specifically, about the links between home and work for low-paid women who work full-time .
Due to the threat of libel action, the author was obliged to
disguise the firm, its location and the product, as well as the
name of the trade union . She even had to use a psuedonym
herself.
Whereas Pollert remained an observer, Cavendish's
book is based on her personal experience of working on an
assembly line in a motor car component factory for 7 months .
She was employed as a 'semi-skilled' manual worker . The job
was labour intensive and alongwith 200 Irish, West Indian, and
Asian women she sat all day at a conveyor belt . The work was
done exclusively by women.
In depressing detail Cavendish describes her daily experience of working at the factory. Although she maintains the
impossibility of putting over in writing `the speed of the line,
the pace of the work, the fiddliness of the jobs we had to repeat
all day long', in fact her account is vivid . The strain imposed by
the constant pressure to keep pace with the speed of the line in
assembly work has been the subject of various studies - but
their focus has been male workers . Here assembly line work is
shown to have the same deletrious effect on women as has been
demonstrated for men. In addition, the kind of assembly work
that women are typically involved in is sedentary and thus
shares with women's office work the consequent health hazards
that feminists have recently been exposing (Craig, 1981 : Huws,
1982). Amongst those identified by Cavendish are eye strain

Women on
the Line

CAPITAL AND CLASS

Z
c
3

1~ro~nnd

.~' " ,ve"vsay

v7 .

VOLUMES, Number 1, Spring

1982 : Phyllis Mack, Female
Prophecy in the English Civil War.
Elizabeth Spelman, Woman as
Body : Ancient and Contemporary
Views . Natalie Zeman Davis,
Women in the Crafts in SixteenthCentury Lyon . Gills Son
and Lourdes Benerla, Class
and Gender Inequalities and
Women's Role in Economic Development . Bernice Johnson
Reagan, My Black Mothers and
Sisters or On Beginning a Cultural
Autobiography. INTERVIEW with
Sonia Johnson by Karen Longlois . REVIEW ESSAYS by
Martha Vicinus and Katherine
See. POEMS by Norms Alarcon
and Clarita Raja. ART ESSAY:
"Forever Free," An by AfricanAmerican Women . Introduction
by Susan Wllland Warlock .

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WORKING WOMEN
`concentrating on those tiny objects all day' and the `almost
unbearable' aches and pains from sitting in the same position .
All in all the job took an enormous toll on her life generally :
`the job only left time for basic living . . . it took me hours to
relax after work and stop feeling the line whirr through me' .
What is unusual in Cavendish's book is that the women
on the line were all immigrants . Most were Irish, 20% were
West Indian and 10% were Asian . The ways their different
cultures affected their perceptions of each other and of their
work are detailed at length . The effect of describing the varied
cultural backgrounds brought into the workplace by these
women is to place a valuable stress on the extent to which
different work experiences can coexist on a shared shopfloor .
Our understanding of the difficulty of workers organising even
within a shared workplace is thereby enlarged .
Description reveals that the West Indian women were
much more accustomed to industrial life and generally held the
Irish responsible for the poor working conditions . It was said
that `all these new girls off the banana boat from Cork' would
do whatever they were told and never challenge anything . To
complicate matters further, both the Irish and the West Indian
women had prejudices about the Indian women . Not only was
women's work segregated from men's, but the women themselves were segregated from each other into a rigid ethnic
hierachy . In this context, Cavendish was a witness to the fact
that specific groups of workers had their own concerns . There
were apparently no issues capable of uniting all the shopfloor
workers even though they were all members of the workingclass for, as Cavendish notes, `the differences (between them)
seemed almost to override the similarities' .
These themes are explored in the last part of Cavendish's
book which, like Pollert's, describes a dispute that occurred
while the author was there . Pay increases were at stake and
Cavendish emphasises the seriousness of a strike for women
whose take-home pay was too low for a single person to live on :
it was `married women's wages' . Most single women had to
take a second job just to make ends meet .
The story of the dispute is one of women taking action
despite continual harassment from their own union officials .
These officials had always been seen as : `part of the firm's
authority structure along with management, and equally
remote' . The role of the Works Committee during the monthlong action reinforced the women's distrust . When the women
involved were suspended from work the initial solidarity was
systematically eroded by the Works Committee's insistence
that : `there would be a vote every few hours about reviewing

CAPITAL AND CLASS

the decision to stay out' . In the end the Committee achieved a
return to work at a meeting that Cavendish describes as : `a
classic and successful divide and rule - bringing in people who
weren't involved and offering them something for nothing
which they would naturally accept, and then using this against
us . No one was really surprised - they expected as much from
the Works Committee' . The women hardly gained financially
and were left depressed and divided, once again into ethnic
groups, as a result . In sum, Cavendish's experience of factory
work left her pessimistic about the possibilities for uniting a
working-class that is fundamentally divided.
Work, Women
and the Labour
Market

This is a collection of articles around the theme indicatedby the

title . Like most such collections, it has problems of coherence
and integration . For example, having read several contributions which expose and criticise the ways in which trade unions
actively exclude women and how childcare responsibilities
force mothers into the `black economy', we find Judith Hunt's
essay, `A Woman's Place is in Her Union', extolling the virtues
of union membership . Jackie West's introduction does not
fully succeed in providing a framework that resolves these
inconsistencies . Nevertheless, several of the individual articles
are worth considering . The two most relevant to the overall
theme of this review are those by Marilyn Porter and Angela
Coyle .'
Porter's essay `Standing on the Edge : Working Class
Housewives and the World of Work', shares with Cavendish
and Pollert an interest in the way in which the consciousness of
working-class women is shaped by their domestic role, by their
identity first and foremost as housewives . The article is based
on a sample of 25 working-class women all of whom were
married and had dependent children under the age of sixteen.
None of the women worked full-time, most worked part-time,
and all were dependent on their husband's wage . Porter claims
that these women `represent the paradigm of working-class
women in a capitalist soceity' . Porter succinctly states her
conclusion as follows: `Women's experience of work is significantly different to that of men, and I want to suggest that the
difference rests upon a sexual division of labour rooted, outside
work, in the family' . Because men are still the designated
breadwinners and women's primary focus is the home, `when
women enter the labour market they do so as migrants from the
domestic domain and it is that fact that crucially differentiates
their experience of work'.
As a result, women regard their own paid work as quite

WORKING WOMEN
different from their husbands, finding it hard : `to transfer their
own experience of work in an "imaginative extension" to that
of their husbands'. This was exacerbated by the men's attitudes
to telling their wives about their work : some thought they had
no business to know whilst others thought their wives would
not be interested . Or, at least, they would only be interested
when the pay packet might be affected . So, Porter comments :
`the women were expected to have only the narrowest of
economic interest in their husband's jobs . . .Any notion of
class solidarity . . . is completely absent'. This is further evidenced in the women's ambivalent attitudes to the counterdemonstration by the Cowley wives in 1974 . In Porter's interviews the women expressed sympathy for the demonstration
because the unions posed a threat to next week's housekeeping. As housewives, the women shared a preoccupation
with consumption and prices . Porter sees here the `chasm
between the two worlds' in which `there appeared to be no
immediate way these men and women could unite in common
class concerns .'
Angela Coyle's excellent article entitled `Sex and Skill in
the Organisation of the Clothing Industry' is in the tradition of
Braverman's work as taken up by Phillips and Taylor (1980),
and Cockburn (1981) . The argument is concerned with the way
in which distinctions of skill in women's and men's work have as
much to do with job control and wage levels as they have to do
with technique. The article aims to explain why women are still
concentrated in unskilled and low-paid work within the clothing industry . Coyle sees the answer in the forms of organisation
of the labour process itself:
`To perceive women's marginalised relation to
production as a consequence of their "dual role" and a
discriminatory labour market is not enough, and here
the concentration of women in low-paid work is placed
within the context of the deskilling of the labour
process' .
This statement also reflects on the shortcomings of previous studies of women workers - to which I will return later in
this article .
The history of the clothing industry since the war exemplifies for Coyle, the way in which a craft-based industry has
been deskilled, resulting in a changed labour process and
labour force. It is a history that shows a deterioration of wage
and employment levels for all workers; but for women this is
compounded by the effects of the trade-union's defence of
male jobs and wages. Furthermore, the short-term interests of
male trade unionists to segregate women into certain jobs

CAPITAL AND CLASS

coincided with those of management : `strategies employed by
management to exert a downward pressure on wages, combine
with union strategies to resist that, to have the effect of reinforcing sexual divisions within the labour process' .
In conclusion, Coyle questions the value of `orthodox'
strategies for the improvement of women's position as follows :
`Exclusion and the preservation of sectional interests, the de
fence of skill and differentiation, have always been ways in
which skilled workers have organised to protect themselves . As
a form of job control it is conservative and gained at the
expense of others'.
Neither, Coyle argues, has it been particularly effective .
As management go on the offensive, skilled labour is increasingly under threat from low-paid labour . Indeed, section union
practice by its very nature encourages this - endorsing the
creation of a cheap, unskilled labour reserve, for short-term
gains.
`Women are employed on terms which place them in an
antagonistic relation to men, and yet men's defences
against the threat of cheap female labour operate divisively and precisely reinforce the conditions which make
women such a threat' .
Developing our
Analysis

All three books, then, have a lot to offer the socialist-feminist

study of the relations of women to paid work . Nevertheless,
four overall problems with our theory are reflected in these
empirical studies. It is to these I should now like to turn .
Women and Men
Socialist-feminist theory, with its focus on women's subordination, has necessarily stressed what is specific about the
position of women in paid work . But this healthy emphasis on
the difference between the actual situations of women and men
has had an unfortunate counterpart at the level of theory - a
tendency to overemphasise the differences between women
and men by treating each sex as a homogeneous group. The
study of work has proceeded along sex-differentiated lines,
resulting in certain factors being defined as appropriate in the
study of either women's work or men's work, but not in both
(4) . Typically, a `gender model' has been adopted for the study
of women's work . In this model, women's relation to employment is treated as derivative of their family experiences . Simultaneously, men's work is analysed using a `job model', in which
men's work attitudes and behaviour are seen solely as the
consequence of their occupational experiences .

WORKING WOMEN
This approach to theory prevents us understanding either
women's work or men's work . Neither the family nor gender
fully account for women's experience of work . If the gender
model is the only analytic tool we apply, we are often left asking
the spurious question `what makes women workers different
from workers in general?' with the latter group taken implicitly
to be male . For men's relation to work cannot be understood in
isolation from their family responsibilities and priveleged
domestic position . Rather than a gender model applied to
women's work, and a job model applied to men's work, we
need a gender and job model applied to both men's and
women's work .
None of the studies reviewed here succeeds in doing this .
For example, Cavendish argues that for women workers:
`family and homes were the important things in their lives . . .
you want a happy home life to make up for the work' . Pollert
and Porter similarly make statements about how: `all these
women saw their primary focus as the home' . While it is true to
say that for women the family still is in certain respects the area
of prime importance, such unqualified statements are unlikely
in fact to distinguish women from men. In a recent survey of
unqualified male manual workers in a wide variety of jobs,
almost 90% of married respondents rated a'good family life at
home' above enjoyment of their work life (Blackburn and
Mann, 1979) . That men also put `home' first is completely
ignored by these studies because of their use of the gender
model. This shows the need for a single account of job and
gender factors and how they operate for women and men.
Whereas `gender' and `job' models emphasise dissimilarities,
the examination of important similarities between sections of
male and female workers is now overdue . For example, it may
be the case that, in terms of their experience of paid work,
full-time women workers without dependent children have
more in common with similarly placed full-time men than with
part-time women workers.
The problem has its parallel in discussions of class consciousness . There is an assumption that women's class consciousness lags behind a male working-class consciousness . The
latter is implicitly taken as the `standard' from which deviations
are measured, but its character is never explored . This is the
case even with those authors who are concerned to explode the
myth of women's conservatism - the male paradigm is seldom
acknowledged, let alone demolished .
This can be clearly seen in Porter's article, where she sets
herself the task of explaining why the consciousness of the
women in her study was different from their husbands . WhereC& C 18 - J

CAPITAL AND CLASS

as all of the husbands were union members and many of them
even shop-stewards, we are told that women mostly rejected
unions as irrelevant to them and as more to do with men (and
this is taken more as a sign of their backwardness than of their
astuteness!) .
So what Marilyn Porter is doing is trying to account for
the difference between women's `regressive' attitudes and
men's `radical' one's by reference to the women's family
position . The women's work identity, she says, is derived from
their identity as housewives . They don't identify with their
husband's politics because they don't identify with their
position as workers.
But why should we have expected the women to share
their husband's experience and consciousness of work? The
only answer Porter provides is that they are the wives of these
men . Surely, though, the differences between the husbands'
and wives' experience at the workplace might be just as crucial
as gender in accounting for differences in their consciousness .
Would it not be more illuminating to consider these women's
work consciousness in relation to men in similarly low-pay
sector jobs? Porter's aim is to challenge the myth of women's
inherent conservatism . However, by assuming that it is legitimate to compare the consciousness of all women with all men,
gender per se emerges as the crucial determinant of women's
consciousness .
In a similar way, Pollert says that the nature of women's
consciousness is due to `women's involvement in the separate
spheres of production and reproduction' . She argues that
women's consciousness is contradictory, rather than backward,
as a result. In an ambitious attempt to make sense of this most
difficult of issues, Pollert invokes Gramsci's notion of `common
sense', which `even in the brain of one individual is fragmentary, incoherent and inconsequential' . But she does not
elaborate on the notion of common sense and, in her use, it is
effectively synonymous with `consciousness' . Further, to conclude that women's consciousness is contradictory does not
distinguish it from men's consciousness (unless one says that it
is even more so) . Most of the recent empirical studies of male
working-class consciousness have reached the same conclusion
- that consciousness is contradictory (Blackburn and Mann,
1975 ; Nichols and Beynon, 1977 ; Hyman, 1973) .
In so far as Pollert argues that women's consciousness is
different from men's, as does Porter, the specific factor which
makes it different and distinguishes it from men's conscious
ness is `gender' . But men are gendered too . Discussions such as
Pollert's deny the extent to which men's experience is

WORKING WOMEN
structured by their masculinity . The promise of socialistfeminist studies is to question the standard conceptions of the
sociology of work, but they remain wedded to them - in that
the gender model is constructed in relation to the deficiences of
a `male' job model in its application to women . The `gender'
model merely stands alongside or in addition to the job model
and far from questioning its assumptions these studies accept
the job model as adequate in explanations of male experience .
Home and work
Linked to our failure to fuse `gender' and `job' models
has been a tendency to study `home' and `work' separately .
This is of course standard in the male sociology of work, where
exclusive reliance on a `job' model runs hand in hand with
in-depth ethnography of the workplace and complete neglect
of the home . But despite their theoretical awareness of the
importance of home and gender, both Pollert and Cavendish
rely exclusively on information collected at theworkplace . This
is so despite it now being widely acknowledged that a serious
limitation of established studies of male manual workers lies in
their failure to go `beyond the factory gates' .
I can sympathise with the practical difficulties involved in
studying both home and workplace. But this pragmatic
problem should not be allowed to turn into an unfounded
assertion of the political paramountcy of one over the other.
Both Pollert and Cave ndish tend to do this . Pollert ends her
book with the standard Engels quote to the effect that the
emancipation of women will flow from their 're-introduction
into public industry'. Both Pollert and Cavendish include in
their final chapters a diatribe on the shortcomings of the
Women's Liberation Movement . We are told that the WLM's
concern with `changing relationships' and `determining our
own sexuality' had no relevance to the women studied and that,
therefore, the women's movement should reorient itself 'towards the workplace and away form an exclusive preoccupation with domestic and personal experience' . But these assertions are based on a minimal contact with, and knowledge of,
the women's lives outside the factory . Further, much of the
conversation recorded at the factory has as its subject relationships with men. These women are clearly very preoccupied
with relationships and sexuality, perhaps more so than Pollert
and Cavendish were able to discover as self-confessed white
middle-class observers of life on the factory floor. Are we to
believe that none of the women they studied were lesbians,
were battered by their men, had been raped, had been sexually
harrassed? - or that these things were somehow irrelevant to

CAPITAL AND CLASS

the formation of their `workplace consciousness'?

Ethnicity and life-cycle

A further and related problem of much socialist-feminist

theory is that it tends to treat `women' as a homogeneous
group . This is often the case even when authors have gone to
great lengths to distinguish between women at various points in
their studies. This is more striking when Cavendish, in discussing the links between home and work, assumes the similarity of all low-paid full-time women workers. But the very
strength of Cavendish's own account is that it points to major
differences in the way that women from different cultures
perceive and organise their domestic lives. Certainly the articles by Hoel and Phizacklea (in the West collection) about
Asian and West Indian women respectively reinforce the importance of ethnicity. Both these articles, like Cavendish's
book, contain fine ethnographic material on divisions between
women workers and remind us to be cautious of generalising
about women workers as such .
Aside from their different ethnicity, women differ too in
their position in the life-cycle . Life-cycle stages are crucial to
the way in which domestic cirumstances affect work ex
perience, attitudes and behaviour. The importance of this is
indicated by the recent spate of factory occupations in Scotland
involving women workers. The women involved in the Plessey
occupation this year and the Lee Jeans occupation last year
were respectively older women with no dependent children and
young childless women. In both cases, their life-cycle position
tells us more about their ability to participate in a workplace
struggle than general statements about every woman's place
being in the home .
These life-cycle phenomena, which are obvious in
practice, have yet to be assimilated theorectically . For example, having clearly distinguished in the text between the
different significance of waged work for the young girls and the
older married women, Pollert proceeds in her final chapter to
talk about how waged labour creates the potential for all
women to gain a new consciousness. Porter distinguishes 2
stages - before and after childbearing - but then ignores even
these by going on to claim the typicality of her sample of
married women with dependent children . They are not typical .
If we were to accept that they were, much women's workplace
militancy (centred around women without dependent
children) would look like an aberration .
Again, what we need is more careful elaboration of the
relationship between home and work . The life-cycle, the dev-

WORKING WOMEN
elopment aspect of family life, is crucially important to
women's relation to employment . And - an even more
neglected topic this - we may find that it is of fundamental
importance too in men's relationship to their work .'
Resistance and shopfloor culture
Finally, what of women workers' response to their
subordination? I outlined above the valuable acount provided
by Pollert of how the women at the tobacco factory created
their own shopfloor culture . Factory politics become sexual
politics as women use feminity as a weapon against male
authority . In their discussion of patriarchal relations in the
office, Barker and Downing (1980) similarly discuss the way
women have developed a culture of resistance which is peculiar
to them as women. `It is within the invisible culture of the office
that we find the development of forms of resistance which are
peculiarly "feminine" . It is a culture which is contradictory,
appearing oppressive, but at the same time containing the
seeds of "resistance" .
But I think we should question whether it is best to think
of this as `resistance' . I have always been rather unhappy about
calling the kind of worker response to factory discipline de
scribed by Pollert `resistance' . This is not to deny that there is a
shopfloor culture and life on the factory floor and even in the
office . But are signs of life amongst the workforce in themselves subversive? Shopfloor culture is as much about adjusting
to and making bearable the intolerable conditions of most
manual labour . If it cannot be said to change and improve those
conditions then why call it resistance?
Such a notion of resistance crucially lacks a critical and
materialist perspective . Such a perspective would need to detail the conditions in which some form of genuine resistance
might arise, and would need to understand the structural conditions that inhibit it . If we lack such a perspective we can too
easily end up `blaming the victim' (as male Marxists have often
done) - failing to see the roots of people's consciousness in
their lives, blaming them for being weak and confused . This is
particularly damaging in discussions of women workers who
are traditionally seen this way. Without knowing if male
workers in a comparable work situation would respond less
passively, we do not really know what is gender specific about
women's response . And, perhaps most important of all, if we as
socialist feminists do not understand the roots of change in
consciousness, we will not be able to give those changes a
helping hand .

CAPITAL AND CLASS

BRITISH SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION

ANNUAL CONFERENCE

BEYOND THE FRINGE :

THE PERIPHERY
OF INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY
University College, Cardiff
5-8 April 1983
MAIN THEMES
Theorising the Periphery ; Industrial Restructuring;
Class Relations and Class Action at the Periphery ;
Politics, the State and Centre/Periphery Relations ;
The Production and Reproduction of Cultural Forms ;
The Centre and Periphery in a Post-Imperial World ;
Regional Development in the European Context .
'Cross-theme streams' on Gender, Ethnicity, Wales.
BSA Study Groups will meet at Conference ; a visit to the
industrial valleys of South Wales has been planned and
there will be a film and video evening, disco, bars, etc.
There will be full creche facilities .
Conference Fee

E18
BSA fullmembers
Student & Unwaged members 6
Non-members
40

Accommodation

Bed and Breakfast from 9.25

Fullboard perday from E16.50
Whole Conference from 49.00

Further details, booking forms etc, available from

BSA, 10 Portugal Street, London WC2A 2H U
(01-242 3388)

WORKING WOMEN
(l) Some of the authors concerned are Barrett (1980) ; Beechey
(1977) ; Bland et al (1978) ; Hartman (1979) .
(2) Perhaps the best known is Beynon (1973) .
(3) Articles which are not mentioned in this review include two on
clerical work . Written by Jackie West and Rosemary Crompton et al
they deal with the nature of female clerical work and the impact of new
technology respectively . Peter Armstrong's piece is about work
segregation on the shopfloor, based on fieldwork in a footwear and
electrical goods factory. Caroline Freeman looks in detail at how
women's responsibility for children leads to their exploitation as parttime workers . She documents the nature of childcare provision and the
resulting complex arrangements of working mothers.
(4) This `job/gender' model distinction is developed by Feldberg and
Glenn (1979) . Thanks to Jan Siltanen for pointing this out to me .
(5) 1 have discussed this point at greater length in Wajcman (1981) .
REFERENCES
Barker, J. and Downing, H. (1980) Word processing and the transformation of the patriarchal relations of control in the office . Capital
and Class 10 : 64-99
Barrett, M. (1980) Women's Oppression Today (Verso).
Beechey, V. (1977) Some notes on female wage labour in capitalist
production . Capital and Class 3: 45-66.
Beynon, H. (1973) Working For Fords (Penguin).
Blackburn, R.M . and Mann, M. (1975) Ideology in the Non-Skilled
Working Class, in M. Bulmer (ed) Working-Class Images of Society
(Routledge & Kegan Paul).
Blackburn, R .M . and Mann, M. (1979) The Working Class in the
Labour Market (Macmillan).
Bland, L . et al (1978) Women inside and outside the relations of
production, in Women's Studies Group Women Take Issue (Hutchinson) .
Cockburn, C . (1981) The material of male power. Feminist Review 9:
41-58.
Craig, M. (1981) Office Workers' Survival Handbook (BSSRS).
Feldberg, R. and Glenn, E. (1979) Male and female : job versus gender
models in the sociology of work . Social Problems 26: 524-538.
Hartman, H. (1979) Capitalism, patriarchy and job-segregation in Z.
Eisenstein (ed) Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism (Monthly Review Press) .
Huws, U. (1982) Your Job in the Eighties (Pluto).
Hyman, R. (1973) Industrial conflict and the political economy, in R.
Miliband & J. Saville (ed) The Socialist Register (Merlin) .
Nichols, T. and Beynon, H. (1977) Living with Capitalism (Routledge
& Kegan Paul) .
Phillips, A. and Taylor, B. (1980) Sex and Skill - notes towards a
feminist economics. Feminist Review 6: 79-88.
Wajcman, J. (1981) Work and the family, in Cambridge Women's
Studies Group Women in Society (Virago) .

NOTES

Getting it write

AT THE CSE conference in July, one work-

shop attracted quite a bit of attention . It

was a 'teach-in' on how to write more
clearly, led by Eva Kaluzynska, who
ealier this year gave the Capital & Class
editorial group a session on how to rid
the journal of pomposity and obfuscation . . . we are trying!
This issue, C& C has a new design . We
want to use good graphics to get good
ideas across . It seems the right moment
to turn over a new leaf on language too .
We asked Eva, who is sub-editor on a
national newspaper and active in the
National Union of Journalists, to
summarise her talk so that we have some
guidance in print to which we can point
our writers and with which we can
remind ourselves.
We want socialist ideas to become part of
the common sense of our age, says the
Socialist Society . Yet they are so often
expressed in an elaborate code that restricts access to them, a `leftwrite' which
the newcomer cannot decipher .
How often have you felt or heard
others say they feel excluded, bored, put
down or up-staged in situations that are
intended to nurture or develop socialist
ideas and activity? Apparently even the
cognoscenti find much socialist writing
difficult and off-putting, though there is
evidence that there comes a point, as

with cigarettes, when the experience

stops being revolting. Readers of this
journal may have ceased to notice
unnecessary political jargon, flights of
obscurantism
and lazy
academic
drafting . Worse, they may have been
responsible for such things themselves,
here or elsewhere.
`For socialist ideas, and a socialist
alternative, to gain wider credibility
and commitment we must seek a
systematic public voice in the media
of communication and education'
Socialist Society.
Well, yes, but as long as that `voice'
has things like this to say, it will go on
talking to itself :
`The major task now confronting us is
to rejuvenate and enthuse the spirit of
socialist theory and practice in a
challenge to the exploitative structure
ideologies
of
and
oppressive
contemporary British capitalism
itself'.
Socialist Society again .
Serious and important ideas too often
come looking about as tempting a read as
an out-of-date telephone directory . It
seems expected that we should have to
work punishingly hard to grasp them,
though I have seldom felt ennobled by
what I shall try and show is superfluous
labour .
Few of us think critically enough

GETTING IT WRITE
about the form of what we read and what
we write . We think of content as political . We must recognise that form too is
political .
Ignore this and our ideas will continue
to look old-fashioned or too `academic'
especially to younger readers for whom
'68 is a meaningless cypher . We must
write with more imagination, more care,
more respect for the reader if we are to
bring to that perennial `major task now
confronting us' anything other than more
stale formulas .
Many texts could be improved by
correcting simple errors of English
grammar. But my main criticism is not of
socialists' `bad English' . In fact, a style
that slavishly observes all the rules can
sound dull and old-fashioned . More important is simplicity of structure and
vocabulary .
In pulling to pieces the examples that
follow, I have used relatively few
grammatical terms, as I didn't feel labels
would be that helpful, and I would have
had to have looked them up myself anyway. Instead, I have relied on a feel for
sense.
Neither of the types of division of
labour that Marx describes as operating within commodity production the a priori division of labour between
workers employed by an individual
capital through the organising control
and authority of the capitalist, and
the a posteriori social division of
labour between workers employed by
different capitals, which, though the
market, operates via the coercive
force of competition - neither of these
divisions of labour touches domestic
labour .
A long convoluted sentence often
reveals a convoluted train of thought.
There are no frank grammatical errors in
this sentence . All the individual words
are apt and make perfectly good sense.
But it is a cumbersome compilation of

GETTING IT WRITE
statement and background, using 72 argument could well be put off by the
words.
sight of these italicised signals in an interLook at it closely and you'll see it's a national language of the learned while
sandwich . It has a huge parenthesis as they having trouble with `difficult'
the filling in a sliver of statment that has English.
been split to accommodate it . Even the
Unrelieved slabs of small, grey type
authors doubted its readability . Because across a wide measure can look very
the sentence is split, and because of the daunting, which is why I tried dividing
distance between the two ends of the the material into shorter paragraphs .
statement, they have felt it necessary to
There is no single best way to rerepeat themselves .
arrange or write such things . My example
`Neither of the types of labour . . . is intended merely to illustrate possible
neither of these divisions of labour . . .' ways of doing so, and leading a willing
There are several alternative ways of reader to the point.
reorganising the material to make it read
That example is from an academic
more clearly. One, the most obvious, journal with which readers of this one
would be to start with the statement may well be familiar . The following is
`Neither of Marx's two types of division from a textbook that says it is `mainly
of labour touches domestic labour' . This written for students who come to
could be followed with an explanation as economics in the expectation of gaining
to what each of the two divisions involves . an understanding of how economic
Another structure might involve lay- society functions and who have become
ing the groundwork for the statement disillusioned with the subject' .
before making it . I think this the better
If they get as far as page 152, their
type of solution here . The statement quest for an alternative will lead them to
could come as a punchline in a scheme this extract from a paragraph of some 200
something like this :
words, 3in long and 4 in wide .
Marx described two types of division
Because he must believe in a natural
of labour as operating within comequilibrium for capitalist society, he
modity production .
cannot reconcile himself to the notion
One is that which the organising
that there may not be an `equilibrium
control and authority of an individual
real wage', that the workers may not
capitalist exerts in dividing labour
be prepared to accept a wage conamong workers employed by that
venient to capital while the objective
capital.
situation gives them sufficient strength
The other is the social division of
to fight, that they demand wage inlabour between workers employed by
creases which are `excessive' not from
different capitals, which, through the
the point of view of their needs, but
market, operates via the coercive
rather the need of the capitalists'
force of competition .
system for sufficient profits.
Neither of these divisions of labour
`He' refers to Milton Friedman . Anytouches domestic labour .
one familiar with the argument and
The sentence is now split in four. The sympahetic to it may be carried through
material is organised into a series of steps the confusion by force of sheer goodwill .
rather than a loop .
But the chances of persuading wavering
I have omitted the distinction readers to read from beginning to end,
emphasised in Latin . Many readers who let alone agree, are severely reduced by
are perfectly capable of following the the effort required to understand how

GETTING IT WRITE
the elements of the sentence are
supposed to connect.
We need a strong contrast between
the alleged needs and interests of the
capitalist and those of the worker to bring
the opposition between them clearly to
view . Without that, the author's opposition to Friedman remains comprehensible to most readers only on an
emotional level .
A more carefully assembled structure
could achieve that opposition . Try
stripping and reassembling the sentence
now .
The habits that produce such
muddled, if well-intentioned offerings
mean that writers lack the flexibility to
vary the mood of a text, for example, by
using humour . Take the following clumsy
example:
Prices increased by 2 .4 per cent . The
Government made much of the fact
that the bulk of the latter rise was
accounted for by increases in the
prices of `seasonal foodstuffs' . This
information was as comforting to
workers as would be the disclosure to
those unemployed during the winter
months of the fact that viewed in
,seasonally-adjusted terms', they were
in work .
Here is a possible tightened rendering :
The government made much of price
rises being due largely to seasonal
foodstuffs costing more . It might as
well have told workers unemployed
during the winter that, viewed in
.seasonally-adjusted' terms, they were
not on the dole .
There are 63 words in the first version, 38 in the second . The original has
been pared down to a sharp point. Only
superfluities are lost .
Conscious application of such staple
editing techniques can ease, encourage,
cajole the reader through an argument .
It is the responsibility of the writer to use

them when drafting . It is unreasonable to

expect an editor to compensate for inattention and laziness . The writer that
relies on someone else to that extent may
later find cause to complain that the
original intention was damaged in the
laundry .
I cannot hope to do more here than
sketch ways of encouraging clearer,
more accessible expression . Below are
some of the less desirable mannerisms I
have noticed recurring in this journal and
in other writings its readers will be
familiar with . I hope this checklist will
help Capital & Class writers and readers
to see themselves as others see them and
encourage clearer ways of writing.
Active forms of the verb are almost always better and livelier than passive
ones . `The dog bit the lecturer', not
`the lecturer was bitten by the dog' .
Use verbs rather than nouns to get ideas
across . As the active bit of
language, they're rather good at it .
`The dog bit the lecturer, who had
to go to hospital', not `There was an
urgent
necessity
for
the
hospitalisation of a lecturer who
sustained a canine dentallyinflicted injury from a pet poodle' .
Acronyms are out unless instantly recognisable. TUC and UK are OK,
PZPR (Polska Zjednoczona Partia
Robotnicza) and PFSN (planning
for social need) are not . AES,
CSE? Try `the strategy', `the
conference' . There are almost
always ways of avoiding the
difficulty and readers will feel
articles just aren't for them if
unfamiliar cyphers pepper the
page .
Fashionable jargon changes with the
seasons, but usually manages to
sound coy, mannered, and then
after a point, dowdy. `Critiquing'
appears to be passe now, but
there's a lot of `prioritising' around .

CAPITAL AND CLASS

Short, simple words get less tired of being
read than long ones and throw into
relief the pieces where a long word
or a technical term really is necessary . In spite of the fact that = although ; approximately = about ;
accordingly = so ; absence of = no ;
proceed = go ; requiring additional
physical and mental concentration
in order to achieve satisfactory
comprehension = harder to read .
Short sentences and paragraphs do a
similar job. Unrelieved acres of grey
type look very unappealing . Samizdat
writers have the excuse of a paper
shortage for omitting paragraph
spacing. We waste paper that isn't
read for want of white relief in the
dense argument .
Startyour sentence with an element comprehensible in itself . When you begin
with `That the . . . ', for instance, the
verb usually drops at the end . This
means you have to file a whole gobbet
of wisdom before you know what to
do with it . Similar bad starts in this
category : `The question of (an urgent
improvement in) . . . .' ; `The implication of the view that . . .'
Also avoid `Said to . . .' ; `Having
seen . . .', as starts of this type mean
you don't find out whodunnit till later.
Some readers just can't stand the
suspense, so they don't read the sentence. Reverse is, putting the subject
first, or at least early: `The Tories,
said to have . . .'
Check for strings of things tacked together with prepositions : `The notification OF the list OF names BY the
council TO the committee AT the
meeting IN Birmingham ON Sunday
was UNDER consideration BY . . .'
Break it up . Try using some verbs
instead.
In lists of items or ideas, decide what the
priorities are and rank them . Serve
them up bit by bit, sentence by sen-

tence if necessary .
Parentheses, in this context usually
lengthy explanations within a sentence
(ie, as here, an explanation without
which the author considers it impossible to proceed), usually mean you
need two or more sentences to do the
job .
Modify a point without losing sight of
what it was. Avoid trying to pack all
nuances in the same sentence . . .
`even though' . . . `and similar proposals such as' . . . 'unless' . . . could
all deserve their own slot . That selection of illustrations all came from a
genuine offender .
Puns when clever, can be funny. But
beware semi-conscious punning that
is mere sleight of hand . `The production of human beings is a distinct
labour process' . Puns on reproduction
have snarled up marxist and feminist
theory .
Curb cliches and rhetoric . `My point is
basically that they have very little
impact at all,' said the dreary speaker
who wondered why no-one seemed to
be listening.
Make sure the bits of your sentence connect up properly . `Lecturers must take
a discerning position on marxist
theory . Swallowed whole, students
tend to rebel.' Jonah and the whale?
Mixed metaphors, and even consistent
ones, need watching . Use sparingly.
Concrete investigations?
Compound noun situations make difficult
notions more difficult to digest by
compacting them into dense units.
`The rapidly-accelerating deindustrialisation crisis situation' will have most
readers indifferent to its outcome.
For me, the most striking feature of
the kind of socialist writing to which I
object is the extent to which people tend
to get evacuated from the story, from the
very activities with which they hope to
change society. `Movements' are sup-

CAPITAL AND CLASS

A vital concern for this conference as
posed to involve people doing things, yet
for other socialist discussions now, as
the protagonists in these texts are consocialist principles and ideas seem to
cepts, ideas, actions, merely impaled on
be further from popular acceptance
labels for contemplation .
than ever, must be first to make a real
This sometimes goes a stage further,
commitment to the idea of broadin such a way that the activities and
phenomena themselves take on human
based involvement instead of merely
paying lip-service to it ; second looking
attributes . People no longer appear to
retain responsibility for actions and reto the implications of this for the forms
and practices we use - including the
sults . Some examples :
The necessity for a broadening of the
CSE conference itself and third seeking to discuss and develop ideas and
mobilisation against the effects of this
legislation is apparent .
action to enable a truly popular
politics .
A turn to building the party among
industrial workers is, however, not
Eva Kaluzynskaya helped form a
nearly sufficient on its own.
The struggle to turn the AES around collective of journalists, Leftwrite, that
so that it faces not the higher echelons runs occasional workshops on writing,
of the civil service, the trade union reporting and editing for activists . The
movement and the city- but rank and theme of this article is treated at length in
file workers, young people and women the context of the domesic labour debate
at home, has already begun.
in Wiping the Floor with Theory, Feminist
Such habits start, I daresay, in school, Review 6, 1980 .
where those responsible for `the sodium
Thanks to the C&C collective and
having been added to water producing particularly to Cynthia Cockburn for
ignition and an explosion' manage to editing with flair and patience .
escape from the sentence by pleading
scientific objectivity . We must try and
avoid these formulae that distance both
reader and writer from matters in which
we explicitly take sides. We say we want
people to join in, but thoughtlessly use a
distancing technique that deepens the
split between intellectual and activist,
thinking and doing.
It's difficult to judge one's own
writing, and it would be surprising to me
if you hadn't thought of improvements
you could make to this article by now. I
find that the best test of a piece of writing
for clarity is to read it aloud. If you can,
without stumbling and referring back, READERS AND writers of Capital and
and it makes sense to you, then there's a Class may have noticed that there has
good chance that it will to someone else been no consistent system of dealing with
`footnotes' and `bibliography' - some
too.
Try it with this plea from the July CSE authors have used one style, some
conference papers, then test yourself by another . It will not be possible overnight
attempting a rethink.
to bring about uniformity, but we want

HOW TO
ORGANISE

NOTES AND

REFERENCES

CAPITAL AND CLASS

to try to move in that direction .

Below we outline the system we
would prefer . Would authors of future
article please use it when typing their
manuscripts?
May we also remind you, as editors,
of the following points . Clean typing,
double spacing and wide margins are
essential. We need five copies of any
manuscript submitted. The first paragraph should summarise the argument of
the article and explain to the reader why
it is worth reading - especially its political and strategic significance for socialists . Use only title ; main headings ; and
sub-headings - no sub-sub-heads . Label
them A, B and C heads . Please also
attach a 40-60 word summary to go on
the Contents Page .

NOTES
First, there are no `footnotes' as such
in C&C. That is to say, there are no
small-type notes at the bottom of the text
page . Instead, `footnotes' are cued 'by
number and collected together at the end
of the text, under the heading NOTES.
Notes should be used to expand points,
not to give sources of information . That
is dealt with under a separate section
called REFERENCES (see below) .
Occasionally, of course, a `note' will include reference to another book or
article. This should be dealt with exactly
as for a reference in the main text .
REFERENCES
We plan to use a modified version of
the Harvard system . It is based on the
principle that you minimise the amount
of page-turning necessary, by including
the name of the author in the text .
In the text will appear the following
kind of cue:
argued
Hartmann
(1979)
has

that . . . (or)
A reent feminist critique (Hartmann,
1979) has made the point . . .
If you are quoting from another
work, again give the reference, including
the page number, in the text, thus :
`like the marriage of husband and
wife depicted in English common
law : marxism and feminism are one,
and that one is marxism . . .we need a
healthier marriage or we need a
divorce' (Hartmann, 1979 :1)
If you refer to a number of authors :
. . .as has been argued by several
people (e .g . Baran, 1957 ; Frank,
1969 ; Amin, 1975)
If an author has more than one
publication in a year, use small letters to
distinguish them :
. . as argued in Frank (1969a) . . .
In the REFERENCES, as they are
collected at the end of the article, the
works should be listed in alphabetical
order of author's surname . Begin with
the author, followed by the date in
brackets . Titles of articles and chapters
of books will have only the first letter
capitalised, whereas in the titles of books
and journals the first letter of each
major word should be capitalised .
Underline the title of books, and the title
of journals and periodicals, so that these
will be italicised in the printed volume .
Place the publisher's name in brackets .
Use as little punctuation as reasonable .
Examples :
Coyle, A . (1982) Sex and skill in the
organisation of the clothing industry, in
J. West (ed) Work, Women and the
Labour Market (Routledge and Kegan
Paul).
Frank, A .G . (1969a) Latin America:
Underdevelopment
or
Revolution
(Monthly Review Press) .
Hartmann, H . (1979) The unhappy
marriage of marxism and feminism :
towards a more progressive union
Capital and Class 8.

CAPITAL AND CLASS

now available

KARL MARX AND FREDERICK ENGELS

COLLECTED WORKS
VOLUME 18:1857-1862
This volume is largely made up of articles written by
Engels, most ofthem on military matters, and confirms his
reputation as an expert in the field, the first writer to
approach military science from a materialist perspective.
With absolute mastery of his subject, he treats topics as
diverse as the history of the rifle, the development of
strategy during different historical epochs and the course
of the Americam Civil War . His articles on Burmah,
Algeria andAfghanistan condemn the expansionist
policies of imperialist powers and describe the struggles
waged against the invaders .
600 pages maps illustrations indexes cloth 8.50
VOLUME 38 : LETTERS 1844-1851
The publication of this volume marks the beginning
of a major new stage within Lawrence & Wishart's project
of publishing the Collected Works of Marx and Engels, as
it is the first of thirteen volumes which will bring together
all their surviving letters . Covering the early years of their
friendship and the maturing of their political philosophy,
this volume includes the revolutionary year of 1848 (a
crucial one in the lives of both men) and the early years of
their long exile in England . As well as providing fresh
perspectives on their political development, these letters
offer exceptional portraits of the writers and their
families, and their closest collaborators .
712 pages illustrations indexes cloth 8 .50
Lawrence & Wishart
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