Deliberate Force

Del i berate Force
A Case Study i n
Effecti ve Ai r Campai gni ng
Fi nal Report of the Ai r Uni versi ty
Bal kans Ai r Campai gn Study
Edited by
Col Robert C. Owen, USAF
Air University Press
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
J anuar y 2000
Disclaimer
Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the
authors and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force,
the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release:
distribution unlimited.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Deliberate force a case study in effective air campaigning : final report of the Air
Uni versi t y Bal kans ai r campai gn st udy / edi t ed by Robert C. Owen.
p. c m.
Incl udes bi bl i ographi cal references and i ndex.
ISBN 1-58566-076-0
1. Yugos l av War , 19911995Aer i al oper at i ons . 2. Yugos l av War , 1991
1995Campai gnsBosni a and Hercegovi na. 3. Yugosl av War, 19911995Forei gn
part i ci pat i on. 4. Peacekeepi ng forcesBosni a and Hercegovi na. 5. Nort h At l ant i c
Treat y Organi zat i onArmed ForcesAvi at i on. 6. Bosni a and Hercegovi na Hi st ory,
Mi l i t ary. I. Owen, Robert C. , 1951
DR1313. 7. A47 D45 2000
949. 703dc21 99- 087096
ii
Contents
Chapt er Page
DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
ABOUT THE EDITOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv
PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii
1 The Demi se of Yugosl avi a and t he
Dest ruct i on of Bosni a: St rat egi c Causes,
Effect s, and Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Dr. Karl Mueller
2 The Pl anni ng Backgr ound . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Lt Col Bradley S. Davis
3 US and NATO Doctrine for
Campai gn Pl anni ng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Col Maris McCrabb
4 The Del i berat e Force Ai r Campai gn Pl an . . . . 87
Col Christopher M. Campbell
5 Execut i ng Del i berat e Force,
30 August 14 Sept ember 1995 . . . . . . . . . 131
Lt Col Mark J. Conversino
6 Combat Assessment : A Commanders
Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
Maj Mark C. McLaughlin
7 Assessing the Effectiveness of Deliberate Force:
Harnessing the Political-Military Connection . . 189
8 Aircraft Used in Deliberate Force . . . . . . . . 199
Lt Col Richard L. Sargent
iii
Chapt er Page
9 Weapons Used i n Del i berat e Force . . . . . . . 257
10 Del i berat e Force Target i ng . . . . . . . . . . . 279
11 Del i berat e Force Tact i cs . . . . . . . . . . . . 297
12 Del i berat e Force Combat Ai r Assessment s . . . 331
13 Aspects of Leading and Following:
The Human Fact ors of Del i berat e Force . . . . . 351
Lt Col John C. Orndorff
14 Chari ot s of Fi re: Rul es of Engagement
i n Operat i on Del i berat e Force . . . . . . . . . . 381
Lt Col Ronald M. Reed
15 Roads Not Taken: Theoretical Approaches
t o Operat i on Del i berat e Force . . . . . . . . . 431
Lt Col Robert D. Pollock
16 Summar y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455
Col Robert C. Owen
CONTRIBUTORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 523
INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 527
Il l ustrati ons
Figure
2.1 UNSCRs and NAC Decisions Leading
to Deliberate Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.2 NATO Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.3 UN/ NATO Command Rel at i onshi ps . . . . . . . 49
iv
Figure Page
2.4 Air Strategy to Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.5 Del i berat e Force Operat i onal Locat i ons . . . . . 54
4.1 Operation Deadeye Key Nodes . . . . . . . . . 101
4.2 Zones of Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.3 Del i berat e Force Ai r St ri ke Concept . . . . . . . 108
8.1 Assigned Aircraft by Nationality
( 30 August 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
8.2 Assigned Forces by Nationality
( 14 Sept ember 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
10. 1 Zones of Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
10. 2 Del i berat e Force Ai r St ri ke Concept . . . . . . . 284
11. 1 BSA Order of Battle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300
11. 2 Del i berat e Force Concept of Operat i ons . . . . . 308
12. 1 National Sortie Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . 332
12. 2 Overall Sortie Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . 332
12. 3 Di st ri but i on of Penet rat i ng Sort i es . . . . . . . 332
12. 4 Di st ri but i on of Support Sort i es . . . . . . . . . 333
12. 5 Del i berat e Force Mi ssi ons . . . . . . . . . . . 333
12. 6 Del i berat e Force Mi ssi on Apport i onment . . . . 334
12. 7 US Joi nt Sort i e Di st ri but i on . . . . . . . . . . 335
12. 8 Gr ound- and Ai r - Abor t Summar y . . . . . . . . 337
12. 9 Post st ri ke Resul t s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341
12. 10 Deadeye Resul t s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343
v
Figure Page
12. 11 Tar get s Remai ni ng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344
12. 12 DMPIs Remaining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344
14. 1 ROE Infl uences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383
14. 2 Development of ROE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 396
14. 3 NATO and UN Chai ns of Command . . . . . . . 401
14. 4 Zones of Action for Deliberate Force . . . . . . 409
15. 1 Wardens Five Rings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435
15. 2 The Campai gn- Pl anni ng Model . . . . . . . . . 441
Photo
Ri chard Hol brooke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Adm Lei ght on W. Smi t h . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Gen Mi chael E. Ryan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Lt Gen Hal M. Hornburg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Lt Gen Michael C. Short . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
F-16s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
Mi rage 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
F-14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
F-18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
EA-6B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
A-10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
F-15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
vi
Photo Page
AC-130 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
KC-135 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
KC-10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
U-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
Predator UAV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
S-3 Vi ki ng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
P-3 Orion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
RC-135 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
EF- 111 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
E-3 ai rborne warni ng and cont rol syst em ai rcraft . . . . 234
E-2 Hawkeye . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
MH-53 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
C-17s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
C-21 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
F-15C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
B-52 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
F-117s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
AGM-65 Maverick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
GBU-15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
AGM-88 HARM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
2. 75- i nch r ocket . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
vii
Photo Page
Loadi ng an A-10s cannon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
Serb art i l l ery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
Bri dge damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
F-18 with HARMs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312
Gen J ames J amer s on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 456
Lt Gen Jay W. Kelley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 456
Tables
2.1 NATO Aircraft for Deliberate Force . . . . . . . 53
4.1 OPLAN 40101 Deny Flight Phases
and Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.2 Exampl e Target Mat ri x . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
8.1 Players Available at Onset . . . . . . . . . . . 203
8.2 End- St at e For ce St r uct ur e
(Assigned Aircraft Only) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
8.3 Shoot er Mi ssi ons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
8.4 Support er-Mi ssi on Sort i es . . . . . . . . . . . 220
8.5 Allocation and Apportionment of Aircraft
in Deliberate Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
9.1 Deliberate Forces Precision Munitions . . . . . 258
9.2 Del i berat e Forces Nonpreci si on Bombs . . . . . 265
10. 1 Safe-Area Target Set s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
10. 2 Onset Target and DMPI Dat a . . . . . . . . . . 290
viii
Table Page
11. 1 Obscurant Effect s on Sensor Performance . . . 303
11. 2 SEAD Windows in Deliberate Force . . . . . . . 313
12. 1 Del i berat e Force Mi ssi on Apport i onment . . . . 334
12. 2 Del i berat e Force Sort i e Summary . . . . . . . . 337
12. 3 Gr ound- and Ai r - Abor t Summar y . . . . . . . . 338
12. 4 US Air Force Precision Munitions Analysis . . . 339
12. 5 Indi vi dual Target s At t acked/ Dest royed . . . . . 342
12. 6 Sarajevo ZOA Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 342
12. 7 Deadeye Target s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343
ix
F oreword
Every ai rman or person i nt erest ed i n t he art and sci ence of
ai r and space war f ar e shoul d r ead t hi s book. Tr ue t o t he
di r ect i on of Gen James Jamer son, f or mer deput y commander
i n chi ef of US European Command, and me, t he Ai r Uni versi t y
Bal kans Ai r Campai gn St udy (BACS) has emerged as a bal-
anced and wi de-rangi ng di scussi on of t he Del i berat e Force ai r
campai gn, whi ch occurred duri ng t he fal l of 1995. Expl oi t i ng
t he sources and resources avai l abl e t o t hem, t he BACS t eam
members have l ai d out a mi l e-wi de and foot -deep expl orat i on
of t he cont ext , t heoret i cal foundat i ons, pl anni ng, execut i on,
l eadershi p, and effect s of t hi s mi l est one event . In so doi ng,
t hey have cont ri but ed si gni fi cant l y t o our knowl edge about t he
pol i t i cal , mi l i t ar y, t echni cal , and human el ement s t hat shape
ai r campai gns and i nf l uence t hei r out comes. Mor eover , t he
BACS offers i nsi ght s i nt o persi st ent quest i ons of mi l i t ary pl an-
ners, such as t he rel at i onshi p of di pl omacy and war; t he syn -
ergy of l and power, space power, and ai rpower; and t he rol e of
chance and fog i n t he conduct and out come of ai r and space
warfare. Fi nal l y, because t he BACS t eam from t he st art wrot e
t hi s report for i mmedi at e decl assi fi cat i on, vi rt ual l y t he ent i re
report and al l of i t s subst ant i ve el ement s are avai l abl e here as
an open source, onl y four years aft er t he event . Gi ven i t s
scope, t hi s book shoul d cont ai n mat eri al of i nt erest t o al l
aerospace-warfare pract i t i oners and/ or t hi nkers, regardl ess of
t hei r area of expert i se.
The following are core implications of the BACS:
Del i berat e Force was a deci si ve el ement i n shapi ng t he
out come of t he al l i ed i nt ervent i on i nt o t he Bosni an con-
fl i ct , but i t s ful l effect must be underst ood i n t he cont ext
of t he ot her pol i t i cal and mi l i t ary devel opment s al so un-
der way at t he t i me.
The characteristics and weaponry of air and space warfare
gave the diplomats and soldiers of the i nt ervent i on a usable
xi
tool of great power and flexibility with which to influence
event s i n t he Bal kans r egi on.
For al l of t he capabi l i t i es of modern i nformat i on t echnol-
ogy, t he scal e, pace, human fact ors (such as l eadershi p,
cul t ur e, and concept ual i zat i on) , and ot her nont echni cal
el ement s of Del i berat e Force ensured t hat Cl ausewi t zs
trilogy of fog, friction, and chance remained important in
shapi ng i t s ul t i mat e out come.
If Deliberate Force is considered a new form of intervention-
ism on behalf of peace, then the experience gained from
that operation suggests the need for a review of our concep-
tions about the nature of military and diplomatic leadership
i n such ci r cumst ances.
If it is to be useful, doctrineas formalized advice on wha t
mi l i t ary l eaders shoul d do when faced by cert ai n ki nds of
pr obl ems mus t be r ead and under s t ood. But i t al s o
must be under st ood as a gui de f or t hi nki ng t hr ough pr ob -
l ems ahead of t i me, rat her t han a reci pe for t hei r sol ut i on
aft er t he fact .
The st udy makes ot her i mpor t ant poi nt s, of cour se, and any
gi ven reader l i kel y wi l l fi nd t hi ngs wi t h whi ch t o agree and
disagree. However, these core implications of the BACS serve
t o i l l ust r at e i t s val ue, bot h as a hi st or i cal document and as a
spar k f or debat e and t hought i t s r eal pur pose.
I woul d be remi ss i f I di d not commend t he dedi cat i on and
persi st ence of al l t he members of t he BACS t eam. When t hey
vol unt eer ed t o par t i ci pat e i n t hi s st udy, we al l under st ood t hat
i t woul d be a focused effort t o capt ure t he most i mport ant
pol i t i cal and operat i onal event s of Del i berat e Force and t o
st ar t an ar chi ve of r el at ed mat er i al s t o suppor t f ur t her r e-
search. As t hey pursued t hei r research, however, t he t eam
member s soon r eal i zed t hat t hey had a hol d on t he t ai l of a
much bi gger el ephant t han anyone at Ai r Uni versi t y ori gi-
nal l y had expect ed. Del i ber at e For ce t ur ns out t o have been a
very complex event, composed of layered political, military,
and human el ement s t hat al l bore some l evel of exami nat i on.
Despi t e i t s growi ng scal e and compl exi t y, every t eam member
el ect ed t o st ay wi t h t he st udy, even t hough i t defi ni t el y was a
vol unt ary soci et y and even t hough t hei r work on i t was i n
xii
addi t i on t o t hei r assi gned dut i es as facul t y and st aff at Ai r
Uni versi t y. Aft er most of t he BACS t eam members di spersed t o
new assi gnment s as f ar away as Ger many and Hawai i , t hey
cont i nued t o work t he proj ect and t o meet al l of t he deadl i nes
i mposed on t hem by t he edi t ori al and decl assi fi cat i on proc-
esses. The resul t of t hei r dedi cat i on i s t hi s fi ne report , one
t hat cert ai nl y benefi t ed from t he wi de-rangi ng experi ences and
i nt el l ect ual capabi l i t i es of t he peopl e who wrot e i t .
JAY W. KELLEY
Li eut enant General , USAF, Ret i red
Col orado Spri ngs, Col orado
J une 1999
xiii
About the
Edi tor
Col Robert C. Owen is chief of the Policy and Doctrine Divi-
sion, Air Mobility Command, Scott AFB, Illinois. In that pos ition
he supervises the development and articulation of air-mobili ty
concept s and doct r i ne and speci al pr oj ect s, such as t he com-
ma nds i nvol vement i n t he Expedi t i onary Ai r Force and Fut ure
Tot al Force Uni t . At t he t i me he di rect ed t he Bal kans Ai r
Campai gn St udy, Col onel Owen was dean of t he School of
Advanced Airpower Studies at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. While
he served as chi ef of t he Joi nt Doct ri ne Branch of t he Doct ri ne
Di vi si on at Headquart ers Uni t ed St at es Ai r Force, he wrot e t he
Chronology volume of the Gulf War Air Power Survey. He al so
has publ i shed a number of j our nal ar t i cl es and has a book,
The Rise of Global Airlift in the USAF, in final editorial review.
A command pi l ot wi t h over t hree t housand hours of opera-
tional flying in the C-130 and T-41 aircraft, Colonel Owen
holds an MA in African studies from UCLA and a PhD in
military history from Duke University.
xv
Preface
Operat i on Del i berat e Force was t he Nort h At l ant i c Treat y
Organization (NATO) air campaign conducted between 30 Au -
gust and 20 Sept ember 1995 t o advance t he cause of peace i n
t he Bal kans regi on. Lt Gen Jay W. Kel l ey, commander of Ai r
Uni versi t y, Maxwel l Ai r Force Base, Al abama, and Gen James
L. Jamer son, deput y commander i n chi ef of Uni t ed St at es
Eur opean Command, St ut t gar t , Ger many, j oi nt l y char t er ed
t he Bal kans Ai r Campai gn St udy (BACS) i n Oct ober 1995.
They di rect ed t he BACS t eam t o capt ure t he pl anni ng and
operational experience of Deliberate Force on behalf of Air
Uni versi t y st udent s prepari ng for fut ure responsi bi l i t i es as
ai r-warfare pl anners and l eaders, and on behal f of t he broader
communi t y of ai r-warfare t hi nkers. Thei r speci fi c di rect i on en-
tailed (1) writing a mile-wide-and-foot-deep report laying out
t he sal i ent event s, causal rel at i onshi ps, and i mpl i cat i ons of
t hi s i mpor t ant ai r campai gn and ( 2) assembl i ng a compr ehen-
si ve archi ve of rel evant oral and document ary evi dence t o sup-
port fut ure research i nt o t he pl anni ng, execut i on, and di pl o -
matic exploitation of Deliberate Force.
1
To hi ghl i ght t hi s st udys focus on t he pl anni ng and execu -
t i on of an ai r campai gn, t he BACS t eam adopt ed t he fol l owi ng
as i t s core research quest i on: How and wi t h what consi dera-
t i ons di d t he pl anners and execut ors of Del i berat e Force l i nk
mi l i t ary operat i ons wi t h t he st rat egi c, pol i t i cal , and di pl omat i c
goal s t hey wer e char ged t o at t ai n? To make t he r epor t usef ul
t o a pot ent i al l y br oad audi ence, t eam member s set out t o
answer t hi s quest i on t hrough a wi de-rangi ng exami nat i on of
the geopolitical, sociological, diplomatic, technological, and
oper at i onal f act or s t hat shaped t he char act er i st i cs and out-
come of t hi s par t i cul ar ai r campai gn. Thus, t he chapt er s of
t hi s report deal broadl y wi t h (1) t he pol i t i cal and i nst i t ut i onal
cont ext of Del i berat e Force pl anni ng, (2) t he act ual pl anni ng of
t he campai gn, (3) t he execut i on of t he campai gn, and (4) t he
i mpl i cat i ons of t hose experi ences. An i mport ant i ni t i al sub-
t heme of t he st udy was an ef f or t t o det er mi ne t o what ext ent
xvii
t he pl anners and execut ors of Del i berat e Force were cogni zant
of and/ or wi el ded i nfl uence over fact ors t hat most si gni fi -
cant l y shaped t he operat i on and det ermi ned i t s out come. In
ot her words, t o what ext ent were t hey i n charge of event s and
t o what ext ent wer e event s i n char ge of t hem? The t eam ex-
pect ed t hat t he answer t o t hose and ot her quest i ons r ai sed by
t he st udy woul d carry si gni fi cant i mpl i cat i ons for t heori es and
doct ri nes of ai rpower st rat egy and pl anni ng.
Assembl i ng a comprehensi ve dat abase on Del i berat e Force
proved more chal l engi ng t han t he campai gns rel at i vel y com-
pact di mensi ons of scal e and t i me fi rst suggest ed. In cont rast
t o t hei r count erpart s duri ng t he Persi an Gul f War of 199091,
t he non-US coal i t i on part ners i n Del i berat e Force pl ayed a
more i ndependent and nearl y coequal pol i t i cal and, t o a l esser
ext ent , mi l i t ary rol e wi t h t hei r Ameri can count erpart s i n t he
pl anni ng and conduct of t he campai gn. Thi s l evel and conse-
quence of non-US part i ci pat i on obl i ged BACS researchers t o
l ook far afi el d for dat a and perspect i ves on Del i berat e Force.
Thei r search was compl i cat ed by t he ret urn of many non-US
mi dl evel pl anners and fl yi ng personnel i nvol ved i n Del i berat e
For ce t o t hei r home count r i es shor t l y af t er t he campai gn
ended. Di pl omat i c ci rcumst ances furt her obl i ged t he t eam t o
cast a wi de net for dat a. Conduct ed as a st ep i n a l ong effort
t o mai nt ai n peace i n or at l east cont ai n t he vi ol ence of t he
Bal kans regi on, Del i berat e Force was shaped and expl oi t ed by
t he oft en confl i ct i ng i nt erest s of numerous regi onal and gl obal
actors, including the United Nations (UN), NATO political and
mi l i t ary agenci es, di pl omat i c and mi l i t ary agenci es of numer-
ous Eur opean st at es, and, of cour se, t he war r i ng r egi onal
groups t hemsel ves. To t he ext ent t hat barri ers of secrecy, na-
t i onal sensi t i vi t i es, and t he l i mi t s of i t s chart er al l owed, t he
BACS t eam at l east as k e d many of t hese sources for i nforma-
t i on and comment swi t h l i mi t ed r esul t s.
Gi ven t he br eadt h of avai l abl e sour ces and t he const r ai nt s
of t i me and resources, t he BACS t eam focused on anal yzi ng
and descri bi ng Del i berat e Force as a di st i nct mi l i t ary cam-
pai gn. The t eam member s di d t hi s i n f ul l awar eness t hat t he
operat i on was a compl ex event one t hat coul d be underst ood
onl y i n i t s ful l pol i t i cal and mi l i t ary cont ext . The t eam al so
remai ned cogni zant of t he rel uct ance wi t hi n some US mi l i t ary
xviii
ci rcl es t o use t he word campaign t o l abel t he act i vi t i es of a
specific military component of a multiservice (joint) or multi-
nat i onal (combi ned) command. Thi s rel uct ance i s but t ressed
by fundament al US j oi nt doct ri ne, whi ch reserves t he pl an-
ni ng of campai gns f or j oi nt f or ce commander s ( JFC) and
whi ch r el egat es t hei r component commander s t o pl anni ng
operat i ons or annexes t o t he JFCs campai gn pl an.
2
Nevert hel ess, descri bi ng Del i berat e Force as a campai gn
makes good analytical sense. As a consciously connected serie s
of ai r act i ons ai med at coerci ng t he Bosni an Serbs t o make
mi l i t ary and pol i t i cal concessi ons, what happened over t he skies
of Bosni a i n August and Sept ember 1995 essent i al l y coi nci des
wi t h t he US j oi nt doct ri nal defi ni t i on of a campai gn as a
seri es of rel at ed mi l i t ary operat i ons ai med at accompl i shi ng a
st rat egi c or operat i onal obj ect i ve wi t hi n a gi ven t i me and
space.
3
Moreover, l abel i ng Del i berat e Force as a campai gn fi t s
aut hor i t at i ve usage by seni or US def ense l eader s such as Sec-
ret ary of Defense Wi l l i am Perry, who descri bed i t as a mas-
si ve ai r campai gn t hat st unned t he Serbs wi t h i t s power
and effect i veness.
4
Still, given the importance of definitions in
t he devel opment and art i cul at i on of doct ri ne, t he choi ce of
campaign i n t hi s case wi l l carry uncomfort abl e pol i cy and
budget ary i mpl i cat i ons for some readers. But t hat di scomfort
shoul d not bl ock an open-mi nded readi ng of t hi s report .
For si mi l ar reasons of focus and conci seness, most mem-
ber s of t he BACS t eam di d not set out on t hei r r esear ch i n t he
expect at i on t hat Del i berat e Force woul d fi t neat l y i nt o some
ni che of t he so-cal l ed cont i nuum of war art i cul at ed i n US
doctrine.
5
As a met hod of art i cul at i ng t he t ypes of confl i ct and
war t hat mi ght exi st bet ween t he ext remes of absol ut e peace
and absol ut e war, t he cont i nuum-of-war concept useful l y pre-
di ct s t he broad causes and pol i t i cal obj ect i ves of vari ous ki nds
of confl i ct and, by i mpl i cat i on, t he sacri fi ces combat ant s wi l l
make. But t he concept i s not part i cul arl y useful as a predi ct or
of the likely intensity, tactics, strategies, political ramifica-
t i ons, or many ot her speci fi c det ai l s of such confl i ct s and
wars. For example, for the United States and most UN membe r
st at es, Del i berat e Force was a campai gn of l i mi t ed i mport ance
to tangible vital interests. For the Balkan states, howeve r , it s
outcome carried grave importance for their foreseeable political,
xix
soci al , and cul t ural dest i ni es. Si mi l arl y, at t he st rat egi c l evel ,
Del i berat e Force was a const rai ned exerci se i n power and ri sk
management . At t he t act i cal l evel , t hough, NATO ai rmen expe-
ri enced t he campai gn as a mi crocosm of t he operat i ng t empos,
t act i cs, weapons, and t hr eat s t hey woul d have expect ed t o
face i n a hi gh-i nt ensi t y confl i ct i n cent ral Europe had t he col d
war gone hot .
Del i berat e Force al so does not fi t neat l y i nt o t he mi l i t ary
operat i ons ot her t han war (MOOTW) subcat egory of t he con-
t i nuum of war. Perhaps t he campai gn fi t t he MOOTW cat egory
pol i t i cal l y si nce t he UN and NATO l aunched i t as a peace
operat i on, wi t hout any formal decl arat i ons of war. However,
even i n secondar y r esear ch mat er i al s avai l abl e t o t he t eam at
t he begi nni ng of t he st udy, Del i berat e Force cl earl y had a spl i t
personality in terms of where it fit into the MOOTW concept.
To t he ext ent t hat NATO i ni t i at ed t he bombi ng t o hel p t he UN
for ce Bosni an Ser b mi l i t ar y f or ces t o cease shel l i ng t he UN-
declared technical exclusion zones or safe areas around sev-
eral l arge Bosni an ci t i es, Del i berat e Force was an exerci se i n
peacemaki ng. But t o t he ext ent t hat t he bombi ng al so un-
derpi nned ongoi ng effort s by t he UN and t he fi ve-nat i on Con-
t act Group t o force t he Serbs t o ent er i nt o seri ous peace nego-
t i at i ons, t he oper at i on i nvol ved peace enf or cement . The
oper at i onal compl exi t y of Del i ber at e For ce r ei nf or ced t he
sense t hat t he real -worl d boundari es of t hi s campai gn woul d
not conf or m t o t he t heor et i cal boundar i es del i neat ed i n
MOOTW t heory. Del i berat e Force may have been a rest rai ned
peace operat i on st rat egi cal l y, but t act i cal l y i t was an energet i c
operat i on charact eri zed by t he empl oyment of t echnol ogi cal l y
cut t i ng-edge ai r forces.
As a consequence of t hese def i ni t i onal ambi gui t i es, t he
BACS report was never intended to fix Deliberate Forces place
i n an exi st i ng confl i ct t axonomy. Inst ead, as di rect or of t he
report , I want ed i t t o descri be t he event as accurat el y and i n
as much det ai l as pract i cal at t he t i me. Even at t he begi nni ng,
i t was obvi ous t o most probabl y al l BACS t eam members
t hat t hi s part i cul ar ai r campai gn had di st i nct i ve charact eri stics,
t he descri pt i on of whi ch woul d i n i t sel f j ust i fy t he report .
Several of t hese feat ures st ood out al ready, i n out l i ne at l east ,
in the fall of 1995. First, Deliberate Force was strategically more
xx
of a mat ch t han mi ght have fi rst appeared. The count ervai l i ng
commi t ment s and obj ect i ves of t he combat ant s t ended t o r e-
duce the advantage of NATOs overwhelming military power.
Second, t he ai r campai gn was t act i cal l y one-si ded. The de-
pl oyed l and- and sea-based ai r forces of t he NATO part ners
dwarfed t he ai r force and ground-based ai r defenses of t he
Bosni an Serbs. Thi rd, Del i berat e Force was not a pol i t i cal l y or
mi l i t ari l y i sol at ed event . It was, aft er al l , conduct ed i n support
ofor at least in the context ofthe political activities of sev-
er al or gani zat i ons and nat i ons i nt er veni ng i n t he Bosni an
confl i ct . For t hat reason, by t he fal l of 1995, t he ai r command-
ers had al ready st at ed t hei r bel i ef t hat , i n t he pol i t i cal l y
charged ci rcumst ances of t he campai gn, every t act i cal event of
t he operat i on pot ent i al l y carri ed si gni fi cant and i mmedi at e
st rat egi c pol i t i cal i mport ance. Al so, at t he t i me of t he ai r cam-
pai gn, Cr oat i a and t he Bosni an Feder at i on wer e conduct i ng a
coordi nat ed ground offensi ve t hat successful l y pushed Croa -
t i an Serb and Bosni an Serb mi l i t ary forces out of areas t hey
had conquer ed pr evi ousl y. The BACS t eam under st ood t hat
any useful assessment of t he shape and i nfl uence of Del i ber-
at e Force event ual l y woul d have t o consi der t he si mul t aneous
i mpact of t he gr ound campai gn.
Given these salient elements, Deliberate Forces theoretical
survey mark, upon which most aspects of this study are ori-
ent ed, i s i t s uni que i dent i t y as an ai r campai gn conduct ed
against an airpower-weak opponent, under conditions of politi-
cal subtlety and limited time, in which every tactical event had
great pot ent i al i mport ance. Thi s descri pt i on of t he char a c-
teristics and context of Operation Deliberate Force facilitates the
effort of placing it in the existing body of theory and doctrine. As
propositions, respectively, of how things work and of what ac-
tions will most likely produce desired results under anticipated
ci rcumst ances, t heori es and doct ri nes are cont ext ual l y depend-
ent i n t hei r meani ng and appl i cat i on. One must present any
theoretical proposition about the forces of human affairs, cause-
and-effect relationships, and so on, in the context of an accurate
descri pt i on of t he ci rcumst ances under whi ch such observed
event s and processes happened. Li kewi se, effect i ve doct ri ne
must reflect both a solid foundation of relevant theories, based
on experience, and a carefully constructed descri pt i on of t he
xxi
ci r cumst ances under whi ch one expect s an ant i ci pat ed act i on
t o produce desi red resul t s. To become credi bl e, an ai r pl an-
ners i mpl i ci t l y doct ri nal st at ement t hat a new st ri ke pl an
shoul d i ncorporat e an el ement of surpri se, for exampl e, must
meet t wo cri t eri a:
1. It must be related, even if only subconsciously in the min d s
of t he peopl e i nvol ved, t o a t heoret i cal underst andi ng
t hat a di rect rl at i onshi p may exi st bet ween surpri se and
mi ssi on success.
2. It al so must showagai n, even i f onl y subl i mi nal l yt hat
a di rect rel at i onshi p exi st s bet ween t he ci rcumst ances of
t he act i on pr oposed and t hose under pi nni ng t he gener al
t heor y r el at i ng sur pr i se and success.
Li kewi se, fut ure ai r commanders and t hei r advi sors can ex-
t ract t he wi sdom of t he Del i berat e Force commanders deci-
si on t o make al l weapon ai m-poi nt sel ect i ons hi msel f, onl y i f
t hey have a cl ear underst andi ng of t he t heoret i cal rat i onal e for
t he deci si on, t he cr i t er i a under whi ch i t was made, and t he
rel at i on of t hese t wo t hi ngs t o t he ci rcumst ances i n whi ch
t hey cont empl at e maki ng si mi l ar deci si ons t hemsel ves.
The ul t i mat e goal of t hi s st udyt o i dent i fy t he i mpl i cat i ons
of t he Del i berat e Force experi ence for t he fut uret hus cal l ed
for a preci se descri pt i on of t he event agai nst t he backdrop of
t he t heoret i cal and doct ri nal expect at i ons of t he part i ci pant s
for t he pl anni ng and execut i on of ai r campai gns, part i cul arl y
under ci r cumst ances si mi l ar t o t hose sur r oundi ng t he act ual
event . Thi s r equi r ement , i n t ur n, r ai sed t wo r esear ch ques-
t i ons corol l ary t o t he core one about t he mat chi ng of means
and ends :
1. To what ext ent di d t he pl anni ng, execut i on, and out come
of Deliberate Force reflect the expectations of the exist-
i ng body of ai rpower t heory and doct ri ne?
2. Gi ven t he out come of Del i berat e Force and t he rel at i on-
shi p of t heory and pract i ce i n i t s pl anni ng, execut i on,
and effect, what are its implications for the body of fu -
t ure ai rpower t heory, doct ri ne, and pol i cy?
Team members bel i eved t hat t he answers t o t hese and t he cor e
research quest i on woul d ext ract a great deal of benefi t from
xxii
t he BACS for i t s i nt ended audi ences. They expect ed t hat
t hose answer s woul d be l oaded wi t h t heor et i cal and doct r i nal
i mpl i cat i ons f or f ut ur e ai r - war f ar e t hi nker s, pl anner s, and
l eaders. They were not di sappoi nt ed.
Notes
1. This archive, held at the Air Force Historical Research Agency at
Maxwel l AFB, Al a. , consi st s of over 10, 000 pages of document s, about one
hundr ed hour s of or al i nt er vi ews on audi ot ape, and a number of comput er
disc files.
2. Joi nt Publ i cat i on (Pub) 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1 Febr uar y
1995, chap. 3, t hr oughout .
3. Joi nt Pub 1- 02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and
Associ at ed Terms, 1994, 60.
4. Wi l l i am H. Perry, remarks t o Adj ut ant General Associ at i on of t he
Uni t ed St at es, Nat i onal Guard Associ at i on Bui l di ng, Washi ngt on, D. C. , 7
Febr uar y 1996.
5. Joi nt Pub 3-0, I-2 and I-3.
ROBERT C. OWEN, Colonel, USAF
Scott Air Force Base, Illinois
J une 1999
xxiii
Chapt er 1
The Demi se of Yugosl avi a
and t he Dest ruct i on of Bosni a:
St rat egi c Causes, Ef f ect s, and Responses
Dr. Karl Mueller
To under st and Uni t ed St at es and West er n pol i cy i n Bosni a-
Her zegovi na and t he sur r oundi ng st at es i n gener al , and Op-
erat i on Del i berat e Force i n part i cul ar, one must pl ace t hese
pol i ci es i n st rat egi c cont ext . The sequence of event s t hat l ed t o
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ai r campai gn of
August and Sept ember 1995 di d not r eal l y begi n i n t he f our-
t eent h cent ur y, as some wr i t er s have suggest ed, but i t does
predat e t he breakup of Yugosl avi a and the civil war in Bosnia
t hat began i n 1992.
Thi s chapt er l ays t he groundwork for t hose t hat fol l ow by
descr i bi ng t he act or s, r el at i onshi ps, and condi t i ons at t he
st r at egi c l evel t hat not onl y caused but shaped and con -
st r ai ned West er n act i ons i n and ar ound Bosni a i n 199295.
Most of t he chapt er i s i n narrat i ve form, wi t h occasi onal ana-
l yt i cal i nt errupt i ons, but i t does not purport t o be a hi st ory of
i t s subj ect . It can provi de no more t han a superfi ci al account
of Yugosl avi an and Bosni an hi st ory, and t he reader who seeks
a r easonabl y compl et e under st andi ng of t hese compl ex mat -
t ers woul d be wel l advi sed t o consul t some of t he excel l ent
account s and anal yses ci t ed i n t he not es.
1
The Yugosl avi an Prol ogue
The st at e of Yugosl avi a was const r uct ed af t er t he Fi r st
World War f r om t he r ui ns of t he Aust r o- Hungar i an Empi r e
and t he i ndependent Al l i ed st at es of Ser bi a and Mont enegr o,
t hemsel ves cal ved of f t he di si nt egr at i ng Ot t oman Empi r e i n
t he l at e ni net eent h cent ury. The Great War had been t ri ggered
by t he Jul y Cri si s of 1914, whi ch began when a member of a
1
Ser bi an- suppor t ed Bosni an separ at i st or gani zat i on assassi -
nat ed Ar chduke Fr anz Fer di nand, hei r t o t he Aust ro-Hungar -
i an t hr one, and hi s consor t dur i ng a vi si t t o t he Bosni an
provincial capital of Sarajevo. Encour aged by Ger many, Aus-
tria bl amed Serbi a for the killing, leading to a confrontation
wi t h Russi a , Serbia s Pan-Slavic great-power ally, and eventu -
al l y t o a general European confl agrat i on.
2
I n r edr awi ng t he
map of cent r al and east er n Eur ope af t er t he war , t he vi ct or i -
ous Al l i es broke up t he Aust ri an empi re, combi ni ng i t s Sout h
Sl avi c provi nces wi t h t he et hni cal l y rel at ed Serbi an and Mon -
tenegrin states to form Yugoslavia .
3
The Allies intended the creation of Yugoslavia and t he ot her
p o s t - Ve r s a i l l e s mu l t i n a t i o n a l s t a t e s o f Ea s t e r n Eu r o p e
(Czechosl ovaki a, Pol and, and an expanded Romani a) t o hel p
st abi l i ze t he cont i nent . France i n par t i cul ar st r ove dur i ng t he
1920s t o cr eat e a net wor k of al l i ances wi t h t hese st at es
agai nst t he possi bi l i t y of expansi oni sm by t he defeat ed cent ral
powers.
4
The most successful aspect of t hi s effort was t he
est abl i shment of an al l i ance bet ween Czechosl ovaki a , Yugo-
slavia , and Romani a di r ect ed mai nl y agai nst Hungar y, which
became known as t he Li t t l e Ent ent e . Although it deteriorated
i n t he 1930s as i t s member s secur i t y concer ns began t o di-
verge, during the early years of the League of Nations , s ome
st at esmen opt i mi st i cal l y vi ewed t he Li t t l e Ent ent e as t he f unc-
t i onal equi val ent of a si xt h maj or European power, at l east i n
t he di pl omat i c sphere.
5
On the domestic political plane, Yugoslavia was domi nat ed
by Serbs, who were not onl y on t he wi nni ng si de i n t he war
but wer e t he most numer ous of i t s et hni c gr oups, compr i si ng
about 38 per cent of t he popul at i on; t he Ser bi an ki ng and
capi t al became t hose of t he new Yugosl avi an st at e. Int erwar
Yugoslavia was never a paragon of pol i t i cal st abi l i t y, and i t s
t roubl ed democracy was repl aced by a t roubl ed di ct at orshi p i n
1928. Bel gr ades vari ous effort s t o overcome t he count rys et h -
ni c di vi si ons and forge a pol i t i cal l y uni t ed st at e duri ng t he
i nt erwar years met wi t h consi derabl y l ess success t han di d
t hose of t he post war Yugosl avi an government .
6
As the power of Fascist Italy and Nazi Ger many grew i n t he
1930s, Bel grades t i es t o Fr ance weakened, and i t sought i n -
creasi ngl y t o appease t he l oomi ng It al i an t hreat . Fi nal l y, i n
DELIBERATE FORCE
2
April 1941, while the Italian invasion of Greece was fl ounder -
i ng, t he Yugosl avi an government s effort s t o reach a modus
vivendi with the Axislike the one Sweden was devel opi ng
wi t h Ger manyl ed t o a pro-Al l i ed mi l i t ary coup. Germany a nd
its allies responded by invading Yugoslavia , conqueri ng t he
country in short order before going on to defeat Greece a nd
t hen t o i nvade t he Sovi et Uni on .
7
Under brut al Axi s cont rol ,
parts of Yugoslavia wer e annexed by Ger many, Italy, Hungar y,
and Bul gari a , and t he r est was di vi ded i nt o Ger man and I t al-
i an zones of occupat i on and a nomi nal l y i ndependent Croa -
t i an fasci st st at e (i ncl udi ng part of present -day Croat i a and al l
of Bosnia-Herzegovina), which was in practice an Italo-Ger -
man condomi ni um.
8
The Fasci st Ust asas, who r an war t i me
Croatia , set out t o ki l l a t hi rd of t hei r st at es Serb popul at i on
and expel anot her t hi rd, pri or t o convert i ng t he remai nder t o
Cat hol i ci sm.
9
Yugoslavia was one of t he few Axi s-occupi ed count ri es t hat
saw si gni fi cant resi st ance-fi ght i ng duri ng t he war. Thi s fi ght-
i ng i nvol ved t wo mai n guerri l l a groups: t he royal i st Chet ni ks
and t he communi st part i sans l ed by t he Croat -Sl ovene l eader
of t he Yugosl av Communi st Part y, Josi p Broz, known by t he
ps eudonym Tito.
10
The resi st ance forces fought a gri sl y war
agai nst t he Axi s occupi ers and t hei r Croat i an al l i es and, more
oft en, agai nst each ot her. The Chet ni ks grew increasingly col-
l abor at i oni st under Ger man pr essur e, and t hei r campai gn of
vi ol ence agai nst Croat s and Musl i ms prevent ed t he Yugosl av-
i an government -i n-exi l e i n London from gai ni ng subst ant i al
support from non-Serbs. Ti t o s part i sans recei ved Sovi et sup -
port (although Tito rejected Moscows instructions to cooper -
at e wi t h t he Chet ni ks and ot her ant i communi st f or ces) , and,
ul t i mat el y, t he West ern Al l i es deci ded t o back Ti t o as well.
They di d so si nce he seemed far more wi l l i ng t han t he Chet -
ni ks t o prosecut e t he war agai nst t he Axi s i n spi t e of horri fi c
German repri sal s agai nst t he ci vi l i an popul ace. Over a mi l l i on
Yugosl avs di ed at t he hands of t hei r vari ous domest i c and
forei gn enemi es duri ng t he Second Worl d War; t hi s number
r epr esent ed mor e t han 6 per cent of t he count r y s pr ewar
popul at i ona great er proport i onal l oss t han was suffered by
any ot her st at e i n t he war except f or Ger many, Pol and, and
the Soviet Union.
MUELLER
3
Tito became premi er and l at er presi dent of post war Yugosl a -
via , as wel l as Communi st Part y general secret ary. He est ab-
l i shed a pol i t i cal syst em based on a st rong federal government
but wi t h si gni fi cant powers and perqui si t es reserved for each
of t he si x Yugosl av republ i cs and prot ect i ons for t he vari ous
official ethnic groups.
11
Thi s syst em under went sever al r ounds
of revi si on over t he years, most not abl y i n 1971, when Mus-
l i ms recei ved ful l recogni t i on as an et hni c nat i on, and i n t he
1974 const i t ut i on, whi ch i ncreased federal decent ral i zat i on
and gave vi r t ual r epubl i c st at us t o t he aut onomous Ser bi an
regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina .
Yugoslavia emerged from t he war as a l eadi ng member of
t he communi st movement i n East er n Eur ope, but Tito and hi s
Soviet allies soon parted ways; Yugoslavia was expelled from
t he Comi nform in 1948 for its disobediently militant foreign
policies and for Titos criticism of Stalin , al t hough Yugosl avi an
relations with Moscow improved somewhat following Stalin s
deat h.
12
The Uni t ed St at es provided arms to Yugoslavia under
t he Mut ual Assi st ance Pact duri ng t he 1950s, al ong wi t h l arge
amount s of ot her forei gn ai d, and for a whi l e Yugosl avi a even
appeared t o be a pot ent i al candi dat e for event ual NATO mem-
bershi p. In t he 1960s rel at i ons bet ween Bel grade and Moscow
improved, and Yugoslavia became one of t he sol i dl y neut ral
st at es of Eur ope, enj oyi ng t he at t ent i ons of bot h East and
West as t he superpowers vi ed for i nfl uence over i t .
13
Toget her wi t h neut ral Aust ri a and Albania aft er i t s break
with MoscowYugoslavia was a buffer bet ween t he sout hern
flanks of NATO and t he War saw Pact during most of the cold
war, largely insulating Italy from ext ernal mi l i t ary t hreat .
14
Yugoslavia based i t s def ensi ve st r at egy upon a nat i onal ar my
(the JNA) support ed by t erri t ori al defense forces organi zed i n
each republ i c.
15
In the event of invasion (most likely from the
Soviet Union ), the JNA woul d del ay t he aggressor l ong enough
for the mobilization of territorial forces, after which national
defense woul d i ncreasi ngl y fal l back upon a st rat egy of guer -
rilla warfare, especi al l y i n t he mount ai nous regi ons of Bosni a-
Herzegovina (where Bel grade concentrated Yugoslavia s devel-
opi ng def ense i ndust r i es) , Mont enegr o, and Kosovo . Th e
prospect of fighting a long and bloody guerrilla war i n t he
Yugosl avi an mount ai ns woul d l i kel y det er any prospect i ve
DELIBERATE FORCE
4
conqueror of t he count ry. The l eadershi p of t he JNA i ncl uded
di sproport i onat e numbers of Serbi an offi cersespeci al l y Bos -
ni an Ser bs due t o fact ors rel at i ng t o hi st ori cal t radi t i on and
t o t he l i mi t ed economi c opport uni t i es avai l abl e i n rural Bos -
nia . The mul t i nat i onal army, however, was probabl y t he Yugo -
sl avi an i nst i t ut i on t hat cont ri but ed t he most t o federal uni t y.
16
On the international political scene, Yugoslavia rose t o addi-
t i onal pr omi nence i n t he 1960s and 1970s as a pr i nci pal
l eader of t he nonal i gned nat i ons movement . The post -St al i ni st
Yugosl av experi ment of an economi c mi ddl e course bet ween
capi t al i sm and Sovi et communi sm seemed t o be, i f not a roar -
i ng success, at l east a modest one, especi al l y compared t o
some of i t s nei ghbors. However, duri ng t he 1970s, specul at i on
abounded about t he l i kel y resul t s of Ti t o s presumably im-
pendi ng deat h. An i mpressi on wi del y hel d i n t he West was
that Yugoslavia had an i nt r i nsi c t endency t owar ds di si nt egr a -
tion and interethnic conflict held off only by Titos personal
prestige and power. Yet, after Tito did finally die in 1980, his
political creation survived. Defying many expectations, Yugo -
slavia seemed t o cont i nue i nert i al l y al ong i t s decent ral i zed
soci al i st pat h bet ween East and West more or l ess as before.
Ot her l eaders peaceful l y succeeded Ti t o, al t hough wi t hout hi s
l eader shi p, maki ng any new changes i n t he f eder al syst em
woul d prove di ffi cul t . The 1984 Wi nt er Ol ympi cs showcased
t he apparent success of t he Yugosl av experi ment ; t hey were
held in Sarajevo , where, as Olympic television viewers were
r emi nded al most ni ght l y, t he spar k t hat i gni t ed t he Fi r st
World War had been st r uck 70 year s ear l i er .
Beneath the superficial level, however, the Yugoslavian sys -
t em came under acut e economi c pr essur e i n t he 1980s.
17
As
Yugoslavia s political system ossified, its economic fortunes
decl i ned due t o a vari et y of fact ors, i ncl udi ng ri si ng energy
pri ces. Bot h t he st at e and t he republ i cs i ncreasi ngl y t urned t o
forei gn borrowi ng t o sust ai n t hemsel ves. In t he 1980s, t he
I nt er nat i onal Monet ar y Fund requi red Bel grade t o i nst i t ut e
i ncreasi ngl y st ri ngent aust eri t y measures as a condi t i on for
furt her l oans. Despi t e effort s t o reduce t hem, i ncome di spari -
t i es bet ween t he r i chest and poor est r epubl i cs cont i nued t o
grow. The evaporat i on of t he col d war r educed t he super pow-
ers interest in buying Yugoslavia s fri endshi p, and West ern
MUELLER
5
i nvest ment headi ng east f ound mor e and mor e al t er nat i ve
pl aces t o l and. These forces combi ned t o undermi ne Ti t os
el aborat e spoi l s-di st ri but i on syst em among t he republ i cs and
r egi ons, t hus weakeni ng t he adhesi ve t hat hel d t he count r y
t oget her. Bet ween 1982 and 1989, t he Yugosl avi an st andard
of living fell by 40 percent.
18
When newl y el ect ed Yugosl av
prime minister Ante Markovic l aunched an economi c and po-
l i t i cal reform program i n 1989, l i t t l e i nt erest or support was
fort hcomi ng from a US government t hat was preoccupi ed wi t h
devel opment s i n t he Sovi et Uni on and t he War saw Pact .
19
As
economic conditions grew more difficult, support for the feder al
s tructure eroded, especially in the wealthiest republics, so that
when domest i c revol ut i on and i nt ernat i onal real i gnment swept
East er n Eur ope i n 1989, t he st age was set for t he breakup of
Yugoslavia .
The Di ssol uti on of Yugosl avi a
I t i s not unusual t o hear West er n obser ver s char act er i ze t he
explosive decompression of Yugoslavia as t he i nevi t abl e resul t
of anci ent and enduri ng hat reds among t he count rys con -
st i t uent et hni c gr oups . They suggest that only Titos program
of repressi on was abl e t o keep t he st at e t oget her duri ng t he
col d war, and af t er hi s deat h no one el se coul d hol d back t he
mighty centrifugal forces of age-old interethnic animosity. Im -
pl i ci t , and occasi onal l y expl i ci t , i n t hi s argument i s a sugges -
t i on t hat t he Yugosl avi an popul ace i s pri mi t i ve and even sav-
age i n a way t hat ful l -fl edged, ci vi l i zed West erners are not .
20
Al t hough Ameri cans manage t o l i ve i n rel at i ve peace i n mul t i -
et hni c communi t i es,
21
Ser bs and Cr oat s (like Rwandans, Cyp -
ri ot s, and Kashmi ri s) cannot forget t he wrongs t hei r ancest ors
di d t o each ot her. Therefore, we shoul d not have been sur-
prised by Yugoslavia s breakup, and we shoul d not feel gui l t y
about i t .
22
Thi s expl anat i on for t he cat ast rophe i s at t ract i vel y si mpl e,
but i t i s t oo ad hoc t o be sat i sfyi ngand i t i s at odds wi t h t he
f act s. Many peopl es r ecal l anci ent ( and t went i et h- cent ur y)
wrongs done by t hei r t radi t i onal enemi es but l i ve peaceful l y
wi t h each ot her anyway. Moreover, al t hough Ti t o di d us e an
DELIBERATE FORCE
6
i ron fi st t o repress ant i federal nat i onal i sm, progress t owards
t he creat i on of a pan-Yugosl av i dent i t y proceeded by many
means, onl y some of t hem coerci ve.
23
Forces si mi l ar t o t hose
t hat l ay behi nd cl assi cal soci al revol ut i ons caused t he revol u -
t i onary changes i n Yugosl avi a :
24
demand for pol i t i cal change
from bel ow, t ri ggered i n t hi s case pri mari l y by economi c hard-
shi p, combi ned wi t h t he weakeni ng of t he st at es capaci t y t o
resi st t hese pressuresat t ri but abl e here not onl y t o Ti t os
deat h but al so t o t he col l apse of t he bi pol ar European order
and t he wave of r evol ut i ons sweepi ng East er n Eur ope i n
198991. As t hese revol ut i onary forces st rengt hened, l eaders
(and nat i onal medi a) who recogni zed t he pot ent i al power of
et hni c and rel i gi ous pri de and hat red eagerl y ki ndl ed t hose
emot i ons, as wart i me and warmongeri ng l eaders have oft en
done before.
25
In short , et hni c rel at i onshi ps i n Yugosl avi a did
not si mpl y burst i nt o fl ames; rat her, i ncendi ary et hni c fuel
was t hrown ont o t he fi res of regi onal and cl ass confl i ct .
26
Nevertheless, Yugoslavia was unusual l y fert i l e ground for
the growth of ethnic conflict . Serbs di d recal l t he Bat t l e of
Kosovo Polje i n 1389, i n whi ch Serbi a s army was gloriously
defeat ed by Ot t oman forces, and consi dered i t rel evant t o
t hemsel ves fi ve hundred years l at er. It was much more i mpor -
t ant t hat memori es of t he Second Worl d War were far from
di st ant and even fart her from pl easant , especi al l y si nce con -
flict between Serbs and Cr oat s was i n f act qui t e unusual be-
fore t he t went i et h cent ury.
27
Such fact ors di d a great deal t o
make t he sl ope t owards warfare and at roci t y i n Yugosl avi a
much st eeper and mor e sl i pper y t han i t ot her wi se woul d have
been. To describe postwar Yugoslavia as a powder keg or a
house of car ds i mpl i es f ar t oo much det er mi ni sm, but i t was
cert ai nl y a compl ex syst em wi t h many seri ous i nst abi l i t i es. It
di d not si mpl y fai l ; i t t ore i t sel f apart as a resul t of bei ng
vandal i zed.
The fi rst maj or cracks i n t he Yugosl avi an federat i on began
in Kosovo following Titos death. Local Serbs, who were be-
comi ng an ever smal l er mi nori t y i n t he regi on known as t he
historical heart of Yugoslavia ,
28
began t o compl ai n of persecu -
t i on and i nj ury by t he poorer Al bani an maj ori t y i n Kosovo
account s wi del y report ed and bel i eved el sewhere i n Serbi a . In
1987, as a popul ar gr oundswel l of Ser b r esent ment agai nst
MUELLER
7
the Kosovan Albanians grew, Slobodan Milosevic , t he ambi-
t i ous presi dent of t he Serbi an League of Communi st s , capi t al-
i zed upon t he pot ent i al power base and est abl i shed hi msel f as
l eader of a new nat i onal i st Ser bi an pol i t i cal movement .
29
Milosevics part y rebuked hi m for hi s devi at i on from i t s feder -
al i st pri nci pl es, but i n t he ensui ng power st ruggl e, Mi l osevi c
gai ned an overwhel mi ng vi ct ory and expel l ed hi s key oppo-
nent s f r om t he par t y. He t hen set out t o bui l d hi s and Ser bi a s
power within Yugoslavia : i n r api d successi on, he and hi s sup -
port ers t ook cont rol of communi st part i es i n Voj vodi na, Mon -
t enegr o, and t hen Kosovo, installing pro-Milosevic pr esi dent s
i n each regi on or republ i c.
30
When t he Al bani an maj ori t y i n
Kosovo objected, Milosevic used t he t hr eat of Ser bi an mob
violence in Belgrade t o coerce t he federal government i nt o
gr ant i ng hi m emer gency power s t o use t he JNA agai nst t hem
and decl ar ed t hat t hi s showed t hat Ser bi a had r egai ned i t s
former power.
31
Kosovans resi st ance t o Bel grades reci si on of t hei r regi onal
aut onomy f ound wi des pr ead s uppor t f r om Sl oveni a , t h e
weal t hi est and most West erni zed of t he Yugosl av republ i cs.
Rel axat i on of Sl oveni an press cont rol s i n recent years had
r esul t ed i n t he pr omi nent di spl ay of ant i f eder al and ant i -
Milosevic opinion there; Serbia s apparent bi d for hegemony i n
Yugoslavia i ncr eased t hi s sent i ment . Bel gr ades efforts to sup-
pr ess t hi s di ssent f ur t her f anned t he f l ames of r esent ment ,
and when Milosevic r esponded by cal l i ng an ext r aor di nar y
Yugosl av Part y Congress i n whi ch t he Serbi an bl oc consi s -
tently defeated reforms proposed by Slovenia , t he Sl oveni an
del egat i on wal ked out . Faced wi t h t he possi bi l i t y of a pot en -
tially catastrophic split in the federation, Milosevic tried to
persuade t he Croat i an del egat i on not t o fol l ow sui t , but t he
Cr oat i ans depart ed aft er deci di ng t hey coul d not accept a fed-
erated Yugoslavia that excluded the Slovenes. Later, Milosevic
would blame Slovenia for causi ng t he breakup of Yugosl avi a
and all that followed.
32
Milosevic s nat i onal i s m cont r i but ed s ubs t ant i al l y t o t he
el ect i on of Franj o Tudj man as president of Croatia in April
1990.
33
Tudj mans nat i onal i sm and hi s i nvocat i on of symbol s
from Croatia s bri ef heyday of i ndependent Fasci sm i n t urn
caused f ear and al ar m among Cr oat i an Ser bs , who made up
DELIBERATE FORCE
8
l ocal maj ori t i es i n part s of t he i mpoveri shed, so-cal l ed Croa -
t i an Kraj i na and of East ern Sl avoni a , regi ons al ong t he repub-
lics borders with Bosnia and Serbi a . Cr oat i an Ser b r esi st ance
t o t he el ect i on of Tudj man and hi s nat i onal i st s was cent er ed
in the town of Knin , where l ocal aut hori t i es refused t o accept
t he aut hori t y of t he new government i n Zagreb . They asked for
support from Bel grade and r ecei ved Ser bi an encour agement
and advi ce for t hei r buddi ng rebel l i on. Croat i an l eaders were
keen t o move agai nst t he Serbs , especi al l y si nce key t ransport
r out es t o t he Dal mat i an coast passed t hr ough t he Kni n ar ea,
but t hey feared t hat t hi s mi ght t ri gger i nt ervent i on by t he
JNA. When t he confront at i on escal at ed and Zagreb sent sev-
eral helicopters carrying special forces to Knin , they were in -
t ercept ed and t urned back by Mi G fi ght ers of t he Yugosl av ai r
force. The Croat i an government began secret l y t o i mport arms
f or use agai nst t he Ser bs and pot ent i al l y t he JNA.
34
Croatia
appr oached t he Uni t ed St at es as a pot ent i al ar ms suppl i er ,
but t he US government rebuffed t he i nqui ri es, st i l l hopi ng t o
keep Yugoslavia uni t ed and t hereby mi ni mi ze i nst abi l i t y i n t he
Bal kans . Croatia found ot her vendors, however.
Milosevic favored sendi ng t he JNA agai nst t he Cr oat s, but
t hi s requi red a maj ori t y vot e wi t hi n t he Yugosl av St at e Coun-
cil. On 12 March 1991, St at e Counci l chai rman Bori sav Jovi c
of Serbia cal l ed a meet i ng of t he counci l t o consi der a proposal
by t he mi ni st er of defense t o est abl i sh a nat i onal st at e of
emergency t o st op t he ci vi l war t hat he accused t he Croat s of
pl anni ng. The Croat s and Macedoni ans opposed t he pl an, and
t he Sl oveni an del egat i on was absent , feari ng arrest by t he
Ser bs. Wi t h t he Serbi an, Voj vodi nan, Kosovan, and Mont ene-
gri n represent at i ves support i ng mart i al l aw, Bosni a-Herze -
govina held the deciding vote. Although Bosnia seemed t o
have t he most t o l ose i n an i nt ra-Yugosl avi an ci vi l war, t he
Bosni an represent at i ve surpri sed Mi l osevi c by opposi ng t he
motion. In response, Milosevic announced t hat Ser bi a and i t s
al l i es woul d wi t hdraw from t he St at e Counci l , cal cul at i ng t hat
wi t h ci vi l i an aut hori t y over t he JNA el i mi nat ed, t he ar my
woul d be free t o act on i t s own agai nst t hose who t hreat ened
t he federat i on.
The United States ambassador war ned Bel gr ade not t o us e
force against Croatia , causi ng consi der abl e concer n among
MUELLER
9
t he Serbi an l eadershi p. Therefore, t he mi ni st er of defense se-
cretly traveled to Moscow to meet Soviet defense officials and
asked for a promi se of Sovi et assi st ance i n t he event of West -
ern intervention in Yugoslavia .
35
The Sovi et s provi ded hi m
wi t h i nt el l i gence i nformat i on i ndi cat i ng t hat t he Uni t ed St at es
woul d not i nt ervene, and Mi l osevi c concl uded t hat t he way
now lay clear for federal forces to reassert Belgrades cont r ol
over Croatia . However, Milosevic s pl an ul t i mat el y foundered
because t he commander of t he JNA coul d not bri ng hi msel f t o
establish military rule in Yugoslavia .
In May 1991 Croatians overwhelmingly voted to declare their
republics independence effective in late June, coordinating with
t he dat e a si mi l ar Sl ovene i ndependence decl arat i on was al ready
set to take effect. Slovene and Croat representat i ves l obbi ed t he
Eur opean Communi t y ( EC), whi ch t hey aspi red t o j oi n, t o rec-
ogni ze t hei r i ndependence, but t he EC had no desi re t o see
Yugoslavia br eak up. I nst ead, t he West set about exer t i ng
pressure on Sl oveni a and Cr oat i a t o remai n within Yugoslavia ,
culminating in a visit to Belgrade by James Baker , US secretary
of state. Baker decl ared t hat t he Uni t ed St at es would not recog-
nize Croatia and Slovenia under any circumstances, which all
si des t ook as a si gnal t hat Washi ngt on woul d not obj ect t o t he
use of force t o hol d t he federat i on t oget her.
36
The t wo r epubl i cs deci ded t o pr ess ahead anyway, and
when t he i ndependence dat e came on 25 June, Sl oveni a ex-
pel l ed Yugosl avi an cust oms offi ci al s from t hei r post s on t he
It al i an and Aust ri an front i ers. Sl ovene presi dent Mi l an Kucan
and hi s government resol ved t o fi ght t he JNA i f necessary.
When t he JNA sent some t wo t housand pr edomi nant l y con -
scri pt t roops t o ret ake t he vari ous border post s, expect i ng no
ser i ous r esi st ance, t hese uni t s soon f ound t hemsel ves sur-
rounded by 35, 000 Sl ovene mi l i t i a forces who used t he t erri t o -
rial-defense tactics designed to defend Yugoslavia agai nst So -
vi et i nvasi on. Sl ovene t roops bl ocked al l maj or roads i n t he
r epubl i c, t r appi ng unpr epar ed and s t unned J NA forces in
t hei r bar r acks. JNA effort s t o break t hrough t he barri cades
and resuppl y t hei r besi eged bases by ai r met wi t h fi re from t he
Sl ovene mi l i t i a, and t he fi rst of a number of i t s hel i copt ers was
shot down. Croat i a was not so eager as Slovenia t o br eak
DELIBERATE FORCE
10
away from t he federat i on but was more rel uct ant yet t o remai n
behi nd wi t hout Sl oveni a i n a Ser bi an- domi nat ed st at e.
The Eur opean Communi t y sent envoys t o Zagreb t o encour-
age Slovenia and Cr oat i a t o de-escal at e t he cri si s i n ret urn for
event ual pol i t i cal recogni t i on by t he EC. Although the Slo -
venes agreed t o a cease-fi re and negot i at i ons, fi ght i ng cont i n -
ued in Slovenia , wi t h t he Sl ovene mi l i t i a cont i nui ng t o fare
bet t er t hen i t s opponent s. In Bel grade, t he federal Mi ni st ry of
Defense proposed a massi ve mi l i t ary at t ack agai nst Sl oveni a ,
predi ct i ng hi gh casual t i es on bot h si des, but Mi l osevi c s u r-
pri sed t he St at e Counci l by opposi ng t he scheme. Sl oveni a
cont ai ned vi rt ual l y none of t he Serbs whom Milosevic want ed
t o i nc l ude i n hi s Yugos l a vi a . He c a l c u l a t e d t h a t a f t e r
Slovenia s secessi on, Serbi a woul d have a suffi ci ent prepon -
derance of power to do as it liked aboutor toCroatia . Serbia
agreed to withdraw the JNA from Slovenia , and t he war i n t he
republ i c ended aft er 10 days of fi ght i ng and some 62 deaths .
A much l arger war woul d soon begi n i n Croat i a .
37
Tudj mans
rul i ng part y became i ncreasi ngl y assert i ve and nat i onal i st i c,
and t he Kraj i na Serbs grew i ncreasi ngl y t hreat ened and defi -
ant , aski ng for and recei vi ng arms from Bel grade. The l ocal
chi ef of t he Croat i an nat i onal pol i ce, who t ri ed t o de-escal at e
t he confl i ct i nst ead of movi ng t o crush t he Serbs , was as s as s i -
nat ed by members of Tudj man s inner circle, who also launched
a rocket at t ack agai nst a Serb suburb of Vukovar.
38
Each killing,
sensationalized by either the Serbian or the Croatian media,
escalated the crisis; as the violence intensified, JNA forces under
Col Ratko Mladic went to the Krajina as peacekeepers to pro-
t ect t he Serbs and seized many Croat towns .
Because wi despread desert i ons, not l i mi t ed t o i t s Sl ovene
and Croat i an t roops, weakened t he JNA, t he forces sent t o
Croatia were bol st ered by Serbi an parami l i t ary uni t s rangi ng
f r om ul t r anat i onal i st ext r emi st gr oups t o cr i mi nal gangs.
These uni t s soon began a pat t er n of massacr es and ot her
t er r or i sm desi gned t o dri ve Croat s out of areas t hey con -
quer ed, and ethnic cleansing, al so pract i ced on a smal l er scal e
by t hei r enemi es, ent ered t he i nt ernat i onal l exi con.
39
Serb
shel l i ng of t he medi eval Dal mat i an ci t y of Dubrovni k al so
st i mul at ed West er n concer n wi t h t he conf l i ct , and t he EC
MUELLER
11
cal l ed represent at i ves of t he si x Yugosl av republ i cs t o t he
Hague t o meet wi t h medi at or Lord Pet er Carri ngt on .
Milosevic agreed t o a proposal by Carri ngt on that Croatia be
allowed to secede from Yugoslavia , provi ded t he ri ght s of t he
Ser b mi nori t y were prot ect ed. However, he subsequent l y re-
j ect ed t he formal pl an t hat Carri ngt on proposed, whi ch ex -
panded this principle to allow the independence of all six
Yugosl av r epubl i cs wi t h si mi l ar guar ant ees. The Cr oat i an,
Bosni an, and Macedoni an presi dent s al l agreed t o t he Car -
rington pl an, as di d Mont enegri n presi dent Momi r Bul at ovi c ,
who di d not ent i rel y share Mi l osevi c s zeal for bui l di ng a
Great er Serbi a . Shocked and chagr i ned by t hi s bet r ayal by hi s
protg, Milosevic wal ked out of t he negot i at i ons and fi nal l y
forced Bulatovic t o r et r act hi s agr eement t o t he pl an, t hus
killing it.
40
In Croatia t he JNA had gai ned cont rol over al l of t he t erri -
t ory i t sought approxi mat el y one-t hi rd of t he republ i cex -
cept for the city of Vukovar , which it besieged. With Vukovar s
fall an obvious inevitability, Germany grant ed di pl omat i c rec-
ognition to Croatia and Sl oveni a , and t he r est of t he Eur opean
Communi t y followed suit, effective 15 January 1992. Britain ,
t he l east i ncl i ned of t he maj or EC member s t o become ent an-
gled in Yugoslavia , fel t very much dragged al ong by a degree of
German pol i t i cal assert i veness not seen before i n t he post war
er a. The Cr oat i an f i ght i ng ended i n Januar y 1992, and i n
March the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) be-
gan depl oyi ng as peacekeepers i n t he Serb-hel d areas of Croa -
tia , whi ch had decl ar ed t hemsel ves t he i ndependent Republ i c
of Serbian Krajina (RSK).
The Bosni an Ci vi l War
Anal yses of t he nat ur e of t he war t hat began i n Bosni a-
Herzegovin a i n 1992 t end t o l ean t owards one of t wo maj or
school s of t hought , al t hough many i nt ermedi at e perspect i ves
l i e bet ween t he t wo pol ar ext remes. One school sees t he Bos -
ni an war as pri mari l y t he resul t of Serbi an aggressi on and
expansi oni sm, and i t s pr oponent s poi nt out t he cl ose and
act i ve t i es bet ween t he Bel grade and Bosni an Ser bs . The US
DELIBERATE FORCE
12
government has general l y adopt ed somet hi ng cl ose t o t hi s per -
spect i ve, oft en associ at ed wi t h support for out si de mi l i t ary
i nt ervent i on or ai d t o assi st t he Bosni an government agai nst
t he Ser bs . (A variant of this view would add Croatia t o t he l i st
of ext ernal aggressors and foment ers of confl i ct , al t hough t hi s
refinement is not typical of official US views. ) The opposite
school hol ds t hat t he Bosni an war i s essent i al l y i nt ernal i n
nat ure, i n spi t e of t he i nvol vement of out si de st at es, and t hat
no si de i n t he confl i ct i s an i nnocent vi ct i m. Thi s ci vi l -war
perspect i ve has been associ at ed i n part i cul ar wi t h t he Bri t i sh
government (and t o a l esser ext ent t he French), and i t i s usu-
al l y hel d by peopl e who argue t hat any ext ernal i nt ervent i on i n
t he confl i ct ought t o be based on an i mpart i al peacekeepi ng or
peace- enf or cement approach. As descri bed i n t he fol l owi ng
sect i ons, t he t r ut h l i es somewher e bet ween t hese t wo char ac-
t eri zat i ons, and t hi s mul t i facet ed nat ure of t he war i n Bosni a
was one of t he maj or obst acl es t o West ern effort s t o deal wi t h
t he cr i si s.
As t he fi ght i ng wound down i n Croat i a , Bosnia-Herzegovina
headed t owards t he most cat ast rophi c post -Yugosl av war t o
dat e.
41
Within Yugoslavia , Bosnia-Herzegovina had been t he
most mul t i et hni c of al l t he republ i cs, bot h i n aggregat e and t o
a consi derabl e ext ent on t he l ocal l evel , al t hough t he Bosni an
Ser b popul at i on was rel at i vel y rural whi l e t he Bosni an Mus-
l i ms t ended t o l i ve i n and around Saraj evo and other relatively
affl uent urban areas. As t he Yugosl av federat i on di si nt egrat ed,
t he non-Serb popul at i ons of Bosni a-Herzegovi na f ear ed domi-
nat i on by Serbi a , whi l e t he l arge Bosni an Serb minority feared
domi nat i on by t he mor e numer ous Bosni an Musl i ms, should
t he republ i c become i ndependent . The l eadershi ps of bot h t he
Bosni an gover nment and t he Bosni an Ser bs consi dered t hei r
two positions irreconcilable.
The Eur opean Communi t ys deci si on i n December 1991 t o
recognize Slovenia and Croat i a i n Januar y 1992 i ncl uded es -
t abl i shment of a panel t o consi der appl i cat i ons for recogni t i on,
whi ch ot her Yugosl av r epubl i cs mi ght submi t by 20 Januar y.
Thi s pl aced consi derabl e pressure on Bosni a-Herzegovi na a nd
Macedoni a t o move qui ckl y t owards i ndependence, and bot h
made t hei r appl i cat i ons t o t he EC by t he deadl i ne. The EC
panel approved t he Macedoni an appl i cat i on and rej ect ed one
MUELLER
13
from Kosovar Al bani ans, but i n Bosni a t he panel deci ded t hat
a r ef er endum on i ndependence shoul d be hel d.
Bosni an Ser bs l ed by Mont enegri n psychi at ri st Dr. Radovan
Karadzic decl ared t hei r i ndependence from Bosni a i n J a nua r y
1992, cal l i ng t hemsel ves t he Republ i ka Srpska and es t ab -
lishing their capital at Pale , near Saraj evo. At the end of Feb -
ruary, Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic hel d a republ i cwi de
pl ebi sci t e on whet her Bosni a-Herzegovi na shoul d decl are i t s
independence from Yugoslavia . Musl i ms and Cr oat s voted al-
most unani mousl y i n favor of i ndependence, whi l e most Serbs
boycot t ed t he referendum. Int eret hni c vi ol ence escal at ed dur-
i ng March, and l arge-scal e fi ght i ng began on 2 Apri l . The
Uni t ed St at es had not i ni t i al l y j oi ned t he Europeans i n recog-
nizing Croatia and Slovenia , st i l l seei ng t hei r secessi on as
dest abi l i zi ng, but di d recogni ze t hem on 6 Apri l , si mul t ane-
ousl y j oi ni ng t he EC i n recogni zi ng t he i ndependence of Bos -
ni a-Herzegovi na.
42
The West s rat her forl orn hope t hat recogni-
t i on mi ght hel p st op t he vi ol ence i n Bosni a went unfulfilled.
Milosevic and Tudj man, each wi t h pl ans for enl argement of
hi s count ry t o i ncl ude i t s ext rat erri t ori al et hni c bret hren, had
al ready met secret l y t o di scuss carvi ng up Bosni a bet ween
them, leaving little if any territory for the Bosnian Muslims.
Izetbegovic had made f ew pr epar at i ons f or a war t hat seemed
t oo horri bl e t o cont empl at e;
43
however, Bel grade had pr epar ed
for Bosni an secessi on by post i ng Bosni an Serbs to JNA uni t s
i n Bosni a-Herzegovi na. There they would be in place to join
Karadzics fi ght agai nst t he Bosni an government wi t hout re-
qui ri ng t he JNA t o mount an overt i nvasi on, wi t h al l t he i nt er -
nat i onal cri t i ci sm t hat woul d generat e, and Serbi a ar r anged t o
bankr ol l t he Bosni an Ser bs. Once t he war was under way,
Milosevic al so sent Serbi an parami l i t ary groups, oft en armed
by t he Serbi an secret pol i ce, t o assi st i n t he fi ght . These forces
i ncl uded pol i t i cal ext remi st groups, profi t -seeki ng cri mi nal s,
and event ual l y even young Serbi ans l ooki ng for fun and pl un-
der, who woul d spend t hei r weekends fi ght i ng or pi l l agi ng i n
Bosni a and t hen r et ur n home. These gr oups t ook a l eadi ng
rol e i n t he campai gn of ci vi l i an massacres, rape, and ot her
atrocities t hat soon horri fi ed t he West .
Enj oyi ng t he advant age of ex-JNA mi l i t ary equi pment and
ot her forms of assi st ance from Bel grade, t he Bosni an Ser bs
DELIBERATE FORCE
14
made rapi d gai ns i n t he Apri l fi ght i ng and soon hel d some
t wo-t hi rds of Bosni a . Artillery units in Serbia shel l ed def end-
ers of the Bosnian border city of Zornik ; when it fell, two
t housand Musl i ms were execut ed or sent t o concent rat i on
camps, and al l ot hers were expel l ed. By May 1992, t he Bos -
ni an Ser bs were abl e t o mount a maj or offensi ve agai nst Sara -
jevo al ong mul t i pl e axes, al most overwhel mi ng t he government
defenders unt i l t he Serb armor was knocked out i n st reet -t o-
street fighting. A Bosnian army (BiH) count er at t ack est ab -
l i shed a l ocal st al emat e t hat woul d endure for t hree years, and
t he Ser b si ege and bombar dment of t he ci t y cont i nued.
44
The
EC, whi ch had j ust recogni zed Bosni a s soverei gnt y, now sent
Lord Carri ngt on to Bosnia wi t h a pl an for t he part i t i on of t he
republ i c i nt o separat e et hni c provi nces, whi ch Izet begovi c re-
jected. The JNA sent Rat ko Ml adi c t o Bosni a t o become t he
new commander of t he Bosni an Serb army (BSA) .
In spri ng 1993, Ml adi c l aunched a maj or offensi ve agai nst
t he east ern Bosni an ci t y of Srebreni ca, whi ch had fi l l ed wi t h
Muslim refugees from surroundi ng areas al ready conquered
and cl eansed by t he Ser bs . Under pressure from t he defenders
(who would not let him leave after a visit to Srebrenica), Gen
Philippe Morillon , UNPROFOR commander , pr omi sed t hat t he
UN woul d pr ot ect t hem, al ar mi ng t he UN l eadershi p i n New
York. In the General Assembly, a large bloc of nonaligned
st at es pr oposed t he est abl i shment of UN- pr ot ect ed saf e ha-
vens i n e a s t e r n Bos ni a . Al t hough t he UN mi l i t ar y st af f
st rongl y cri t i ci zed t hi s proposal as unworkabl e,
45
t he Securi t y
Counci l adopt ed i t on 16 Apri l , aft er t he European powers
succeeded i n wat eri ng i t down t o a desi gnat i on of si x ci t i es
(Sarajevo, Srebreni ca , Gorazde, Tuzla, Zepa, and Bi hac) as
safe areas t hat bot h si des woul d be asked t o r espect . UN-
PROFORs mandat e was expanded t o i ncl ude det er r i ng but not
def endi ng agai ns t at t acks on t he s af e ar eas, and Ml adi c
agreed t o l eave Srebreni ca al one onl y on t he condi t i on t hat t he
defenders di sarm. Thi s t hey di d, maki ng i t possi bl e for t he
Ser bs t o t ake t he ci t y whenever t hey chose t o do so.
The war i n Bosni a resembl ed t he 194145 war i n Yugosl avi a
not onl y i n i t s brut al i t y but al so i n i t s compl exi t y. The Bos -
ni an Cr oat s were nomi nal al l i es of t he Bosni an government
earl y i n t he war, but at vari ous t i mes, each of t he t hree si des
MUELLER
15
made war agai nst t he ot her , somet i mes f i ght i ng an enemy at
one l ocat i on whi l e s i mul t aneous l y cooper at i ng wi t h t hat
armys forces agai nst t he t hi rd si de i n anot her.
46
This ten-
dency t owar ds chaos was f ur t her exacer bat ed by t he f act t hat
each army had onl y a l i mi t ed abi l i t y t o cont rol t he act i ons of
many of i t s component uni t s, especi al l ybut not onl yt hose
consisting of paramilitary thugs. As a result, forces in the field
oft en i gnored cease-fi re or safe-passage agreement s made by
seni or commander s, and al t hough many at r oci t i es were car -
ri ed out wi t h t he approval or knowl edge of cent ral aut hori t i es,
many ot her s pr obabl y wer e not .
47
Whi l e t he Bosni an Serb spri ng offensi ve of 1993 was under
way in the east, Bosnian Croat (HVO) forces under Mat e Bo -
b a n t urned agai nst t hei r nomi nal Bosni an government al l i es
i n t he sout hwest and began car vi ng out t hei r own st at e wi t hi n
Bosni a (whi ch t hey named Herceg-Bosna ). Boban ha d pr e-
vi ousl y been seen i n Aust ri a hol di ng meet i ngs wi t h Karadzi c
about possi bl e part i t i ons of Bosni a . Now Tudj man s ent s ub -
st ant i al numbers of Croat i an regul ar forces i nt o Bosni a to
s uppor t Bobans t roops as t hey began roundi ng up t hei r for -
mer Musl i m comr ades and pl aci ng t hem i n concent r at i on
camps, and Bosni an gover nment f or ces f ought t o cont ai n t he
Cr oat offensive.
On t he di pl omat i c f r ont , a new peace pl an had been pr o -
posed i n Januar y 1993. The [ Cyr us] Vance-[Lord David] Owen
pl an cal l ed for a federat ed Bosni a di vi ded i nt o et hni c prov-
i nces t hat woul d have consi derabl e l ocal aut onomy but woul d
be di st r i but ed so t hat t he Ser bs coul d not easi l y secede and
j oi n a great er Serbi a . As i n pr evi ous peace pl ans, t he Bosni an
Ser bs woul d have t o wi t hdraw from much of t he t erri t ory t hey
had conquer ed; however , Mi l osevi c, unde r pr e s s ur e f r om
West ern economi c sanct i ons agai nst Serbi a , agr eed t o suppor t
t he pl an and t ri ed t o persuade Karadzi c t o si gn on. Karadzi c
proved extremely reluctant to do so. Although Milosevic ar -
gued t hat t he Vance-Owen pl an coul d not work and t herefore
woul d not endanger t he Bosni an Ser bs, Karadzic was l oat he t o
gi ve up t he requi red t erri t ory and feared t hat several t housand
NATO t r oops on t he gr ound i n Bosni a could cripple his logis -
t i cs and make f ut ur e oper at i ons by t he BSA impossible. Fi-
nally, Karadzic si gned t he agreement , pendi ng i t s rat i fi cat i on
DELIBERATE FORCE
16
by t he Bosni an Ser bs , and t he West became caut i ousl y opt i -
mi st i c. But i n a referendum hel d i n May, 96 percent of Bos -
ni an Ser b voters rejected the plan, killing it.
West ern React i ons
The course of West ern mi l i t ary responses t o t he confl i ct s i n
the ruins of Yugoslavia was one of gr adual but i nconst ant
escal at i on. A defi ni t e l ack of consensus exi st ed wi t hi n t he
ranks of t he West ern powers regardi ng ul t i mat e st rat egi c ob-
j ect i ves i n t he regi on, due i n part t o di fferi ng anal yses of t he
nat ure of t he wars, especi al l y i n Bosni a . Moreover, different
NATO al l i es were di fferent l y di sposed t owards t he vari ous par -
t i es i n t he confl i ct ,
48
t he most vi si bl e exampl es of whi ch were
t he ami t y of Ger many towards Croatia , of Greece t owards Ser -
bia , and of Turkey t owar ds t he Bosni an Musl i ms. This led to
pol i ci es di rect ed t owards achi evi ng t hose obj ect i ves on whi ch
exi st ed a reasonabl e amount of agreement , compl i cat ed by al l
of the major NATO powers desi res t o do somet hi ngor at
l east t o be seen t o be doi ng somet hi ngabout t he probl ems
wi t hout sufferi ng subst ant i al l osses i n t he defense of i nt erest s
l ess t han vi t al t o t hem. In general , among NATOs l eadi ng
nat i ons, t he Uni t ed St at es was usual l y t he most hawki sh
regarding the use of force in Bosnia , whi l e t he Uni t ed Ki ngdom
was t he l east i ncl i ned t o t ake act i ons t hat seemed t o represent a
depart ure from t he pat h of i mpart i al peacekeepi ng.
49
French
views tended to correspond with those of the British, although
this was not always true, and when it was, it was not always for
t he same reasons. Germany consi st ent l y support ed t he Uni t ed
St at es in discussions of intervention policy, but since it did not
contribute forces either to UNPROFOR or t o Operat i on Deny
Flight (discussed below), its opinions carried less weight than
those of the three alliance leader s.
The possibility of Western military intervention was of spe-
cial concern to Izetbegovic and t he Bosni an Musl i ms, who
were eager for t he West t o st ep i n and st op t hei r enemi es. At
t i mes t he Bosni an gover nment pur sued t hi s goal by havi ng i t s
forces st age at t acks agai nst i t s own ci vi l i an popul at i on i n or -
der t o out r age t he West er n pr ess and t ur n popul ar opi ni on
MUELLER
17
agai nst t he Ser bs, al t hough t he Bosni an Ser bs and t he Cr oa -
t i an government were not above doi ng t he same t hi ng. As t he
war i n Bosni a cont i nued, West ern negot i at ors found t hem-
sel ves al t ernat el yeven si mul t aneousl yt ryi ng t o convi nce
t he Ser bs t hat t he West mi ght i nt ervene i n t he confl i ct i f no
progress occurred i n t he peace negot i at i ons, and t ryi ng t o
per suade t he Bosni an gover nment t hat t he West woul d not
i nt ervene and save i t i n t he absence of such progress.
Asi de from humani t ari an ai d t o t he regi on, sent al most from
t he out set of t he fi ght i ng,
50
t he i ncrement al process of i nt er -
vent i on may be sai d t o have begun wi t h t he Jul y 1992 depl oy-
ment of naval forces under NATO and West er n Eur opean Un -
ion auspi ces t o t he Adri at i c Sea t o moni t or shi ppi ng t o t he
former Yugosl av republ i cs. Thi s began aft er t he UN i mposed
an embar go agai nst ar ms shi pment s t o al l st at es i n t he f or mer
Yugoslavia i n Sept ember 1991, fol l owed by i mposi t i on of an
economi c bl ockade on Serbi a and Mont enegro i n May 1992.
51
In November 1992, t hese forces were empowered not onl y t o
moni t or shi ppi ng but act ual l y t o enforce t he embargo a nd
sanct i ons.
52
As t he confl i ct s progressed, t he arms embargo
qui ckl y fel l i nt o di sreput e si nce i t worked t o t he advant age of
t he Ser bs, who had i nheri t ed most of t he JNAs arsenal. Brit -
ain and Fr ance consi st ent l y opposed l i ft i ng t he arms embargo
for Croatia and Bosni a , however, feari ng t he effect s of any
escal at i on of t he conf l i ct upon t hei r peacekeepi ng t r oops.
Event ual l y, t he embargo l ost some of i t s effect i veness as t he
Bosni ans, Cr oat s, and forei gn support ers became more ski l l ed
at evadi ng i t . In cont rast , economi c sanct i ons agai nst Serbi a
sl owl y grew more effect i ve as some of t he many obst acl es t o
enforci ng t hem were addressed.
Uni t ed Nat i ons peace- enf or cement effort s i n t he regi on be-
gan wi t h t he depl oyment of UNPROFOR to Croatia i n s pr i ng
1992. Wi t h i t s headquart ers i mprudent l y pl aced i n Saraj evo
(over the objections of the forces commanders), it was inevita -
ble that UNPROFOR woul d fi nd i t sel f ent angl ed i n t he Bosni an
war, and a deci si on made i n Sept ember 1992 cal l ed for dra -
matic expansion of UNPROFORs presence i n Bosni a i n order
t o prot ect shi pment s of humani t ari an ai d under t he auspi ces
of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees .
53
As described
above, UNPROFOR rapidly became a key player in the Bos ni a n
DELIBERATE FORCE
18
conflict, and all sides consistently damned it for allegedly fa -
vori ng t hei r enemi es.
NATO began pat rol l i ng t he ski es over Bosni a on 16 Oct ober
1992 i n Operat i on Sky Moni t or, following a UN resolution
banni ng fl i ght s by any ai rcraft wi t hout approval from UNPRO-
FOR. On 12 Apri l 1993, t hi s operat i on was renamed Deny
Fl i ght aft er UN Securi t y Counci l Resol ut i on (UNSCR) 816
grant ed i t aut hori t y t o i nt ercept and, i f necessary, shoot down
ai rcraft vi ol at i ng t he prohi bi t i on.
54
I t s mandat e was f ur t her
expanded from 22 Jul y t o i ncl ude provi di ng cl ose ai r support
(CAS) as necessary t o prot ect UN peacekeepers. NATOs 5t h
Allied Tactical Air Force (5 ATAF) cont rol l ed t he operat i on, and
a combi ned ai r operat i ons cent er near Vicenza , It al y, managed
it.
55
The Uni t ed St at es, United Kingdom, France , Italy, t he
Net herl ands , Spain , Tur key, and t he mul t i nat i onal NATO ai r -
bor ne ear l y war ni ng force eventually provided aircraft for Deny
Fl i ght. Most were based i n It al y or on US, Bri t i sh, and French
ai rcraft carri ers in the Adriatic, al t hough s ome t anker s, air -
borne-warni ng and ot her support ai rcraft operat ed di rect l y
f r om bases i n Ger many, Fr ance, and t he Uni t ed Ki ngdom.
Al t hough UN resol ut i ons prohibited all flights over Bosnia , a
deci si on made at Al l i ed Forces Sout hern Europe (AFSOUTH)
and approved at hi gher l evel s l i mi t ed Deny Fl i ght t o i nt ercept -
ing fixed-wing aircraft. All sides in the conflict continued to
use hel i copt ers i n a vari et y of rol es, oft en pai nt i ng red crosses
on hel i copt ers act ual l y bei ng used for t act i cal resuppl y and
ot her mi ssi ons. Al t hough US and NATO officials claimed
rat her i mpl ausi bl y t hat t he hel i copt er fl i ght s were not mi l i t ar -
i l y si gni fi cant , t hey were al l owed t o cont i nue because of t he
very pl ausi bl e fear t hat i f one were shot down, i t s owners
woul d rapi dl y fabri cat e evi dence t hat i t had been on a hu-
mani t ar i an mi ssi on l oaded wi t h noncombat ant s, pot ent i al l y
causi ng a publ i c-rel at i ons di sast er for NATO.
I n August 1993 t he Deny Fl i ght mandat e f ur t her expanded
t o i ncl ude t he possi bi l i t y of l aunchi ng non-CAS ai r st ri kes t o
det er or ret al i at e for at t acks agai nst peacekeepi ng forces in
Bosni a . Following a meeting of NATO l eaders i n London, on 8
August the North Atlantic Council (NAC), NATOs gover ni ng
body, approved a cont i ngency pl an for ai r st ri kes i n Bosni a ,
whi ch l ai d out t hree general opt i ons for t arget i ng.
56
The first
MUELLER
19
and most l i mi t ed i nvol ved at t acki ng onl y forces t hat posed a
di rect and i mmedi at e t hreat t o fri endl y forces. The second
expanded t he t arget set t o i ncl ude pot ent i al l y, but not i mmedi-
at el y, t hreat eni ng forces and asset s. The t hi rdand most ex -
pansi veadded t o t he set a wi de range of t arget s t hat woul d
cont ri but e t o t he adversarys abi l i t y t o pose such t hreat s over
the long term. This strategic blueprint for NATO ai r st ri kes
woul d ul t i mat el y form t he basi s for Operat i on Del i berat e Force
t wo years l at er.
St ar t i ng i n l at e 1993, t he US gover nment began t o t ake an
i ncreasi ngl y act i ve rol e i n t he Bosni an cri si s, dri ven by t he
ri si ng domest i c pol i t i cal cost s of appeari ng t o be doi ng not hi ng
t o st op i t , and by t he growi ng real i zat i on t hat t he Europeans
di d not appear t o be maki ng pr ogr ess t owar ds a sol ut i on.
57
The fi rst order of busi ness for t he Uni t ed St at es was a proj ect
t o end t he fi ght i ng bet ween t he Bosni an Croat s and t he Bos -
ni an government , whi ch woul d si mpl i fy t he Bosni an si t uat i on
consi derabl y and do much t o even t he l ocal bal ance of power.
The Uni t ed St at es pr essur ed Zagr eb by poi nt i ng out t hat
Croatia would have little chance of ever regaining its Serb-held
t er r i t or i es wi t hout Amer i can suppor t . On 18 Mar ch 1994, t he
BiH-HVO al l i ance was r est or ed wi t h t he announcement of a
new federat i on bet ween t he Bosni an government and t he Bos -
ni an Cr oat s , marki ng a key t urni ng poi nt i n t he confl i ct .
Within NATO, t he Uni t ed St at es advocat ed more forceful
act i on agai nst t he Bosni an Ser bs. Following a mortar shell
expl osi on i n a Saraj evo mar ket pl ace on 4 Febr uar y 1994 t hat
ki l l ed 68 Bosni an ci vi l i ans, t he Uni t ed St at es proposed ret al i -
at or y ai r st r i kes agai nst t he Bosni an Ser bs . London and Pari s
cont i nued t o oppose exacerbat i ng t he confl i ct bet ween t he
BSA and t he West , especi al l y (t hough not sol el y) because t he
Br i t i sh and Fr ench had t housands of peacekeepi ng t roops i n
harms way on t he ground i n Bosni a . However, i n an 8 Febru -
ary meet i ng of t he Bri t i sh cabi net , Forei gn Mi ni st er Dougl as
Hur d ar gued t o hi s col l eagues t hat t he f ut ur e not j ust of
Bosni a but also of NATO was at st ake, and t hat t he sur vi val of
t he al l i ance needed t o be t hei r foremost concern. The fol l owi ng
day, the NAC demanded t hat t he BSA wi t hdraw i t s heavy
weapons f r om a 20- ki l omet er - wi de excl usi on zone a r o u n d
DELIBERATE FORCE
20
Saraj evo within 10 days or NATO woul d bomb t hem. The Bos -
ni an Ser bs refused t o compl y.
The NATO ul t i mat um met wi t h st r ong opposi t i on f r om t he
Russi an government . Serbi a had been an i mpor t ant al l y of
pan-Sl avi st Russi a i n t he ear l y year s of t he cent ur y, and t he
Russi an nat i onal i st ri ght , l ed by Vl adi mi r Zhi ri novsky, argued
t hat i t was t i me for Russi a t o st and up agai nst NATO in
def ense of i t s t r adi t i onal i nt er est s. Russi an envoy Vi t al y
Churki n traveled to Serbia t o meet Karadzi c and br oker ed a
deal under whi ch BSA art i l l ery woul d wi t hdraw from t he ex -
cl usi on zone and Russi an peacekeeper s would deploy there to
pr event t he Ser bs enemi es from t aki ng advant age of t he wi t h -
dr awal t o at t ack t hem. The pr esence of Russi an peacekeeper s
would also prevent NATO f r om easi l y l aunchi ng ai r at t acks at
t ar get s i n t he excl usi on zone.
NATOs Deny Flight ai rcraft soon drew fi rst bl ood (and t he
al l i ances fi rst ever) on 28 February 1994, when t wo pai rs of
US Air Force F-16 fighters intercepted six Yugoslav air force
Super Gal eb l i ght at t ack ai r cr af t on a bombi ng mi s s i on
agai nst Bosni an government forces and shot down four of
t hem. Thi s was fol l owed on 12 March by t he fi rst l aunch of a
CAS mi ssi on t o support UN peacekeepers, al t hough no at -
tacks actually occurred. The first CAS st ri kes t ook pl ace on 10
and 11 Apri l , when UN t roops came under fi re duri ng a Bos -
ni an Serb offensi ve agai nst t he newl y desi gnat ed safe area of
Gorazde, i n r e s p o n s e t o wh i c h t h e Se r b s t o o k 1 5 0 UN
peacekeeper s host age t o det er f ur t her ai r at t acks.
58
Dur i ng
subsequent mi ssi ons over Gor azde, ground fi re damaged a
Fr ench navy Et endard IVP on 15 April, and the following day a
Bri t i sh Sea Harri er was shot down. The pi l ot ej ect ed, and UN
f or ces r escued hi m.
The BSA offensi ve agai nst Gorazde l ed t he Uni t ed St at es to
advocat e puni t i ve ai r st r i kes agai nst t he Bosni an Ser bs , whom
President Bill Clinton decl ared t o be t he compl et e aggressors
i n t he act i on. On 22 Apri l , t he Uni t ed St at es per s uaded t he
NAC t o demand t hat t he BSA wi t hdraw i t s heavy weapons
f r om t he f r ont l i ne ar ound Gor azde a nd t o t hr e a t e n t ha t
st r i kes woul d al so be l aunched agai nst any heavy weapons
t hat mi ght be used t o at t ack t he ot her saf e ar eas . Seeking to
MUELLER
21
avert t hi s escal at i on of t he fi ght i ng, UN envoy Yasushi Akashi
negot i at ed a new cease-fi re.
On 20 Jul y 1994, t he Bosni an Ser b Assembl y consi dered
yet anot her part i t i on pl an for Bosni a t hat r equi r ed si gni f i cant
t erri t ori al concessi ons from t hem. Even t hough i t recei ved
support from Sl obodan Mi l osevi c, whose count r y had by t hi s
time been suffering from two years of UN economi c sanct i ons,
the assembly rejected it. Milosevic r eact ed by announci ng i n
August t hat he was breaki ng Serbi a s t i es wi t h t he Bosni an
Ser bs and cl osi ng t hei r common border. The UN responded
wi t h an easi ng of t he sanct i ons agai nst Serbi a i n Sept ember .
Meanwhi l e, on 5 August , BSA forces broke i nt o a UN weap-
ons-col l ect i on si t e near Saraj evo and removed several armored
vehi cl es and art i l l ery pi eces t hey had previ ousl y t urned over t o
UN cust ody. In response, several US A-10s st r af ed and de-
st royed a BSA 1945- vi nt age M18 t ank dest r oyer , and t he
Ser bs ret urned t he ot her weapons t hey had sei zed. NATO air -
cr af t st r uck agai n on 22 Sept ember , when anot her A- 10 a nd
two Royal Air Force (RAF) J aguar s at t acked a t ank near Sar a -
jevo t hat had fi red on an armored vehi cl e bel ongi ng t o French
UNPROFOR forces and wounded one of i t s crew.
St art i ng i n l at e Oct ober, t he Bosni an government Croat fed-
erat i on l aunched i t s l argest offensi ve so far i n t he war i n
west ern Bosni a , defeat i ng t he ant i government Musl i m forces
of Fikret Abdic near Bi hac. Duri ng t he heavy fi ght i ng i n t hi s
regi on, t he BSA recei ved ai r support from ai rcraft based i n t he
Serb-hel d Kraj i na region of Croatia , which NATO coul d not
i nt ercept due t o t he short fl i ght t i me bet ween t hei r bases and
t he bat t l efi el d, and t he UN Securi t y Counci l expanded t he
Deny Fl i ght mandat e t o per mi t at t acks agai nst t er r i t or y i n
Croatia t o prevent such fl i ght s. On 21 November, some 30
NATO ai rcraft from four count ri es at t acked t he ai rfi el d at Ud -
bi na , cr at er i ng t he r unway but spar i ng t he ai r cr af t based
t her e at t he r equest of t he UN.
59
Two days l at er, US j et s
l aunched hi gh- speed ant i r adi at i on mi ssi l e at t acks agai ns t
BSA surface-to-air missile (SAM) bat t eri es i n west ern Bosni a
t hat had f i r ed on t wo Br i t i sh ai r cr af t t he day bef or e. A mas-
sive post st ri ke reconnai ssance-i n-force mi ssi on agai nst t hese
site s was pl anned but cancel ed at t he demand of t he Br i t i s h
a n d Fr ench gover nment s, whi ch want ed t o pr event f ur t her
DELIBERATE FORCE
22
escalat i on.
60
The year ended wi t h negot i at i on effort s by former
US pr esi dent Ji mmy Car t er produci ng a four-mont h cease-fi re
bet ween t he BSA and t he Bosni an- Cr oat federation forces,
effective 31 December.
Fi nal Approach to Interventi on
By t he end of t he cease-fi re i n Apri l 1995,
61
si gni fi cant
changes had occur r ed i n t he bal ance of power i n and ar ound
Bosni a , al t hough t hey were wi del y recogni zed onl y i n ret ro -
spect . The Bosni an ar my had cont i nued t o gr ow i n st r engt h,
t hr ough r eor gani zat i on and an i ncr eased f l ow of ar ms and
equi pment , much of whi ch came f r om Musl i m st at es i n t he
Mi ddl e and Far East .
62
Croatia had st eadi l y r ear med, i n par t
by keepi ng a por t i on of t he ar ms shi pment s t o Bosni a t hat i t
al l owed t o cross i t s t erri t ory aft er t hey penet rat ed t he rat her
l eaky i nt ernat i onal bl ockade. Organi zat i onal advi ce for t he
Croat i an mi l i t ary had come from a t eam of former US mi l i t ary
offi cers i n t he nongovernment al gui se of Mi l i t ary Professi onal
Resources, Incorporat ed. The BSA a nd t he RSK a r my r e-
mai ned i n a powerful st rat egi c posi t i on i n spi t e of recei vi ng
reduced mat eri al support from Serbi a , but t he l ocal bal ance of
power was shi ft i ng i n favor of t hei r opponent s. Perhaps as
si gni fi cant , as woul d soon be reveal ed, years of war and depri -
vat i on had appar ent l y begun t o t ake a t ol l on t he Ser b ar mi es
moral e and pol i t i cal cohesi on.
63
Dr amat i c si gns of t hi s weakness came when t he Cr oat i an
army l aunched an i nvasi on of Serb-hel d West ern Sl avoni a
(Sector West in UNPROFOR parl ance) on 1 May 1995. Cal l ed
Operat i on Fl ash , t he Croat i an offensi ve conquered t he t erri -
t ory i n l ess t han t wo days, surpri si ng most observersi ncl ud-
i ng West ern offi ci al swho had expect ed t he RSK forces to
r esi st any Cr oat i an at t ack wi t h f ar gr eat er det er mi nat i on and
effectiveness.
64
El sewhere i n t he Kraj i na, pl anni ng began f or a
mi l i t ar y r eor gani zat i on, and a new commander was appoi nt ed
for t he RSK army.
However , a key weakness of t he West er n power s soon
emerged as wel l . In response t o renewed shel l i ng of safe areas
and t he cont i nued presence of Serb art i l l ery i n t he excl usi on
MUELLER
23
zone ar ound Sar aj evo, the UN request ed puni t i ve ai r st ri kes
agai nst t he Bosni an Ser bs. On 25 and 26 May, NATO aircraft
at t acked ammuni t i on st orage si t es i n Pal e , t he Bosni an Ser b
capital.
65
The Serbs responded as t hey had t o previ ous ai r
st ri kes, by t aki ng 370 UN peacekeepers host age, and pl aced
many of t hem at st r at egi c l ocat i ons as human shi el ds t o det er
further NATO ai r st ri kes. The bombi ng ceased, and by 18
J une t he Ser bs had rel eased al l of t he host ages. UNPROFOR
redepl oyed t he rest of i t s out l yi ng uni t s t o prot ect t hem from
capt ur e by t he BSA i n si mi l ar ci r cumst ances i n t he f ut ur e.
Short l y aft er t he Pal e rai ds, Ameri can domest i c at t ent i on
focused on Bosni a as never bef or e, when a Bosni an Ser b SA-6
Kub SAM shot down a US Ai r Force F-16 near Banj a Luka in
west ern Bosni a on 2 June. The pi l ot ej ect ed safel y, and hi s
fat e became t he subj ect of i nt ense specul at i on unt i l a US
Mari ne Corps combat sear ch- and- r escue mi ssi on rescued hi m
s i x days l at er . Popul ar Amer i can concer n about Bos ni a
quickly subsided to its original level of relative indifference,
and even at t he hei ght of Operat i on Del i berat e Force, Bosni a
recei ved l ess US medi a at t ent i on t han i t di d duri ng t hi s i nci -
dent .
66
In t he wake of t he l oss, Deny Fl i ght oper at i ons wer e
adj ust ed t o keep pat rol l i ng ai rcraft fart her out of harms way,
over the Adriatic , i n spi t e of Br i t i sh and Fr ench i nsi st ence t hat
occasi onal casual t i es were t o be expect ed i n such an opera -
t i on. The al l i es argued t hat Deny Fl i ght ai rcraft shoul d con -
t i nue t o pat rol t he ski es over Bosni a , at l east unt i l i t became
cl ear t hat t he F- 16 shoot down was not a fl uke. However, AF -
SOUTH commanders mai nt ai ned t hat si nce rel at i vel y few ai r -
pl anes were vi ol at i ng t he no-fl i ght zone and since NATO would
not al l ow t he preempt i ve dest ruct i on of t he BSA i nt egrat ed ai r
defense syst em (IADS),
67
t he ri sks i nvol ved i n furt her over -
flights were not worthwhile.
68
I n Jul y t he BSA seized the long-isolated Muslim enclave of
Sr ebr eni ca aft er several days of heavy fi ght i ng, duri ng whi ch
US Navy and Dut ch ai r force fighters flew CAS mi ssi ons t o
support Dut ch UNPROFOR peacekeepers when t hey came un-
der at t ack. Aft er occupyi ng t he ci t y on 11 Jul y, t he BSA ex-
pelled its Muslim popul at i on and bused t hem t o Tuzl a , except
f or some seven t housand men who r emai n unaccount ed f or .
Almost immediately, the BSA began shel l i ng and t hen l aunch i ng
DELIBERATE FORCE
24
gr ound a t t a c ks a ga i ns t Ze pa a n d t h r e a t e n e d t o a t t a c k
Gorazde. Gal vani zed by t he sei zure of Srebreni ca and f aci ng
growi ng domest i c pressure t o act , especi al l y i n Europe, West -
er n l eader s i ncr easi ngl y advocat ed maj or mi l i t ar y act i on.
Fr ench pr esi dent Jacques Chi r ac called for Western interven -
t i on on 14 Jul y, and al t hough t he Br i t i sh gover nment ur ged
caut i on, Bri t i sh, French, and Ameri can defense offi ci al s met i n
London, and pr epar at i ons wer e made t o depl oy a Rapi d Reac-
tion Force (RRF) of Fr ench, Br i t i sh, and Dut ch combat t r oops,
including heavy artillery, to Sarajevo. American officials, led
by Secretary of Defense William Perry, advocat ed wi despread
ai r st ri kes agai nst t he BSA.
On 21 Jul y, as RRF artillery units arrived in Sarajevo a nd
pr epar ed t o depl oy on Mount I gman, overlooking Sarajevo,
officials from all the NATO al l i es hel d a summi t meet i ng i n
London and agreed t o l aunch l arge-scal e ai r st ri kes i f t he BSA
ei t her at t acked Gorazde or concent r at ed f or ces or weapons
t hat posed a di r ect t hr eat t o i t .
69
Al t hough t hi s was a dr amat i c
pol i t i cal act i on, on a st rat egi c l evel t he deci si on was not con -
cei ved as a depar t ur e f r om past pol i cy so much as a cont i nu-
at i on of i t , si nce t he members had agreed on t he possi bi l i t y of
such a course of action two years earlier. At NATO t he cam-
pai gn t hat became known as Del i ber at e For ce was seen si mpl y
as a furt her phase of Deny Fl i ght , and AFSOUTHs name f or
t he ai r campai gn came i nt o use i n Br ussel s onl y aft er t he fact .
However, t he London conference di d add several not ewort hy
aspects to the air strike plan of 1993. First was the estab-
lishment of two zones of action in Bosnia one covering the
southeast, including Sarajevo and Gorazde, and t he ot her t he
nort hwest , i ncl udi ng Bi hac. Instead of AFSOUTH aircraft being
limited to striking targets in the close vicinity of whichever safe
area(s) came under attack, the entire zone of action cont ai ni ng
the safe area(s) i n quest i on woul d be subj ect t o ai r attack. Sec -
ond, at least in theory, once a campaign began, on l y mut ual
agreement between NATO and UNPROFOR would stop it. As one
official characterized the arrangement, both of the dual keys
were required to turn off the bombing, instead of just one.
70
The North Atlantic Council approved t he ai r st ri ke pl an on
25 Jul y, t he same day t hat Zepa fell to the BSA a nd t he s a me
day t hat t he UN War Cri mes Tri bunal at t he Hague i ndi ct ed
MUELLER
25
Radovan Karadzi c and Rat ko Ml adi c . One week later, the NAC
ext ended t he det er r ent t hr eat s t o cover at t acks agai nst t he
ot her remai ni ng safe areas (Sarajevo, Tuzla , and Bi hac) as
wel l , whi l e t he US Congress sent a resol ut i on t o Presi dent
Clinton calling for the lifting of the UN ar ms embar go agai nst
t he Bosni an gover nment .
71
Immedi at el y aft er t he London conference, a del egat i on of
NATO air force generals traveled to Serbia to deliver the alli -
ances ul t i mat um t o General Ml adi c i n per son and t o war n
hi m furt her about t he consequences t hat woul d fol l ow from a
BSA vi ol at i on of t he remai ni ng safe areas. Del egat i on l eader
Air Chief Marshal Sir William Wratten report ed t hat Ml adi c
seemed not t o have expect ed t he ul t i mat um. Ml adi c di d not
question NATOs abi l i t y t o st r i ke, as pr omi sed, when and
where i t chose, but he rej ect ed NATOs demands fol l owi ng
what West ern di pl omat s had by t hen di scovered t o be a t ypi-
cal , l engt hy sol i l oquy on i nj ust i ces t he Serbs had suffered
t hrough hi st ory.
72
Soon NATO and UNPROFOR officers were
worki ng out coordi nat i on arrangement s t o prevent RRF artil -
l ery fi re from endangeri ng ai rcraft i n t he event of ai r st ri kes
ar ound Sar aj evo, and Lt Gen Ber nar d Janvi er , UNPROFOR
commander, agreed with NATO ai r campai gn pl anner s o n a
joint target list for a possi bl e ai r campai gn.
If t he mi l i t ary st rat egy for Operat i on Del i berat e Force was
pri nci pal l y l ai d out i n t he London conference of August 1993,
t he London meet i ng of Jul y 1995 was i t s pi vot al moment i n
pol i t i cal t erms. The sacki ng of Srebreni ca i n spi t e of i t s UN
prot ect i on and t he ensui ng carnage cat al yzed West ern det er -
mi nat i on t o do somet hi ng deci si ve about t he war i n Bosni a .
Moreover, t hi s occurred at t he same t i me t hat t he Bri t i sh
gover nment was r eachi ng t he concl usi on t hat t he peacekeep-
i ng approach t o t he probl em embodi ed i n UNPROFOR ha d
accompl i shed as much as i t was l i kel y t o do. Thi s bel i ef may
have been encouraged by AFSOUTHs deci si on t o st op Deny
Fl i ght pat rol s over Bosni a i n t he absence of permi ssi on for
preempt i ve suppressi on of enemy ai r defenses.
73
The Fr ench
were al so growi ng t i red of t he unremi t t i ng cri si s, and t he el ec-
t i on of Presi dent Chi rac may have cont ri but ed si gni fi cant l y t o
French movement t owards t he Ameri can posi t i on regardi ng
i nt ervent i on. Fi nal l y, t he Europeans wi del y vi ewed ai rpower as
DELIBERATE FORCE
26
an opt i on of l ast resort , and few European l eaders were confi -
dent t hat i t coul d be used bot h wi t h deci si ve effect and at l ow
physi cal and pol i t i cal cost i n Bosni a until after the very lim-
i t ed ai r st r i kes l aunched i n 1994 and 1995 had pr oduced
some equal l y l i mi t ed resul t s.
74
Overal l , i t i s reasonabl e t o say
t hat US l eader shi p was a necessar y but not a suf f i ci ent condi-
tion for NATO t o deci de t o i nt ervene i n Bosni a wi t h ext ensi ve
ai r st ri kes i n 1995.
In west ern Bosni a , i nt ense fi ght i ng had devel oped i n t he
Bi hac pocket i n l at e Jul y. Ten t housand Croat i an army (HV)
t roops crossed t he Bosni an border t o assi st Bi H and HVO
forces in their offensive against BSA forces in the Livno valley,
while Croatian air force (HRZ) fi ght ers and hel i copt ers pro -
vi ded ai r s uppor t . Then on 3 Augus t , t he HV a nd HRZ
l aunched Oper at i on St or m, a massi ve offensi ve agai nst t he
Kraj i na Serbs , who col l apsed or fl ed before t he onsl aught wi t h
a speed t hat shocked obser ver s, i ncl udi ng US and Br i t i sh
government officials.
75
The ski l l wi t h whi ch t he operat i on was
organi zed l ed t o specul at i on t hat nongovernment al Ameri can
advisors had been actively involved in its planning.
76
Knin fell
t o t he Croat i an forces on 5 August , and by t he end of t he next
day, vi rt ual l y al l of t he Serb-hel d Kraj i na had been t aken and
HV forces had l i nked up wi t h t he Bi H at Bi hac.
77
Twenty
t housand RSK troops fled their imploding political entity to
j oi n BSA f or ces ar ound Bi hac, whi l e over t wo hundr ed t hou -
sand Ser b ci vi l i an refugees ul t i mat el y t ook t o t he roads t o t he
east . At t he t i me, many anal yst s bel i eved t hat t he i nfl ux of
t roops from t he Kraj i na woul d bol st er t he Serb forces i n west -
ern Bosni a ; l at er i t woul d appear t hat t hese bi t t erl y demoral-
i zed mi l i t ar y r ef ugees had act ual l y hel ped t o weaken t he
BSA.
78
Fi ght i ng cont i nued i n west ern and sout hern Bosni a ,
and t he si t uat i ons of t he Bi H , HVO, and HV forces gradual l y
i mproved. Karadzi c declared that Milosevic was a t rai t or for
allowing the collapse of the Krajina, while Milosevic responded
t hat Karadzi c was a warmonger for refusi ng t o accept t he
West s peace proposal s.
On 17 August Slobodan Milosevic reiterated his 1994 agree -
ment t o t he Cont act Group peace plan for Bosnia present ed t o
him by US assistant secretary of state Richard Holbrooke, which
Presi dent s Tudj man and Izetbegovic had al r eady approved. The
MUELLER
27
Bosni an Ser bs r emai ned def i ant ,
however. Hol brooke t u r n e d u p
t he heat f ur t her on 27 August
when he appeared on t he t el evi -
s i o n n e ws p r o g r a m Me e t t he
Press and t hr eat ened a si x- t o
12- mont h campai gn of ai r st r i kes
a ga i ns t t he Bos ni a n Se r bs t o
l evel t he pl ayi ng fi el d i n t he
conflict.
79
He furt her prophesi ed
t hat i f t he Bosni an Serbs dont
want t o negot i at e, t hen t he game
will basically just be to wait for
t he t ri gger for ai r st ri kes.
80
The objectives of leveling the
playing field or of bombing the
Bosni an Ser bs t o t he bar gai ni ng
t abl e were not ones upon whi ch NATO had agr eed, and t he
overt goal of Operat i on Del i berat e Force al ways remai ned se-
cur i ng t he saf e ar eas from Bosni an Serb at t acks. However, US
pol i cy, at l east si nce l at e 1993, appears t o have been ori ent ed
consi st ent l y t owards shi ft i ng t he regi onal bal ance of power i n
favor of Croatia and t he Bosni an gover nment . Per haps t he
most obvi ous i ndi cat i on of t hi s i s t hat bl at ant Croat i an i nt er -
vent i on i n t he war i n Bosni a was never cri t i ci zed by Washi ng-
t on i n t he way t hat Serbi an i nvol vement i n t he war was, l et
al one seen as a r eason t o use ai r power agai nst Cr oat i an
forces.
81
Somewhat i r onically, it is at least conceivable that the
US-engineered federation between the Bosnian Croats and t he
Bosnian government , t he i mprovement i n Croat i an and Bi H
military power, and the success of economic sanctions and ot her
international pressures in persuading Milosevic to withdraw his
support from t he Bosni an Serbs had finally combined by mid-
1995 to make a Croatian-Bosnian victory over the BSA possible,
even without direct involvement by NATO.
82
It is noteworthy that
the developing capabilities and possible actions of the Croatian
and BiH forces did not figure prominently in US and NATO
campai gn pl anni ng, as some of the following chapters disc us s .
83
The trigger for NATO ai r st ri kes t hat Hol brooke had foretold
was provi ded t he very next day when t wo mort ar shel l s fel l i n
Richard Holbrooke
DELIBERATE FORCE
28
a Saraj evo market pl ace, ki l l i ng 37 peopl e and woundi ng 85.
The Bosni an government t hreat ened t o wi t hdraw from t he on -
goi ng Pari s peace t al ks i f t he Serbs were not puni shed, whi l e
Karadzic accused t he Bi H of l aunchi ng t he at t ack i t sel f . On
29 August, UNPROFOR announced t hat i t had conf i r med be-
yond al l reasonabl e doubt t hat t he shel l s had been fi red from
a Ser b- hel d ar ea. I n spi t e of t he Bosni an Ser b parliaments
a nnouncement t hat i t now accept ed t he West er n peace pl an i n
pri nci pl e (and a Russi an st at ement t hat NATO shoul d not
retaliate for the shelling, even if the Serbs were responsible for
it), NATO deci ded t o execut e i t s ai r campai gn pl an agai nst t he
BSA.
84
On 30 August , US, Br i t i sh, Spani sh, and Fr ench ai r -
craft began l aunchi ng ai r st ri kes agai nst Bosni an Serb t ar get s
i n t he sout heast zone of act i on , whi l e French and Bri t i sh
gunner s on Mount I gman shel l ed BSA t arget s ar ound Sar a -
jevo, as Operat i on Del i berat e Force began.
Not es
1. Among t he recent account s of Yugosl avi as di si nt egrat i on and i t s con -
sequences, per haps t he best and most accessi bl e i s Chr i st opher Bennet t ,
Yugoslavias Bloody Collapse (New York: New York University Press, 1995).
Al so wort hy of exami nat i on, among ot hers, are Susan L. Woodward, Bal kan
Tragedy (Washi ngt on, D. C. : Brooki ngs Inst i t ut i on, 1995); Laura Si l ber and
Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: TV Books/ Pengui n
USA, 1996); Miron Rezun, Europe and War i n t he Bal kans (West port , Conn. :
Praeger, 1995); Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: Yugoslavias Disintegration
and Balkan Politics in Transition, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995);
James Gow, Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis (London: Pin -
ter, 1991); Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia (New York: Penguin, 1992);
Br anka Magas, The Destruction of Yugoslavia (London: Verno, 1993); and
Mi hai l o Crnobrnj a, The Yugosl av Drama (Montreal: McGill-Queens Univer -
si t y Press, 1994). Focusi ng on Bosni a-Herzegovi na i n part i cul ar are Noel
Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (New York: New York University Press,
1994); and Robert J. Doni a and John V. A. Fi ne, Bosnia and Hercegovina: A
Tradition Betrayed (London: Hurst , 1994). Many of t hese works al so provi de
useful summari es of earl i er (and pre-) Yugosl av hi st ory.
2. On t he Jul y Cri si s see, among many ot hers, L. C. F. Turner, Origins of
the First World War (New York: Norton, 1970), which also describes the
pr ecedi ng Bal kan War s; and James Jol l , The Origins of the First World War,
2d ed. (New York: Longman, 1992).
3. Bul gari a was t he onl y Sout h Sl avi c nat i on not i ncl uded i n Yugosl avi a,
whi ch means Land of t he Sout h Sl avs i n Serbo-Croat i an. General hi st ori es
of Yugoslavia that predate the 1980s include Stephen Clissold, ed., A Short
MUELLER
29
History of Yugoslavia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968); and
Stevan Pavlowitch, Yugoslavia (London: Ernest Benn, 1971). On the formation
of Yugoslavia in particular, see Dimitrije Djordjevic, ed., The Creation of Yugo-
sl avi a, 19141918 (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Clio, 1980); and Ivo Banac, The
National Question in Yugoslavia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984).
4. See Piotr S. Wandycz, France and Her Eastern Allies, 19191925 (Min-
neapol i s: Uni versi t y of Mi nnesot a Press, 1962); and The Twilight of the
French Eastern Alliances, 19261936 (Princeton, N. J. : Princeton University
Press, 1988).
5. Robert Rot hst ei n, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia
Uni versi t y Press, 1968), 12870.
6. On i nt erwar and wart i me Yugosl avi a, see Bennet t , chap. 3; J. B.
Hopt ner , Yugosl avi a i n Cri si s, 19341941 (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1962); Aleksa Djilas, The Cont est ed Count ry: Yugosl av Uni t y and
Communi st Revol ut i on, 19191953 (Cambri dge, Mass. : Harvard Uni versi t y
Press, 1991); and Donal d Cameron Wat t , How War Came (New York: Pan-
t heon, 1989) , chap. 17.
7. On t he i nvasi on and occupat i on of Yugosl avi a, see al so Il i va Juki c,
The Fall of Yugoslavia (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974); Jozo
Tomasevi ch, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia: The Chetniks (St anford:
St anford Uni versi t y Press, 1975); El i zabet h Wi skemann, The Subj ugat i on
of Sout h-East ern Europe, i n Survey of Int ernat i onal Af f ai rs, 19391946:
The Initial Triumph of the Axis, ed. Arnold Toynbee and Veronica M. Toynbee
(London: Oxford University Press, 1958), 31963; and idem, Partitioned
Yugoslavia, in Toynbee and Toynbee, 64873.
8. For geographic details of the Axis partition, see The Ti mes At l as of t he
Second World War, ed. John Keegan (Avenel , N. J. : Crescent Books, 1995).
9. Bennet t , 4346.
10. Among many bi ographi cal st udi es of Ti t o, see especi al l y St evan
Pavl owi t ch, Yugosl avi as Great Di ct at or: Ti t o, a Reassessment ( London:
Hurst , 1992).
11. See Bennet t , chap. 4; and Woodward, chap. 2. On post war Yugosl a -
vi as economi c syst em, see al so Denni son Rusi now, The Yugoslav Experi-
ment , 19481974 (London: Hurst, 1977).
12. Although the West welcomed Titos withdrawal from the Soviet bloc,
unt i l (and i n some cases even aft er) t he Si no-Sovi et spl i t i n t he 1960s, many
Ameri can pol i cy makers (i n spi t e of t he cont rary advi ce of George Kennan)
cont i nued t o vi ew t he communi st worl d as a uni t ed monol i t h and argued
t hat t he West woul d wast e i t s effort s by t ryi ng t o foment furt her spl i t s i n t he
i nt er nat i onal communi st movement .
13. On Yugoslavias foreign relations during the cold war, see also David L.
Larson, United States Foreign Policy toward Yugoslavia, 19431963 (Wash-
ington, D. C. : University Press of America, 1979).
14. On t he ot her hand, It al i an domest i c pol i t i cs were a l ong-st andi ng
hot bed of East -West compet i t i on, wi t h t he Uni t ed St at es and t he USSR
DELIBERATE FORCE
30
provi di ng ext ensi ve covert assi st ance t o It al i an pol i t i cal part i es on t he ri ght
and l ef t .
15. See Adam Robert s, Nations in Arms: The Theory and Practice of
Territorial Defense, 2d ed. (New York: Sai nt Mart i ns, 1986), chaps. 56; and
Douglas A. Fraze, The Yugoslav All-Peoples Defense System: A Pessimistic
Apprai sal (mast ers t hesi s, Naval Post graduat e School , June 1981).
16. See Woodward, chap. 2.
17. See i bi d. , chaps. 34; and Bennet t , chap. 5.
18. Bennet t , 69.
19. War r en Zi mmer man, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its
Dest royersAmeri cas Last Ambassador Tel l s What Happened and Why
(New York: Times Books, 1996), 4248.
20. Presumabl y Sl ovaks, Ukrai ni ans, Quebecoi s, and ot her rel at i vel y
peaceful secessi oni st s woul d occupy some i nt ermedi at e rung on t hi s hy-
pothesized civilizational ladder.
21. It may or may not be si gni fi cant t hat , as some observers have not ed,
d uring most of the Bosnian civil war, Sarajevans have faced a lower risk of
violent death than do residents of some cities and towns in the United States.
22. And, us ual l y mos t i mpor t ant i n s uch ar gument s , t her ef or e we
shoul d not get i nvol ved. Of course, t he same noni nt ervent i oni st pol i cy pre -
scri pt i on coul d al so fol l ow from a number of very di fferent anal yses of t he
probl em. For an el egant l y scat hi ng cri t i que of one promi nent exampl e of
this perspective (Robert D. Kaplans Bal kan Ghost s: A Journey t hrough Hi s -
tory [New York: Saint Martins, 1993]), see Noel Malcolm, Seeing Ghosts,
The National Interest, Summer 1993, 8388.
23. One i ndi cat or of t hi s t rend was t he ri si ng number of peopl e i dent i fy -
i ng t hemsel ves i n censuses as et hni c Yugosl avs r at her t han as member s of
one of t he subnat i onal et hni c groups. Not t he l east of t he fact ors worki ng t o
erode t radi t i onal et hni c boundari es (and t o creat e most of t he sel f-i dent i fi ed
Yugosl avs) was t he subst ant i al and r i si ng number of mar r i ages bet ween
members of di fferent et hni c groups.
24. See Theda Skocpol , States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1979).
25. See V. P. Gagnon Jr. , Et hni c Nat i onal i sm and Int ernat i onal Con -
flict, International Security 19, no. 3 (Wi nt er 199495): 13066.
26. Many schol ars and observers have argued t hat t hi s t rend i s effec -
t i vel y i rreversi bl e, at l east for t he foreseeabl e fut ure, and t hat memori es of
the latest wave of internal wars in Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia, now leave
no al t ernat i ve t o et hni c part i t i on. See, for exampl e, John J. Mearshei mer
and St ephen Van Evera, When Peace Means War, The New Republic, 18
December 1995, 1621.
27. See, among ot hers, Bennet t , chap. 2.
28. Kosovo i s al so t he spi r i t ual home of t he Ser bi an Or t hodox chur ch.
See i bi d. , 8687.
29. On Milosevics rise to power, see V. P. Gagnon Jr. , Serbias Road to
War, Journal of Democracy 5, no. 2 (April 1994): 11731.
MUELLER
31
30. Al t hough compari ng l esser di ct at ors t o Adol f Hi t l er has become a
t roubl i ngl y popul ar cot t age i ndust ry i n recent years, Chri st opher Bennet t ,
i n Yugoslavias Bloody Collapse, offers the following, unusually worthwhile,
exampl e of t he art form: Cont emporary Yugosl av comment at ors were i m -
medi at el y st ruck by t he si mi l ari t i es [wi t h] . . . t he t act i cs Adol ph Hi t l er had
empl oyed . . . duri ng t he 1930s. Hi t l ers remi l i t ari zat i on of t he Rhi nel and
and t he fai l ure of t he i nt ernat i onal communi t y t o react i n 1936 corre -
sponded t o Mi l osevi cs assaul t agai nst Serbi as aut onomous provi nces and
t he i nert i a of Yugosl avi as federal aut hori t i es i n 1988 and 1989. Anschl uss
wi t h Aust ri a i n 1937 was aki n t o t he Mi l osevi c coup dtat i n Mont enegro.
Si mi l arl y t he Serb communi t i es of Croat i a and Bosni a-Hercegovi na served
t he same pur pose as t he Ger man mi nor i t i es i n Czechosl ovaki a and Pol and
(page 116).
31. Milosevic himself was finally elected president of Serbia in December
1990, fol l owi ng a campai gn i n whi ch he enj oyed compl et e cont rol over t he
medi a and was abl e t o fi nance hi s effort by havi ng t he mai n Serbi an bank
pri nt t he $1. 7 bi l l i on he deemed necessary t o ensure hi s el ect i on (i bi d. ,
12122).
32. Tel evi si on document ary Discovery Journal, Yugoslavia: The Death of
a Nation, episode 2 (1995).
33. Hi s el ect i on al so benefi t ed from campai gn fi nanci ng from expat ri at e
Croat s abroad (Bennet t , 124). For det ai l ed di scussi on of el ect i ons i n Yugo-
sl avi a, see Cohen.
34. Unl i ke t he Croat i an government , t he Sl oveni an government had fore -
knowl edge of t he JNAs pl an t o di sarm t he t wo republ i cs t erri t ori al defense
forces i n l at e 1990 and t hus was abl e t o ret ai n cont rol of a si gni fi cant
port i on of i t s arms (Bennet t , 144).
35. Yugoslavia: The Death of a Nation, episode 2.
36. Bennet t , 15456.
37. For a det ai l ed anal ysi s, see Norman Ci gar, The Serbo-Croat i an War,
1991: Political and Military Dimensions, Journal of Strategic Studies 16, no.
3 (Sept ember 1993): 297338.
38. Yugoslavia: The Death of a Nation, episode 3.
39. See Norman Ci gar, Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of Ethnic Cleans -
ing(College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M University Press, 1995).
40. Mi l osevi c t hreat ened t o dest roy Bul at ovi c by reveal i ng t hat t he It al-
i an government had offered hi m an at t ract i ve package of forei gn ai d and
per sonal enr i chment i n r et ur n f or accept ance of t he EC pl an.
41. In addi t i on t o t he broader account s of Yugosl avi as breakup and t he
resul t i ng wars, see Edward OBal l ance, Civil War in Bosnia, 199294 (New
York: Saint Martins, 1995).
42. The si xt h of Apri l was al so t he anni versary of t he German t error
bombi ng of Bel grade and i nvasi on of Yugosl avi a i n 1941.
43. Bennet t , 18485.
DELIBERATE FORCE
32
44. As OBallance repeatedly observes, the siege of Sarajevo was never
qui t e as i mper meabl e as t he Bosni an gover nment and many j our nal i st s
port rayed i t t o beand somet i mes was much l ess so (i bi d. ).
45. Seni or UN offi ci al , i nt ervi ewed by aut hor, spri ng 1996.
46. Moreover, not only were the Bosnian governments forces not exclu -
sively Muslim, in western Bosnia the Muslim militia force led by Fikret
Abdi c was an i mport ant al l y of t he Bosni an Serbs i n t he Bi hac area.
47. The incendiary question of which side(s) committed the most atrocities
in Bosnia cannot be addressed adequately herenor need it be. As a first
approximation, all but the most partisan analysts generally agree that i n t he
wars in Croatia and Bosnia, all sides committed ethnic cleansing and even
more vile acts, and that in both conflicts, Serbs committed by far the most.
48. Vi ce Adm Norman W. Ray and Uni t ed Ki ngdom del egat i on, Head-
quart ers NATO, i nt ervi ewed by aut hor, 9 February 1996.
49. Headquart ers NATO, vari ous i nt ervi ews by aut hor, 79 February
1996. One US di pl omat suggest ed i t was r el evant t hat i n 1995 t he Br i t i sh
military was finalizing official doctrine regarding peace operations, which
hel d t hat peacekeepi ng and peace enforcement (Chapt er VI and Chapt er
VII operat i ons i n UN parl ance) are fundament al l y di fferent from each ot her
and ought t o be kept separ at e.
50. Of course, humani t ari an ai d was far from i rrel evant t o t he mi l i t ary
di mensi on of t he confl i ct si nce shi pment s of food and ot her suppl i es oft en
pl ayed a key rol e i n sust ai ni ng t he vari ous bel l i gerent forces. For det ai l s of
vari ous humani t ari an ai d effort s, see OBal l ance.
51. In UN Securi t y Counci l Resol ut i ons 713 and 757, respect i vel y.
52. Wi t h t he grant i ng of enforcement powers on 22 November, t he West -
ern European Uni ons Operat i on Sharp Vi gi l ance and NATOs Operat i on
Mari t i me Moni t or were renamed Sharp Fence and Mari t i me Guard, respec -
t i vel y. They were consol i dat ed i nt o a combi ned operat i on cal l ed Sharp
Gua r d i n J une 1993.
53. A vi vi d and di st urbi ng account of UNPROFORs depl oyment and
earl y days i n Saraj evo and of what peacekeepi ng i s l i ke more general l y
appears i n t he memoi rs of Lt Gen Lewi s MacKenzi e, a Canadi an who ori gi -
nal l y commanded t he UN force i n Saraj evo. See Peacekeeper: The Road to
Saraj evo (Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre, 1993).
54. Four hundred si xt y-fi ve fl i ght s over Bosni a had been moni t ored by
t he t i me t he Securi t y Counci l adopt ed UNSCR 816.
55. Seni or mi l i t ar y command of Deny Fl i ght l ay wi t h US admi r al
Lei ght on Smi t h, t he commander of Al l i ed Forces Sout hern Europe, and
bel ow hi m, day-t o-day operat i onal command resi ded wi t h US Ai r Force
l i eut enant general Mi chael Ryan, commander of Al l i ed Ai r Forces Sout hern
Eur ope.
56. Memorandum for t he NATO secret ary-general , NAC Deci si on St at e -
ment , MCM-KAD-084-93, subj ect : Operat i onal Opt i ons for Ai r St ri kes i n
Bosni a-Herzegovi na, 8 August 1993.
MUELLER
33
57. Some segment s of t he US admi ni st r at i on, such as t he Nat i onal Se-
curi t y Counci l st aff, had l ong favored st rong West ern i nt ervent i on i n t he
Bosni an cr i si s but had been out wei ghed by t hose who ar gued t hat i nt er ven -
tion would produce little gain but involve potentially high political costs.
58. Ai r Force F-16s and Mari ne Corps F/ A-18s fl ew t he Apri l CAS
st ri kes. The UN host ages were subsequent l y rel eased.
59. The NAC had ant i ci pat ed a far more subst ant i al ai r at t ack when i t
approved t he st ri ke agai nst Udbi na (US Mi ssi on offi ci al s, Headquart ers
NATO, interviewed by author, 8 February 1996).
60. Vari ous i nt ervi ews at Headquart ers NATO, 89 February 1996.
61. The cease-fi re di d not act ual l y l ast out i t s fourt h mont h, as Bi H
forces l aunched a number of successful l ocal offensi ves duri ng Apri l .
62. Janes Sent i nel : The Bal kans Newsl et t er 1, no. 10 (Oct ober 1994): 2;
and vol . 2, no. 7 (n. d. ): 13. On t he growt h of t he HZS and apparent
German i nvol vement t herei n, see Georg Mader, Hrvat ske Zrance Snage:
Croatias Embargoed Air Force, World Air Power Journal 24 (Spring 1996):
14047.
63. St rai ns i n t he Bosni an Serb l eadershi p bet ween Presi dent Karadzi c
and General Ml adi c woul d soon become apparent as wel l . See Robert Bl ock,
The Madness of General Mladic, The New York Revi ew, 5 Oct ober 1995,
79.
64. US mi ssi on and Bri t i sh del egat i on offi ci al s, Headquart ers NATO, i n -
t ervi ewed by aut hor, 89 February 1996.
65. NATO identified the attacking forces as including four US Air Force
F- 16s and one Dut ch F- 16, t wo US and t wo Spani sh F- 18s, and one Fr ench
Mi rage, i n addi t i on t o t anker, el ect roni c warfare, and search-and-rescue
ai rcraft .
66. According to Vanderbilt University Television News Archive statis -
t i cs, t he t hree maj or US t el evi si on net works t oget her devot ed a t ot al of
al most 45 mi nut es of cover age t o st or i es about Bosni a on 2 and 3 June
1995, compar ed t o j ust over 33 mi nut es on 30 and 31 August , t he f i r st t wo
days of bombi ng i n Operat i on Del i berat e Force. One shoul d not e t hat on t he
fi rst day of Del i berat e Force, a Bosni an Serb SA-16 shot down a French
Mi rage 2000D, and t he fat e of i t s t wo-man non-Ameri can crew remai ned
unknown for several weeks.
67. The Uni t ed St at es had l ong been l obbyi ng for such permi ssi on from
NATO, even to the point of revealing previously unshared intelligence infor -
mat i on about t he Bosni an Serb IADS wi t h i t s al l i es, but di fferences bet ween
Ameri can and European at t i t udes t owards proport i onal i t y and defi ni t i ons of
hostile intent led the NAC consistently to reject these requests. AFSOUTH
di d not have suffi ci ent defense-suppressi on ai rcraft avai l abl e t o provi de
routine protection from SAMs for Deny Flight patrols over Bosnia (Ray
interview).
68. The same di fference of opi ni on bet ween t he Uni t ed St at es and i t s
European al l i es about t he t ol erabi l i t y of fri endl y l osses al so charact eri zed
some aspect s of t he pl anni ng and execut i on of NATO ai r st ri kes i n Sept em -
DELIBERATE FORCE
34
ber 1995 (Group Capt Trevor Murray and Bri t i sh UN del egat i on offi ci al s,
RAF Uxbri dge and Headquart ers NATO, i nt ervi ewed by aut hor, 69 Febru -
ary 1996).
69. During this time, one of the stranger incidents of the conflict oc -
curred when i t was wi del y report ed t hat an expl osi on heard i n Pal e on 22
Jul y had been a uni l at er al Fr ench bombi ng at t ack agai nst t he home of a
relative of Radovan Karadzic in retaliation for the killing of two French
peacekeepers t he day before. The French Defense Mi ni st ry deni ed t hi s, and
subsequent l y i t appear ed t hat t he noi se had act ual l y been a soni c boom
(Janes Sent i nel : The Bal kans Newsl et t er 2, no. 7 [n. d. ]: 6). However, the
myst ery has been fuel ed by a comment from French defense mi ni st er Mi l l on
t hat i f such an at t ack had been l aunched, i t woul d obvi ousl y be part of an
appropri at e response t o t he l ogi c of war chosen by t he Serbs, and by a
comment from Presi dent Chi rac t hat he had ordered unspeci fi ed ret al i at i on
for t he deat hs of t he peacekeepers (French Revenge St ri ke i n Bosni a?
World Air Power Journal 24 [Spring 1996]: 5).
70. US and Br i t i sh del egat i on, Headquar t er s NATO, i nt er vi ewed by
aut hor, 78 February 1996. In pract i ce, ei t her of t he key hol ders woul d
probabl y have been abl e t o hal t t he bombi ng uni l at eral l y i f suffi ci ent l y set
on doing so (Ray interview).
71. Presi dent Cl i nt on vet oed t hi s resol ut i on on 11 August .
72. Air Chief Marshal William Wratten, RAF High Wycombe, interviewed
by aut hor, 5 February 1996. In addi t i on t o Ai r Chi ef Marshal Wrat t en,
commander i n chi ef of RAF St ri ke Command, t he NATO del egat i on i ncl uded
Ai r For ce gener al James Jamer son, deput y commander i n chi ef of US Eur o-
pean Command, and an Arme de lAir maj or general . Wrat t en ended t he
vi si t when a heat ed ar gument began bet ween Ml adi c and t he Fr ench gen -
eral.
73. Several di pl omat s i n t he US NATO mi ssi on ret rospect i vel y assessed
t he mi l i t ary deci si on t o di scont i nue rout i ne overfl i ght s aft er t he l oss of t he
F-16 i n June as havi ng been a powerful pol i t i cal l ever t o encourage t he
Bri t i sh t o support new measures i n Bosni a (i nt ervi ews, 8 February 1996).
74. Vari ous i nt ervi ews by aut hor, 79 February 1996.
75. Ibid. For details of the offensive, see Tim Ripley and Paul Beaver,
Analysis: Operation Storm, Janes Sent i nel : The Bal kans Newsl et t er 2, no.
8 (n. d. ): 23.
76. Ri pl ey and Beaver, 2.
77. Duri ng t he fi ght i ng, US Navy EA-6Bs and F/ A-18s fi red hi gh-speed
ant i r adi at i on mi ssi l es at Ser b SAM si t es near Kni n and Udbi na t hat had
l ocked on t o t hem.
78. On 13 August, RSK troops who had fled to Yugoslavia were ordered
t o ret urn t o Bosni a; soon Bel grade began sendi ng Kraj i na Serb refugees t o
fi nd new homes i n Kosovo, l eadi ng t o ri si ng et hni c t ensi ons t here (Janes
Sent i nel : The Bal kans Newsl et t er 2, no. 8 [n.d.]: 3).
79. St even Greenhouse, U. S. Offi ci al s Say Bosni an Serbs Face NATO
Attacks If Talks Stall, New York Ti mes, 28 August 1995, A1, A6.
MUELLER
35
80. Ibid., A6.
81. On 4 August 1995, NATO ai rcraft were i n fact sent t o provi de a
det errent overhead presence for Canadi an UNPROFOR peacekeepers who
were under fi re from HV forces duri ng Operat i on St orm. However, RSK
forces i l l umi nat ed t he fl i ght wi t h t hei r radars, and t he ai rcraft responded by
fi ri ng ant i radi at i on mi ssi l es, whi ch seemed l i kel y t o have embol dened rat her
t han det erred t he Croat i an forces (Capt Chi p Pri ngl e, Ramst ei n Ai r Base,
interviewed by Lt Col Chris Campbell, 14 February 1996).
82. Thi s st udy cannot and wi l l not t ry t oanswer t he quest i on of what
mi ght have happened i f Oper at i on Del i ber at e For ce had not been l aunched,
but t he quest i on deser ves f ur t her st udy and consi der at i on. I n l i ght of t he
r api d successes t hat Cr oat i a scor ed agai nst t he RSK i n mi d- 1995 and t he
sl ower progress made agai nst t he BSA i n l at e August , i t must fal l t o t hose
who argue t hat NATO bombi ng not onl y accel erat ed but det ermi ned t he
out come of t he war i n Bosni a t o prove t hei r case.
8 3 . Gi v e n t h e s p l e n d i d s y n e r g y b e t we e n t h e a i r c a mp a i g n a n d
HV/ HVO/ Bi H oper at i ons, i t i s not sur pr i si ng t hat t her e has been wi de -
spr ead specul at i on about whet her t hi s was t he r esul t of acci dent or desi gn.
The US government has consi st ent l y mai nt ai ned t hat no st rat egi c coordi na-
t i on exi st ed bet ween Washi ngt on and t he bel l i gerent s, poi nt i ng t o t he fact
t hat US di pl omat s i n Zagreb t ri ed unsuccessful l y t o persuade t he Croat i an
government not t o l aunch i t s maj or offensi ves i n 1995. Ambassador Ri chard
Hol brooke, i nt ervi ewed by aut hor, 24 May 1996.
If any such col l aborat i on occurredand for t hat mat t er, i f t he Uni t ed
St at es were even aware of t he ext ent t o whi ch Croat i a and t he Bi H had
improved their capabilities relative to the RSK army and the BSAit re -
mai ns a cl osel y hel d secret .
84. The day aft er t he ai r st ri kes began, Russi a swi t ched t o bl ami ng t he
Bosnian Serbs for provoking NATO.
DELIBERATE FORCE
36
Chapt er 2
The Pl anni ng Background
Lt Col Bradley S. Davis
I n t he af t er mat h of t he deadl y mor t ar at t ack on t he cr owded
Mr kal e mar ket pl ace i n Sa r a j e v o i n Au g u s t 1 9 9 5 , Ad m
Lei ght on W. Smi t h , commander i n chi ef of Al l i ed For ces
Sout hern Europe (CINCSOUTH), cal l ed Bri t i sh l i eut enant gen -
eral Rupert Smi t h , commander of t he Uni t ed Nat i ons Prot ec-
tion Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia ,
1
to tell him
t hat i f t he Bosni an Serbs were responsi bl e, he woul d recom-
mend ret al i at ory ai r st ri kes by t he Nort h At l ant i c Treat y Or -
ganization (NATO). At 2300 (l ocal t i me) t hat same ni ght , Admi-
ral Smi t h and Gener al Smi t h agreed t o t urn t he key (the
prevai l i ng met aphor for st ri ke aut hori t y), t hus set t i ng i n mo-
tion NATOs i nt ense offensi ve ai r act i onOperat i on Del i berat e
Force, t he cul mi nat i on of event s and rel at ed pl anni ng effort s
by t he UN and NATO over a l ong peri od of t i me. Al t hough by
t he st andards of modern warfare, Del i berat e Force was a mod-
est operat i on, i t nonet hel ess served as a si gni fi cant exampl e of
t he effi ci ent use of mi l i t ary force i n pursui t of i nt ernat i onal
st abi l i t y i n t he post -col d-war era.
I n t hi s uni que oper at i on, NATO military forces fulfilled
Uni t ed Nat i ons Securi t y Counci l resol ut i ons (UNSCR) a n d
NATO pol i t i cal mandat es by assi st i ng UN pol i t i cal and mi l i t ary
efforts to bring peace to the region of the former Yugoslavia .
Parallel UN and NATO command and cont rol (C
2
) s t r uct ur es
used for t he previ ous t wo years provi ded l ess t han opt i mum
pol i t i cal and mi l i t ary coordi nat i on and gui dance duri ng Del i b -
erat e Force. As one mi ght expect , t ensi ons exi st ed bet ween UN
and NATO commanders, and t he syst em occasi onal l y proved
less than timely in applying NATO ai rpower i n response t o UN
request s; nonet hel ess, i t seems t o have worked. Thi s chapt er
descri bes t he UN and NATO pol i t i cal and mi l i t ary st ruct ures
and t hei r unusual i nt er r el at i onshi ps, and di scusses t he an-
ticipated flow of planning they provided for Deliberate Force.
37
Fol l owi ng chapt er s addr ess t he pl anni ng process as i t act ual l y
occurred and t he execut i on of t he operat i on.
Uni ted Nati ons and NATO Pol i ti cal Structures
The UN has been politically and militarily involved in the former
Yugoslavia since the civil war spread to Bosnia i n 1992. One can
trace the UNs political and military intervention activities to the
UN Charter and t he Securi t y Counci l resol ut i ons concerni ng
civil strife in the former Yugoslavia . The UN evoked the Charter
to provide the basis of its actions and to meet its primary re-
sponsibility of maintaining international peace and security.
Chapter 7, Article 39 of the Charter allows the Security Council
to survey the world for any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression; make recommendations for action in
accordance with Articles 39, 41, and 42 of chapter seven; and
t hen mai nt ai n or rest ore i nt ernat i onal peace and securi t y. These
three articles specifically allow the UN to employ military forces
Adm Leighton W. Smith holds a poster of alleged war criminals.
DELIBERATE FORCE
38
volunteered by member nations to intervene within the sover -
eign territory of another member nation to maintain or restore
the peace.
2
Article 48 allows member states to carry out Security
Council deci si ons di rect l y and t hrough appropri at e i nt ernat i onal
agenci es of whi ch t hey are members.
Based on recommendations and resolutions of the UN Secu -
rity Council , Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali directed
t he UNs political efforts and military forces in the war-ravaged
former Yugoslavia throughout the Bosnian crisis prior to mid-
1995. Yasushi Akashi, the secretary-generals special repre-
sentative for that country, headed the political and military forces,
UNPROFOR, t here for t he peri od l eadi ng up t o and i ncl udi ng
Operation Deliberate Force. UNPROFOR, headquartered in Za -
greb, Croatia, included military, civil affairs, civilian police, public
information, and administrative components. Akashi was direct ly
responsible to Boutros-Ghali for coordination of political initia -
tives with the warring parties, UN humanitarian relief efforts, and
in-theater civilian control of UN military peacekeeping forces .
UN Security Council r esol ut i ons 781, 816, and 836 had a
di r ect and f ar - r eachi ng i mpact upon t he ul t i mat e pl anni ng
st ruct ure for Del i berat e Force. Through UNSCR 781 (1992),
t he UN r equest ed member st at es t o assi st UNPROFOR in
moni t ori ng t he UN ban on any mi l i t ary fl i ght s over Bosni a-
Herzegovina . NATO mi l i t ary forces began t hei r moni t ori ng ac-
t i vi t i es i n support of t hi s resol ut i on i n Oct ober 1992.
3
On 31
March 1993, UNSCR 816 (1993) ext ended t he ban t o cover al l
flights not authorized by UNPROFOR and di r ect ed member
st at es t o t ake al l necessar y measur es t o ensur e compl i ance
wi t h t he ban.
4
The North Atlantic Council (NAC , t he day-t o-
day political arm of NATO)
5
approved NATOs pl ans for t he
enforcement of t hi s ext ended ban on 8 Apri l 1993 and t hen
notified the UN of NATOs wi l l i ngness t o undert ake t he opera -
tion. NATOs Operat i on Deny Fl i ght began at noon Gr eenwi ch
mean t i me on Monday, 12 Apri l 1993, wi t h ai rcraft from t he
air forces of France , t he Net herl ands , t he Uni t ed Ki ngdom,
and t he Uni t ed St at es fl yi ng what woul d event ual l y become a
24-hour, around-t he-cl ock ai r pat rol over t he ski es of Bosni a-
Herzegovina . (For a succinct review of the applicable UNSCRs
and NAC deci si ons t hat l ed t o Operat i on Del i berat e Force, see
fig. 2.1.)
DAVIS
39
DELIBERATE FORCE
40
Paragraph 10 of UNSCR 836 ( 1993) had t he gr eat est i mpact
on t he pl anni ng for Operat i on Del i berat e Force. It st at ed t hat
member st at es, act i ng nat i onal l y or t hrough regi onal organi-
zat i ons or ar r angement s, may t ake, under t he aut hor i t y of t he
Securi t y Counci l and subj ect t o cl ose coordi nat i on wi t h t he
Secret ary-General and UNPROFOR, al l necessar y measur es,
t hr ough t he use of ai r power , i n and ar ound t he saf e ar eas i n
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovi na , t o support UNPRO-
FOR i n t he per f or mance of i t s mandat e set out i n par agr aphs
5 and 9.
6
In response t o t hi s resol ut i on, NATO foreign minis -
t er s agr eed on 10 June 1993 t hat NATO woul d provi de prot ec-
t i ve ai rpower i n case of at t acks agai nst UNPROFOR i n Bosni a-
Herzegovina . The al l i ances ai rcraft began t hi s coverage on 22
Jul y 1993.
The Bosnian Serb armys (BSA) shel l i ng of t he same Mrkal e
market pl ace i n Saraj evo i n Febr uar y 1994 pr eci pi t at ed t he
enforcement of UNSCR 836. In accordance wi t h t hat resol u -
t i on, t he UN secret ary-general request ed preparat i ons for ai r
st ri kes t o det er furt her at t acks. He al so i nformed t he Securi t y
Counci l t hat he had request ed Wi l l y Cl aes , secret ary-general
of NATO, t o obt ai n a deci si on by t he Nort h At l ant i c Counci l to
aut hori ze t he Commander i n Chi ef of NATOs Sout her n Com -
mand t o l aunch ai r st ri kes, at t he request of t he Uni t ed Na -
t i ons, agai nst BSA ar t i l l er y or mor t ar posi t i ons i n and ar ound
Saraj evo whi ch are det ermi ned by UNPROFOR t o be r esponsi -
bl e for at t acks agai nst ci vi l i an t arget s i n t hat ci t y.
7
The NAC accept ed Bout ros-Ghal is r equest and aut hor i zed
CINCSOUTH t o l aunch ai r st ri kes i n cl ose coordi nat i on wi t h
t he secret ary-general on behal f of UNPROFOR. Bout ros-Ghal i
t hen i nst r uct ed Akashi t o fi nal i ze det ai l ed procedures for t he
i ni t i at i on, conduct , and t ermi nat i on of request ed ai r st ri kes
with CINCSOUTH. He also delegated to Akashi the specific
aut hori t y t o approve a request from t he force commander of
UNPROFOR for close air support i n defense of UN per sonnel
anywhere i n Bosni a-Herzegovi na . Prior to this delegation, only
t he UN secret ary-general approved UNPROFORs request s for
NATO ai r suppor t a t i me- consumi ng, i nef f i ci ent pr ocess.
Even wi t h Akashis newly delegated authority, delays still oc -
cur r ed. For exampl e, i n Mar ch 1994, a r equest t o at t ack a
40-mi l l i met er gun fi ri ng on UN forces i n t he Bi hac area t ook
DAVIS
41
over six hours for approval. Ironically, two AC-130 gunshi ps
over t he area had t he offendi ng gun i n t hei r si ght s, but by t he
t i me t hey r ecei ved cl ear ance, t he gun had moved back under
camouf l age and escaped.
8
Earlier, at a meeting of the NAC in Oslo, Nor way, i n June
1992, NATO forei gn mi ni st ers announced t hei r readi ness t o
suppor t t he UN i n Bosni a-Herzegovi na by maki ng avai l abl e
NATO resources and expert i se for peacekeepi ng operat i ons on
a case-by-case basi s; t hus t hey l ai d t he pol i t i cal foundat i on
for NATOs role in the former Yugoslavia . In December 1992,
the NAC r ei t er at ed i t s r eadi ness t o suppor t peacekeepi ng op -
erat i ons under aut hori t y of t he UN Securi t y Counci l, whi ch
has pri mary responsi bi l i t y for i nt ernat i onal peace and secu -
ri t y. The forei gn mi ni st ers revi ewed peacekeepi ng a n d s a n c-
t i ons- enf or cement measur es al r eady under t aken by NATO
count ri es, i ndi vi dual l y and as an al l i ance, t o support t he i m -
pl ement at i on of Securi t y Counci l resol ut i ons rel at i ng t o t he
confl i ct . Upon t he recommendat i ons of t he Defense Pl anni ng
Committee (DPC),
9
t he forei gn mi ni st ers i ndi cat ed t hat NATO
st ood ready t o respond favorabl y t o furt her i ni t i at i ves t hat t he
UN secret ary-general mi ght t ake i n seeki ng al l i ance assi st ance
in this endeavor (fig. 2.2).
Fig. 2.2. NATO Organization
DELIBERATE FORCE
42
The fi rst mi l i t ary engagement undert aken by t he al l i ance
si nce t he i ncept i on of t he organi zat i on
10
occur r ed on 28 Febr u -
ary 1994, when NATO ai rcraft shot down four warpl anes vi o -
l at i ng t he UN-mandat ed no-fl y zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina .
One fi nds t he next evol ut i onary st ep i n t he cooperat i ve effort s
bet ween UN and NATO mi l i t ary forces i n t he NAC s a n -
nouncement on 22 Apri l 1994 of far st ri ct er prot ect i on of t he
safe areas duri ng Deny Fl i ght. The counci l asser t ed t hat i f any
BSA heavy-weapons at t acks occur r ed on t he UN-desi gnat ed
safe areas of Gorazde, Bi hac, Srebreni ca, Tuzla , and Zepa ,
t hese weapons and ot her BSA mi l i t ary asset s, as wel l as t hei r
di rect and essent i al mi l i t ary-support faci l i t i es such as fuel
i nst al l at i ons and muni t i ons si t es, woul d be subj ect t o NATO
ai r st r i kes i n accor dance wi t h t he pr ocedur al ar r angement s
worked out bet ween NATO and UNPROFOR.
11
Specifically, the NAC decl ared t hat , consi st ent wi t h i t s deci -
si ons of 2 and 9 August 1993, any vi ol at i on of t he provi si ons
of t hose deci si ons woul d const i t ut e grounds for t he NATO
mi l i t ary command t o begi n ai r at t acks on t arget s preapproved
by UN/ NATO wi t hout furt her approval by t he counci l . These
t ar get s i ncl uded any mi l i t ary asset s di rect l y rel at ed t o t he
vi ol at i on and l ocat ed i n t he vi ci ni t y of t he area concerned.
Under al l ci rcumst ances, NATO forces woul d carry out such
at t acks i n cl ose coordi nat i on wi t h UNPROFOR. Based upon i t s
view of the violation, the NATO mi l i t ar y command coul d r ec-
ommend addi t i onal ai r at t acks i n coordi nat i on wi t h UNPRO-
FOR. However, such recommendat i ons requi red conveyance t o
the NATO secret ary-general t hrough t he NATO chain of com-
mand for NAC approval . These at t acks coul d cont i nue unt i l
the NATO mi l i t ar y command j udged t he mi s s i on accom-
plished. The NAC also reaffirmed its earlier decision of Febru-
ary 1994 t hat aut hori zed t he NATO mi l i t ary command t o i ni t i -
at e ai r at t acks t o suppr ess BSA ai r def enses r epr esent i ng a
di rect t hreat t o NATO ai r cr af t oper at i ng under t he agr eed
UN/ NATO coordi nat i on procedures, and t o t ake al l necessary
and appropriate action for their self-defense. The final NAC
di rect i on i nst ruct ed US Army general George A. Joul wan, Su -
preme Al l i ed Commander Europe (SACEUR), to delegate to
CINCSOUTH t he necessary aut hori t y t o i mpl ement t he councils
DAVIS
43
deci si ons, coordi nat i ng wi t h UNPROFOR i n accordance wi t h
t he rel evant operat i ons pl an .
Over the next 17 months, the political and military situation
slowly worsened in Bosnia-Herzegovina . Following the interna -
tional meeting on Bosnia-Herzegovina held in London i n Jul y
1995, the NAC authorized NATO commanders t o det er a BSA
at t ack on t he safe area of Gorazde and t o ensure t he t i mel y and
effective use of NATO airpower if this area were threatened or
attacked.
12
On 1 August the council announced similar deci-
sions regarding the use of NATO ai rpower ai med at det erri ng
at t acks on t he safe areas of Sarajevo, Bihac, and Tuzl a . The NAC
decisions following the London conference of July 1995 specified
that NATO meet furt her Bosni an Serb offensive action with a
fi rm and rapi d response desi gned t o det er at t acks on t he safe
areas and authorized the timely and effective use of airpower, if
necessary. Through both the UN and the NATO political appara -
tus, the coordination of military actions by both CINCSOUTH
and t he force commander of UN Peace Forces (UNPF)
13
was
al ways a st rat egi c and operat i onal necessi t y.
United Nations and NATO Military Structures
Before di scussi ng t he UN and NATO mi l i t ary st ruct ures i n
the former Yugoslavia , one shoul d not e t he st rat egi c pol i t i cal
objectives of Operat i on Del i berat e Force as agreed upon by t he
UN and NATO communi t i es i n t he summer of 1995: (1) reduce
t he t hreat t o t he Saraj evo safe area and det er f ur t her at t acks
t her e or on any ot her saf e ar ea, (2) force the withdrawal of
Bosni an Serb heavy weapons from t he 20-ki l omet er t ot al -ex -
cl usi on zone ar ound Sar aj evo , (3) ensure compl et e freedom of
movement for UN forces and personnel as wel l as nongovern -
ment al or gani zat i ons, and ( 4) ensur e unr est r i ct ed use of t he
Saraj evo ai rport .
14
The UN originally established its military forcesUNPROFOR
in the former Yugoslavia i n Febr uar y 1992 and r edesi gnat ed
t hem UNPF i n t he spri ng of 1995, t he l at t er organi zat i on com-
manded by a seni or mi l i t ary offi cer from one of t he UNs me m-
ber st at es. From 1 March 1995 unt i l aft er Operat i on Deliberate
Force, Lt Gen Bernard Janvier of France, headquar t er ed i n
DELIBERATE FORCE
44
Zagreb wi t h Yasushi Akashi, commanded UNPF, whi ch i n -
cl uded t hr ee subor di nat e commands: t he UN Conf i dence Res -
t orat i on Operat i on in Croatia , al so headquart ered i n Zagreb;
UNPROFOR Bosni a-Herzegovi na, headquar t er ed i n Sar aj evo;
and UN Preventive Deployment Forces i n t he former Yugosl av
Republic of Macedonia , headquart ered i n Skopj e. The t hree
commanders report ed t o t he force commander of UNPF, who,
t oget her wi t h t he ci vi l i an di pl omat i c and humani t ari an rel i ef
component s, act ed under t he overal l di rect i on of Speci al Rep-
r esent at i ve Akashi.
15
As of Sept ember 1995, about 35, 000 UN
mi l i t ary personnel were depl oyed i n-t heat er. Combi ned wi t h
civilian police and civilian personnel, UNPF t ot al ed nearl y
50, 000 peopl e.
16
The i ni t i al mandat e for UNPROFOR cal l ed for ensuri ng t he
demilitarization of the UN-prot ect ed areas by wi t hdrawi ng or
di sbandi ng al l armed forces i n t hem, as wel l as prot ect i ng al l
per sons r esi di ng i n t hem f r om at t ack. Out si de t hese ar eas,
UNPROFOR mi l i t ary observers were t o veri fy t he wi t hdrawal of
all Yugoslav national army and irregular forces from Croatia .
Finally, UNPROFOR was t o faci l i t at e t he safe, secure ret urn of
di spl aced ci vi l i ans t o t hei r homes wi t hi n t he prot ect ed areas.
I n May and June 1993, t he Secur i t y Counci l adopt ed resol u -
t i ons 824 and 836, respect i vel y, t he former expandi ng UN-
PROFORs mandat e t o pr ot ect t he saf e ar eas of Saraj evo,
Tuzla , Zepa , Gorazde, and Bi hac. Thi s i ncl uded det erri ng at -
t acks agai nst t hem, moni t ori ng cease-fi re arrangement s, pro -
mot i ng t he wi t hdrawal of mi l i t ary or parami l i t ary uni t s ot her
t han t hose of t he Bosni an gover nment , and occupyi ng key
poi nt s. Resol ut i on 836 aut hori zed t he use of ai rpower i n and
ar ound t he decl ar ed saf e ar eas t o support UNPROFOR.
17
In an attempt to convey the delicate interrelationship of the
UNPROFOR and NATO missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina , Akashi
sent a letter in December 1994 to Dr. Radovan Karadzic , leader
of the Bosnian Serbs , explaining the role assigned by the UN
Security Council to NATO in support of UNPROFORs mandate.
He described the four missions of NATO in the airspace over
Bosnia and how/ why NATO would be employed, placing special
emphasis on the restraint of using NATO airpower and the im -
partiality of UNPROFOR and NATO:
DAVIS
45
Except for self-defense, NATO ai rcraft wi l l not conduct ai r-t o-ground
operat i ons wi t hout advance aut hori zat i on from t he Speci al Repre -
sentative of the Secretary-General. If the armed forces in conflict re -
spect t he t erms of t he Securi t y Counci l resol ut i ons and the NAC deci -
si ons, do not at t ack UNPROFOR, and do not t hreat en NATO aircraft,
they will have nothing to fear from NATO. In concl usi on, I wi sh t o
reiterate that NATO operat es over Bosni a onl y i n support of t he Uni t ed
Nat i ons mi ssi on. It s ai rcraft provi de essent i al support t o UNPROFOR
i n t he i mpart i al and effect i ve di scharge of i t s Securi t y Counci l ma n -
dat es, and ar e nei t her t he enemy nor t he al l y of any combat ant .
18
The issuance of UNSCR 836 made i t necessary t o al l ow t hen-
UNPROFOR forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina to request both NATO
ai rpower wi t hi n t hei r area of responsi bi l i t y and t he means t o
coordinate it. This led the UN to create the air operations control
center (AOCC) at Kiseljak i n Jul y 1993. The cent er request ed
and coordinated NATO air assets on behalf of the UNPROFOR
ground commander. As a UN organization, the AOCC h a d n o
controlling authority over NATO air assets. In addition to AOCC
staff, UNPROFOR member nat i ons pr ovi ded t act i cal ai r cont rol
parties (TACP) for t ermi nal gui dance of ai rcraft .
Br i t i sh, Canadi an, Dut ch, Fr ench, and Spani sh f or ces pr o -
vi ded more t han 20 TACPs i n Bosni a-Herzegovi na. Often lo -
cat ed i n t he areas of great est t ensi on, sol i t ary, and wi t hout
support , t hey were t asked by t he AOCC but r emai ned under
t he command of t hei r count rys parent bat t al i on. If depl oyed
by the local battalion to an area of fighting, the TACP, i n cl ose
consul t at i on wi t h t he gr ound- i nci dent commander , woul d
make a request for ai r support t o t he AOCC, whi ch i ni t i at ed
act i on t o request t hat ai rcraft be scrambl ed by NATO; it also
st ar t ed t he ai r - r equest assessment f or t he UN secret ary-gen -
eral . The request proceeded t hrough t he UNs C
2
chai n t o t he
Securi t y Counci l or, subsequent l y, t he speci al represent at i ve
for approval or refusal . If t he request was approved, t he AOCC
si mul t aneousl y coordi nat ed ai rcraft t hrough NATOs ai r bor ne
bat t l efi el d command and cont rol cent er ai rcraft and t he com -
bi ned ai r operat i ons cent er (CAOC) of NATOs 5th Allied Tacti-
cal Air Force (5 ATAF) at Vicenza , Italy. The AOCC t hen i ssued
necessary clearances to the battalion and TACP for attack. At
times, UN forces woul d request ai r support despi t e knowi ng t hat
clearance would not be forthcoming, simply because they real-
ized NATO aircraft would be overhead quickly. This esta blished
DELIBERATE FORCE
46
a presence t hat oft en suppressed
t he BSAs offensive activities with-
out the need for actually using di-
rect attacks from the air.
19
The separation of the UN/ NATO
C
2
st ruct ures requi red cl ose l i ai-
son bet ween t he operat i onal arms
of bot h el ement s, best achi eved
not only by having NATO and UN
liaison officers assi gned t o each
organi zat i ons command post s but
also by establishing a close rela -
tionship between the AOCC staff
and the staff at 5 ATAF s CAOC.
Thi s enabl ed t he di rect and fo -
cused passage of t act i cal i nfor-
mat i on wi t hout t he at t enuat i on
or amplification associated with additional layers of unneeded
bureaucracy. Such close cooperation was vital for the success -
ful attainment of political and military objectives.
The Military Committee (MC), t he supr eme mi l i t ar y aut hor -
ity in NATO, fal l s under t he pol i t i cal aut hori t y of t he NAC a nd
t he Defense Pl anni ng Commi t t ee. It provi des for maxi mum
consul t at i on and cooper at i on bet ween member nat i ons on
mi l i t ary mat t ers and serves as t he pri mary source of mi l i t ary
advi ce on al l i ance mat t ers t o t he secret ary-general , NAC , and
DPC. It s members i ncl ude t he chi efs of st aff of member na-
t i onsexcept France, whi ch mai nt ai ns cont act t hr ough i t s
mi l i t ary mi ssi on at NATO, and I cel and, whi ch has ci vi l i a n -
observer st at us onl y. The MC al so gi ves mi l i t ary gui dance t o
the major NATO commanders, t he NAC , and DPC as requi red
and act s as t he cri t i cal pi vot bet ween t he pol i t i cal and mi l i t ary
bodies of NATO.
The MC provided instructions to SACEUR, by direction of the
NAC and DPC, to delegate authority and operational control for
the development, coordination, and implementation of Operation
De l i be r a t e For c e t o Adm Le i ght on Smi t h, CINCSOUTH,
headquartered in Naples , Italy. Admiral Smith , in turn, dele -
gated control of air operations to the Air Forces Michael E.
Ryan, then a lieutenant general and commander of Allied Air
Gen Michael E. Ryan
DAVIS
47
Forces Southern Europe (COMAIRSOUTH), also headquarter ed in
Naples .
20
Italian air force lieutenant general Andrea Fornasiero,
commander of 5 ATAF at Dal Molin Air Base, Vicenza, It al y, had
responsibility for the day-to-day mission tasking and operational
control of all NATO air assets over the former Yugoslavia .
The original mission of 5 ATAF was t he coordi nat i on and
control of peacetime and combat air defense of NATOs Southern
Region for COMAIRSOUTH. Since it was not able to adequately
command and cont rol the added responsibility for Operation
Deny Flight, this fell to the CAOC, specifically established for
such a mission. Technically a multinational organization as -
signed to 5 ATAF under t he command of General Fornasi ero, in
reality the CAOC worked directly for COMAIRSOUTH.
An exchange of representatives between 5 ATAF and UNPF
headquart ers i n Zagreb and UNPROFOR Bosnia-Herzegovina
headquart ers i n Saraj evo provided coordination between NATO
and t he UN. These liaison officers ensur ed a cont i nuous ex -
chan ge of information between NATO and UNPF (fig. 2.3). The
headquart ers of General Janvier and Lt Gen Rupert Smi t h , as
well as the UN AOCC, housed the NATO liaison officers, while
CINCSOUTHs headquarters and the CAOC included the UNPF
liaison officers . These officers proved essential to the detailed
coordination of airpower requests, approval , mi ssi on pl anni ng,
force application, and bomb damage assessment. Although Admi-
ral Smith and Mr. Akashi (and, later, General Janvier ) approved
the use of airpower, the liaison officers, in close cooperation with
the in-place UN and NATO air staffs, got the aircraft to their
targets. The separate UN and NATO military organizations did
not represent the first tenet of warfareunity of commandbut
their coordination from the top down, i ncl udi ng t he liaison offi -
cers, did eventually facilitate a rudimentary unity of effort.
The CAOC was the focal point of all NATO ai r act i vi t y i n t he
former Yugoslavia . Located at Vicenza si nce t he spr i ng of
1993, when NATO ai r f or ces embar ked upon Oper at i on Deny
Flight, the CAOC was t o be a si x-mont h t emporary operat i on
and was not originated for Operation Deliberate Force.
21
Directed
by the US Air Forces Hal M. Hornburg, t hen a maj or general ,
the CAOC i ncl uded personnel drawn from al l t he count ri es par -
ticipating in Deny Flight, but most of them were Americans. The
CAOC followed a conventional air-staff structure, with a NATO
DELIBERATE FORCE
48
flavor for personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, pl ans,
and communications branches. Also based at Vicenza were sen -
ior national representatives from the United Kingdom, France ,
Ge r ma ny, the Net herl ands, Spain , and Turkeycount ri es t hat
had assigned aircraft to Deny Flight. The UN, US Navy, a nd
NATOs airborne early warning force also maintained liaison
cells at the CAOC. The center maintained close links with the
Italian Ministry of Defense.
Fig. 2.3. UN/NATO Command Relationships
DAVIS
49
The CAOC ensured safe decon -
fl i ct i on of ai rspace usage over t he
t heat er of oper at i ons. The dai l y
pr oduc t i on of a i r t a s ki ng me s -
sages (ATM), whi ch t r ansl at ed t he
i nt ent i on of NATO c omma nde r s
i nt o orders, achi eved t hese obj ec-
t i ves . ATMs , wh i c h i n c l u d e d
rout es, cal l si gns, weapons l oads,
and ot her i nf or mat i on, pr ovi ded
ai rcrews wi t h t he t aski ngs and co -
o r d i n a t i n g i n s t r u c t i o n s t h e y
needed t o car r y out t hei r dai l y
mi s s i ons . Al t hough member s of
the NAC had t o unani mous l y ap-
prove al l rul es of engagement, t he
CAOC s er ved as t he s ol e com-
mand el ement for i ssui ng t hese rul es t o ai rcraft fl yi ng i n t he
area of operat i on. A sat el l i t e-communi cat i ons net work, cen -
tered on Vicenza , allowed the CAOC operat i ons st aff t o mai n -
t ai n st ri ct cont rol over al l ai rcraft i n t he area of operat i on .
The ATM was a t i me- phased management of ai r r esour ces,
and i t s product i on cycl e account ed for al l t he fact ors neces -
sary t o conduct a hi gh-i nt ensi t y ai r campai gn. Al t hough t he
ATM provi ded i nformat i on on mi ssi on t ype, t i mes, and con -
f i gur at i on t o assi gned uni t s, t he uni t s t hemsel ves accom -
pl i shed speci fi c mi ssi on pl anni ng. The process (j ust pri or t o
Operation Deliberate Force) began with the NACs decisions,
whi ch were t ransmi t t ed t hrough SACEUR, al ong wi t h Admi ral
Smi t hs and Gener al Ryan s gui dance, t o t he CAOC (fig. 2.4). A
spr eadsheet dubbed t he Gucci , whi ch proj ect ed event s si x
weeks i nt o t he fut ure, consi dered al l t he vari ous t aski ngs.
Each seni or nat i onal represent at i ve recei ved t he Gucci every
Monday, and uni t represent at i ves recei ved i t at t hei r dai l y
meet i ng. The l at t er represent at i ves t hen scoured t he Gucci to
ensure t hat t hei r uni t s ai rcraft coul d meet t he t aski ng re-
qui rement s. Thi s process fost ered l ong-t erm pl anni ng, a nd by
t he t i me t he pl an came t o t he week-i n-progress, t hose requi re-
ments were well defined. The ATM t hen r ol l ed i nt o a 72- hour
cycl e before t he current operat i ons day.
Lt Gen Hal M. Hornburg
DELIBERATE FORCE
50
Each day, uni t r epr esent at i ves r ecei ved 72- hour , 48- hour ,
and 24-hour fl ows showi ng what t hei r ai rcraft needed t o do
over t he upcomi ng days. These fl owsgraphi c i l l ust rat i ons of
what t he Gucci i ndi cat eddescri bed ai rcraft , t ype, and coun-
t ry and mi ght di ffer from t he Gucci si nce ai rcraft broke, pi l ot s
got si ck, or uni t s were si mpl y unabl e t o perform a mi ssi on.
The l ast st age i n t he process i nvol ved present i ng t he fi nal i zed
ATM for t he next 24 hours t o t he CAOCs di rect or. If he
authorized the ATM, t he ful l 12- t o 16-page document was
publ i shed by earl y aft ernoon, and t he t aski ngs t ook effect at
0300 t he fol l owi ng morni ng.
When a cri si s devel oped, pl anners qui ckl y broke i nt o t hei r
ATM cycle and provided the required forces. If UNPF cal l ed at
0900 saying it was going to request NATO ai r st r i kes agai nst
some l ocat i on not current l y i n t he 24-hour fl ow, t he CAOC
i ncorporat ed t hat request i nt o t he ATM cycle. If the request for
ai rpower support occurred aft er publ i cat i on of t he ATM, t he
CAOCs cur r ent - oper at i ons cel l mani pul at ed t he schedul e t o
meet t he request , or, i f t hat di d not prove feasi bl e, t he cel l
publ i shed a change message. At t i mes, COMAIRSOUTH or t he
CAOC director rejected the ATM, and t he CAOC t eam st ar t ed
over again. The entire ATM cycl e was normal l y 18 hours from
st art t o fi ni sh but was known t o t ake l ess t i me.
22
Development of the ATM was not just a problem of air-traffic
schedul i ng. Pl anners matched aircraft weapons loads to likely
t hreat s and t arget s; they also considered the ground situation.
Fig. 2.4. Air Strategy to Execution
DAVIS
51
General Hornburg, all the cell chiefs, and the senior national
representatives received two intelligence briefs a day. Based on
this information, General Hornburg could heighten the readi-
ness posture of NATO air forces in the planning cycle, putting
extra aircraft on ground-alert lines or more aircraft in the air.
CAOC pl anners also provided contingency plans to respond to
new mi ssi ons or requi rement s, such as ai r supp ly to besieged
enclaves or air cover for any UN wi t hdrawal . Duri ng t he summer
of 1995, the CAOC developed a concept of operations to provide
air support for the new UN Rapid Reaction Force.
From the CAOC, the ATM and orders to execute air operations
went to the various tactical units of the combined NATO air
forces spread across the European continent (table 2. 1 and fig.
2.5). Aviano Air Base, Italy, home of the American 31st Fighter
Wi ng and other deployed NATO and US units, exemplified the
manner in which the ATM was transmitted. Th e CAOC sent t he
ATM by mul t i pl e, secure-communi cat i on syst ems t o t he Deny
Flight/Deliberate Force operations center at Aviano. The center
t hen passed i t al ong t o t he wi ng mi ssi on-pl anni ng cell for
weaponeeri ng and issuance of frag orders. The various flying
uni t s st at i oned at Avi ano used the ATMs guidance to plan the
mission from takeoff to recovery back at Aviano and then finally
carried through with the actual mission s .
As a resul t of t he i ncreasi ng number of uni t s t asked t o fl y
mi ssi ons over Bosni a-Herzegovi na, C
2
of t hese forces became
increasi ngl y di ffi cul t . On 1 Jul y 1995, Headquart ers Uni t ed
St at es Ai r Forces Europe (USAFE), est abl i shed t he 7490t h
Wing (Provisional)
23
at Avi ano t o exerci se operat i onal and ad -
mi ni st rat i ve cont rol of t he Deny Fl i ght f or ces assi gned t o t hat
base. These forces, consi st i ng of bot h home-st at i on and de-
pl oyed personnel , represent ed not onl y t he act i ve dut y US Ai r
Force but also elements of the Air Force Reserve , US Navy,
Mari ne Corps, and two NATO member nat i onsSpai n a nd t he
United Kingdom.
24
The commander and oper at i ons gr oup com -
mander of t he 31st Fi ght er Wi ng assumed t he same posi t i ons
i n t he new wi ng. One of t he most i mport ant aspect s of t hi s
or gani zat i onal r eadj ust ment was t hat t he i ncr eased per sonnel
i t brought t o Avi ano al l owed around-t he-cl ock manni ng of t he
provi si onal wi ngs operat i ons cent er. Thi s permi t t ed Avi ano
forces t o be more responsi ve t o l at e-breaki ng or changi ng
DELIBERATE FORCE
52
Table 2.1
NATO Aircraft for Deliberate Force
Nation Number Aircraft Type Location
France 8 Mirage F-1 Istrana
8 Jaguar Istrana
18 Mirage 2000 Cervia
6 Super Etendard Foch*
1 E-3 Avord
1 C-135 Istres
8 Puma Brindisi
Germany 14 Tornado Piacenza
Italy 8 Tornado Ghedi
6 AMX Istrana
1 KC-135 Pisa
1 C-130 Pisa
4 G-222 Pisa
NATO 4 E-3A Geilenkirchen
4 E-3A Trapani
4 E-3A Preveza
Netherlands 18 F-16 Villafranca
Spain 1 CASA C-212 Dal Molin
8 EF-18 Aviano
2 KC-130 Aviano
Turkey 16 F-16 Ghedi
United Kingdom 6 Tornado Gioia del Colle
17 Harrier Gioia del Colle
6 Sea Harrier HMS Invincible*
2 K-1 Tristar L-1011 Palermo
2 E-3D Aviano
United States 20 F-16 Aviano
12 O/A-10 Aviano
7 EC-130 Aviano
4 AC-130 Aviano
6 EF-111A Aviano
12 KC-135 Pisa
12 KC-135 Istres
10 EA-6B Aviano
24 FA-18 USS America*
5 KC-10 Genoa
8 E-3A Geilenkirchen,
Trapani, Preveza
*When the aircraft carrier is in the Adriatic Sea
DAVIS
53
ATMs duri ng sust ai ned operat i ons. Al ong wi t h t he Deny Fl i ght
operat i ons cent er, creat ed i n conj unct i on wi t h t he 7490t h a nd
fully operational only days before Deliberate Force, the mili -
t ar y pl anni ng st r uct ur e was now i n pl ace f r om t he hi ghest
political echelons of both the UN and NATO down t o each of
t he t act i cal mi l i t ary uni t s.
The Pl anni ng Process: The Shakedown
Up to the early part of 1995, NATO had accompl i shed smal l
tit-for-tat air operations. Anticipating a greatly expanded role
for NATO ai rpower, gi ven t he det eri orat i ng si t uat i on i n Bosni a-
Herzegovina, General Ryan decided to collocate his Sixteenth Air
Force staff with that of the CAOC. Most of hi s st rat egi c pl an -
ni ng staff assigned to Headquarters AIRSOUTH stayed in Naples
under the direction of Col Daniel Zoerb, whi l e t he oper at i onal
Fig. 2.5. Deliberate Force Operational Locations
DELIBERATE FORCE
54
and tactical experts of Sixteenth Air Force moved wi t h Gener al
Ryan to the CAOC. There, t he general real i zed t hat Operat i ons
Pl an 40101, which governed AIRSOUTH ai r operat i ons over
Bosni a , had not been updat ed t o cover a ful l -scal e operat i on
over Bosnia-Herzegovina .
25
Thus, i n Apri l 1995 he i ni t i at ed a
pl anni ng pr ocesswi t hout di r ect UN/NATO political guid -
ancet o devel op a pl an of act i on out l i ni ng some st rat egi c and
oper at i onal assumpt i ons, a f r amewor k, and a concept of op-
erat i ons . Duri ng t he earl y phases of i t s devel opment , he kept
t hi s new pl an on cl ose hol d but di d br i ef t he chai r man of Joi nt
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) on hi s concept ual pl an. The JCS s intelli -
gence di r ect or at e and t he Ai r St af f s Checkmat e di vi si on
(AF/ XOOC) eval uat ed t he pl an.
26
In late May 1995, COMAIRSOUTHs st r at egy cel l , headed by
Colonel Zoerb at Headquart ers AIRSOUTH in Naples , nomi-
nat ed t ar get l i st s covering broad categories of targets for two
zones of action i n Bosni a-Herzegovi na ( one nor t hwest and one
sout heast ) t o Gener al Ryan. At t he same t i me, General Ryan
r equest ed assi st ance f or ai r campai gn pl anni ng f r om t he dep-
ut y chi ef of st aff for pl ans and operat i ons at Headquart ers
USAF, who i n t ur n t asked Checkmat e t o pr ovi de any r e-
quest ed hel p. A Checkmat e pl anner sent to Vicenza in early
June provi ded i nval uabl e i nsi ght s for t he i ni t i al feasi bi l i t y as -
s e s s me nt a nd c a mpa i gn pha s i ng. Ge ne r a l Rya n, Gener al
Hor nbur g, and t he t act i cal - uni t r epr esent at i ves compl et ed t he
feasi bi l i t y assessment i n l at e May/ earl y June and i dent i fi ed
t he nomi nal f or ces t o be t asked i n t he yet - unnamed oper a -
t i onal pl an. General Ryan f or war ded t hi s pl an t o Admi r al
Smi t h for hi s recommendat i ons and coordi nat i on.
27
While Admiral Smith reviewed the plan, the CAOC under -
went a r enai ssance. Col John R. Baker f r om Headquar t er s
USAF, Di rect or of Operat i ons, l ed a US j oi nt -servi ce assess-
ment t eam t o t he CAOC on 2431 Jul y 1995. Speci fi cal l y,
COMAIRSOUTH want ed t he Baker team to identify improve -
ment s and capabi l i t i es needed for t he CAOC t o perform cur-
rent Deny Fl i ght/5 ATAF mi ssi ons and t o devel op a fused
intelligence -operat i ons organi zat i on abl e t o pl an and execut e a
r obust , sust ai ned ai r campai gn of t wo si mul t aneous ai r oper a -
t i ons i n support of t he safe areas . Colonel Baker investigated
manni ng, st abi l i t y, and equi pment t o det er mi ne what asset s
DAVIS
55
t he CAOC needed t o i mpr ove t he shor t - t er m and l ong- t er m
pl anni ng pr ocess.
28
The t eam st r ongl y r ecommended t hat ad -
di t i onal manpower and equi pment i mmedi at el y be sent t o t he
CAOC, and t he J CS and NATO t ook t hese r ecommendat i ons
seri ousl y. Consequent l y, begi nni ng i n mi d-August , addi t i onal
har dwar e/ sof t war e capabi l i t i es such as t he Ai r Campai gn
Planning Tool (now known as t he JFACC [Joi nt Force Ai r
Component Commander ] Pl anni ng Tool ), t he Joi nt Si t uat i onal
Awareness Syst em, and t he Cont i ngency Theat er Ai r Pl anni ng
System, a l ong wi t h i nc r e a s e d ma npowe r ( pl a nne r s f r om
USAFEs 32d Ai r Oper at i ons Gr oup) arri ved dai l y t o augment
t he operat i on. On t he negat i ve si de, Col onel Bakers r epor t
stepped on the toes of a few of our NATO par t ner s. That i s,
most of the NATO cont i ngent t hought t hat t he r epor t and
subsequent l arge-scal e i nfusi on of US mi l i t ary personnel and
equi pment furt her i sol at ed t hem from t he operat i on. Thi s rei n -
forced t hei r underl yi ng feel i ng t hat t hi s operat i on was goi ng t o
be an Amer i can show.
29
On 10 August 1995, Admi ral Smi t h and Gener al Janvi er
si gned a memor andum of under st andi ng t hat cont ai ned t he
joint UN/ NATO ar r angement s f or i mpl ement i ng t he act i ons
specified in the NAC and UN Securi t y Counci l deci si ons. These
ar r angement s ai med t o det er at t acks or t hr eat s of at t ack
agai nst t he saf e ar eas and, shoul d det er r ence f ai l , t o pr epar e
t o conduct oper at i ons t o el i mi nat e t he t hr eat or def eat any
force engaged i n an at t ack on a safe area . The memor andum
descri bed t he aut hori t y each man possessed (euphemi st i cal l y
cal l ed dual -key aut hori t y) t o l aunch broad ret al i at ory coun-
t er at t acks i n Bosni a . In an earlier letter to NATO secret ary-
general Cl aes, UN secret ary-general Bout ros-Ghal i agr eed t hat
t hi s was a prudent deci si on: I have deci ded t o del egat e t he
necessary aut hori t y i n t hi s respect t o t he UN military com-
manders i n t he fi el d. I have accordi ngl y del egat ed aut hori t y i n
respect of ai r st ri kes, whi ch I had hi t hert o ret ai ned, t o General
Janvi er , t he Commander of Uni t ed Nat i ons Peace Forces, wi t h
i mmedi at e effect . As regards cl ose ai r support , my Speci al
Represent at i ve, Mr. Akashi, has t oday del egat ed t he necessar y
aut hor i t y t o Gener al Janvi er , who i s aut hori zed t o del egat e i t
furt her t o t he UNPROFOR For ce Commander when oper a -
t i onal ci rcumst ances so requi re.
30
Bot h men (Admi ral Smi t h
DELIBERATE FORCE
56
and Gener al Janvi er or Lt Gen Rupert Smi t h ) had to agree to
t urn t hei r keys to approve air strikes before the first bomb
could fall.
31
Consi st ent wi t h t he memor andum of under st andi ng, Admi-
ral Smi t h t ook General Ryan s pl an t o t he NATO/ UNPF J oi nt
Targeting Board on 14 August 1995 for coordi nat i on and i ni -
t i at i on of t he process for Uni t ed Nat i ons approval .
32
He ob -
t ai ned agreement , i n pri nci pl e, from t he force commander of
UNPF f or bot h t he oper at i on and associ at ed t ar get s. The pl an
moved t hrough UN pol i t i cal and mi l i t ary st ruct ures at t he
same t i me i t moved t hrough t he NATO approval process. Ad -
mi r al Smi t h present ed t he pl an t o Secret ary-General Cl aes
and Gener al Joul wan, who i n t urn t ook i t t o t he NATO Military
Commi t t ee. Bot h t he UN and NATO pol i t i cal st ruct ures ap -
proved t he pl an, accept i ng a broad set of t hree t arget cat ego -
ries or options. They delegated final approval for target-list
sel ect i ons t o General Ryan, overseen by the Military Commit -
tee , Gener al Joul wan, and Admi ral Smi t h .
Wi t h t hi s t ent at i ve approval , General Ryan agai n t asked hi s
st rat egy cel l t o per f or m t ar get sel ect i on and pri ori t i zat i on,
keepi ng i n mi nd and harmoni zi ng t he pol i t i cal obj ect i ves out-
lined by UNSCRs and NAC deci si onsa st rat egy-t o-t ask pro-
cess. General Hornburg ensured t hat t he CAOC pl anner s al so
cl osel y fol l owed t hi s const ruct and moni t ored t he process so
t hat each mi ssi on mat ched and was l i nked di r ect l y t o t he
st rat egy and obj ect i ves.
33
General Ryan want ed t ar get s t h a t
woul d i nfl uence t he behavi or of t he Bosni an Serbst hei r cen -
ters of gravity.
34
These various requirements led General Ryan to develop a
unique blend of strategy and operational concepts for the forth -
coming campaign. In this situation he considered himself the air
campai gn pl anner.
35
As far as he was concerned, he coul d not
and would not delegate target -selection responsibility to anyone
else because of the political implications: If we had committed
one atrocity from the air, NATO would forever be blamed for
crimes, and the military threat would be lessened. Henceforth,
the air commander will bemust bea pplying t he overarchi ng
air strategy at the tactical level. You cannot delegate the selec -
t i on. The commander must ask al l of t he det ai l ed quest i ons.
There will be no time in the future when he will have the option
DAVIS
57
to say, I delegated that responsibility. The commander must
be accountable for all actions taken by his forces.
36
General
Ryans personal perspective for the campaign on how best to
meet the objectives set forth by the political leadership was to
t ake away what t he Bosni ans Serbs hel d dear and dri ve t hem t o
pari t y wi t h t he Bosni an Croat s and Musl i ms. He also believed it
vital that the Bosnian Serbs under st and and know what was
happening to their forces and how t he bal ance of power was
ebbi ng away from t hem. If t hey want ed t hi s surgi cal reduct i on
from t he ai r hal t ed, t hey had t o compl y wi t h t he obj ect i ves
out l i ned t o t hem by t he UN.
General Ryan furt her i nst ruct ed hi s AIRSOUTH strategy cell
and t he CAOC oper at i onal pl anner s t o l i mi t col l at eral damage
as much as possi bl e (no ci vi l i an casual t i es or undue mi l i t ary
casual t i es) and t o ensure t he prot ect i on of NATO forces t o t he
hi ghest degree. He st rongl y bel i eved, as di d Admi ral Smi t h
and General Janvi er , that any NATO air operation of this size
must ensur e t hat at t acks i n Bosni a- Her zegovi na st ruck onl y
mi l i t ary t arget s and i nfl i ct ed onl y t he absol ut e mi ni mum of
military casualties. The UN and NATO were not t ryi ng t o de-
st r oy t he BSA but st rongl y move i t t oward t he UN/ NATO ob -
j ect i ves. Ci vi l i an casual t i es woul d have precl uded t hi s end
state. The use of NATO mi l i t ary power i n support of t he UN
mandat es was a cri t i cal i ssue i n al l of t he part i ci pat i ng NATO
count r i es. Gener al Ryan cor r ect l y under st ood t he pol i t i cal
ramifications in those countries if NATO casual t i es sust ai ned
duri ng t he operat i on became excessi ve. Thus, hi s second re-
st r i ct i onensur i ng f or ce pr ot ect i onper meat ed t he ent i r e
pl anni ng pr ocess.
The strategy cell bri efed General Ryan on suggest ed t arget
categories: i nt egrat ed ai r defense syst ems; command, cont rol ,
and communi cat i ons; l i nes of communi cat i on ; a nd a mmuni-
tion storage sites. After General Ryan appr oved t hi s t ar get i ng
pl an, Gener al Hor nbur gt oget her wi t h t he uni t and seni or
NATO r e pr e s e nt a t i ve s be ga n t he t a r ge t- s e que nc i ng a nd
force-packagi ng process. On 22 August 1995, at t he end of a
gr uel i ng f our - t o- f i ve- mont h pl anni ng pr oc e s s , t he t a c t i c a l
units received the first ATM of what woul d event ual l y become
Operat i on Del i berat e Force. No one coul d have guessed t hat i t
DELIBERATE FORCE
58
woul d be i mpl ement ed al most wi t hout maj or change onl y one
week l at er .
On t he morni ng of 30 August 1995, NATO secret ary-general
Willy Claes s t at ed t hat
NATO ai r cr af t commenced at t acks on Bosni an Ser b mi l i t ary t arget s in
Bosnia . The ai r operat i ons were i ni t i at ed aft er t he UN military com -
mander s concl uded, beyond r easonabl e doubt , t hat Monday s br ut al
mort ar at t ack i n Saraj evo came f r om Bosni an Ser b posi t i ons. The
operat i ons were j oi nt l y deci ded by t he Commander i n Chi ef, Al l i ed
For ces Sout her n Eur ope and t he Force Commander, UN Peace Forces
under UN Securi t y Counci l Resol ut i on 836 and i n accor dance wi t h t he
North Atlantic Council s deci si ons of 25 Jul y and 1 August , whi ch
were endorsed by t he UN Secret ary-General . Our obj ect i ve i s t o reduce
t he t hreat t o t he Saraj evo saf e ar ea and t o det er f ur t her at t acks t her e
or on any ot her safe area . We hope t hat t hi s operat i on wi l l al so dem -
onst r at e t o t he Bosni an Ser bs t he fut i l i t y of furt her mi l i t ary act i ons
and convi nce al l part i es of t he det ermi nat i on of t he Al l i ance t o i mpl e -
ment its decisions. NATO remai ns st rongl y commi t t ed t o t he cont i n -
ued effort s of t he i nt ernat i onal communi t y t o bri ng peace t o t he former
Yugoslavia t hrough t he di pl omat i c process. It i s my fervent hope t hat
our deci si ve response t o Mondays mort ar at t ack wi l l cont ri but e t o
at t ai ni ng a peaceful set t l ement .
37
Concl usi ons
The unusual , paral l el NATO and UN C
2
st ruct ures were fer -
t i l e ground for probl ems, especi al l y i n t he pl anni ng and coor -
dination functions. Differing NATO a nd UN C
2
syst ems wi t h
Band-Ai d connect i ons woul d not have l ast ed forever; nei t her
were t hey necessari l y t i me sensi t i ve t o t he needs of al l con -
cernedespeci al l y t he on-scene t act i cal forces. However, a
great deal of det ermi nat i on by t he men and women of bot h
organizations and the ceaseless efforts of key people in senior
positions of authority as well as those in the UN and NATO
t act i cal uni t s made t he process work. Nonet hel ess, despi t e t he
obvious success of Deliberate Force, the operational effective -
ness of t he pl anni ng process was lower than it could have been .
Some peopl e have cal l ed i nt o quest i on t he concept of t he
dual -key command-aut hori zat i on syst em uneasi l y devel oped
bet ween t he UN and NATO. Undoubt edl y, t hi s process vi ol at ed
t he pri nci pl e of uni t y of command, especi al l y i n cases of t act i -
cal-level close air support oper at i ons t hat demand a sui t abl e
DAVIS
59
st r uct ur e t o r el ay near - r eal - t i me i nf or mat i on and command
deci si ons. Ambassador Ri chard Hol brooke fl at l y st at ed t hat
t he dual key syst em was an unmi t i gat ed di sast er . I t di d gr eat
damage t o bot h t he UN and NATO.
38
Because of the differ -
ences bet ween t he t wo or gani zat i ons and t hei r mandat es, he
believed that NATO and t he UN never shoul d have been r e-
l at ed i n t hi s fashi on. Ul t i mat el y, t hough, a modi fi ed versi on of
t hi s process coul d haveperhaps shoul d havebeen devi sed.
The aut hori zed ai r st ri kes of Del i berat e Force t o rel i eve t he
st rangul at i on of Saraj evo and ot her t hr eat ened saf e ar eas con -
stituted a series of decisive military actions by NATO i n sup -
port of t he UN mission in the former Yugoslavia . Together with
a det ermi ned di pl omat i c effort , t he sur gi cal appl i cat i on of
NATOs ai rpower st opped t he Bosni an Serb armys siege of
Saraj evo and st rongl y encouraged t he negot i at ed sol ut i on t o
t he confl i ct i n t he fal l of 1995.
The UN and NATO had developed a cooperation, at times
tenuous, that when forcibly applied during Deliberate Force,
highlighted the ability of separate political and military organiza -
tions to work together. In hindsight, critics can declare that the
arrangement s coul d have been much bet t er, and t o some ext ent
that viewpoint has validity. However, the bottom line is that
cooperation in military planning between the UN and NATO
worked and successfully fulfilled political and military objectives.
Thi s experi ence shows t hat NATO can adapt i t s mi l i t ar y
forces and pol i ci es t o t he European requi rement s of t he post -
col d-war worl d and cont i nue t o provi de col l ect i ve securi t y and
defense for all allies. It offers tangible proof that, in addition to
car r yi ng out t he cor e f unct i ons of def endi ng t he al l i ance,
NATO can use i t s mi l i t ary forces out si de t hei r normal area of
responsibility (e. g. , i n operat i ons under t he aut hori t y of t he
UN Security Council and with political objectives t hat def i ne
the required military tasks). NATOs mi l i t ary capabi l i t i es and
its adaptability to include forces of non-NATO count r i es ar e
deci si ve fact ors i n t he al l i ances rol e i n i mpl ement i ng t he Day-
t on Peace Agreement. Del i ber at e For ce mar ked t he successf ul
end t o a l ess-t han-successful peacekeepi ng oper at i on and al-
lowed UNPROFOR to withdraw in favor of a force unified in
bot h mi s s i on and command.
DELIBERATE FORCE
60
Not es
1. Admi ral Smi t h fi rst at t empt ed t o cont act Lt Gen Bernard Janvi er,
force commander of Uni t ed Nat i ons Peace Forces and General Smi t hs com -
mandi ng offi cer. General Janvi er was on l eave i n France at t he t i me.
2. Chart er of the United Nations; on-line, Internet, 18 December 1998, avail -
abl e from ht t p: / / www. t ami l nat i on. org/ humanri ght s/ unchart er/ cont ent s. ht ml .
3. UN Securi t y Counci l Resol ut i on 781, 9 Oct ober 1992, adopt ed by t he
Secur i t y Counci l at i t s 3122d meet i ng on 9 Oct ober 1992.
4. UN Securi t y Counci l Resol ut i on 816, 3 March 1993, adopt ed by t he
Secur i t y Counci l at i t s 3191st meet i ng on 3 Mar ch 1993.
5. The NAC, consi st i ng of permanent represent at i ves of t he 16 member
count ri es and chai red by t he NATO secret ary-general (t he counci l s pri nci -
pal spokesperson), meet s t wi ce a year at t he mi ni st eri al l evel and weekl y at
t he ambassador l evel . It has effect i ve pol i t i cal aut hori t y and powers of
decision over the daily operations of NATO and is the only body within
NATO to derive its authority explicitly from the North Atlantic Treaty. The
counci l provi des a uni que forum for wi de-rangi ng consul t at i on bet ween
member government s on al l i ssues affect i ng t hei r securi t y and i s t he most
i mport ant deci si on-maki ng body i n t he al l i ance. Al l ot her commi t t ees i n
NATO derive their authority from NAC. Decisions reflect the collective will of
member gover nment s ar r i ved at by common consent and must be unani-
mous .
6. UN Securi t y Counci l Resol ut i on 836, 4 June 1993, adopt ed by t he
Secur i t y Counci l at i t s 3228t h meet i ng on 4 June 1993.
7. Bout ros Bout ros-Ghal i , UN secret ary-general , t o t he presi dent of t he
UN Securi t y Counci l , l et t er, subj ect : Ai r St ri kes agai nst t he BSA, 6 February
1994, United States Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), Maxwell
AFB, Ala.
8. Lt Col Lowel l R. Boyd Jr. , AIRSOUTH Pl ans, Headquart ers AIR-
SOUTH, Naples, Italy, interviewed by Lt Col Rob Owen, 6 December 1995,
AFHRA.
9. Composed of represent at i ves from al l NATO member st at es except
France, t he DPC focuses on col l ect i ve defense pl anni ng and provi des gui d -
ance to NATOs military authorities. Within the area of its responsibilities
and compet ence, i t has t he same f unct i ons, at t r i but es, and aut hor i t y as t he
NAC. Although France withdrew from the NATO integrated military struc-
t ure i n 1966, i t st i l l i nt eract s wi t h t he DPC and ot her NATO mi l i t ary organi-
zat i ons t hrough i t s mi l i t ary mi ssi on t o t he al l i ance.
10. NATO Basi c Fact Sheet no. 4, March 1997; on-l i ne, Int ernet , 18
December 1998, avai l abl e f r om ht t p: / / www. nat o. i nt / docu/ f act s/ f s4. ht m.
11. Headquart ers NATO, press rel ease, Deci si on on t he Prot ect i on of t he
Safe Areas Taken at t he Meet i ng of t he NAC on 22 Apri l 1994.
12. General Ryan, commander of Al l i ed Ai r Forces Sout hern Europe,
believed that the UN Security Council would be unwilling to approve offen -
si ve mi l i t ary operat i ons because of t he expect ed opposi t i on of Russi a. He
further believed that the London Conference of NATO Defense Ministers
DAVIS
61
(basi cal l y from t he same count ri es on t he Securi t y Counci l , mi nus Russi a)
i n Jul y 1995 was a pol i t i cal expedi ent t o al l ow mi l i t ary operat i ons under t he
guise of NATO. Gen Michael Ryan, interviewed by authors of the Air Univer -
si t y Bal kans Ai r Campai gn St udy at Ai r Command and St aff Col l ege, Max-
well AFB, Ala., 7 February 1996, AFHRA.
13. The UN mi l i t ary command st ruct ure was reorgani zed i n t he spri ng of
1995. The pr evi ous command st r uct ur e r emai ned i n pl ace but now had new
names and a modi fi ed mandat e. UN Prot ect i on Force, t he overal l command
organi zat i on i n t he former Yugosl avi a, was redesi gnat ed UN Peace Forces.
Subordi nat e command mai nt ai ned t he desi gnat i on of UNPROFOR i n Bos -
ni a-Herzegovi na.
14. NATO Basi c Fact Sheet no. 4.
15. The fol l owi ng count ri es current l y provi de mi l i t ary and/ or ci vi l i an
police personnel for UNPROFOR: Argentina, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil,
Canada, Col ombi a, Czech Republ i c, Denmar k, Egypt , Fi nl and, Fr ance,
Ghana, Indonesi a, Irel and, Jordan, Kenya, Mal aysi a, Nepal , Net herl ands,
New Zeal and, Ni geri a, Norway, Paki st an, Pol and, Port ugal , Russi an Federa-
t i on, Sl ovak Republ i c, Spai n, Sweden, Swi t zerl and, Tuni si a, Ukrai ne, Uni t ed
Ki ngdom, Uni t ed St at es, and Venezuel a. Duri ng i t s exi st ence, UNPRO-
FOR/ UNPF has i ncur r ed si xt een hundr ed casual t i es, i ncl udi ng 198 f at al i -
t i es.
16. UN Peace Forces Fact Sheet, UN Peace Forces Division of Informa-
t i on, Sept ember 1995.
17. UN Securi t y Counci l Resol ut i on 824, 6 May 1993, adopt ed by t he
Securi t y Counci l at i t s 3208t h meet i ng on 6 May 1993; and UN Securi t y
Counci l Resol ut i on 836.
18. Yasushi Akashi , speci al represent at i ve of t he UN secret ary-general
for the former Yugoslavia, to Dr. Radovan Karadzic, letter, subject: NATO
Airpower in Bosnia, 10 December 1994, AFHRA.
19. Boyd interview.
20. General Ryan has dual responsi bi l i t y as commander of Si xt eent h Ai r
Force, headquart ered at Avi ano Ai r Base, It al y (Si xt eent h Ai r Force i s a
s ubor di nat e command t o Uni t ed St at es Ai r For ces Eur ope [ USAFE] ,
headquart ered at Ramst ei n Ai r Base, Germany), and as COMAIRSOUTH. As
such, he si mul t aneousl y wears t he hat s of a NATO and US Ai r Force com -
mander .
21. Maj Gen Hal M. Hornburg, i nt ervi ewed by Dr. Wayne Thompson and
Maj Tim Reagan, 16 October 1995, AFHRA.
22. Col St eve Teske, di rect or for pl ans, CAOC, Headquart ers USAFE,
i nt ervi ewed by aut hor, 14 February 1996, AFHRA.
23. Headquart ers USAFE Speci al Order GD-19, Act i vat i on of t he 7490t h
Wing (Provisional) at Aviano Air Base, Italy, 30 June 1995, AFHRA.
24. Br i ef i ng, 7490t h Wi ng ( Pr ovi si onal ) , subj ect : Deny Fl i ght Sup-
portAircraft Status Snapshot Slide, 24 August 1995, AFHRA.
25. Bri efi ng, Maj or General Hornburg t o Joi nt Doct ri ne Ai r Campai gn
Course, cl ass 96D, Maxwel l AFB, Al a. , subj ect : Del i berat e Force, 14 March
DELIBERATE FORCE
62
1996, AFHRA. Pl anni ng had act ual l y begun i n February 1995 for Deadeye,
t he suppressi on of enemy ai r defenses port i on of what was t o become
Operat i on Del i berat e Force.
26. Lt Gen Mi chael Ryan, i nt ervi ewed by Dr. Wayne Thompson and Maj
Tim Reagan, 18 October 1995, AFHRA.
27. Ibid.
28. Bri efi ng sl i des (uncl assi fi ed), Col John R. Baker t o General Ryan,
subj ect : CAOC Assessment , 30 Jul y 1995, AFHRA.
29. Ibid.
30. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, UN secretary-general, to Willy Claes, NATO
secret ary-general , l et t er, subj ect : Del egat i on of Aut hori t y, 25 Jul y 1995,
AFHRA.
31. Under i nt ense pressure from NATO and US offi ci al s, who bel i eved
t hat mi l i t ar y commander s shoul d det er mi ne when Ser b t r ansgr essi ons war -
rant ed repri sal s, UN secret ary-general Bout ros Bout ros-Ghal i t ook t he key
from Mr. Akashi and gave i t t o General Janvi er on 25 Jul y 1995. But NATO
hoped t o push i t even f ur t her down t he UN chai n of command t o Gener al
Smi t h, known t o be more i ncl i ned t o mart i al act i on t han t he caut i ous
Janvi er. The secret ary-general decl i ned and, support ed by France, kept t he
key wi t h Janvi er. Ironi cal l y, General Janvi er was on vacat i on when Admi ral
Smi t h cal l ed on 28 August , and General Smi t h act ual l y had t he key. Aft er
consul t at i on wi t h Janvi er , Gener al Smi t h and Admi r al Smi t h made t he
i ni t i al deci si on t o l aunch t he at t acks. General Janvi er ret urned before t he
at t acks commenced, recl ai med t he key from General Smi t h, and reaffi rmed
t he deci si on t o at t ack t he Bosni an Ser bs.
32. The NATO/ UNPF Joi nt Target i ng Board was a hi gh-l evel coordi nat -
i ng body est abl i shed by t he UN and NATO t o j oi nt l y val i dat e t arget s and l i nk
t hem t o mandat ed UN/ NATO mi ssi on obj ect i ves. The board i ncl uded CINC-
SOUTH and t he force commander of UNPF.
33. Hor nbur g briefing.
34. Ryan i nt ervi ew, 18 Oct ober 1995.
35. Ryan i nt ervi ew, 7 February 1996. General Ryan was convi nced t hat
t he Serbs knew when NATO was fl yi ng and even who was fl yi ngri ght down
t o knowi ng t hat Capt Scot t OGrady was t he pi l ot of Basher 52, t he F-16
shot down i n t he summer of 1995.
36. Ibid.
37. Press statement (95)73 by NATO secretary-general Willy Claes, 30
August 1995.
38. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, New York City, interviewed by Maj
Mark McLaughlin and Dr. Karl Mueller, 24 May 1996, AFHRA.
DAVIS
63
Chapt er 3
US and NATO Doctrine
for Campai gn Pl anni ng
Col Maris McCrabb
Operat i on Deny Fl i ght/ Del i ber at e For ce pr ovi ded a uni que
chal l enge for campai gn pl anners , especi al l y t hose reared i n
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) envi r onment .
Si nce t he foundi ng of t he al l i ance, i t had focused on l arge-
scal e, convent i onal war. But Deny Fl i ght possessed char ac-
t eri st i cs best descri bed as operat i ons ot her t han war (OOTW),
such as the pivotal role of the United Nations (UN) a nd t he
lack of clear-cut, militarily achievable objectives. Fur t her mor e,
t hi s act i on i n t he former Yugosl avi a const i t ut ed an out -of-area
operation for NATO, somet hi ng pr ohi bi t ed under t he Washi ng-
t on Treat y of 1949. Because of these differences, NATO air
doct ri ne offered pl anners l i mi t ed gui dance on pl anni ng a nd
execut i ng an ai r operat i on i n Bosni a .
Li kewi se, al t hough US j oi nt doct ri ne offers considerably
more gui dance on OOTW, t hat gui dance general l y focuses on
US-onl y operat i ons, and i t rel egat es mul t i l at eral and coal i t i on
consi derat i ons t o separat e sect i ons i n t he appl i cabl e publ i ca -
t i ons.
1
Thus, NATO possesses ai r-pl anni ng doct ri ne t hat fo -
cuses on coal i t i on consi derat i ons but remai ns l argel y si l ent on
OOTW, while US joint doctrine feat ures great er emphasi s on
t he uni que aspect s of OOTW but does not ful l y consi der coal i -
t i on consi derat i ons. An addi t i onal i ssue t hat bedevi l s bot h
sets of doctrine is the role of airpower in either OOTW or
convent i onal war.
Si nce t he fi rst use of ai rpower
2
i n a mi l i t ary campai gn, com-
manders have st ruggl ed wi t h t he quest i on of how best t o em-
pl oy t hi s capabi l i t y. Was ai rpower j ust anot her means of fi re
support pl anned i nt o l and operat i ons, much l i ke art i l l ery, t o
st ri ke at an enemy armys most i mport ant operat i onal cen -
t er s, t hose t arget s most affect i ng i t s abi l i t y t o resi st t he ad -
vance of fri endl y surface forces? Or was ai rpower somehow
65
uni que i n t hat i t coul d operat e wel l beyond t he range of sur-
face bat t l es and st ri ke an enemy nat i ons vi t al or strategic
cent er s, those that most affected its ability and will to con -
t i nue fi ght i ng? Al t hough t he l at t er provi ded a st rat egi c opt i on
previ ousl y deni ed t o operat i onal commanders, i t al so i nt ro -
duced a uni que t ensi on i n ai rpower st rat egy: t he choi ce of
st ri ki ng ei t her of t wo di st i nct t arget set s , each wi t h di st i nct l y
di fferent rel at i onshi ps t o surface-combat operat i ons and wi t h
di fferent physi cal and t emporal effect s on t he wi l l and abi l i t y
of an enemy nat i on t o cont i nue resi st i ng t he pol i t i cal wi l l of i t s
opponent . Choosi ng t he best or most r emuner at i ve t ar get s for
ai r at t ack became a cri t i cal deci si on for ai r pl anners, one
requiring new categories of military intelligence t o l ocat e t hem
and assess t hei r absol ut e and r el at i ve i mpor t ance t o an en -
emys will and ability to continue fighting.
Gi ven al l t hese rel at i onshi ps and t ensi ons associ at ed wi t h
ai r power campai gn pl anni ng,
3
t he essence of ai r st rat egy i s
capt ured i n an aphori sm: ai rpower i s t arget i ng, t arget i ng i s
intelligence , and intelligence is analyzing the effects of air
operat i ons on chosen st rat egi c and operat i onal cent ers .
4
This
formul a, however, omi t s t wo i mport ant quest i ons: (1) What
const i t ut es a vi t al cent er ? (2) Si nce scarce resources prevent
one f r om at t acki ng al l cent er s at once, what ar e t he pr i or i -
t i es?
5
A rel at ed quest i on deal s wi t h who makes t he choi ces,
but ai rpower t heori st s al most dogmat i cal l y i nsi st t hat ai rmen
not onl y choose t he rel evant t arget s, usi ng t he overal l com-
mander s i nt ent as t hei r gui de, but al so command al l ai r power
resources avai l abl e t o t he operat i on.
6
Thi s essay exami nes US j oi nt and NATO doctrine for pl an-
ni ng and conduct i ng ai r oper at i ons wi t h an emphas i s on
OOTW consi derat i ons, as wel l as st rat egy devel opment from
t he nat i onal or al l i ance l evel down t o t he operat i onal l evel .
Further, it explores, in some detail, the process of air-operation s
pl anni ng and addr esses gui dance of f er ed when t hi s pr ocess
i nvol ves ot her pl ayers, such as t he UN. It does al l t hi s wi t h t he
ai m of det ermi ni ng whet her an adequat e body of wri t t en doc -
t ri ne was avai l abl e t o t he pl anners of Del i berat e Force t o gui de
their efforts to set objectives, develop strategies, and assign
t asks appropri at e t o t he obj ect i ves of hi gher pol i t i cal and mi l i -
t ary l eaders.
DELIBERATE FORCE
66
US Doctri ne
US doct ri ne out l i nes a very speci fi c process for maki ng
st rat egy t hat t i es nat i onal pol i t i cal st rat egy down t o every t ar -
get st ruck i n a campai gn. Nat i onal securi t y st rat egy
7
l ays out
broad pol i t i cal gui dance, whi l e nat i onal mi l i t ary st rat egy
8
pro-
vi des general gui dance for t he mi l i t ary i nst rument of power.
The Joi nt St rat egi c Capabi l i t i es Pl an provides classified guid-
ance t o t he commanders i n chi ef of j oi nt uni fi ed commands for
devel opi ng pl ans t o meet pot ent i al t hr eat s.
9
For bot h cont i n -
genci es and cr i ses, t he commander s i n chi ef devel op t heat er
campai gn pl ans l argel y composed of operat i ons pl ans (OPLAN)
from t he vari ous component sl and, sea, ai r, and speci al op-
erat i ons. The j oi nt ai r operat i ons pl an (JAOP) provi des t he
foundat i on t o bui l d t he dai l y ai r t aski ng order (ATO). As t hi s
fl ow i mpl i es, t he ent i re process i deal l y progresses from t he t op
down t hrough l evel s of i ncreasi ng but l ogi cal l y connect ed l ev-
els of refinement and specificity. The ATO, therefore, is not a
st and-al one document . Rat her, i t i s a smal l sl i ce (normal l y
del i mi t ed by t i meusual l y 24 hours) of a chai n of gui dance
and pl anni ng document s t hat ext ends f r om t he l evel of na-
t i onal st rat egy ri ght down t o t he l evel of t act i cal operat i ons.
Therefore, an ATO-only focus is too narrow a view for any
useful expl i cat i on of t he body of t heori es and doct ri nes avai l -
abl e t o gui de t he pl anner s of Deliberate Force. Likewise, a
focus only on an air campaign is too narrow a view for
anal yzi ng a t heat er campai gn .
Toget her, t hese document s provi de i mport ant gui dance t o
campai gn pl anner s . Fi rst , al t hough t he US armed forces must
prepare for a wi de vari et y of cont i ngenci es, t he most i mport ant
are t he t wo post ul at ed maj or regi onal cont i ngenci es . Second,
t he Uni t ed St at es will use force decisively and with clear objec -
t i ves. Thi rd, t he Uni t ed St at es might fight unilaterally, but for
t he most part i t wi l l fi ght as part of a coal i t i on. Fourt h, t he
United States must ret ai n t he capabi l i t y t o proj ect power over -
seas. Fi nal l y, US forces must t rai n and prepare t o fi ght i n bot h
combi ned and j oi nt envi ronment s, wi t h cl ear vi si on regardi ng
t he use of l and, mari t i me, ai r, space, and speci al forces.
10
Thi s formal US st rat egy process al so produces so-cal l ed
st r at egi c- concept document s at t he nat i onal and t heat er l evel ,
MCCRABB
67
and concept of operat i ons (CONOPS) document s at t he compo-
nent level.
11
Working in concert with other components, theater -
l evel ai r component commander s develop CONOPS as basi c
expressi ons of t hei r ai r st rat egi est he foundat i ons of t hei r
JAOPs. The l at t er, i n t urn, provi de dai l y gui dancerefi ned as
condi t i ons war r ant f or mast er ai r at t ack pl ans t hat gui de
development of the ATO i n t he fi nal st ep of st rat egi c and
operat i onal pl anni ng.
The pri mary dut i es and responsi bi l i t i es of j oi nt force com-
mander s ( JFC) ent ai l exerci si ng command and cont rol over
assi gned forces i n t he accompl i shment of mi ssi ons assi gned t o
t hem by hi gher command aut hor i t i es. Fundament al l y, JFCs
must under st and t hei r mi ssi ons and assi gned obj ect i ves, as
wel l as t he i nt ent and end st at e or out come envi si oned by
t hei r commander . Joi nt Publ i cat i on ( Pub) 3- 0, Doctrine for
Joint Operations, l i st s ei ght ways i n whi ch commanders exer -
ci se t hei r command responsi bi l i t i es: (1) assi gni ng mi ssi ons, (2)
desi gnat i ng pri ori t i es of effort , (3) desi gnat i ng and al l ocat i ng
pri ori t i es for resources, (4) assessi ng ri sks, (5) deci di ng when
adj ust ment s need t o be made, (6) commi t t i ng reserves, (7)
under st andi ng t he needs of seni or and subor di nat e command-
ers, and (8) gui di ng and mot i vat i ng t he organi zat i on t oward
t he desi red end.
12
These command prerogat i ves are i nherent i n
J FC campai gn pl ans t hat provi de t he bases for subordi nat e
component pl ans.
At t hei r hear t , t hese component pl ans epi t omi ze t he opera -
t i onal art , defi ned by US j oi nt doct ri ne as t he empl oyment of
mi l i t ary forces t o at t ai n st rat egi c and/ or operat i onal obj ect i ves
t hrough t he desi gn, organi zat i on, i nt egrat i on, and conduct of
st rat egi es, campai gns, maj or operat i ons, and bat t l es. Opera -
t i onal art t ransl at es t he j oi nt force commanders st rat egy i nt o
operat i onal desi gn, and, ul t i mat el y, t act i cal act i on, by i nt e -
grating key activities at all levels of war.
13
Further, it deter -
mi nes when, where, and why t he j oi nt force wi l l be empl oyed
and provides a framework for the efficient use of resources to
achi eve obj ect i ves and a means for pl anni ng campai gns and
maj or operat i ons.
14
Some of t he more i mport ant facet s of op -
erat i onal art i ncl ude syner gy, si mul t anei t y and dept h, and
ant i ci pat i on. Synergy prompt s t he JFC t o consi der t he com-
pl ement ary capabi l i t i es of t he vari ous part s of t he j oi nt force.
DELIBERATE FORCE
68
Si mul t anei t y and dept h deny t he enemy sanct uar y or r espi t e
by i mposi ng compet i ng and si mul t aneous demands on enemy
commander s. And ant i ci pat i on makes t he JFC al er t t o t he
unexpect ed and t o opport uni t i es for expl oi t i ng rapi dl y chang-
i ng si t uat i ons.
15
In US Air Force doct r i ne, operat i onal art consi st s of four
t asks. The fi rst i nvol ves creat i ng a concept for aerospace op-
erat i ons t o det ermi ne when, where, or even i f ai r and surface
engagement s shoul d be sought , based on how t hey mi ght con -
t ri but e t o t he combat ant commanders i nt ent . The second
t ask ent ai l s orchest rat i ng aerospace forces so t hey can hel p
provi de advant ages (e. g. , concent rat i on, posi t i on, and sur-
pri se) t o aerospace and surface forces t hat wi l l gi ve t hose
forces t he best chance of t act i cal success.
16
Thi rd, t he ai r
commander must make adj ust ment s based on mi ssi on r esul t s
and/ or changes i n t he J FCs operat i onal i nt ent . Fi nal l y, t he
ai r commander must be abl e t o expl oi t fl eet i ng opport uni t i es.
Ai r Force basi c doct ri ne emphasi zes t he key rol e ai rpower can
pl ay i n di rect l y at t acki ng t he enemys sources of power: One
way a commander can exer ci se oper at i onal ar t i s t hr ough a
st rat egi c ai r campai gn t hat di rect l y at t acks an enemys cen -
ters of gravity [COG]. . . . If a st rat egi c ai r campai gn i s not
feasi bl e, achi evi ng a campai gns obj ect i ve can depend on com-
bi ni ng aer ospace and sur f ace oper at i ons i n a way t hat cr eat es
powerful synergi es.
17
Joi nt doct r i ne offers a concept ual model for pl anners to
devel op JAOPs i n a war or OOTW si t uat i ons.
18
According to
j oi nt doct ri ne, t hough mi ssi ons vary wi del y across t he range
of military operations from war to [OOTW], t he framework and
processes for [command and cont rol] of j oi nt ai r operat i ons are
consi st ent .
19
However, the key difference . . . is that in opera -
t i ons ot her t han war, ot her US Gover nment agenci es and host
nat i ons have a pr eemi nent r ol e and t he mi l i t ar y cont r i but i on
to the strategic objective is likely to be indirect. . . . Therefore,
t he maj or chal l enge i s j oi nt , combi ned, and i nt eragency con -
sensus bui l di ng.
20
Furt hermore, set t l ement , not vi ct ory may
be t he ul t i mat e measur e of success.
21
The model of j oi nt pl anni ng so far descri bed i s i t erat i ve, not
l i near . Each phase occur s si mul t aneousl y, and no one phase
i s ever compl et e because each i s i nf l uenced by unf ol di n g
MCCRABB
69
devel opment s i n t he ot her phases. St i l l , i n pract i ce, t he pl an-
ni ng process shoul d begi n wi t h t he art i cul at i on of t he JFCs
obj ect i ves. As t he process cont i nues, however, even funda -
ment al obj ect i ves may be al t ered by devel opment s i n ot her
phases of pl anni ng. Feedback mechani sms i mbedded i n t he
pl anni ng process may requi re changes i n earl i er i deas. For
exampl e, det ai l ed anal ysi s of COGs may reveal t hat t he ori gi -
nal st r at egy i s i nadequat e and t hat t he change i n st r at egy
may require a modification of the objective. As outlined in
Joi nt Pub 3- 56. 1, Command and Control for Joint Air Opera-
tions, t hi s pl anni ng model has fi ve phases.
Phase One: Operati onal -Envi ronment Research
Duri ng t hi s phase, one gai ns i nformat i on about fri endl y
and adver sar y capabi l i t i es and i nt ent i ons, doct r i ne, and t he
envi ronment i n whi ch t he operat i ons wi l l t ake pl ace.
22
An -
swer i ng t he key quest i on of t hi s pl anni ng phasewhat i s t he
nat ure of t he war or confl i ct ?
23
ent ai l s i ncorporat i on and syn -
t hesi s of i nformat i on t aken from sources as di verse as news -
paper art i cl es, novel s, and sat el l i t e i magery. Order-of-bat t l e
dat a al one deci dedl y wi l l not provi de t he answer. Li kewi se,
t hi s phase of pl anni ng must synt hesi ze i nput s f r om i ndi vi du -
al s and agenci es wi t h expert i se i n such areas as i nt el l i gence ,
operat i ons, nat i onal st rat egy, economi cs, ant hropol ogy, and a
host of ot her speci al t i es.
Thi s quest i on of confl i ct i dent i t y i s part i cul arl y cruci al and
generally more difficult to answer for OOTW s i t uat i ons t han
for more conventional conflicts. Limitations in US intelligence ,
coupl ed wi t h a cur r ent f ocus on maj or r egi onal t hr eat s in
specific global areas, increase the difficulty by limiting intelli -
gence coverage of other areas. For military leaders, OOTW al so
r e q u i r e s a s o me wh a t u n c o n v e n t i o n a l s t r a t e g i c o u t l o o k
whereby enemy mi l i t ary forces may prove l ess a concern t o
pl anner s t han pol i t i cal , economi c, or soci ocul t ural fact ors. Fi -
nally, OOTW usual l y i ncl udes nonDepar t ment of Def ense
government agenci es, nongovernment al organi zat i ons, or i n -
t ernat i onal organi zat i ons.
DELIBERATE FORCE
70
Phase Two: Objecti ve Determi nati on
Thi s i s t he cruci al pl anni ng phas e becaus e i t r es ul t s i n an
art i cul at i on of t he end st at e t hat l eaders want from mi l i t ary
action. Often, however, higher-level guidance (e. g. , from na-
t i onal l eaders t o t heat er commanders) can be i mpreci se. In
t hat case, subor di nat e pl anner s must det er mi ne t hei r own
obj ect i ves, based on what ever sources are avai l abl e, and t hen
pass t hem t o t he next hi gher l evel of aut hori t y for approval .
24
Just as i mpor t ant l y, t he end st at e sought ( t he ul t i mat e mi l i -
tary objective) represent s onl y t he set of condi t i ons necessary
t o resol ve t he i mmedi at e cri si s and move from t he predomi-
nant use of mi l i t ary force t o t he predomi nant use of ot her
i nst rument s of nat i onal power (e. g. , di pl omacy or economi cs).
In OOTW, however, mi l i t ary t erms cannot sol el y defi ne t hese
condi t i ons. In many cases, condi t i ons whi ch need t o be cre-
at ed can onl y occur wi t h emphasi s on pol i t i cal / di pl omat i c,
economic, or social activities.
25
Thi s does not mean t hey do not
exist. As joint doctrine warns, an essential consideration . . . is
an underst andi ng, regardl ess of t he nat ure and ext ent of mi l i -
ta ry involvement, of the parameters which spell success, failure,
or conflict termination.
26
Finally, multiple objectivesoften not
prioritizedmay conflict. Of most importance, however, i s t hat
t he obj ect i ves of each l evel must support t he obj ect i ves of t he
higher level to ensure unity of effort.
27
Ot her consi der at i ons i n obj ect i ve det er mi nat i on i ncl ude
const r ai nt s, r est r ai nt s, and r ul es of engagement. Const r ai nt s
ar e i t ems pl anner s must do; r est r ai nt s ar e t hi ngs t hey must
not do. The l at t er may i ncl ude prohi bi t ed t arget s , rest ri ct i ons
on t he use of cert ai n weapons or t act i cs, or buffer zones be-
t ween enemy t erri t ory and neut ral count ri es. Rul es of engage -
me nt based on i nt er nat i onal l aw, oper at i onal r equi r ement s,
capabi l i t i es of t he force, host -nat i on l aw and agreement s, t he
t hreat , and US pol i cy
28
are di rect i ves i ssued by compet ent
aut hor i t i es t hat del i neat e t he ci r cumst ances and l i mi t at i ons
on t he use of force.
Phase Three: Strategy Identi fi cati on
US joint doctrine defi nes st rat egy as t he art and sci ence of
devel opi ng and usi ng pol i t i cal , psychol ogi cal , and mi l i t ary
MCCRABB
71
forces as necessary duri ng peace and war, t o afford t he maxi -
mum support t o pol i ci es, i n order t o i ncrease t he probabi l i t i es
and f avor abl e consequences of vi ct or y and t o l essen t he
chances of defeat .
29
Thus, i n pract i ce, separat i ng st rat egy
from objectives can prove difficult in some ways. The objective
sought i mpl i es some not i on of how one can achi eve i t . One
rul e of t humb i s t hat hi gher-l evel st rat egi es become t he obj ec-
tives of the next lower level. If a JFC, f or i nst ance, pr omul-
gat es a st rat egi c obj ect i ve of undermi ni ng t he mi l i t ary power
of t he pal ace guar d, t hen t heat er component commander s
must devel op st rat egi es for t hei r forces t hat wi l l undermi ne
t he pal ace guard i n some way. The advant age of subordi nat es
l i nki ng t hei r st rat egi es t o t he obj ect i ves of t hei r superi ors i s
t hat i t al l ows t he mor e seni or commander s t o pi ck t he st r at egy
most l i kel y t o produce t he desi red resul t . In a more rel evant
exampl e t o t he i ssue at hand, t he j oi nt ai r operat i ons pl an i s
how t he JFACC [j oi nt force ai r component commander] com-
muni cat es, pr omul gat es, and ar t i cul at es st r at egy, i n suppor t
of t he JFCs obj ect i ves.
30
As i n t he case of ot her pl anni ng phases, several i t ems com-
pl i cat e st rat egy maki ng i n OOTW, compar ed t o st r at egy mak-
i ng i n war. Fi rst , as not ed i n phase t wo, OOTW obj ect i ves are
general l y l ess cl ear cut t han t hose for war, especi al l y i n t erms
of desi red end st at es. Second, OOTW l ends i t sel f more t oward
a prevent i ve st rat egy t han a posi t i ve st rat egy.
31
In ot her words,
the goals of OOTW are more likely to involve stopping things
f r om occur r i ng, such as keepi ng saf e ar eas i n Bosni a from
bei ng over r un, r at her t han maki ng somet hi ng happen, such
as mi l i t ari l y defeat i ng t he Bosni an Serb army.
Phase Four: Identi fi cati on of Centers of Gravi ty
US doctrine defines COGs as t hose charact eri st i cs, capa -
bilities, or localities from which a military force derives its
freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight.
32
The
need t o i dent i fy t he COGs correct l y i s cl ear: t hey are t he
t hi ngs or concept s t hat st rat egy t arget s t o accompl i sh i t s
posi t i ve or negat i ve obj ect i ves. As Joi nt Pub 3-0 st at es, The
essence of operat i onal art l i es i n bei ng abl e t o mass effect s
agai nst t he enemys sources of power i n order t o dest roy or
DELIBERATE FORCE
72
neut ral i ze t hem. In t heory, destruction or neutralization of en-
emy centers of gravity is the most direct path to victory (em-
phasi s i n ori gi nal ).
33
Again, identifying COGs in an OOTW si t uat i on can prove ex-
tremely challenging, given their ephemeral nature as compared
to those in war. For example, a friendly COG (one to protect)
may be the legitimacy of the supported host nations govern -
ment, while the enemys COG may be ideology. In this case,
directly attacking or influencing the enemys COG in OOTW
could prove difficult. US doctrine stresses decisive points in
indirectly attacking COGs. But these points generally are geo-
graphi c i n nat ure and, al t hough i n t hemsel ves not COGs, they
are the keys to attacking protected centers of gravity.
34
Phase Fi ve: Devel opment of Joi nt Ai r Operati ons
Thi s phase i s t he most di ffi cul t part of ai r campai gn pl an-
ni ng. One met hod of organi zi ng JAOP development calls for
cat egori zi ng operat i ons by funct i on or t ask (e. g. , by ai r supe-
riority). Another involves categorizing operations by time or
event (e. g. , by phase or by operat i ons occurri ng aft er a par -
ticular event). Particularly for OOTW, wi t h i t s many i nt angi bl e
st r at egi c i ssues, event - based pl anni ng offers i mport ant advan-
t ages over f unct i on- based pl anni ng. The former forces plan-
ner s t o out l i ne a desi red operat i onal sequence from t he st art -
i ng set of condi t i ons down t o t he fi nal condi t i ons t hat defi ne
t he end st at e. Thi s t echni que focuses i nt el l i gence -collection
asset s and sharpl y i dent i fi es key deci si on poi nt s i n ant i ci -
pat ed oper at i ons and st r at egi es. These, i n t ur n, hel p ot her
pl anni ng funct i ons, such as l ogi st i cs , t o ascert ai n support
r equi r ement s. Event - based pl anni ng al so descri bes t he pri ori -
t i es of effort and resources. For exampl e, ai r superi ori t yt he
prerequi si t e for t he success of furt her operat i onsi s usual l y
t he J FCs first priority. The JFACC i s t he support ed com -
mander f or ai r super i or i t y operat i ons. An event -ori ent ed ap-
proach, t herefore, descri bes t he seri es of rel at ed uni fi ed or
j oi nt operat i ons t hat l ead t o ai r superi ori t y, and i t shoul d
descri be t he amount of ai r superi ori t y needed t o open sub -
sequent oper at i onal phases.
MCCRABB
73
Ident i fyi ng pl anni ng br anches and sequel s i s especi al l y
cri t i cal i n put t i ng t he JAOP t oget her . Br anches ar e opt i ons
t hat ant i ci pat e si t uat i ons t hat coul d change t he basi c pl an,
whi l e sequel s ar e subsequent oper at i ons based on t he possi -
bl e out comes of t he current operat i on.
35
Toget her, t hey form
t he phases, sequenced t oget her , t hat l ead f r om t he st ar t i ng
condi t i on down t o t he desi r ed end st at e. Thus, br anches and
sequels build flexibility into plans and preserve freedom of
act i on under rapi dl y changi ng condi t i ons.
For each phase of t he JAOP, i ncl udi ng i t s br anches and
sequel s, pl anner s must devel op measures of meri t t o assi st i n
det ermi ni ng how wel l t he pl an achi eves i t s goal s. These mea-
sures must not l i mi t t hemsel ves t o mere sort i e count i ng or
account i ng of physi cal damage done t o enemy mat er i el but
shoul d focus on effect s achi eved i n t erms of t he JAOP and i t s
br anches and sequel s, and i n r el at i on t o t he ef f ect s pl anned.
Nat ural l y, t oo, t he pl anni ng ambiguities of OOTW i ncr ease t he
difficulty of this part of JAOP devel opment .
The center of JAOP devel opment i n t he j oi nt ai r operat i ons
cent er (JAOC) i s t he st rat egy cel l. Al t hough some cur r ent
JAOCs formally establish this cell wi t hi n t hei r Combat Pl ans
divisions, all have functional strategy cells somewhere i n t hei r
organi zat i on. Fundament al l y, t he st rat egy cel l is responsible
for t ransl at i ng JFC and JFACC gui dance i nt o an ai r st rat egy.
Strategy-cell pl anner s, i n conj unct i on wi t h ot her component
pl anner s, det ermi ne t he best use of t he JFCs airpower assets
t o achi eve operat i onal obj ect i ves. Based on t hei r det ermi nat i on,
t hese pl anner s t hen propose ai r CONOPS to their JFACCs t ha t
underpi n t he advi ce of t hese ai r commanders t o t hei r JFCs .
36
The ot her sect i ons of t he JAOC pr oduce and execut e t he
daily ATO. Al l component s (i . e. , l and, sea, ai r, and speci al
oper at i ons) nomi nat e t ar get s t o accompl i sh t hei r assi gned
mission on any specific ATO. The j oi nt gui dance, apport i on -
ment , and t arget i ng (JGAT) cel l , composed of represent at i ves
from t hese component s, pri ori t i zes t hose request s i nt o a j oi nt ,
i nt egrat ed, pri ori t i zed t arget l i st for force application. The driv-
i ng pri nci pl e i s gui dance provi ded by t he JFC/ J FACC, found
i n t he JFACCs CONOPS. The most common model used i s
st rat egy-t o-t asks because i t connect s each support ed obj ect i ve
t o an i ndi vi dual t arget.
37
Fr om t hi s pr ocess al so comes t he
DELIBERATE FORCE
74
appor t i onment r ecommendat i ont he det er mi nat i on and as -
si gnment of t he t ot al expect ed ai r effort by percent age, pri or -
ity, or weight of effort devoted to counterair, strategic attack,
i nt erdi ct i on, or cl ose ai r support .
Emergi ng j oi nt doct ri ne ri ght l y emphasi zes t hat forwardi ng
desi r ed ef f ect s r at her t han st r i ct t ar get nomi nat i ons gi ves
t hose responsi bl e for conduct i ng j oi nt i nt erdi ct i on maxi mum
flexibility to exploit their capabilities. Further, supported
commander s shoul d pr ovi de suppor t i ng commander s as much
l at i t ude as possi bl e i n pl anni ng and execut i ng t hei r opera -
t i ons. . . . Suppor t ed commander s shoul d cl ear l y st at e how
t hey envi si on i nt erdi ct i on enabl i ng or enhanci ng t hei r maneu -
ver operat i ons and what t hey want t o accompl i sh wi t h i nt er -
di ct i on (as wel l as t hose act i ons t hey want t o avoi d).
38
This
t arget l i st goes t o t he JFC for approval.
The joint, integrated, prioritized target list forms t he basi s of
t he mast er ai r at t ack pl an, whi chusi ng t he Cont i ngency
Theat er Aut omat ed Pl anni ng Syst em (CTAPS)mat ches t ar -
gets , al ong wi t h weaponeeri ng dat a, weat her i nformat i on, i n -
telligence, and so fort h, t o avai l abl e resources, accordi ng t o
t he pri nci pl e of economy of force. The mast er ai r at t ack pl an
t urns i nt o t he ATO and goes t o t he appr opr i at e uni t s, nor -
mal l y 12 hours before execut i on.
Al t hough commanders want t o know how wel l t he execut ed
mi ssi ons have accompl i shed t he desi red effect s, combat as -
sessment remai ns an oft en-overl ooked aspect of JAOP pl an-
ni ng. Tr adi t i onal bat t l e damage assessment can provi de bot h
qui ck l ooks and det ai l ed exami nat i on of t he damage done.
Weapons effect s det ermi ne t he correct ness of t he weaponeer -
i ng and est abl i sh dat a on t he per f or mance of muni t i ons. Fur-
t her, based upon t he obj ect i ve sought , overal l mi ssi on effec-
t i veness r ecommends whet her or not t o r est r i ke t he t ar get.
NATO Doctrine
As wi t h US doct ri ne, t he key t o underst andi ng how NATO
pl ans ai r oper at i ons st ar t s wi t h an under st andi ng of how t he
al l i ance devel ops st rat egi c gui dance. Thi s process has i t s root s
i n t he ori gi ns of t he al l i ance and i n i t s fundament al pri nci pl es
MCCRABB
75
of pol i cy maki ng: defensi ve ori ent at i on, consensus, cohesi on,
and an i ni t i al prohi bi t i on on out -of-area operat i ons . Si nce t he
e nd of t he c ol d wa r a nd t he de mi s e of NATOs r ai s on
dt ret he Warsaw Pact NATO r eaf f i r med s ome of t hes e
pri nci pl es and modi fi ed ot hers. At t he Rome Summi t of 1991,
NATO put fort h a new st rat egi c concept t hat soft ened t he
Washi ngt on Treat ys prohi bi t i on on out -of-area operat i ons. Ac-
cording to this concept, NATO must be capable of responding to
instability arising from the serious economic, social and politi-
cal difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes,
whi ch are faced by many count ri es i n Cent ral and East er n
Eur ope.
39
In 1994 NATO affirmed this expanded orientation
when it declared its offer to support, on a case by cas e basis in
accordance wi t h our own procedures, peacekeepi ng and ot her
operations under the authority of the UN Security Council . . .
including making available Alliance resources and expertis e.
40
Structurally, NATO s gr and- st r at egy pr ocess st ar t s wi t h t he
North Atlantic Council (NAC) and i t s mi l i t ary arm, t he Mi l i t ary
Committee (MC). The NAC i ncl udes al l t he heads of st at e and
gover nment f r om t he 16 member st at es, r epr esent ed i n t he
counci l s day- t o- day busi ness by per manent ambassador i al -
level ministers. The secretary-general chairs the NAC , and t he
Int ernat i onal St aff support s i t . The MC, composed of t he
chi efs of st aff of t he member nat i ons or t hei r mi l i t ary repre-
sent at i ves, report s t o t he counci l on t he mi l i t ary affai rs of t he
al l i ance. An el ect ed chai r heads t he MC, and t he I nt er nat i onal
Mi l i t ar y St af f suppor t s i t . Thi s st af f , whi ch has no i nde-
pendent i nt el l i gence -gat heri ng funct i on but onl y col l at es and
di st ri but es i nt el l i gence provi ded by t he nat i ons, recei ves scant
at t ent i on i n most di scussi ons of NATO operat i ons. Nevert he-
l ess, i t can pl ay an i mport ant rol e. The pl ans and pol i cy di vi -
si on and t he operat i ons di vi si on provi de i ndependent advi ce t o
the MC on proposed pol i cy mat t ers, i ncl udi ng pl ans put fort h
by t he oper at i onal commands.
The NATO strategy process continues from the NAC and MC
down t hrough t he al l i ances i nt egrat ed command st ruct ure,
which is divided at the top into two major NATO comman ds: (1)
Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (not addressed here) a n d
(2) Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. The latter comma nds
t hree maj or subordi nat e commands: Al l i ed Forces Nort hwest
DELIBERATE FORCE
76
Eur ope, Al l i ed For ces Cent r al Eur ope, and Al l i ed For ces
Sout hern Europe (AFSOUTH), whi ch had responsi bi l i t y for t he
Bal kans area duri ng Del i berat e Force. Al l i ed Ai r Forces Sout h -
ern Europe (AIRSOUTH), one of AFSOUTHs si x pr i nci pal sub-
ordi nat e commands, i s col l ocat ed wi t h AFSOUTH in Naples ,
Italy.
41
According to NATO doctrine, AIRSOUTHs pr i nci pal
pl anni ng organi zat i on i s t he combi ned ai r operat i ons cent er
(CAOC) located at Vicenza , Italy, with the 5th Allied Tactical
Air Force (5 ATAF).
Two operational-level issues also influenced the NATO s t r at -
egy process at t he t i me of Del i berat e Force. Fi rst , i n t he post -
cold-war era, NATO si gni fi cant l y st rengt hened i t s Rapi d Reac-
tion Forces (RRF) by di vi di ng t hem i nt o i mmedi at e react i on
forces, consi st i ng of l and, ai r, and mari t i me component s, and
an RRF consi st i ng of t he Al l i ed Command Europe Rapi d Reac-
t i on Corps and suppor t i ng ai r and mar i t i me component s. On
t he one hand, t hi s enhancement of NATOs reaction forces
gave the alliance greater flexibility in dealing with problems
l i ke t he Bosni an confl i ct ; on t he ot her hand, t hese react i on
forces operat ed under an i mport ant l i mi t at i on: NATO does not
t ask member nat i ons f or f or ces. Each nat i on assi gns oper a -
t i onal command or operat i onal cont rol , as di st i nct from ful l
command over al l aspect s of t he oper at i ons and admi ni st r a -
t i on of t hose forces.
42
In effect , each nat i on det ermi nes what
forces i t wi l l provi de and t he condi t i ons under whi ch t hose
forces may be employed. Thus, NATO commander s had t o
make t hei r pl ans f or l and and ai r oper at i ons wi t h t he under -
st andi ng t hat , i f any par t i ci pat i ng st at e di sagr eed wi t h t hem,
i t had t he opt i on of wi t hdrawi ng i t s forces at any t i me.
Second, al t hough emergi ng NATO doct ri ne emphasi zes t he
need for i nt eroperabi l i t y bet ween forces and t he overarchi ng
need t o have a common doct r i ne f or j oi nt pl anni ng and execu -
t i on,
43
NATO tactical doctrine act ual l y pr ovi des onl y scant
gui dance concer ni ng ai r oper at i ons pl anni ng. For exampl e,
Allied Tactical Publication (ATP)-33(B), NATO Tactical Air Doc-
trine,
44
t he funct i onal equi val ent of Joi nt Pub 3-56. 1, does not
offer a model for campai gn pl anni ng, as i s found i n US doc -
t ri ne. It does, however, offer some bri ef gui dance on how an
ai r commander shoul d al l ot , apport i on, and al l ocat e ai r re-
s our ces.
45
The first factor is the objective to be achieved, fo llowed
MCCRABB
77
by t he nat ure of t he confl i ct , st rat egy empl oyed, operat i onal
capabi l i t i es of t he forces assi gned, t errai n, weat her, l ogi st i cs
support avai l abl e, and pol i t i cal rest rai nt s in effect.
46
Anot her
limitation on NATO t act i cal ai r doct ri ne i s t he absence of any
detailed discussion of OOTW, whi ch refl ect s t he fact t hat most
of NATO doctrine st i l l predat es t he end of t he col d war. Thus ,
at l east t o t he ext ent t hat t hey l ooked t o NATOs ai r doct ri ne t o
gui de pl anni ng f or Del i ber at e For ce, AFSOUTH p l a n n e r s
l argel y were on t hei r own.
Al t hough not di rect l y rel evant t o t hi s essay, one mi ght not e
(si nce i t i n part refl ect s t he experi ences of Deny Fl i ght a nd
Deliberate Force) that Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-1(A), Al -
lied Joint Operations Doctrine (draft), addresses peace-suppor t
operat i ons. Thi s doct ri nal gui dance foresees event s st art i ng
wi t h request s from t he UN Securi t y Counci l for assi st ance
from NATO. The draft publ i cat i on emphasi zes NATO military
i nvol vement i n pl anni ng act i vi t i es from t he earl i est st ages.
Once the NAC aut hor i zes peace- suppor t oper at i ons, t he maj or
NATO command devel ops appropri at e cont i ngency pl ans to
i ncl ude t he recommended si ze, composi t i on, operat i onal con -
cept and command st r uct ur e of t he Al l i ance cont r i but i on, t he
t asks for t he Force Commander/ COMAJF [Commander, Al l i ed
Joi nt Force ], and ant i ci pat ed t i mel i nes for mi ssi on execu -
t i on.
47
Import ant l y, t hi s publ i cat i on gi ves expl i ci t gui dance on
i nt erposi t i on force operat i ons, whi ch seek t o keep opposi ng
mi l i t ary forces apart fol l owi ng a cease-fi re agreement t hrough
placing an impartial force between the belligerents and estab-
lishing a buffer zone with continuous monitoring. However, this
draft NATO doctrine still offers no guidance on the use of force to
facilitate achieving an agreement between opposing forces.
Three ATPs pr ovi ded pr ocedur al gui dance t o Del i ber at e
For ce pl anner s, al t hough t hey deal t pri mari l y wi t h t act i cal
empl oyment and i ncl uded l i t t l e di scussi on about how one
should develop overall air strategy or CONOPS. ATP-40 and
ATP-42, neither of which are discussed here, dealt with airspace
cont r ol pr ocedur es and count er ai r operations, respectively.
48
Presently, no ATP deal s excl usi vel y wi t h i nt erdi ct i on or st rat e-
gi c at t ack, al t hough ATP-33(B) di scusses t he former and AJP-
1(A) ment i ons t he l at t er.
49
In NATO par l ance, ai r suppor t to
land operations consists of counterair , air interdiction , tact i cal
DELIBERATE FORCE
78
ai r t ransport , and offensi ve ai r support (OAS), t he l ast cat e-
gory consi st i ng of t act i cal ai r reconnai ssance , battlefield air
interdiction (no longer a recognized air mission in US doc -
trine),
50
and cl ose ai r support . OAS is specifically tied to the
l and bat t l e, i n t hat i t i nvol ves doct ri ne and procedures [t hat ]
permi t ai r forces t o assi st di rect l y i n achi evi ng t he i mmedi at e
and short -t erm obj ect i ves of l and forces.
51
Despi t e t he pauci t y of det ai l ed ai r-pl anni ng gui dance i n
NATO doctrine manual s, some NATO pl ans do addr es s an
ends- ways- means f or mul a t hat has some si mi l ar i t y t o US doc -
t ri ne. For exampl e, t he Deny Fl i ght OPLAN of t he commander
in chief of Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH) s t ar t s
wi t h t he mi ssi on assi gned t o a par t i cul ar phase of an oper a -
t i on.
52
Wi t hi n t hat mi ssi on, one fi nds t wo measures: one deal s
with the deployment of forces, listing timing of the deploy-
ment , obj ect i ves sought , and requi red act i ons; t he ot her deal s
wi t h empl oyment oper at i ons dur i ng t he phase, st ar t i ng wi t h
t he obj ect i ves, act i ons, and resul t s expect ed from t he act i ons.
Mi ssi ng f r om t hi s f or mul a, and f r om t he US ends- ways- means
formul a, i s any di scussi on of how act i ons t aken produce ex -
pect ed resul t si n ot her words, t he mechani sm, whi ch out-
lines the why part. That is, if the st rat egy occur s , t hen t he
end l i kel y occurs because of a cert ai n mechani sm. It speci fi es
t he t heoret i cal foundat i on for t he st rat egy. For exampl e, t he
mechani sm for Operat i on Del i berat e Force may have t aken t he
following form: If force is applied to critical communications
facilities of the Bosnian Serbs, t hen t hey wi l l accede t o UN
demands becaus e t he loss of those communication facilities
will result in a loss of central control over their forces .
ATO ai r doct r i ne emphasi zes t hat pl anni ng must be j oi nt at
all levels of command. For OAS operat i ons, t he l and-force
commander est abl i shes t ar get pr i or i t i es based on t he JFCs
dai l y apport i onment deci si on. Army r equest net s f or war d pr e-
planned OAS mi ssi ons t o t he ai r f or ce headquar t er s r esponsi -
ble for the allocation of air resources, normally an ATAF . The
j oi nt command operat i ons cent er, normal l y col l ocat ed wi t h a
CAOC, al l ocat es resources t o meet t he request s. Land-force
channel s l et t he r equest i ng uni t s know whet her t hei r r equest s
have been accept ed or rej ect ed. An ai r support operat i ons
center (ASOC), subordi nat e t o t he CAOC and nor mal l y wi t h
MCCRABB
79
t he hi ghest l and-force format i on depl oyed (e. g. , a corps), may
have t aski ng aut hori t y for OAS . Any combat uni t may send
request s for i mmedi at e OAS mi ssi ons di rect l y over dedi cat ed
communi cat i on l i nks t o t he ASOC. Any i nt er medi at e ar my
command may di sapprove a request . If not , t he ASOC a t -
t empt s t o fi l l t he request out of avai l abl e asset s. If none are
avai l abl e, based upon t he ASOCs del egat ed aut hori t y, i t may
di vert l ower-pri ori t y mi ssi ons t o fi l l t he i mmedi at e request .
53
NATO doctrine for t he organi zat i on and pl anni ng processes
of the CAOC paral l el s US doct ri ne for a JAOC. For exampl e,
the CAOC under 5 ATAF at Vicenza , I t al y, has a pl ans el ement
char ged wi t h ut i l i zi ng gui dance f r om hi gher headquar t er s,
al ong wi t h t he commanders i nt ent and uni t i nput s, t o devel op
t he pl an for t he dai l y ai r t aski ng message (ATM). Plan develop-
ment may cover up t o 30 days, 48 t o 72 hour s, or 24 hour s.
Along with the ATM, affected units also receive special in -
st r uct i ons and an ai r space cont r ol or der . An operations ele -
ment in 5 ATAF execut es t he publ i shed ATM and exerci ses
command and cont r ol t hr ough r egi onal oper at i ons cent er s
and t hei r subor di nat e sect or oper at i ons cent er s. The CAOCs
ai r bor ne el ement s may i ncl ude ai r bor ne war ni ng and cont r ol
syst em as wel l as ai r bor ne command, cont r ol , and communi-
cat i on ai rcraft . As i n US doct ri ne, l i ai son el ement s pl ay a
cruci al rol e. In t he mul t i nat i onal envi ronment of NATO, n a -
t i onal represent at i ves t o t he CAOC are especi al l y i mport ant .
Concl usi on
US and NATO doctrines shar e many char act er i st i cs. They
bot h emphasi ze t hat pl anni ngat al l l evel smust i ncl ude i n -
put s from every rel evant part i ci pant . Furt her, t hese doct ri nes
point out that although flexibility is one of airpowers greatest
asset s, i t can al so be i t s wor st di l emma si nce ever y combat
ar m seeks as much ai r power suppor t as i t can get , gener al l y
exceedi ng t he amount avai l abl e.
Because airpower is best employed in mass, these competi ng
demands may i nadvert ent l y l ead t o penny packet i ng among
several forces, to the detriment of the total force. Therefore, both
NATO and US doct ri nes argue for cent ral i zed cont rol of all
DELIBERATE FORCE
80
asset s under an ai r man char ged wi t h t he r esponsi bi l i t y t o
pl an and conduct ai r oper at i ons i n suppor t of t he JFCs obj ec-
t i ves. Fi nal l y, si nce US nat i onal securi t y st rat egy s t at es t hat
t he purpose of armed forces i s t o wi n wars, each body of
doct ri ne t ends t o emphasi ze convent i onal st at e-versus-st at e
confl i ct rat her t han OOTW. However, t o t he ext ent t hat peace-
suppor t oper at i ons become mor e t he nor m t han t he except i on,
doct ri nal gui dance needs expandi ng.
Despi t e t hei r si mi l ari t i es, t he di fferences bet ween t he t wo
set s of doct ri ne remai n subst ant i al . Most i mport ant l y, NATO
doct r i ne provi des l i t t l e gui dance on how t o devel op an ai r
operat i ons st rat egy. Beyond a bri ef di scussi on of t he pri nci -
ples of war in ATP-33(B) and a single page in AJP-1(A), the
ot her manual s focus excl usi vel y on t act i cal event s. US doc -
t r i ne, bot h j oi nt and servi ce, pays a great deal of at t ent i on t o
operat i onal art and t he maki ng of operat i onal st rat egy. Li ke-
wi se, Joi nt Pub 3-56. 1 offers an excel l ent model t o gui de ai r
oper at i on pl anner s t hrough a process of t urni ng st rat egi c-l evel
gui dance i nt o an ATO. NATO air doctrine i s di st urbi ngl y mut e.
OOTWs or peace-support operat i ons present t he most di ffi cul t
probl em t o mi l i t ary pl anners because t he ver y nat ur e of t he
t askprevent i ng confl i ct i s al most t he exact opposi t e from
t he t radi t i onal mi l i t ary rol e of concl udi ng confl i ct on t erms
favorable to the political leadership. Therefore, for the plan-
ners of Operat i on Del i berat e Force, NATO doct ri ne provided
vi rt ual l y no gui dance for bui l di ng convent i onal ai r st rat egy,
and i t proved even l ess useful i f such were possi bl eas a
guide for developing strategy for the OOTWs wi t h whi ch t hey
were concerned. The quest i on, t herefore, of whet her t hese
pl anner s cons ul t ed t he exi s t i ng body of doct r i ne or j us t
winged it is largely mootthey had almost nothing to which
t hey coul d refer.
Not es
1. For exampl e, i n Joi nt Publ i cat i on (Pub) 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Opera -
tions, 1 February 1995t he keyst one document of j oi nt doct ri neMul t i na-
t i onal Operat i ons i s a separat e chapt er. Nevert hel ess, t hi s chapt er does
pr ovi de usef ul gui dance on sever al key consi der at i ons t hat pl anner s must
bear i n mi nd when pl anni ng and conduct i ng mul t i nat i onal oper at i ons.
MCCRABB
81
2. As used i n t hi s essay, airpower means t he abi l i t y t o do somet hi ng i n
or through the airthe definition used by William Billy Mitchell, an air -
power pi oneer, i n Winged Defense: The Development and Possibilities of
Modern Air PowerEconomic and Military (1925; reprint, New York: Dover
Publ i cat i ons, 1988), 34.
3. For most of i t s hi st or y, ai r oper at i ons conduct ed agai nst t he enemy,
whet her or not i n di rect support of surface operat i ons, were cal l ed cam-
pai gns. Exampl es i ncl uded ai r superi ori t y or count erai r campai gns, ai r
i nt erdi ct i on campai gns, and t he l i ke. In t he 1990s, t he t erm air operations
has r epl aced air campaign i n t he US armed forces j oi nt doct ri ne, emphasi z-
i ng t he exi st ence of a si ngl e t heat er campai gn consi st i ng of support i ng
operat i ons. Thi s essay fol l ows t hat convent i on.
4. See Col Phillip S. Meilinger, 10 Propositions Regarding Air Power
(Washi ngt on, D. C. : Ai r Force Hi st ory and Museums Program, 1995), 2027.
Meilinger writes that selecting objectives to strike or influence is the es -
sence of ai r st rat egy. Vi rt ual l y al l t he ai r t heori st s recogni zed t hi s; unfort u -
nat el y, t hey were frust rat i ngl y vague on t he subj ect (page 21).
5. The cl assi c ai r t heori st Gi ul i o Douhet wrot e t hat obj ect i ves vary con -
si derabl y i n war, and t he choi ce of t hem depends chi efl y upon t he ai m
sought , whet her t he command of t he ai r, paral yzi ng t he enemys army and
navy, or shat t eri ng t he moral e of ci vi l i ans behi nd t he l i nes. Such vari ance
l ed hi m t o concl ude t hat no hard and fast rul es can be l ai d down on t hi s
aspect of aeri al warfare. It i s i mpossi bl e even t o out l i ne general st andards,
because t he choi ce of enemy t arget s wi l l depend upon a number of ci rcum-
st ances, mat er i al , mor al , and psychol ogi cal , t he i mpor t ance of whi ch,
t hough real , i s not easi l y est i mat ed. See hi s The Command of the Air, t r a ns .
Di no Ferrari (1942; new imprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force
Hi st ory, 1983), 50, 5960. Operat i on Desert St orm i s oft en t out ed as an
exampl e of paral l el or si mul t aneous warfare, whi ch i nvol ves st ri ki ng
every key t arget at once, made possi bl e by advances i n preci si on at t ack and
st eal t h ai rcraft . Leavi ng asi de t he quest i on of whet her US and al l i ed forces
wi l l al ways have t he overwhel mi ng numbers of ai rcraft t hey had i n t hat war,
even t hen t hey di d not st ri ke every t arget t he very fi rst ni ght . Therefore,
some pri ori t i zat i on occurred. For a di scussi on of paral l el at t ack, see Col
John A. Warden III, Air Theory for the Twenty-first Century, in Challenge
and Response: Anticipating US Military Security Concerns, ed. Karl P. Magyar
(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, August 1994), 31132.
6. Meilinger, 4955.
7. See William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Engagement
and Enl argement (Washi ngt on, D. C. : The Whi t e House, February 1995).
8. See Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States
of America 1995: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement (Washi ng-
ton, D.C.: [Joint Chiefs of Staff,] 1995).
9. For a di scussi on of t he Joi nt St rat egi c Capabi l i t i es Pl an, see Joi nt Pub
5- 0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, 13 April 1995, II-1012.
10 . National Military Strategy, 1415.
DELIBERATE FORCE
82
11. These are st at ement s of i nt ent as t o what , where, and how opera -
tions are to be conducted in broad, flexible terms. They provide for unity of
effort and achi eve st rat egi c advant age t hat i s t he favorable overall power
relationship t hat enabl es one group of nat i ons t o effect i vel y cont rol t he
course of politico-military events to ensure the accomplishment of objectives
t hrough nat i onal , i nt ernat i onal , and t heat er effort s (emphasi s i n ori gi nal ).
See Joi nt Pub 3-0, III-4. A concept of operat i ons i s a verbal or graphi c
st at ement , i n br oad out l i ne, of a commander s assumpt i ons or i nt ent i n
regard t o an operat i on or seri es of operat i ons. See Joi nt Pub 1-02, Depart-
ment of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Mar ch 1994.
12. Joi nt Pub 3-0, II-1617.
13. J oi nt Pub 1- 02.
14. Joi nt Pub 5-00. 1, Joi nt Tact i cs, Techni ques, and Procedures for
Campai gn Pl anni ng, 2d draft , 18 May 1995, II-1.
15. Joi nt Pub 3-0, III-913.
16. Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United
States Air Force, vol . 2, March 1992, 129.
17. Ibid.
18. For a compl et e di scussi on of t hi s model , see t he aut hors Ai r Cam-
pai gn Pl anni ng, Ai rpower Journal 7, no. 2 (Summer 1993): 1122.
19. Joi nt Pub 3- 56. 1, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, 1 4
November 1994, I-2.
20. Joi nt Pub 3-07, Joi nt Doct ri ne for Mi l i t ary Operat i ons ot her t han
War, final draft, April 1993, VII-23.
21. Joi nt Warfi ght i ng Cent er, Joint Task Force Commanders Handbook
for Peace Operations (Fort Monroe, Va. : Joint Warfighting Center, 28 Febru -
ar y 1995) , 6. The Joi nt War f i ght i ng Cent er i ssued t hi s handbook as a
resource t ool for commanders even t hough i t i s not US j oi nt doct ri ne.
22. Joi nt Pub 3-56. 1, III-4.
23. See Carl von Cl ausewi t z, On War, ed. and t r ans. Mi chael Howar d
and Pet er Paret (Pri ncet on, N. J. : Pri ncet on Uni versi t y Press, 1976), 88.
24. Handbook for Peace Operations, 11.
25. Joi nt Pub 3-07, VII-3.
26. Ibi d. , I-7. However, t he doct ri ne goes on t o say t hat t he paradox . . .
i s t hat . . . pol i cy i s oft en devel opment al and cont i ngent on t he resul t s of
precedi ng act i ons. As such, pl anni ng for [OOTW] shoul d be an open-ended
and i nt eract i ve process adapt i ve t o t he pol i t i cal and pol i cy dri vers of t he US
Government and i t s forei gn pol i cy at any st age of t he process.
27. Joi nt Pub 3-56. 1, III-4.
28. Handbook for Peace Operations, 7475.
29. J oi nt Pub 1- 02.
30. Joi nt Pub 3-56. 1, III-5.
31. Joi nt Pub 3- 07, I - 10.
32. J oi nt Pub 1- 02.
33. Joi nt Pub 3-0, III-20.
34. Ibid. , III-21.
MCCRABB
83
35. Ibid. , III-20.
36. For a recommended JAOP format , see JFACC Primer, 2d ed. (Wash-
i ngt on, D. C. : US Ai r Force Deput y Chi ef of St aff, Pl ans and Operat i ons,
February 1994), 4650.
37. Davi d E. Thal er, Strategies-to-Tasks: A Framework for Linking Means
and Ends (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1993).
38. Joi nt Pub 3-03, Doct ri ne for Joi nt Int erdi ct i on Operat i ons, draft ,
n. d. , II-1314.
39. The Alliances Strategic Concept, in NATO Handbook ( Br ussel s:
NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995), 237.
40. Decl arat i on of t he Heads of St at e and Government Part i ci pat i ng i n
t he Meet i ng of t he Nort h At l ant i c Counci l Hel d at NATO Headquart ers,
Br ussel s, on 1011 Januar y 1994, i n NATO Handbook, 271.
41. The ot hers i ncl ude Al l i ed Land Forces Sout hern Europe, Al l i ed Land
Forces Sout h Cent ral Europe (not act i vat ed), Al l i ed Land Forces Sout heast -
ern Europe, Al l i ed Naval Forces Sout hern Europe, and Naval St ri ki ng and
Support Forces Sout hern Europe. AFSOUTH has si x pri nci pal subordi nat e
commands as opposed t o t he t hree found i n Al l i ed Forces Cent ral Europe
and Al l i ed Forces Nort hwest ern Europe because of t he cont i nui ng ani mosi t y
bet ween Greece (host t o Al l i ed Land Forces Sout h Cent ral Europe and 7
ATAF, when they are activated) and Turkey (home of Allied Land Forces
Sout heast ern Europe and 6 ATAF).
42. NATO Handbook, 167.
43. Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-1(A), Allied Joint Operations Doc -
t ri ne, draft , 1995. Al so not ewort hy i n t hi s publ i cat i on i s t he di scussi on of
operat i onal art . It general l y fol l ows US doct ri ne but wi t h a cl ear exami na-
t i on of t he mi l i t ary condi t i ons requi red t o achi eve t he st rat egi c obj ect i ves,
t he event s t hat wi l l l i kel y produce t hose condi t i ons, t he way mi l i t ary re -
sour ces shoul d be appl i ed t o accompl i sh t hose event s, and t he r i sks i n -
vol ved. See chap. 2, sec. 3, par. 0206.
44. ATP-33(B), NATO Tactical Air Doctrine, November 1986.
45. NATO defines allotment as the temporary change of assignment of
tactical air forces between subordinate commands. Apportionment is the deter-
mination and assignment of the total expected air effort devoted to various air
operations, normally by percentage and/or priority. Allocation is the transla -
tion of apportionment into numbers of sorties by aircraft type. Ibid., 3-5.
46. Ibid. , 3-6.
47. AJP-1(A), par. 2231.
48. ATP-40, Doctrine and Procedures for Airspace Control in the Combat
Zone, Januar y 1977; and ATP- 42, Counter Air Operations, Mar ch 1981.
49. See ATP-33(B), chap. 5, sec. 2; and AJP-1(A), chap. 18, sec. 2.
50. For an extended discussion of the origin of battlefield air interdiction
i n NATO, see Davi d J. St ern, The Development of NATO Tactical Air Doctrine,
19701985 (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, December 1987).
51. ATP-27(B), Offensive Air Support Operations, May 1980, 1-3.
DELIBERATE FORCE
84
52. Headquart ers Al l i ed Forces Sout hern Europe, CINCSOUTH OPLAN
40101, Deny Flight, 3 May 1995. (NATO Confidential) Information ex-
t ract ed i s uncl assi fi ed.
53. Ibid. , chaps. 5 and 6. (NATO Confidential) Information extracted is
uncl assi fi ed.
MCCRABB
85
Chapt er 4
The Deliberate Force Air Campaign Plan
Col Christopher M. Campbell
The fi rst bomb i mpact of Operat i on Del i berat e Force, at
0012Z on t he mor ni ng of 30 August 1995, di d not occur by
happenst ance or wi t hout consi der abl e del i ber at i on and soul -
searchi ng on t he part of many i ndi vi dual s. NATOs f i r st t r ue
ai r campai gn, Del i berat e Force was i n fact t he product of
years of pl anni ng. The al l i ances focus on an expect ed Warsaw
Pact adver sar y pr eceded t hat pl anni ng effort by decades, and
t he doct r i ne t hat devel oped as a r esul t of t hat f ocus shaped
t hose pl ans.
Many peopl e pl anned and execut ed Del i ber at e For ce t o
achieve narrowly defined military objectives t hat emanat ed
from the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and t he Uni t ed Nat i ons
(UN) Security Council . These objectives underwent revision
over more t han t hree years of mi l i t ary operat i ons i n t he Bal-
kans and fi nal l y became mi l i t ari l y vi abl e. Si mpl y put , t he de-
cl ared Del i berat e Force ai r obj ect i ve was t o execut e a robust
NATO ai r operat i on t hat adversel y al t ers t he BSAs [Bosni an
Ser b ar mys] advant age i n conduct i ng successful mi l i t ary op-
erat i ons agai nst t he Bi H [Bosni an army]. This objective re-
fl ect ed a desi red end st at e whi ch envi saged t hat t he Bosni an
Ser bs woul d sue for cessat i on of mi l i t ary operat i ons, compl y
wi t h UN mandat es, and negot i at e.
1
A tactical objective of lev-
eling the playing field bolstered this overt objective. Such
l evel i ng ensured t hat t he Bosni an government forces coul d
adequat el y defend t hemsel ves. Impl i ed obj ect i ves i ncl uded t he
mi ni mi zi ng of casual t i es, col l at eral damage, and pol i t i cal and
mi l i t ary cost s. The combi ned force ai r component commander
(CFACC) adopt ed t hese obj ect i ves, bot h for humani t ari an rea -
sons and t o ensure t hat NATO conduct ed t he ai r campai gn i n
a manner pol i t i cal l y accept abl e t o t he i nt erveni ng count ri es.
The requirement to achieve consensus on all alliance deci si ons
87
was cri t i cal l y i mport ant t o mai nt ai n i n t he background of al l
operat i onal deci si ons.
Given the generally recognized success of Deliberate Force,
one s houl d s eek t o under s t and t he pl anni ng of t hi s ai r cam-
pai gn and compare i t t o avai l abl e doct ri ne and procedure. To
be effective, a body of doctrine must be r el evant , accept ed,
and used. Maj Gen I. B. Hol l ey Jr. , US Air Force Reserve
(USAFR), Retired, defines doctrine as officially approved pre-
scri pt i ons of t he best way t o do a j ob. Doct ri ne is, or should
be, t he product of experi ence. Doct ri ne i s what exper i ence has
shown usual l y works best .
2
The success of Del i berat e Force shoul d dri ve us t o di scover
i mpor t ant i nsi ght s t hat mi ght assi st ai r campai gn pl anner s .
Towar d t hat end, t hi s es s ay addr es s es s ever al ques t i ons .
Fi rst , i t seeks t o det ermi ne whet her t he success of t he opera -
t i on was pr emedi t at ed or ser endi pi t ous. Just as pl ans of t en go
awry because of unforeseen devel opment s of war, so can t hey
go bet t er t han expect ed. Second, di d t he pl anni ng a nd out-
come of Deliberate Force reflect the provisions of existing doc -
t ri nes? If not , di d ai r campai gn pl anners deviate from doc -
t r i nal nor ms due t o t he i nadequacy or i nappr opr i at eness of
t he exi st i ng doct ri ne or because t hey di d not r ef er t o t hat
doct r i ne i n t he heat of event s? Or was a devi at i on i nspi red by
some combi nat i on of reasons?
Answer i ng t hose quest i ons depends on t he answer s t o at
l east t hree corol l ary quest i ons. Fi rst , how di d t he pl anners
and l eaders of t hi s campai gn act ual l y go about devel opi ng
such a successf ul pl an? Of concer n her e ar e t he i nst i t ut i onal
a nd phys i c a l e nvi r onme nt s unde r whi c h t he s e pl a nne r s
worked, t he fact ors t hey consi dered, and t he way t hey del i ber -
at ed and processed t he pl an . Second, what const i t ut ed t he
act ual Del i berat e Force ai r campai gn pl an, and how did NATO
ensure t hat i t woul d work at t he t i me of execut i on? Of part i cu -
l ar i nt erest i s t he l i nkage t hat exi st ed bet ween t he obj ect i ves
pur sued and t he st r at egi es empl oyedt he so- cal l ed ends ver -
s us means as t he pl an changed over t i me before t he operat i on
began. If one accept s t he t rut h of t he adage t hat no pl an
survi ves fi rst cont act wi t h t he enemy, t he t hi rd corol l ary
quest i on becomes under st andi ng how t he execut or s of t he
Del i berat e Force pl an al t ered i t t o refl ect unfol di ng event s and
DELIBERATE FORCE
88
what success t hey enj oyed. Fi nal l y, t he essay exami nes t he
rel at i onshi p of t he pl anni ng and out come of t he operat i on t o
doct r i nal pl anni ng nor ms. Chapt er 3 demonst r at ed t he l i mi t a -
t i ons of t he exi st i ng body of doct ri ne. These obser vat i ons
shoul d have broad fut ure i mpl i cat i ons for fut ure ai r campai gn
pl anner s . Thus, t hi s chapt er set s out t o exami ne t he devel op-
ment pr ocess of t he ai r campai gn pl an for Deliberate Force;
show t he key component s of t he pl an itself, emphasizing how
i t was modi fi ed over t i me; compare t he st art i ng pl an t o t he
conduct of t he oper at i on and descr i be adapt at i ons t o t he pl an
i n t he heat of bat t l e; and compare t he Del i berat e Force experi -
ence t o doct r i nal ai r campai gn pl anni ng nor ms.
The Planning Effort
Duri ng t he more t han t wo and one-hal f years of ai r opera -
t i ons l eadi ng t o Del i berat e Force, a wi de array of pol i t i cal and
military factors influenced NATO ai r act i on i n t he Bal kans.
Compet i ng i nt er est s const r ai ned ai r campai gn pl anni ng a nd
deci si on maki ng i nt o forms t hat di d not al ways coi nci de wi t h
cur r ent ai r power doct r i ne. Thi s sect i on exami nes some of
t hose f act or s as t hey r el at ed t o t he pl anni ng pr oces s t hat
cul mi nat ed i n Del i berat e Force.
NATO and UN Institutional Factors
A review of NATOs hi st or i cal pl anni ng process l eadi ng up t o
Del i berat e Force hel ps one underst and what NATO pl anned
and executedand why. Deliberate Force did not fit NATOs
t r adi t i onal pl anni ng focus, historically oriented on a defensive
st r at egy. That st r at egy accept ed t he pr emi se t hat t he enemy
(i. e. , the Warsaw Pact ) would attack first. NATO, bl oodi ed but
not bowed, woul d wi t hst and t he i ni t i al onsl aught , r egai n
what ever t erri t ory i t mi ght have l ost , and at l east rest ore t he
borders of NATO member nat i ons. That st r at egy envi si oned no
requi rement t o proj ect force beyond t he t erri t ory of member
nat i ons, except t o reest abl i sh al l i ance borders. Thus, i nvol ve -
ment i n Deny Fl i ght and Del i berat e Forcebot h of whi ch were
out -of-area, proact i ve operat i ons compelled NATO t o r et hi nk
i t s hi st or i cal pl anni ng focus.
CAMPBELL
89
For i t s part , t he UN had never been i nvol ved i n an operat i on
on t he scal e of Deny Fl i ght or i n one wi t h t he proj ect ed mi s -
si on of Del i berat e Force. Because t he UN ha s no s t a ndi ng
mi l i t ary depart ment and rel i es on t roop-cont ri but i ng nat i ons
t o provi de forces t o conduct i t s operat i ons, very l i t t l e corporat e
memory exi st s wi t hi n t he i nst i t ut i on ot her t han for qui t e l i m-
i t ed mi ssi ons.
A di spari t y exi st ed bet ween UN and NATO i nst i t ut i onal per -
cept i ons of t he capabi l i t i es and l i mi t at i ons of ai rpower. That
di spari t y st emmed from de fact o di fferences i n t hei r hi st ori c
rol es i n confl i ct resol ut i on i n general and i n Bosni a-Herze -
govina i n par t i cul ar . On t he one hand, t he UNfocused on
humani t ar i an r el i ef a n d p e a c e k e e p i n gemphasi zed st r i ct
neut ral i t y and i mpart i al i t y, no mat t er t he provocat i on. NATO,
on t he ot her hand, sought t o pr ot ect UN t r oops and ot her s
unde r t he UN umbr el l a, event ual l y ar r ayi ng t he al l i ance
agai nst t he Bosni an Ser bs. These i nst i t ut i onal di fferences i n
viewpoint created a dilemma for NATO ai r campai gn pl anner s .
Thei r accumul at ed mi l i t ary experi ence and wi sdom argued for
aggressi ve, robust operat i ons t o coerce an adversary t o accede
to NATOs will (i. e. , to win the war). The UNs l ogi c of
peacekeepi ng, however, spoke for careful , measured, mi ni mal-
i st operat i ons t o preserve t he di al oguenot t o mi l i t ari l y de-
feat one group or t he ot her.
Throughout the years of NATOs involvement in Bosnia , UN
l eadersbot h mi l i t ary and ci vi l i anhad proven much more
rel uct ant t han NATO l eaders t o aut hori ze empl oyment of si g-
ni fi cant force agai nst t he regi ons combat ant s. Despi t e numer -
ous at roci t i es perpet rat ed agai nst one or t he ot her fact i ons
and despi t e count l ess provocat i ons commi t t ed agai nst UN a nd
NATO forces, t he UN l eadershi p st eadfast l y refused t o aut hor -
i ze ai r st ri kes for ot her t han ret al i at ory demonst rat i on event s.
Key Players
Al t hough i ndi vi dual s and organi zat i ons from many nat i ons
i nf l uenced t he pl anni ng and execut i on of Del i berat e Force, t he
pronounced US hue of i t s core pl anni ng and command f unc-
t ions was a fact of life. Ironically, the fact that virtually all senior
commander s and many of t he key pl anni ng-staff direct or s
DELIBERATE FORCE
90
i nvol ved i n t he Del i ber at e For ce chai n of command wer e
American was largely a quirk of fate. Since NATOs foundi ng,
i t s member s have sought t o ensur e t hat l eader shi p t hr ough -
out t he mi l i t ar y command st r uct ur e cl osel y mi r r or s t he f or ce
cont ri but i on of t he member st at es. The nat i onal i dent i t y of
commanders posi t i oned t hroughout t he al l i ance i s a careful l y
crafted political decision, usually requiring years of dialogue
and negot i at i on t o change. Lt Gen Mi ke Ryan, US Air Force
(USAF), was commander of Al l i ed Ai r Forces Sout hern Europe
(COMAIRSOUTH) and was desi gnat ed t he CFACC. Lt Gen An -
dr ea For nasi er o , Italian air force , was commander of t he 5t h
Allied Tactical Air Force (5 ATAF) at Dal Molin Air Base (AB),
Vicenza, It al y. Maj Gen Hal Hornburg, USAF, director of the 5
ATAF combi ned ai r operat i ons cent er (CAOC) at Vicenza , Italy,
worked directly for General Ryan . Brig Gen David A. Sawyer ,
USAF, was both deputy commander of 5 ATAF and deput y
director of the CAOC. Most of t he seni or l eadershi p i n t he
CAOC consisted of USAF colonels. The collegial relationship
bet ween t he AI RSOUTH and CAOC s t a f f s e a s e d Ge ne r a l
Ryan s t ask of pl anni ng and execut i ng t he Deny Fl i ght and,
l at er, Del i berat e Forceai r operat i ons.
Recognizing the lack of sensitivity and undesirability of an
all-US chain of command for Operation Deny Flight, Generals
Ryan and Hor nbur g asked all participating NATO nat i ons t o
provide senior staff members for the CAOCwith limited suc-
cess.
3
Although each nation (except the United States ) had a
senior national representative at the CAOC, US officers provided
t he bul k of ai r operat i ons pl anni ng and l eadershi p t here.
4
Adm Leighton W. Smith, US Navy, commander in chief of Allied
Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH)the combined force
commander in the regionensured that a direct line of commu-
ni cat i ons exi st ed bet ween hi s headquart ers and t hat of hi s ai r
component commander, General Ryan. The t wo commanders
coul d t hus share an underst andi ng of t he Bosni a si t uat i on.
Admiral Smith provi ded General Ryan appropri at e gui dance and
di rect i on, ensuri ng t hat he had t he forces t o accompl i sh t he
mission. Admiral Smith saw t o i t t hat t he ai r operat i ons pl an
was in harmony with the strategic direction fort hcomi ng from
hi s boss, Gen Geor ge Joul wan, US Army, Supreme Allied Com-
mander Europe (SACEUR). Thus, a de facto all-American chain
CAMPBELL
91
of NATO air command existed for Bosnia operationsclearly
anomalous to the international nature of NATO.
NATO commanders (and, by ext ensi on, t hei r st affs) coordi-
nat ed t hei r act i ons at several l evel s wi t h t hei r opposi t e num-
ber s i n t he UN hi erarchy. Admi ral Smi t h worked closely with
Lt Gen Bernard Janvi er, Fr ench ar my, force commander (FC)
of the United Nations Peace Forces (UNPF, previ ousl y known
as United Nations Protection Force [UNPROFOR]) , headquar -
tered in Zagreb, Croatia .
5
Subor di nat e t o Gener al Janvi er was
Lt Gen Rupert Smi t h , Br i t i sh ar my, commander of UNPRO-
FOR in Bosnia , headquart ered i n Saraj evo. General Smi t h a nd
General Ryan coordi nat ed t hei r t act i cal and operat i onal deci -
si ons di rect l y, j ust as General Janvi er and Admi ral Smi t h did
at t he st rat egi c l evel s.
Both the NATO and UN mi l i t ary commands were responsi ve
to their respective civilian political masters. The NAC , the high -
est civilian body of the alliance, and Willy Claes, NATO secre-
t ary-general , exerci sed command aut hori t y over NATO mi l i t ary
forces t hrough General Joul wan . The UN Security Council ex-
erci sed i t s aut hori t y t hrough Bout ros Bout ros-Ghal i , UN secre-
t ary-general . Yasushi Akashi, speci al represent at i ve t o t he UN
secretary-general, exercised day-to-day civilian authority over
t he UN-assi gned forces t hrough General Janvi er .
The Cont act Group of nat i ons and i t s negot i at i ng t eam, l ed
by US ambassador Ri char d Hol br ooke, al so served as key
pl ayers pri or t o and duri ng Del i berat e Force. Al t hough not
formal l y i n t he chai n of command of ei t her t he UN or NATO,
t he Cont act Gr oup exerci sed consi derabl e sway over t he mi l i -
t ary act i ons t aken. The focus of concern for Ambassador Hol -
brooke and hi s t eam was t he pol i t i cal negot i at i ons i n whi ch
they were involved. However, they were quite familiar with the
ai r operat i on as i t unfol ded and were i n t he best pl ace t o
wi t ness f i r st hand i t s i mpact on t he l eader shi p of t he war r i ng
fact i ons. As t i me wore on and t he st art of Del i berat e Force
appr oached, t hi s negot i at i ng t eam became much l ess r espon -
si ve t o t he Cont act Group and much mor e di r ect ed f r om t he
US l eadershi p.
Despite the heavy American flavor of the NATO command
st r uct ur e, i nt er nat i onal concer ns and r el at i onshi ps hel ped
s hape t he pl anni ng for Deny Fl i ght and, l at er, Del i berat e
DELIBERATE FORCE
92
Force. Because many of t he i ndi vi dual s weari ng UN bl ue be-
ret s on t he UNPF/ UNPROFOR st af f s and i n t he uni t s wer e
from NATO member nat i ons, t hey were qui t e fami l i ar wi t h
NATO t act i cal and operat i onal pl anni ng met hods and pr oce-
dures. However, t hey operat ed wi t hi n a pol i t i cal syst em very
different than that of NATOone, as ment i oned above, t hat
di d not have t he same dept h of experi ence or knowl edge of
mi l i t ary capabi l i t i es and l i mi t at i ons. Thus, al t hough most po-
litical leaders of the NATO nat i ons were fami l i ar wi t h mi l i t ary
ai r operat i ons on t he scal e bei ng cont empl at ed for Bosni a-
Herzegovina , UN l eadershi p had l i t t l e experi ence i n pl anni ng a
coerci ve operat i on on t hi s scal e. But because of t he i ncreasi ng
importance of offensive air operations in Deny Flight/ Del i b -
er at e For ce pl anni ng, consi derabl e debat e resul t ed wi t hi n bot h
t he UN and the NATO nat i ons.
The Pl anni ng Trai l Begi ns
The root s of what woul d become Del i berat e Force st em from
l at e 1992. The Serbs (of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia)
and Bosni an Ser bs were fl yi ng combat mi ssi ons i n support of
gr ound oper at i ons i n t he newl y r ecogni zed Bosni a- Her ze -
govina. Deci di ng t o moni t or t he si t uat i on i n an effort t o carry
out i t s mandat e, t he UN Securi t y Counci l i n Oct ober 1992
asked NATO t o provi de ai r survei l l ance i n support of UNPRO-
FOR. Consequently, NATO began Operat i on Sky Moni t or l at er
t hat mont h. I n December 1992, as t he Uni t ed St at es prepared
t o suppor t humani t ar i an ai r dr op and ai r l i f t oper at i ons into
Bosni a-Herzegovi na, Gen Robert C. Oaks , t hen commander i n
chief of US Air Forces Europe (CINCUSAFE),
6
appoi nt ed Maj
Gen J ames E. Chamber s (t hen commander of Sevent eent h Ai r
Force) j oi nt force ai r component commander (JFACC) for US
Joi nt Task Force Provi de Promi se. The joint task force com-
mander at t hat t i me was Adm Jer emy M. Boor da , US Navy,
Admi ral Smi t hs predecessor as CINCSOUTH and (as was Ad -
mi ral Smi t h ) commander i n chi ef of US Naval Forces Europe.
Gener al Chamber s operat ed for t he fi rst four mont hs from
Ramst ei n AB, Ger many, bui l di ng hi s st aff and conduct i ng op -
erat i ons i n coordi nat i on wi t h t he UN on a bi l at eral basi s.
CAMPBELL
93
In March 1993 t he UN Securi t y Counci l vot ed t o est abl i sh a
no-fly zone over Bosnia , and NATO began enf or cement of t hat
exclusionary zone in April. NATO act i vat ed t he CAOC, and
General Oaks di spat ched Gener al Chamber s t o form i t s core.
The est abl i shed command r el at i onshi ps pl aced t he CAOC
t echni cal l y under command of General Fornasi ero yet al so
subordinate to COMAIRSOUTH; Gener al Chamber s became
the director of the CAOC. Lt Gen Joseph W. Ashy, then COM-
AIRSOUTH, assumed dut i es as t he CFACC. The CAOC re-
mai ned responsi ve t o t he commander of 5 ATAF yet became
t he de f act o command post for COMAIRSOUTH as t he CFACC.
From t he st art of Deny Fl i ght i n Apri l 1993, General s Ashy
and Chamber s worked closely, their two staffs essentially be-
comi ng t he l ong- r ange pl anni ng and oper at i ons el ement s of a
si ngl e organi zat i on.
From t he begi nni ng of t he no-fl y-zone enf or cement i n t he
spri ng of 1993 t hrough t he compl et i on of Del i berat e Force,
mi l i t ary commanders and t hei r st affs on bot h si des of t he
Adriatic devel oped cl ose worki ng rel at i onshi ps t hat resul t ed i n
unity of effort, if not unity of command and control (C
2
). The
primary tool used by NATO t o effect t hi s coordi nat i on and t o
l ay out i t s pl an for support of t he pol i t i cal deci si ons was CINC-
SOUTH Operations Plan (OPLAN) 40101 Deny Flight. Al-
t hough t he pl an was NATOs t heat er pl an and t hus bor e t he
logo of Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), AIRSOUTH
cont ri but ed consi derabl e t i me and t al ent t o i t s devel opment .
Indeed, the UNPROFOR staff in Zagreb also played a role in
formul at i ng t he pl an t o ensur e t hat i t t r ul y suppor t ed t he UN
f or ces and achi evement of t hei r mandat e.
7
Thi s pl an became
the off-the-shelf plan for i mpl ement at i on or revi si on as nec-
essary and l at er formed t he backbone for Del i berat e Force.
OPLAN 40101 had i t s pol i t i cal root s i n UN Securi t y Counci l
resolutions (UNSCR) and decisions of the NAC . The devel opi ng
pl an i ncor por at ed t he const r ai nt s and r est r ai nt s i mposed by
t he pol i t i cal aut hori t i es. Duri ng t he summer of 1993, adopt i on
of UNSCR 836 i ni t i at ed t he pl anni ng for and depl oyment of
forces to support the first-ever provision of offensive air sup-
port t o a UN effort.
8
Admiral Boorda and General Ashy over -
s aw t he pl anni ng process al t hough t he respect i ve st affs had
responsi bi l i t y for day-t o-day refi nement of t he pl an. General
DELIBERATE FORCE
94
Ashy formed a smal l core of ai r pl anners the Deny Flight air
operat i ons cent er (AOC) at COMAIRSOUTHs Naples h e a d-
quar t erschargi ng t hem t o t hi nk more broadl y t han t he AIR-
SOUTH st aff di d. Thi s cel l served as a st rat egy-devel opment
t eam upon whi ch Gener al Ashy and, l at er, General Ryan de-
pended t o devel op t he ai r operat i ons pl ans t o pursue NATO
obj ect i ves i n t he Bal kans. This strategy cell f unct i oned si mi-
larly to the Black Hole of Operat i on Desert St orm notoriety.
Even duri ng t he earl y st ages of Deny Fl i ght, i t became appar -
ent t o General Ashy t hat much mor e mi ght be r equi r ed i n t he
end. As a resul t he t ook st eps t o ensure t he i dent i fi cat i on of
significant targets and t he mai nt enance of t ar get f ol der s t hat
woul d support a more i nvol ved mi ssi on t han t he one envi -
sioned early on. Col Daniel Doc Zoerb assumed l eader shi p of
this strategy cell i n earl y 1994.
The operat i onal envi ronment wi t hi n whi ch t he AIRSOUTH
and CAOC pl anner s had t o operat e di ffered i n many aspect s
from any t hey had previ ousl y experi enced. The pol i t i cal com-
plexities, even the difficulty in identifying the enemy, guar -
ant eed t hat NATOs fi rst l arge-scal e operat i on woul d be very
di fferent from Ameri cas l ast l arge-scal e operat i onDesert
St orm. Bosni a cont ai ns ext remes of geography and weat her
not found i n Sout hwest Asi a; mount ai nous and heavi l y fo -
l i aged t errai n render t he gat heri ng of t arget i nt el l i gence a nd
t he preci se del i very of weapons more probl emat i c t han over
fl at , open desert s. Dug-i n t roops and di spersed fi el d equi p -
ment woul d prove rel at i vel y di ffi cul t t o l ocat e and accurat el y
t arget . The presence of fri endl i es (not t o ment i on t he press
and nongovernment al organi zat i ons) i n t he vi ci ni t y of t arget s
posed anot her concer n not f aced t o t he same ext ent i n Deser t
St or m. The ai r space was const r ai ned bot h i n shape and si ze,
compri si ng a vi rt ual t ri angl e of 150 naut i cal mi l es on a si de.
The presence of neut ral count ri es on t wo si des and ext ensi ve
civil air traffic transiting all sides of the triangle greatly com-
pl i cat ed t he ai rspace-cont rol probl em. The rul es of engage -
ment (ROE), therefore, were crafted very carefully to render
mi st akes i n empl oyment a very remot e possi bi l i t y.
From i t s i ncept i on i n 1993, OPLAN 40101 cont ai ned provi -
si ons t o go beyond t he st ri ct enforcement of a no-fl y zone over
Bosni a-Herzegovi na. Following the issuance of UNSCR 836 i n
CAMPBELL
95
June 1993, NATO revised the draft of OPLAN 40101 t o i ncl ude
provi si ons for t aki ng offensi ve act i on i n support of UN objec-
t i ves, i f and when t hat shoul d ever be approved.
Each provocation of the UN or new at t ack on a safe area
prompted a responsealways political or occasionally military
(see chaps. 2 and 3 for a det ai l ed t reat ment of t he background t o
the actual operation). The large number of provocations indi-
cated that the offending party ignored the political responses.
Suffice it to say that in response to the changing situation in
Bosnia and to the world communitys reaction to it, the plan
underwent continuous revision from early 1993 onwardmost
recently in May 1995, only four months before Deliberate Force
began. The core of OPLAN 40101, the concept of operations
(CONOPS), established five phases for the air operation, extend-
ing from initial planning through final redeployment upon mis -
sion completion (table 4. 1). Construction of the phases was
closely linked to the ROE t hat were est abl i shed and cont i nu-
ously modified (see chap. 14 for a detailed discussion of ROE).
Wi t hi n phases t hree and four, st eps and measures furt her
delineated specific actions that the commander could take to
respond to a changing operational environment. These steps
and measures allowed NATO and t he UN to gradually increase
the level of force applied to any warring faction in response to
noncompliance with terms of the UNSCRs . Thi s pl anned gradu -
alism served to place checkpoints (some would say roadbl ocks)
Table 4.1
OPLAN 40101 Deny Flight Phases and Objectives
Phase Objective(s)
1 Compliance
2 Show Presence
3
Air-to-Air Enforcement and Close Air
Support (CAS) Operations
4 Offensive Air Operations
5 Termination and Redeployment
Source: Condensed from Headquarters Allied Forces Southern Europe, CINCSOUTH OPLAN 40101, Deny
Flight, change 4, 3 May 1993.
DELIBERATE FORCE
96
t o unr est r ai ned escal at i on by t he NATO commander s . The
NAC r equi r ed t hose checkpoi nt s t o account f or t he ver y
compl ex pol i t i cal i nf l uences wei ghi ng on t he mi l i t ar y com-
mander s. Unt i l t he i ni t i at i on of Del i ber at e For ce, t he ai r - t o-
ai r and CAS st eps of phase t hr ee wer e aut hor i zed onl y i n
di rect support of UN forces. Addi t i onal l y, t he UN on occa -
si on had aut hor i zed t he of f ensi ve ai r oper at i ons of phase
f our t he so- cal l ed f i r st - st r i ke opt i on one. These st r i kes
wer e der i si vel y known as pi npr i cks, an accur at e descr i p -
t i on of t he l evel of damage i nfl i ct ed on t he t ar get . Ot her t han
t hese, t he UN had aut hor i zed no subsequent ai r oper at i ons.
Any furt her act i ons woul d requi re bot h UN and NATO com-
mander s appr oval f or any ai r at t acks , whi ch became known
as t he dual - key mechani sm (see chap. 2).
Faci l i t i es and Processes
NATO C
2
faci l i t i es are not known for bei ng st at e-of-t he-art
or , i n some cases, even f or bei ng adequat e t o t he t ask at hand.
Historically, NATOs Sout hern Regi on has r ecei ved syst em and
faci l i t y upgrades onl y aft er t he ot her regi ons recei ved t hei rs.
Therefore, 5 ATAF and AFSOUTH/ AIRSOUTH had l ong exi st ed
wi t h l ess-t han-opt i mal faci l i t i es and equi pment . Communi ca -
t i ons and comput er s const i t ut ed obvi ous weaknesses, and t he
l ack of adequat e offi ce or command-cent er space proved prob-
l emat i c. Thus, i n t he summer of 1995, as event s i n Bosni a
heat ed upsparked speci fi cal l y by vul nerabi l i t i es i dent i fi ed af-
t er t he downi ng of a US Ai r Force F-16 t hat Junet he Uni t ed
St at es t ook uni l at eral act i on. At General Ryan s r e que s t , a
Headquar t er s USAF t eam conduct ed t he s o- cal l ed Baker
St udy i n l at e Jul y, whi ch spar ked numer ous i mpr ovement s t o
operat i onal condi t i ons at t he CAOC and put i n mot i on many
per sonnel and equi pment enhancement s. The US 32d Ai r Op-
er at i ons Gr oup from Ramst ei n AB, Germany, among ot her s,
provi ded di rect support t o pl anni ng and t aski ng i n t he form of
comput er s, communi cat i ons, and per sonnel .
Al t hough t he Uni t ed St at es i ni t i at ed t he Baker St udy a nd
r es ul t ant C
2
syst ems i mprovement s, NATO s houl d have pur-
chased t he i mpr ovement s t o i t s syst ems under nor mal condi-
t i ons. However , t he quest i on of who woul d pay t he bi l l s
CAMPBELL
97
r emai ned a noni ssue set asi de f or set t l ement at a l at er dat e.
As the US national force provider for the NATO Eur opean
t heat er, Gen Ri chard E. Hawl ey, then CINCUSAFE, di d not
concern hi msel f wi t h t he i dea t hat NATO pl anni ng and pr o -
cur ement pr ocesses wer e bei ng usur ped. He was mor e i nt er -
est ed i n get t i ng t he j ob done. When General Ryan identified a
requi rement , t herefore, USAFE (or even Headquart ers USAF)
provi ded i t as compl et el y and qui ckl y as possi bl e. In fact by
t he t i me Del i berat e Force began, t he opposi t e probl em oc -
curred, wi t h equi pment vi rt ual l y fl oodi ng t he CAOC.
9
During July 1995, in an effort to improve the air campaign
pl anni ng process, the CAOC invited Col Dave Deptula , one of
the architects of the Desert Storm ai r campai gn, t o assi st t he
CAOC and the AOC pl anners in thinking through the develop-
ment of t hei r ai r operat i ons pl an.
10
Checkmat e pl anner s a t
Headquarters USAF/XOCC provided more helpin terms of
bot h i nt el l ect and equi pment . The assi st ance provi ded by t hese
and ot her i ndi vi dual s markedl y i mproved t he pl anni ng process
itself, helping the staff focus on the essentials of the plan.
Thi s effort t o i mprove t he processes and product s of t he
CAOC became qui t e i nt ense by l at e August 1995, as NATO
and t he UN made t he necessary pol i t i cal deci si ons t o aut hor -
i ze t he empl oyment of ai rpower. Not onl y woul d t he i mpendi ng
action be NATOs fi rst sust ai ned empl oyment of ai rcraft i n t he
ai r-t o-ground mi ssi on, but al so i t woul d be t he UNs f i r st use
of offensive airpower to coerce belligerent parties to resolve a
confl i ct . The precedent -set t i ng i mport ance of t hat fact was not
l ost on t he CFACC or hi s pl anni ng staff.
The Air Campaign Plan
The Del i berat e Force ai r campai gn pl an event ual l y refl ect ed
several elements of OPLAN 40101 but also differed from it in
many ways. To ful l y underst and t he pl an as NATO event ual l y
execut ed i t , as wel l as t he rat i onal e for i t , one needs t o exam-
i ne t he pr ogr essi on of t he var i ous r el at ed and suppor t i ng
pl ans t hat resul t ed i n t he fi rst weapon del i very on 30 August
1995. Thi s i nvol ves exami ni ng t he framework est abl i shed by
OPLAN 40101 as descr i bed above and t hen movi ng t hr ough
DELIBERATE FORCE
98
several key event s i n t he devel opment of t he Del i berat e Force
ai r campai gn pl an. The met amorphosi s of t he mi l i t ary obj ec-
tives and t he st rat egi es empl oyed t o achi eve t hem are of par -
t i cul ar i mport ance.
Earl y Pl an Devel opment
Ant ecedent s of t he i ni t i al pl anni ng for what woul d become
Del i berat e Force dat e from t he deci si ons made by t he NAC in
August 1993. In response t o UNSCR 836, whi ch aut hori zed
the use of force to protect UNPROFOR and t he saf e ar eas ,
NATO pl anner s devel oped t he so-cal l ed operat i onal opt i ons for
ai r st ri kes i n Bosni a-Herzegovi na.
11
Those opt i ons l ooked very
much l i ke t he skel et on of a CONOPS f or an ai r campai gn pl an
and di d, i n fact , become t he t ouchst one for al l fut ure pl ans.
The document essent i al l y est abl i shed opt i ons or progressi ve
phases t hat NATO coul d i mpl ement t o support varyi ng l evel s
of need from t he UN:
Opt i on One: Fi r st - St r i ke Phase
l i mi t ed i n scope and durat i on
ai med agai nst mi l i t ari l y si gni fi cant t arget s t hat i mpede or
prevent implementation of UNSCRs
l ow chance of col l at eral damage , hi gh chance of success
at t ack conduct ed by more t han one nat i oni deal l y as
many as possible
exampl e: art i l l ery bat t eri es part i ci pat i ng i n t he si ege of
Saraj evo
Option Two: Initial Follow-on Phase
l i mi t ed t o i mmedi at e envi rons of safe area
relief of siege; later expanded to support of UNPROFOR
exampl es: art i l l ery and heavy weapons; suppl y poi nt s and
muni t i ons si t es; C
2
facilities; early warning (EW) r adar
and surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites
Opt i on Thr ee: Expanded Oper at i ons Phase
expanded out si de i mmedi at e ar ea under si ege
reat t acks approved agai nst previ ous t arget s as necessar y
requi red addi t i onal pol i t i cal approval
CAMPBELL
99
exampl es: same as opt i on t wo pl us mi l i t ary-rel at ed pet ro -
l eum, oi l , and l ubri cant s; count erai r t hreat s; and CAS
The two main differences between options two and three were
geographic linkage and infrastructure. Whereas option two was
closely tied to particular safe areas and t arget s immediately
affecting the warring factions there, option three permitted more
robust attack without specific linkage to a safe area and coul d
affect the infrastructure of the belligerent. The differentiation
between option-two and -three targets was muddled, however, in
that option-three strikes might well result in increased collateral
damage and were seen as a huge political step to take.
In conj unct i on wi t h t hi s skel et on pl anni ng effort , i n t he fal l
of 1993 NATO and t he UN began t o coordi nat e l i st s of pot en -
t i al t arget s t hat mi ght be st r uck i n t he event t he UN request ed
ai r support . Al t hough pl anners di d consi derabl e work on t he
t arget l i st s over t he i nt erveni ng t wo years, few peopl e out si de
t he AOC at AIRSOUTH in Naples seem t o have consi der ed t he
t ar get s part of a t heat erwi de campai gn pl an. From t i me t o
t i me, i n response t o some sort of provocat i on, t he UN would
requestand NATO would flylimited strikes against selected
t ar get s. One such st r i ke t ook pl ace i n ear l y 1994 agai nst t he
Bosni an Serb ai rfi el d at Udbi na i n t he Kraj i na region of Croa -
tia . NATO hi t t he ai rfi el d i n response t o fl agrant vi ol at i ons of
the no-fly zone, yet wi t hout havi ng a cl ear operat i onal obj ec-
tive. The UN prevented NATO from dest royi ng si gni fi cant t ar -
gets and put t i ng t he ai rfi el d out of busi ness, i nt endi ng t he
at t ack merel y as a si gnal of t he resol ve of t he worl d commu-
nity to enforce the provisions of UNSCRs to end the fighting.
Such pi npr i ck at t acksdi sconnect ed event s wi t h no r eal l i nk-
age t o one anot heraccompl i shed l i t t l e i n t he end.
Throughout 1994 NATO military and civilian leaders contin -
ued t o encourage t hei r count erpart s i n t he UN to take a broa der
vi ew of t he pot ent i al i mpact of an ai r campai gn and such a
campaigns ability to achieve theater objectives. Detailed coor -
dination of a list of targets began i n earnest . More i mpor -
tantly, the military objectives and, specifically, the air objec-
t i ves began t o come i nt o much bet t er focus. Thi s i ncreasi ngl y
cl ear di rect i on al l owed pl anners at the AOC and t he CAOC in
Vicenza to plan the prosecution of target sets syst emat i cal l y
DELIBERATE FORCE
100
wi t h t he i nt ent of affect i ng t he BSAs center of gravity (COG).
The list of targets became mor e t han si mpl y an l a car t e
menu from whi ch t o choose one or t wo i t ems.
Fol l owi ng a seri es of i nci dent s i n l at e 1994 i nvol vi ng t he
targeting of NATO ai rcraft by t he Bosni an Serb i nt egrat ed ai r
defense syst em (IADS), and wi t h UN Securi t y Counci l concur-
rence, the NAC appr oved t he pl anni ng and conduct of s up-
pressi on of enemy ai r defenses (SEAD) apart from t he CAS or
ot her t arget i ng of opt i on t wo. In response t o t hi s broadened
pl anni ng aut hori zat i on, t he CAOC devel oped a pl an t o syst em-
at i cal l y at t ack EW, SAM, a n d C
2
si t es t hat posed a t hr eat
wi t hi n Bosni a-Herzegovi na. Most of t he pot ent i al t arget s ex-
i st ed i n Bosni an Ser bhel d t erri t ory. The pl an l at er became
known as Oper at i on Deadeye. Thr oughout t he spr i ng of 1995,
t he CAOC conduct ed ext ensi ve nodal anal ysi s and compl et ed
i ni t i al wor k on t he pl an.
12
It focused on force prot ect i on
t hrough t he el i mi nat i on, or at l east degradat i on, of t he Bos -
ni an Serb armys IADS (fig. 4. 1). For political reasons, this
operat i on was l at er spl i t i nt o t wo hal ves, Deadeye Sout heast
and Deadeye Nor t hwest.
Figure 4.1. Operation Deadeye Key Nodes (Extracted from briefing, Lt Gen
Michael Ryan, COMAIRSOUTH and commander, Sixteenth Air Force, to US
Air Force Corona Conference, subject: Operation Deliberate Force, February
1996. [Secret] Information extracted is unclassified)
CAMPBELL
101
Summer 1995: The Si t uat i on Int ensi f i es
NATO ai r cr af t at t acked t he Pal e a mmuni t i on de pot on
2425 May 1995 i n r esponse t o escal at i ng Bosni an Ser b
t hr eat s t o t he east er n saf e ar eas. I n r esponse, t he Bosni an
Ser bs t ook UN per sonnel host age, a si t uat i on t hat per si st ed
for weeks and spurred devel opment of yet anot her pl an whi ch
fi nal l y began t o draw t oget her t he di sparat e el ement s of pre-
vi ous pl anni ng efforts. This plan, NATO Air Operations in
Bosni a-Herzegovi na, existed in the form of briefing slides and
memos onl y and was t he i mmedi at e pr ecur sor t o Del i ber at e
Force. A t wo-st ep and t i me-sequenced campai gn pl an, i t pro -
vi ded for escal at ory measures shoul d t he UN and NATO com-
manders agree t hat t hey were not meet i ng earl i er obj ect i ves.
The CAOC r equest ed and r ecei ved assi st ance f r om Checkmat e
i n revi ewi ng t he pl an; t hi s hel ped furt her refi ne t he obj ect i ves
and associ at ed t asks and measur es of mer i t f or achi evi ng each
objective.
13
Planning for Deadeye , which had not yet been imple -
ment ed, cont i nued t o percol at e on a separat e but paral l el t rack.
On 2 J une 1995, Bas her 52, a US F- 16 flying a Deny Flight
mi ssi on, was shot down near t he Bosni an Ser b st ronghol d of
Banj a Luka. Consequently, COMAIRSOUTH briefed Operation
Deadeye for t he fi rst t i me and spurred i nt ensi fi ed work on i t s
provi si ons.
14
The objective of Deadeye was t o provi de support
t o ongoi ng Deny Fl i ght oper at i ons and ensur e f r eedom of
movement t hroughout Bosni a-Herzegovi na by NATO aircraft
enforcing the no-fly zone. Wi t h t he shoot down of Basher 52,
t he Deny Fl i ght operat i onal concept was revi sed and refocused
wi t h a st ronger emphasi s on force prot ect i on. The revi sed
CONOPS, t herefore, sought t o reduce fri endl y force exposure
yet cont i nued t o support UN mandat es .
15
Int erest i ngl y, pl an-
ner s made no formal modi fi cat i ons t o OPLAN 40101 at t hi s
t i me but r evi sed t he gui dance and di r ect i on t o account f or t he
change in policy.
Dur i ng l at e June and Jul y, event s i n- t heat er escal at ed t he
pace of work at a number of l ocat i ons. At nat i onal , NATO, and
UN headquart ers, offi ci al s formul at ed pl ans t o respond t o t he
changi ng nat ure of t he confl i ct . The UN saf e ar eas of Zepa a nd
Sr ebr eni ca fel l , and Gorazde came under i ncr eased t hr eat .
Although NATO employed CAS around Srebreni ca i n an att empt
DELIBERATE FORCE
102
t o forest al l i t s bei ng overrun, a broad appl i cat i on of force on a
wi der scal e t hat woul d not i ceabl y affect t he Bosni an Serbs
was l acki ng. Escal at i ng vi ol ence and t hr eat s of vi ol ence
agai nst t he r emai ni ng saf e ar eas made i t appear l i kel y t hat
NATO would have to use sustained offensive military force.
AIRSOUTH and CAOC pl anner s had al ready begun devel op -
ing a plan to provide CAS or battlefield air interdiction to
pr event Gor azde f r om bei ng over r un. Al t hough of a scal e
l arger t han t hat previ ousl y empl oyed, t he pl an woul d fal l short
of an ai r campai gn pl an. Short l y aft er t he Jul y summi t i n
London and t he subsequent NAC deci si on t o get t ough, pl an-
ner s devel oped si mi l ar document s for t he defense of Saraj evo,
Tuzla , and Bi hac. The pl ans exi st ed pri nci pal l y i n t he form of
bri efi ng sl i des wi t h l i t t l e support i ng mat eri al . Al l of t hem were
safe-area-speci fi c and not part of an operat i onal -l evel t heat er
ai r campai gn.
The Del i berate Force Pl an Takes Shape
Each of t he safe-area-specific plans focused on militarily
significant targets i n t he i mmedi at e vi ci ni t y of t hat safe area .
Concent rat i ons of forces, heavy weapons, and l i nes of commu-
ni cat i ons const i t ut ed t ypi cal t arget set s . These pl ans sought t o
defend t hei r respect i ve popul at i ons from Bosni an Serb at t ack.
Deadeye Sout heast and Nor t hwest would provide SEAD for
any of t hose ar ea pl ans.
The chance of t he UNs approvi ng sust ai ned, l arge-scal e ai r
st ri kes had seemed qui t e remot e before, but t he deci si ons
t aken at t he London summi t sol i di fi ed NATO resol ve and em-
bol dened t he UN.
16
The earlier CONOPS, NATO Air Operations
to Stabilize Bosnia-Herzegovina, agai n underwent revi si on.
A key modi f i cat i on t o t he pl an, r esul t i ng f r om act i vi t y
among warri ng fact i ons i n Jul y, was t he UNs adopt i on of t he
NATO view of wider zones of action (ZOA) , whi ch ent ai l ed an
i ncrease i n radi us of t he t ot al -excl usi on zone ar ound each saf e
ar ea from 20 kilometers (km) to 25 km. The ZOAs pr oposed by
AIRSOUTH, however, coi nci ded wi t h t he subdi vi si on of t he
Deadeye pl an, part i t i oni ng Bosni a-Herzegovi na i nt o sout heast
a nd northwest ZOAs . An area of overlap existed in the northeast
corner of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the vicinity of the Posavi na
CAMPBELL
103
Corridor (fig. 4. 2). The southeast ZOA cont ai ned t he saf e ar eas
of Sarajevo and Gorazde, whi l e Bi hac l ay i n t he nort hwest
ZOA. The Tuzla safe area was in both ZOAs . The UN ul t i -
mat el y accept ed t hi s ZOA subdivision of Bosnia and t he i mpl i -
cat i on t hat t ar get s wel l away from t he safe areas coul d be
at t acked. Thi s change i n UN t hi nki ng was i mpor t ant t o t he
eventual approval of the relatively wide-scale Deliberate Force.
Adoption of the wider ZOAs permi t t ed t he appl i cat i on of
syst emat i c ai r-t o-ground t arget i ng t o effect t he desi red out-
come i n t he saf e ar eas. Al t hough t he ZOA concept di d not
allow unfettered application of airpower by NATO t hr oughout
Bosni a-Herzegovi na, t he concept was a si gni fi cant st ep i n t he
di rect i on of a st rat egi c ai r campai gn. The UN fi nal l y under -
st ood t hat act i vi t i es occurri ng out si de t he safe areas by t he
war r i ng f act i ons had a si gni f i cant i mpact on mor e t han one
safe areai ndeed, on t he ent i re count ry.
Figure 4.2. Zones of Action (Extracted from briefing, Lt Gen Michael Ryan,
COMAIRSOUTH and commander, Sixteenth Air Force, to US Air Force
Corona Conference, subject: Operation Deliberate Force, February 1996.
[Secret] Information extracted is unclassified)
DELIBERATE FORCE
104
Pl anni ng f or Del i ber at e For ce cont i nued si mul t aneousl y
wi t h pl anni ng for t he prot ect i on of i ndi vi dual safe areas a nd
for t he conduct of Deadeye t hr oughout Jul y and August . An -
other intermediate plan developed by AIRSOUTH and CAOC
pl anner s was for Operat i on Vul can, desi gned t o bri ng t oget her
t he const i t uent par t s of ot her ar ea pl ans el ement s i nt o a
cohesi ve ai r operat i on i n t he sout heast ZOAespecially the
Saraj evo ar ea. Thi s pl an consi st ed of a mast er at t ack pl an
(MAP),
17
whi ch exi st ed i n t he form of bri efi ng sl i des. The Vul-
can plan primarily targeted radio relays (RADREL), SAMs , am-
muni t i on depot s, and mi l i t ary repai r faci l i t i es.
At about t he same t i me as t he devel opment of Vul can a nd
t he updat es t o t he ot her i ndi vi dual safe-area pl ans, anot her
AFSOUTH pl an/ bri efi ng ent i t l ed Graduat ed Ai r Operat i ons
18
showed t he connect edness of t ar get s i n t he vari ous safe-area
zones and ways t hey mi ght be at t acked i n a progressi ve and
syst emat i c manner . The pl an suggest ed expandi ng oper at i ons
into neighboring safe areas or across the entire country, if nec -
essary. As a precursor, t he pl an assumed freedom of action of
NATO ai r f or ces, and i t s assur ance r emai ned a key el ement of
al l pl anni ng efforts.
Even as t hese several pl ans evol ved, t he NATO Military
Commi t t ee provi ded gui dance and di rect i on for t he appl i cat i on
of a graduat ed st rat egy t o assess possi bl e react i ons of t he
part i es i n confl i ct fol l owi ng i t s meet i ng of 31 Jul y 1995:
Fi rst , t he obj ect i ve of det errence and, t hereaft er t he t wo ob-
jectives of providing CAS t o defend Fri endl y Forces . . . and t he
wider application [of] airpower in a wider context. . . . Finally, if
approved, t he appl i cat i on of ai rpower on a great er scal e.
19
Following that guidance, AIRSOUTH pl anner s devi sed a se-
quence of operat i ons t o represent t he bui l di ng bl ock nat ure
of pl anned oper at i ons and phased an escal at i on of at t acks on
t ar get s near t he s af e ar eas. I mpl ement at i on of t he phases
depended upon t he response by t he Bosni an Serbs t o t he pre-
vi ous phase. The pl anners also proposed other so-called non -
phased t arget s, but these largely fell into the option-three cate -
gory (OPLAN 40101 was still operative during this time).
20
The
London summi t had aut hor i zed i ncor por at i on of only option-
one and option-two targets into air-strike operational plans .
CAMPBELL
105
Al so i n August a key memor andum of under st andi ng known
as t he Ai r / Land Oper at i ons Coor di nat i on Document emerged.
That memor andum est abl i shed t he basi s f or coor di nat i on be-
tween AIRSOUTH (and by ext ensi on, t he CAOC) and t he UN
Rapi d React i on For ces ( RRF) oper at i ng under UNPROFOR,
i n t he event t hat of f ensi ve ai r - st r i ke oper at i ons began. The
r es ul t ant dr af t pl an
21
cal l ed for cl ose cooperat i on bet ween
t he ai r and l and component s of t he over al l oper at i on ( AI R-
SOUTH a nd RRF, r espect i vel y) al t hough t hey t echni cal l y
ser ved di f f er ent mast er s. Thi s pl an f or esaw t he need t o coor -
di nat e CAS and bat t l efi el d ai r i nt erdi ct i on mi ssi ons wi t h
RRF ar t i l l er y f i r es . Mor e t han t hat , coor di nat i on mecha-
ni sms evol ved t o mi ni mi ze t he chance of f r at r i ci de, limit
col l at er al damage, and gi ve t he RRF maxi mum oppor t uni t y
t o j oi nt l y ef f ect t he desi r ed out come. I n addi t i on, one shoul d
not e t hat t he f our t h and mos t vi ol ent phas e car r i ed t he
descr i pt or ai r/ l and operat i ons r a t he r t ha n ai r operat i ons, a s
us ed i n t he CI NCSOUTH/ FC UNPF me mor a ndum. Thi s
s eemi ngl y mi nor modi f i cat i on r ef l ect s t he nat ur e of t he
document s domi nant l and- oper at i ons t heme.
By mi d August , t herefore, NATO had devel oped a pat ch -
wor k of ai r oper at i ons pl ans t o deal wi t h a vari et y of cont i n -
genci es and t as ki ngs .
22
The pl ans t hemsel ves exi st ed i n t he
f or m of br i ef i ng sl i des onl y, not as f or mal wr i t t en document s
l i ke OPLAN 40101. Each br i ef i ngt her ef or e each pl anwas
r ef i ned t o gr eat er f i del i t y wi t h each pr esent at i on and as t he
si t uat i on i n t he ar ea of r esponsi bi l i t y c ha nge d. The na me
Deliberate Force s ur f aced about t hi s t i me as a l abel f or t he
col l ect i on of pl ans. Del i ber at e For ce br ought sever al com-
mon char act er i s t i cs t o t hes e pl ans : common under s t andi ng
of event s t hat coul d t ri gger NATO act i on, pl anni ng a s s u mp -
t i ons, obj ect i ve ( or end st at e) , and summar y of t he phased
s equences of at t ack:
Triggers
killing of UN host ages
at t ack on UN forces
concent rat i on of forces or heavy weapons deemed t o be a
di r ect t hr eat t o a saf e ar ea
shel l i ng of ci vi l i an popul at i on areas or safe areas
DELIBERATE FORCE
106
opposition to UN wi t hdrawal (preempt i ve or react i ve re-
sponse cont empl at ed)
Ai r Campai gn Pl an Assumpt i ons
international recognition of Bosnian Serbs as t he aggressors
necessary mandat es provi ded by UN and NATO
no opposition by Croatia to necessary air strikes on Krajin a
neutrality of Serbia
availability of assets from NATO cont r i but i ng nat i ons
agreement of basi ng nat i ons t o operat i ons from t hei r t er -
ritories
Bosni an Ser b COG: hi st ori c fear of domi nat i on
Bosni an Serb mi l i t ary advant age wi t h respect t o Bi H :
abi l i t y t o swi ng more capabl e but l ess numerous forces
equi pped wi t h heavy weapons t o pl aces of t hei r need or
choosi ng
at t acki ng Bosni an Serb advant ages l eads t o changi ng t he
bal ance of power t o t hei r di sadvant age
Bosni an Ser b real i zat i on of a shi ft i n advant age event u -
ates in their suing for termination of hostilities
onl y r obust at t ack l eads Bosni an Ser bs t o t hat real i zat i on
Military [Air] Objective
a robust NATO ai r campai gn t hat adver sel y al t er s t he
BSAs advant age i n conduct i ng successful mi l i t ary opera-
t i ons agai nst t he Bi H ; desi r ed end st at e: Bosni an Ser bs
sue for cessat i on of mi l i t ary operat i ons, compl y wi t h UN
mandat es, and negot i at e
Phased Sequence of At t ack
i sol at e l eadershi p and at t ack concent rat ed, t i me-sensi t i ve
t arget s
i sol at e fi el ded forces and at t ack suppl y/ l ogi st i cs base
at t ack fi el ded forces and sel ect ed i nfrast ruct ure
mai nt ai n nonphased sensi t i ve t ar get opt i ons
23
Del i berate Force: The Pl an
As a result of the UN/ NATO J oi nt Target i ng Board
24
of 14
August 1995, COMAIRSOUTH di st i l l ed t he approved l i st of
151 t ar get s t o 87 mi ssi on-speci fi c t arget s for i ncl usi on i n t he
CAMPBELL
107
Del i berat e Force pl an. These t arget s were of t he opt i on-one
and -t wo vari et yand Bosni an Serb only.
25
The few targets
grouped i n t he demonst rat i on cat egory consi st ed of onl y op-
t i on- one t ar get s and wer e subsumed wi t hi n t he br oader pl an.
Opt i on-t wo t arget s fel l i nt o t he ai r operat i ons cat egory. The
IADS target set was not originally part of the Deliberate
Force concept but const i t ut ed t he Deadeye piece of the overall
operation (fig. 4.3).
26
Fi el ded forces consi st ed mai nl y of heavy weapons r at her
t han t he per sonnel who manned t hem. Di r ect and essent i al
t ar get s i ncl uded muni t i ons depot s and st orage faci l i t i es as
well as supply depots and storage facilities. Command, cont rol ,
and communi cat i ons ( C
3
) consisted largely of RADRELs , ot her
Figure 4.3. Deliberate Force Air Strike Concept (Extracted from briefing, Lt
Gen Michael Ryan, COMAIRSOUTH and commander, Sixteenth Air Force,
to US Air Force Corona Conference, subject: Operation Deliberate Force,
February 1996. [Secret] Information extracted is unclassified. Although this
depiction is substantially the same as the Deliberate Force briefings of
August 1995, those earlier briefings had divided communications into a
separate category from C
2
/Leadership, and IADS was called EW/AIR
DEF. See AIRSOUTH briefing, subject: NATO Operations in Bosnia-
HerzegovinaDeliberate Force, c. August 1995 [NATO Secret], US Air
Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala.)
DELIBERATE FORCE
108
communi cat i ons nodes, and a few sel ect command faci l i t i es.
The IADS t ar get s consi st ed of EW and SAM sites primarily,
i ni t i al l y i n t he sout heast and t hen i nt o t he nor t hwest as nec-
essary. Target s i n t he i nf r ast r uct ur e category actually looked
mor e l i ke l i nes of communi cat i ons : t r ans por t at i on choke
poi nt s, br i dges, and t unnel s. Most t r ue i nf r ast r uct ur e t ar get s
wer e cont ai ned i n opt i on t hr ee. Pl anner s cl osel y exami ned t he
linkage of all targets i n an at t empt t o achi eve paral ysi s of t he
BSA wi t h mi ni mal effort and l oss of l i fe on bot h si des.
Obvi ousl y, one doesnt drop bombs on t arget set s or COGs
but on t hi ngshopeful l y t hose t hi ngs t he adversary consi ders
valuable. CAOC intelligence personnel had aggressi vel y sought
t o i dent i fy as many pot ent i al t arget s as possible. They evalu -
at ed t ar get s wi t hi n t he cat egori es as t o t hei r pot ent i al mi l i t ary
val ue and t he possi bi l i t y for col l at eral damage associ at ed wi t h
each desi red mean poi nt of i mpact (DMPI). Intelligence s pe-
ci al i st s t hen devi sed a t arget mat ri x t o ai d t he CFACC a nd
pl anner s i n sel ect i ng t arget s for attack (table 4.2).
Table 4.2
Example Target Matrix
Target Category Demonstration Value Moderate Value High Value
Air Defense EW Site Radar
East SAM Storage
Facility, DMPI: I-3
Electricity
Plant
C
3
Station Military C
3
RADREL Bunker
Military C
3
RADREL
Bunker, DMPI: I-6
Leadership Brigade Headquarters Division
Headquarters
Ground-Forces
Headquarters
Direct and
Essential
Military Facilities
Explosives Storage
Facility
DMPI: 12, 15
Vehicle Storage
Depot
Military Repair
Depot
Lines of
Communications
Highway Bridge Highway Bridge Highway Tunnel
Infrastructure Petroleum Storage Ammo, Metal
Parts Plant
DMPI: 8, 11, 12
Military Plant
Source: Extracted from briefing, Lt Gen Michael Ryan, COMAIRSOUTH and commander, Sixteenth Air Force,
to US Air Force Corona Conference, subject: Operation Deliberate Force, February 1996. (Secret) Information
extracted is unclassified.
CAMPBELL
109
As one may accurat el y surmi se from t he foregoi ng di scus-
si on of pl anni ng effort s t hat preceded t he act ual st art of ai r-
st r i ke oper at i ons, no si ngl e pl an cont ai ned al l component
pi eces of an ai r campai gn pl an. Because t he safe areas wer e
under const ant and i ncr easi ng t hr eat f r om t he Bosni an Ser b
fact i on and because of shi ft i ng st rat egi c gui dance from bot h
UN and higher NATO commands, t he CAOC and AIRSOUTH
pl anner s were prepared t o i mpl ement any one of t he seri es of
ai r operat i ons pl ans. As i t happened, an exerci se of t he Vul can
operation pl an was schedul ed f or 29 August t o 1 Sept ember
1995. The C
2
capabilities of the NATO forces and coordi nat i on
ar r angement s wi t h t he UN were set for eval uat i on. The i mpact
of a Bosni an Serb mor t ar r ound i n Sar aj evo, however, would
change t hose pl ans.
The Del i berate Force Pl an i n Acti on
Wi t h t he compl et i on of t he vari ous cont i ngency pl ans for
prot ect i on of t he safe areas and t he format i on of t he over -
archi ng Del i berat e Force pl an, t he i mpl ement at i on of any of
t hem now awai t ed t wo event s t hat had t o occur before ai r
st ri kes coul d begi n. One of t he warri ng fact i ons had t o pul l
one of the so-called triggers, and NATO and t he UN had t o
t ur n t he keys . Before t he l at t er event coul d occur, t he UNPF
commander deci ded t hat he had t o compl et el y redepl oy hi s
forces within Bosnia-Herzegovina i n order t o mi ni mi ze t he
possibility of a repeat of the earlier hostage t aki ng of UN
peacekeeper s (following the May attack on Pale ). UNPROFOR
compl et ed i t s redepl oyment , and General Janvi er, UNPF force
commander , was pr epar ed t o t ur n hi s key af t er 25 August .
27
The market pl ace mort ari ng on 28 August served t o pul l t he
requi red t ri gger. Admi ral Smi t h t urned t he NATO key i mmedi-
at el y, and Lt Gen Rupert Smi t h commander of UNPROFOR
in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Gener al Janvi er s subor di nat e
t ur ned t he UN key
28
on 29 August. NATO aircraft flew their
fi rst mi ssi ons at t he end of t hat t aski ng day.
29
At 0600Z on 29 August, COMAIRSOUTH and hi s st aff from
Naples arri ved at t he CAOC. Colonel Zoerb , AOC di rect or, and
Col Steve Teske, CAOC Pl ans di rect or, j oi nt l y oversaw t he
DELIBERATE FORCE
110
pl anni ng, t aski ng, and t ar get eer i ng pr ocess f r om t hat poi nt
on. Invol ved i n t hese processes were several speci al -purpose
cel l s, each wi t h i t s own area of expert i se or responsi bi l i t y and
staffed mostly by US Air Force personnel on t emporary dut y.
The fi rst days pl anned operat i ons deri ved most l y from Op-
erat i ons Vul can and Deadeye Sout heast . Initial SEAD and ai r
st ri kes t arget ed Bosni an Serb IADS, C
2
, and fi el ded forces.
Fi ve addi t i onal waves of st ri kes were pl anned agai nst t arget s
i n t he sout heast ZOA. Pr e- and post st r i ke r econnai ssance,
t anker , ai r bor ne ear l y war ni ng, electronic intelligence, air -
bor ne bat t l ef i el d command and cont r ol, and combat ai r pat r ol
were i nt egrat ed t o provi de 24-hour coverage. Thi s heavy rel i -
ance on suppor t asset s cont i nued f or t he dur at i on of t he op-
erat i on. The act ual sort i e rat e was nearl y doubl e t hat ant i ci -
pated prior to Deliberate Force, requiring the rapid deployme nt
of additional SEAD, t anker , and ot her suppor t asset s t o t he
t heat er , most f r om t he Uni t ed St at es.
30
The F-16CJ wi t h t he
hi gh- speed ant i r adi at i on mi ssi l e t ar get i ng syst em, f or i n -
st ance, was i n great demand, as was t he ai rborne bat t l efi el d
command and cont r ol cent er ai rcraft . The l at t er provi ded not
only critical radio linkage between the CAOC and ai r forces
that flew feet dry (i . e. , over l and) but al so much-needed C
2
capabi l i t y. The hi gh demand for such support i ng pl ayers was
a l esson l ear ned f or ai r pl anner s at all levels.
Because COMAIRSOUTH was ext remel y concerned wi t h t he
possibility of fratricide and col l at eral damage resul t i ng from
t he bombi ng, he personal l y sel ect ed each t arget and DMPI
t hat t he ai rcrews used t hroughout Del i berat e Force. Hi s di rect
i nvol vement , however, i nt roduced anot her el ement of del ay
i nt o t he ai r t aski ng message (ATM) pr ocess. For exampl e,
rapi d ret arget i ng of shoot er mi ssi ons requi red revi si on of t he
t anker f l ow pl an. Each t i me a change was i nt r oduced i nt o t he
ATM cycl e, t he pl anni ng-t i me cl ock woul d reset , whi ch meant
t hat pl anner s were const ant l y t ryi ng t o respond t o new com-
mand gui dance and bomb damage as s es s ment or ot herwi se be
responsi ve t o t he UN.
Accordi ng t o doct ri ne and pract i ce pri or t o Del i berat e Force,
the MAP was a si ngl e-source t arget eeri ng, weaponeer i ng, and
st ri ke-package const ruct i on t ool t hat shoul d have cont ri but ed
to production of the ATM. The l at t er shoul d have been produced
CAMPBELL
111
by 1600Z of t he day precedi ng t he st art of t aski ng (i . e. , 11
hours before t he st art of t he t asked day). Duri ng t he course of
Deliberate Force, however, the MAP evolved from a working-
level tool to a vital input to the ATM duri ng t he fi rst week or
so. By t he second week of operat i ons, t he MAP nearl y t ook on
a l i f e of i t s own and was i ssued, al ong wi t h i t s of t en numer ous
dai l y changes, as t he conci se aut hori t y on t aski ngs. The ATM
was essent i al l y rel egat ed t o t he st at us of a cooki e-cut t er
st yl e of pl anni ng document subj ect t o any number of changes
implemented by MAP al t erat i ons or ot her real -t i me t aski ngs
from CAOC cur r ent oper at i ons.
The cri si s act i on t eam produced the MAP after receipt of
commanders gui dance, newl y approved t arget s, and DMPIs ,
as wel l as any ot her speci fi c gui dance as t o t ypes of ai rcraft or
ordnance t o use. Al t hough preDel i berat e Force pl anni ng pro-
cedur es gener al l y appr oxi mat ed t hose of Joi nt Publ i cat i on
(Pub) 3-56. 1, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations,
act ual procedures aft er t he fi rst coupl e of days di d not . Usi ng
cookie-cutter ATMs and t anker pl ans, faxi ng t he MAP and i t s
numer ous changes t o uni t s i n l i eu of adher i ng st r i ct l y t o a
pl anni ng cycl e, and empl oyi ng si mi l ar work-arounds were de-
vi sed t o account for t he dynami c and pol i t i cal l y sensi t i ve na-
t ure of t he operat i on.
Gi ven t he abundance of forces avai l abl e and t he rat her l i m-
i t ed t ar get set , s omeone out s i de t he oper at i on mi ght be
t empt ed t o ask why i t was so di ffi cul t t o adhere t o a t aski ng
cycl e wi t h a mi ni mal number of changes and t urbul ence. An
exampl e may serve t o show t he pressures on COMAIRSOUTH
and t he CAOC st aff. Duri ng t he fi rst week of t he operat i on,
pl anner s t ar get ed an ammuni t i on- st or age depot , wr ot e t hat
at t ack i nt o t he ATM, and t asked a mi ssi on of ei ght st ri ke
ai rcraft pl us al l t he necessary support t o dest roy t he depot .
Short l y before mi ssi on t akeoff, t he CAOC recei ved word t hat a
company of Fr ench peacekeeper s was cl ose t o t he t ar get .
Rat her t han cancel i ng t he mi ssi on out r i ght , pl anner s ret asked
i t wi t hi n t he same pl anni ng cycl e for a di fferent t arget . That
change t hen ri ppl ed i nt o t he t anker-fl ow pl an as wel l as i nt o
t he t aski ng f or al l ot her asset s pl anned t o suppor t t he st r i ke
mi ssi on. These t ypes of mi ssi on changes were rel at i vel y com-
monpl ace and affect ed t he ent i re days schedul e.
DELIBERATE FORCE
112
The reason for cancel i ng t he ori gi nal mi ssi on i n t he above
example is fairly straightforward: to avoid the potential for frat-
ricide i n t he mi ssi on area. The rat i onal e for dynami cal l y re-
t aski ng t he mi ssi on, rat her t han rol l i ng t he t arget i nt o t he next
ATM cycl e, i s more compl ex. An undercurrent of apprehensi on
existed within the CAOC seni or l eadershi p t hat t he pol i t i cal
l eadershi p of t he UN and NATO mi ght hal t t he operat i on before
t he mi l i t ary deemed t he j ob accompl i shed and obj ect i ves
achi eved. Thus, t he CAOC felt pressure to prosecute all poten-
t i al t arget s as rapi dl y as possi bl e j ust i n case t hat occurred.
Cons t a nt l y c ha ngi ng t he t a s ki ng f or s o ma ny of t he
CFACCs asset s had t he ef f ect of subst ant i al l y compr essi ng
t he ori gi nal 24-hour pl anni ng/ t aski ng cycl e. The ATM a nd
MAP under went maj or modi f i cat i ons, but because of commu-
nications deficiencies, the CAOC had t o f ax t he changes t o
uni t s; t he l at t er oft en di d not have t he l at est message. Thi s
compression of the cycle was also evident in a subcycle called
t he reconnai ssance at t ack cycl e (RAC). During the RAC , pl an-
ner s i dent i fy reconnai ssance r equi r ement s and assi gn ai r cr af t ,
based on t he gr ound commander s needs. Those ai r cr af t t hen
at t ack t he t ar get s and (i f necessary) fl y post st ri ke reconnai s -
s ance. Having to respond to the UNPROFOR commanders
st at ed needs and t hose of t he RRF commander at one poi nt
compressed the RAC t o si x hours.
31
As shoul d be apparent , t he t heat er st rat egy t o achi eve NATO
and UN objectives in the Balkans was essent i al l y an ai r st rat egy.
Si nce t he obj ect i ve was t o coerce an enemy i nt o a part i cul ar
pat t ern of behavi or rat her t han dest roy or defeat hi m, com -
mander s mai nt ai ned a ver y shor t l eash on empl oyment meas -
ures i n order t o st op t he operat i on rapi dl y at any t i me.
The abi l i t y t o measure t he effect i veness of an ai r campai gn
i s oft en el usi ve. Moreover, i n an operat i on i n whi ch one can-
not quant i fy t he success or l ack t hereof i n t radi t i onal t erms
(e. g. , body count s, enemy-uni t combat -effect i veness rat i ngs,
ai r cr af t shot down, et c. ) , est abl i shi ng measur es of mer i t
proves particularly difficult. In addition, subdivision of the
campai gn i nt o phases al l owed prosecut i on of t he vari ous es -
t abl i shed t ar get set s t o be measured. Al t hough not expl i ci t l y
defi ned by begi nni ng and end poi nt s, t he phases corresponded
t o t he t arget set s t hat support ed t he i dent i fi ed Bosni an Serb
CAMPBELL
113
COG. Anal yst s measured t he overal l progress of t he ai r cam-
pai gn pri mari l y agai nst t he desi red end st at e.
The ai r campai gn began wi t h an i nt ense poundi ng of t he
Bosni an Ser b IADS on 30 Augus t . Tar get s were sel ect ed
t hr oughout sout heast Bosni a t o ensur e f r eedom of movement
for NATO ai rcraft operat i ng t here. St ri ke t arget s i ncl uded key
communi cat i ons nodes and l ar ge ammuni t i on- st or age f aci l i -
t i es. On 1 Sept ember t he UN request ed t hat NATO pause
t he oper at i on.
The turning off of the UN key had been ant i ci pat ed but
was not warml y greet ed. The pause permi t t ed i nt ensi fi ed di p -
l omat i c effort s by bot h t he UN and Ambassador Hol br ookes
t eam. Dur i ng t he pause t he UN and NATO spel l ed out t er ms
t he Bosni an Ser bs woul d have t o meet i n order t o forest al l
resumpt i on of t he Del i berat e Force campai gn. Poor weat her
hampered NATO moni t ori ng of compl i ance, but by t he morn -
i ng of 5 Sept ember, i t was obvi ous t hat t he Bosni an Serbs
were not meet i ng t he UN-NATO demands, so Del i ber at e For ce
resumed. The very fact t hat NATO rest art ed t he ai r operat i on
was i n al l l i kel i hood t he si ngl e most i mport ant deci si on made
duri ng t he ent i re course of Del i berat e Force.
32
Ambassador
Holbrooke obser ved t hat t he r esumpt i on of t he oper at i on was
t he most cri t i cal moment of t he bombi ng and t hat i f t he
bombi ng had not r esumed t hat day, t he negot i at i ons woul d
have been very adversel y affect ed.
33
When t he campai gn resumed on 5 Sept ember, COMAIR-
SOUTH was det er mi ned t o i nt ensi f y t he pace as much as pr ac-
tical. Although the target list was not long, very poor weather
di mi ni shed t he success of many mi ssi ons or forced t hem t o
abort . The ROE required positive identification of the assigned
DMPI before droppi ng bombs, and t hat was not al ways possi -
bl e because of bad weat her. Despi t e t he probl ems encount ered,
t he operat i on proceeded so smoot hl y t hat by 7 Sept ember
CINCSOUTH apprised SACEUR of subst ant i al progress:
a . Attack of the IADS i n t he sout heast er n ZOA had been l ar gel y suc-
cessf ul . I t s r obust ness and r edundancy, however , made cont i nued
suppr essi on necessar y.
b. Responsive CAS and RRF art i l l ery cont i nued t o pound t arget s in
and ar ound t he Sar aj evo area. The synergi sm of t hi s coordi nat ed
ai r-l and response had proven very successful i n suppressi ng Bos -
ni an Ser b shelling of Sarajevo .
DELIBERATE FORCE
114
c. A syst emat i c at t ack of fi el ded forces cont i nued, i ncl udi ng C
3
as well
as di r ect and essent i al mi l i t ar y suppor t .
d. Target i ng of mul t i pl e choke poi nt s and bri dges had begun. NATO
closely coordinated with UNPROFOR to achieve the desired effect
yet pr eser ve r out es t hat coul d sust ai n r esuppl y and humani t ar i an
relief of Sarajevo.
34
At the same time, COMAIRSOUTH r eal i zed t hat he was
qui ckl y faci ng a t arget i ng di l emma. Even wi t h t he forced sl ow-
down i n oper at i ons due t o poor weat her , t he appr oved t ar get
l i st from t he 14 August Joi nt Target i ng Board was al mos t
exhaus ted. On t he one hand, Gener al Ryan want ed t o pr ose-
cut e t he t ar get s as r api dl y as possi bl e i n case of anot her hal t .
On t he ot her hand, he became ver y concer ned about r eachi ng
t he end of t he approved opt i on-t wo t arget s before achi evi ng
t he end st at e.
Some of t he t empor ar y per sonnel t hat had ar r i ved t o aug-
ment t he CAOC came equi pped wi t h bot h a good abi l i t y t o
t hi nk out si de t he box (usi ng a fresh approach t o t he same
probl em) and a comput er syst em cal l ed t he JFACC Pl anni ng
Tool.
35
At about t hi s t i me, usi ng t he JFACC Pl anni ng Tool a nd
worki ng apart from t he ongoi ng Del i berat e Force pl anni ng
process, a smal l t eam devel oped opt i ons for at t acki ng t arget s
i n t he opt i on-t hree cat egory. Al t hough t he l i kel i hood of ever
recei vi ng cl earance t o prosecut e t hose t arget s was r emot e be-
cause of t he l i kel i hood of col l at eral damage , pl anni ng f or t hat
cont i ngency cont i nued nonet hel ess. COMAIRSOUTH ha d a l-
ready i dent i fi ed hi s t arget i ng predi cament t o CINCSOUTH; for -
t unat el y, t he t eam never had t o pur sue opt i on t hr ee. As a
consequence, AIRSOUTH became even more sel ect i ve about
t he t arget s i t woul d st ri ke. The pl anners hoped t o wear down
t he Bosni an Ser bs by cont i nui ng t o st ri ke t hose few remai ni ng
t ar get s t o ensur e t hei r t ot al dest r uct i on.
On 14 Sept ember Admi r al Smi t h a nd Ge ne r a l J a nvi e r
agreed that NATO had subst ant i al l y achi eved t he mi l i t ary ob-
jectives and t hat t hey needed anot her pause t o det er mi ne t he
act ual compl i ance of t he Bosni an Ser bs wi t h t hei r agr ee-
ment s .
36
At t hat t i me onl y ei ght t arget s of t he ori gi nal 56 had
escaped dest ruct i on. Fol l owi ng an ext ensi on of t he ori gi nal
72- hour pause f or anot her 72 hour s, t he t wo commander s
CAMPBELL
115
i ssued a j oi nt st at ement on 20 Sept ember , decl ar i ng success
of t he operat i on and achi evement of t he end st at e.
Conformi ty to and Devi ati on from
Pl anni ng Doct ri ne and Pract i ce
Many si mi l ari t i es exi st ed bet ween pl anni ng doct r i ne a nd t he
pract i cal experi ence of Del i berat e Force due t o t he credi bi l i t y
and influence of existing US (Air Force and j oi nt ) doct ri ne.
Experi ence di verged from doct ri ne, however, as a resul t of
confl i ct s bet ween t he underl yi ng assumpt i ons of exi st i ng doc -
t r i ne and t hose t hat framed Del i berat e Force.
Of part i cul ar i mport ance t o t he commander fi ght i ng t he bat -
tle is clarity of the objective. Without a clearly defined objective
for operat i ons and a desi red end st at e, t he mi l i t ary commander
may fl ounder i n uncert ai nt y. Numerous peri ods of uncert ai nt y
about st rat egi c obj ect i ves exi st ed t hroughout t he t wo and one-
half years of NATO i nvol vement i n t he Bal kans l eadi ng up t o
Deliberate Force. The CINCSOUTH/ FC UNPF memor andum of
underst andi ng of 14 August 1995 cl earl y est abl i shed condi-
tions for the initiation of hostilities and strategic objectives.
However, the evolution of operational objectives during the
weeks pr ecedi ng t he oper at i on does i ndi cat e s i gni f i cant
changes i n t he desi red end st at e. For exampl e, compel l i ng t he
Bosni an Serbs t o negot i at e was added t o t hose obj ect i ves.
37
Anot her si mi l ari t y bet ween Del i berat e Force experi ence and
US doct ri ne i s t he asymmet r i c nat ur e of t he st r at egy t hat
NATO empl oyed. Wi t hout effect i ve ai r opposi t i on from t he
BSA, NATO est abl i shed ai r superi ori t y qui ckl y and was t hr eat -
ened onl y by ground-based ai r-defense syst ems. Havi ng char -
act eri st i cs sharpl y asymmet ri c from t hose of t he fact i on under
attack, the NATO ai r ar mada r emai ned f r ee t o st r i ke at t ar get s
of i t s choosi ng. For exampl e, al t hough t he BSA enjoyed signifi -
cant advant ages i n (ground-based) heavy weapons over t he
federat i on forces, t hose weapons were of l i t t l e use agai nst
NATO ai rpower. Al t hough at t acki ng i ndi vi dual art i l l ery t ubes
proved too difficult for NATO to conduct economically, indirectly
at t acki ng t hos e weapons t hr ough s t r i kes on ammuni t i on-
st orage, repai r, and weapon-st orage faci l i t i es l argel y negat ed
DELIBERATE FORCE
116
t he BSA advant age. The supremacy of space and i nformat i on
capabilities on NATOs part l i kewi se overwhel med t he Bosni an
Ser bs, denyi ng t hem any securi t y of operat i ons or i nformat i on
about t hei r enemy.
The selection of target sets by AIRSOUTH pl anner s i ndi-
cat ed a cl ear underst andi ng of di rect - and i ndi rect -t arget i ng
st rat egi es. Few opt i on-one and -t wo t arget s directly affected
t he Bosni an Ser b COG, t hus requi ri ng an i ndi rect st rat egy.
For example, AIRSOUTH had assessed t hat t he BSAs advan-
t age i n heavy weapons hi nged on i t s abi l i t y t o shi ft a smal l
number of hi ghl y t r ai ned per sonnel f r om one bat t l e t o an-
ot her, usi ng equi pment st ored i n di spersed l ocat i ons. Wi t h
devast at i ng ai r at t acks on t he means of C
2
of t hose personnel
r at her t han di r ect at t acks on t he equi pment or per sonnel , t he
BSA coul d no l onger effect i vel y command and cont rol t hem
and r espond t o r api d changes on t he bat t l ef i el d. Thus, i ndi-
r ect l y at t acki ng t hat st r engt h by at t acki ng t he suppor t i ng C
2
nodes greatly reduced its effectiveness.
The t opogr aphy and weat her i n t he mi ssi on area mi l i t at ed
agai nst successful l y at t acki ng i ndi vi dual art i l l ery pi eces or
t anks. Mor eover , i t made l i t t l e sense t o at t ack t he t ubes t hat
t he UN demanded t he Ser bs remove from the total-exclusion
zones. The Serbs coul d have cl ai med, wi t h some j ust i fi cat i on,
t hat t hey were bei ng prohi bi t ed from wi t hdrawi ng t hei r art i l -
lery by NATO ai r st ri kes. Thi s exampl e of asymmet ri c and
i ndi rect at t ack served t o neut ral i ze t he st rengt h of t he BSA.
Al t hough Del i berat e Force i ncorporat ed many of t he doc -
t ri nal concept s found i n US j oi nt doct ri ne and NATO proce-
dures (such as t hey were), t he operat i on di verged i n si gni fi -
cant areas as wel l . Of speci al concern was t he fri endl y C
2
arrangement . Al t hough t he mi l i t ary forces assi gned t o NATO
and t he UN had worked t oget her for nearl y t hree years, t here
was never a si ngl e commander over al l ai r and l and forces.
Yet, even after the UN t ur ned i t s key and Del i berat e Force
began, CINCSOUTH had t o coordi nat e wi t h t he force com-
mander of UNPF (as a de fact o l and component commander)
and RRF and r espond t o t hei r concer ns. The i ni t i al 24- hour
pause on 1 Sept ember t hat st r et ched i nt o f our days i s a
prime example of the fragility of that C
2
ar r angement . The
pause had emanat ed f r om out si de CI NCSOUTHs change of
CAMPBELL
117
command and r equi r ed i nt ensi ve coor di nat i on t o ensur e t hat
no operat i onal mi l i t ary probl ems devel oped. Yet anot her ex -
ample of fragile C
2
occurred bet ween t he CAOC and RRF . They
essent i al l y reval i dat ed t he t arget s each ni ght dur i ng t he pl an-
ni ng pr ocess.
38
Al t hough t he August Joi nt Target i ng Board
had gi ven expl i ci t approval t o prosecut e t he opt i on-t wo t ar -
get s, t he UN revi ewed and approved t hem anew each day.
Even within the NATO command st r uct ur e, si gni f i cant chal-
l enges exi st ed. For i nst ance, a si mpl e yet t el l i ng change had t o
be made i n t ermi nol ogy and procedure. For years, t he Uni t ed
St at es and NATO have i ssued t o f l yi ng uni t s an ai r t aski ng
order , the directive coordinating all flying activities of the com-
mand. One of t he coal i t i on part ners, however, refused t o ac-
cept orders from NATO, t hus necessi t at i ng a name change t o
ai r t aski ng message. Although not significant at first glance,
t he di st i nct i on hi ghl i ght s a pot ent i al area for expl oi t at i on by a
fut ure adversary. Of more si gni fi cance, however, i s t he seem-
i ng l ack of adequat e aut hor i t y, pl anni ng, and i nt egrat i on of
s ear ch- and- r es cue as s et s of t he member nat i ons . When a
French Mi rage 2000 (call sign Ebro 33) was shot down ( t he
only NATO aircraft lost during Deliberate Force), NATO ma de
rat her fal t eri ng at t empt s t o l ocat e and rescue t he ai rcrew.
Bot h US Joi nt Speci al Operat i ons Task Force (JSOTF) forces
and Navy r escue t eams par t i ci pat ed but not i n coor di nat i on.
39
Another doctrinal area from which Deliberate Force signifi -
cant l y devi at ed had t o do wi t h t he concept of synergya key
tenet of aerospace power. Although AIRSOUTH achieved cer -
tain internal synergies at the tactical level, it realized little
pl anned ext ernal synergy. Int ernal synergy, t hrough use of
composi t e force packages t hat cont ai ned al l el ement s neces -
sary t o accompl i sh t he st ri ke mi ssi on, ensured force securi t y
by utilizing the full range of capabilities of airpower platforms.
On t he ot her hand, al t hough t he Ai r / Land Oper at i ons Coor di-
nat i on Document set fort h operat i ng procedures for l and and
air forces, it merely provided deconfliction of operations. The
pri mary purpose of t he agreement was t o avoi d col l ocat i ng an
art i l l ery round and an ai rcraft i n t he same pi ece of sky. It
nei t her est abl i shed nor fost ered synergi st i c effect s of t he RRF
and NATO ai r forces.
DELIBERATE FORCE
118
Airpower, however, did achieve one unintended synergy with
land forces. Because of the simultaneous nature of Deliberate
Force and the BiH/Croatian Defense Council (HVO) federation
ground offensive, both operations seem to have benefited from
the battlefield successes of the other. COMAIRSOUTH t ook gr eat
pains to avoid even the appearance that NATO had somehow
coordinated operations with the federation. The fact remained,
however, that the BSA was severely pressed from the western
offensive, was being hurt by the bombing, and was unable to
exercise effective C
2
over its forces as a result. NATO det ermi ned
t hat i t had been so successful i n t hi s regard t hat at one poi nt
General Hornburg suggested providing Gen Ratko Mladic (the
BSA commander) wi t h a cel l ul ar phone and some sat el l i t e pho-
tos, thinking that Mladic di d not have a cl ue as t o what was
happening to his forces.
40
Thus, ground and ai r forces achi eved
de facto synergies with each others operations that undoubtedly
propelled both toward achievement of their respective objectives.
Whereas pol i t i cal and mi l i t ary st rat egi c obj ect i ves duri ng
t he col d war focused on t he war-wi nni ng nat ure of mi l i t ary
oper at i ons , pl anner s a n d c o mma n d e r s h a v e e x p e r i e n c e d
somet hi ng of a vacuum when i t comes t o cl ear st rat egi c gui d -
ance i n operat i ons ot her t han war (OOTW). Even the definition
of OOTW and t he di fferent i at i on bet ween i t and war have
proven di ffi cul t t o est abl i sh. To st rat egi c-l evel pl anners a nd
decision makers (e. g. , at NATO headquar t er s and t he UN in
New York), Deliberate Force was an OOTW. But t o ai rcrews
droppi ng bombs and dodgi ng SAMs over Bosnia-Herzegovina ,
t he operat i on l ooked every bi t l i ke a war. Not havi ng a cl ear,
warl i ke focus from st rat egi c deci si on makers pl aced opera -
t i onal - and t act i cal -l evel warri ors i n a t enuous posi t i on. The
pr essur e t o i mpl ement war l i ke ai r act i ons whi l e r ecei vi ng
OOTW-l i ke pol i t i cal and mi l i t ary gui dance seemed t o cul mi-
nat e at t he CAOC. As our nat i ons hi st ory has shown, mi l i t ary
and pol i t i cal pressures oft en compet e duri ng US uni l at eral
act i on. The probl ems can (and l i kel y wi l l ) be exacerbat ed i n a
coal i t i on endeavor such as Del i berat e Force i n whi ch member
nat i ons have di f f er ent agendas t o advance and i n whi ch na-
t i onal mi l i t ary doct ri ne and pr act i ce may not coi nci de. A
number of fact ors, such as l ack of coal i t i on consensus, act i ve
involvement of the UN, or diffused influence of other bodies
CAMPBELL
119
(e. g. , t he Cont act Group) can further complicate the effective
empl oyment of ai rpower.
Clearly, existing NATO mi l i t ary doct ri nespecifically, air -
power doct ri neis woefully inadequate to give proper guid-
ance to NATO mi l i t ary commanders engaged i n UN-sponsored
NATO missions. Because of NATOs historic focus on self-de-
f ense r at her t han any out - of - ar ea empl oyment, little in the
way of useful doct ri ne has ari sen t o support such new worl d
order act i vi t i es. Each member nat i ons ci t i zenry and l eader -
shi p must wrest l e wi t h t he quest i on of whet her or not NATO
should involve itself in out-of-area activities. The quest i on r e-
mai ns i mport ant for mi l i t ary l eaders because of t he pot ent i al
uncer t ai nt y i t can l end t o t hei r i mpendi ng mi ssi on and t he
pol i t i cal wi l l support i ng i t . Al t hough several member nat i ons,
i ncl udi ng t he Uni t ed St at es, have br ought r ecent oper at i onal
experience to the alliance, the NATO bur eaucr acy st i l l seems
mi red i n a hi st ori cal rut .
Graspi ng t he di fferences i n t he rel at i ve sophi st i cat i on of US
and NATO pl anni ng pr ocesses and mechani sms i s key t o un-
derst andi ng why Del i berat e Force l ooked so much l i ke a US
effort. Due in large measure to its relatively large military force
st r uct ur e, t he Uni t ed St at es was best sui t ed for t he l eadershi p
rol e i n t he operat i on. Many al l i es had t aken part i n US t rai n -
i ng of one sor t or anot her , gi vi ng t hem a basi c under st andi ng
of t he US met hod of pl anni ng, t aski ng, andi n some cases
campai gn pl anni ng.
41
Yet , even wi t h t hat ver y si gni f i cant
cross-flow of information and expertise, COMAIRSOUTH found
hi msel f wi t h a l i mi t ed number of pl anners i n whom he had
confi dence t o conduct t he i mport ant pl anni ng for Del i berat e
Force. General Ryan al so knew t hat he had t he opt i on at any
t i me of aski ng hi gher US headquar t er s f or suppor t i f he
needed i t and he exer ci s ed t hat opt i on. Al t hough Deny
Fl i ght/ Del i berat e Force most defi ni t el y remai ned a NATO ef-
f or t , no one hesi t at ed t o r equest uni l at er al assi st ance f r om t he
Uni t ed St at es whi ch di d not hesi t at e t o provi de i t .
Even wi t h i t s l ong hi st or y of peacekeepi ng i nvol vement
around t he worl d, t he UN has no doct r i ne of airpower employ-
ment. Until Deny Flight enforcement actions began in April 1993,
t he UN had not had any significant air force at it s disposal
certainly not one with a shooter capability. Correspondi ngl y,
DELIBERATE FORCE
120
prior UN operat i ons t ypi cal l y had been commanded and con -
t rol l ed by l and-force commanders, some wi t h l i t t l e experi ence
or fami l i ari t y wi t h ai rpower t heory and doct ri ne. The r esul t i ng
l ack of det ai l ed underst andi ng of ai rpower mi ssi ons and capa -
bi l i t i es, t herefore, i s not surpri si ng. Throughout t he earl y days
of peacekeepi ng operat i ons i n t he former Yugosl avi a , smal l
cel l s of ai r force personnel at t he i n-t heat er headquart ers
managed t o bri ng some ai r sense t o t he UN oper at i on. But
because t he UN secret ary-general , hi s speci al represent at i ve,
and t he UNPF force commander made most of t he cri t i cal
decisions driving the UN operation, their collective lack of un-
derst andi ng of ai rpower oft en resul t ed i n const rai nt s t hat ef-
fectively hobbled its potential impact.
Duri ng t he hei ght of t he col d war , SACEURs General De-
fense Plan sought to defend NATO agai nst at t ack i nt o t he
al l i ances t erri t ory, meet force wi t h force, reest abl i sh t he bor -
ders, and force t he Warsaw Pact t o desi st i n i t s mi l i t ary opera -
t i ons. Such war pl anni ng engender ed an at t i t ude of st eadi-
nessa sense t hat not hi ng woul d ever change and t hat t he
correl at i on of forces cont ri but ed st abi l i t y t o t he European con -
t i nent . In t he past , what peopl e have consi dered NATO doc-
t r i ne has act ual l y been l i t t l e mor e t han pr ocedur e. I n t he
Jomi ni an t radi t i on, t he defense of Cent ral Europe woul d be
r at her mechani st i cf r om bot h t he gr ound and ai r per spec-
t i ves. Deci si on processes coul d afford t o be sl ow and meas -
ured. However, t he i nherent i nst abi l i t y and requi rement for
rapi d responsi veness i n OOTW put st ress on t he NATO civilian
and mi l i t ary bureaucracy, forci ng i t t o shi ft i t s operat i onal
focus t oward a much more fl ui d maneuver warfare st rat egy.
Furt her, compet i ng nat i onal i nt erest s of NATO member na-
tions can sometimes negatively affect the achievement of alli -
ance goal s. No l onger can member nat i ons focus on defeat i ng
a common enemy; now t hey must st r i ve t o achi eve somewhat
less defined objectives against less clearly identified adversarie s.
Due to the lack of solid NATO, UN, or other coalition doc -
t ri ne for t he operat i onal envi ronment of t he Bal kans , com-
mander s and pl anner s had t o fal l back on t hei r nat i onal doc -
t r i ne and personal experi ence. Yet , even t hat doct ri ne was
i ncompl et e, so t hey had t o devi at e from i t when t he si t uat i on
demanded. The uni que ci r cumst ances of t he t heat er r equi r ed
CAMPBELL
121
CAOC and AIRSOUTH pl anner s to exercise considerable origi-
nal t hi nki ng i n devi si ng a workabl e and accept abl e st rat egy
for i mpl ement at i on.
Of first priority in Air Force doctrine is control of the air.
42
Some modern airpower advocates, such as Col Phillip Meilinger,
have gone so far as to equate air superiority with victory.
43
Colo-
nel Meilinger calls into question the usefulness of air superiority,
however, if the enemy believes that his opponent will not exploit
it or if there is nothing that air superiority can effectively exploit.
NATO unequivocally achieved air superiority almost immediately
on 30 August, yet overall success remained in question even
after the final bomb fell on 14 September. The nature of the
operation did not lend itself to final solution through the appli -
cation of airpower although such application absolutely facili -
tated success. Perhaps a redefinition of victory in the OOTW
context would be appropriate for the future.
In cont rast , pri or t o Del i berat e Force some peopl e mai n -
t ai ned t hat ai rpower coul d not be deci si ve. In an i nt ervi ew,
Ambassador Hol brooke poi nt ed t hi s out , sayi ng t hat many
peopl e bel i eved, al most as a Mant ra, t hat you cannot use
ai rpower unl ess i t s backed up by ground t roops.
44
He be-
l i eved t hat an ambi val ence exi st ed concerni ng t he capabi l i t y of
ai rpower t o achi eve t he obj ect i ve wi t hout t he i nt roduct i on of
si gni fi cant ground forces. Ai rpower, however, overcame t hat
skept i ci sm i n t he end.
Al t hough t he i mpact of exi st i ng doct ri ne was subst ant i al ,
devi at i ons from i t ensured success i n t hi s nont ext book opera -
t i on. Because doct r i ne has evol ved over t he decades t o enabl e
ai r forces t o cont ri but e t o war wi nni ng, i t i s l ess t han opt i -
mally suited for OOTWs. But if one views doctrine as gui dance
rather than as Holy Writ, the tenets of flexibility and versatil -
i t y can ext end beyond t he machi nes t hemsel ves t o t he Ai r
Force pl anners and commanders who direct their employmen t.
As descri bed i n t he previ ous chapt er, US j oi nt -doct ri ne pub -
l i cat i ons have sought t o l ay common foundat i ons upon whi ch
t he i ndi vi dual servi ces can bui l d t hei r doct ri ne. Such com -
monal i t y has advant ages but can dr i ve i nappr opr i at e deci -
sions if one follows it too rigidly. For example, Joint Pub 1-02,
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated
Terms, associ at es a COG with a military force. That is cer -
DELIBERATE FORCE
122
t ai nl y t rue i n most scenari os, but i n Bosni a-Herzegovi na t he
COG was t he Bosni an Ser bs ment al at t i t udet hei r fear of
domi nat i on. That at t i t ude ext ended wel l beyond t he force t o
t he popul ace and ci vi l i an l eadershi p.
Although AIRSOUTH det ermi ned t hat t he hi st ori c Bosni an
Ser b fear of domi nat i on was t he COG t o at t ack, i t was equal l y
i mport ant t o defend t he Bosni an-government COGthe city of
Saraj evo. More t han any ot her l ocat i on i n Bosni a-Herzegovi na ,
t hat ci t y symbol i zes t he core i ssue for Bosni an Musl i ms . Loss
of Sarajevo woul d have l ed t o t he fal l of t he federat i on and t he
end of Bosni a-Herzegovi na as a uni t ar y, sover ei gn nat i on.
Thus, protection of the friendly COG was every bi t as i mpor -
t ant t o t he overal l success of t he operat i on as was at t ack of
the enemy COG. Cur r ent doct r i ne i s vi rt ual l y si l ent about
the issue of defending friendly COGs.
On a more pract i cal l evel , t he st andard 24-hour t aski ng
cycl e has gi ven mi l i t ary pl anners a schedul e t i ed t o t he sun
and t hei r ci r cadi an r hyt hms. However , r i gi d adher ence t o
such a cycl e may det ract from t he very fl exi bi l i t y t hat ai rpower
af f or ds t he commander . The need t o r espond r api dl y t o chang-
i ng si t uat i ons requi red massi ve dai l y changes t o current op-
erat i ons t asked by t he CAOC. More responsi ve syst ems, bot h
har dwar e and management , woul d cont r i but e t o br eaki ng t hat
rel i ance on a 24-hour cycl e and get t i ng i nsi de an adversarys
observe -orient-decide-act loop
45
or hi s t aski ng cycl e.
Joi nt Pub 3- 56. 1 pr ovi des j oi nt ai r campai gn pl anner s a n
excel l ent t ool t o hel p t hem organi ze an ai r operat i ons pl an.
AIRSOUTH and t he CAOC pl anner s used el ement s of t he fi ve-
phase ai r campai gn pl anni ng process descri bed i n sect i on
t hree of t hat publ i cat i on (and chap. 3 of t hi s book) pri or t o
and duri ng Del i berat e Force. That process, not l i near but i t -
erat i ve i n nat ure, has excel l ent appl i cabi l i t y across t he spec-
t rum of war and OOTW. The fi rst phase, Operat i onal Envi -
r onme nt Re s e a r c h, whi c h wa s c onduc t e d c ont i nuous l y,
affect ed t he ot her four phases. The t ool , havi ng no fi xed
l engt h, can be cust omi zed for t he cont i ngency; i t i s al so re-
sul t s-ori ent ed and responsi ve t o t he fog and fri ct i on of warfare
(or of OOTW). Too few planners in the CAOC and AIRSOUTH
were fami l i ar wi t h ei t her t hi s doct ri nal t ool or t he t rai ni ng
avai l abl e i n i t s appl i cat i on.
46
CAMPBELL
123
The physi cal and organi zat i onal l ayout of t he CAOC, a s
previ ousl y descri bed, di d not adequat el y support pl anni ng re-
qui rement s for a dynami c operat i on such as Del i berat e Force.
The CAOC l acked a cent ral command faci l i t y, and a sense of
uni t cohesi on di d not exi st because of t he shor t - dur at i on,
t empor ar y- dut y assi gnment s of per sonnel . Fur t her , i t l acked
adequat e communi cat i ons means , and compet i ng nat i onal
and par ochi al ser vi ce i nt er est s wer e abundant .
For exampl e, because t he physi cal l ayout of t he CAOC
bui l di ngs and l ack of offi ce space prevent ed col l ocat i on of t he
commands vari ous cel l s, t hey had t o work very hard t o coor -
di nat e t hei r work. The JSOTF , headquar t er ed at San Vi t o dei
Normanni AB , Italy (the joint US Special Operations Forces
[SOF] cont i ngent ), had post ed l i ai son offi cers i n t hree separat e
l ocat i ons at t he CAOC: t he combi ned rescue coordi nat i on cen -
ter, the CAS cell, and intelligence (C-2). These liaison officers
had di fferent report i ng chai ns for t hei r SOF speci al t y area. A
speci al -operat i ons l i ai son el ement di d not exi st i n t he CAOC,
t hus ensur i ng a pi ecemeal appr oach t o t he pr ovi si on of US
SOF to the CFACC. JSOTF di d not have a st r ong advocat e f or
i t s capabi l i t i es and, t herefore, was underut i l i zedor, i n at
l east one i nst ance, ut i l i zed i ncorrect l y. The CAOCs strategic
pl ans were formul at ed at Fort Apache, ni ckname for t he
t emporary faci l i t y out si de t he mai n bui l di ng. Most deci si ons
about t aski ng were worked bet ween Fort Apache and t he com -
manders offi ce. Thus, i nadequat e faci l i t i es and compet i ng pri -
ori t i es resul t ed i n l ess-t han-opt i mal SOF empl oyment .
In at l east one i nst ance, t he use of AC-130 guns hi ps i n a
pur el y r econnai ssance rol e nearl y resul t ed i n t he l oss of 15
ai r cr ew member s.
47
Duri ng t he fi rst week of t he campai gn,
gunshi ps wer e t asked t o conduct r econnai ssance of roads
ar ound Sar aj evo, l ooki ng for movement s of Bosni an Serb
heavy weapons. The gunshi ps were ret asked and fl ew fi ve
successive nights following the same general flight profile. On
t he fi ft h ni ght , t he ai rcraft came under ant i ai rcraft art i l l ery
(AAA) and SAM fire. After the AAA exploded above the aircraft
and fl ares defeat ed t he SAMs, t he AC-130 recovered wi t hout
f ur t her i nci dent . Al t hough gunshi ps have an ar med- r econ -
nai s s ance role, the CAOC deci ded t i me and agai n t o use t he
AC-130 i n a pur el y r econnai ssance rol e, rat her t han empl oy
DELIBERATE FORCE
124
ot her speci al -operat i ons asset s t ai l ored t o t he t aski ng. Thi s
hi ghl i ght s t he l ack of a vi abl e speci al -operat i ons advocat e on
the CAOC pl anni ng and operat i ons st aff. Because SOF r epr e-
sent at i ves, such as a speci al -operat i ons l i ai son el ement , were
not i nvol ved i n i ni t i al t arget i ng deci si ons, very scarce and
high-value assets suffered from less-than-optimal employment .
The pract i cal out growt h of t he pl anni ng processthe Delib -
er at e For ce ai r campai gn pl anand t he way i n whi ch i t was
execut ed at t he operat i onal l evel dramat i cal l y al t ered t he t act i -
cal conduct of t he operat i on. In most wars and OOTWs , t he
react i on of t he enemy wi l l di ct at e changes t o operat i ons, but
t hree maj or ext ernal fact ors i nfl uenced t he conduct of Del i ber -
at e Force even more profoundl y. Fi rst , force prot ect i on was of
paramount i mport ance t o COMAIRSOUTH, CINCSOUTH, and
t he UN commanders. On t he NATO side of the Adriatic , t he
opi ni on t hat not a si ngl e t arget was wort h t he l i fe of one
aircrew member typified the concern for force protection. As
for t he UN, i t was unwi l l i ng t o t urn i t s key until all UN forces
redepl oyed t o more defensi bl e cant onment s. Aft er Del i berat e
Force st art ed, any UN movement usually affected NATO t ar -
get i ng and of t en r esul t ed i n mi ssi on cancel l at i ons or changes.
The second maj or ext ernal fact or, t he avoi dance of frat ri ci de,
proved nearl y as i mport ant as force prot ect i on. Pl anners made
every effort t o prevent st ri ki ng t arget s i n proxi mi t y t o known
UN or other friendly personnel. Third, because of NATOs ex-
t reme concern for col l at eral damage, pl anner s vi ewed t he se-
lection of each DMPI t hrough t he fi l t er of pot ent i al col l at eral
damage. Commanders were ext remel y concerned t hat even
one st ray bomb mi ght ki l l i nnocent ci vi l i ans and t hereby un-
der mi ne wor l d suppor t f or t he oper at i on. Rat her t han ext end-
i ng t o t he pol i t i ci ans and Cont act Group negot i at ors, t hi s con -
cern for col l at eral damage appear s t o have been a cons t r ai nt
self-imposed by NATO.
48
Concl usi on
As we have seen, t he Del i berat e Force ai r campai gn was
careful l y pl anned and execut ed t o achi eve bot h expl i ci t and
i mpl i ci t obj ect i ves t hat emanat ed from t he NAC and t he UN
CAMPBELL
125
Securi t y Counci l over t he course of years of i nvol vement i n t he
Bal kans . The air objective established by COMAIRSOUTH for
hi s command woul d cause t he Bosni an Ser bs , as not ed above,
t o sue for cessat i on of mi l i t ary operat i ons, compl y wi t h UN
mandat es, and negot i at e.
Thi s chapt er has endeavor ed t o exami ne t he nat ur e of De-
l i berat e Forces remarkabl e success, whi ch was l argel y unpre-
medi t at ed and r esul t ed f r om t he unf or eseen i mpact of t he
st oppi ng and rest art i ng of t he ai r campai gn. The rest art of 5
Sept ember shocked t he Bosni an Ser b l eader shi p and f or t he
fi rst t i me convi nced General Ml adi c of NATOs resol ve. The
chapt er al so exami ned t he rel at i onshi p of ai rpower doct ri ne to
t he pl anni ng and conduct of Del i berat e Force. Cl earl y, t he
operat i on bot h devi at ed from est abl i shed ai rpower doct ri ne in
cer t ai n key ar eas and adher ed t o i t i n ot her s. A vacuum exi st s
in the area of good doctrine for OOTW i n US j oi nt and servi ce
doct r i ne.
When Admi ral Smi t h and Gener al Janvi er i ssued t hei r j oi nt
st at ement f r om Zagr eb on 20 Se pt e mbe r 1995 de c l a r i ng
achi evement of t he end st at e, Del i berat e Force ended.
49
The
operat i on real i zed al l t heat er and ai r obj ect i ves and est ab-
l i shed precondi t i ons for t he event ual Dayt on Peace Accord
t al ks. Al t hough ai rpower had not operat ed i n i sol at i on from
ot her component s, i t was deci si ve. Perhaps fut ure cont i ngen -
ci es wi l l feat ure naval or l and forces more promi nent l y t han
ai r forces. As Gen Ronal d Fogl eman , former chief of staff of the
US Air Force observed, Joi nt warfi ght i ng i s not necessari l y an
equal opport uni t y ent erpri se.
50
Airpower doctrine and pl an-
ni ng must suppor t t he f ul l r ange of aer ospace oper at i ons as
wel l as support and compl ement t he capabi l i t i es of ot her com-
ponent s. But such doct r i ne and pl anni ng mus t enabl e t he
st rat egi c and i ndependent empl oyment of ai rpower.
Not es
1. Extracted from briefing, Lt Gen Michael Ryan, COMAIRSOUTH and
commander, Si xt eent h Ai r Force, t o US Ai r Force Corona Conference, sub-
j ect : Operat i on Del i berat e Force, February 1996. [Secret ] Informat i on ex-
2. Maj Gen I. B. Holley Jr. , USAFR, Retired, Of Saber Charges, Escort
Fi ght ers, and Spacecraft , Ai r Uni versi t y Revi ew, Sept ember 1983, 4.
DELIBERATE FORCE
126
3. Briefing, Maj Gen Hal Hornburg, director, 5 ATAF CAOC, Vicenza,
Italy, to study team, Maxwell AFB, Ala. , subject: Operation Deliberate Force,
14 Mar ch 1996.
4. The seni or nat i onal r epr esent at i ve mai nt ai ned an under st andabl y
nat i onal vi ew of t he operat i on. Thi s represent at i ve woul d conduct l i ai son
wi t h hi s nat i on, and any obj ect i ons t o t he oper at i on woul d come t hr ough
hi m. Nat i ons woul d get i nformat i on di rect l y from t hose represent at i ves for
t hei r own deci si on-maki ng bodi es t o act on. Curi ousl y, t he Uni t ed St at es
di d not have such a represent at i ve. Al t hough i t mi ght seem obvi ous t hat t he
Uni t ed St at es di d not need a seni or nat i onal r epr esent at i ve si nce t he oper a-
t i on used US commanders, t he Joi nt Chi efs of St aff and ot hers fel t t hat
ot her nat i ons somet i mes had bet t er i nf or mat i on t han t hey di d. For t he
purposes of Del i berat e Force and wi t h onl y l i mi t ed except i ons, t he com -
manders di l i gent l y mai nt ai ned t hei r i dent i fi cat i on as NATO commanders
r at her t han US commander s .
5. UNPROFOR reorgani zed i n t he spri ng of 1995, whi ch changed t he
overall body to UN Peace Forces in the former Yugoslavia; the former Bosnia-
Herzegovina Command changed to UNPROFOR.
6. CINCUSAFE also serves as the NATO commander of Allied Air Forces
Cent ral Europe (COMAIRCENT). Thus, he has t he uni que abi l i t y t o cross
over bet ween nat i onal and NATO responsi bi l i t i esand oft en does so. Gen
Ri chard Hawl ey repl aced General Oaks pri or t o Del i berat e Force.
7. Aut hors experi ence as commander of UNPROFORs Moni t ori ng and
Cl ose Ai r Support Coordi nat i on Cent er, Zagreb, Croat i a, MayOct ober 1993.
8. Wi t hi n t wo weeks of passage of UNSCR 836 i n June 1993, t he posi-
t i on of force commander of UNPROFOR changed hands t o Lt Gen Jean Cot
of t he French army. Specul at i on at t he t i me l i nked t hose t wo event s.
9. Gen Richard Hawley, CINCUSAFE and COMAIRCENT, interviewed by
aut hor , Ramst ei n AB, Ger many, 12 Febr uar y 1996.
10. Col St eve Teske, execut i ve t o Headquart ers AIRCENT/ Deput y Chi ef
of St aff for Pl ans and Pol i cy, and CAOC Pl ans (served on t emporary dut y),
i nt ervi ewed by aut hor, Ramst ei n AB, Germany, 14 February 1996.
11. North Atlantic Council, memorandum to the secretary-general, North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, subject: NAC Decision Statement MCM-KAD-084-
93, Operational Options for Air Strikes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 8 August 1993.
12. Allied Air Forces Southern Europe, Deliberate Force Factual Re -
view, draft, 14 November 1995, 2-2. (NATO Secret) Information extracted is
uncl assi fi ed.
13. Deput y chi ef , Checkmat e Di vi s i on, Headquar t er s USAF/ XOOC,
memor andum t o di r ect or , CAOC Pl ans, 28 May 1995.
14. Ibid. , 2-3.
15. Bri efi ng, Gen George Joul wan, SACEUR, t o t he NAC, 21 June 1995.
16. Notice C-N (95) 65, Decisions Taken at the Meeting of the [North
At l ant i c] Counci l on Tuesday, 25t h Jul y 1995 at 2: 30 p. m.
CAMPBELL
127
17. As used here, t he MAP i s roughl y equi val ent t o t he mast er ai r at t ack
plan (MAAP) as specified in Joint Publication 3-56.1, Command and Cont rol
for Joint Air Operations, 14 November 1994.
18. The t erm graduated air operations may sound vaguel y f ami l i ar and
unpl easant . The pol i cy of gr adual escal at i on dur i ng Oper at i on Rol l i ng
Thunder of 196568 sought t o achi eve success t hr ough t he sendi ng of
si gnal s t o t he Nort h Vi et namese and Vi et cong. Pol i t i cal rest rai nt s pl aced
on t he operat i on and many ot her fact ors mi t i gat ed agai nst success. Del i ber -
at e Force had qui t e di fferent goal s and perhaps even more sensi t i ve pol i t i cal
rami fi cat i ons.
19. Mi l i t ary Commi t t ee, memorandum t o t he secret ary-general , NAC,
MCM-KAD-057-95, 31 Jul y 1995. (NATO Confi dent i al ) Informat i on ex-
20. In hi s l et t er t o t he UN secret ary-general t o convey C-N (95) 65,
Decisions Taken at the Meeting of the [North Atlantic] Council on Tuesday,
25t h Jul y 1995 at 2: 30 p. m. , NATO secret ary-general Wi l l y Cl aes st at es t he
NACs willingness to authorize option three or elements thereof. In re -
sponse, Bout ros Bout ros-Ghal i not es t hat t he opt i on-t hree quest i on re -
mai ns open, but he i s obvi ousl y unent husi ast i c about prosecut i ng a bel l i g -
erent t hat severel y.
21. Ai r/ Land Operat i ons Coordi nat i on Document , draft , Rapi d Reac-
t i on Forces (RRFOS) 1000-12, August 1995.
22. The US Air Force Historical Research Agency at Maxwell AFB, Ala.,
mai nt ai ns el ect r oni c and paper copi es of t hese pl ans.
23. AIRSOUTH briefing, subject: NATO Air Operations in Bosnia-Herze -
govinaDeliberate Force, c. 1 August 1995, US Air Force Historical Re -
search Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala. (NATO Secret) Information extracted is
uncl assi fi ed.
24. The Joi nt Target i ng Board, whose key members i ncl uded CINC-
SOUTH and t he force commander of UNPROFOR/ UNPF, was t he hi gh-l evel
coordi nat i on body t hat revi ewed t he t arget l i st i ng.
25. Deliberate Force Factual Review, 2-6. (NATO Secret) Information
ext ract ed i s uncl assi fi ed.
26. Nami ng of t he separat e safe-area ai r-st ri ke operat i ons and det ermi n -
i ng wher e one ended and anot her began ar e di f f i cul t t asks. Oper at i ons
Vul can and Deadeye were separat e but cl osel y l i nked, i n t hat t he fi rst woul d
not happen wi t hout t he second. Duri ng t he conduct of t he operat i on, COM-
AIRSOUTH di rect ed t hat t he overal l operat i on be named Del i berat e Force, a
convent i on used t hr oughout t he r emai nder of t he di scussi on.
27. Lt Gen Bernard Janvi er, deput y commander, Impl ement at i on Force
(earl i er, t he force commander of UNPF), i nt ervi ewed by aut hor, Saraj evo,
Bosni a-Herzegovi na, 9 February 1996.
28. Al t hough t he aut hori t y for key t urni ng had been del egat ed t o Gen-
eral Janvi er, he was out of t he count ry on l eave t hi s day and had del egat ed
key cont rol t o General Smi t h. Accordi ng t o hi s own account , Janvi er
l earned about t he si t uat i on and agreed ful l y wi t h Smi t hs deci si on. He
DELIBERATE FORCE
128
i mmedi at el y ret urned t o hi s headquart ers i n Zagreb pri or t o i ni t i at i on of t he
ai r campai gn on t he 29t h/ 30t h.
29. The 24-hour t aski ng day ext ended, for exampl e, from 0300 29 Au -
gust t o 0259 30 August . Di spat ch of t he ai r t aski ng message (ATM)t he
pl anni ng/ t aski ng document was pl anned t o (t heoret i cal l y) al l ow adequat e
t i me for execut i ng uni t s t o recei ve t he ATM, compl et e mi ssi on pl anni ng and
coordi nat i on, and compl et e mi ssi on-crew bri efi ngs.
30. Aft er reeval uat i on of t he Deny Fl i ght mi ssi on earl i er i n t he summer
of 1995, many ai rcraft redepl oyed t o t hei r home bases wi t h t he under -
st andi ng t hat t hey were on a rel at i vel y short st ri ng for recal l i n t he event
t hey wer e needed i n- t heat er .
32. Di pl omat i c channel s i ndi cat ed t hat General Janvi er ful l y i nt ended t o
make t he pause a hal t . Yugosl av presi dent Mi l osevi c was t rul y shocked
when t he bombi ng resumed. Ambassador Ri chard Hol brooke, i nt ervi ewed
by Maj Mark McLaughlin and Dr. Karl Mueller, New York, N. Y. , 24 May
1996.
33. Ibid.
34. Message, 070800Z SEP 95, CINCSOUTH t o SACEUR, 7 Sept ember
1995. (NATO Secret ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s uncl assi fi ed.
35. Headquar t er s USAF/ XOOC ( Checkmat e) sent Maj John Ri ggi ns
al ong wi t h t he JFACC Pl anni ng Tool . Checkmat e had mai nt ai ned a pres -
ence i n t he CAOC f or many mont hs and was wel l acquai nt ed wi t h t he
si t uat i on. The home offi ce had al so provi ded much hel p.
36. Exchange of letters between Admiral Smith (CINCSOUTH) and Gen-
eral Janvi er (FC UNPF), 14 Sept ember 1995.
37. Briefing slides, CAOC, Vicenza, Italy, subject: Deliberate Force, c.
ear l y August 1995.
38. Brig Gen David Sawyer, deputy director, 5 ATAF CAOC, interviewed
by Maj Ti m Reagan, Vi cenza, It al y, 16 Oct ober 1995.
39. Lt Col Randy P. Durham, chi ef, St rat egy and Doct ri ne Branch, Ai r
Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), Hurlburt Field, Fla. , Trip
Report, JSOTF2, San Vito dei Normanni AB, IT, 5 Aug11 Oct 95. Colonel
Durham served as t he JSOTF2/ J-3 (Operat i ons) duri ng Del i berat e Force.
41. Headquart ers AIRCENT at Ramst ei n AB, Germany, has recent l y de -
vel oped an ai r campai gn pl anni ng course for present at i on t o NATO cam-
pai gn pl anners. The course i s pat t erned cl osel y aft er t he USAFs Joi nt
Doct ri ne Ai r Campai gn Course t aught at Maxwel l AFB, Al a. (see al so not e
44). The AIRCENT course is the only one of its kind in NATO and has
recent l y moved t o t he NATO School (Supreme Headquart ers Al l i ed Powers
Europe [SHAPE]) at Oberammergau, Germany.
States Air Force, vol . 1, March 1992, 10.
43. Col Phillip S. Meilinger, 10 Propositions Regarding Air Power (Wash-
i ngt on, D. C. : Ai r Force Hi st ory and Museums Program, 1995), 6.
CAMPBELL
129
44. Holbrooke interview.
45. Col John R. Boyd, A Di scourse on Wi nni ng and Losi ng, bri efi ng
slides, August 1987, available at Air University Library, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
46. Air Universitys College of Aerospace Doctrine Research and Educa-
t i on at Maxwel l AFB, Al a. , conduct s a course appropri at el y named t he Joi nt
Doct ri ne Ai r Campai gn Course.
47. Dur ham, t r i p r epor t .
48. Ambassador Chri st opher Hi l l , US St at e Depart ment deput y chi ef
negot i at or, i nt ervi ewed by Lt Col Rob Owen, Washi ngt on, D. C. , 27 February
1996.
49. Joi nt St at ement by Adm Lei ght on W. Smi t h, CINCSOUTH, and Lt
Gen Bernard Janvi er, FC UNPF, Zagreb, Croat i a, 20 Sept ember 1995.
50. Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, US Air Force chief of staff, speech to the
Air and Space Doctrine Symposium, Maxwell AFB, Ala. , 30 April 1996.
DELIBERATE FORCE
130
Chapt er 5
Executi ng Del i berate Force,
30 Augus t 14 Sept ember 1995
Lt Col Mark J. Conversino
News of t he mor t ar at t ack on t he Mr kal e mar ket pl ace in
Saraj evo on 28 August 1995 fi nal l y moved t he West t o act .
Si nce Fr ench gener al Ber nar d Janvi er , Uni t ed Nat i ons Prot ec-
tion Force (UNPROFOR) commander , was on vacat i on i n
Fr ance to attend his sons wedding, Adm Leighton W. Smith ,
commander in chief of Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINC-
SOUTH), cont act ed Bri t i sh l i eut enant general Rupert Smi t h ,
t he act i ng UN commander. Admi ral Smi t h confi rmed i n a l et -
t er t o Gener al Smi t h t hat , i n t hei r common j udgment , t he
Mrkale shel l i ng r epr esent ed an at t ack agai nst a saf e ar ea a nd
t hat ai r st ri kes woul d commence as soon as Uni t ed St at es Ai r
Force (USAF) lieutenant general Michael E. Ryan , commander
of Al l i ed Ai r For ces Sout her n Eur ope ( COMAI RSOUTH),
deemed t he condi t i ons sui t abl e. Admi ral Smi t h al so wr ot e t hat
Ryan woul d del ay t he st art of hi s ai r campai gn unt i l mi dni ght ,
29 August , t o al l ow UN forces on t he ground t o wi t hdraw from
t hei r mor e i sol at ed out post s and t hus pr ecl ude anot her em-
bar r assi ng r ash of host age t aki ng by t he Ser bs , as had oc -
curred duri ng t he Nort h At l ant i c Treat y Organi zat i ons (NATO)
bombing of Pale t he precedi ng May. Nevert hel ess, t he UN a nd
NATO had t urned t hei r keys , and t he most i nt ense mi l i t ary
operation in the history of NATO was about t o get under way.
1
Indeed, Admi ral Smi t h had al r eady t aken sever al act i ons t o
ready hi s forces. Speci fi cal l y, he had al l owed uni t s bel ongi ng
to participating NATO count ri es under t he al l i ances opera -
t i onal cont rol t o ret urn home on an on-cal l st at us and re-
quest ed addi t i onal ai r cr af t , i ncl udi ng F- 16C/ Ds a nd F- 4G
Wild Weasels armed wi t h hi gh-speed ant i radi at i on mi ssi l es
(HARM), t o count er t he Serb i nt egrat ed ai r defense syst em
(IADS). Upon i ssui ng t he order t o i ni t i at e Del i berat e Force,
Admiral Smith also recalled his on-call tactical forces, inclu di ng
131
t hree Mirage F1-CTs , one Mirage F1-CR, t wo Jaguars , four Mi -
rage 2000Cs, and six Mirage 2000D/Ks from France; four F-
16As and two F-16Rs (reconnaissance ) from the Netherlands; 10
F-16C/ Ds from Turkey; four GR-7 Harriers from the United
Kingdom ; and six F-4G Wild Weasels , four EA-6Bs, five KC-10s ,
t wo C-21s, t wo MC/ HC- 130s, t wo ai r bor ne command and
control center (ABCCC) EC-130Es , and t wo EC-130H Com-
pass Cal l electronic-warfare (EW) ai rcraft from t he Uni t ed
St at es . As a resul t of t he i ni t i al success of t he operat i on,
CINCSOUTH woul d cancel t he request s for t he F-4Gs, t he t wo
EC-130Hs , and one of t he EC- 130Es.
2
The sudden i nt ensi fi cat i on and expansi on of ai r operat i ons
act ual l y requi red few subst ant i ve organi zat i onal changes from
t hose al ready est abl i shed for t he ongoi ng Deny Fl i ght opera -
t i on, of whi ch Del i berat e Force act ual l y const i t ut ed a part i cu -
l arl y i nt ense phase. As he had for Deny Fl i ght, US general
Ge or ge J oul wa n, S u p r e me Al l i e d Co mma n d e r Eu r o p e
(SACEUR), del egat ed operat i onal cont rol of t he i mpendi ng De-
liberate Force activity to Admiral Smith , who i n t urn del egat ed
operat i onal cont rol for all theater-level air forces to General
Ryan . Lt Gen Andrea Fornasi ero of the Italian air force, com-
mander of the 5th Allied Tactical Air Force (5 ATAF), would
exerci se command and cont rol (C
2
) of Deliberate Force opera -
t i ons t hrough t he combi ned ai r operat i ons cent er (CAOC) a t
Dal Molin Air Base (AB), Vicenza, Italy. US Ai r Force maj or
general Hal Hornburg, director of the CAOC, oversaw bot h t he
cent er s day- t o- day oper at i ons andt hr ough US Ai r For ce
col onel Dougl as J. Ri chardson , hi s chi ef of current operat i ons
(C-3)those of Deliberate Force as well. As the CAOC di rect or,
Gener al Hor nbur g used t he cal l si gn Chari ot to identify him-
self to NATO ai rcrews. Si nce bot h Del i berat e Force and Deny
Fl i ght were coalition efforts, representatives from the NATO
nat i ons were al so assi gned t o t he CAOC.
3
As was t he case wi t h Deny Fl i ght, NATOs Deliberate Force
oper at i ons and command st r uct ur e r emai ned wedded t o t he
UN s. As t he commander of UNPROFOR, Gener al Janvi er
served as Admi ral Smi t hs count er par t . Gener al Smi t h al so
woul d work cl osel y wi t h General Ryan. The course event ual l y
t aken by Del i berat e Force resul t ed from t he coordi nat i on and
pl anni ng among t hese men i n part i cul ar. Li ai son offi cers from
DELIBERATE FORCE
132
NATO and 5 ATAF served wi t h t he UN headquar t er s i n Zagr eb,
Croatia . Further, a NATO liaison officer was at t ached t o UN-
PROFORs air operations control center (AOCC) in Kiseljak
(near Saraj evo) as well as to the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF).
4
I n t he meant i me, upon hear i ng of t he Ser b at t ack, Gener al
Janvi er hur r i ed back t o hi s post i n Zagr eb, t aki ng t he key
from General Smi t hs hands and set t l i ng fi nal st rat egy wi t h
Admiral Smith , who pressed for an indirect use of his air -
power t o t ake out t he ant hi l l of Serbi an l ogi st i cs and C
2
faci l i t i es, rat her t han t he ant s of t he offendi ng art i l l ery and
ot her heavy weapons themselves. UN intelligence est i mat ed
t hat t he 240- squar e- mi l e zone ar ound Sar aj evo cont ai ned
some 250 Ser b heavy weapons. Fi ndi ng and dest r oyi ng t hese
t ar get s wi t h any consi st ency woul d be wel l -ni gh i mpossi bl e.
General Janvi er agr eed t hat t he Ser bs shoul d be puni shed,
but he was anxi ous t o keep Del i ber at e For ce on a shor t
l eashhe want ed t o i nfl i ct pai n but not deat h. Aft er some
t ense haggl i ng, t he Amer i can admi r al and t he Fr ench gener al
came t o an agr eement by 2130 on 29 August . Del i ber at e For ce
woul d st art wi t h t he Operat i on Deadeye target list, which in -
cl uded 25 ai r - t o- gr ound t ar get s and 15 ot her s on Mount I g -
ma n out si de Saraj evo desi gnat ed for shel l i ng by guns of t he
Angl o-French-Dut ch RRF . The at t ack woul d begi n i n roughl y
f i ve hour sat 0200 on 30 August . I n t he wani ng moment s of
calm, UN peacekeepers bl ew up t hei r bunker s and sl i pped
away to safety.
5
The ai r fl eet at General Ryan s di sposal r epr esent ed a f or mi-
dable collection of NATO ai r asset s. At t he out set of Del i berat e
Force, he woul d have avai l abl e more t han 280 ai rcraft from
t he Uni t ed St at es (Air Force, Mari ne Corps , and Navy), France ,
Britain , Turkey, t he Net her l ands, Italy, Spain, and Ger many.
NATO al so provi ded ei ght E-3A ai rborne warni ng and cont rol
system (AWACS) aircraft. With the arrival of on-call aircraft
and t he i ncl usi on of addi t i onal non-NATO assets, COMAIR-
SOUTH woul d ul t i mat el y have nearl y 350 ai rcraft at hi s di s -
posal . Al t hough most of t he uni t s fl ew from bases i n It al y,
Del i berat e Force sort i es al so l aunched from bases as far away
as Bri t ai n , Ger many, and Fr ance.
6
By far, t he si ngl e l argest concent rat i on of al l i ed ai rcraft was
at Aviano AB, north of Venice, Italy. To accommodat e t he
CONVERSINO
133
i nfl ux of peopl e and ai rcraft as t ensi ons rose over t he summer,
Col Charles F. Wald , t he newl y arri ved commander of Avi anos
31st Fi ght er Wi ng, assumed command of a new pr ovi si onal
out fi t t he 7490t h Wi ng. On an i nst al l at i on desi gned for 42
F-16s and 16 CH- 47 helicopters, Walds st aff event ual l y had
t o bed down a t ot al of 140 ai rcraft , i ncl udi ng 52 F-16s , 16
CH-47s , 12 US Mari ne Corps F/ A-18s, 12 A-10s, t hree Bri t i sh
E-3Ds , 10 Spani sh EF- 18s , 10 F- 15Es , 10 EA-6Bs from t he
carri er USS Roosevelt , ni ne C- 130s of various types, and six
EF- 111s . Of t hese, 114 were i n pl ace when Del i berat e Force
opened on t he ni ght of 2930 August . Nevert hel ess, as com-
mander of t he 7490t h Wi ng (Provi si onal ), Wald di d not exer -
ci se command aut hori t y over t he non-USAF uni t s.
7
Overseei ng t hi s vari ed array of ai r asset s was t he Deny
Fl i ght operat i ons cent er, whi ch st ood up i n conj unct i on wi t h
t he pr ovi si onal wi ng and super seded a spar sel y manned Deny
Fl i ght coordi nat i on cel l al ready operat ed by t he 31st Wi ng.
Becomi ng ful l y operat i onal j ust days before t he i ni t i at i on of
Del i berat e Force, t he cent er served as Avi anos primary C
2
cent er for t he i mpendi ng aeri al act i vi t y. Manned by avi at ors
on t emporary dut y t o Avi ano and combi ned wi t h t he 31st
Fi ght er Wi ngs l ogi st i cs and muni t i ons personnel i n t he l ogi s -
t i cs cont rol cent er, t he operat i ons cent er worked di rect l y wi t h
t he CAOC in Vicenza . Despi t e sporadi c l i nes of communi ca -
t i ons between Vicenza and Avi ano, senior officers at Aviano
bel i eved t hat t hei r ai r operat i ons cent er was i nst r ument al i n
t he wi ngs abi l i t y t o meet i t s t aski ngs.
8
Against NATO ai rpower, t he Bosni an Serbs coul d count on
an efficient and well-developed IADS. The Bosni a Ser b ar my
(BSA) al so possessed a smal l ai r force , est i mat ed at a coupl e of
dozen combat ai rcraft of l i mi t ed mi l i t ary capabi l i t y. Bosni an
Ser b ai rcraft had fl own agai nst Croat i an forces earl i er i n Au -
gust i n a desperat e at t empt t o hal t Zagreb s spectacular five-
day campai gn t o recl ai m t he Serb-hel d Kraj i na region of Croa -
tia . Usi ng cl ust er muni t i ons, five Serb aircraft ki l l ed four
ci vi l i ans and wounded 14 i n Sl avoni a . Dur i ng t he at t ack, t he
Ser bs l ost t wo ai r cr af t t o Cr oat ai r def enses and di d not hi ng
mor e t han f ur t her enr age t he Cr oat i ans.
9
The real threat to NATO ai rpower l ay i n t he BSAs i nvent ory
of surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) .
DELIBERATE FORCE
134
NATO ai r pl anner s est i mat ed t hat i n l at e August t he BSA
possessed seven SA-2 , six SA-6, and 12 SA-9 SAM bat t eri es,
unknown number s of man- por t abl e mi s s i l es , a nd ne a r l y
eleven hundred pieces of AAA ranging in caliber from 20 milli -
met er s ( mm) t o 76 mm. Ai r pl anner s al so consi dered t he pos -
si bi l i t y t hat t he Bosni an Ser bs coul d count on i nformat i on
from the Republic of Yugoslavia s ai r defense net work, t he
mai n t arget of t he Deadeye port i on of t he Del i berat e Force
plan. In the region of Sarajevo , t he area of most i mmedi at e
concern t o General Ryan and hi s st aff, t he BSA must er ed
t hree corpst he Romanj a, Dri na, and Herzegovi nanumber -
i ng some 1520, 000 per sonnel backed by an est i mat ed 250
heavy weapons, i ncl udi ng mor e t han 50 t anks. As ment i oned
previ ousl y, however, Del i berat e Force woul d not seek t o en -
gage and dest r oy t hese weapons unl ess necessar y.
10
Bosni an Ser b l eader s made cr ude at t empt s t o count er t he
percept i bl y growi ng i nt ernat i onal out rage at t he mort ar at t ack
on Saraj evo. Radovan Karadzic , for exampl e, bl amed t he Mus-
lim government of Bosnia f or t he at t ack, st at i ng t hat he hoped
t he i nt ernat i onal communi t y woul d no l onger buy t hat ki nd
of story, and called for an international investigation. Likely,
he was hear t ened by Moscows open skept i ci sm r egar di ng
Serb culpability for the attack. Momcilo Krajisnik, chai r man of
t he Serb Republ i c Assembl y, per sonal l y condemned t he at -
t ack, st at i ng t hat i t means no good for Serbs, Musl i ms, or
Croat s , and i t i s not good for t he cont i nuat i on of t he peace
process ei t her.
11
Yet, the cries of foul by the Serb leadership
fell on deaf earsat least outside of Russia . Armed wi t h t he
earlier UN assessment of Serb responsibility for the Mrkale at-
tack and convinced of the need to back NATOs threats with
force, the Western alliance finally moved toward decisive action.
A wa r ni ng or de r of 29 Augus t de f i ne d t he c ombi ne d
l and/ ai r oper at i on and set t he CAOC into motion. NATO pl an-
ner s and commanders had no i dea how l ong t he NATO a nd
UN aut hori zat i on keys , part i cul arl y t he UNs, would remain
t ur ned on and t hus pl anned t o hi t as many t ar get s as possi -
bl e, as qui ckl y as possi bl e. As a preparat ory st ep, General
Hor nbur g cancel ed most of t he prepl anned Deny Fl i ght mis -
si ons schedul ed aft er 1400 cent ral European t i me (CET). The
ai r t aski ng message (ATM) for t he remai nder of t hat day, as
CONVERSINO
135
wel l as for t he next , was changed t o i mpl ement t he ai r-st ri ke
pl an, i ni t i al l y code-named Vul can but soon changed t o Del i b -
erat e Force. As pl anned, t he i ni t i al at t ack i ncl uded Deadeye
t ar get s a n d t h o s e a r o u n d Sa r a j e v o i n c l u d e d i n Bouton
Doran earl i er pl an. On t he morni ng of 29 August , General
Ryan arrived at Vicenza t o t ake a more di rect rol e i n t he
execut i on of t he i mpendi ng operat i on. Part i cul arl y concerned
t hat even a si ngl e i nci dent of col l at eral damage coul d under -
mi ne or even hal t t he ai r campai gn and convi nced t hat com -
manders were ul t i mat el y responsi bl e for al l t he act i ons of t hei r
forces, Ryan intended to personally select all targets and desi r ed
mean points of impact (DMPI) (i.e., aiming points) for attack. If
anything went wrong, he wanted to accept the bla me.
12
Still, even for many NATO per sonnel , t he not i on t hat some-
t hi ng bi g was about t o happen di d not st r i ke home unt i l ver y
l at e. Indeed, upon l andi ng at Avi ano late in the evening of 29
August , US Navy capt ai n Ken Cal i se, a CAOC staff officer,
f ound Col Ji m Tur ner , commander of t he 31st Oper at i ons
Gr oup, i ncredul ous t hat Del i berat e Force was real l y about t o
begin. Moreover, many of the people at the CAOC envisioned
Del i ber at e For ce l ast i ng no mor e t han 48 t o 72 hour s. The
doubt s of some of hi s subordi nat es asi de, at 0140 CET Gen -
er al Hor nbur g cl eared t he fi rst st ri ke package i nt o Bosni a-
Herzegovina from the Adriatic . The first NATO bombs st r uck
t hei r t ar get s roughl y hal f an hour l at er.
13
Bombs Away: Del i berate Force Begi ns
The fi rst ai rcraft bound for Bosni a l aunched from Avi ano
a n d t h e c a r r i e r Roosevelt s hor t l y bef or e mi dni ght . Once
cl eared by Chari ot, 43 st ri ke ai rcraft escort ed by 14 ai rcraft
performi ng suppressi on of enemy ai r defenses (SEAD) st r uck
t ar get s on t he Deadeye Sout heast list. Four F-16Cs of Avianos
510t h Fi ght er Squadron , each carryi ng t wo GBU-10 t wo-t hou -
sand- pound l aser - gui ded bombs, st r uck t he Han Pi j esak ra -
di o-rel ay st at i on near t he Bosni an Serb capi t al of Pal e , a key
communi cat i ons node i n t he regi on, al l weapons hi t t i ng t hei r
t ar get s.
14
Ot her ai r cr af t st r uck at t he Jahor i na communi ca -
t i ons compl ex near Pal e , an SA-6 si t e at Sokol ac, and t ar get s
DELIBERATE FORCE
136
as far away as t he Tuzl a r egi on i n t he nor t h- cent r al par t of t he
count ry. Fi ve st ri ke packages, Al pha t hrough Echo, hammered
at t ar get s i n t he Saraj evo regi on t hroughout t he day. More
SEAD packages, as wel l as day- and- ni ght cl ose ai r suppor t
(CAS) mi ssi ons rounded out t he days act i vi t y. The CAOC co-
ordinated all aerial sorties to allow the RRF a firing window
ear l y on t he mor ni ng of 30 August . Numer ous r econnai ssance
mi ssi ons f l own by bot h manned ai r cr af t and Pr edat or un-
manned aeri al vehi cl es augment ed pi l ot mi ssi on r epor t s and
weapons fi l m for bomb damage assessment (BDA).
15
By t he
end of ATM Day Two, 0259 31 August , Del i berat e Force had
l ogged 364 sor t i es, i ncl udi ng suppor t mi ssi ons such as aer i al
refuel i ng, airborne early warning (AEW), and C
2
.
16
Despi t e a great deal of success duri ng t hi s cri t i cal fi rst day,
not all went well. A US Air Force U-2R reconnai ssance ai rcraft
t asked t o support Del i berat e Force crashed on t akeoff from i t s
base i n t he Uni t ed Ki ngdom. The pi l ot ej ect ed but di ed several
hours l at er i n t he hospi t al from hi s i nj uri es.
17
Over Bosnia
i t sel f a Serb man-port abl e mi ssi l e br ought down a Fr ench
Mi rage 2000K. Al t hough observers on t he ground report ed t wo
good chut es, at t empt s t o est abl i sh r adi o cont act wi t h t he
downed ai rmen proved unsuccessful . The l oss of t he Mi rage,
cal l si gn Ebro 33, was a soberi ng remi nder of t he dangers t o
al l al l i ed ai rmen. Indeed, Serb gunners and SAMs engaged
ot her ai rcraft , i ncl udi ng US A-10s, Dut ch NF- 16s , and Br i t i sh
Tornadoes, but di d not i nfl i ct addi t i onal fri endl y l osses.
18
Ebr o 33s shoot down l aunched a ser i es of ad hoc and pr eor -
gani zed combat search and rescue (CSAR) activities. Upon
heari ng of t he shoot down, an EF-111Nikon 24volunteered
t o st ay on st at i on t o cont i nue suppressi ng Serb radar. AWACS
cont rol l ers ret asked an F-15E whose t ar get was obscur ed by
cl ouds t o serve as t he on-scene commander for t he i ni t i al
recovery effort. Again, aircraft overhead could not establish
cont act wi t h t he French pi l ot s. In an effort t o reach t he crew of
Ebr o 33 before the Serbs did, the CAOC ordered a CSAR
package of two MH-53 Pave Low hel i copt ers and one HC-130
put on ai rborne al ert off t he coast of Croat i a . So as t o enhance
the CSAR activity, the CAOC redi rect ed a schedul ed fl i ght of
fi ght ers t o hi t t arget s i n t he r escue ar ea t hat bad weat her ha d
CONVERSINO
137
obscured earl i er i n t he day. Despi t e t hese effort s, rescuers
coul d not l ocat e t he French pi l ot s.
19
The third ATM day of Del i ber at e For ce began at 0300 on
31 August wi t h t hree st ri ke packages hi t t i ng t arget s i n t he
Saraj evo ar ea. As on t he day bef or e, t he CAOC s chedu led
CAS and SEAD sorties to provide more or less continuous cover -
age. Avi ano- based ai r cr af t st r uck Bosni an Ser b ammuni t i o n -
st orage faci l i t i es as wel l as depot s near Saraj evosome for t he
second t i me. Poor weat her del ayed t wo addi t i onal packages
t hat wer e added t o t he schedul e l at er i n t he day, but bot h st i l l
managed t o st r i ke at depot s, st or age si t es, and command
post s wi t h varyi ng degrees of success. Indeed, on t hi s day
numerous mi ssi ons were cancel ed or rat ed noneffect i ve due t o
t he charact eri st i cal l y adverse weat her condi t i ons i n t he regi on
at t hat t i me of t he year.
20
Whi l e bombs fel l across t he Bosni an Serb Republ i c , UN a nd
NATO represent at i ves mount ed a di pl omat i c bl i t z t o keep t he
onus of r es pons i bi l i t y f or t he ai r at t acks on t he Ser bs .
Karadzic remai ned defi ant , cal l i ng t he ai r operat i on bl ack-
mai l and i nsi st i ng t hat Ser bs coul d not be bri bed wi t h
money or fri ght ened by bombs. He warned darkl y t hat De-
l i berat e Force was set t i ng a precedent for West ern meddl i ng i n
ot her ci vi l confl i ct s i n bot h Chi na and Russi a . Undet er r ed by
such t al k, UN envoy Yasushi Akashi announced t hat a deci -
si on t o end t he bombi ng depended on t he at t i t udes and pol i -
ci es of t he Bosni an Serb party. NATO secretary-general Willy
Claes cal l ed on t he Serbs t o st op provoki ng t he West and t o
observe the most basic rules of civilized society.
21
Nevert hel ess, Serb efforts to halt the bombing by offering to
t al k were not compl et el y i n vai n. Yugosl av presi dent Sl obodan
Milosevic cont act ed Akashi in Zagreb on t he aft ernoon of 30
August . Earl i er, General Janvi er had sent a f ax t o Gen Rat ko
Mladic, Bosni an Ser b commander, i nformi ng hi m t hat t he ai r
st r i kes woul d cont i nue unt i l Janvi er was convi nced t hat t he
BSA no l onger posed a t hr eat t o t he saf e ar eas. Milosevic now
t ol d Akashi t hat i f General Janvi er would send Mladic anot her
l et t er out l i ni ng hi s condi t i ons for a cessat i on of t he bombi ng,
t he Bosni an Ser b general was likely to give in. Akashi a nd
Gener al Janvi er wr ot e such a l et t er i n whi ch t hey demanded
an end t o BSA at t acks, t he wi t hdrawal of heavy weapons from
DELIBERATE FORCE
138
ar ound Sar aj evo, and an i mmedi at e and compl et e end t o hos -
t i l i t i es t hroughout Bosni a . The l et t er went out at 1600. Real i z-
i ng t hat t he l ast demand mi ght pr ove unat t ai nabl e wi t hout t he
assent of t he Cr oat i ans and Bosni an Musl i ms , bot h t he UN
and NATO backed away from i t . St i l l , cont act s cont i nued be-
t ween Pal e and Zagr eb t hroughout 31 August . Short l y aft er
mi dni ght on 1 Sept ember, t he CAOC in Vicenza recei ved a
copy of a message from General Smi t h s headquar t er s t hat
suspended al l ai r st ri kes for t he next 24 hours, effect i ve 0200
Greenwi ch mean t i me (GMT), pendi ng negot i at i ons wi t h t he
Ser bs. The UNPROFOR commander di d promi se t o al l ow at -
t acks t o count er any BSA offensi ve and t o permi t at t acks on
heavy weapons movi ng i nt o or manned i n t he Saraj evo sect or .
The gener al emphasi zed t hat t hi s was onl y a pause and t hat
NATO shoul d pr epar e t o r esume ai r st r i kes no l at er t han 0200
GMT on 2 September. All ATM Day Three missions were off
t hei r t ar get s before t he suspensi on t ook effect . Roughl y 48
hours i nt o t he operat i on, Del i berat e Force was on hol d.
22
Key leaders differed over the utility of the operational pause.
Ri chard C. Hol brooke, t he US assi st ant secr et ar y of st at e
t asked wi t h fi ndi ng a di pl omat i c sol ut i on t o t he Bal kan mess,
i ni t i al l y endorsed t he i dea of a bombi ng pause. General Jan-
vier seemed ready for a break as wel l . In cont rast , bot h NATO
secret ary-general Cl aes and Gener al J oul wan were not con -
vi nced of t he Serbs si ncer i t y and t hought t hat t he al l i ance
would forfeit whatever initiative it had only recently gained.
Nevert hel ess, Janvi er and Ml adi c met for nearl y 14 hours i n a
hotel in the town of Mali Zvornik , at t empt i ng t o r each an
underst andi ng. Ml adi c , however, showed no si gns of accedi ng
t o t he earl i er UN ul t i mat um. When he pr oduced a l et t er out-
l i ni ng hi s own condi t i ons for a cease-fi re, Joul wan wa s out-
raged. Sensi ng Serb i nt ransi gence, Admi ral Smi t h , who had
al so i ni t i al l y agreed t o t he bombi ng pause, sought guarant ees
from General Janvi er t hat i f t he operat i on resumed, i t woul d
do so i n a si gni f i cant f ashi on.
23
While Claes wonder ed i f
NATOs unity and credibility would survive and while US Air
Force officers entertained visions of the ill-fated, on-again-off-
agai n Rol l i ng Thunder campai gn of t he Vi et nam War, US and
NATO ai r uni t s used t he pause t o assess t hei r own si t uat i ons.
CONVERSINO
139
At Aviano AB, senior officers of the 31st Fighter Wing viewed
t he bombi ng hal t as a mi xed bl essi ng. Anxi ous t o get on wi t h
t he oper at i on, t hey r eal i zed t hat wi t h t hei r human and mat e -
r i al r esour ces st r et ched t aut by i ncr eases i n t he t empo of
oper at i ons, t he pause woul d al l ow peopl e t o get a much-
needed rest . As t he fi rst t rue combat t est of an Ai r Force wi ng
organized according to the objective wing concept, Deliberate
For ce uncover ed t he consequences of t he per sonnel r educ-
t i ons ent ai l ed i n t he concept . Reduct i ons i n aut hori zed fi el d-
grade posi t i ons forced many supervi sors t o work ext ended
hours. Ai rcrews oft en fl ew mi ssi ons and t hen proceeded t o
wor k 12- hour shi f t s af t er war ds. Compoundi ng t he pr obl em,
uni t s t hat had depl oyed t o Avi ano usual l y had not br ought
al ong adequat e supervi sory overhead. Thus, t he burden for
overseei ng a vast l y expanded combat wi ng fel l on t he shoul-
der s of per manent - par t y per sonnel .
24
A critical part of the objective-wing reorganization involved
pl aci ng or gani zat i onal f l i ght - l i nemai nt enance under t he
commander of t he operat i ons group. Col onel Turner, com-
mander of bot h t he 31st Oper at i ons Gr oup and t he 7490t h
Operat i ons Group (Provi si onal ), after the first night, found it
physi cal l y i mpossi bl e t o oversee bot h fl yi ng and fl i ght -l i ne
mai nt enance operat i ons. Thus, aft er t he fi rst ni ght of Del i ber -
ate Force, Col David Stringer , commander of t he 31st Logi st i cs
Gr oup, t ook cont rol of fl i ght -l i ne mai nt enance and weapons
l oadi ngan arrangement remi ni scent of t he t ri deput at i ve
wi ng concept recent l y repl aced by t he newer concept .
25
Members of Avi anos l ogi st i cs group had i ndeed pl anned for
an i ncr ease i n oper at i ons, but no amount of pl anni ng i n t he
summer of 1995 coul d r emedy some of t he pr obl ems t hat l ay
ahead. Col onel St ri nger and hi s st aff, for exampl e, pl anned for
a sort i e rat e at Avi ano of 175 per day. At t hat rat e, t he de-
mand for fuel woul d t op nearl y 388, 000 gal l ons every 24
hours. By worki ng wi t h t hei r It al i an host s, St ri ngers st aff was
abl e t o ensure a dai l y fl ow of four hundred t housand gal l ons.
Wi t h t he act ual peak sort i e rat e at Avi ano at j ust over 120
sor t i es and r oughl y t hr ee hundr ed t housand gal l ons i n f uel ,
t he advanced pl anni ng pai d off; an i nadequat e suppl y of fuel
at t he out set l i kel y woul d have resul t ed i n l ost sort i es.
26
DELIBERATE FORCE
140
Other problems, however, were not so easily overcome. Avi -
a no consi st s of a mai n operat i onal area, i ncl udi ng t he runway,
key servi ce faci l i t i es, and several support areas, al l separat ed
from one anot her by farml and or smal l set t l ement s and vi l -
l ages. Movi ng muni t i ons from t he st orage area t o t he fl i ght
l i ne requi red coordi nat i on wi t h t he l ocal It al i an carabinieri to
get weapons convoys across a maj or l ocal hi ghway. The It al-
i ans cooperat ed cl osel y wi t h US securi t y personnel , but t he
ar r angement made a muni t i ons st ockpi l e on t he f l i ght l i ne
mandat or y i f sor t i es wer e t o be t ur ned i n an adequat e amount
of t i me. Muni t i ons were fi rst bui l t up and t hen moved t o a
flight-line holding areaAvianos normal hot -cargo pad. Be-
cause t he wi ng di d not have suffi ci ent securi t y pol i ce avai l abl e
t o guar d t hi s new bomb dump and mai nt ai n adequat e pr ot ec-
t i on of t he ai r fl eet now crammed ont o every avai l abl e square
f oot of pavement , i t used mai nt enance and muni t i ons per son -
nel t o saf eguar d weapons t hus st or ed. By t he second day,
base ci vi l engi neers const ruct ed from concret e sl abs a 30, 000-
squar e- f oot r evet t ed pad wi t hi n t he st or age ar ea t o hel p han-
dl e t he i ncr ease i n muni t i ons bui l dup. Wi t hout such mea-
sur es, Avi anos sort i e-generat i on capabi l i t i es woul d have been
great l y di mi ni shed.
27
Yet, finding adequate weapons storage was only part of Avi -
a n os challenge. With so many aircraft on the base, maintaining
safe intermagazine distances between aircraft proved virtually
impossible. This situation put added stress on supervis or s and
f ur t her hi ghl i ght ed t he danger s of bot h chr oni c and acut e
fat i gue for al l personnel i nvol ved i n handl i ng weapons. Usi ng
commonsense safet y and coordi nat i ng cl osel y wi t h t he Span-
i sh and mar i nes ( each of whom mai nt ai ned t hei r own weapons
account at t he base), t he wi ng prevent ed a pot ent i al l y danger -
ous si t uat i on from ari si ng. St i l l , t he use of t he hot -cargo pad
as a st or age si t e i ncr eased hazar ds i n ot her ways. Tr anspor t
ai rcraft act ual l y del i veri ng hot cargo (mai nl y muni t i ons) t o t he
base had t o do so i n al t er nat e and l ess- t han- opt i mal l ocat i ons.
The need t o mai nt ai n safe cl earances at t hese al t ernat e l oca -
t i ons forced numerous support agenci es peri odi cal l y t o cease
oper at i ng and evacuat e t hei r ar eas.
28
Two pot ent i al showst oppers emerged bot h at t he out set of
Del i berat e Force and as t he operat i on expanded. In t he words
CONVERSINO
141
of Colonel Stringer, t he depot s at Warner Robi ns, Georgi a , and
Ogden, Ut ah , di dnt know t here was a war on. The Ai r
Forces l ean l ogi st i cs phi l osophy precl udes l arge st ockpi l es of
par t s and equi pment at oper at i ng bases, maki ng r esuppl y
from stateside air-logistics centers vital. The first weekend of
t he campai gn coi nci ded wi t h t he t hree-day Labor Day hol i day,
so t he depot s were cl osed. St ri nger s st af f cont act ed manager s
at bot h cent ers who t hen react ed qui ckl y, recal l i ng workers
and movi ng orders out as soon as possi bl e. Unfort unat el y,
t hat r epr esent ed onl y hal f t he bat t l e. Unawar e t hat par t s
coul d be sent vi a Federal Express di rect l y t o Avi ano, Defense
Logistics Agency per sonnel shi pped i t ems by t hi s means onl y
to Dover Air Force Base (AFB), Delaware, wher e t he shi pment s
t hen sat , awai t i ng ai r l i f t t hr ough t he st andar d mi l i t ar y chan-
nel . Even from Dover t he part s woul d t hen t ravel t o Ramst ei n
AB, Ger manynot Aviano. The 86th Airlift Wing offered in -
t rat heat er ai rl i ft t o Avi ano as a means of expedi t i ng t he del i v -
ery of part s. Unfort unat el y, members of t he st aff at Avi ano,
not ant i ci pat i ng a sl owdown i n t he movement of suppl i es,
t urned down t he offer.
29
The second pot ent i al showst opper for Avi ano was r at her
mundane. On t he t ypi cal fl i ght l i ne, not hi ng get s done wi t hout
MB-4 and Bobtail tow vehicles to move aircraft and their
suppor t i ng heavy aer ospace gr ound equi pment . Despi t e t he
rapid influx of aircraft, Avianos Bobtail inventory remained
unchanged, and t he wi ng f ound i t sel f shor t 47 Bobt ai l s and
25 MB-4s rel at i ve t o t he number of ai rcraft i t had t o support .
Moreover, usage of t he avai l abl e t ow vehi cl es i ncreased dra -
matically. Bobtailssmall, odd-looking vehicles that look like
t ruck cabs wi t h a t ow (or pi nt l e) hook at t achedhave an
extremely tight turning radius that allows drivers to safe ly posi-
t i on or remove equi pment cl ose t o ai rcraft . These t i ght t urns
wear t i res qui ckl ya probl em i ncreased at Avi ano by t he ac-
celerated use of its Bobtail fleet. The logistics group com-
mander, al t hough abl e t o procure addi t i onal t i res t hrough Ai r
Force sour ces i n bot h Eur ope and st at esi de and t hus al l ow
t he wi ng t o mai nt ai n i t s accel erat ed sort i e-generat i on rat e,
must have ponder ed some ver si on of t he addage t hat f or want
of a nail. . . .
30
DELIBERATE FORCE
142
Avianos l eadershi p faced anot her chal l enge as wel l . As one
post Del i berat e Force report not ed, not si nce t he use of Ameri -
can bomber s st at i oned on Guam dur i ng t he Vi et nam War did
a peacet i me base communi t y of ai rmen and t hei r fami l i es
face ext ended combat operat i ons t oget her. Al t hough t he j ar -
gon surroundi ng Del i berat e Force l abel ed i t a peacemaki ng or
peace- enf or cement operat i on, t he fact of t he mat t er remai ned
t hat ai rmen ki ssed t hei r spouses and chi l dren good-bye, l eft
t hei r homes, and headed off t o fl y over a host i l e and pot en -
t i al l y deadl y t heat er. Several offi cers expressed concern t hat
their families might fall prey to terrorists. Ot her s comment ed
on t he st r essf ul ef f ect s cr eat ed by t he sudden change f r om a
peacet i me envi ronment t o combat .
31
Lt Col Steve Hoog, com-
mander of t he 555t h Fi ght er Squadr on , believed that if Delib -
er at e For ce had gone on much l onger or ent er ed an i ndef i ni t e
peri od of operat i ons, spouses and fami l i es shoul d have been
moved out of t he area t o el i mi nat e a pot ent i al di st ract i on for
hi s crews and bet t er ensure t he safet y of fami l i es. As event s
unfol ded, however, such act i on proved unnecessary.
32
But many offi cers at Avi ano appr eci at ed havi ng t hei r f ami-
l i es wi t h t hem t o provi de support . Spouses provi ded meal s i n
t he squadrons every eveni ng as a way of support i ng t he uni t
and provi di ng comfort t o one anot her. Lt Col Gary West, com-
mander of t he 510t h Fi ght er Squadr on , not ed t hat al t hough
he and hi s wi f e par t ed each day wi t h a bi t of appr ehensi on,
she was bet t er abl e t o fol l ow event s at Avi ano t han dur i ng hi s
combat fl yi ng i n Operat i on Desert St orm.
33
Thus, Avi ano made a rapi d t ransi t i on from peacet i me t o
combat operat i ons i n a rel at i vel y short peri od of t i me. The
wi ng went t o war wi t h t he manni ng, faci l i t i es, and equi pment
al l ot t ed i t under normal condi t i ons. The base served as a
depl oyed l ocat i on f or numer ous uni t s but r et ai ned al l t he bag-
gage of a ful l y funct i oni ng peacet i me wi ng. Swamped by an
i nfl ux of peopl e and ai rcraft and st i l l requi red t o see t o t he
needs of t he wi ngs dependent popul at i on, Col onel Wal d a nd
hi s st af f or chest r at ed wi t h apl omb and det er mi nat i on t he ac-
tivities of what became the worlds largest composite wing.
Avianos experi ence, however, shoul d prompt a revi ew of t he
capabilities and limitations of the objective wing i n combat .
CONVERSINO
143
Who should determine the requirements of units deploying to
such locations to carry on extended, high-tempo operations ?
The Air Force commands t ask uni t s t o depl oy peopl e and
equi pment based on pr epl anned packages known as uni t t ype
codes (UTC). Uni t s have t he opt i on t o t ai l or UTCs i n cert ai n
si t uat i ons. If Del i berat e Force i s a harbi nger of fut ure opera -
t i ons, arri vi ng packages may augment exi st i ng organi zat i ons
t hat must consi der mai nt ai ni ng day- t o- day t aski ngs as wel l as
provi de t he backbone for cont i ngency act i vi t i es. Is an al t o -
get her separat e UTC appropri at e for t hi s ki nd of depl oyment ?
Certainly, a review of manningparticularly field-grade levels,
faci l i t i es, and equi pment i s i n order for t hose wi ngs t hat
mi ght fi nd t hemsel ves t he hub of radi cal l y expanded act i vi t i es.
Assessi ng t he Fi rst St ri kes
By the end of ATM Day Thr ee, 0259 on 1 Sept ember , t he
CAOC recorded 635 sort i es of al l t ypes fl own. Of t hat t ot al ,
318 were strike sortiesCAS or battlefield air interdiction
(BAI). At the request of UNPROFOR, NATO actually flew 16
CAS mi ssi ons, t he fi rst of Del i berat e Force, on 30 August ,
l argel y agai nst art i l l ery and mort ar posi t i ons. Despi t e t he gen -
eral difficulty of finding heavy weapons i n t he rugged t errai n
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the CAS mi ssi ons car r i ed out agai nst
clearly defined targets t hat day were l argel y successful and
caused l i t t l e, i f any, col l at eral damage. As the operation pro -
gressed, t hough, bad weat her often precluded additional CAS
mi ssi ons, as di d a si mpl e l ack of r equest s f or such st r i kes by
UNPROFOR.
34
In the first two days of operations, NATO ai r st ri kes, i n
COMAIRSOUTHs est i mat i on, el i mi nat ed 48 DMPIs , l eavi ng
near l y t hr ee hundr ed on t he t ar get l i st . Of t he t arget s (not
DMPIs ) tasked in the ATMs and at t acked t hr ough t he ear l y
hour s of 1 Sept ember , CAOC i nt el l i gence cons i der ed 10
nonoperat i onal , t hree probabl y nonoperat i onal , t wo capabl e of
mi ni mal operat i ons, and si x probabl y-t o-ful l y operat i onal . For
exampl e, by dawn on 1 Sept ember, t he Caj ni ce and Tuzl a
Mount ai n radi o-rel ay t arget s remai ned operat i onal , whi l e most
of the other IADS and communi cat i ons t ar get s together with
DELIBERATE FORCE
144
several si gni fi cant ammuni t i on depot swere out of busi ness
or damaged t o varyi ng degrees.
35
Nat i onal i magery and si gnal s i nt el l i gence pai nt ed a pi ct ur e
of mixed success for the first few days of Deliberate Force.
Initial BDA showed t he BSA communi cat i ons net work severel y
damaged; however, furt her anal ysi s reveal ed t he BSAs com-
muni cat i ons capabi l i t y degraded but st i l l funct i oni ng.
36
Damage t o maj or BSA ai r defense si t es al so l eft t he Bosni an
Ser bs wi t h a degraded but effect i ve syst em. Import ant t arget s
such as t he Sokol ac SA-6 si t e had sust ai ned consi der abl e
damage, and t he BSA IADS was not as i nt egr at ed as i t was on
29 August . But Del i berat e Forces openi ng bl ows had not ren -
der ed i t i mpot ent .
37
Nevert hel ess, Ryan s st aff det ermi ned t hat i ni t i al at t acks
agai nst di rect and essent i al support faci l i t i es had severel y de-
gr aded t he BSAs abi l i t y t o manuf act ur e, st or e, and di st r i but e
ammuni t i on. I n par t i cul ar , t he Vogosca ammuni t i on depot , a
maj or source of product i on of l arge-cal i ber muni t i ons for t he
Ser bs, had been hi t har d. Al t hough anal yst s st i l l deemed t he
faci l i t y operat i onal , t he st ri kes had severel y reduced i t s pro -
duct i on of ammuni t i on.
38
Still, intelligence analysts at Aviano were not totally impressed
with the first days results against the BSA. They also deter -
mi ned t hat st ri kes agai nst t he BSAs IADS had onl y a mi ni mal
blinding effect. Additionally, the Serbs were well aware of US
capabilities and often refused to turn on their target-acquisition
radars and thereby invite HARM strikes. Although this action
degraded their effectiveness tremendously, it also meant that
much of t he Serbs air defense network remained capable of
fighting back and would require reattack for continued suppres -
sion. The Serbs had al so rel ocat ed and di spersed much of t hei r
stock of ammunition to temporary sites.
39
Despi t e t he hal t i n ai r st ri kes, NATO ai r uni t s were hardl y
i dl e. Pl anners i n t he CAOC and t he f i el d uni t s cont i nued t o
devel op not i onal st r i ke packages and t o assi gn backup t ar -
gets and DMPIs to aircraft on CAS al er t . Reconnai ssance mi s -
si ons bl anket ed t he count r y t o det er mi ne Ser b compl i ance
wi t h t he UN ultim at um t o wi t hdr aw heavy weapons f r om t he
20-ki l omet er t ot al - excl usi on zone ar ound Sar aj evo. C- 130
ABCCC ai r cr af t cont i nued t o di r ect ai r cr af t f r om r ef uel i ng
CONVERSINO
145
t r acks over t he Adriatic t hrough t he area of responsi bi l i t y
(AOR) and t o recei ve i mmedi at e i n-fl i ght report s of any host i l e
act i vi t y. German ai rcraft fl ew reconnai ssance sor t i es i n sup-
port of the RRF. Import ant l y, al t hough no bombs fel l duri ng
t he pause, RRF artillery continued to fire on BSA posi t i ons.
Cont i nuous dayl i ght CAS , area SEAD , combat ai r pat r ol s
(CAP), and var i ous ot her suppor t mi ssi ons r ounded out t hese
daily activities.
40
As t he di pl omat s at t empt ed t o fi nd a sol ut i on t o t he confl i ct ,
pl anner s in the CAOC f i ne- t uned oper at i ons dur i ng t he bomb-
i ng paus e. During ATM Day Fi ve, 2 Sept ember, pl anners de-
veloped BAI packages and pl aced t hem i n a fl oat i ng-al ert
st at us when t he suspensi on was ext ended. Uncer t ai nt y over
t he st at us of t he ai r campai gn drove t he CAOC t o updat e and
change t he packages cont i nuousl y, causi ng some f r ust r at i on
and confusi on at Avi ano. The fol l owi ng day, pl anners reverted
t o packages t asked vi a t he ATM as BAI packages t hat were on
al ert for speci fi c peri ods. Thus, changes t o one package di d
not dri ve changes t o t he ot hers. The si ze of t he packages
varied from eight to 12 aircraft on ATM Day Six to four to 32
on ATM Day Seven. In t he meant i me, CAS as s et s as s i s t ed t he
RRF by l ocat i ng and rel ayi ng i nformat i on on BSA firing posi-
tions. NATO ai rcraft fl ew roughl y 180 sort i es each day of t he
suspensi on. To no ones surpri se, weat her cont i nued t o ad -
versel y affect al l sort i es, especi al l y reconnai ssance fl i ght s and
at t empt s t o l ocat e t he crew of Ebro 33.
41
As t he bombi ng paus e s t r et ched t hr ough 2 Sept ember ,
some crews report ed Serb movement on t he ground, possi bl y
away from t he safe areas. Still, NATO and UN officials became
i ncreasi ngl y convi nced t hat General Ml adi c was pl ayi ng a
shel l game wi t h hi s heavy weapons to give only the appear -
ance of compl i ance wi t h UN and NATO demands. St or my t al ks
bet ween General Janvi er and Mladic had t hr eat ened t o br eak
down repeat edl y i n t he face of Serb i nt ransi gence. Earl y on
Sunday, 3 Sept ember , NATO secr et ar y- gener al Cl aes gave
Mladic unt i l 2300 t he fol l owi ng day t o hal t al l at t acks on
Saraj evo and t he ot her t hr ee saf e ar eas , wi t hdraw hi s heavy
weapons from the Sarajevo t ot al -excl usi on zone, and guar an-
tee freedom of movement for the UN. General Janvi er s e nt a
DELIBERATE FORCE
146
letter to Mladic i ncor por at i ng t hese t er ms. The Ser b gener al
responded wi t h a fi ve-page harangue of hi s own.
42
Aeri al reconnai ssance cont i nued t o pai nt a confusi ng pi c -
t ure of Serb act i vi t y. Mondays deadl i ne passed wi t h no fi rm
i ndi cat i on from t he Serbs t hat t hey had agr eed t o Gener al
Janvi er s condi t i ons. In t he absence of an ext ensi on of t he
pause, Admi ral Smi t h di d not want t o r i sk an i mmedi at e r e-
sumpt i on of ai r st r i kes i n t he mi ddl e of t he ni ght t hat mi ght
r esul t i n at t acks on Ser b uni t s act ual l y wi t hdr awi ng f r om t he
saf e ar eas. Shor t l y af t er dawn on 5 Sept ember , when un-
manned aeri al vehi cl es confi rmed Admi ral Smi t h s suspi ci ons
t hat t he Ser bs were not pul l i ng back, he t ol d Janvi er t h a t
t heres no i nt ent bei ng demonst rat ed. Let s get on wi t h i t .
43
At 1000 CET on 5 Sept ember, Admi ral Smi t h di r ect ed Gener al
Ryan to recommence air strikes with a time on target no earlier
t han 1300 CET. That aft ernoon, Secret ary-General Cl aes an -
nounced t o t he worl d t hat , because of t he BSAs failure to
compl y wi t h UN demands, NATO had r esumed Del i ber at e
Force. Shortly after 1300 CET, the bombs began falling aga i n.
44
Resumpt i on
The operat i on resumed wi t h a maj or effort i n t he ai r. In -
i t i al l y, pl anners had schedul ed 191 oper at i onal sor t i es, but
wi t h t he r esumpt i on of ai r st r i kes, t hey added 84. Four pack-
ages st ruck wi t h mi xed success t hroughout t he aft ernoon. In
t he fi rst st ri ke package, F-16s f r om t he 555t h Fi ght er Squad -
ron st r uck at Jahor i na and t he Hadzi ci ammuni t i on depot . A
second package hi t mi l i t ar y command, cont r ol , and communi-
cat i ons bunker s at Han Pi j esak. The t hi r d packageF- 15Es of
t he 494t h Fi ght er Squadr on, carryi ng four GBU-12s each
made a hi ghl y successful st ri ke on DMPIs wi t hi n t he Han
Pi j esak st orage faci l i t y. As t he day progressed, t he fourt h
package of Mari ne F/ A- 18Ds of VMFA 533, F-16Cs of t he
510t h Fi ght er Squadr on , and F- 15Es hi t communi cat i ons t ar -
gets wi t h varyi ng degrees of success.
45
In order t o cope wi t h t he rapi dl y changi ng si t uat i on on t he
ground, CAOC pl anner s abandoned effort s t o produce a ful l
ATM each day and resorted to a novel cookie-cutter appr oach
CONVERSINO
147
t o schedul i ng st ri ke packages. The cooki e-cut t er speci fi ed
t i mes-on-t arget wi ndows i nt o whi ch packages woul d be i n -
sert ed usi ng avai l abl e ai rcraft . Pl anners t hen publ i shed t hi s
rough ATM wi t h t he i nt ent t hat change messages woul d r ef l ect
t he l at est mast er - at t ack- pl an target / DMPI assi gnment s. Gen -
eral Ryan and hi s st af f want ed t o ensur e t hat t he unf ol di ng ai r
campai gn remai ned suffi ci ent l y fl exi bl e t o hi t t arget s whos e
dest r uct i on or degr adat i on woul d hur t t he BSA i n a way t hat
would speed up political developments in NATOs di rect i on.
Thi s ext reme Cl ausewi t zi an approach of usi ng mi l i t ary force t o
fost er pol i t i cal ends was correct i n t heory.
46
Impl ement i ng cooki e-cut t er ATMs had i t s pr obl ems . On
more t han a few occasi ons, t he CAOC di d not rel ease ap -
proved t arget s and DMPIs (crews were const ant l y remi nded t o
st ri ke onl y t hese) unt i l l at e i n t he day, somet i mes l ess t han an
hour before t he begi nni ng of a new ATM cycl e. Even t hen,
DMPIs mi ght change ri ght up t o t akeoff and t hereaft er. At
t i mes, t hi s t echni que of execut i ng t he campai gn l ed t o l ess-
t han- opt i mum mi ssi ons, cr ew f r ust r at i on, and conf usi on. For
example, one days ATM tasked pilots of four F-16s f r om t he
510t h Fi ght er Squadr on to hit DMPIs wi t hi n t he Hadzi ci am-
muni t i on-depot t arget area, onl y t o have t he CAOC change
their assigned DMPIs short l y aft er t hey arri ved at t hei r ai r -
craft . Moreover, i nformat i on cont ai ned i n t he t arget fol der
misidentified one DMPI for one al ready hi t and dest royed; t he
ot her DMPI was not found. Pi l ot s descri bed yet anot her
DMPI as a crat er, evi dent l y one previ ousl y dest royed. Fi ght-
er s mi ssed t he r emai ni ng DMPI, t he bombs i mpact i ng one
hundred met ers east of i t . Techni cal l y, t hen, al l ordnance ex -
pended for t hi s mi ssi on was off t arget .
47
Searchi ng for Ebro 33
As the flow of strike packages going into Bosnia cont i nued
on 6 Sept ember, effort s t o l ocat e t he crew of Ebro 33 i nt ensi -
fi ed. On t he day before, German reconnai ssance ai rcraft re-
port ed vi sual si gnal s i n t he regi on of t he downed ai rcraft , and
t he USS Roosevelt l aunched a CSAR mi ssi on t hat abor t ed
because of bad weather in the region. Responding to cont i nued
DELIBERATE FORCE
148
i nt ercept s of weak beacon si gnal s, t he CAOC or der ed anot her
CSAR package of four MH-53s and f our HC- 130s l aunched on
7 Sept ember from Bri ndi si , i n sout hern It al y . Al t hough i t
penet rat ed t o t he obj ect i ve area, ground fog prevent ed t hi s
package f r om conduct i ng a sear ch.
48
A third CSAR package mount ed out of Bri ndi si on 8 Sep -
t ember. Thi s t i me, t he weat her was good, and t he ai rcraft
conduct ed a t hor ough sear ch of t he ar ea. Bosni an Ser b t roops
i n t he area fi red on t he hel i copt ers wi t h heavy machi ne guns,
woundi ng t wo crew members and damagi ng one of t he ai r -
craft . Escort ai rcraft , i ncl udi ng t wo A-10s f r om t he 104t h
Fi ght er Gr oup, ret urned fi re, dest royi ng one of fi ve Serb vehi-
cl es observed on a road bel ow. The fai l ure of t hi s mi ssi on
marked the last active CSAR effort t o l ocat e t he Ebro 33 crew,
al t hough passi ve effort s t o l ocat e t he French crewmen cont i n -
ued while CSAR forces st ood by on al ert . Not unt i l 27 Sept em-
ber di d t he Ser bs confi rm t o t he rest of t he worl d t hat t hey
had i ndeed capt ured and were hol di ng t he t wo French pi l ot s.
49
Choke Poi nt s
Meanwhile, the evolving nature of the overall situation in
Bosni a-Herzegovi na began t o i nfl uence Del i berat e Force t ar -
get i ng. As previ ousl y agreed, General Ryan worked closely
wi t h General Smi t h t o ensur e t hat ai r cr af t hi t t he pr oper t ar -
gets . Initially, AIRSOUTH pl anner s were rel uct ant t o t arget
bridges for fear of inflicting civilian losses. General Smith ,
however , suspect ed t hat t he Ser bs woul d begi n rei nforci ng
uni t s ar ound Sar aj evo and want ed br i dges i n t he sout heast
zone of action (ZOA) at t acked t o precl ude such a move. As
t i me went on, General Smi t h al s o want ed t o channel t he
movement s of t he Serbs heavy weapons so t hat hi s men coul d
count t hem more easi l y.
As i n previ ous wars, t he bri dges i n Bosni a proved difficult
t ar get s. From i t s l ong axi s, a bri dge present s a narrow t arget ,
and, from i t s l at eral axi s, a smal l t arget wi t h a great deal of
empt y space beneat h for gui ded or ungui ded bombs t o pas s
t hr ough har ml essl y. Thus, br i dges ar e har d t o hi t , and even a
near mi ss usual l y has l i t t l e effect on st rongl y bui l t st ruct ures.
CONVERSINO
149
Consequent l y, t he campai gn agai nst bri dges was onl y part i al l y
successful . Of t he 12 bri dges at t acked, fi ve remai ned st andi ng
at t he end of t he operat i on, al bei t wi t h varyi ng degrees of
damage.
50
The bri dges i n Bosni a al so hei ght ened concer ns i n t he
mi nds of General Ryan and ot her s t hat at t acks agai nst t hem
woul d produce col l at eral damage . Indeed, respondi ng t o an
i nst ance of col l at eral damage dur i ng a br i dge at t ack, Gener al
Ryan mandat ed on 11 Sept ember t hat pi l ot s not r el ease t hei r
weapons on t he fi rst pass over t he t arget . Aft er several com-
pl ai nt s from commanders i n t he fi el d, t he general l i ft ed t he
rest ri ct i on t he next day. However, he st i l l rest ri ct ed ai rcrews
t o droppi ng a si ngl e weapon on t he fi rst hot pass i n an
ongoing effort to reduce collateral damage. Regardl ess, ai r -
cr ews coul d mount subsequent at t acks i f necessar y.
51
Wi deni ng the Attack: Deadeye Northwest
Duri ng t he pause i n operat i ons, COMAIRSOUTH cont em-
pl at ed st ri kes i n t he nort hwest ZOA, shoul d t he Ser bs fail to
meet UN and NATO demands. The Serb IADS i n t hat sect or of
t he count r y had r emai ned unt ouched t hus f ar , posi ng a t hr eat
to NATO ai rcraft st ri ki ng t arget s i n t he sout heast ZOA. From
t he out s et and i n accor dance wi t h agr eement s bet ween
NATO pl anner s a n d UN representativesCOMAIRSOUTHs
plans for Deliberate Force did not link IADS t o ei t her of t he
ZOAs . Thus, si nce i t appeared l i kel y t hat ai r operat i ons woul d
have to continue, COMAIRSOUTH had t o addr ess t he I ADS in
t he nort hwest part of Bosni a . Refi nement of pl ans for Deadeye
Nort hwest got under way.
52
Bel i evi ng t hat t he Serbs had redeployed their entire SAM
syst em i nt o t he nor t hwest zone, ai r pl anner s expect ed t he
region to pose formidable risks to NATO ai r cr af t . On 5 Sep-
t ember , Gener al Ryan request ed t he use of Tomahawk l and
attack missiles (TLAM) against IADS t arget s near t he Ser b
st ronghol d of Banj a Luka. Because t he gener al and hi s st af f
recogni zed t he danger t hat Serb ai r defenses posed t o NATO
ai rcraft i n t hi s area, he want ed t o soft en t he area before send-
i ng i n manned ai rcraft i n l arge numbers. The rel i abi l i t y and
DELIBERATE FORCE
150
accuracy of TLAMs al so meshed wel l wi t h t he operat i ons em-
phasi s on mi ni mal col l at eral damage . Fur t her mor e, use of
TLAMs and st eal t h , i n General Ryan s opi ni on, woul d reduce
t he ri sk t o crews subst ant i al l y.
53
General Ryan broached t he t opi c of expandi ng t he campai gn
t o Admi ral Smi t h on 7 Sept ember . I n t he gener al s pl an,
Deadeye Nort hwest woul d unf ol d i n t hr ee par t s over t he
course of several days. The vari ous part s woul d i nvol ve an
intricate combination of SEAD assets, TLAMs, and F- 117A
st eal t h f i ght er s agai ns t t he BSA IADS. Thr ough Admi r al
Smi t h, COMAIRSOUTH i mmedi at el y request ed t he depl oyment
of six F-117s , whi ch, al ong wi t h crews and support personnel ,
woul d bed down at Avi ano. General Ryan expect ed t o keep
t hem t here for approxi mat el y t wo weeks.
54
In i t s mi l i t ary essent i al s, t he pl anni ng for Deadeye North -
west was sound. No aut hori t at i ve i ndi vi dual i n t he US or
NATO command st r uct ur e ar gued agai nst t he use of hi gh-
val ue asset s such as F- 117s and TLAMs agai ns t s uch a har d
t ar get as t he Banj a Luka IADS. Accordi ngl y, on 9 Sept ember
Wi l l i am J. Perry, t he US s ecr et ar y of def ens e, appr oved
SACEURs request t o bri ng si x F-117s to Aviano, st i pul at i ng
t hei r ret urn t o nat i onal cont rol no l at er t han 30 Oct oberwel l
beyond t he peri od duri ng whi ch Ryan envi si oned usi ng t hem.
On t he same day of Secret ary Perrys approval , an advanced
echel on of nearl y 190 peopl e of t he 49t h Fi ght er Wi ngs 9t h
Fi ght er Squadr on deployed to Aviano from Holloman AFB,
New Mexico. Apparently, the US Air Force s most advanced
operat i onal ai rcraft was about t o ent er t he fray.
55
Ryan s pl an di d run i nt o pol i t i cal obst acl es, however, mai nl y
because t he government of It al y was not yet on board wi t h i t .
On 9 Sept ember t he US Embassy i n Rome r epor t ed t hat t he
I t al i an gover nment was upset at bei ng excl uded f r om t he mul-
t i nat i onal Cont act Gr oup formed t o deal wi t h probl ems i n t he
former Yugoslavia . Al t hough t he request for t he ai rcraft had
been made t hrough NATO channel s and t hey wer e ur gent l y
needed, t he It al i an Forei gn Mi ni st ry remai ned unmoved. Ap -
parent l y, t he It al i an pri me mi ni st er had i nformed Ambassador
Holbrooke t hat t hey woul d revi ew furt her request s for support
of operations in Bosnia beyond t hose cur r ent l y appr oved at
pol i t i cal l evel s i n t erms of t he responsi veness of ot hers t o
CONVERSINO
151
Italys part i ci pat i on i n t he Cont act Group. The It al i ans were
t i red of al ways sayi ng yes t o ot hers whi l e ot hers al ways say
no to Italy. That aft ernoon t he US Embassy i nformed Ryan of
t hi s st at e of affai rs.
56
Whi l e t he di pl omat s at t empt ed t o fi nd a set t l ement t o t hi s
l at est t angl e, Ryans staff forged ahead with Deadeye North-
west. COMAIRSOUTH del ayed t he st art of t he operat i on, i n -
i t i al l y schedul ed t o st art i n t he earl y hours of 8 Sept ember, by
24 hours i n order t o bet t er al i gn t he requi red asset s. He al so
want ed t o val i dat e t arget s al ong t he act i ve front and mi ni mi ze
t he i mpact of t he weat her . Par t One t hus began ear l y on 9
Sept ember wi t h a package of 30 SEAD ai rcraft , whi ch fi red 33
HARMs at seven SAM si t es, i ncl udi ng t hose at Maj i ki ci , Donji
Vakuf, Sipovo, and Kolonija , wi t h l ess t han opt i mal r esul t s.
57
The following night, Deadeye Northwest Par t Two st r uck at
t ar get s on Li si na Mount ai n . Del ayed t hr ee hour s because of
bad weat her , t hi s package, consi st i ng of 42 ai rcraft , enj oyed
onl y moderat e success. For t he fi rst t i me, F-15Es l aunched
t hree GBU-15s, one of whi ch st ruck t he Prnj avor radi o-rel ay
si t e. In anot her fi rst combat use of a weapon, Navy F-18s
l aunched st andoff l and at t ack mi ssi l es (SLAM). St i l l , anal yst s
at t he CAOC deemed t he overal l resul t s di sappoi nt i ng, par -
t i cul arl y of t hi s second Deadeye package.
58
TLAM st ri kes proposed for t he ni ght of 1011 Sept ember
pr omi sed t o st r engt hen t he at t acks on t he Banj a Luka IADS
but not before pl anners over came some subst ant i al bar r i er s.
Pl anner s from the Navys Sixth Fleet initially expressed con -
cerns about t he sui t abi l i t y of t hei r weapons agai nst COMAIR-
SOUTHs request ed t arget s: t he Li si na Mount ai n mi l i t ary ra -
di o-rel ay st at i on and t he Li si na EW site. Eventually, imagery
for the Lisina t ar get s became avai l abl e on t he aft ernoon of 7
Sept ember, whi ch permi t t ed Navy t arget eers t o compl et e t he
ful l mi ssi on pl ans requi red. Some confusi on al so arose be-
t ween t he Si xt h Fl eet and t he CAOC over the availability of
exi st i ng t arget coordi nat es. The CAOC had a set of coordi nat es
for both Lisina t ar get s. Nevert hel ess, t he t wo st affs worked
together to overcome the previous fog, and the TLAMs hi t t he
Li si na t ar get s.
59
COMAIRSOUTH pr es s ed ahead wi t h t he t hi r d s t r i ke of
Deadeye Nort hwest, undet er r ed by t he absence of t he F- 117s .
DELIBERATE FORCE
152
Vi ewi ng t hi s package as a vari at i on of Deadeye Two, pl anners
schedul ed 30 SEAD ai rcraft , 18 st ri ke ai rcraft , and 13 TLAMs
t o hi t not onl y Li si na but also sites at Mrkonjic and Gl amoc ,
as wel l as t he Prnj avor radi o-rel ay st at i on at Mount Svi nj ar .
The ai rcraft assi gned t o t he l at t er t arget st r uck bef or e mi d -
ni ght duri ng t he eveni ng of 10 Sept ember. Four F-15Es car r y-
i ng GBU-15s scored hi t s on t hree of four assi gned DMPIs .
Unfort unat el y, F/ A-18Cs armed with SLAMs di d not enj oy t he
same success as t hei r Ai r Force bret hren. Seven SLAMs fired
at t he radi o-rel ay si t e at Gl amoc as wel l as bot h Li si na Moun-
t ai n t ar get s suffered weapons-dat al i nk-cont rol anomal i es, re-
sul t i ng i n poor t arget acqui si t i on and t he i nabi l i t y of t he pi l ot s
t o t r ansmi t commands t o t he weapons. Because of t hese t ech -
ni cal probl ems, i nt el l i gence anal yst s revi ewi ng post st ri ke dat a
deemed all SLAMs t o have mi ssed t hei r t arget s .
60
The TLAMs, however, proved remarkabl y accurat e. Launched
from the USS Normandy , seven TLAMs hit the Lisina EW site
while others struck the radio-relay station. Poststrike reconnais -
s ance showed the latter completely destroyed, with debris scat-
t ered t hroughout t he si t e. The operat i ons bui l di ng and bunkers
at t he Li si na EW site also suffered direct hits. The impact of
t hree mi ssi l es sout h of t he si t es radar posi t i on rendered i t
nonoperational. Tactically successful, the use of TLAMs demon -
st rat ed t o t he Serbs that the Americans in particular were will -
ing to use some of their most advanced weapons.
61
Overall, this heretofore most significant Deadeye strike was
relatively successful. In addition to the damage noted above,
images provided by unmanned aerial vehicles showed heavy
damage t o t he Prnj avor military radio-relay site. Only at the
Lisina Mountain radio-relay and TV transmitter siteone of the
SLAM targets did reconnaissance show no apparent damage.
62
But Deadeye was not over. Anot her st ri ke pl anned for t he
ni ght of 1112 Sept ember, Deadeye Part Three, was t o have
i ncl uded t he l ong-awai t ed F-117s. Unfort unat el y, on 11 Sep-
t ember t he It al i an government offi ci al l y di sapproved t he bed-
down of t hese ai rcraft at Avi ano. Nevert hel ess, t arget s a nd
DMPIs r emai ned, and Gener al Ryan want ed t hem at t acked
wi t h t he best means avai l abl e. Wi t h t he F-117s out of t he
pi ct ur e, pl anner s moved t he upcomi ng mi ssi on t o t he dayt i me,
t hus reduci ng t he openi ng bl ow of Deadeye Par t Thr ee t o a
CONVERSINO
153
SEAD package and t wo F- 15Es carryi ng GBU-15s, one of
whi ch hi t i t s t arget at t he Mrkonj i c radi o-rel ay st at i on.
63
St i l l , General Ryan pr essed t he at t ack on t he Ser b IADS
forward. On 13 Sept ember pl anners added a Deadeye Par t
Three st ri ke for t arget s at t he Li si na EW si t e and t he Li si na
radio-relay/TV transmitter. Two SLAMs f ound t hei r t ar get s on
t hi s occasi on, scori ng hi t s on t he Li si na t arget s. Analysts said
t hat damage t o t hese t ar get s ranged from severe to de-
st royed. Thi s t urned out t o be t he l ast Deadeye st ri ke si nce
anot her package schedul ed for 14 Sept ember fai l ed t o fl y be-
cause of bad weat her .
64
As a resul t of Deadeye Nort hwest a nd
Deadeye Sout heast operat i ons, t he SEAD campai gn achi eved
t he goal of degradi ng and neut ral i zi ng t he Serb IADS t hr ough -
out t he count r y.
65
Closing Out Option Two
In addi t i on t o Deadeye , NATO ai rcraft cont i nued t o hammer
t he rapi dl y di mi ni shi ng number of t arget s and DMPIs still
avai l abl e under opt i on t wo (see chap. 4) of Del i berat e Force.
The CAOC staff sought to maximize the effectiveness of all
avai l abl e asset s. For exampl e, at t he out set of t he operat i on,
Brig Gen David Sawyer, deputy director of the CAOC, ordered
CAS ai rcraft hel d over wat er unt i l a t act i cal ai r cont rol part y
(TACP) r equest ed suppor t . I n t he absence of such r equest s
since 30 August, however, CAOC pl anner s assigned CAS sor -
ties hip-pocket (alternate) targets i n an effort t o make use of
ot her wi se wast ed asset s.
66
The CAOC bat t l e-st aff di rect or as-
si gned al l secondary t arget s from a preapproved target list. As
before, CAS sort i es requi red Chari ot s approval bot h t o go over
l and and t o rel ease t hei r weapons agai nst BAI hi p-pocket t ar -
gets because t he mi l i t ar y si t uat i on i n Bosni a remai ned fl ui d.
67
Close coordination among the NATO and UN uni t s i n and
over Bosnia was i ndeed cruci al . In t heory, CAOC staff officers
notified the AOCC in Kiseljak of any i mpendi ng st r i kes agai nst
t arget compl exes i n proxi mi t y so as t o gi ve t he UN sol di ers
t i me t o t ake shel t er i n t hei r bunkers. Onl y aft er t he AOCC
conf i r med t hat t he peacekeeper s were out of harms way was
an ai r cr af t t o dr op or dnance.
68
DELIBERATE FORCE
154
St i l l , t he rapi d pace of ai r operat i ons and t he fog of war
oft en conspi red t o upset careful l y l ai d pl ans. Duri ng t he earl y
aft ernoon of 8 Sept ember, CAOC st aff offi cers l earned t hat a
British GR-7, properl y rerol ed from reconnai ssance to BAI a nd
cl eared t o drop i t s weapons, nevert hel ess st ruck a DMPI cl ose
t o Russi an peacekeeper s , seemi ngl y wi t hout warni ng. Upon
i nvest i gat i ng t he mat t er, t he CAOC st aff di scovered ot her GR-
7s added t o an upcomi ng st r i ke wi t h a t i me on t ar get of 1630
CET. The CAS desk officer, battle-staff director, and controller
aboard t he ABCCC had no i nformat i on, i ncl udi ng assi gned
t ar get s, for these sorties. Working quickly, battle-staff person -
nel assi gned t he ai rcraft proper t arget s , precl udi ng furt her
sur pr i ses f or UN t r oops on t he gr ound.
69
Probl ems wi t hi n C
2
wer e amenabl e t o swi f t and compet ent
fi xes, but poor weat her r emai ned t he gr eat est obst acl e t o
NATO ai r st ri kes. On 9 Sept ember, for exampl e, t he fi rst t wo of
f i ve st r i ke packages wer e unabl e t o expend t hei r or dnance due
t o det eri orat i ng weat her condi t i ons i n t he t arget area. The
remai ni ng t hree packages had t o del ay t hei r t i mes by t wo t o
t hree hours al t hough t hey di d fl y. Foul weat her limited ATM
Day 16, 1314 Sept ember, t o 140 sort i es, and onl y 20 sort i es
flew on ATM Day 17.
70
Nevert hel ess, t he l i st of t arget s and DMPIs became appr e-
ci abl y short er wi t h each passi ng day, and di pl omat i c t al ks
hel d i n Geneva on 8 Sept ember di d not hi ng t o sl ow t he ai r
campai gn. As pl anned, st ri kes cont i nued agai nst support fa -
ci l i t i es, bri dges, and communi cat i ons t arget s .
The si t uat i on on t he ground remai ned vol at i l e despi t e al l i ed
air activity. On 10 September NATO aircraft flew CAS mi ssi ons
for onl y t he second t i me i n t he operat i on. In response t o t he
shelling of the Tuzla ai rport , whi ch wounded a UN sol di er, t he
CAOC t asked a f l i ght of F/ A-18Ds t o cont act t he Tuzl a
TACPHaml et 02. The F/ A-18s dr opped one GBU- 16 each,
whi l e ot her ai rcraft i ncl udi ng GR-7sj oi ned i n t he fray. The
ai r st ri kes dest royed t wo bunkers at t he t op of a nearby hi l l
and a large-caliber artillery piece. Additional flights main -
t ai ned an ai r presence i n t he area for t he fol l owi ng t wo and
one- hal f hour s unt i l t he gr ound commander det er mi ned t hat
t he si t uat i on had st abi l i zed.
71
CONVERSINO
155
As a resul t of t he shel l i ng of Tuzl a ai rport , UNPROFOR
request ed t hat NATO pl a nne r s develop BAI boxes, si mi l ar t o
the kill boxes used dur i ng t he Gul f War. CAOC pl a nne r s
desi gnat ed one box each f or Sar aj evo, Tuzla , and Gor azde.
The CAOC woul d empl oy t he box syst em whenever UN com -
mander s r equest ed CAS but coul d not pr ovi de a TACP. In
t ur n, t he gr ound commander woul d accept f ul l r es pons i bi l -
i t y for cont rol of ai r act i vi t y wi t hi n t he boxes. Over t he next
f ew days, t he pl ans began t o t ake mor e def i ni t e shape as
CAS/ forward ai r cont rol l er A asset s r econnoi t er ed t he ar -
eas. Del i berat e Force woul d end, however, before NATO ai r
uni t s empl oyed t he s ys t em.
72
Despi t e myr i ad chal l enges, Del i ber at e For ce oper at i ons
made rapi d progress. By 10 Sept ember onl y ni ne t arget s a nd
33 DMPIs r emai ned on t he Deadeye l i st , wi t h 16 t arget s a nd
128 DMPIs l eft i n t he sout heast zone. St i l l , wi t h t he possi bi l i t y
of a pol i t i cal set t l ement neari ng, t he execut i on of Del i berat e
Force operat i ons t ook on added si gni fi cance. On 11 Sept ember
General Ryan and hi s st aff conduct ed a careful revi ew of t he
st at us of remai ni ng opt i on-t wo t arget s and DMPIs t o ensur e
t hat ai r st r i kes mai nt ai ned suf f i ci ent pr essur e on t he Ser bs to
meet bot h mi l i t ar y and political objectives .
73
In t he absence of a pol i t i cal set t l ement , NATO pressed for -
ward wi t h t he ai r campai gn. In order t o st ri ke t arget s pr e-
cl uded by bad weat her over t he l ast few days, t he CAOC added
a st r i ke package of 44 ai r cr af t and 12 t ar get s to the days five
ot her schedul ed packages on 11 Sept ember . St r i ke packages
hi t ammuni t i on depot s and st orage faci l i t i es at Hadzi ci , Ustik-
ol i na, and Saraj evo on several occasi ons t hroughout t he day.
The Vogosca ammuni t i on-l oadi ng pl ant , al ready heavi l y dam-
aged, recei ved addi t i onal at t ent i on. On 12 Sept ember st ri ke
ai r cr af t at t acked ammuni t i on depot s and suppl y f aci l i t i es
ar ound Doboj, near t he Tuzl a safe area .
74
As t he number of approved opt i on-t wo t arget s and DMPIs
dwi ndl ed, t he CAOC began t o r educe t he number of act ual
sort i es. Pl anners placed BAI packages on an al er t post ur e on
12 Sept ember. The Current Operat i ons Di vi si on at t he CAOC
t hen t asked four of t he packages real -t i me agai nst t arget s in
t he Doboj area. By t he end of t he day, however, a l ack of
sui t abl e t arget s for t he weapons l oaded on t he t asked ai rcraft
DELIBERATE FORCE
156
resul t ed i n a cancel l at i on of t he l ast package. The onl y ot her
not abl e event for t he day was mi dday report s of fi xed-wi ng
ai rcraft operat i ng out of Banj a Luka. With designated CAP
sort i es i n t he mi dst of refuel i ng from t ankers over t he Adri at i c ,
the CAOC battle staff simply reroled CAS aircraft to fly CAP
over Tuzla and pr ovi de bot h vi sual and r adar cover age of
Banj a Luka. This ad hoc CAP encountered no hostile aircraft .
75
Concurrent wi t h t he reduct i on of avai l abl e t arget s , weat her
i n t he regi on det eri orat ed rapi dl y. On 13 Sept ember t he days
fi rst st ri ke package fai l ed t o engage hal f i t s assi gned DMPIs
because of condi t i ons i n t he t arget area. The second package
cancel ed, and t he t hi rd, a Deadeye mi ssi on, was del ayed unt i l
mi daft ernoon. The fourt h package, cont ai ni ng ei ght ai rcraft
t asked agai nst t he Saraj evo ar mor - t r ai ni ng ar ea and ammuni-
tion-storage facility, flew as planned late in the afternoon. It
achi eved onl y mi xed success, agai n due t o i ncl ement weat her .
By earl y eveni ng t he onl y asset s over l and i ncl uded SEAD
packages and an AC- 130 t hat was searchi ng for si gns of t he
crew of Ebro 33. Fort y percent of t he days schedul ed sort i es
did not fly.
76
The bad weat her , however, may have been a bl essi ng i n
di sgui se. By 13 Sept ember onl y t wo approved t arget s wi t h 13
DMPIs remai ned on t he Deadeye l i st . Seven t arget s and 43
DMPIs were st i l l avai l abl e i n t he sout heast ZOA. As a resul t of
t hat day s act i vi t y, t hese number s dr opped t o 1/ 11 and 7/ 32,
respect i vel y. On 14 Sept ember poor weat her caused t he can-
cel l at i on of al l but ai rborne-earl y-warni ng, U-2, and ai r-refuel -
i ng sorties. The CAOC pl aced al l ot her packages on hol d pend-
i ng bet t er weat her .
77
Meanwhi l e, Croat and Bosni an ar my ( Bi H) uni t s cont i nued
t o advance agai nst t he fal t eri ng BSA. Donj i Vakuf fell into the
hands of t he Musl i m -l ed government , and t he Croat s took
Jaj ce . BiH and Cr oat advances i n t he west - cent r al par t of t he
count r y posed a menace t o Banj a Luka i t sel f. Perhaps t he
percei ved col l apse of t hei r fi el d army and t he puni shment i t
had endur ed f r om t he sky dr ove t he Bosni an Ser b l eaders t o
si gnal t hei r accept ance on 14 Sept ember of UN and NATO
demands. Admi ral Smi t h agr eed t o i nst i t ut e anot her bombi ng
pa us e , t hi s one of 72 hour s, begi nni ng at 2200 CET on 14
September. The NATO chai n of command aut hor i zed hi m t o
CONVERSINO
157
agr ee i n pr i nci pl e wi t h Gener al Janvi er s as s es s ment t hat
General Mladics wi l l i ngness t o hal t al l at t acks on safe areas ,
al l ow t he UN freedom of movement and t he use of t he Saraj evo
ai rport , and wi t hdraw hi s heavy weapons f r om ar ound Sar a -
jevo const i t ut ed compl i ance wi t h Janvi er s letter of 3 Septem-
ber. Thus, Del i berat e Force went on hol d once agai n. However,
Admiral Smith asked Janvi er to inform Mladic that NATO
woul d cont i nue t o fl y normal Deny Fl i ght mi ssi ons, i ncl udi ng
t act i cal r econnai ssance, CAS, CAP, SEAD , andi f requi red
CSAR. NATO intended to exercise full freedom of action over
all of Bosnia-Herzegovina . These fl i ght s, t he admi ral wrot e,
woul d be nonprovocat i ve i n nat ure, but ai rcrews woul d re-
spond, wi t hi n exi st i ng rul es of engagement , to any hostile act
or host i l e i nt ent .
78
The paus e came at an oppor t une moment f or Gener al Ryan
and his staff. NATO pl anner s realized that if Deliberate Force
cont i nued, t hey woul d be hard-pressed t o fi nd addi t i onal sui t -
abl e t arget s without going into option t hr ee, a move most
officers in the CAOC felt would not receive political approval.
Nevertheless, after combing the list of option-two targets, COM-
AIRSOUTH forwarded to Admiral Smith a list of nine to 12
addi t i onal t arget s : equi pment -st orage faci l i t i es, communi ca -
t i ons t ar get s, and a handf ul of br i dges, t unnel s, and choke
poi nt s i n t he sout heast ZOA.
Fortunately for NATO and COMAIRSOUTH, t he need t o re-
st art what was sure t o be a bri ef and pol i t i cal l y charged t hi rd
wave of attacks never arose. Initial BSA compl i ance wi t h Gen -
eral Janvi er s demands l ed t o a 72- hour ext ensi on of t he
bombi ng paus e. NATO convoys began movi ng, wi t h ai r pres -
ence, on 15 Sept ember . A Fr ench C- 130 l anded at t he Sar a -
jevo airport that afternoon. By the following day, NATO aircraft
report ed BSA t anks and vehi cl es movi ng away from Saraj evo.
On 20 Sept ember bot h Admi ral Smi t h and Gener al Janvi er
agreed t hat Del i berat e Force had i ndeed met i t s obj ect i ves.
They agreed t o i nform t he worl d t hat , as of 20 Sept ember, t he
resumpt i on of ai r st ri kes i s current l y not necessary. Fi ght i ng
bet ween Bosni an and Cr oat uni t s and t hose of t he BSA would
cont i nue for some weeks. The creat i on of a l ast i ng peace i n
Bosni a now r est ed i n t he hands of t he st at esmen and di pl o -
ma t s, and Del i berat e Force passed i nt o hi st ory.
79
DELIBERATE FORCE
158
Del i berate Force: Effecti ve But Not Effi ci ent?
One of t he ol dest cl i chs regardi ng mi l i t ary operat i ons i s
t hat no pl an survi ves fi rst cont act wi t h t he enemy. Thi s not i on
appl i es wi t h some qual i fi cat i on t o Del i berat e Force as wel l .
Wi t h t he except i on of t he pol i t i cal l y dri ven bombi ng pause
from 1 to 5 September, NATO ai r uni t s execut ed t he operat i on
i n a f ashi on t hat cl osel y mi r r or ed t he pl anni ng. There were no
sudden shi f t s i n t ar get i ng, rul es of engagement , or priorities.
COMAIRSOUTH and hi s st aff fact ored i n pol i t i cal const rai nt s
dur i ng t he pl anni ng process, desi gni ng a campai gn capabl e of
gradual escal at i on t hat nevert hel ess sought t o dest roy t hi ngs
rat her t han ki l l peopl e. To t hat end, t he execut i on of Del i ber -
at e Force cl earl y refl ect ed t he i nt ent i ons of i t s pl anners . Still,
as wi t h any l arge and compl ex operat i on, probl ems exi st ed.
The l eadershi p provi ded at al l l evel s t o t he uni t s empl oyed i n
t he operat i on, as wel l as t he di sci pl i ne of t he crews i nvol ved,
prevent ed t hese probl ems from t hwart i ng t he successful exe -
cut i on of t he campai gn.
Col l ateral Damage and the Targeti ng Process
General Ryan s desi re t o l i mi t col l at eral damage and Serb
casual t i es t o t he l owest possi bl e l evel refl ect ed t he pol i t i cal
real i t i es of t he Bal kans . Should NATO be responsi bl e for t he
ki l l i ng and mai mi ng of even rel at i vel y l i mi t ed numbers of Serb
military personnel and civilians, Pale , Belgrade, and, i ndeed,
Moscow might view (on Cable News Network) the allies as
bel l i gerent s fi ght i ng on t he si de of t he Croat s and Bos ni an
Musl i ms. Adding yet another level of grievances to those al-
ready exi st i ng i n t he Bal kans woul d have been count er pr oduc-
tive to the peace process that NATO and t he UN i nt ended
Del i berat e Force t o hel p move forward.
80
Thi s desi re t o avoi d col l at eral damage, t oget her wi t h t he
rapi dl y changi ng ground and pol i t i cal si t uat i on, drove t he
CAOC t o t i ght l y manage t he conduct of t he ai r campai gn. For
exampl e, speci al i nst ruct i ons (SPINS) i ssued by t he CAOC di-
rect ed pi l ot s t o at t ack onl y t hei r assi gned DMPI, even i f t hat
meant dr oppi ng a weapon i n a cr at er . Thi s r equi r ement
pr oved par t i cul ar l y f r ust r at i ng t o a number of ai r men.
81
CONVERSINO
159
Officers at Aviano and wi t h Ameri can naval uni t s i nvol ved
i n Del i berat e Force al so expressed di ssat i sfact i on wi t h t he
CAOCs apparent i nvol vement i n t act i cs. Al t hough a det ai l ed
di scussi on of t act i cs i s t reat ed el sewhere i n t hi s st udy (see
chap. 11) , one shoul d not e her e t hat by di ct at i ng t hi ngs such
as t he number of passes and weapons- r el ease pul ses, Gener al
Ryan and hi s st aff sought t o mi ni mi ze t he l i kel i hood of col l at-
er al damage . Crews recogni zed t hi s i mperat i ve, but many of
t hem agreed wi t h one Avi ano pilot that a low tolerance for
mi sses and mi st akes al so seemed t o t ake t he j udgment out of
t he cockpi t . Repeat ed passes over a t ar get i ncr eased t he
crews exposure t o enemy fi re. Coupl ed wi t h t hei r i nabi l i t y t o
st ri ke al t ernat e t arget s or DMPIs , some avi at ors bel i eved t hat
COMAIRSOUTH s i nt ol er ance f or col l at er al damage of t e n
pl aced t hem i n harms way wi t h l i t t l e t o gai n.
Al t hough t hi s vi ew mi ght be somewhat overbl own, uni t -l evel
pl anner s and weaponeer s seemed t o share i t as wel l . For ex -
ampl e, member s of t he 7490t h vi ewed t he st andard confi gura -
tion loads specified in the daily ATMs as gospel , t herefore
l i mi t i ng t he uni t s abi l i t y t o det ermi ne t he most appropri at e
muni t i ons f or t he assi gned t ar get. But t he CAOC di d not al-
ways di ct at e weapon l oads; oft en t he ATM simply referred to
t he best avai l abl e. As an exampl e, General Ryan pointed to
an Avi ano-based uni t maki ng i t s own i nt erpret at i on of t hi s
t erm by usi ng t wo CBU-87 cl ust er muni t i ons. For t unat el y, t he
weapons were expended on a SAM si t e and evi dent l y di d not
cause any col l at eral damage . These muni t i ons were t he onl y
ordnance of t hi s t ype empl oyed t hroughout t he campai gn. If
anyt hi ng, such an i nci dent rei nforced t he i mport ance of a
t i ght l y execut ed campai gn i n Bosni a .
82
The compressed ATM cycl e al so rankl ed many peopl e out-
side the CAOC. General Ryans tight control over BDA dat a
pl aced hi m i n t he posi t i on of det ermi ni ng whet her a t arget
requi red a second st ri ke. The fl ui d pol i t i cal si t uat i on and t he
ongoi ng Croat/ Bi H offensive often resulted in the CAOCs add -
i ng st ri kes agai nst previ ousl y wi t hhel d t arget s whi l e removi ng
ot hers from t he approved l i st . Thus, as not ed above, t he CAOC
resorted to cookie-cutter ATMs t hat si mpl y speci fi ed t i mes on
t arget . From t he perspect i ve of t he 7490t h, however, t he accel -
er at ed pl anni ng cycl e al so dr ove a maddeni ng number of
DELIBERATE FORCE
160
changes, ri ght up t o t akeoff. In one i nst ance, offi cers at Avi ano
prot est ed t o t he CAOC t hat t hey coul d not meet t he t i me on
t arget and rol l ed i t back by one hour.
83
But t he CAOC st af f had a cl ear under st andi ng of t he si t u -
ation driving the ATM cycle, derived in part from their proxim-
i t y t o Gener al s Ryan a nd Hor nbur g. Col onel Ri chardson ,
CAOC chi ef of current operat i ons duri ng Del i berat e Force, re-
alized that the ATM pr ocess had t o addr ess emer gi ng t ar get s
as wel l as put ai rpower agai nst t he t arget s most critical to
achi evi ng a pol i t i cal set t l ement i n t he l east amount of t i me.
Navy capt ai n Cal i se, deput y chi ef of pl ans, agreed t hat pl an-
ning inside the ATM cycl e, t oget her wi t h hardware probl ems
associ at ed wi t h di ssemi nat i ng t he f i nal pr oduct , pr esent ed a
challenge to everyone involved. Nevertheless, he could see no
ot her way t o react t o t he commanders gui dance and bel i eved
t hat i f t he operat i on were t o resume, ATM product i on woul d
cont i nue i n t hi s fashi on.
84
Changes t o t he ATM, however, di d i nt erfere wi t h mi ssi on-
pl anni ng efficiency in the field. As mission or flight leaders
at t empt ed t o coordi nat e wi t h ot her uni t s i nvol ved i n a st ri ke
package, t hey somet i mes found t hat each was worki ng from a
different version of the ATM.
85
Despi t e t he ever-present pot ent i al for confusi on, gi ven t he
exi st i ng st at e of affai rs, proact i ve l eadershi p at Avi ano and i n
t he CAOCt oget her wi t h di sci pl i ned cr ewsensur ed t hat
packages st ruck onl y approved t arget s . Col l at eral damage was
indeed minimal; Serbian leader Milosevic admi t t ed t o Ambas-
sador Hol brooke t hat onl y 25 Ser bs di ed as a r esul t of t he
campai gn.
86
Al t hough t he Bosni an Ser bs made a f ew cr ude
at t empt s at port rayi ng wi despread col l at eral damage, Deliber -
at e Forces heavy rel i ance on preci si on muni t i ons and t i ght l y
cont rol l ed execut i on probabl y made i t t he cl eanest mi l i t ary
operat i on ever.
Tacti cal Command and Control
Chariot and his CAOC staff had several means at their dis -
posal to ensure that subordinate units executed each days ATM
i n a manner t hat conformed t o t he commanders i nt ent . ABCCC
Compass Call aircraft served as a conduit of informa t i on t o t he
CONVERSINO
161
CAOC from units entering, flying in, and exiting the AOR.
Aviano-based NATO E-3 AWACS aircraft also flew tracks over
the Adriatic while other NATO asset s orbi t ed over Hungary.
Navy ai r - cont r ol uni t s , gr ound- bas ed cont r ol l er s , and t he
AOCC in Kiseljakcall sign Longbowrounded out the con -
stellation of C
2
asset s l i nki ng al l el ement s of Del i berat e Force.
Although the assets listed above allowed the CAOC battle
st aff t o ret ai n cont rol over t he course of event s i n t he ski es
above Bosni a , problems inevitably developed. On the very first
ni ght of Del i berat e Force, a mechani cal mal funct i on forced t he
on-station ABCCC aircraft, call sign Bookshelf, to return to
base. At 2317 CET, as ai rcraft began arri vi ng on st at i on, t he
CAOC decided to proceed without Bookshelf. The E-3, call sign
Magic, advised all aircraft of the problem, and Chariot cleared
t he fi rst package over l and at 2340. Hal f an hour l at er, Book -
shel f arri ved on st at i onnot an auspi ci ous begi nni ng, but t he
existing SPINS had consi dered t hi s possi bi l i t y. The redundancy
and flexibility of NATO C
2
asset s pr oved i nst r ument al i n ensur-
ing that the CAOC mai nt ai ned cont rol over t he operat i on.
87
What Cl ausewi t z aptly termed the fog and friction of war,
however, would still bedevil Deliberate Force despite advanced
communi cat i ons t echnol ogy. At t i mes, confusi on rei gned over
pr oper backup t ar get s , and on several occasi ons NATO ai r -
borne early warning (NAEW) cont rol l ers were somet i mes not
abreast of cert ai n si t uat i ons. On 30 August , for exampl e, t he
SEAD commander , Ni kon- 23, det ect ed t hr eat emi ssi ons and
made t he appropri at e cal l . Nei t her t he E-3 on st at i on nor
HARM asset s acknowl edged t he cal l . Appar ent l y, t he l ast
HARM shoot ers had fai l ed t o check out wi t h ei t her t he SEAD
commander or t he E- 3 . Neither ABCCC nor NAEW coul d de-
t ermi ne when any HARM asset s woul d r et ur n t o t he AOR.
With the SEAD wi ndow cl osi ng, mass confusi on set i n as
mul t i pl e packages began cal l i ng for vect ors t o t hei r t ankers
from ground cont rol l ers. At l east one el ement ret urned t o base
due t o l ack of fuel .
88
Problems maintaining the big picture were not limited to
airborne control centers. On several occasions confusion among
CAOC st aff members resul t ed i n near pandemoni um i n t he sky.
At approximately 2000 on 1 September, the CAOC, via Book-
shelf, ordered three aircraft to go over land. Ten mi nut es l at er ,
DELIBERATE FORCE
162
ABCCC ordered t hem t o ret urn over wat er. Fi ft een mi nut es
aft er t hat , Bookshel f t ol d t hem t o go over l and, agai n on or -
ders from the CAOC. When cont rol l ers aboard Magi c sought
confi rmat i on for t he count erorder, t he CAOC i nformed t hem
t hat i t had i ssued no such or der s. The ai r cr af t hel d over
wat er. An hour l at er t he CAOC ordered anot her sort i e, Sl eepy
11, t o r et ur n t o base. Ten mi nut es l at er , t he CAOC appar ent l y
ordered Sl eepy 11 over l and. It t urned out t hat CAS cell offi -
cers were coordi nat i ng di rect l y wi t h Bookshel f rat her t han
goi ng t hrough t he seni or operat i ons offi cer on t he bat t l e st aff,
who also evidently issued contradictory instructions. Such con -
fusing incidents diminished as personnel gained experience.
89
Techni cal probl ems and poor radi o di sci pl i ne al so dogged
the NATO C
2
net wor k. Ext r aneous chat t er as wel l as mi ssi on-
rel at ed t ransmi ssi ons crowded t he vari ous radi o frequenci es.
Ot her ai rcraft ent eri ng t he area somet i mes fai l ed t o cont act
Magi c or Bookshel f, confusi ng an al ready di ffi cul t ai r pi ct ure.
90
As regards force protection, the SPINS of August 1995 pro -
hi bi t ed ai rcraft from operat i ng over l and wi t hout SEAD cover -
age. Given a limited number of available SEAD as s et s at any
one t i me, pl anner s scheduled SEAD packages to provide win -
dows duri ng whi ch t i me ot her ai rcraft coul d ent er t he area
and carry out t hei r mi ssi ons. In t heory t he SEAD mi ssi on
commander i nformed NAEW of hi s est i mat ed t i me of arri val at
the ingress corridor. NAEW, i n t ur n, t r ansmi t t ed t he wi ndow-
open t i me over al l rel evant frequenci es. Ten mi nut es pri or t o
depart ure, t he SEAD commander agai n advi sed NAEW of his
est i mat ed arri val t i me at t he egress corri dor so t hat cont rol l ers
coul d announce t he t i me t he wi ndow woul d cl ose.
91
As i n any confl i ct , t he fog and fri ct i on of war, i ncl udi ng
human error, confusi on, confl i ct i ng orders, and poor weat her
oft en l ed t o t he breakdown of even t he most met i cul ousl y
pl anned mi ssi on. SEAD packages were j ust as vul nerabl e t o
such fact ors, t hereby compl i cat i ng C
2
duri ng Del i berat e Force.
The apparent l ack of coordi nat i on bet ween penet rat i ng sort i es
and SEAD packages proved frust rat i ng t o many ai rcrews and,
i n t urn, l ed t o a fai r amount of wast ed effort .
Clearly, with the safety of NATO cr ews par amount , one can-
not overstate the importance of SEAD asset s. Fur t her mor e,
CAOC intelligence anal yst s knew t hat Ser b SAMs had gone
CONVERSINO
163
i nt o hi di ng, as General Ryan poi nt ed out t o Admi ral Smi t h in
hi s l et t er of 16 Sept ember out l i ni ng hi s pl an t o resume ai r
st ri kes i f so di rect ed. Wi t h a very real t hreat st i l l present and
Ser b tactics blunting the efficacy of HARMs, t he pr oper man-
agement and cont rol of SEAD packages became vi t al . Fort u -
nat el y, t he i nci dent s rel at ed above represent onl y a port i on of
t he t ot al pi ct ure, al bei t a port i on most crews wi l l t end t o
r emember . Of gr eat er i mpor t ance, however , i s what t hese
scenes of confusi on can t each. For t he foreseeabl e fut ure,
human fai l i ngs wi l l cont i nue t o serve as t he l i mi t i ng fact ors
behi nd our i ncreasi ngl y compl ex and sophi st i cat ed t echnol -
ogy. A shortage of critical assets, regardless of the overall
st r engt h and number s of an ent i r e f or ce, can t hwar t or at l east
sl ow t he t empo of any ai r campai gn. When t he fog of war
exacerbat es t hi s short age, mi ssi ons are wast ed and l i ves po-
t ent i al l y pl aced i n danger. Fort unat el y, Ebro 33 r emai ned De-
l i berat e Forces fi rst and onl y l ossa t ri but e t o t he ul t i mat el y
successf ul suppr essi on and neut r al i zat i on of t he Ser bs IADS.
Coal i ti on Effort or Ameri can Show?
From t he begi nni ng, Del i berat e Force was a NATO opera -
tion. The air campaign involved US Air Force, Navy, and Ma -
ri ne Corps ai rcraft t oget her wi t h uni t s from Great Bri t ai n ,
Fr ance, Spain , t he Net herl ands, Italy, Turkey, a nd Ge r ma ny.
The Uni t ed St at es flew approximately two-thirds of all sor -
t i esnot surpri si ng consi deri ng t hat roughl y t wo-t hi rds of t he
ai rcraft empl oyed were Ameri can. US ai rcraft dropped 622 of
t he 708 preci si on muni t i ons empl oyed but onl y 12 of 318
nonpr eci si on weapons. Fr ench, Spani sh, and Br i t i sh uni t s ex -
pended t he r emai ni ng pr eci si on weapons.
92
Out wardl y, Del i berat e Force gave t he appearance of a t rue
coal i t i on effort . Indeed, al t hough j ournal i st Ri ck At ki nson
noted bickering allies as one of General Ryans chal l enges,
he descri bed t he operat i on as a comi ng of age part y for a
West ern al l i ance t hat i n more t han four decades had fi red few
shot s i n anger and had never f ought an ext ended campai gn.
93
St i l l , percept i ons of j ust how much Del i berat e Force was a
coalition effort varied among the NATO allies.
DELIBERATE FORCE
164
For example, several senior officers at the CAOC s aw t he
operat i on as a means of forgi ng cl oser t i es bet ween t he Uni t ed
St at es and i t s al l i es. In part i cul ar, Col onel Ri chardson be-
l i eved t hat It al i an general Andrea Fornasi ero, commander of 5
ATAF, was l argel y responsi bl e for t he many posi t i ve changes
and i mprovement s i n CAOC faci l i t i es and capabi l i t i es. The
Ameri can l eadershi p, i n t urn, real i zed t hat t he CAOC was
subor di nat e t o For nasi er o. Evi dent l y, however, Fornasi ero rec-
ogni zed t he domi nant rol e pl ayed by t he Ameri cans i n Del i ber -
at e Force.
94
Bot h Col onel Ri chardson and Navy capt ai n Cal i se al so rec-
ogni zed t he personal nat ure of al l i ed rel at i ons forged at t he
CAOC. Ri chardson bel i eved t hat t he face-t o-face i nt eract i on
bet ween Ameri can and al l i ed offi cers l ai d a foundat i on for
fut ure cooperat i on and i ncreased l evel s of t rust among t he
NATO allies. Calise, as deput y of pl ans, was part i cul arl y sensi -
t i ve t o i nt ernat i onal feel i ngs. On more t han a few occasi ons,
he wor ked qui ckl y t o smoot h over any mi sunder st andi ngs and
was responsi bl e for keepi ng nat i onal represent at i ves at t he
CAOC i n t he pl anni ng loop.
95
Even i n t he absence of open enmi t y bet ween NATO part i ci-
pant s, vi ews of t he combi ned nat ure of Del i berat e Force vari ed
considerably among Americas allies. Many non-US NATO offi-
cer s compl ai ned t hat t he oper at i on was l i t t l e mor e t han an
Amer i can- r un ai r campai gn and t hat t hey wer e j ust al ong f or
t he r i de. Gener al Ryans deci si on t o move from Napl es t o
Vicenza served t o rei nforce t hat percept i on. Wi ng Commander
Andy Bat chel or, a Royal Air Force officer working in the BDA
cell at the CAOC, not ed t hat t he absence of non- Amer i can
offi cers i n key posi t i ons on General Hornburgs st aff creat ed
t he i mpr essi on t hat t he Amer i cans had t aken over t he ent i r e
oper at i on. Ot her s r emar ked t hat onl y t he Uni t ed St at es lacked
a nat i onal represent at i ve at t he CAOC, relying instead on liai-
son officers from i ndi vi dual uni t s.
96
The Ameri cans t ook a far di fferent vi ew t han t hei r al l i es as
t o why US personnel occupi ed so many key posi t i ons. General
Hor nbur g, for exampl e, st at ed t hat he had offered t o fi l l key
posi t i ons wi t h al l i ed offi cers but t hat no one had st epped
forward to accept the offer. The CAOC di rect or al so ci t ed a
di fference i n work habi t s among t he vari ous al l i ed ai r forces
CONVERSINO
165
t hat seemed t o cause t hem t o shun t he day- t o- day oper at i ons
of the CAOC but t hen demand t he opt i on t o become mor e
i nvol ved when somet hi ng i mpor t ant was about t o happen. I n -
deed, American officers shared the belief that allied officers
were onl y sel ect i vel y i nvol ved i n t he ai r campai gn. Thus, al-
t hough t he CAOC was t echni cal l y under General Fornasi ero,
General Sawyer Hornburgs deputywas a US Air Force offi -
cer, as were the directors of operations, plans, intelligence , com-
munications, and personnel. A handful of US Navy officers filled
a few other key positions. The director of logistics, an Italian
colonel, was the only non-US officer to hold a critical position.
97
Still, American officers operating at lower levels of planning
a n d e x e c u t i o n s a w t h e a l l i e d c o a l i t i o n a s f u n c t i o n i n g
smoothly. Maj Keith Kiger, a key member of t he t eam t hat
bui l t t he pl ans for Del i berat e Force, di d not det ect any al l i ed
resent ment at hi s l evel t oward US l eadershi p. Worki ng wi t h a
Bri t i sh offi cer as t hey bui l t t he t arget l i st, Kiger al so fel t t hat
members from ot her NATO count ri es were deepl y i nvol ved i n
t he pl anni ng process.
98
Techni cal capabi l i t i es rat her t han nat i onal prej udi ces oft en
drove t he ai r rol e pl ayed by each member of t he al l i ance.
Ot her t han t hose f r om t he Uni t ed St at es, onl y Bri t i sh, French,
and Spani sh uni t s possessed t he equi pment t o del i ver pr eci -
si on-gui ded muni t i ons . The Dut ch and It al i ans di d not have
such capabi l i t i es, and, as pr evi ousl y ment i oned, bot h t he
Turki sh and German cont i ngent s were l i mi t ed i n t hei r part i ci -
pat i on for vari ous reasons. St i l l , onl y t he Uni t ed St at es ex-
pended an overwhel mi ng percent age of preci si on muni t i ons .
The Fr ench dr opped 73 nonpr eci si on weapons, more t han fi ve
t i mes t he number of pr eci si on weapons they employed. Like-
wi se, t he Bri t i sh dropped 47 Mk-83 nonpr eci si on bombs but
expended onl y 48 l aser-gui ded munitions. Considering NATOs
desi re t o l i mi t col l at eral damage , most coal i t i on offi cers t hus
recogni zed t hat t hei r abi l i t y t o empl oy preci si on-gui ded weap-
onry rel at i ve t o t hat of Ameri can uni t s di ct at ed t hei r pl ace i n
t he campai gn.
99
Nevert hel ess, al l i ed cooperat i on proved absol ut el y essent i al
t o t he success of Del i berat e Force. On t he ground i nsi de Bos -
nia , for exampl e, an i nt ernat i onal UN forcecomposed t o a
s ignificant degree of units from NATO countriesworked closely
DELIBERATE FORCE
166
with COMAIRSOUTH and hi s st aff. The RRF, made up of Bri t -
i sh, French, and Dut ch uni t s, coordi nat ed i t s act i vi t y wi t h
t hat of Ryans air units. UNPROFOR coul dand di drequest
CAS when necessary. NATO and 5 ATAF liaison officers served
with all critical UN C
2
el ement s. Of t hose, possi bl y t he most
i mport ant t o t he CAOC was t he UNPROFOR/NATO par t ner -
shi p represent ed i n t he AOCC at Kiseljak. NATO officers work-
i ng t here passed on vi t al weat her and gr ound i nf or mat i on and,
as not ed above, ensured t hat NATO bombs di d not cat ch UN
peacekeeper s unawar e and i n t he open. On t he one hand,
officers of the CAOCs CAS cell worked closely with the AOCC
to deconflict the RRFs art i l l ery fi re wi t h pl anned sort i es; on
t he ot her hand, t he RRFs guns oft en fi red on suspect ed Serb
posi t i ons i n an effort t o dri ve t hem t o t he ground and reduce
t he t hreat t o ai rcraft from host i l e fi re.
100
The Except i on or t he Rul e?
What ever el s e may be s ai d about i t , Del i ber at e For ce
marked a t urni ng poi nt for NATO and t he course of event s i n
Bosni a . As a coal i t i on effort , t he ai r campai gn had i t s prob-
l ems. Ameri can ai r pl anners as s umed t hat bas i ng nat i ons
woul d agree t o operat i ons from t hei r t erri t ori es. By and l arge
t hey di dwi t h t he not abl e except i on of It al y, which refused to
al l ow t he beddown of t he F-117s. Still, Americas NATO allies
came t o real i ze t hat wi t hout US part i ci pat i on i n t he form of
mi l i t ary muscl e and di pl omat i c i nfl uence, a meani ngful sol u -
t i on t o t he Bosni an cri si s woul d come onl y i n t he form of a
vi ct or s peace of t he wor st ki nd. Al t hough some peopl e
doubted the efficiency of Deliberate Force, few could overlook
i t s effect i veness. Pl anners of t he ai r campai gn sought t o end
t he t hr eat f r om t he Bosni an Ser b ar my t o government safe
ar eas , bri ng about t he cessat i on of mi l i t ary operat i ons, and
force Serbi an compl i ance wi t h UN mandat es. I n meet i ng t hese
goals, they were generally successful. To what extent Deliber -
at e Force proved responsi bl e for t he accords reached i n No -
vember 1995 i n Dayt on, Ohi o , however, i s beyond t he scope of
t hi s chapt er .
CONVERSINO
167
Al t hough pr obl ems abounded, Del i ber at e For ce demon -
strated the inherent flexibility of airpower i n t he most ci r cum-
scribed of settings. NATO ai r uni t s fl ew 3, 535 sort i es and
dropped more t han el even hundred bombs, l osi ng onl y a si n -
gl e ai rcraft . As i nt ended, col l at eral damage was mi ni mal Serb
deat hs number ed sl i ght l y mor e t han t wo dozen.
101
Precision
muni t i ons account ed for nearl y t hree-quart ers of t hose ex -
pended. Gener al Ryans ai r campai gn, careful l y pl anned and
tightly executed, benefited from the discipline of NATO air -
crews and t hei r hi gh st at e of t rai ni ng, as wel l as t he avai l abi l -
i t y of superi or weaponry. Craft ed t o respond t o a pot ent i al l y
expl osi ve and compl ex si t uat i on, Del i berat e Force may not be
t he t empl at e for al l fut ure operat i ons. Consi deri ng t he goal s
sought and t he r est r i ct i ons pr esent , however , t he empl oyment
of airpower over Bosnia f r om 30 August t o 14 Sept ember 1995
achi eved much mor e t han most peopl e t hought possi bl e j ust a
few short mont hs before.
Not es
1. Adm Leighton W. Smith, US Navy, to Lt Gen Rupert Smith, com -
mander, UN Protection Force, Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, letter, 28 Au -
gust 1995, Del i berat e Force Col l ect i on, Ai r Force Hi st ori cal Research Agency
(AFHRA), Maxwell AFB, Ala., NPL-15; and briefing slides (U), Lt Gen Michael
E. Ryan, subject: NATO Air Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Deliberate
Force, 29 August14 September 1995, AFHRA, NPL-16.
2. Al l i ed Ai r Forces Sout hern Europe, Operat i on Del i berat e Force, 29
Sep 9514 Oct 95 [sic] Factual Review, 14 November 1995, 2-7 through
2-8. (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.
3. Ibid. , 1-5, 3-1 (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified;
and bri efi ng, Lt Gen Mi chael Ryan, subj ect : Command Rel at i onshi ps.
4. Operat i on Del i berat e Force, 29 Sep 9514 Oct 95 [sic] Fact ual Re -
vi ew, 1-5, 3-1; and Ryan bri efi ng, subj ect : Command Rel at i onshi ps.
5. Rick Atkinson, Air Assault Sets Stage for Broader Role, Washi ngt on
Post, 15 November 1995.
6. Bri efi ng, Lt Gen Mi chael Ryan, subj ect : Del i berat e Force St ruct ure;
and fact sheet (U), Deliberate Force, CAOC/Historian (HO), n.d., AFHRA,
CAOC-13.
7. Message (U), 061402Z JUL 95, commander, US Ai r Forces Europe, t o
commander, Thi rd Ai r Force et al . , subj ect : Act i vat i on of t he 7490t h Wi ng
(Provi si onal ), 6 Jul y 1995; bri efi ng (U), Col Ji m Turner, commander, 31st
Oper at i ons Gr oup and 7490t h Oper at i ons Gr oup ( Pr ovi si onal ) , and Col
Davi d St ri nger, commander, 31st Logi st i cs Group, subj ect : Del i berat e Force
DELIBERATE FORCE
168
Lessons Learned: The Objective Wing in Combat, to members of the USAFE
st aff, 5 Oct ober 1995; and Col Davi d St ri nger, commander, 31st Logi st i cs
Group, i nt ervi ewed by t he aut hor and Maj Ronal d M. Reed, Avi ano AB,
I t al y, 18 Januar y 1996.
8. Turner/ St ri nger bri efi ng; St ri nger i nt ervi ew; and SMSgt Ri chard R.
Morris, 31st Fighter Wing/HO, Operation Deliberate Force, n. d. , AFHRA,
AVI-02-01. (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.
9. Roderi ck de Normann, Operat i on St orm: At t ack on t he Kraj i na,
Janes Intelligence Review, November 1995, 49598.
10. Bri efi ng, Lt Gen Mi chael Ryan, subj ect : Ai r Defense Threat , Saraj evo
Fi el ded Forces.
11. Karadzi c, Kraj i sni k Comment on Saraj evo Massacre, Banj a Luka
Srpski Radi o Net work, 1700 GMT, 28 August 1995, i n Forei gn Broadcast
Information Service [FBIS], East ern Europe, Bosnia-Herzegovina, FBIS-
EEU- 95- 168, 30 August 1995, 27; and At ki nson.
12. Briefing (U), Lt Gen Michael D. Ryan, to students of the School of
Advanced Airpower Studies (SAAS), Maxwell AFB, Ala., subject: Deliberate
Force, 7 February 1996.
13. Capt Ken Calise, US Navy, CAOC battle-staff director, interviewed by
t he aut hor and Maj Ronal d M. Reed, Dal Mol i n AB, Vi cenza, It al y, 16
Januar y 1996 ( Secr et ) I nf or mat i on ext r act ed i s uncl assi f i ed; Col Ji m
Turner, 31st Fi ght er Wi ng/ Operat i ons Group et al . , i nt ervi ewed by t he
aut hor and Maj Ronal d M. Reed, Avi ano AB, It al y, 19 January 1996 (Secret )
Informat i on ext ract ed i s uncl assi fi ed; and fact sheet , Del i berat e Force.
14. Del i berat e Force: Summary of Dai l y St at us, 29 Oct [sic]14 Sep 95,
package flow, 2930 August 1995 (NATO Secret) Information extracted is
uncl assi fi ed, AFHRA, NPL-15; t arget fol der/ graphi cs, t arget no. D093, Han
Pi j esak mi l i t ary radi o-rel ay st at i on, n. d. (NATO Secret ) Informat i on ex-
tracted is unclassified, AFHRA, AVI-43; and 7490th Wing (Provisional) mis -
si on resul t s, 14 Sept ember 1995 (NATO Secret ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s
unclassified, AFHRA, AVI-40-01, 1.
15. Operation Deliberate Force . . . Factual Review, 4-1 through 4-2
(NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified; and Deliberate Force:
Summary of Daily Status. (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.
16. Deny Fl i ght , commander s dai l y r epor t , 290300Z300259Z and
300300Z310259Z, August 1995 (NATO Secret ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s
uncl assi fi ed; CAOC dai l y mi ssi on summary from 300300Z t o 310259Z Au -
gust 1995 (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA,
CAOC-15; and Operation Deliberate Force . . . Factual Review, 4-2 (NATO
Secret ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s uncl assi fi ed.
17. Commanders dai l y report , 290300Z300259Z August 1995 (NATO
Secret ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s uncl assi fi ed; and U-2 Crashes i n Engl and,
Avi at i on Week and Space Technol ogy 143 (4 Sept ember 1995): 24.
18. Commanders dai l y report , 300300Z310259Z August 1995. (NATO
CONVERSINO
169
19. Operation Deliberate Force . . . Factual Review, 4-1 through 4-2
(NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified; and message, mission
report from 494th Fighter Squadron/deployed to commander, 5 ATAF/CAOC/
Intelligence (INT), mission no. 5C3099, 30 August 1995 (Confidential) Informa-
tion extracted is unclassified, AFHRA, AVI-46.
20. Operation Deliberate Force . . . Factual Review, 4-2. (NATO Secret)
Informat i on ext ract ed i s uncl assi fi ed.
21. Karadzic Defiant Following NATO Air Attacks, Bel grade SNRA,
1438 GMT, 30 August 1995, i n FBIS-EEU-95-168, 30 August 1995, 26;
Akashi : Hal t i n Ai r Operat i ons Depends on Serbs, Paris AFP, 0857 GMT,
31 August 1995, and Cl aes Warns Serbs t o St op Provoki ng Us, Brussels
La Une Radio Network, 1600 GMT, 30 August 1995, bot h i n FBI S- EEU- 169,
31 August 1995, 2.
22. At ki nson; message (U), 010001B SEP 95, Offi ce of t he Commander,
UNPROFOR, to Rapid Reaction Force Operations Staff (RRFOS) et al. , sub-
j ect : Warni ng OrderSuspensi on of Ai r St ri kes, 1 Sept ember 1995, AFHRA,
NPL-15; and Operation Deliberate Force . . . Factual Review, 4-2 (NATO
23. Rick Atkinson, Put to the Test, NATO Shows Its Mettle, Interna -
tional Herald Tribune, 20 November 1995; and Bruce W. Nelan, More Talk -
ing, More Bombing, Time, 18 Sept ember 1995, 7677.
24. 31st Fighter Wing/CVR, memorandum for record (U), subject: Delib -
er at e For ce Lessons Lear ned, 11 Oct ober 1995, AFHRA, AVI - 35; and
Stringer interview.
25. Tur ner / St r i nger bri efi ng; and St ri nger i nt ervi ew.
26. Tur ner / St r i nger bri efi ng; and St ri nger i nt ervi ew.
27. 31st Fi ght er Wi ng/ CVR, memor andum f or r ecor d, at t achment 2- 2;
Turner/ St ri nger bri efi ng; and St ri nger i nt ervi ew.
31. Capt Todd Gent ry, 510t h Fi ght er Squadron, i nt ervi ewed by Lt Col
Brad Davi s and Maj Chri s Orndorff, Avi ano AB, It al y, 20 February 1996.
32. Ibi d. ; and Turner i nt ervi ew. Col onel Hoog t ook part i n a group di s -
cussi on about Del i berat e Force chai red by Col onel Turner.
33. Dr. Wayne Thompson and Maj Ti m Reagan, Del i berat e Force: A
Di st i nct i ve Campai gn, Washi ngt on, D. C. , December 1995, 1718 (Secret )
Informat i on ext ract ed i s uncl assi fi ed; and Lt Col Gary West , commander,
510t h Fi ght er Squadron, i nt ervi ewed by Lt Col Brad Davi s and Maj Chri s
Orndorff, Aviano AB, Italy, 20 February 1996.
34. Operat i on Del i berat e Force . . . Fact ual Revi ew, 5-2 t hrough 5-3
(NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified; AOCC/Ops/1, to Lt
Gen Mi chael Ryan, memorandum, subj ect : Effect i veness of CAS, 12 Sep -
DELIBERATE FORCE
170
tember 1995 (NATO Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AF -
HRA, NPL-18.
35. BDA summary spreadsheet , 9 Apri l 1995 (NATO Secret ), i n Excerpt ,
Cl ose Ai r Suppor t Cel l Dai l y Log, Combi ned Ai r Oper at i ons Cent er ,
Vi cenza, It al y, 29 August 16 Sept ember 1995. (Secret ) Informat i on ex-
36. Briefing, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Intelligence Directorate, to vice
chai rman, JCS, subj ect : Impact of Ai r St ri kes on BSA Communi cat i ons,
copy faxed from Headquart ers European Command (EUCOM) t o General
Ryan and General Hornburg, n. d. (NATO Secret ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s
unclassified, AFHRA, CAOC-19.
37. Ibid. (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.
39. Message, 070800Z SEP 95, CINCSOUTH, to SACEUR, subject: Op -
eration Deliberate Force, 7 September 1995 (NATO Secret) Information ex-
tracted is unclassified, AFHRA, NPL-15.
(NATO Secret ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s uncl assi fi ed; message, 031600Z SEP
95, Headquart ers 5 ATAF, subj ect : Ai r Task, reference message, com -
mander, 5 ATAF, 3 September 1995 (NATO Secret) Information extracted is
unclassified, AFHRA, CAOC-18; and BSA Weapons Withdraw Recce (U),
n.d., AFHRA, CAOC-18.
(NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified; and Deliberate Force:
Summary of Dai l y St at us, package fl ows, 1 t hrough 5 Sept ember 1995.
(NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.
42. At ki nson, Put t o t he Test ; and Lt Gen Bernard Janvi er, Headquar-
t ers, Uni t ed Nat i ons Peace Forces, t o Gen Rat ko Ml adi c, l et t er (U), 3 Sep -
t ember 1995, AFHRA, NPL-15.
43. Adm Lei ght on Smi t h, quot ed i n At ki nson, Put t o t he Test ; and
t ranscri pt of press conference, Adm Lei ght on W. Smi t h, commander i n
chi ef, Al l i ed Forces Sout hern Europe, NATO Recommences Ai r St ri kes
agai nst Bosni an Serbs, NATO Cl ub, Headquart ers AFSOUTH, Napl es, It al y,
6 Sept ember 1995.
44. Message, 050800Z SEP 95, CINCSOUTH, to COMAIRSOUTH, sub-
ject: Air Strike Execution, 5 September 1995 (NATO Confidential) Informa-
t i on ext ract ed i s uncl assi fi ed, AFHRA, NPL-15; and st at ement by t he NATO
secret ary-general , press rel ease (95)79, 5 Sept ember 1995.
45. Deliberate Force: Summary of Daily Status, package flow, 5 Sep -
t ember 1995 and 56 Sept ember 1995; and 7490t h Wi ng (Provi si onal ) mi s -
si on r esul t s, 5 Sept ember 1995.
47. Mi ssi on r epor t , 5C0654/ Seagul l 11, 062332Z SEP 95, 6 Sept ember
1995 (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA, AVI-57; and
CONVERSINO
171
Operation Deliberate Force . . . Factual Review, 3-4 (NATO Secret) Infor -
mat i on ext ract ed i s uncl assi fi ed.
48. Commander s dai l y r epor t , 060300Z070259Z Sept ember 1995
(NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified; Deliberate Force fact
sheet , 6 and 7 Sept ember 1995; Operat i on Del i berat e Force . . . Fact ual
Review, 4-5 (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified; and brief-
ing, Lt Gen Michael Ryan, subject: CSAR Time Line.
49. Operation Deliberate Force . . . Factual Review, 4-5 (NATO Secret)
I n f o r ma t i o n e x t r a c t e d i s u n c l a s s i f i e d ; c o mma n d e r s d a i l y r e p o r t ,
070300Z080259Z Sept ember 1995 (NATO Secret ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s
uncl assi fi ed; and mi ssi on report , MRP1, 8 Sept ember 1995, from 104t h
Fighter Group, deployed to commander, 5 ATAF/CAOC/INT (Secret) Infor -
50. Thompson and Reagan, 9; and Del i berat e Force BDA t racki ng sheet ,
31 OSS/ OST, 19 Sept ember 1995, 11 (Secret ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s
unclassified, AFHRA, AVI-40-01.
51. Maj Gen Hal Hornburg, CAOC director, interviewed by Lt Col Robert
Owen et al. , Air Force Wargaming Institute, Maxwell AFB, Ala. , 14 March
1996; 7490t h Wi ng (Provi si onal ) resul t s; ATM, 110300Z t o 120259Z Sep -
tember 1995, 1 (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA, C-!a3;
and ATM, 130300Z t o 140259Z Sept ember 1995, 4 (Secret ) Informat i on
extracted is unclassified, AFHRA, C-!a3.
52. Ryan br i ef i ng, 7 Febr uar y 1996; and message, 070001Z SEP 95,
COMAIRSOUTH, to CINCSOUTH, subject: Operation Deliberate Force, 7
September 1995 (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified, AF -
HRA, NPL-15-01.
53. Message, 051100Z SEP 95, COMAIRSOUTH, t o commander i n chi ef,
European Command (USCINCEUR), subj ect : Tomahawk Operat i ons, 5 Sep -
t ember 1995 (Secret ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s uncl assi fi ed, AFHRA, NPL-15;
and Hornburg i nt ervi ew.
54. Message, 081100Z SEP 95, CINCSOUTH, to SACEUR, subject: IADS
West , 8 Sept ember 1995 (NATO Secret ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s uncl ass -
ified, AFHRA, NPL-17.
55. Message, 091053Z SEP 95, from USCINCEUR, t o Supreme Head-
quarters Allied Powers Europe et al. , subject: Change to ACEORBAT TOA-
Ai r, 9 Sept ember 1995 (NATO Confi dent i al ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s un-
classified, AFHRA, NPL-15.
56. Message, Ameri can Embassy, Rome, t o US secret ary of st at e et al . ,
subject: Government of Italys Delay in Approving NATO F-117A Deploy-
ment s t o It al y, 9 Sept ember 1995 (Secret ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s uncl ass -
ified, AFHRA, NPL-16.
57. Commanders daily report, 080300Z090259Z September 1995 (NATO
Secret) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA, CAOC-15; Operation
Deliberate Force . . . Factual Review, 4-5 (NATO Secret) Information extracted
is unclassified; and briefing, Gen Michael Ryan, subject: Deadeye Results.
DELIBERATE FORCE
172
I nf or mat i on ext r act ed i s uncl as s i f i ed; and commander s dai l y r epor t ,
090300Z100259Z September 1995 (NATO Secret) Information extracted is
unclassified.
59. Cal i se i nt ervi ew; commander, Si xt h Fl eet , Tomahawk Operat i ons i n
Support of Operat i on Del i berat e Force, 5 Sept ember 1995 (Secret ) Informa-
t i on ext ract ed i s uncl assi fi ed, AFHRA, NPL-16; and Capt ai n Hl avka, memo-
randum t o General Ryan vi a General Hornburg, subj ect : TLAM Updat e, 7
Sept ember 1995, AFHRA, NPL-15-01.
60. Repor t , CAOC C- 2 As s es s ment of Oper at i on DEADEYE Par t
III10/11 Sep 95 (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified,
AFHRA, EUCOM-14.
61. Ibi d. ; Hornburg i nt ervi ew; and Cal i se i nt ervi ew.
62. CAOC C-2 Assessment.
Informat i on ext ract ed i s uncl assi fi ed; message, 111125Z SEP 95, Mi ni st ry
of Defense, Italy, to AIRSOUTH plans cell, subject: Beddown Request for
F-117A Aircraft, 11 September 1995 (NATO Confidential) Information ex-
tracted is unclassified, AFHRA, NPL-16; 7490th Wing (Provisional) mission
resul t s; and Del i berat e Force: Summary of Dai l y St at us, package fl ow,
1112 Sept ember 1995.
(NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified; and Deliberate Force
BDA t racki ng sheet , 19 Sept ember 1995.
65. CAOC C-2 Assessment.
66. Close Air Support Cell Daily Log, 7 September 1995.
67. Ibi d. , 8 Sept ember 1995; and Operat i on Del i berat e Force . . . Fac-
tual Review, 4-6 (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.
69. I bi d. , 11 Sept ember 1995.
70. Commander s dai l y r epor t , 130300Z140259Z Sept ember 1995 and
140300Z150259Z Sept ember 1995; and Operat i on Del i berat e Force . . .
Factual Review, 4-8 through 4-9 (NATO Secret) Information extracted is
uncl assi fi ed.
71. Commander s dai l y r epor t , 100300Z110259Z Sept ember 1995;
Cl ose Ai r Support Cel l Dai l y Log, 10 Sept ember 1995; AOCC/ Ops/ 1
memorandum; and Operat i on Del i berat e Force . . . Fact ual Revi ew, 4-7
72. Ibid., 4-8 through 4-9; Close Air Support Cell Daily Log, 1112
Sept ember 1995; and Cal i se i nt ervi ew.
73. Ambassador Chri st opher Hi l l , i nt ervi ewed by Lt Col Rob Owen,
Washi ngt on, D. C. , 27 Febr uar y 1996; Ryan br i ef i ng, 7 Febr uar y 1996; and
Operation Deliberate Force . . . Factual Review, 4-7 (NATO Secret) Infor -
74. Deliberate Force: Summary of Daily Status, package flow, 1113
Sept ember 1995; t arget fol der no. C005, Vogosca ammuni t i on-l oadi ng pl ant
CONVERSINO
173
(NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA, AVI-43; and
target folder no. C026, Doboj ordnance depot, (NATO Secret) Information
extracted is unclassified, AFHRA, AVI-43.
75. Close Air Support Cell Daily Log, 12 September 1995; and Opera-
tion Deliberate Force . . . Factual Review, 4-8 (NATO Secret) Information
76. Commander s dai l y r epor t , 130300Z130259Z Sept ember 1995
(NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified; Operation Deliberate
Force . . . Factual Review, 4-9 (NATO Secret) Information extracted is
uncl assi fi ed; and Del i berat e Force: Summary of Dai l y St at us, package
fl ow, 1213 Sept ember 1995.
77. Briefing, Lt Gen Michael Ryan, subject: Deliberate Force, Air Opera-
t i on: Target s Remai ni ng, DMPIs Remai ni ng; and commanders dai l y report ,
140300Z150259Z Sept ember 1995 (NATO Secret ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s
uncl assi fi ed.
78. Janvi er l et t er t o Ml adi c; and Adm Lei ght on W. Smi t h, commander i n
chi ef, Al l i ed Forces Sout hern Europe, t o Lt Gen Bernard Janvi er, l et t er (U),
14 Sept ember 1995, AFHRA, NPL-15.
80. Ryan bri efi ng, 7 February 1996; Cal i se i nt ervi ew; and Col Dougl as J.
Ri char dson, CAOC C- 3 and chi ef of st af f , i nt er vi ewed by t he aut hor ,
Vi cenza, It al y, 16 January 1996.
81. 31st Fi ght er Wi ng/ CVR memor andum f or r ecor d, 3.
82. Ibi d. , 4; Capt Scot t MacQueen, 510t h Fi ght er Squadron, i nt ervi ewed
by Lt Col Brad Davis and Maj Chris Orndorff, Aviano AB, Italy, 20 February
1996; and Ryan bri efi ng, 7 February 1996.
83. Tur ner / St r i nger br i ef i ng; and 31st Fi ght er Wi ng/ CVR memor andum
for record, 3.
84. Ri chardson i nt ervi ew; and Cal i se i nt ervi ew.
86. Hill interview.
87. Close Air Support Cell Daily Log, 2930 August; and Deny Flight
SPINS, commander, 5 ATAF CAOC SPINS/028, effective 260300 August
1995 (NATO Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.
88. Mi ssi on r epor t , Mi ssi on I D/ 05/ 7C3007, 429 ECS, 300858Z August
1995, AFHRA, AVI-46. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.
90. Mi ssi on report , Mi ssi on ID I8M942, Magi c 80, 9 Sept ember 1995
(Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA, AVI-52; and
mi ssi on r epor t , Mi ssi on I D/ 05/ 7C0842, 429 ECS, 081602Z Sept ember
1995 (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA, AVI-51.
91. Deny Fl i ght SPI NS, 4; Ryan br i ef i ng, 7 Febr uar y 1996; and
Thompson and Reagan, 18.
92. Ryan bri efi ng, 7 February 1996.
93. At ki nson, Put t o t he Test .
DELIBERATE FORCE
174
95. Calise interview.
96. Wing Commander Andy Batchelor, BDA cell, interviewed by Lt Col
Brad Davi s and Maj Chri s Orndorff, Ramst ei n, Germany, 14 February 1996.
97. Hor nbur g i nt er vi ew; and Thompson and Reagan, 11.
98. Maj Kei t h Ki ger, Si xt eent h Ai r Force, i nt ervi ewed by t he aut hor and
Maj Ronal d M. Reed, Avi ano AB, It al y, 18 January 1996, and by Lt Col Brad
Davi s and Maj Chri s Orndorff, Avi ano AB, It al y, 21 February 1996; and
Calise interview.
99. Cal i se i nt ervi ew; and Col Arj en Koopmans, Net herl ands ai r force,
interviewed by Lt Col Brad Davis and Maj Chris Orndorff, Vicenza, Italy, 21
Febr uar y 1996.
100. Thompson and Reagan.
101. Hill interview.
CONVERSINO
175
Chapt er 6
Combat Assessment :
A Commanders Responsi bi l i ty
Thi s chapt er exami nes t he combat - assessment pr ocess i n
Operat i on Del i berat e Force, pl aci ng part i cul ar emphasi s on
bat t l e damage assessment (BDA). Dur i ng combat assessment ,
intelligence and operat i onal communi t i es anal yze st ri ke re-
sul t s and weapons ef f ect s t o r ef i ne st r at egi es, oper at i onal
pl ans, and t ar get l i st s, as wel l as sel ect weapons f or sub-
sequent st r i kes. Because of t he mul t i nat i onal nat ur e of t he
pl anni ng, command, and execut i on of t hi s ai r campai gn and
as a r esul t of deci si ons by seni or l eader s, combat assessment
experi enced probl ems wi t h t he cohesi on, compl et eness, and
di st r i but i on of bat t l e- damage i nf or mat i on. Al t hough t hese
probl ems were obvi ous at t he t i me and have been wel l docu -
ment ed si nce t hen, t he i ssue f or f ut ur e ai r pl anner s and com -
mander s r emai ns whet her t hey wer e avoi dabl e or somehow
i nherent t o ai r warfare. In ot her words, were t hese probl ems
t he consequence of i nappropri at e doct ri ne and policies (which
one can change), or were t hey t he consequence of t he part i cu -
l ar ci rcumst ances of Del i berat e Force, whi ch may or may not
be rel evant t o fut ure ai r campai gns (and t hereby probabl y
beyond t he power of ai rmen t o change)? Cl earl y, i mpl i cat i ons
of t he assessment ar e i mpor t ant f or t he f ut ur e pl anni ng a nd
execut i on of ai rpower.
Combat Assessment i n Theory
From a US doct ri nal st andpoi nt , combat assessment i ncl udes
t hr ee el ement s : BDA, muni t i ons ef f ect i venes s as s es s ment
(MEA) , and r eat t ack r ecommendat i ons.
1
BDA, the subjective
est i mat e of damage t o enemy forces resul t i ng from t he appl i -
cat i on of force t o achi eve operat i onal and t act i cal obj ect i ves,
2
177
i s based on t he physi cal damage t o a t arget, the effect on that
t arget syst ems functional or operational capability, and the
overall impact on the enemys operational capability. Normally,
the chief intelligence officers in US joint or coalition com-
mandsJ-2s or C-2s, respectivelyare responsible for BDA. As
chief of operations, the J-3 is responsible for MEAthe effective -
ness of friendly weapons systems and munitio ns . A reattack
recommendationdetermining what needs to be done nextfol-
lows directly from BDA and MEA. The joint/ combined force air
component commander det ermi nes fut ure courses of act i on
bas ed on i nput s f r om t he J - 2/ C- 2 and J - 3/ C- 3. As t he s um of
t hese el ement s, combat assessment cl oses t he l oop i n t he
t ar get i ng process and seeks t o det ermi ne i f st rat egi c obj ect i ves
are bei ngor have beenmet .
Combat assessment i nvol ves bot h sci ence and art . Int el l i -
gence personnel begin by collecting information from all avail -
abl e sourcesmai nl y from communi cat i ons and el ect roni c i n -
t er cept s ( i . e. , si gnal s i nt el l i gence) , i ma g e r y , a n d h u ma n
report i ng. Anal yst s assess or fuse t hi s i nformat i on t o est i -
mat e t he di rect physi cal and funct i onal damage t o a t arget or
t arget s and t o det ermi ne t he overal l i mpact of t hat damage t o
t he funct i onal and operat i onal effect i veness of t he t arget sys -
tem. The integration of BDA and MEA underpi ns deci si ons of
whet her and how one shoul d r eat t ack t he t ar get(s) or add new
t arget s. To t he ext ent t hat t he degree of an at t acks dest ruc-
t i on or di srupt i on of a t arget det er mi nes physi cal and f unc-
t i onal damage, measur i ng such damage i s a sci ence. But
j udgi ng whet her such at t acks have met st r at egi c and oper a -
t i onal obj ect i ves remai ns more of an art , si nce t hi s det ermi na-
t i on rest s on fact ors t hat one cannot easi l y quant i fy. The l at t er
i ncl ude t he enemys psychol ogi cal st at e or val uat i on of t he
t ar get s under at t ack.
Ef f ect i ve combat assessment r equi r es subst ant i al i nvest -
ment i n command at t ent i on and physi cal r esour ces. Accor d-
i ng t o US mi l i t ary doct ri ne, j oi nt force commanders a r e r e-
sponsi bl e for provi di ng gui dance and adequat e resources t o
conduct combat assessment i n suppor t of t hei r oper at i ons.
Thi s gui dance shoul d i ncl ude cl ear i nst r uct i ons on how sub-
or di nat es shoul d measur e damage and conver t t hose meas -
urement s i nt o assessment s of t he effect i veness of at t acks i n
DELIBERATE FORCE
178
t erms of t he commands operat i onal and st rat egi c obj ect i ves.
3
Joi nt force commanders shoul d provi de enough resources t o
est abl i sh an i nt el l i gence archi t ect ure capabl e of support i ng
i nformat i on col l ect i on, conversi on of t hat i nformat i on i nt o us-
able intelligence, and di ssemi nat i on of appropri at el y det ai l ed
intelligence products (imagery, BDA reports, etc.) to valid
user s. The l at t er may r ange f r om t act i cal squadr ons pl anni ng
st ri kes t o t he Nat i onal Command Aut hori t i es assessi ng t he
st rat egi c progress of t he campai gn.
Similarly, in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) op-
er at i ons, seni or commander s shoul d ensur e t hat a pr ocess
and archi t ect ure exi st t o carry out combat assessment . An
est abl i shed doct r i ne accompani ed by t rai ni ng i s necessary for
al l i ed forces t o know what combat assessment i s and how t o
perform i t . Operat i ons and exerci ses al l ow personnel t o prac-
t i ce combat assessment , gai n profi ci ency, and refi ne t he doc -
t ri ne according to lessons learned. Thus, at the theoretical level
at l east , successf ul combat assessment i ncl udes adequat e
physical resources, properly trained providers and users of intel-
ligence dat a, cl ear and rapi d communi cat i on among al l con -
nect ed el ement s, and mut ual t rust among l eaders and fol l owers.
Combat Assessment i n Real i t y
In t he speci fi c case of pl anni ng and execut i ng Del i berat e
For ce, t he peopl e r esponsi bl e f or est abl i shi ng and r unni ng
ef f ect i ve combat assessment f aced daunt i ng gui dance and r e-
source chal l enges from t he st art . Preparat i ons for provi di ng
combat - assessment suppor t t o Del i ber at e For ce r esi ded i n t he
combi ned ai r operat i ons cent er (CAOC) at Headquar t er s 5t h
Allied Tactical Air Force (5 ATAF) j ust out si de Vi cenza , Italy.
Fol l owi ng t he Bosni an Serb at t ack on a Sar aj evo mar ket i n
Febr uar y 1994 and t he subsequent NATO ul t i mat um t o t he
Bosni an Ser b ar my t o wi t hdraw i t s heavy weapons out si de t he
20-ki l omet er t ot al -excl usi on zone ar ound Sar aj evo , CAOC
pl anner s , worki ng wi t h l i t t l e formal gui dance, began t o set up
BDA pr ocedur es t o suppor t possi bl e ai r at t acks on heavy
weapons in the zone. No published NATO st andar d agr ee-
ment s on BDA or combat assessment exi st ed, and t he f or mal
MCLAUGHLIN
179
gui dance avai l abl e di d l i t t l e t o make up for t he short fal l i n
doct ri nal gui dance. For i nst ance, Al l i ed Ai r Forces Sout hern
Europe (AIRSOUTH) Directive 80-50, vol. 2, AIRSOUTH Report -
ing Directive, est abl i shed t i me l i nes for movi ng i nformat i on
from subordi nat e uni t s t o hi gher headquart ers (whi ch woul d
prove unreal i st i cal l y short )
4
but sai d or i mpl i ed not hi ng about
t he act ual ar t and sci ence of usi ng t hat i nf or mat i on t o make
usabl e and t i mel y assessment s.
Lacki ng suffi ci ent NATO gui da nc e , US pe r s onne l us e d
Ameri can doct ri ne from joint publications. CAOC t arget eers
produced a CAOC BDA gui de
5
i n Mar ch 1994 bas ed on a
Defense Intelligence Agency gui de devel oped from t he l essons
of t he 199091 Persi an Gul f War . Moreover, MSgt Mark Sweat,
a t arget eer for 20 years who worked in the CAOC, pi npoi nt ed
NATOs shortcomings: There is no BDA career field. A target-
eer does not make one a BDA expert . There i s no school , and
it [BDA] i s never done t he same way t wi ce.
6
Maj Dave Min -
st er , who helped write the CAOCs BDA gui de, added t hat t he
NATO t ar get i ng school , whi ch he at t ended, i s onl y a basi c
cour se desi gned t o convey t he l owest common under st andi ng
of t arget i ng and fai l s t o address BDA at all.
7
Throughout Operat i on Deny Fl i ght, whi ch i nvol ved t he moni-
t ori ng and subsequent enforcement of t he no-fl y zone over
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the CAOC BDA cell stood up as offensive
mi ssi ons (e. g. , at t acks on t he Kraj i na Serb airfield at Udbina ,
Croatia , i n November 1994 and t he Pal e ammuni t i on-st orage
facilities outside Sarajevo i n May 1995) t ook pl ace and t hen
st ood down as operat i ons ret urned t o normal l evel s. As t he
securi t y si t uat i on i n Bosni a det er i or at ed t hr oughout t he sum-
mer of 1995, t he chal l enge i ncreased for CAOC personnel t o set
up a NATO combat assessment capabl e of support i ng a con -
certed air offensive. The shootdown of Capt Scott OGrady by
t he Bosni an Ser bs on 2 June 1995 provi ded addi t i onal i mpe-
t us t o bri ng t he CAOC up t o a l evel requi red t o execut e a
r obust ai r campai gn.
8
In order to do that as quickly as possible, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS) and other agenciesmainly the Air Staff and US
Eur opean Commandcircumvented the slower funding process
of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) a n d
provided additional money, people, and equipment to the CAOC.
DELIBERATE FORCE
180
Many of the high-tech systems were still in the final stages of
test and evaluation, and NATO had not purchased most of t hem
for coalition operations. Augmentees from the 32d Air Opera -
tions Group (AOG) at Ramstein Air Base, Germany; Headquar -
ters AIRSOUTH at Naples ; and elsewhere raised the BDA cells
manning from four people at the start of Deliberate Force to 10.
More comput ers, pri nt ers, and ot her equi pment used t o process
and communi cat e BDA data, such as Linked Operations-Intelli -
gence Centers Europe (LOCE), arrived in-theater prior to the
start of the operation, and more arrived as it progressed.
Despite these improvements in materiel, the multinational
character of Deliberate Force infused combat assessment with
problems of cohesion, completeness, and distribution of infor -
mat i on. Combat assessment i s a cumbersome and murky pro-
cess in any operation, but several challenges made it particu -
larly so in Deliberate Force. According to Maj Gen Hal Hornburg,
the CAOC director, the policy of sending personnel on temporary
duty to the CAOC for three to six months, sometimes less,
meant t hat approxi mat el y 90 percent of t he posi t i ons are
manned by t emporary personnel [who] rot at e at a rat e of 25
percent or more a mont h.
9
This lack of fully trained personnel
and cont i nui t y by an experi enced st aff undermi ned t he smoot h
functioning of the BDA cell. Consequently, some CAOC BDA
representatives, including some US personnel but particularly
many of the European allies, needed training in computer soft -
ware as wel l as i n t arget -coordi nat e mensurat i on.
10
Training lev-
els differed considerably among individuals from the various
nations, especially in computer automation, as did their experi-
ence i n act ual BDA methodology. Thus, training posed a signifi -
cant problemat least in the campaigns early stages.
Anot her i ssue of cohesi on concerned t he rel easabi l i t y of i n -
telligence to NATO al l i es, whi ch caused some European offi -
cers t o quest i on whet her Del i berat e Force was a NATO opera -
tion or a US and NATO operat i on.
11
Adm Lei ght on Smi t h ,
commander i n chi ef of Al l i ed Forces Sout hern Europe, r e-
marked t hat t he bi ggest probl em of combi ned operat i ons was
the ability to share intelligence [with the allies] but added
t hat t hi s was overcome when we got nat i onal agenci es t o
share i nt el l i gence .
12
Thi s deci si on hel ped fost er t rust wi t hi n
t he mul t i nat i onal CAOC.
MCLAUGHLIN
181
In light of lessons learned in Operation Desert Storm, NATO
assign ed responsibility for BDA to the CAOC, although other
organizationsmainly the joint analysis center at Royal Air
Force Molesworth , United Kingdom, which provided theater-level
intelligence support, and national-level intelligence agenci es,
such as JCS/J-2T (Targets), the Central Intelligence Agency,
and the National Security Agencyprovided battle-damage in -
puts to support the CAOCs deliberations. The CAOC BDA cell
produced spreadsheet s, among ot her t hi ngs, t o t rack t arget
names; assigned basic-encyclopedic numbers to newly identified
targets as a cross-reference to the target name; and identified and
described desired mean points of impact (DMPI [aiming points for
each target]) and tracked their status during the campaign.
The scope and scal e of t he ai r campai gn duri ng i t s fi rst few
days overwhel med t he CAOC BDA cell.
13
For sever al r easons,
t he BDA cycl e of post st ri ke anal ysi s t ook up t o 48 hours t o
feed back i nt o t he ai r t aski ng message (ATM) cycle. The need
t o t r ai n so many per sonnel i n comput er s and BDA met hodol -
ogy caused some del ay, as di d t he sl ow arri val and poor qual-
ity of critical elements of information. As one CAOC member
compl ai ned, [mi ssi on report s] were sl ow t o arri ve, and t he
qual i t y and resol ut i on of gun camera i magery was t oo poor for
BDA pur poses.
14
Ot her del ays resul t ed from t he fact t hat di f-
ferent servi ces and nat i ons used a vari et y of vi deo format s i n
t hei r ai rcraft recorders and t hat LOCE, t he mai n di ssemi na-
t i on syst em, had l i mi t ed bandwi dt h t o t ransmi t t he l arge vol -
umes of i magery dat a requi red for t i mel y BDA. At the begin -
ning of Deliberate Force, the target cell shar ed t he LOCE
t ermi nal used by t he col l ect i on, coordi nat i on, and i nt el l i gence-
requi rement s management cel l . It di d not recei ve a dedi cat ed
LOCE unt i l 17 Sept emberaft er t he ai r st ri kes had st opped.
Poor weather over t he t arget s al so cont ri but ed t o del ays i n t he
BDA cycl e, al t hough t he i nt el l i gence communi t y part l y over -
came t hi s pr obl em by usi ng mul t i pl e sensor s.
BDA i mpr oved dur i ng t he oper at i on as mor e equi pment and
support personnel arri ved and as t he l at t er recei ved on-t he-
j ob t rai ni ng. Despi t e t he hard work of wel l -i nt ent i oned and
dedicated personnel, imperfect communication down the chain
of command made combat assessment difficult. Michael Short,
then a major general and AIRSOUTH chief of staff, noted that
DELIBERATE FORCE
182
BDA success cri t eri a and met h -
odol ogy wer e not concept ual l y
d e t e r mi n e d b e f o r e t h e c a m-
paign.
15
Within the first few days,
however, Lt Gen Mi chael Ryan,
commander of Allied Air Forces
Sout her n Eur ope, who personally
ret ai ned aut hori t y t o add and re-
move targets f r om t he mast er at -
t ack pl an, aut hori zed removal of
a target from this plan when it was
two-thirds destroyed.
16
At least,
the proximity of the BDA special-
ists and General Ryan eased t he
phys i cal act of communi cat i ng
BDA. The BDA team chief, Wing
Comdr Andrew Batchelor, briefed
Gener al Ryan a nd/ or ot he r CAOC l eader s t wi ce a day
s omet i mes more oftenand General Ryan or his deputies regu -
larly briefed Admiral Smith on BDA. The admi ral , i n t urn, re-
tained sole authority for releasing BDA to non-CAOC organiza -
tions, including field units, national intelligence centers, SHAPE,
and t he US St at e Depart ment.
17
Although the CAOC BDA t eam knew t he l ocat i on of each
DMPI and coul d det ermi ne physi cal damage t o t he t arget s ,
l i nki ng t he apparent physi cal damage t o funct i onal damage
and t o t he t heat er obj ect i ve of compel l i ng t he Bosni an Serbs to
wi t hdraw equi pment from t he t ot al -excl usi on zone proved dif-
fi cul t .
18
Given the limited training of the BDA per sonnel and
t he rapi d pace of t he ai r campai gn, t he 32d AOG, whi ch aug-
me nt e d t he CAOC, hi ghl i ght ed one as pect of t he combat -
a ssessment probl em: The CAOC . . . did not close the ATM
l oop (cycl e) wi t h a uni fi ed assessment of operat i onal resul t s.
BDA focused on t arget st at us as a r esul t of bomb damage.
Partially attributable to a lack of detailed campaign objectives ,
t he BDA effort measured the lower teir [sic] resul t s of pl anned
strikes to the exclusion of higher teir [sic] t ask- achi evement ,
obj ect i ve-at t ai nment , and st rat egy i mpl ement at i on.
19
As a re-
sul t , t he group not ed t hat seni or l eaders and st rat egi st s per -
formed t hei r own anal ysi s of operat i onal resul t s vi s--vi s t he
Lt Gen Michael C. Short
MCLAUGHLIN
183
chosen st rat egy. . . . Leaders had t o pul l t he i nformat i on,
anal yze t he dat a, and det ermi ne a course of act i on, wi t hout a
fully supporting staff effort.
20
General Ryan , however, exercised his prerogative by inten -
tionally reserving for himself the responsibility for overall com-
bat assessment . Consequent l y, t he BDA cell briefed him on
t he physi cal damage i nfl i ct ed on t arget s . As noted by Lt Col
Robert Wallace , t he CAOCs chi ef of t arget s, No one was
sl at ed t o perform funct i onal or t arget syst em anal ysi s because
wi t h ai r supr emacy and t he abi l i t y t o perform what amount ed
t o sat ur at i on bombi ng, al bei t wi t h smar t bombs , i t was easi er
t o cont i nue t o hi t known, appr oved t ar get s t han i dent i fy new
t ar get s t hat mi ght f unct i on as backups f or t he dest r oyed t ar -
gets .
21
General Ryan t hen di scussed t he r esul t s wi t h hi s sen -
ior staff and Admiral Smith t o assess overal l progress and
pl an f ut ur e at t acks because, as Col Dani el Zoer b, director of
the AIRSOUTH Deny Flight ai r-operat i ons cel l , poi nt ed out ,
Onl y commanders hel d account abl e/ responsi bl e for execu -
tion (CINC & COMAIRSOUTH) were fully aware of all consid -
er at i ons and i mpl i cat i ons, and i n pr oper posi t i on t o j udge t he
ext ent t o whi ch at t acks achi eved [t he] desi red resul t .
22
However, t he deci si on not t o di ssemi nat e BDA out si de t he
CAOC (except to Admiral Smith ) was a cont ent i ous i ssue, par -
ticularly for aircrews flying the missions. Aviano pilots com-
pl ai ned of t he l at eness and i ncompl et eness of t he BDA r each -
i ng t hem. Because pl anner s oft en ordered rest ri kes wi t hout
much expl anat i on about BDA, many pi l ot s suspect ed t hat , i n
some cases, t hey had r est r uck al r eady- dest r oyed t ar get s. Also
t endi ng t o st rengt hen t hi s suspi ci on was t he CAOCs pr act i ce
of sendi ng down t arget phot os showi ng al l DMPIs associ at ed
wi t h a t arget but not di st i ngui shi ng bet ween t hose al r eady
dest r oyed and t hose t o be at t acked.
Gi ven t he l i mi t at i ons of t hei r prest ri ke i nformat i on and ri gi d
r ul es of engagement, pi l ot s general l y had t o i dent i fy t he as -
signed DMPI duri ng an i ni t i al pass over t he t arget s a requi re-
ment t hat f ur t her i ncr eased t hei r r i sks. Avi anos intelligence
uni t t ri ed t o mi t i gat e t hi s probl em by comi ng up wi t h i t s own
BDA, usi ng gun-camera foot age, mi ssi on report s, and any i m -
agery available.
23
In t he fi nal anal ysi s, pi l ot s fl ew a few redun-
dant st ri kes i n t he fi rst days of Del i berat e Force, but as BDA
DELIBERATE FORCE
184
caught up wi t h t he ATM cycl e, t he pr obl em of r edundant
st r i kes seemed t o di sappear , al t hough knowl edge of bomb
damage remai ned cl ouded i n t he fi el d.
Colonel Zoerb acknowl edged t he frust rat i on of t he Avi ano
pi l ot s over t he i mperfect communi cat i on of BDA t o t he uni t s
but st r essed t hat t he est abl i shed BDA syst em served a broader
agenda t han si mpl y t el l i ng fi el d uni t s how wel l t hey were do -
ing. He later explained that internal release of BDA i nforma-
t i on was rest ri ct ed t o prevent t hi s i nformat i on from bei ng mi s -
represented (unintentionally) to NATO and t he nat i ons, whi l e
external release [outside the CAOC] was restricted to avoid
compromi se and t o avoi d di vul gi ng st rat egi c and t act i cal pl ans .
Widespread release (media ) would have given the warring fac-
t i ons i nsi ght i nt o t arget i ng st rat egy, i ncreasi ng ai rcrew ri sk
and maki ng obj ect i ve at t ai nment more di ffi cult.
24
Concl usi ons
Combat assessment i n Del i berat e Force refl ect ed t he prefer -
ences of General Ryan and Admi ral Smi t h . Overal l , bot h men
were pl eased wi t h t he process.
25
Due to the relatively small
number of t ar get s (56) and DMPIs (346), General Ryan and hi s
seni or st aff were abl e t o gauge t he progress i n meet i ng t heat er
and st rat egi c obj ect i ves by exami ni ng t he physi cal -damage as -
sessment s. However, had t he operat i on been broader, l onger,
or wi t hout pauses, t he bur den on t he seni or st af f woul d have
been much great er. Moreover, t he debat e over t he rel easabi l i t y
of BDA outside the CAOC cont i nues.
From a US perspect i ve, BDA has i mpr oved si nce Deser t
St or m, and it worked relatively well during Deliberate Force.
In general, the CAOC had t he di ffi cul t t ask of t ransi t i oni ng
from a smal l -scal e operat i on i n a l argel y beni gn envi ronment
(Deny Flight) to an offensive posture in a short amount of time.
After the necessity for air strikes became more apparent, CAOC
personnel adapt ed as best as t hey coul d t o t he changed ci rcum-
st ances, and resources poured i nt o t he CAOC. In terms of spe-
cific progress, the theater is now the focal point for BDA, with
intelligence i nput s from vari ous syst ems and agenci es. Furt her -
mor e, US syst ems ar e mor e i nt er oper abl e, communicat i ons
MCLAUGHLIN
185
have i mpr oved bet ween shi pbor ne and l and- based uni t s, and
per sonnel have acqui r ed t r ai ni ng t hr ough oper at i ons such as
Deny Flight and Del i berat e Force.
However, NATO as a whole remains relatively backward and
unpract i ced i n combat assessment . It l acks suffi ci ent doct ri ne
on how to perform BDA, l et al one combat assessment , and t he
NATO targeting school does not address even the first step of
combat assessment BDA. This lack of doctrine and t he di spar -
i t y i n t rai ni ng and experi ence among member nat i ons mani-
fested itself during the rapid expansion of the CAOC BDA cell
just prior to and during Deliberate Force. Successful combined
operations require additional improvements since future opera -
tions likely will involve US forces operating as part of a coalition.
Al t hough t he Uni t ed St at es and NATO differ in their institu -
tional capabilities to practice BDA, bot h l ack formal doct ri nal
gui dance f or t he act ual assessment s phase of combat assess-
ment , part i cul arl y for Del i berat e Force, i n whi ch pol i t i cal i ndi-
cat ors proved cri t i cal t o assessi ng bombi ng effect s. US doc -
t r i ne pr ovi des some gui dance f or measur i ng and descr i bi ng
physi cal and funct i onal damage. However, nei t her body of
doct r i ne expl ai ns how t o l i nk physi cal and funct i onal damage
t o desi red pol i t i cal end st at es. Perhaps t hi s defi ci ency i s due
t o t he uni queness of each operat i on, but one can previ ew i n
doct r i ne a concept ual framework for measuri ng progress t o -
wards pol i t i cal goal s so t hat commanders need not rel y on
t hei r i nst i nct s al one. The smal l scal e of Del i berat e Force, i t s
shor t dur at i on, and t he l eader shi p of Gener al Ryan a nd Admi-
r al Smi t h mi t i gat ed t he l ack of speci fi c doct ri ne t o some de-
gr ee, but t hese speci al ci r cumst ances may not al ways be pr e-
sent or rel evant i n fut ure appl i cat i ons of ai rpower.
Thi s i s not t o say t hat Del i berat e Force had no general
appl i cat i ons for t he empl oyment of ai rpower. Indeed, one can
ant i ci pat e many of t he campai gns feat ures as el ement s of
fut ure campai gns, whi ch l i kel y wi l l be charact eri zed by a re-
qui rement for t he rapi d expansi on of operat i onal and i nt el l i -
gence capabi l i t i es, t he bl endi ng of mul t i nat i onal personnel
wi t h di fferi ng l evel s of t heoret i cal and pract i cal t rai ni ng and
experience, and a high pace of operations. In addition, the large
number of t arget s hit in every air tasking order (ATO) cycle will
requi re robust comput er syst ems capabl e of t ransmi t t i ng hi gh
DELIBERATE FORCE
186
vol umes of dat a from t he cont i nent al Uni t ed St at es and acr os s
a t heat er of oper at i ons, as wel l as t i mel y assessment s i n sup-
port of subsequent ATO pl anni ng.
Thus, whi l e combat - assessment pr act i ce and i nf r ast r uc-
t ures al ways have room for i mprovement , t he most compel l i ng
area for fut ure resource i nvest ment l i es i n devel opi ng a body
of doct ri ne t hat permi t s t he effi ci ent bl endi ng of mul t i nat i onal
per sonnel and pr ovi des combi ned assessment s and r ecom -
mendat i ons t o ai r commander s on al l aspect s of combat as -
sessment from sensor-dat a i nt erpret at i on t o pol i t i cal advi ce.
Thi s doct ri ne can gui de educat i on and t r ai ni ng, as wel l as
provi de ready-made st aff manual s sui t abl e for qui ck modi fi ca -
t i on t o refl ect i di osyncrat i c ci rcumst ances. Ai rmen must push
doct r i ne as far into the strategic levels of political-military
connect i ons as possi bl e. Thi s effort may requi re cl oser coordi-
nation with political advisors, both from within NATOif ap-
propri at eand from t he US Depart ment of St at e a nd/ or a p -
pr opr i at e f or ei gn mi ni st r i es. But we shoul d wel come such
connect i vi t y, gi ven t he cl ose and cont i nual mi l i t ary and di pl o -
mat i c i nt eract i ons of operat i ons such as Del i berat e Force.
Not es
1. Joi nt Pub 2-01. 1, Joi nt Tact i cs, Techni ques, and Procedures for In -
telligence Support to Targeting, third draft, April 1995, III-23III-32.
2. Ibid. , III-26.
3. Ibi d.
4. Lt Col Robert Wallace, JCS/J-2T, previously CAOC chief of targets and
deputy C-2, telephone interview by the author, 6 March 1996.
5. Battle Damage Assessment Guide, 5th ed., 5 ATAF CAOC, 1 October
1995, Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), Maxwell Air Force Base
(AFB), Ala., NPL-03. (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassifie d.
6. MSgt Mark Sweat , CAOC, t el ephone i nt ervi ew by t he aut hor, 6 March
1996.
7. Maj Dave Mi nst er , JCS/ J- 2T, t el ephone i nt er vi ew by t he aut hor , 6
Mar ch 1996.
8. Col John R. Baker, Headquart ers USAF/ XOO, i nt ervi ewed by Lt Col
Chri s Campbel l and t he aut hor, 1112 December 1995, AFHRA, Mi sc-13.
9. Qui ck Look at t he CAOC Ops/ Int el Archi t ect ure Needs, Headquar-
ters USAF/XOO, n. d. (created 28 July 1995), 3, AFHRA, SAGC-01-05. (Se -
cret ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s uncl assi fi ed.
MCLAUGHLIN
187
10. Wal l ace i nt ervi ew. Col onel Wal l ace had t o t rai n some Europeans i n
conver t i ng degr ees, mi nut es, and seconds t o degr ees, mi nut es, and hun-
dr edt hs of mi nut es.
11. Wing Comdr Andrew Batchelor, Royal Air Force, interviewed by Maj
Chri s Orndorff, 14 February 1996, AFHRA, Mi sc-18.
12. Adm Leighton Smith, videotaped presentation to Air War College
students, Maxwell AFB, Ala. , 9 November 1995, AFHRA, Misc-19.
13. Batchelor interview.
14. Hi st ory, 5 ATAF Combi ned Ai r Operat i ons Cent er Organi zat i on and
Function from April 1993, 18, AFHRA, SAGC-10. (NATO Secret) Information
15. Maj Gen Michael Short, vice commander, AIRSOUTH, interviewed by
Lt Col Robert C. Owen and Lt Col Ri chard L. Sargent , 4 December 1995.
16. Batchelor interview.
17. AIRSOUTH DE [sic] ai r oper at i ons cent er , memor andum t o Lt Col
Robert C. Owen, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Ala., subject: Deliberate Force
BDA Process, 25 March 1996.
18. History, 5 ATAF Combined Air Operations Center. (NATO Secret)
19. 32 Air Operations Group (AOG) After Action Report, Ramstein Air
Base, Germany, n. d. , 10.
20. Ibi d. , 11.
21. Wallace interview. Col Daniel Zoerb, director of the AIRSOUTH Deny
Flight air-operations cell, contends that AIRSOUTH/CAOC intelligence per -
sonnel and t arget eers accompl i shed what anal ysi s was possi bl e gi ven con -
st rai nt s of t i me, qual i fi cat i on and t rai ni ng, and made request s for anal yt i cal
support t o appropri at e nat i onal agenci es. Short fal l s i n i nt ernal capabi l i t y
and l ack of t i mel i ness and coherence on t he part of nat i onal support agen -
ci es were si gni fi cant l i mi t at i ons i n t hi s regard. Faxed comment s on 2d
draft of Bal kans Ai r Campai gn St udy t o Col Robert C. Owen, Ai r Command
and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala. , 16 July 1997.
22. AIRSOUTH DE [sic] ai r oper at i ons cent er memor andum.
23. Pilots who flew in Desert Storm also had difficulty getting BDA. See
Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey: Summary
(Washi ngt on, D. C. : Depart ment of t he Ai r Force, 29 March 1993), 139.
24. AIRSOUTH DE [sic] ai r oper at i ons cent er memor andum.
25. Lt Gen Michael Ryan, NATO Air Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina:
Deliberate Force, After Action Report, n.d. (NATO Secret), information ex-
t r act ed i s uncl assi fi ed, AFHRA, CAOC-13; and Smi t h present at i on. Col onel
Zoerb, anot her key part i ci pant i n t he combat -assessment process, poi nt ed
out t hat t he Combat Assessment pr ocess was made t o wor k and accom -
pl i shed basi c obj ect i ves . . . but nobody was pl eased wi t h i t . Thi s i s anot her
traditional lesson that U.S. and NATO forces must take as a priority. Faxed
comment s .
DELIBERATE FORCE
188
Chapt er 7
Assessi ng t he Ef f ect i veness
of Del i berate Force:
Harnessing the Political-Military
Connect i on
Thi s chapt er as s es s es whet her and t o what ext ent Oper a-
t i on Del i berat e Force achi eved i t s mi l i t ary and pol i t i cal ob -
jectives . No mi l i t ary operat i on ever t akes pl ace i n i sol at i on;
cons equent l y, any s t udy of whet her and how Del i ber at e
For ce achi eved i t s goal s must t ake i nt o account not onl y t he
ai r s t r i kes t hems el ves but al s o ot her dynami c f or ces t hat
may have i nf l uenced t he Bos ni an Ser bs event ual deci si on t o
meet NATO s demands. I n addi t i on, one must j udge t he op -
erat i ons effect i veness from t he perspect i ve of t he i nt ended
t ar get t he Bosni an Ser b pol i t i cal and mi l i t ar y l eader shi p.
I n t hi s cont ext , one shoul d j udge NATO ai r oper at i ons i n
l i ght of t hei r di r ect i mpact as wel l as t he concur r ent vi ct o-
r i es by Cr oat i an and Mus l i m ( f eder at i on) gr ound f or ces ,
Amer i can- sponsor ed di pl omat i c i ni t i at i ves, and Ser bi a s po-
l i t i cal pr essur e on i t s Bosni an Ser b c ous i ns .
I n Oper at i on Deser t St or m, t he number of I r aqi di vi si ons
dest r oyed was a key measur e of pr ogr ess t owar d t he obj ec-
t i ve of ej ect i ng t he Iraqi s from Kuwai t . Duri ng Del i berat e
For ce, i n addi t i on t o t he t angi bl e ef f ect s of t he ai r at t acks,
nonquant i f i abl e measur es of pr ogr ess emer ged because US
di pl omat s met f ace- t o- f ace wi t h t he Ser bs even as ai r st r i kes
t ook pl ace. Thes e di pl omat s had t he uni que oppor t uni t y t o
j udge f i r s t hand t he i mpact of t he ai r s t r i kes on t he Ser bi an
l eader s f aces and by t he pol i t i cal movement on t he par t of
t he Ser bs . Moreover, t he di pl omat s were i deal l y posi t i oned
t o advi se t he mi l i t ar y on t he campai gn s ef f ect i veness.
189
Identi fyi ng the Objecti ves
Chapt er 4 of t hi s vol ume not ed t hat Del i berat e Force con -
t ai ned bot h overt , l i mi t ed obj ect i ves as wel l as i mpl i ci t , st rat e -
gic objectives. From the beginning, Lt Gen Michael Ryan, com-
ma nde r of Al l i e d Ai r For c e s Sout he r n Eur ope a n d t h e
operat i onal commander of t he campai gn, sai d t he operat i on
was not i nt ended t o defeat t he BSA [Bosni an Serb army] but
t o convi nce t he BSA t o st op at t acki ng Saraj evot o t ake away
military capability, not lives.
1
The military objective entailed
execut[ing] a robust NATO ai r campai gn t hat adver sel y al t er s
t he BSAs advant age i n conduct i ng successful mi l i t ary opera -
t i ons agai nst t he BIH [Federation forces]. The desired end
state of the campaign for NATO commanders, t herefore, cal l ed
for t he Bosni an Serbs [to] sue for cessation of military opera -
tions, comply with UN [United Nations] mandat es, and negot i -
ate.
2
Thi s art i cul at i on of t he desi red end st at e t i ed t he mi l i -
tary objectives of t he operat i on t o t he UNs decl ared goal of
secur i ng t he saf e ar easparticularly Sarajevo and t o US as -
si st ant secret ary of st at e Ri chard Hol brookes mor e ci r cum-
spectly announced objective of leveling the playing field in
order t o bri ng t he Bosni an Serbs t o t he negot i at i ng t abl e.
3
Nonet hel ess, Hol brooke emphasi zed t hat t he bombi ng was
not pl anned as a part of t he negot i at i ng t rack. . . . It [t he ai r
campai gn] was a resul t of t he Bosni an Serbs decision to mor -
t ar t he [Saraj evo] marketplace.
4
The Cycl e of Stri ke, Pause, and Negoti ati on
Ai r oper at i ons began at 0200Z on 30 August 1995, and l at er
t hat day Lt Gen Ber nar d Janvi er , force commander of Uni t ed
Nat i ons Peace Forces i n t he Bal kans, sent a l et t er t o Gen
Ratko Mladic , BSA commander, set t i ng t he condi t i ons for end -
i ng t he ai r st ri kes. These i ncl uded removi ng heavy weapons
from i nsi de Saraj evos 20-ki l omet er (km) t ot al -excl usi on zone
(TEZ), ceasi ng at t acks agai nst t he ot her r emai ni ng saf e ar eas ,
and accept i ng a cease-fi re t hroughout al l of Bosni a .
5
Meanwhi l e, Ambassador Hol brooke, l ead negot i at or of t he
fi ve-nat i on Cont act Group r epr esent i ng t he Uni t ed St at es ,
DELIBERATE FORCE
190
Fr ance, Britain , Ger many, and Russi a , shut t l ed bet ween Bel -
gr ade and Zagreb from 30 August t o 1 Sept ember and urged
Serbi an presi dent Sl obodan Mi l osevi c and Cr oat i an pr esi dent
Fr anj o Tudj man t o accept a compr ehensi ve peace pl an. On 31
August, as NATO ai r st r i kes cont i nued a second day, Pr esi -
dent Milosevic , represent i ng t he Bosni an Serbs, accept ed t he
pri nci pl e t hat woul d di vi de Bosni a i n a 51/ 49 per cent spl i t
bet ween t he Musl i m-Croat federat i on and Bosni an Serbs .
6
Al-
t hough r epr esent i ng t he Bosni an Ser bs politically, President
Milosevic had not yet convi nced General Ml adi c t o accede t o
NATOs demands.
After two days of air strikes, NATO paus ed at 0200Z on 1
September. While NATO l eaders assessed t he effect s of t hei r
bombi ng campai gn, di pl omat i c cont act s cont i nued. Gener al
Janvi er met General Ml adi c at t he Serb border t own of Mal i
Zvornik, where Mladic har angued Janvi er and handed hi m a
letter filled with conditions of his own. During this time, Am -
bassador Hol brookes del egat i on was abl e t o measur e t he po-
l i t i cal i mpact of t he ai r st ri kes by observi ng t he faces of t he
Ser bs. Chri st opher Hi l l, who assi st ed Hol brooke, not ed t hat
President Milosevic wel comed t he pause on 1 Sept ember be-
cause i t woul d make rest art i ng t he campai gn di ffi cul t .
7
Ac-
cording to Hill, t he Serbi an presi dent fi nal l y real i zed t he t rue
power of t he ai r campai gn when, duri ng a meet i ng wi t h Am -
bassador Hol brooke l at er on 1 Sept ember, he t ri ed t o cont act
General Mladic , onl y t o l earn from an ai de t hat NATO forces
had sever ed t he communi cat i ons l i nks bet ween Pal e the Bos -
ni an Ser b headquart ers i n Bosni a-Herzegovi na and Bel grade.
It dawned on Milosevic, t o hi s chagr i n, t hat t he ai r st r i kes
woul d, of course, t arget t el ecommuni cat i ons syst ems.
The bombi ng pause gave UN and NATO l eader s di r ect and
i ndi rect opport uni t i es t o t i ght en t he screws on t he Serbs . Re-
spondi ng t o General Ml adi c s t i rade of t he day before, General
Janvi er sent hi m a l et t er on 3 Sept ember , i nf or mi ng hi m t hat
hi s condi t i ons wer e unaccept abl e and war ni ng hi m t hat ai r
st ri kes woul d resume i f by 5 Sept ember t he Serbs di d not
remove heavy weapons from Saraj evos 20 km TEZ, cease at-
t acks agai nst t he ot her saf e ar eas , al l ow freedom of movement
for humani t ari an rel i ef workers and t he Uni t ed Nat i ons Pro -
tection Force (UNPROFOR), and al l ow unrest ri ct ed use of t he
MCLAUGHLIN
191
Saraj evo ai rport . Janvi er hoped t hat t he pause woul d al l ow
Mladic t o see j ust how damagi ng t he ai r st r i kes had been. Maj
Gen Hal Hor nbur g, t he combi ned ai r operat i ons cent er (CAOC)
di r ect or , even want ed t o send phot os and a cel l ul ar phone t o
Mladic so he coul d see t he ext ent of t he damage and st ay i n
bet t er cont act wi t h UN and NATO l eaders.
8
However, t he pause al so al l owed doubt s t o fest er among
some mi l i t ar y l eader s about t he ef f i cacy of r esumi ng t he
bombi ng. Dur i ng hi s shut t l e di pl omacy, Ambassador Hol -
brooke received reports of the existence of great ambivalence
i n Washi ngt on about r esumpt i on of t he bombi ng and about
t he bombi ng i t sel f. . . . Seni or Ameri can mi l i t ary personnel
were sharpl y di vi ded on whet her t o resume or not , whereas
t he di pl omat s were not . Hol brooke apt l y s ummed up s ome
mi l i t ary l eaders unease by not i ng t hat t he same peopl e who
had doubt s about i t ran i t so bri l l i ant l y.
9
When i magery from unmanned aeri al vehi cl es i ndi cat ed no
withdrawal from the TEZ, NATO ai r st r i kes r esumed on 5
Sept ember. In ret rospect , Hi l l not ed t hat r esumi ng t he ai r
campai gn had an unf or es een and per haps even mor e s t un-
ni ng e f f e c t on t he Se r bi a n l e a de r s t ha n ha d t he i ni t i a l
st ri kes.
10
The r es umpt i on of ai r s t r i kes das hed Pr es i dent
Milosevics hopes t hat NATO once agai n had spent i t s pol i t i cal
ener gy i n a hal f hear t ed ai r campai gn and t hat t he pr edi ct abl e
pat t ern of prot ract ed negot i at i ons woul d fol l ow.
While the NATO ai r st r i kes cont i nued, di pl omat s made pr o -
gress on 8 Sept ember when t he forei gn mi ni st ers of Bosni a ,
Croatia , and Yugoslavia (Serbia and Mont enegro) agreed to
abi de by basi c pri nci pl es t hat woul d govern fut ure peace nego -
t i at i ons. The agreement cal l ed for t wo ent i t i est he exi st i ng
Bosni an federat i on (of Croat and Musl i m-cont rol l ed t erri t ory)
and a Ser b r epubl i c (Republ i ka Srpska)to form a federation
of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Al t hough Bosni a-Herzegovi na would
remai n a si ngl e count ry, t he accord cal l ed for t wo aut onomous
par t s and a cent r al connect i ng st r uct ur e.
11
The agr eement
al so al l owed t he ent i t i es t o est abl i sh paral l el speci al rel at i ons
wi t h nei ghbori ng count ri es, a concessi on t hat permi t t ed l i nks
bet ween Ser bs in Bosnia and Serbi a .
12
On 14 Sept ember di pl omat i c and mi l i t ary pressure came t o
a climax. Hill di d not need up- t o- t he- mi nut e bomb damage
DELIBERATE FORCE
192
as s es s ment s t o t el l hi m t he effect i veness of t he ai r campai gn:
he coul d see t he i mpact on Presi dent Mi l osevi cs face. Hill
recal l ed t hat when t he del egat i on met wi t h Mi l osevi c t hat day
in Belgrade, t he Serbi an presi dent l ooked very worri ed.
13
Milosevic i mpl ored Ambassador Hol brooke t o cal l a hal t t o t he
ai r st ri kes but wi t hout offeri ng any assurances t hat t he BSA
woul d remove t he weapons from around Saraj evo or compl y
with NATOs ot her demands. When Hol brooke r es ponded t hat
t he BSA l eader shi p knew what i t must do t o st op t he bomb -
ing, President Milosevic asked i f Hol brooke would talk directly
wi t h t he BSA l eader s. Hol br ooke c ons e nt e d, a nd, t o hi s
ast oni shment , Mi l osevi c had Gener al Ml adi c a nd Bos ni a n
Ser b president Radovan Karadzic dri ven over from a nearby
villa. Because Mladic rel uct ant l y agreed t o wi t hdraw t he heavy
weapons and acceded t o ot her demands, NATO suspended
offensi ve ai r operat i ons for 72 hours. At t he end of t hat peri od,
NATO suspended t hose oper at i ons anot her 72 hour s, and on
20 Sept ember NATO and UNPROFOR announced t hat a r e-
sumpt i on of ai rst ri kes i s current l y not necessary.
14
A Propi ti ous Convergence of Events
Hill remarked t hat on 14 Sept ember, when General Ml adi c
reluctantly agreed to NATOs terms, this was a guy who really
looked like hed been through a bombing campaign. He con -
cluded that the use of airpower and our ability to . . . sustain it
for a couple of weeks was really the signal the Bosnian Serbs
needed t o get t o underst and t hat t hey had t o reach a peace
agreement. . . . They basically had to surrender some major war
aims. I think the way it was done was with this air campaign.
15
From a ground perspect i ve, Hi l l concl uded t hat t he federa -
tion offensive in western Bosnia woul d not have been as s uc-
cessf ul wi t hout t he ai r campai gn.
16
Cr oat i an and Musl i m (fed-
erat i on) forces, whi ch had begun operat i ons agai nst t he BSA
i n west ern Bosni a by mi d-August , capi t al i zed on t he BSAs
di ffi cul t y i n bri ngi ng i t s forces t o bear when and where t hey
were needed. By 13 Sept ember t he mi l i t ary bal ance i n Bosni a
had t i l t ed i n t he federat i ons favor agai nst t he Bosni an Serbs ,
j ust as i t had t i l t ed i n Croat i a s favor agai nst t he separat i st
MCLAUGHLIN
193
Kraj i na Serbs earl i er, from May t o August . Press report s i ndi-
cat ed up t o 50, 000 Bosni an Ser bs i n west ern Bosni a fled to
t he Bosni an Ser b st ronghol d of Banj a Luka dur i ng t he f i ght-
i ng. Thi s number was i n addi t i on t o t he 160, 000 Kr aj i na
Ser bs who had fl ed t o Banj a Luka i n t he wake of Croat i a s
swi ft reconquest of Sect or West i n earl y May and Sect ors
Nort h and Sout h i n earl y August . (See chap. 1 for more on
Croatia s recapt ure of t he Kraj i na, whi ch Kraj i na Serbs ha d
hel d for four years. ) The rout i n t he west cont i nued, and by 19
Sept ember t he federat i on offensi ve had recapt ured over t hree
t housand squar e ki l omet er s f r om t he Bosni an Ser bs , trim-
mi ng t he area t hey cont rol l ed from 70 percent t o about 49
per cent . Thi s ar ea mat ched what t he Cont act Gr oup had of-
f er ed t hem.
In assessing the air campaigns effectiveness, Adm Leighton
Smi t h, commander in chief of Allied Forces Southern Europe,
concl uded t hat t he federat i on ground offensi ve i n t he west
helped dramatically, although NATO ai r and federat i on ground
operations did not integrate intentionally.
17
General Ryan also
pointed out the value of the federation ground operations in
western Bosnia by noting that it took bothairpower nailed
down the forces, hamstringing the BSAs ability to communi-
cate and respond to the western offensive.
18
General Hornburg
observed that without the territorial loss, the air campaign
would not have been as effective. . . . One without t he ot her
would not have been as effective.
19
Similarly, Holbrooke de-
scribed the federation ground offensive as extremely important
but concl uded t hat t he ai r campai gn remai ned t he most i mpor -
tant single factor influencing the Serbs.
20
From a pol i t i cal st andpoi nt , Ambassador Hol brookes diplo -
macy benefi t ed from t he bombi ngs, whi ch al l owed hi m t o
mai nt ai n pressure on Presi dent Mi l osevi c t o convi nce t he Bos -
ni an Ser bs to comply with NATOs ul t i mat um. He concl uded
t hat never has ai rpower been so effect i ve i n t erms of a pol i t i -
cal resul t .
21
For his part, Milosevic knew t hat t he UN would
not l i ft t he ongoi ng sanct i ons agai nst Serbi a in effect since
t he summer of 1992 due t o Ser bi a s suppor t of t he BSAuntil
t he fact i ons reached a peace agreement on Bosni a . The eco-
nomi c sanct i ons had put t he Ser bi an economy on i t s back.
Moreover, because Milosevic realized the UN woul d not remove
DELIBERATE FORCE
194
t he sanct i ons without US approval, this gave Holbrooke addi -
tional leverage with the Serbian president. As a result, Milosevic
had l i t t l e choi ce ot her t han agreei ng t o pressure t he Bosni an
Serb leadership to withdraw its weapons from around Sarajevo.
Concl usi ons
The BSA had t o deal wi t h foes fi ght i ng on t he ground and
at t acki ng from t he ai r. The overal l mi l i t ary bal ance i n t he
regi on had begun t o shi ft wi t h Croat i a s recapt ure of t hree of
the four UN sectors in Croatia from May t o earl y August 1995.
The tide in Bosnia began t o shi ft i n mi d-August as Croat i an,
Bosni an Cr oat , and Muslim forces began an offensive to re-
t ake t erri t ory from t he BSA i n west ern Bosni a . The ai r cam-
pai gn uni nt ent i onal l y ai ded t hat offensi ve. The federat i ons re-
capt ure of t erri t ory from t he BSA t i di ed up t he map, br i ngi ng
pr opor t i onal di st r i but i on of t er r i t or y bet ween t he f act i ons
more i nt o l i ne wi t h what t he Cont act Group offered the Bos -
ni an Ser bs. The t erri t ori al l osses al so meant t hat t he Bosni an
Ser bs ceded at t he negot i at i ng t abl e at Wri ght -Pat t erson Ai r
Force Base (AFB) i n Dayt on, Ohi o, onl y what had been t aken
f r om t hem on t he bat t l ef i el d. Nonet hel ess, t he bal ance of
power had shi ft ed percept i bl y from t he BSA t o t he federat i on.
If General Mladic continued to resist NATO s demands, he
ri sked l osi ng more t erri t ory and combat capabi l i t y.
NATO ai r st ri kes, coupl ed wi t h t he federat i on offensi ve out
west , confront ed t he BSA wi t h a mi l i t ary chal l enge i t had not
experi enced duri ng t he previ ous t hree-pl us years of fi ght i ng.
Moreover, Ambassador Hol brookes just-in-time diplomacy
t he prospect of get t i ng economi c sanct i ons agai nst Serbi a re-
moved and t he recogni t i on of a Serb republ i c wi t hi n Bosni a
with special links to Serbia provided President Milosevic
wi t h everyt hi ng he needed t o pressure t he Bosni an Serbs.
By t he end of Del i berat e Force, t he ai r st ri kes not onl y had
achi eved t he obj ect i ve of compel l i ng t he Bosni an Serbs t o
comply with NATOs demands but al so, when combi ned wi t h
the federation ground offensive, had contributed to the shift in
the military balance in the region. This military reality, in turn ,
hel ped i nfl uence t he warri ng fact i ons deci si on t o negot i at e a
MCLAUGHLIN
195
fi nal peace agreement at Dayt on. Hi l l r epor t ed t hat t he ai r
campai gn had a l i ngeri ng effect at Dayt on by est abl i shi ng a
record of compliance.
22
Through Deliberate Force, NATO ha d
proven i t s wi l l i ngness t o enforce an agreement .
In t he end, t he combi nat i on of mi l i t ary power and di pl o -
macy made a di fference i n Bosni a . Ambassador Hol brookes
diplomatic initiatives capitalized on the federation offensive in
t he west and t he NATO ai r st ri kes t o pressure t he Serbs a nd
Bosni an Ser bs . Di pl omacy without military leverage would
have proved i nsuffi ci ent t o persuade t he Bosni an Serbs as
pr evi ous at t empt s t o br i ng peace t o t he Bal kans had ampl y
demonst rat edwhi l e mi l i t ary operat i ons wi t hout di pl omacy
woul d have pr oved unsust ai nabl e.
Not es
1. Lt Gen Mi chael Ryan, i nt ervi ewed by Maj Ti m Reagan and Dr. Wayne
Thompson, 18 October 1995, Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA),
Maxwell AFB, Ala., CAOC-30.
2. Briefing slides (U), Lt Gen Michael E. Ryan, subject: NATO Air Opera-
t i ons i n Bosni a-Herzegovi na: Del i berat e Force, 29 August 14 Sept ember
1995, AFHRA, NPL-16.
3. Steven Greenhouse, U. S. Officials Say Bosnian Serbs Face NATO
Attack If Talks Stall, New York Ti mes, 28 August 1995.
4. Ri chard Hol brooke, i nt ervi ewed by Dr. Karl Muel l er and t he aut hor,
24 May 1996.
5. Rick Atkinson, The Anatomy of NATOs Decision to Bomb Bosnia,
International Herald Tribune, 17 November 1995, 2.
6. Roger Cohen, Serb Shi ft Opens Chance for Peace, a U. S. Envoy
Says, New York Ti mes, 1 Sept ember 1995.
7. Chri st opher Hi l l , di rect or, Offi ce of Sout h Cent ral European Affai rs,
Bureau of European and Canadi an Affai rs, US Depart ment of St at e, i nt er -
vi ewed by Lt Col Robert Owen and t he aut hor, 27 February 1996.
8. Maj Gen Hal M. Hornburg, present at i on t o Joi nt Doct ri ne Ai r Cam-
pai gn Course st udent s, Col l ege of Aerospace Doct ri ne Research and Educa-
tion, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 14 March 1996.
10. Hill interview.
11. Chri s Hedges, Three Enemi es Agree t o Serbi an St at e as Part of
Bosnia, New York Ti mes, 9 Sept ember 1995.
12. Ibid.
13. Hill interview.
14. Joi nt St at ement by Admi ral Lei ght on W. Smi t h, Commander, Al l i ed
Forces Sout hern Command and Lt . Gen. Bernard Janvi er, Force Com -
DELIBERATE FORCE
196
mander, Uni t ed Nat i ons Peace Forces, Headquart ers, Uni t ed Nat i ons Peace
Forces Zagreb, 20 Sept ember 1995, AFHRA, NPL-06-13.
15. Hill interview.
16. Ibid.
17. Adm Leighton Smith, NATO Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina: De -
l i berat e Force, 29 August 14 Sept ember 1995, vi deot aped present at i on t o
Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 9 November 1995, AFHRA, Misc-19.
18. Ryan i nt ervi ew.
19. Maj Gen Hal M. Hornburg, i nt ervi ewed by t he Ai r Uni versi t y Bal kans
Ai r Campai gn St udy Group, 12 March 1996, AFHRA, Mi sc-20.
21. Ibid.
22. Hill interview.
MCLAUGHLIN
197
Chapt er 8
Ai rcraft Used i n Del i berate Force
Operation Deliberate Force was a robust 17-day air campaign
conducted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to
adversely alter the advantages of the Bosnian Serb army (BSA)
in conducting successful military attacks against Sarajevo a n d
other safe areas. By conducting active bombing operat i ons be-
t ween 29 August 1995 and 14 Sept ember 1995, NATO l aunched
its first sustained air-strike operation, one that included several
operat i ons and weapons-empl oyment hi ghl i ght s:
f i r st ai r campai gn t o pr edomi nant l y empl oy pr eci si on-
gui ded weapons (69 percent);
first employment of Tomahawk missiles i n t he European
Command t heat er t he Bal kans ar ea of r es pons i bi l i t y
(AOR);
fi rst sust ai ned use by Uni t ed St at es Ai r Force (USAF)
F-16s of bot h 500 l b (GBU-12) and 2, 000 lb (GBU-10)
l aser-gui ded bombs (LGB) i n combat ;
f i r st sust ai ned use by USAF F- 15Es of the 2, 000 lb GBU-
15 el ect ro-opt i cal gui ded bomb i n combat ;
fi rst use by USAF F-16s of t he hi gh-speed ant i radi at i on
missile (HARM) Targeting System (HTS) and first firing of
the AGM-88 HARM i n combat ;
fi rst t i me i n combat t hat st rafi ng passes by USAF A-10s
exceeded 15, 000 feet + sl ant range;
fi rst empl oyment of t he Predat or unmanned aeri al vehi cl e
(UAV) i n combat ;
first deployment of the German Luftwaffe i nt o combat
since World War II;
fi rst depl oyment of modern Spani sh ai r force uni t s i nt o
combat;
fi rst cont ri but i on by It al i an air force units to NATO/ De ny
Fl i ght oper at i ons; and
199
fi rst del i very by t he French Mi rage 2000D/ K and Sepecat
Jaguar of Matra 1,000 lb LGBs and US GBU-12s i n combat .
Thi s chapt er and i t s four compani on chapt ers (912) t ake a
tactical-level look at the use, performance, and effectiveness of
the individual weapon systems, support systems, and tactics
employed against the BSA during Deliberate Force. Primarily,
they deal with fundamental war-fighting elements (forces, weap-
ons, targets, and tactics) and the way they interlinkfrom initial
conception, to employment, to their effects on the BSA. To-
gether, they translate air combat power into success in air-strike
operat i ons.
Thi s chapt er, t oget her wi t h chapt ers 9, 10, and 12, revi ews
the military science of Deliberate Force, its physical aspects
(such as force st ruct ure, mi l i t ary hardware, and t echnol ogi cal
t ool s), and ot her quant i fi abl e subj ect s.
1
Chapt er 11 provi des
i nsi ght i nt o t he operat i onal art of t he campai gnt he em-
pl oyment of pl at forms, weapons, and t ool s agai nst t he t arget
array. Each chapt er exami nes i t s subj ect i n l i ght of one basi c
question: What effect(s) did politico-military constraints and
l i mi t at i ons (e. g. , t he rul es of engagement and t he t i ght , cen -
t ral i zed cont rol exerci sed by t he combi ned force ai r component
commander [CFACC]) have on t he forces, weapons, t arget s ,
and t act i cs i n pursui t of Del i berat e Forces obj ect i ves?
Del i berat e Forces mul t i nat i onal force composi t i on i ncl uded
over f i ve t housand per sonnel f r om 15 nat i ons;
over four hundred ai rcraft (i ncl udi ng 222 fi ght ers) avai l -
abl e at any one t i me;
approxi mat el y 260 l and-based ai rcraft 40 percent based
at Aviano Air Base (AB), Italy;
18 ai r bases i n f i ve count r i es acr oss Eur ope; and
up t o t hree ai rcraft carri ers i n t he Adri at i c Sea .
What follows is an examination of NATO ai r pl at forms used
during Deliberate Force, including fixed- and rotary-wing air -
craft as well as UAVs . These platforms consist of both shooters
(lethal-weapon platforms) and supporters (nonlethal, although
some are capable of self-defense). Further, one can distinguish
these platforms by a variety of operat i ng characteristics and
capabilities that give them unique flexibility and versatility to
DELIBERATE FORCE
200
perform various roles and missions. Thus, for purposes of differ -
ent i at i on, t hi s di scussi on mat ches t he pl ayers wi t h t hei r pri mary
rol e and mi ssi on even t hough some pl at forms are not l i mi t ed t o
particular roles or missions.
The Players
After Deny Flight launched its first sorties in April 1993, the
force structure grew proportionally to mission tasking. The pace of
growt h accel erat ed aft er 2 June 1995 wi t h t he shoot down of
Basher 52, a USAF F-16 patrolling Bosnian airspace, by a Ser-
bia n SA-6 surface-to-air missile (SAM). Gen Michael Ryan, com-
mander of NATOs Allied Air Forces Southern Europe (COMAIR-
SOUTH), began t o augment hi s force st ruct ure wi t h addi t i onal
suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) assets over Bosnia-
Herzegovina. COMAIRSOUTHs other requests included extension
of the assignment of Spanish EF-18s to Aviano AB and a new re-
quest for an additional 12 jammers and 24 HARM shooters.
2
By mi d-Jul y t wo Compass Cal l EC-130Hs arrived at Aviano
t o support SEAD agai nst t he Bosni an Ser b i nt egrat ed ai r de-
fense system (IADS). By the end of July, Adm Leighton Smith ,
commander in chief of Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINC-
SOUTH), request ed addi t i onal forces for possi bl e ai r st ri kes i n
Bosni a-Herzegovi na. He al so request ed t hat F-16 HTS ai rcraft ,
F-4G Wild Weasels , and addi t i onal support ai rcraft be pl aced
on alert for recall.
3
On 13 August 1995, i n response t o act i vi t y i n Iraq, t he USS
Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) departed the Adriatic Sea , cr eat-
i ng a r equi r ement t o depl oy el ect r oni c combat ( EC) a n d
HARM-capable aircraft previously placed on alert to fill the
SEAD gaps. In addition CINCSOUTH r equest ed an ext ensi on
of t he depl oyment of EF-111s al ready based at Avi ano.
4
By 18 August 1995, COMAIRSOUTH request ed a recal l pos -
t uri ng of Deny Fl i ght asset s: seven Mi r age F- 1s, ei ght Jaguar s ,
and 17 Mi r age 2000s f r om Fr ance; 18 NF-16s from t he Net h -
er l ands; 18 TF-16s from Turkey; and 12 J aguar s and ei ght
Tornados from the United Kingdom. At t he same t i me, t hese
ai r cr af t r ecei ved appr oval f or depl oyment f r om t hei r al er t
bases t o t hei r respect i ve beddown bases i n It al y .
5
SARGENT
201
By the end of August, as tensions mounted, CINCSOUTH
increased the alert posture of all on call aircraft. On 29 Au -
gust, with the concurrence of Lt Gen Bernard Janvier , force
commander of United Nations Peace Forces (FC UNPF), CINC-
SOUTH issued the order to initiate Operation Deliberate Force
and recalled 61 aircraft to their respective beddown bases. These
recalled air assets included three Mirage F1-CTs , one Mirage
F1-CR, t wo Jaguar s , four Mi rage 2000Cs , and si x Mi r age
2000Ds/ Ks from France; four NF-16As and t wo NF-16Rs from
t he Net herl ands; four GR-7s from the United Kingdom; 10 TF-
16Cs from Turkey; two AC-130Hs, two EC-130Es , five KC-10s,
six F-4Gs, four EF-111As / EA-6Bs, two C-21s, two EC-130Hs,
and t wo MC/ HC-130s from the United States .
6
Onset Force Structure
After the shootdown of Basher 52 in June, air assets assigned
to Deny Flight grew nearly 20 percent. Of these, land-based
ai rcraft i ncreased nearl y 30 percent , and ai rcraft assi gned t o t he
7490th Composite Wing (Provisional) at Aviano nearly doubled
to 114.
7
The largest gain came in the increase of overall air
platforms available (assigned plus nonassigned) to 385, a 27
percent i ncrease i n assi gned ai rcraft and a 22 percent i ncrease
in ai rcraft avai l abl e t o fl y mi ssi ons. Thi s i s an overal l change
of 57 percent from Deny Flight numbers (see table 8. 1 and fig.
8. 1). Additionally, 14 support assets not assigned to NATO were
avai l abl e day-t o-day, and anot her 80 such asset s62 carri er
aircraft and 18 aircraft based at Avianowere avai l abl e i mme-
diately if needed.
As a result of the initial success of Deliberate Forces first-
day ai r st ri kes agai nst t he Serbi an IADS and communi cat i ons
infrastructure, CINCSOUTH cancel ed t he requi rement for t wo
Compass Cal l s , one ai rborne bat t l efi el d command and cont rol
center (ABCCC) aircraft, and six Wild Weasels . In addi t i on t he
r et ur n of t he Theodore Roosevelt to the Adriatic Sea and Avi -
a nos dedi cat i on of a second squadron of 18 F-16Cs increased
t he number of pl at f or ms avai l abl e t o conduct NATO ai r
st r i kes.
8
Thi s i ni t i al force st ruct ure remai ned i n pl ace for t he
remainder of Deliberate Force. On the second day of operations,
CINCSOUTH request ed an additional three KC-135 t anker s t o
DELIBERATE FORCE
202
support t he i ncreased tempo in the AOR until the KC-10 de-
t achment became ful l y operat i onal .
9
By 5 Sept ember 1995, t he SAM threat to NATO aircraft in
Bosnia-Herzegovina remai ned hi gh, and t he need for preci si on-
muni t i ons- capabl e ai r cr af t t o at t ack r adar si t es and SAM
l aunchers i ncreased. As a resul t , CINCSOUTH request ed t wo
additional F-16 HTS ai rcraft and t wo addi t i onal F-15Es.
10
On
t he same day, Greece t ur ned down Tur keys request to fly 10
recalled TF-16s t hrough Greek ai rspace.
11
Nevert hel ess, t he
Tur ki sh aircraft circumvented Greece and event ual l y arri ved at
t hei r beddown base i n Ghedi , It al y .
Figure 8.1. Assigned Aircraft by Nationality (30 August 1995)
Table 8.1
Players Available at Onset
Category Assigned Available* On Call
Shooters 193 166 15
Supporters 76 74 2
Total 269 240 17
*Assigned aircraft available to fly missions at the start of the air campaign.
SARGENT
203
On 8 Sept ember 1995, t he cont i nued i ncrease i n operat i ons
tempo resulted in CINCSOUTHs request t o i ncrease t he t empo
of tankers based in the United Kingdom t o support t he surge i n
refueling requi rement s.
12
In addition the robust sortie rate began
to take its toll on aircraft availability, leading to a request for one
additional Raven and one Compass Cal l aircraft. Before the EF-
111 and EC- 130H could be deployed, the conditions which led
to the requests for these aircraft were overcome by additional
logistics support from the US and the request for these aircraft
was cancel ed.
13
Thi s day woul d see anot her force-st ruct ure
change when CINCSOUTH requested six F-117A Stealth fight-
ers, t o be based at Avi ano, to conduct air strikes against the
hi gh-t hreat ai r defenses ar ound Banj a Luka i n suppor t of
Deadeye Northwest operations. Italian leaders, however, did not
cooperate (discussed later in this chapter).
14
End-State Force Structure
At the close of Deliberate Force on 14 September 1995, the
forces available to conduct operations had reached 414 total
aircraft (NATO assigned plus NATO nonassigned)an 8. 1 per -
cent i ncrease over t he onset numbers (see fi g. 8. 2 and t abl e
8. 2). Remarkabl y, t hi s i ncl udes a net gai n of onl y 36 ai rcraft
assigned to NATOan i ncrease of onl y 13. 4 percent .
Figure 8.2. Assigned Forces by Nationality (14 September 1995)
DELIBERATE FORCE
204
SARGENT
205
The Shooters
As ment i oned above, shoot er s compr i se l et hal ai r pl at-
formsweapon syst ems capabl e of expendi ng ( shoot i ng) mu -
ni t i ons on ai r or gr ound t ar get s t o effect a ki l l . The pri mary
r ol es of t hese ai r cr af t ar e aer ospace cont r ol and f or ce appl i -
cat i on, t he f or mer t ypi cal l y i ncl udi ng mi ssi ons such as of-
fensi ve count erai r (OCA) , defensi ve count erai r (DCA) , a nd
SEAD, and t he l at t er t ypi cal l y i ncl udi ng mi ssi ons such as ai r
interdiction (AI), bat t l efield air interdiction (BAI), and cl os e
ai r suppor t ( CAS). Dur i ng Deliberate Force, AI , BAI, and CAS
wer e gr ouped i nt o a catchall NATO mi ssi on cat egory referred
t o as offensi ve ai r operat i ons (OAS).
15
Typi cal l y, ai r-t o-ai r pl at forms perform OCA and DCA mi s -
si ons, pr i mar i l y wi t h a t aski ng t o conduct ai r sweeps, ai r
escor t , and combat ai r pat r ol ( CAP); however, OCA mi s s i ons
can i nvol ve ai r st r i kes agai nst t he enemy s ai r bases and
ai r cr af t on t he gr ound. Ai r - t o- gr ound pl ayer s per f or m SEAD
and OAS mi ssi ons. Dur i ng Del i ber at e For ce, ai r cr af t f l ew al l
of t hese mi ssi ons i n one f or m or anot her ( see t abl e 8. 3) .
F-16s
DELIBERATE FORCE
206
Only a third of these sorties, which involved HARM shoot er s
and OAS mi ssi ons, act ual l y dr opped or f i r ed or dnance dur i ng
operat i ons. The ot her t wo-t hi rds di d not shoot for several rea -
sons: (1) the CAP mi ssi ons di d not engage and shoot any
aircraft, (2) the SEAD shooters did not always fire HARMs on
every mi ssi on, and (3) not al l of t he shoot ers act ual l y ex -
pended muni t i ons on ever y t ar get / sor t i e ( e. g. , some mi ssi ons
j et t i soned ordnance i n t he Adri at i c Sea due t o bad weat her ).
Regardl ess of what const i t ut ed a t rue shoot er, t he vari ous
Del i berat e Force shoot er pl at forms coul d perform more t han
one mi ssi on and coul d use di fferent t act i cs t o perform a mi s -
si on (e. g. , t he swi ng-capabl e F-15Es , F-16s , and F- 18s). Given
t he shoot ers rol es and mi ssi ons, t he fol l owi ng revi ew exam-
i ne s how a nd why t he s e l e t ha l pl a t f or ms we r e a c t ua l l y
usedas wel l as who used whi ch ones.
Combat Air Patrol. Since the early days of enforcing the
no-fly zones during Deny Flight, the skies over Bosnia-Herze -
govina have been cont rol l ed and domi nat ed by mul t i nat i onal
forces. Prior to Deliberate Force, the only fixed-wing air-to-air
challenge resulted in the splashing of four Galebs on 28 Feb-
ruary 1994. However, identifying, intercepting, and controlling
rotary-wing aircraft became such a confusing and difficult prob-
lem that the helicopters had to be written off by the rules of
engagement. Rotary-wing aircraft were given a sanctuary at or
below three thousand feet while Deny Flight aircraft were at four
thousand feet and above to deconflict traffic, thereby not affect -
ing Deliberate Force air operations as a whole. The bottom line
is that Deny Flight operat i ons est abl i shed and mai nt ai ned ai r
supr emacy, whi ch cont i nued t hroughout Del i berat e Force.
16
Table 8.3
Shooter Missions
Mission Sorties % of Total
Sorties
% of Shooter
Sorties
CAP 294 08.3 12.1
SEAD 785 22.2 32.2
OAS 1,365 38.6 55.7
Total 2,444 69.1 100.0
SARGENT
207
This aerospace control was a prerequisite to accomplishing
Deliberate Forces roles and missions as well as a requirement
for the effectiveness of the roles and missions of the United
Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).
During Deliberate Force, France , t he Net herl ands, Turkey,
and the United Kingdom provided the primary CAP shoot ers,
with US aircraft filling in as required. Their missions included
roving and barrier CAPs , the former providing enforcement of
the no-fly zones and the latter providing DCA for high-value air
assets. The following aircraft flew CAP during Deliberate Force:
Dassaul t Mi rage 2000C (M2000C)a Fr ench si ngl e- seat ,
ai r-superi ori t y aircraft capable of Mach 2, a ceiling of
59, 000 feet , and a combat range of 920+ mi l es wi t h drop
tanks. It has a postulated look-down/shoot-down capabil-
ity with a Doppler radar optimized for interception of low-
al t i t ude opposi ng ai rcraft . The M2000C has an ai r - t o- ai r
or dnance l oad of Mat r a Super 530D semi act i ve radar mi s-
siles, two Magic infrared mi ssi l es, and t wo 30 mm Defa
554 guns wi t h 125 r ounds per gun.
17
Six M2000Cs wer e
assigned and deployed to Cervia, Italy , wi t h anot her t hr ee
on call. Cervia l aunched and recovered four M2000Cs a
day, on t he average, for a t ot al of 60 sort i es or 20 percent
of all Deliberate Force CAP.
18
Netherlands / General Dynamics NF-16A Fighting Falcon an
Ameri can-export , si ngl e-seat , ai r combat , and mul t i rol e
fighter capable of Mach 2+ and a combat ceiling of 50,000
Mirage 2000
DELIBERATE FORCE
208
feet. The NF-16A has a combat radius of 575+ miles with
an air-to-air weapons load of Sidewinders and a 20 mm
M61A1 Vulcan cannon.
19
Based at Villafranca, Italy, with
six aircraft assigned, NF-16As launched and recovered, on
t he average, four sort i es a day t hrough t he fi rst 15 days but
did not fly the last two days of the campaign for a total of 56
sorties19 percent of the Deliberate Force CAP sorties.
20
Turkey / General Dynamics TF-16C Fighting Falconbasi -
cal l y a st andard USAF F-16C pur chased by t he Tur ki sh
government, which allowed its aircraft to fly only CAP
and, if required, to support the NATO Rapid Reacti on Force
(RRF). Operating out of Ghedi, Italy, t he 18 assi gned TF-
16Cs flew four to six sorties per day for a total of 70
sorties24 percent of the Deliberate Force CAP sort i es.
21
British Aerospace (Hawker Siddeley) FMK-3 Harriert he
Royal Air Forces (RAF) si ngl e-seat , vert i cal / short t akeoff
and l andi ng (V/ STOL) ai rcraft , wi t h a maxi mum speed of
737 MPH at l ow al t i t ude, a 55, 000-foot cei l i ng, and a
414-mi l e combat radi us wi t h a basi c fuel l oad.
22
Although
t he Harri er is primarily a CAS and r econnai s s ance (recce)
platform, the RAF desi gnat ed and assi gned si x ai r-t o-ai r-
dedicated FMK-3s to Gioia del Colle, Italy. Thei r weapons
i ncl ude four heat -seeki ng mi ssi l es (heat ers) and t wo 30
mm Aden guns. The FMK-3s l aunched and r ecover ed any-
where from four t o ei ght sort i es per day for t he fi rst 15
days of t he campai gn for a t ot al of 68 sort i es23 percent
of the Deliberate Force CAP sor t i es.
23
British Aerospace FRS.MK2 alias FA-2 Sea Harriert he
Royal Navys shi pborne, si ngl e-seat , V/ STOL, multirole
ai rcraft . Li ke t he ot her Harri er , it is primarily a tactical-
st ri ke and recce pl at form, but si x of t hem fl ew 12 CAP
sorties from HMS Invincible in the Adriatic Sea .
24
The Sea
Harri er patrolled with a weapons load of four AIM-120
advanced medi um-range ai r-t o-ai r mi ssi l es (AMRAAM),
t wo or f our heat er s, and t wo 30 mm Aden cannons.
Grumman F-14D Super Tomcatthe US Navys F- 14A u p-
grade, i ncl udi ng engi nes, fi re cont rol , and cockpi t redes-
i gn t o make a more capabl e ai r machi ne. This Tomcat
variant carries improved Phoenix air-to-air missiles (AAM),
SARGENT
209
four AIM-7 Sparrows , four AIM-9 Sidewinders , and an i n -
t er nal 20 mm gun.
25
The F-14D l aunched and recovered
from the USS Theodore Roosevelt, located in the Adriatic
Sea. The Super Tomcat flew CAP on onl y t hree dayst he
first night and 89 Septemberfor a total of 16 sorties.
As for the remaining 12 CAP sort i es, USAF F-16s ba s e d a t
Aviano flew eight, and US Navy F-18Cs bas ed on t he Theodore
Roosevelt flew four. These multirole fighters primarily flew
OAS mi ssi ons.
Suppressi on of Enemy Ai r Defenses. SEAD asset s neut r al-
ize, degrade, or destroy ground-based emitters such as early
warni ng/ ground cont rol l ed i nt ercept ; command, cont rol , and
communications (C
3
) syst ems; and SAM/ ant i ai rcraft art i l l ery
(AAA) fire-control systems and their associated surface-to-air
weapons. Aircraft accomplish the SEAD mission either by dis -
ruptive or destructive means.
26
Examples of electronic combat
assets used for disruption include EF-111s and Compass Cal l
aircraft. (Because these assets are non-HARM shoot ers, t hey are
included in the discussion of supporters.) HARM shoot ers ac-
complish SEAD by destructive means. Deliberate Force used six
different platforms as HARM shooters (four US and two NATO):
McDonnell Douglas F-18C Hornetthe Navys single-seat,
carrier borne, multirole fighter, capable of Mach 1.8+ speed
F-14
DELIBERATE FORCE
210
at altitude with a ceiling of 50, 000 feet and a combat
radi us of 662 mi l es. The Hornet s normal SEAD configu -
r at ion includes two or four HARMs .
27
Launchi ng and r e-
coveri ng from t he USS Roosevelt (29 August 12 Sept em-
ber 1995) and t he USS America (13 Sept ember 1995), t he
Hor net took top billing by flying 210 SEAD sort i es.
28
Grumman EA-6B Prowlerthe Navys l and- or carri er-based
electronic combat platform, capable of 530 knots at sea
level, a combat ceiling of 38,000 feet, and an unrefueled
combat range of 1,099 miles. Equipped with five ALQ-99
tactical jammer pods, the Prowler can detect, sort, classify,
and deal wi t h el ect roni c t hreat s across a broad spect rum of
frequency bands. The E-6s SEAD weapons load consists of
four to six HARMs.
29
The Prowler flew 183 SEAD sorties, 58
from the USS Roosevelt and 125 from Avi ano AB. VAG
(carrier air group) 141/209 Tacelrons flew land-based sor-
ties from Aviano.
30
General Dynamics F-16 HTS t he USAFs new si ngl e-seat
Wild Weasel, incorporating an ASQ-213 HTS. The standar d
F-16 HTS configuration consists of two HARMs , two AIM-
120 AMRAAMs, and two AIM-9 L/ M infrared missiles .
31
The
F-18
SARGENT
211
F-16 HTS made its debut in Deliberate Force and fired
HARMs for t he fi rst t i me i n combat . The 23d Fi ght er Squad-
ron from Spangdahl em AB, Germany, deployed 10 F-16
HTS aircraft to Aviano AB, Italy, where they flew a total of
176 SEAD sort i es.
McDonnell Douglas F/A-18D Night Attack Hornetthe US
Marine Corps s two-seat, multirole fighter with night-attack
and HARM capabilities. The aircraft is capable of a maxi-
mum speed of 1, 000+ knot s at 40, 000 feet , a cei l i ng of
50, 000 feet , and a combat radi us of 635 mi l es.
32
A dozen
F/ A-18D Hornets (call sign Hawks) from the 2d Wing,
31st Group, 533d Fighter Air Squadron, Beaufort, South
Carol i na, were assi gned t o t he 7490t h Composi t e Wi ng
(Provisional) at Aviano and flew 66 SEAD sort i es duri ng
Deliberate Force.
33
McDonnell Douglas/ Spai n (Espaa) EF-18A Hornetthe
Spani sh si ngl e- seat , l and- based, mul t i r ol e f i ght er i s a
HARM-capable variant of the F/A-18A, with performance
similar to that of the F/A-18D (above). Spain deployed eight
Hor net s f r om i t s 31s t Gr oup t o t he 7490t h Compos i t e
Wing (Provisional) at Avi ano; they flew 52 SEAD sor t i es
i n al l.
34
Panavia ECR-Tornado (ECRT)Ger manys t wo-seat , t an-
dem, el ect r oni c combat and r econnai ssance ( ECR) version
EA-6B
DELIBERATE FORCE
212
of t he i nt ercept or ai r defense and ai r st ri ke (IDS) Tor nado,
capabl e of a maxi mum speed of Mach 2. 2 and a cei l i ng of
over 50, 000 feet . The ECRTs nor mal combat l oad i n -
cludes two AGM-88s, two AIM-9s , as wel l as an el ect roni c
count er measur es ( ECM) pod, chaff/ fl ares, and t wo drop
t anks .
35
Ger many based ei ght ECRTs at Pi acenza, It al y;
they flew 28 SEAD mi ssi ons duri ng Del i berat e Force.
36
The Navys S-3B (descri bed under el ect roni c i nt el l i gence
[ELINT] pl at forms, bel ow) and t he Ai r Forces EF-111A Raven
( descr i bed under el ect r oni c suppor t measur es [ ESM] pl a t-
forms, below) both contributed SEAD mi ssi ons t o Del i berat e
Force. The S-3B fl ew t wo mi ssi ons, and t he Raven logged 68
dedicated SEAD mi ssi ons.
The Uni t ed St at es flew 89 percent of Deliberate Forces 785
SEAD sort i es, wi t h t he remai nder spl i t bet ween Spai n (7 per -
cent ) and Ger many (4 percent). Of the 705 US SEAD sor t i es,
56 percent (395) were t he Navy s, 35 percent (244) were t he
Air Forces, and 9 percent (66) bel onged t o t he Mari nes.
37
Offensive Air Operations. As mentioned previously, during
Deliberate Force, force-application or striker aircraft performed
three basic missions: AI, BAI , and CAS . Rat her t han bei ng
linked to any particular types of aircraft, these mission catego-
ries were defined by the effects that General Ryan expected them
t o have on t he Serbs.
38
Specifically, AI involves air operations
conducted to destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemys military
potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against
friendly forces at such distance from friendly forces that detailed
integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of
friendly forces is not required.
39
BAI refers to air operations
conducted against enemy forces near enough to friendly forces
to require coordination, though not necessarily integration, with
the fire and maneuver of those friendly forces.
40
And CAS in -
volves air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hos -
tile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and
which require detailed integration of each air mission with the
fire and movement of those forces.
41
Deliberate Force air opera -
tions accomplished all of these types of missions while flying
1, 365 OAS sorties utilizing 19 different strike platforms from
ei ght di fferent nat i ons:
SARGENT
213
General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falconthe USAFs sin -
gl e-seat , ai r combat , mul t i rol e fi ght er capabl e of a maxi-
mum speed of over Mach 2, a combat cei l i ng of 50, 000+
feet , and a combat radi us of over 575 naut i cal mi l es wi t h
i n-fl i ght refuel i ng. The ai rcraft can carry over 20, 000
pounds of or dna nc e , a l t hough a ma xi mum of a bout
12, 000 pounds i s t he normal l i mi t for sort i es requi ri ng
ni ne-G maneuveri ng.
42
Duri ng Del i berat e Force an F-16C
st andard combat l oad consi st ed of t wo or four LGBs , two
AIM-120 AMRAAMs , two AIM-9Ms , fi ve hundred rounds
of 20 mm for t he M61A1 Vul can nose cannon, an ALQ-
131 ECM pod, ALE-40 or -47 chaff / flares, and the LAN-
TIRN navi gat i on and t arget i ng pod. Duri ng Del i berat e
For ce t he 31st Fi ght er Wi ng/ 7490t h Compos i t e Wi ng
(Provisional) a t Av i a n o pr ovi de d 12 F- 16Cs r ot a t i ng
t hr ough day and ni ght shi f t s bet ween t he 510t h Fi ght er
Squadron Dimes and the 555th Fighter Squadron Triple
Ni ckel s. Bot h combi ned t o fl y 340 st ri ke mi ssi ons.
43
Fairchild Republic OA/A-10A Thunderbolt II the USAFs
single-seat CAS and BAI ai rcraft , capabl e of a maxi mum
speed of 380 knot s at sea l evel and a combat r adi us of
250 mi l es, whi ch al l ows for a t wo-hour l oi t er over a t arget
area wi t h a ful l weapons l oad pl us 750 rounds of nose-
gun ammuni t i on. The Wart hog can carry up t o 16, 000
pounds of or dnance on 11 har d poi nt s, i ncl udi ng conven-
t i onal bombs , cl ust er bomb uni t s (CBU), Rockeye, Maver -
ick air-to-surface missiles (ASM), LGBs , and 750 t o 1, 350
r ounds of 30 mm f or i t s GAU 8/ A cannon.
44
I n suppor t of
Del i berat e Force, t he 104t h Fi ght er Groups 131st Fi ght er
Squadr on , t he Deat h Vi pers from Barnes Ai r Nat i onal
Guar d Base, Massachuset t s, depl oyed 12 A- 10s t o t he
7490th Composite Wing (Provisional) at Aviano AB, Italy.
They flew 142 CAS / BAI mi ssi ons.
45
McDonnell Douglas F-15E Eagle t he USAFs t wo-seat ,
dual -rol e fi ght er, capabl e of a maxi mum speed of Mach
2. 5, a combat cei l i ng of 60, 000 feet , and a maxi mum
unrefuel ed range of 3, 570 mi l es. The St ri ke Eagl e i s an
adverse-weat her and ni ght deep- penet r at i on st r i ke ai r -
craft equi pped wi t h a LANTIRN navi gat i on/ t arget i ng pod,
DELIBERATE FORCE
214
A-10
F-15
SARGENT
215
which allows it to provide laser designation for its own
guided bombs , including GBU-10s , -12s , and -24s. The air -
crafts AXQ-14 data-link pod provides electro-optical guid-
ance for the GBU-15 bomb. Normally, the aircraft also car-
ries two AIM-7 F/ M Sparrows , two or four AIM-9 L/M
Sidewinder missiles, and a 20 mm M61A1 Vulcan six-barrel
cannon.
46
During Deliberate Force, the 48th Fighter Wings
494t h Fi ght er Squadron depl oyed 10 F-15Es from Laken-
heat h, Engl and, to Aviano AB. They flew 94 strike sorties
against key targets, particularly bridges.
47
Lockheed AC- 130H Spect r et he USAF s mul t i s ens or
ground-attack gunship capable of a maximum speed of over
330 knot s and an endurance of over fi ve hours. Armament
i ncl udes a 105 mm howi t zer, t wo 40 mm Bofors cannons,
t wo 20 mm Vul can cannons, and four 7. 62 mm mi ni guns.
48
Dur i ng Del i ber at e For ce t he 16t h Speci al Oper at i ons
Squadron of the 1st Special Operations Wing, Hurl burt
Field, Florida, deployed four AC-130Hs to Brindisi, Italy, as
part of the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF).
The Spect re flew 32 missions, including BAI , CAS, recce,
and combat search and rescue (CSAR).
49
AC-130
DELIBERATE FORCE
216
McDonnell Douglas F-18C Hornetthe US Navys car r i er -
based, si ngl e-seat , mul t i rol e fi ght er, wi t h performance
similar to that of the SEAD -configured aircraft. This air -
craft fl ew 178 st ri ke mi ssi ons, provi di ng addi t i onal LGB
precision-weapon deliveries during Deliberate Force. In
addi t i on t he si st er vari ant F/ A-18C Hornet (also a carrier-
borne ni ght -at t ack fi ght er) i s an i mproved F/ A-18A wi t h
dat a- bus- l i nked smal l comput er s; i t i s r econnai ssance
equipped and has AIM-120 AMRAAM and AGM- 65F capa-
bi l i t y. Duri ng Del i berat e Force t he F/ A-18C flew a total of
10 mi ssi onsfour st ri ke, four CAP, and t wo recce.
50
Grumman Super Tomcat F-14Dthe US Navys two-seat,
mul t i rol e fi ght er capabl e of carryi ng 14, 500 pounds of
vari ous ordnance l oads of free-fal l weapons.
51
(For other
speci fi cat i ons see t he di scussi on under CAP pl at forms. )
These Super Tomcat s fl ew 47 st ri ke mi ssi ons duri ng De-
liberate Force.
52
McDonnel l Dougl as F/ A- 18D Hornett h e US Ma r i n e
Corps s ni ght -at t ack, t wo-seat , mul t i rol e fi ght er (see de-
scri pt i on under SEAD platforms). The Hawks provided
anot her 94 st ri ke sort i es for Del i berat e Force, fl yi ng out of
Aviano AB.
53
Sepecat Jaguar A (JAGA)t he Fr ench single-seat, CAS ,
t act i cal st r i ke, t act i cal r econnai ssance f i ght er / bomber ,
capabl e of a maxi mum ai r speed of Mach 1. 5, a combat
cei l i ng of 40, 000+ feet , and a combat radi us of 357 mi l es
on a l ow-al t i t ude mi ssi on profi l e on i nt ernal fuel , or ei ght
hundr ed+ mi l es on a medi um- al t i t ude mi ssi on pr of i l e
wi t h ful l i nt ernal and ext ernal fuel . Armament combi na-
t i ons i ncl ude t wo 30 mm Def a cannons wi t h 150 r ounds
per gun, ai r-t o-ai r mi ssi l es , bombs, r ocket - l auncher pods,
l aser-gui ded ai r-t o-ground mi ssi l es, and dr op t anks on
fi ve ext ernal hard poi nt s.
54
In support of Deliberate Force,
t he French ai r force depl oyed si x Jaguars t o Ist rana, It al y,
from whi ch t hey fl ew 63 st ri ke mi ssi ons.
55
Dassault Mirage 2000D/Kthe French single-seat, delta-
wing, CAS , t act i cal st ri ke, and t act i cal reconnai ssance
fighter. (See the discussion of the M2000C, above, for per -
formance characteristics). The strike Mirages in Deliberate
SARGENT
217
Force were ni ght / l aser capabl e and coul d carry nearl y
14,000 pounds of external stores, including AAMs , ASMs,
bombs, rockets , ECM and recce pods, and t wo drop t anks.
Like the 2000Cs, t hey have t wo 30 mm Defa 554 cannons
wi t h 125 rounds per gun.
56
Operating out of Cervia, Italy,
Mirage 2000Ds flew 10 strike missions, and M2000Ks flew
36 missions. One Mirage 2000K was lost to an infrared
man-portable missile on the first day of operations, the only
NATO ai rcraft l ost duri ng t he campai gn.
57
Panavia GR.MK1/Italy Tornado IDS (ITORN)the Italian
al l -weat her fi ght er, capabl e of a maxi mum speed of Mach
2. 2, a servi ce cei l i ng of 50, 000 feet , and a combat radi us
of 865 mi l es wi t h a heavy weapons l oad on a medi um- t o-
l ow-al t i t ude mi ssi on. The ai rcraft can carry nearl y 20, 000
pounds of or dnance on s even har d poi nt s , i ncl udi ng
Hunt i ng JP 233 weapon packs, ALARM ant i radi at i on mi s-
siles , AAMs , ASMs, free-fal l and gui ded bombs , CBUs ,
ECM pods, and drop t anks. The ai rcraft al so carri es i nt er -
nal l y t wo 27 mm IWKA-Mauser cannons wi t h 180 rounds
per gun.
58
During Deliberate Force, the ITORNs flew 26
st ri ke sort i es out of Ghedi , It al y.
59
Unfort unat el y, duri ng
operations the Italian pilots lack of proficiency in refuel-
ing from US KC-135 drogue t ankers mi ni mi zed t he ai r -
craft s surge capabi l i t y, si nce t hey were rest ri ct ed t o usi ng
only the Italian air forces IB707 t anker .
60
General Dynami cs/ Net herl ands NF-16At he Net herl ands
si ngl e-seat , mul t i rol e fi ght er (see CAP di s cus s i on f or
speci fi cat i ons). For st ri ke operat i ons, t he NF-16A c a n
carry 15, 000 pounds of ordnance, i ncl udi ng AAMs; ASMs ;
rocket s ; convent i onal bombs; smar t - weapon ki t s, i ncl ud-
i ng l aser - gui dance syst ems; ECM pods ; a nd e xt e r na l
tanks. Flying out of Villafranca, Italy, Dut ch F-16s flew 86
OAS sort i es i n support of Del i berat e Force.
61
McDonnell Douglas/ Spai n EF- 18At he Spani sh si ngl e-
seat, multirole fighter (see SEAD di scussi on). EF-18s con-
t ri but ed 46 st ri ke mi ssi ons duri ng Del i berat e Force.
McDonnell Douglas/BAe GR-7 Harrier II the RAFs single-
seat, V/STOL, CAS, tactical strike, and tactical reconnais -
sance ai rcraft . Capabl e of carryi ng up t o ni ne t housand
DELIBERATE FORCE
218
pounds of ordnance, the GR-7 has a maxi mum speed of
575 knots at sea level and a combat ceiling of 50, 000 feet.
With a 6, 000 lb payload, its combat radius is 172 miles. Its
normal armament l oad consi st s of t wo 25 mm Aden 25
cannons with 125 rounds per gun, AAMs , ASMs, general-
purpose and gui ded bombs , CBUs , rocket l aunchers, and
an ECM pod carri ed on si x ext ernal hard poi nt s.
62
Based at
Gioia del Colle, Italy, the RAFs GR-7 Harrier II flew 126
strike sorties during Deliberate Force.
63
British Aerospace FRS.MK2 (FA-2) Sea Harriert he Royal
Navys al l - weat her , si ngl e- seat , V/ STOL, car r i er bor ne,
mul t i rol e (t act i cal st ri ke, t act i cal reconnai ssance , a nd a n-
tiship) aircraft. (See CAP discussion for specifications). In
t he st ri ke mi ssi on, t he FA-2 i s equi pped wi t h t wo 30 mm
Aden cannons pl us ei ght t housand pounds of st or es car -
ried on five pylons.
64
In addi t i on t o t he Sea Harri ers CAP
support , t he ai rcraft fl ew a t ot al of 30 st ri ke sort i es from
t he HMS Invincible in the Adriatic Sea in support of Delib -
erat e Force.
65
Othert he few remai ni ng Del i berat e Force st ri ke mi ssi ons
were fl own by German ECRTs (three), Turkish TF-16s
(four), and US Navy EA-6Bs (four). (See previ ous di scus-
sions for specifications.)
The Supporters
The shoot ers coul d not perform t hei r mi ssi ons effect i vel y
and efficiently without support from aircraft that fulfilled vari-
ous f or ce- enhancement r ol es. For ce enhancement , whi ch mul-
t i pl i es t he combat effect i veness of fi ght i ng forces and enabl es
and i mproves operat i ons, may be t he maj or cont ri but i on ai r
forces make t o a campai gn such as Del i berat e Force.
66
Force
support ers, bet t er known as force mul t i pl i ers, cont ri but ed
over 30 percent (1, 091) of t he sort i es fl own i n Del i berat e
Force. Support er mi ssi ons i ncl ude ai r-t o-ai r refuel i ng (AAR)
and i nt el l i gence, survei l l ance, and reconnai ssance (ISR). The
latter includes ELINT, ai rborne earl y warni ng (AEW), recce ,
ABCCC, electronic warfare (EW)/ ES M, and CSAR . Ot her sup -
port came from i nt rat heat er ai rl i ft provi ded by t he Spani sh
CASA 212 (see table 8.4).
SARGENT
219
Air-to-Air Refueling. For t he 17 days of t he campai gn,
tanker aircraft from several NATO member st at es provi ded
aeri al refuel i ng support . Operat i ng mai nl y from t wo st at i ons
over the Adriatic Speedy and Sonnythese tankers flew
383 (35. 1 percent ) of al l Del i berat e Force support sort i es. The
Uni t ed St at es provided the majority of the AAR pl at f or ms and
310 (80. 9 percent) of the refueling sorties, with the United
Kingdom provi di ng 32 (8. 4 percent ), France 18 (4. 7 percent),
Spai n 17 (4. 4 percent ), and It al y si x (1. 6 percent ). These na-
tions operated six different types of AAR ai rcraft .
US/Boeing KC-135R Stratotankerthe USAF upgrade of the
KC-135E with four large, high-bypass-ratio CFM F-108 tur-
bofans, capable of a speed of 460 MPH and a mission ra-
dius of 2,875 miles. The KC-135R has a maxi mum t akeoff
weight of 322, 500 pounds with a maximum fuel load of
203, 288 pounds.
67
During Deliberate Force, 12 US Strato-
t ankers (an even mix of KC-135Es and Rs ) flew 265 (69.2
percent) of the AAR sorties and over 85 percent of the US
tanker sorties from bases at Pisa, Italy; Sigonella, Sicily;
Istres, France ; and RAF Mildenhall, United Kingdom. To
make up for an initial unavailability of larger KC-10 aircraft,
the Stratotankers from Mildenhall flew 108 missions down
to the Balkans area of operations.
68
US/ Dougl as Ai r cr af t Company KC- 10A Ext endert he
USAFs l ong-range, aeri al t anker/ t ransport , capabl e of a
Table 8.4
Supporter-Mission Sorties
Mission Sorties % of Total
Sorties
% of Supporter
Sorties
AAR 383 10.8 35.1
Recce 312 08.8 28.6
ELINT 169 04.8 15.5
AEW 166 04.7 15.2
ABCCC 32 01.0 03.0
CSAR 19 00.5 01.7
Other 10 00.3 00.9
Total 1,091 30.9 100.0
DELIBERATE FORCE
220
crui se speed of 520 MPH at a cei l i ng of 42, 000 feet . The
Ext ender can provi de boom and drogue pod refuel i ng and
can t r ansf er al most t wi ce as much f uel as t he KC- 135
360, 000 pounds.
69
KC-10As did not fly their first Deli ber at e
KC-10
KC-135
SARGENT
221
For ce mi ssi ons unt i l 2 Sept ember 1995. Based at Genoa,
Italy, these Extenders flew 45 AAR mi ssi ons.
70
United Kingdom/Lockheed K. MK1 L-1011K Tri-Starthe
RAFs t anker, capabl e of a maxi mum speed of 520 knot s at
35,000 feet, a service ceiling of 43,000 feet, and a range of
4, 836 mi l es wi t h a maxi mum payl oad.
71
In support of De-
liberate Force, the RAF deployed two Tri-Stars to Palermo,
Italy; from there they flew 32 AAR sort i es.
72
France/ Boei ng C- 135FR St rat ot ankert he Fr e nc h a i r
forces equi val ent t o t he USAF KC-135R. Unlike the refu -
el i ng boom of t he USAF ver si on of t hi s ai r cr af t , t he
French KC-135s ended i n a dr ogue i nst ead of a pr obe,
whi ch made i t compat i bl e wi t h many NATO ai r cr af t t hat
t he Ameri can versi on coul d not servi ce wi t hout t emporary
modification.
73
The Fr e nc h de pl oye d one of t he i r C-
135FRs t o Ist res, France , i n support of Del i berat e Force.
The ai rcraft fl ew every day except on t he fi rst and l ast
days, for a t ot al of 18 sort i es.
74
Spai n/ Lockheed KC- 130H Dumboa r ough- f i el d, al l -
weat her, t act i cal , i n-fl i ght -refuel i ng t anker, capabl e of a
refuel i ng speed of 308 knot s and an operat i ng radi us of
one t housand mi l es t o offl oad 31, 000 pounds of fuel .
75
Spai n deployed two KC-130Hs of t he 31st Gr oup, 12t h
Wi ng to Aviano; from t here t hey l aunched and recovered
17 sor t i es.
76
It al y/ Boei ng IB-707the Italian air forces modified Boe -
i ng 707 t anker wi t h drogue-refuel i ng capabi l i t y. Operat-
i ng out of Pi sa, this aircraft flew six missions. Primarily it
refuel ed It al i an Tornados , whose pi l ot s had not been
t rai ned t o refuel from US t ankers.
77
Int el l i gence, Survei l l ance, and Reconnai ssance. ISR air -
cr af t ar e t asked pr i mar i l y f or combat - i nf or mat i on suppor t .
When I SR asset s are properl y i nt egrat ed, t hei r synergi sm can
produce resul t s great er t han t he t ot al of t hei r i ndi vi dual ef-
fort s. The si t uat i onal awareness provi ded by ISR enabl es t he
CFACC to exploit the capabilities of forces more fully by warn -
i ng of enemy act i ons and t hr eat s.
78
Many t heat er organi c, servi ce, Depart ment of Defense, and
nat i onal gr ound- , ai r - , sea- , and space- based sensor syst ems
DELIBERATE FORCE
222
col l ect combat i nformat i on. In t urn, t hese sensors have vari -
ous pr ocessi ng, anal ysi s, and pr oduct i on cent er s and nodes,
from t heat er fi el d l ocat i ons t o nat i onal agenci es and j oi nt i n -
telligence cent ers. Thei r product s are usual l y di ssemi nat ed
t o user s at al l l evel s vi a dedi cat ed and common- use communi-
cat i ons l i nks and ar chi t ect ur es, i ncl udi ng gr ound- ai r - space
syst ems and t hei r rel ays, di rect downl i nks, and even run-
ners or shuttles to other locations. Military and civilian
sat el l i t e communi cat i ons systems play a critical role in dis -
t ri but i ng combat i nformat i on where and when i t i s needed.
79
Ot her I SR sources i ncl ude pi l ot s post mi ssi on report s, t heat er-
cont rol l ed U-2s, Ri vet Joi nt, t act i cal recce ai rcraft , and sat el -
l i t e syst ems of t he Uni t ed St at es and ot her nat i ons.
The recce priorities of NATO ai r commanders i n rel at i on t o
Bosni a-Herzegovi na focused on heavy-weapons si t es, SAMs ,
fixed targets , weapons-col l ect i on poi nt s, and t he ai rfi el ds at
Udbi na and Banj a Luka . The general UN and NATO r equi r e-
ment t o mi ni mi ze bot h t he ri sk t o NATO ai r cr ews and t he r i sk
of confl i ct escal at i on was best ful fi l l ed by t he use of pre-
pl anned recce by st rat egi c and nat i onal asset s, i ncl udi ng U-2
fl i ght s, t act i cal reconnai ssance aircraft, and UAVs . U-2 mis -
si ons were t asked pri mari l y agai nst heavy weapons, Udbi na
airfield, fixed targets, and weapons-col l ect i on poi nt s. Gener -
al l y, nat i onal asset s were t asked agai nst SAM si t es and Banj a
Luka ai rfi el d. Usi ng t hese asset s t o gat her i nformat i on on
t hose t arget s allowed NATO commander s t o mi ni mi ze t he use
of manned and unmanned t heat er pl at f or ms and t hus r educe
t hei r exposure t o enemy t hreat s. Tact i cal reconnai ssance a s -
s et s , t her ef or e, wer e us ed mai nl y f or t act i cal , of t en s hort-
notice, missions. AIRSOUTH kept t hem at vari ous l evel s of
al er t t o mai nt ai n t hei r r eadi ness f or such scr ambl e mi ssi ons.
80
Duri ng Del i berat e Force, fi ve nat i ons empl oyed 13 di fferent
manned or unmanned r ecce pl at forms for purposes t hat i n -
cl uded moni t ori ng t he movement of heavy weapons out of t he
Saraj evo t ot al -excl usi on zone (TEZ) t owar ds t he weapons -
col l ect i on poi nt s, as wel l as maki ng assessment s of di rect ed
t ar get s and bat t l e damage.
French Dassault Mirage F-1CRt he French ai r forces t a c-
t ical and st r at egi c al l - weat her r econnai s s ance ai rcraft
SARGENT
223
assi gned t o t he 33d Reconnai ssance Squadron based at
Strasboling, France. This aircraft is capable of a maximum
speed of Mach 1. 8 and a combat radi us of 863 mi l es on a
medi um- al t i t ude mi ssi on.
81
During Deliberate Force, five
F-1CRs based in Istrana, Italy, were listed as ELINT asset s
but actually flew 66 tactical reconnaissance sort i es.
82
French Dassault Mirage M2000Dthe French air forces
mul t i r ol e f i ght er . Thi s ai r cr af t can f l y r econnai ssance
when equi pped wi t h a recce pod. Duri ng Del i berat e Force,
M2000Ds f l ew 12 t act i cal r econnai ssance sort i es from
Cervia, Italy, in support of the RRF .
83
French Sepecat Jaguar A (JAGA)a French ai r force st ri ke
fi ght er. Jaguars operat i ng from Ist rana, It al y , also flew
t hr ee r ecce mi ssi ons i n support of t he RRF.
84
German Panavia Tornado GR. Mk1(TORNR)/1a (GTORN)
the German air forces t act i cal reconnai ssance aircraft
wi t h var i ant s f r om t he Tor nado I DS/ ECR. Rest ri ct ed t o
support of t he RRF only, six TORNRs operat i ng from
Piacenza, Italy, fl ew 32 t act i cal reconnai ssance sort i es
during Deliberate Force. Also operating from Piacenza ,
GTORN aircraft flew four recce sor t i es i n suppor t of t he
RRF i n addi t i on t o performi ng t hei r normal el ect roni c
combat and r econnai ssance roles.
85
Netherlands General Dynamics NF-16R Recce Falcona
modi fi ed F-16A recce aircraft. Five NF-16Rs, based at Vi l -
l afranca, It al y, fl ew 52 t act i cal reconnai ssance sort i es
duri ng Del i berat e Force.
86
United Kingdom McDonnell Douglas/BAe GR. Mk7 Harrier
IIrecce version of the RAF s cl ose-support ai rcraft . Two
of t hem fl ew 49 sort i es duri ng Del i berat e Force.
87
United Kingdom British Aerospace FRS.Mk2 (FA-2) Sea Har-
rierRoyal Navy multirole aircraft. Flying from the Invinci-
ble and equipped with camera pods, these aircraft flew 12
tactical reconnaissance sort i es duri ng t he ai r campai gn.
88
US Navy Grumman F-14A TARPS US Navy fleet defense
fi ght ers. Equi pped wi t h t he t act i cal ai r reconnai ssance
pod system (TARPS), these aircraft flew 32 tactical recon-
nai ssance sor t i es f r om t he Roosevelt a nd t he America.
89
The F-14As were capabl e of a maxi mum speed of Mach
DELIBERATE FORCE
224
2. 37, a service ceiling of 56, 000 feet, and a range of over
t wo t housand mi l es. Refl ect i ng t hei r pri mary ai r combat
role, TARPS F-14As al so carri ed a war l oad of mi ssi l es
and an i nt er nal cannon.
90
USAF Lockheed U-2R Dragon Lady US hi ghal t i t ude r e-
connai ss ance ai rcraft , capabl e of a crui si ng speed of 430
MPH, an operat i onal cei l i ng of 90, 000 feet , and a maxi-
mum r ange of 6, 250 mi l es.
91
U-2Rs have a vari et y of
sensors for performi ng al l ISR missions, including ELINT ,
sur vei l l ance, a nd r e c c e . ELINT U-2s have l ar ge f ar ms
of gat her i ng ant ennas or wi ndows f or opt i cal sensor s.
Bat t l efi el d-surveillance U-2s have hi gh- r esol ut i on r adar
such as t he Hughes Advanced Synt het i c Aper t ur e Radar
Syst em Type 2. Al so, t he preci si on l ocat i on st ri ke syst em
was devel oped for use wi t h t he Dragon Ladi es t o l ocat e
hostile radar emitters. Flying out of RAF Fairford or RAF
Alconbury, U-2Rs at t empt ed 44 l aunches i n suppor t of
Deliberate Force. Fifteen recce and 10 ELINT sor t i es wer e
successful , whi l e 13 and fi ve were ground or ai r abort ed,
respect i vel y. On 29 August 1995, a U-2R cr as hed on
takeoff at RAF Fairford, and t he pi l ot di ed of i nj uri es.
92
US Army Schweizer RG-8 Lofty View and RG-8A Condor a
si ngl e-engi ne, t wo-seat , fi xed-wi ng reconnai ssance ai r -
craft. Lofty View has an endur ance of at l east f our hour s
U-2
SARGENT
225
and a cr ui se speed of l ess t han 80 knot s. RG- 8 Condor s
have t wo engi nes, t hr ee seat s, an endur ance of si x hour s,
and a crui se speed of one hundred knot s. Duri ng Del i ber -
ate Force, Lofty View and Condor aircraft based at Dezney,
Tur key, fl ew ni ne sort i es, l oggi ng more t han 52 hours of
recce and survei l l ance t i me.
Two aircraft previously mentioned flew weather reconnais sance
missions. On two different weather days, a pair of F/A-18Cs a nd
a pair of F-16Cs l ogged a t ot al of four reconnai ssance sort i es
as col l at eral mi ssi ons.
By May 1994 t he mi l i t ary commanders of Deny Fl i ght wer e
looking for ways to improve their ability to monitor the TEZs
or safe areas est abl i shed ar ound cer t ai n Bosni an ci t i es. By
t hat t i me i t was cl ear t hat UNPROFOR woul d not be abl e t o
ful l y moni t or t he safe areas , part i cul arl y i f more were act i -
vated. Air recce offered a vi t al compl ement t o ground-force
capabi l i t i es i n t hi s area, but i t t oo had l i mi t at i ons, mai nl y due
t o bad weat her , roughness of t he Bosni an t errai n, camoufl age
ski l l of t he Serbs, and limited availability and flexibility of
manned ai r cr af t avai l abl e t o do t he mi ssi on. Unmanned aer i al
vehicles , t herefore, became a t hi rd pot ent i al source of val uabl e
i nformat i on, bot h i n rel at i on t o TEZ moni t or i ng and t o t he
si t uat i on i n Bosni a i n general .
93
UAVs date back to World War I. Prior to Deliberate Force,
t hey were empl oyed i n combat duri ng t he Persi an Gul f War .
These i ncl uded t he Pi oneer , Pointer, and Exdr one, oper at ed by
t he Ar my, Navy, and Mari ne Corps , respectively. In Operation
Desert Storm, these UAVs showed t hat t hey coul d provi de
near-real -t i me bat t l efi el d survei l l ance and det ect i oni deal ca -
pabilities for Deny Flights TEZ moni t ori ng.
94
Moreover, UN
commander s on t he scene r ecogni zed t hat dur i ng Deny Fl i ght ,
if employed overtly, the RPV [remotely piloted vehicle ] act s as
yet anot her det errent t o pot ent i al vi ol at ors of t he TEZ r ul es.
The syst em can t r ack/ f ol l ow weapon syst ems t hat vi ol at e t he
TEZ, whet her dur i ng t he day or at ni ght .
95
Consequent l y, t hey
believed that in the event of additional TEZ tasking, UAVs
woul d enhance t hei r sur vei l l ance resources at l ow ri sk. Two
UAV syst ems subsequent l y depl oyed t o t he Bal kans regi on:
DELIBERATE FORCE
226
General At omi cs Gnat 750 (UAV-2)t he US Ar mys
modified RG-8A Condor wi t h cont rol and dat a rel ay, l at er
named an i nt er i m medi um- al t i t ude endur ance, sur vei l -
l ance , a nd r e c onna i s s a nc e dr one. Pr i or t o Del i ber at e
For ce, t he Gnat had seen servi ce duri ng Deny Fl i ght op-
erat i ons, unl i ke Predat or. Duri ng Del i berat e Force, t he
Gna t l aunched and recovered from Dezney, Turkey, and
i nsi de Cr oat i a . I n a l l , t h e Gn a t 7 5 0 a t t e mp t e d 1 2
l aunches and fl ew seven successful fl i ght s.
96
General Atomics Predator (UAV-1)t he USAFs medi u m-
altitude-endurance UAV for surveillance, reconnai ssance,
and target acquisition. This air platform cruises at speeds
less than 250 knots and carries electro-optical, infrared,
and synt het i c apert ure radar sensors. Images capt ured by
the sensors go from the aircraft to the ground-control cell
an d t hen by sat el l i t e t o vi deo uni t s t hroughout t he t heat er
or even the world. NATO planners and peace-implementation
force commanders at several l evel s used i mages from t he
Predat or . These included UNPROFOR i n Bosni a ; t he com-
bi ned ai r operat i ons cent er (CAOC) at Vicenza, Italy; t he
allied RRF; and t he Eur opean Command Joi nt Anal ysi s
Center at RAF Molesworth, England. Commanders watchi ng
Predator UAV
SARGENT
227
t he vi deo downl i nk screens see pi ct ures l ess t han t wo
seconds ol dwhat t he mi l i t ary cal l s near real t i me. The
ability to pull still photo images from the video is a popu-
l ar feat ure, but t he resol ut i on st i l l needs work.
97
Dur i ng
Del i berat e Force a US Army uni t l aunched and r ecover ed
Predat or from Gjader, Albania . It l aunched 15 fl i ght s (17
were attempted), 12 of which were effective, logging over
150 hours of coverage over Bosni a-Herzegovi na.
98
A pri me
demonst rat i on of Predat ors val ue occur r ed on 5 Sept em-
ber 1995, as Admi ral Smi t h and Gener al Janvi er pon-
dered whet her or not t o resume bombi ng. Thei r deci si on
hi nged on whet her t he Ser bs were wi t hdrawi ng, or at
l east demonst rat i ng an i nt ent i on t o wi t hdraw, t hei r heavy
weapons from t he Saraj evo safe area . Based on a Pr edat or
sort i e l aunched j ust before dawn, Admi ral Smi t h advised
Janvi er t hat t her e wer e no i nt ent s bei ng demonst r at ed;
lets get on with it!
99
Duri ng Deny Fl i ght t he Uni t ed St at es , Great Britain , and
Fr ance r out i ne l y pr ovi de d a i r bor ne s i gna l s i nt e l l i ge nc e
(SIGINT) and el ect roni c i nt el l i gence by usi ng fi ve di fferent
types of aircraftRivet Joints, U-2Rs , and EP-3s from t he
Uni t ed St at es ; Nimrods from Great Bri t ai n ; and C- 160s from
Fr ance. Fl yi ng roughl y 75 sort i es per mont h and averagi ng
seven t o ei ght hours of coverage per day, t hese pl at forms
added t o t he t ot al i nformat i on avai l abl e t o t he CAOC. Duri ng
Del i ber at e For ce, ai r bor ne i nt el l i gence mi s s i ons i ncr eas ed
nearl y fi vefol d. The same t hree nat i ons added four more ELINT
pl at forms t o i ncrease around-t he-cl ock coverage of t he area of
operat i ons wi t h an average of 11 sort i es per day.
100
US Navy/ Lockheed ES-3A/ S-3B Vi ki ngthe Navys carrier -
borne electronic warfare aircraft, capable of a maximum
speed of 450 knots at 25, 000 feet, a service ceiling of
35, 000 feet, and a combat range of more than twenty-three
hundred miles. The Vikings passive ELINT configurat i on
wasnt known at t he t i me of t hi s wri t i ng. Duri ng Del i ber -
at e Force, Vi ki ngs l aunched and recovered from t he USS
Theodore Roosevelt or t he USS America i n t he Adri at i c
Sea . ES-3As flew 38 ELINT sort i es, and S-3Bs flew 33.
101
DELIBERATE FORCE
228
US Navy/Lockheed EP-3E Oriona Navy ELINT pl at form.
Also known as Aries II , t hi s ai r cr af t has a maxi mum
crui se speed of 380 knot s at 15, 000 feet , a servi ce cei l i ng
of 28, 000 f eet , and a maxi mum mi ssi on r adi us of 2, 532
mi l es. Duri ng Del i berat e Force, four EP-3Es suppor t ed
CAOC operations, normally patrolling off the coast of Bos -
nia feet wet over the Adriatic Sea i n a nor t hwes t / s out h-
east orbit. Based at Sigonella Naval Air Station, Sicily, t he
Orions flew 18 ELINT mi ssi ons.
102
USAF/Boeing RC-135W Rivet Jointt he Ai r Forces elec-
t r oni c r econnai ssance pl at form feat uri ng a si de-l ooki ng
ai r bor ne r adar capabi l i t y. The ai r cr af t s di r ect - t hr eat
war ni ng s ys t em can pr ovi de a br oadcas t heads - up
t hreat warni ng t o fri endl y ai rborne ai rcraft . The RC-135W
f l i es at a maxi mum speed of 535 knot s at 25, 000 f eet , a
servi ce cei l i ng of 40, 600 feet , and an operat i onal radi us of
2, 675 mi l es. The ai rcraft has no armament and l i mi t ed
ECM.
103
Dur i ng Del i ber at e For ce, Ri vet Joi nt ai rcraft
commuted from RAF Mildenhall. They flew 21 ELINT
S-3 Viking
SARGENT
229
missions feet wet over the Adriatic Sea, orbi t i ng nort hwest
t o sout heast , l i ke t he Ori on , but at a hi gher al t i t ude.
104
RAF/British Aerospace Nimrod R.Mk1the RAFs electronic
intelligence pl at form, capabl e of a maxi mum speed of fi ve
hundred knots, a service ceiling of 42, 000 feet, and a ferry
range of 5, 755 mi l es on i nt ernal fuel wi t hout i n-fl i ght
refuel i ng. The mai n vi si bl e sensors are t hree very l arge
spi ral -hel i x recei ver domesone faci ng ahead on t he front
of each wing and one facing aft on top of the vertical fin. It
P-3 Orion
RC-135
DELIBERATE FORCE
230
car r i es no ar mament .
105
Duri ng Del i berat e Force, Ni mrods
flew seven ELINT mi ssi onsone mi ssi on on each of t he
f i r st t hr ee days and one on each of t he l ast f our days,
aver agi ng si x hour s of cover age t i me. Li ke t he ot her
ELINT asset s, i t or bi t ed nor t hwest t o sout heast over t he
Adriatic Sea, just off the coast of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
106
France/ Transal l C-160NG Gabri ela Fr e nc h me di um-
range SIGINT ai r cr af t t hat f l i es at a maxi mum speed of
277 knot s at 16, 000 feet . It has a servi ce cei l i ng of 27, 000
feet , a t ypi cal range of 1, 151 mi l es, and no armament .
107
Based at Avord, France , Gabriels flew four SIGINT mi s-
si ons i n support of Del i berat e Forceone mi ssi on on each
t he f i r st t wo days and one on each t he l ast t wo days.
108
France/DC-8 a SIGINT-modified DC-8. Duri ng Del i berat e
Force, these aircraft flew three ELINT support sort i es.
109
El ect roni c warfare/ el ect roni c support measures ai rcraft en -
hanced t he effect i veness of Del i berat e Forces penet rat i ng ai r -
cr af t when t hese EW/ ES M syst ems oper at ed i n mut ual l y sup-
port i ve rol es at opport une t i mes and pl aces wi t hi n t he AOR.
These syst ems proved essent i al t o t he process of det ect i ng,
i dent i fyi ng, and fi xi ng t he exact l ocat i ons of enemy ai r defense
syst emst he fi rst st eps i n t he process of deci di ng whet her t o
avoi d, degrade, or dest roy part i cul ar syst ems. NATO con -
duct ed t hes e EW oper at i ons i n a combi ned envi r onment .
110
Because el ect roni c combat asset s have a broader fi el d of
i nf l uence t han sur f ace- based asset s, t he EC mi ssi on bot h i n -
creases t he l et hal i t y of combi ned forces and i mproves t hei r
survi vabi l i t y. Throughout Del i berat e Force t he whol e range of
EC missions, including SEAD, EW, or ESM, coordi nat ed wi t h
ot her mi ssi ons t o cont r ol t he EC envi ronment by denyi ng i t s
use t o t he BSA whi l e preservi ng i t s use by t he mul t i nat i onal
force. During Deliberate Force the following nonlethal, force-
enhancer EW/ ESM pl at forms conduct ed EC mi ssi ons agai nst
gr ound- bas ed el ect r omagnet i c emi t t er s s uch as C
3
, ear l y
war ni ng, and SAM/ AAA fi re-cont rol syst ems, as wel l as t hei r
associ at ed surface-t o-ai r weapons:
USAF/ Grumman (General Dynamics) EF-111A Ravent he
USAFs ESM t act i cal j ammer. The Raven combines low-
SARGENT
231
al t it ude, hi gh-speed, ni ght , al l -weat her capabi l i t i es wi t h a
moder n, t act i cal , r adar - j ammi ng syst em. Capabl e of a
maxi mum speed of 2. 14 Mach at hi gh al t i t ude, a servi ce
cei l i ng of 45, 000 feet , and an unrefuel ed endurance of
mor e t han f our hour s, t he EF- 111A ha s no a r ma me nt .
111
The Raven has t hree operat i onal modes: (1) st andi ng off
i n i t s own ai rspace t o screen t he rout es of at t ack ai rcraft ,
(2) escort i ng packages t hat are penet rat i ng t he enemys
defenses, and (3) neut ral i zi ng enemy radars i n t he force-
protection role. The EF-111As primary-role equipment is
t he Eat on Corporat i ons ALQ-99E tactical jamming subsys -
t em (JSS), housed i n t he weapons bay; t he sensi t i ve JSS
emission receiver system is in its fin-top fairing. Syst em
i nput s act i vat e t he ai rcraft s 10 powerful j ammers. The
ALQ-99E JSS has proven t o have suffi ci ent power t o al l ow
t he ai rcraft t o penet rat e t he most concent rat ed el ect roni c
defenses.
112
Duri ng Del i berat e Force, Ravens of t he 429t h
El ect roni c Combat Squadron fl ew a t ot al of 68 EC sort i es
i n support of bot h SEAD and ESM mi ssi ons.
113
EF-111
DELIBERATE FORCE
232
USAF/ Lockheed EC-130H Compass Calla USAF aircraft
featuring a computer-assisted, operator-controlled, selective
jamming system. When supporting offensive operations, the
EC-130H can become part of a SEAD effort. Capable of a
maximum speed of 325 knots at 30, 000 feet, a service ceil-
ing of 33, 000 feet, and a range of 2, 356 miles, this special-
i zed ai rcraft can al so support ground, sea, amphi bi ous, and
special forces. It carries no armament. The 43d Electronic
Combat Squadron flew four Compass Call aircraft for a total
of 35 EW/ ESM missions in support of Deliberate Force;
these were logged as ELINT mi ssi ons.
114
In addition to flying its primary SEAD role, the US Navys
EA-6B Prowler per f or med ESM missions as well. This aircrafts
j ammi ng capabi l i t y i s si mi l ar t o t he EF-111s, but , unl i ke t he
Raven, t he Prowl er can al so dest r oy enemy r adar s .
All-weather surveillance performed by space-based platforms
and/ or ai rcraft i n t he Bal kans AOR provided NATO commanders
information to plan and direct combat air operations. In addi-
tion, air surveillance platforms provided C
3
t o enhance t he si t u -
ational awareness of NATO uni t s and commander s.
NATO/ Boei ng Aerospace E-3A/ D/ F Sent ry an ai r bor ne
war ni ng and cont r ol syst em ai rcraft . The l arge rot odome
on NATOs E-3A/ D a nd Fr a nc es E-3F Sent ry aircraft
houses a 24- f oot - di amet er ant enna t hat per mi t s sur vei l -
l ance f r om t he Ear t h s sur f ace up i nt o t he st r at ospher e,
over l and and wat er . The r adar has a r ange of mor e t han
two hundred miles for low-flying targets and f ar t her f or
ai r pl at forms fl yi ng at medi um t o hi gh al t i t udes. As an ai r
defense syst em, t he E-3 can l ook down t o det ect , i dent i fy,
and t rack enemy and fri endl y l ow-fl yi ng ai rcraft by el i mi-
nat i ng gr ound- cl ut t er r et ur ns t hat conf use ot her r adar
syst ems. In i t s t act i cal rol e, t he Sent ry can provide infor-
mat i on needed for i nt erdi ct i on , r econnai ssance, airlift ,
and CAS for NATO forces. Thi s hi gh-val ue ai r asset i s
capabl e of a maxi mum speed of 530 MPH at al t i t ude, a
servi ce cei l i ng of 40, 000 feet , and an endurance of si x
hour s at a di st ance of one t housand mi l es f r om i t s home-
pl at e. The Sent ry has no ar mament .
115
Duri ng Del i berat e
SARGENT
233
Force, NATO Sentries flew a total of 99 AEW mi ssi ons (74
by E-3As and 25 by E- 3Ds ). The French E-3Fs fl ew an
addi t i onal fi ve mi ssi ons.
116
US Navy/ Grumman E- 2C Hawkeyethe US Navys carrier -
borne and l and-based AEW and C
3
aircraft. The Hawkeye is
equipped with a General Electric APS-125 radar and a Lit -
t on L-304 general -purpose comput er capabl e of aut omat-
ically tracking 250 targets and controlling 30 intercepts
simultaneously up to 250 miles away. Also, the aircrafts
syst ems al l ow f or an ABCCC rol e. Operat i onal l y, t he
Hawkeye has a maxi mum speed of 325 knot s, a servi ce
ceiling of 30,800 feet, and a patrol endurance of up to six
hour s . During Deliberate Force, Hawkeyes l aunched and
recovered 62 AEW sorties from the USS Theodore Roosevelt
and USS America in the Adriatic Sea.
117
By obt ai ni ng needed combat i nf or mat i on, I SR pl at forms
played a key role in the planning, execution, and combat assess -
ment phases of Deliberate Force. Overall, NATO flew 647 ISR
sort i es duri ng t he operat i on, account i ng for 59. 3 percent of t he
support sort i es and 18. 3 percent of t he t ot al sort i es fl own.
Ai rborne Battl efi el d Command and Control Center. As
an ai rborne bat t l e st affs command post , t he ABCCC f unct i ons
E-3 airborne warning and control system aircraft
DELIBERATE FORCE
234
as a direct extension of the CAOC. By flying near the scene of
air operations, ABCCC ai r cr af t and cr ews ensur ed cont i nuous
command and cont r ol over NATO ai rcraft by l i nki ng t hem and
the CAOC by radi o or by exerci si ng some di rect -cont rol func-
t i ons t hemsel ves.
USAF/ Lockheed-Georgia EC-130EUSAF C-130Es config-
ur ed t o accept a bat t l ef i el d command and cont r ol cent er
capsul e i n t hei r cargo bays. They were t he onl y dedi cat ed
ABCCC aircraft flying during Deliberate Force. With 16
bat t l e-st aff members i n t hei r capsul e, t hese ai rcraft coul d
communi cat e vi a UHF, VHF, HF, and FM radi os; secure
t el et ype and voi ce communi cat i ons syst ems; and aut o-
mat i c radi o rel ay. The ai rcraft have a maxi mum speed of
318 knot s, an unr ef uel ed r ange of t went y- t hr ee hundr ed
mi l es, and l ong endurance t hrough ai r-t o-ai r refuel i ng.
USAF ABCCCs ar e unar med.
118
Duri ng t he operat i on, four
EC- 130Es flew 32 sorties from Aviano AB, each usually
E-2 Hawkeye
SARGENT
235
i nvol vi ng a 12-hour shi ft on pat rol st at i on for 24-hour
cover age. One sor t i e was abor t ed and t hen r el aunched
t he fi rst day of operat i ons. The onl y ot her t i me ABCCC
di d not fl y occurred on t he l ast day of Del i berat e Force
because of ext remel y bad weat her condi t i ons at Avi ano
and wi t hi n t he Bal kans AOR.
119
Combat Search and Rescue. Duri ng Del i berat e Force, spe-
cial operations forces assi gned t o t he JSOTF at Brindisi, Italy,
had primary responsibility for CSAR operat i ons. These forces
pl us t hree French ai r force Puma hel i copt ers and sever al US
Navy car r i er bor ne sea- r escue asset s r emai ned on cal l f or
CSAR mi ssi ons. On 30 August 1995, Ebro 33, a French Mi -
r age 2000, was hi t by a man-port abl e i nfrared SAM, and t he
ai rcrew ej ect ed. Wi t h mi ssi on report s of t wo good chut es and
var i ous i nt er mi t t ent , uni dent i f i ed r adi o t r ansmi ssi ons, US
JSOTF ai r asset s at t empt ed t hree di fferent CSAR mi ssi ons on
t hree di fferent days, t ot al i ng 19 sort i es: t hree on 30 August ,
ei ght on 6 Sept ember, and ei ght on 7 Sept ember. Unfort u -
nat el y, r escuer s coul d not r each t he downed Fr enchmen be-
fore Bosni an Serb f or ces capt ur ed t hem.
USAF/ Si korsky MH-53J Pave Low IIIa heavy- dut y, mul-
t i rol e hel i copt er equi pped wi t h a forward-l ooki ng i nfrared
sensor; hi gh-resol ut i on, t errai n-avoi dance radar; an i ner -
t i al navi gat i on syst em; and a Gl obal Posi t i oni ng Syst em
for low-level flight and precision navigation in all weather
condi t i ons. The ai r cr af t al so has a r adar war ni ng syst em,
di spensers for fl ares and chaff, and t hr ee . 50- cal i ber ma-
chine guns for self-defense. The Pave Low III is air refu -
el abl e and has a maxi mum speed of 170 knot s, a ser vi ce
ceiling of 18,500 feet, and an unrefueled range of 1,290
mi l es. Duri ng Del i berat e Force, si x assi gned MH-53Js
based at Brindisi, Italy, flew a total of 10 CSAR sorties.
During the mission of 7 September to find the downed Ebro
33 crew, some Pave Low IIIs t ook bat t l e damage, and some
helicopter aircrews received wounds from ground fire in the
vicinity of the crash site. The aircraft recovered safely.
120
USAF/ Lockheed HC-130P Herculesthe USAFs fixed-wing,
rescue-and-recovery aircraft equipped with outer wing pods
DELIBERATE FORCE
236
for refueling helicopters in flight. The CSAR Hercul es has
a maximum speed of 325 knots, a service ceiling of 33, 000
feet, and a range of 2, 356 miles.
121
During Deliberate Force,
four HC-130Ps flew nine CSAR sort i es i n concert wi t h
MH-53J s, searching for the Ebro 33 aircrew.
122
Airlift. Prior to Deliberate Force, Deny Flight had al r eady
established routine, scheduled strategic and theater airlift to
sustain its normal level of operations. Since the establishment of
the 7490th Composite Wing (Provisional) at Aviano AB, Italy,
and the force-structure changes following the shootdown of a US
F-16 in early June 1995, the gradual tempo of needed airlift for
force enhancement and support i ncreased subst ant i al l y. By t he
onset of Deliberate Force, C-5 Galaxies , C-17 Globemasters , and
C-141 Starlifters were providing daily strategic airlift flights into
air bases in and around Italy. A limited number of C-21s , C-
130s , G-222s , and CASA C-212s provided intratheater airlift
capability within the AOR t o sust ai n operat i ons.
MH-53
SARGENT
237
Two USAF C-21s from Capodichino Airport in Naples, Italy,
made dai l y ferry fl i ght s of t act i cal -reconnai ssance and cockpi t
vi deot apes i n suppor t of t he bat t l e damage assessment pr o-
cess. In addi t i on t hey provi ded seni or l eadershi p wi t h i n -
t rat heat er t ransport at i on, part i cul arl y bet ween AIRSOUTH in
Naples and t he CAOC at Vicenza .
123
The Italian air force pro-
vi ded one C-130 and four Aeri t al i a G-222 gener al - pur pose
t ransport ai rcraft , whi ch operat ed from Pi sa, It al y .
124
Spai n
assigned one CASA C-212 Aviocar as a ut i l i t y t ransport for
CAOC use at Vicenza . The only theater-airlift aircraft to appear
C-17s
C-21
DELIBERATE FORCE
238
on t he dai l y mi ssi on summari es, t he CASA C-212 logged 10
airlift mi ssi ons duri ng Del i berat e Force.
125
Throughout Deliberate Force, supporters fulfilled an impor -
tant role in multiplying the combat effectiveness of the shooters.
The force-supporter missions previously discussed enhanced the
mobility, lethality, survivability, and/ or accuracy of the land,
sea, and air force missions during the operation. However, none
of the missions within their respective rolesaerospace control,
force application, or force enhancementcould be effectively
performed without the surface activities of force support to sus -
t ai n and mai nt ai n al l t he pl ayers.
Although a discussion of Deliberate Force logistics i s be-
yond t he scope of t hi s chapt er, al l pl at forms performi ng t hei r
ai r rol es depended on t he avai l abi l i t y of secure, funct i onal
bases t o provi de needed mat eri el and faci l i t i es t o t he ent i re
f or ce st r uct ur e. I n al l , 18 bases acr oss ei ght nat i ons sup-
port ed t he ai r campai gn. In part i cul ar, Avi ano AB was a bee-
hive of activity, supporting 40 percent of all Deliberate Force
pl at forms and t he maj ori t y of US pl at forms.
The Nonpl ayers
For al l of t he t echnol ogi cal sophi st i cat i on and power of t he
fleet of aircraft employed by NATO duri ng Del i berat e Force,
t he operat i on di d not ut i l i ze every t ype of ai rcraft pot ent i al l y
useful and avai l abl e t o t he part i ci pat i ng ai r forces. The ai rcraft
l eft out of Del i berat e Force compri se an i nt erest i ng i ssue be-
cause t he r easons f or t hei r absence r eveal much about t he
operat i onal , l ogi st i cal , and pol i t i cal forces t hat shaped and
gal vani zed t hi s part i cul ar ai r campai gn. A bri ef exami nat i on of
why cert ai n syst ems di d not part i ci pat e i n or were removed
from t he fi ght provi des a wi ndow i nt o t he nat ure of t hi s ki nd
of warfareone t hat compl ement s t he precedi ng di scussi on of
syst ems t hat di d fl y i n t he ski es over Bosni a . At the core of
t hat exami nat i on i s t he quest i on of whet her commander s or
government s wi t hhel d or wi t hdrew syst ems as a resul t of mi l i -
t ary or pol i t i cal consi derat i ons. The answer t o t hat quest i on
wi l l i ndi cat e j ust how l i mi t ed or expansi ve was t he mi l i t ary
SARGENT
239
chal l enge and pol i t i cal si gni fi cance of Del i berat e Force i n t he
eyes of t he government s cont ri but i ng t o i t .
Absent from the Deliberate Force air order of battle were a
number of US ai rcraft t ypes whose i ncl usi on one woul d have
expect ed, gi ven t hei r i mport ant cont ri but i ons t o t he coal i t i on
ai r effort duri ng t he Gul f War of 199091. These aircraft, all of
which remained operational in the US inventory, included B- 52s
or ot her heavy bombers; fi ght er ai rcraft such as t he F-4E,
F-111, F- 15C, F-117, A-6, and AV-8; and t he RF- 4C manned
r econnai ssance ai rcraft . The Uni t ed St at es al so di d not br i ng
i n t he MC-130 speci al -operat i ons ai rcraft or t he F-4G elec-
t r oni c- combat and def ense- suppr essi on ai r cr af t . Each of t hese
offered capabi l i t i es t o Del i berat e Force pl anners t hat woul d
have or coul d have fi l l ed or mi t i gat ed i mport ant capabi l i t y
gaps or weaknesses i n t hei r order of bat t l e .
For t he most par t , expl anat i ons f or t he absence of t hese
ai rcraft from Del i berat e Force are st rai ght forward, deal i ng
wi t h t he rout i ne and prudent management of mi l i t ary force
structure. NATO commanders l i kel y di d not bri ng i n some
ai r cr af t , such as t he F- 111F, A-6E, and F- 4G, because t hey
were neari ng ret i rement , l ogi st i cal l y uni que and cost l y t o sup-
port , and funct i onal l y repl i cat ed t o an adequat e degree by
ot her, newer ai rcraft . Ot hers, l i ke t he US Mari ne Corpss AV-8
F-15C
DELIBERATE FORCE
240
vert i cal -t akeoff ai rcraft , were i n-t heat er but not assi gned and
si mpl y di d not part i ci pat e i n Del i berat e Force. The operat i on
did not require RF-4Cs si nce t he French and ot her NATO air
forces provi ded or coul d provi de manned reconnai ssance air -
craft as needed. The absence of t hese ai rcraft , t herefore, was
t he consequence of purel y mi l i t ary cal cul at i ons of mi ssi on re-
qui rement s and l ogi st i cs.
Military considerations also restrained NATO commander s
from request i ng depl oyment of t he E-8C j oi nt survei l l ance,
t arget at t ack radar syst em (JSTARS) aircraft, capable of elec-
t roni cal l y observi ng an area of t he Eart hs surface approxi -
mat el y 180 ki l omet ers wi de and ext endi ng up t o 160 ki l ome-
t ers beyond t he forward l i ne of t roops under observat i on.
126
Appropri at e t o i t s desi gners i nt ent i ons, prot ot ypes of t he ai r -
craft proved very successful duri ng t he Gul f War i n l ocat i ng
Iraqi equi pment , suppl y dumps, and fi el d format i ons. JSTARS
al so cooperat ed wi t h ai rcraft such as t he F-15E i n st r i ki ng
t hose t ar get s. Gi ven t hose capabi l i t i es, i t was onl y nat ural for
mi l i t ary commanders t o exami ne t he ai rcraft s ut i l i t y for op-
erations over Bosnia . As earl y as Jul y 1994, US mi l i t ary l ead -
ers at t he Pent agon exami ned t he possi bi l i t y of depl oyi ng
JSTARS t o Engl i sh and Ger man bases as wel l as one Eur o -
pean sout hern-t i er base. They were part i cul arl y i nt erest ed i n
deploying the aircraft to Aviano AB or elsewhere in Italy in
support of a Bosni an fl i ght and ground demonst rat i on. But a
Pentagon talking paper of 22 September concluded that limited
facilities, increased logistical problems, added costs/program
i mpact s and i ncreased ri sk combi ne t o make a Joi nt STARS
demonstration in NATOs Southern Tier undesirable.
127
At t hat t i me, t he t act i cal si t uat i on al so di d not l end i t sel f t o
employing JSTARS i n Bosni a . Unl i ke t he desert t errai n i n t he
Gulf War , t he mount ai nous l ocal t er r ai n woul d mask many
ground-t arget movement s. To fi nd t hem woul d requi re fl yi ng
E- 8s directly over Bosnia at unaccept abl y hi gh pol i t i cal and
mi l i t ary ri sk t o t hese hi gh-val ue ai rcraft .
128
I n any event , E- 8s
di d not ent er t he Bal kans t heat er unt i l aft er Del i berat e Force,
under mi l i t ary and pol i t i cal condi t i ons vast l y changed from
t hose t hat prevai l ed before.
The absence of heavy bombers from Deliberate Force opera -
tions reflected more of a mix of military practicality and political
SARGENT
241
cal cul at i on. Heavy bombers, part i cul arl y t he B-52, had t wo
di st i nct rol es at t he t i me of t hi s operat i on. Ei t her t hey coul d
act as bomb t rucks, droppi ng massi ve pat t erns of ungui ded
bombs agai ns t ar ea t ar get s , or as cr ui semi ssi l e car r i er s,
l aunchi ng st andoff at t acks agai nst poi nt t ar get s . Although
NATO ai r pl anner s mi ght have seen opport uni t i es t o empl oy
pat t ern bombi ng agai nst some Del i berat e Force t arget s s uch
as ammuni t i on dumps, pol i t i cal r est r ai nt s on col l at er al dam-
age absol ut el y precl uded such at t acks. Moreover, t here was
no get t i ng ar ound t he f act t hat t he shor t er - r ange st r i ke ai r -
craft already available in-theater were capable of servicing all
pl anned t ar get s wi t hi n al l of t he appl i cabl e const rai nt s of t i me
and preci si on. Thi s was al so t rue i n rel at i on t o t he B-52s
preci si on-st ri ke capabi l i t i es. What ever t he B-52s convent i onal
ai r-l aunched crui se mi ssi l es coul d do i n t erms of performi ng
preci si on st ri kes and mi ni mi zi ng ri sks from Serbi an ai r de-
fenses , ot her ai r cr af t weapon- syst ems combi nat i ons and t he
US Navys Tomahawk mi ssi l es coul d do al so. Even had a si g-
ni fi cant mi l i t ary reason exi st ed t o bri ng heavy bombers i nt o
t he fi ght , Del i berat e Force commanders l i kel y woul d have had
second t hought s, gi ven t he bi g ai rpl anes i nherent pol i t i cal
liability of signaling escalation. Because of the lack of compelling
mi l i t ary reasons t o bri ng heavy bombers i nt o t he fi ght , t here-
fore, the potential political liabilities of the aircraft remai ned
B-52
DELIBERATE FORCE
242
domi nant i n t he cal cul at i ons of NATO ai r commanders. As
est i mat ed by Maj Gen Hal Hornburg, director of the CAOC a t
Vicenza, empl oyi ng heavy bombers woul d have meant goi ng
beyond t he psychol ogi cal t hr eshol d of t he campai gn and
coul d have had an adver se ef f ect on t he Bosni an Ser b peace
process .
129
The fate of NATOs effort t o bri ng t he Lockheed F-117A
Ni ght hawk i nt o Del i berat e Force, ment i oned previ ousl y, was
more cl earl y t he out come of t he background pol i t i cal forces a t
pl ay duri ng t he ai r campai gn. Thi s si ngl e-seat fi ght er was
desi gned t o expl oi t l ow-observabl e st eal t h t echnol ogy i n order
t o penet r at e hi gh- t hr eat enemy ai r space under t he cover of
dar kness and at t ack hi gh- val ue t ar get s from medi um or hi gh
al t i t udes wi t h pi npoi nt accur acy. These t wo at t r i but es made
t he Ni ght hawk a part i cul arl y val uabl e weapon for t he SEAD
mi ssi on. Consequent l y, mi dway t hr ough t he campai gn, Gen -
eral Ryan requested six F-117As t o empl oy agai nst t he Bos -
ni an Ser b IADS. Ryan based hi s r equest on i nf or mat i on t hat
t he Ser bs had relocated virtually their entire SAM syst em i n a
F-117s
SARGENT
243
pr ot ect i ve r i ng i n and ar ound Banj a Luka , the logical focus of
subsequent NATO ai r at t acks. In Ryan s as s es s ment t he r i s k
of going against this formidable array of SAMs i s very hi gh
and t herefore j ust i fi ed t he use of st eal t h fi ght ers t o reduce t he
ri sks t o ai rcrews.
130
Ryan s boss, Admi ral Smi t h, suppor t ed hi s
request , st at i ng t hat we shoul d t herefore pi t our st rengt hs
agai nst BSA weakness and t hat means [ usi ng t he] F- 117.
131
On t he same day, Admi ral Smi t h approved and forwarded hi s
r equest t o Gen Geor ge Joul wan, Supreme Al l i ed Commander
Europe (SACEUR), for i mmedi at e act i on.
132
Smi t h al so sent a
message t hat day t o t he It al i an Mi ni st ry of Defense (MOD)
request i ng permi ssi on t o bed down si x F-117A aircraft at Avi -
a no AB for at l east a 30-day peri od.
133
US secretary of defense William Perry approved t he F-117
depl oyment at 0051Z on 9 Sept ember for a peri od not t o ex -
ceed 60 days. The ai r cr af t and t hei r associ at ed cr ews and
support equi pment were t o depl oy t o Avi ano i mmedi at el y. The
secr et ar y f ur t her di r ect ed t hat Gener al Joul wan, who was al so
commander i n chi ef of US European Command (USCINCEUR),
take the lead in obtaining diplomatic clearances for all depl oyi ng
ai rcraft .
134
Gi ven t he pot ent i al di pl omat i c sensi t i vi t y of t he
pendi ng depl oyment , General Joul wan sent a message t o t he
commander i n chi ef of US At l ant i c Command, whose com-
mand woul d be rel easi ng t he F-117s t o Eur opean Command
(EUCOM), emphasi zi ng t he proper procedures for cl eari ng t he
depl oyment wi t h t he appropri at e government s: HQ USEU-
COM is the single-point facilitator for obtaining host nation
approval s of al l count ry cl earances. Request s shoul d be made
[i n accordance wi t h] forei gn cl earance gui de i nst ruct i ons. . . .
No US personnel are aut hori zed t o ent er any host nat i on unt i l
speci fi cal l y cl eared by t he count ry t eam.
135
On t hat same day9 Sept ember F- 117 mai nt enance per -
sonnel and suppor t equi pment began ar r i vi ng at Avi ano to
suppor t t he F- 117 beddown. But t he I t al i an gover nment had
yet t o gi ve formal approval for t he depl oyment . In pressi ng t he
mat t er wi t h t he It al i ans, US ambassador Regi nal d Bart hol omew
di scover ed t hat t he hol dup appar ent l y was due t o I t al i an
pri me mi ni st er Lambert o Di nis absence f r om t he count r y.
This left the diplomatic initiative in the hands of Italian foreign
minister Susanna Agnelli, whose communi cat i ons on t he i s s u e
DELIBERATE FORCE
244
had al r eady i mpr essed Bar t hol omew wi t h t hei r vehemence.
She evi dent l y fai l ed t o see any sense of urgency about t he
mat t er t hat woul d r equi r e her t o cont act Di ni about t he r e-
quest . Bart hol omew al so conveyed i n hi s message t hat t he
pr i me mi ni st er had t ol d hi m and US ambassador Ri char d
Holbrooke on 7 Sept ember t hat request s for support of Bos -
nia operat i ons beyond t he support current l y approved woul d
be revi ewed at pol i t i cal l evel s i n t erms of t he responsi veness of
ot hers t o It al ys part i ci pat i on i n t he cont act group.
136
Lat er,
Foreign Minister Agnelli emphat i cal l y t ol d Bart hol omew t hat
Italy was t i red of al ways sayi ng yes t o ot hers whi l e ot hers
al ways say no t o It al y !
137
The US ambassador fel t t hat t he It al i ans were i n a hi gh
pol i t i cal spi n on t he i ssue, mai nl y as a consequence of t he
sl i ght t hey fel t from not havi ng been made a member of t he
Cont act Gr oup conduct i ng negot i at i ons wi t h t he Serbs , and
f r om t hei r r el at i ons wi t h ot her member s of t he Eur opean Un -
ion. Whi l e acknowl edgi ng t hei r concerns, Bart hol omew told
t he It al i ans t hat t here were l i mi t s on what t he Uni t ed St at es
coul d do for t hem i n t hese areas. Two days l at er, on 11 Sep-
t ember 1995, t he I t al i an MOD advised NATO t hat t he F- 117
depl oyment was not aut hori zed.
138
Force Issues
Ei ght part i ci pat i ng nat i ons compri sed t he Del i berat e Force
mul t i nat i onal al l i ance: France, Ger many, Italy, t he Net her -
l ands, Spain , Turkey, t he Uni t ed Ki ngdom, and t he Uni t ed
St at es . Al t hough t he mul t i nat i onal effort successful l y accom-
pl i shed mi ssi on obj ect i ves, al l i ance rel at i onshi ps somet i mes
became st rai ned and affect ed t he forces.
For example, long-standing intra-NATO di pl omat i c t ensi ons
hamper ed t he depl oyment of 10 Tur ki sh TF-16s t o part i ci pat e
i n Del i berat e Force, ment i oned previ ousl y. On 30 August , at
CINCSOUTHs request , Supreme Headquart ers Al l i ed Powers
Eur opeNATOs mi l i t ary headquart ersrecal l ed t he Turki sh
fi ght ers i n support of t he operat i on. Turkey responded posi -
t i vel y t o t he request and asked permi ssi on t o overfl y Greek
airspace on the way to Italy .
139
Act i ng consi st ent l y wi t h a l ong
SARGENT
245
hi st ory of st rai ned rel at i ons wi t h Turkey and NATO on s uch
i ssues, Greece rej ect ed t he Turki sh request .
140
Despi t e t he ur -
gency of t he si t uat i on, t he Greek aut hori t i es st at ed t hat t he
over f l i ght r equest shoul d have been made on a weekday and
fi ve days pri or t o t he fl i ght , t he normal procedure for rout i ne
operat i ons.
141
The TF-16s did deploy to Italy but arri ved l at e
aft er ci rcumnavi gat i ng Greek nat i onal ai rspace.
Di fferi ng pol i t i cal assessment s of t he si t uat i on i n Bosni a by
t he government s of t he Net herl ands, Ger many, Tur key, and
Italy, i n part , l ed t hem t o rest ri ct t he ki nds of operat i ons t hei r
air forces could perform. Dutch aircraft , for instance, flew only
CAP, OAS, and recce mi ssi ons, and t he Germans rest ri ct i ons
on NATOs use of their ECR and IDS Tornados be c a me a
si gni fi cant l i mi t at i on. Because Germany woul d not aut hori ze
mi ssi ons i n di rect support of t he RRF , t he l at t er had t o r e-
quest support i n order for t he CAOC t o schedul e ei t her of
these types of aircraft. The CAOC met t he RRFs recce re-
quest s by usi ng Ger man I DS recce escort ed by ECRs. Also,
t he Turki sh government l i mi t ed i t s ai rcraft t o CAP mi ssi ons i n
protection of the UN ground forces. Last l y, pol i t i cal pressures
wi t hi n t he It al i an government and post confl i ct rel at i onshi ps
wi t h nei ghbors across t he Adri at i c Sea resul t ed i n t he It al i an
air forces comi ng i nt o t he fi ght about a week l at e, and i t s
aircraft flew only OAS , aerial refueling, and airlift mi ssi ons.
The pol i t i cal background t o t hese deci si ons t o l i mi t part i ci pa -
t i on i s compl ex and beyond t he scope of t hi s chapt er. Never -
t hel ess, t he l i mi t at i ons had a di rect effect on t he pl anni ng a nd
execut i on of t he ai r campai gn. Most i mport ant l y, t hey shi ft ed
t he burden of fl yi ng most of t he more dangerous st ri ke sort i es
ont o t he ai r forces whose government s l eft t hem free t o con -
duct offensi ve operat i ons. Cl earl y, t he domest i c pol i t i cal dy-
nami cs of coal i t i on par t ner s i s an i mpor t ant ar ea of t hought
f or f ut ur e ai r l eader s and pl anner s .
In general the CFACC had adequat e number s and t ypes of
ai r cr af t t o per f or m mi ssi ons and mai nt ai n t he r equi si t e oper a -
t i onal t empo of Del i berat e Force. St i l l , an exami nat i on of t he
mi x of ai rcraft avai l abl e t o hi m and of t he mi ssi on l oads t hey
carri ed i ndi cat es some force-st ruct ure i mbal ances (see t abl e
8. 5) . Some mi ssi on ar eas enj oyed a r el at i ve abundance of
a ir cr af t and pl at f or ms, whi l e ot her s coul d have used some
DELIBERATE FORCE
246
a ugment at i on. For exampl e, once operat i ons were under way,
t act i cal r econnai ssance, ear l y war ni ng, ELINT, and ot her s up-
port uni t s fl ew al most doubl e t he sort i e rat e ori gi nal l y ant i ci -
pated for them by NATO ai r pl anner s . Thi s i ncr eased r at e
requi red t he depl oyment of augment at i on forces i nt o t he t hea -
ter, mostly from the USAF.
One al so not es a possi bl e surpl us of ai rcraft al l ocat ed t o
perform CAP. A little over one-fifth of the platforms flew less
t han 10 per cent of t he mi ssi on t aski ng. Per haps t he CFACC
coul d have reassi gned some of t hese ai rcraft t o ot her mi ssi on
cat egori es wi t hout compromi si ng t he OCA mi ssi on. However,
because some of t he al l i es depl oyed wi t h a predet ermi ned mi s -
si on, especi al l y i n t he ai r-t o-ai r rol e, General Ryans flexibility
was pr obabl y mor e r est r i ct ed t han i t appear s.
The SEAD al l ocat i on al so bears cl oser exami nat i on. Al -
t hough, i n raw numbers, asset s al l ocat ed t o SEAD represented
about one-fi ft h of t he t ot al ai rcraft empl oyed i n Del i berat e
Force, di fferent i al capabi l i t i es exi st ed i n t he mi x of asset s pro -
vided. Of the 56 SEAD pl at forms avai l abl e, 50 were capabl e of
firing HARMs whi l e 22 were j ammers, and 16 coul d bot h j am
and shoot HARMs . Because of this mixed capability, Deliber at e
Force pl anners resorted to creating SEAD windows over Bos -
nia , wher eby j ammer s and shoot er s pr ovi ded common- use
suppor t t o a cl ust er of st r i ke packages r at her t han r emai ni ng
t i ed t o a part i cul ar package.
Table 8.5
Allocation and Apportionment of Aircraft in Deliberate Force
Mission Allocation Apportionment
No. of Assets % No. of Sorties %
CAP 64 22.3 294 08.3
SEAD 56 19.5 785 22.2
CAS/BAI 87 30.3 1,365 38.6
Recce 18 06.3 312 08.8
Support 62 21.6 779 22.1
Total 287 100.0 3,535 100.0
SARGENT
247
A subt l e i mbal ance al so exi st ed i n t he st ruct ure of forces
allocated to the CAS and AI missions. At one level the allo -
cated mix of CAS and AI ai rcraft was adequat e t o accompl i sh
t he mi ssi on t aski ng of Del i berat e Force. Indeed, i nformal i n -
t ervi ews conduct ed by t he Bal kans Ai r Campai gn St udy t eam
member s wi t h F- 15E, F- 16, F/ A-18, and A-10 pilots indicated
t hat some fel t underut i l i zed duri ng t he campai gn. St i l l , from
t he st ar t of oper at i ons, t he demand f or pr eci si on- weapon s -
capabl e ai rcraft pressed t he capaci t y of t he avai l abl e fl eet
more t han t he number of avai l abl e preci si on and nonpreci si on
ai rcraft woul d i ndi cat e. The great pressure on NATO com-
manders t o mi ni mi ze casual t i es and col l at eral damage me a n t
t hat preci si on weapons had t o be used i n t he maj ori t y of al l
st ri kes. Fort unat el y for t he i nt ervent i on, t he Spani sh, Fr ench ,
British, and Ameri can ai r forces fi el ded enough preci si on-
st ri ke ai rcraft t o do t he j ob, and t hey l i kel y woul d have de-
pl oyed more i nt o t he fray had combat requi rement s i ncreased.
Thus, t he real concl usi on about preci si on st ri kers i n Del i ber -
at e Force i s t hat t he pol i t i cal ci rcumst ances of t he campai gn
creat ed a great er demand for preci si on t han for nonpreci si on
st ri ke ai rcraft . Gi ven t he avai l abi l i t y of adequat e t ypes and
number s of pr eci si on weapons, t he sui t abl e uses of nonpr eci-
si on weapons are decreasi ng.
The allocation of aircraft to on-call CAS duri ng Del i berat e
Force also bears close examination. Tying air forces to directly
support i ng ground-component combat operat i ons on a pro -
l onged or rout i ne basi s reduces t hei r fl exi bi l i t y. But under
many ci rcumst ances, CAS i s an ext remel y i mport ant mi ssi on,
both militarily and emotionally, given its ability to underpin
t he success of gr ound oper at i ons and t o r educe near - t er m
casual t i es . Historically, CAS allocations have often been in -
flated, compared to the number of missions actually flown. As
a case i n poi nt , over 30 percent of t he sort i es were t asked on
Del i berat e Force ai r t aski ng messages for CAS; j ust over 1
percent act ual l y fl ew such mi ssi ons. Under t he ci rcumst ances,
of course, plenty of aircraft were available to stand CAS al ert .
But under ci r cumst ances i n whi ch t he r equi r ement s of t he
overal l ai r campai gn are more demandi ng i n rel at i on t o t he
forces available, the practice of designating CAS al ert mi ssi ons
demands review. This is particularly true, given the availability
DELIBERATE FORCE
248
of ot her t echni ques of provi di ng responsi ve CAS s uch as
mai nt ai ni ng ground-al ert wi ndows or redi rect i ng i nt erdi ct i on
mi ssi ons t o answer cri t i cal but sporadi c cal l s for hel p.
In t he mai n, t he support ai rcraft avai l abl e for Del i berat e
For ce met mi ssi on r equi r ement s. Ear l y or t r ansi ent shor t ages
di d occur i n a f ew ar eas, such as t anker suppor t and t he
availability of ABCCC aircraft , but force t ransfers from out si de
t he t heat er qui ckl y rect i fi ed t hese i nci pi ent probl ems. Gi ven
t he smal l scal e and short durat i on of Del i berat e Force, such
augment at i ons di d not chal l enge t he capabi l i t i es of t he US Ai r
Force. But because worl dwi de short ages of some t ypes of ai r -
craft do exi st , as i s t he case wi t h t act i cal reconnai ssance ,
SEAD, and ABCCC pl at forms, fut ure ai r pl anners shoul d l ook
careful l y at pl ans t hat depend on t hei r ready avai l abi l i t y.
Not es
1. See Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the
United States Air Force, vol . 2, March 1992, essay D, 27.
2. COMAIRSOUTH, Operation Deliberate Force Factual Review, 14 Oc -
tober 1995 (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified, US Air Force His -
torical Research Agency (hereinafter AFHRA), Maxwell AFB, Ala., NPL-07.
3. Ibi d. (Secret ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s uncl assi fi ed.
4. Message, 131338Z Aug 95, commander i n chi ef of US European Com -
mand (USCINCEUR) to CINCSOUTH, 13 August 1995 (Secret) Information
extracted is unclassified, AFHRA, NPL-14-02.
5. Message, 180930Z Aug 95, It al i an Mi ni st ry of Defense t o CINC-
SOUTH, 18 August 1995 (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified, AF -
HRA, Bal kans Ai r Campai gn St udy speci al col l ect i ons archi ve.
6. Message, 281817Z Aug 95, CINCSOUTH to AIRSOUTH plans cell, 28
August 1995 (Secret ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s uncl assi fi ed, AFHRA, Bal kans
Ai r Campai gn St udy speci al col l ect i ons archi ve.
7. Deny Flight Logistics Report, 282100Z Aug 95 (Secret) Information
extracted is unclassified, AFHRA, AVI-05/06.
10. Message, 051534Z Sep 95, CINCSOUTH to AIRSOUTH plans cell, 5
Sept ember 1995 (Secret ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s uncl assi fi ed, AFHRA, Bal-
kans Ai r Campai gn St udy speci al col l ect i ons archi ve.
SARGENT
249
11. Message, 050815Z Sep 95, TGS [Turkish government sends] to AIR-
SOUTH plans cell (information only), 5 September 1995 (Secret) Information
extracted is unclassified, AFHRA, Balkans Air Campaign Study special col-
lections archive.
September 1995 (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA,
Bal kans Ai r Campai gn St udy speci al col l ect i ons archi ve.
13. Fact ual Review, 2-8. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.
Sept ember 1995. (Secret ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s uncl assi fi ed.
15. The t er m offensive air operations (OAS) is derived from CINCSOUTH
Operat i ons Pl an 40101 Deny Fl i ght Concept of Operat i ons, annex D,
change 4, 3 May 1995.
16. In fact, none of the enemy MiGs ever challenged the coalition; thus, no
air-to-air engagements and/or shootdowns occurred during Deliberate Force.
17. The Encyclopedia of Modern Warplanes (New York: Aerospace Pub-
lishing, Ltd. , 1995), 104.
18. Ext ract ed from CAOC dai l y mi ssi on summari es, 29 August 14 Sep -
tember 1995 (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA,
CAOC-15.
19. Encyclopedia of Modern Warplanes, 123.
CAOC-15.
21. Ibid. (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.
CAOC-15.
26. Mul t i -Command Manual (MCM) 3-1, vol . 1, Tactical Employment,
General Planning & Employment Considerations, at t achment 6, Guide to
Aircraft Combat Capabilities, 17 March 1995, 8-6. (Secret ) Informat i on ex-
CAOC-15.
t ember 1995; and uni t mi ssi on l ogs (Confi dent i al ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s
31. MCM 3-1, vol . 1, 8-14. (Secret ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s uncl assi fi ed.
See al so Encyclopedia of Modern Warplanes, 123.
DELIBERATE FORCE
250
t ember 1995; and uni t mi ssi on l ogs (Confi dent i al ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s
CAOC-15.
38. AFM 1-1, vol. 2, 106.
39. Joi nt Publ i cat i on (Pub) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of
Military and Associated Terms; on-l i ne, Int ernet , 12 August 1999, avai l abl e
f r om ht t p: / / 131. 84. 1. 34/ doct r i ne/ j el / doddi ct / dat a/ a/ 00265. ht ml . Thi s i s
bot h t he US and NATO defi ni t i on.
40. No US joint definition exists for BAI. It remains, however, a NATO
t erm covered i n NATO Pub AAP-6 and i s now t ermed i ndi rect ai r support
(NATO): support given to land or sea forces by air action against objectives
ot her t han enemy forces engaged i n t act i cal bat t l e. It i ncl udes t he gai ni ng
and mai nt ai ni ng of ai r superi ori t y, i nt erdi ct i on, and harassi ng. Joi nt Pub
1-02; on-l i ne, Int ernet , 12 August 1999, avai l abl e from
ht t p: / / www. dt i c. mi l / doct r i ne/ j el / doddi ct / nat ot er m/ i / 00403. ht ml .
41. This is the US definition. The NATO definition is similar but would
be i ncl uded under t he general defi ni t i on of cl ose support . Joi nt Pub 1-02;
on-l i ne, Int ernet , 12 August 1999, avai l abl e from
ht t p: / / 131. 84. 1. 34/ doct r i ne/ j el / doddi ct / dat a/ c/ 01182. ht ml .
43. Ext r act ed f r om CAOC dai l y mi s s i on s ummar i es , 29 Augus t 14
Sept ember 1995; and uni t mi s s i on l ogs ( Conf i dent i al ) I nf or mat i on ex-
t r act ed i s uncl assi f i ed, AFHRA, CAOC- 15.
45. Ext r act ed f r om CAOC dai l y mi ssi on summar i es, 29 August 14
Sept ember 1995; and uni t mi ssi on l ogs ( Conf i dent i al ) I nf or mat i on ex-
t ract ed i s uncl assi fi ed, AFHRA, CAOC-15.
50. Ext ract ed from CAOC dai l y mi ssi on summari es, 29 August 1 4 Sep-
t ember 1995 (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA,
CAOC- 15.
SARGENT
251
CAOC- 15.
CAOC- 15.
CAOC-1 5 .
CAOC-1 5 .
60. Col onel Pal adi ni , ITAF/ DO, memorandum t o Col Dani el R. Zoerb,
director of the AIRSOUTH Deny Flight operations cell, subject: Lack of Pilot
Proficiency on Tankers, 7 September 1995, AFHRA, NPL-14-02.
CAOC-1 5 .
CAOC- 15.
CAOC-1 5 .
66. AFM 1-1, vol . 1, p. 3-6.
CAOC- 15.
69. USAF fact sheet , no. 88-28, December 1988, Offi ce of t he Secret ary
of the Air Force/Public Affairs, Washington, D. C.
CAOC- 15.
CAOC- 15.
DELIBERATE FORCE
252
CAOC- 15.
77. Unit mission logs. (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.
78. AFM 1-1, vol. 1, p. 14.
79. MCM 3-1, vol. 1, 7-24. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.
80. CMC (I,) AIRSOUTH, memorandum to CINCSOUTH chief of staff,
subject: The Way Ahead with Air Recce, 5 June 1995, AFHRA, NPL-22-01.
CAOC- 15.
91. Ibi d. , 169.
CAOC- 15.
93. In t he evol ut i on of unmanned ai rcraft pl at forms, earl i er school s re -
ferred t o t hem as remotely piloted vehicles. Present l y, t he t erm appl i ed t o
t hese ai rcraft i s unmanned aerial vehicles . Regardl ess of t he semant i cs, t hey
ar e bot h unmanned, r emot el y cont r ol l ed, dat a- l i nked ai r f r ames.
94. Thomas A. Keaney and El i ot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey,
vol. 2, Operat i ons and Ef f ect s and Ef f ect i veness (Washi ngt on, D. C. : Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1993), pt . 1, 231.
95. Facsimile, TEZ Monitoring with RPV, routine correspondence from
Headquart ers Bosni a-Herzegovi na Command t o Headquart ers UNPROFOR,
5 May 1994, AFHRA, NPL-23-05.
CAOC- 15.
97. MSgt Dal e Warman, Ai r Force Squadron Takes Over Predat or Op -
erations, United States Air Forces in Europe/Public Affairs, Air Force News
Servi ce, 5 Sept ember 1996.
SARGENT
253
CAOC-15; and Corona briefing slides, Lt Gen Michael Ryan, 5 December
1995, AFHRA, CAOC- 13.
99. Message, CINCSOUTH to COMUNPROFOR, subject: BSA Noncompli-
ance and Resumption of Air Strikes, 6 September 1995 (Confidential) Infor -
mat i on ext ract ed i s uncl assi fi ed, AFHRA, NPL-15-01.
100. See t he previ ous di scussi on about recce pl at forms for i nformat i on
about t he U-2Rs cont ri but i on of 10 sort i es t o t he ELINT mi ssi on. EC-130Hs
fl ew 35 ELINT mi ssi ons, but t hat pl at form i s descri bed i n t he el ect roni c-
combat sect i on of t hi s chapt er.
CAOC- 15.
102. Ibi d. (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.
CAOC- 15.
CAOC- 15.
108. Ext ract ed from CAOC dai l y mi ssi on summari es, 29 August 1 4 Sep -
CAOC- 15.
CAOC- 15.
114. Ibi d. (Confi dent i al ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s uncl assi fi ed. Not e t hat
t he 35 Compass Cal l mi ssi ons were l ogged as ELINT mi ssi ons and not as
el ect roni c-combat or el ect roni c-support mi ssi ons.
115. Chr i st opher Chant , ed. , The Presidio Concise Guide to Military Air-
craft of the World (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1981), 3638.
CAOC-1 5 .
CAOC- 15.
DELIBERATE FORCE
254
CAOC- 15.
123. CAOC records i ndi cat e t hat t he ai rcraft fl ew, but t he fl i ght s were
not l ogged. Because one cannot det ermi ne t he t ot al number of sort i es fl own,
t hey ar e not i ncl uded i n suppor t - sor t i e t ot al s.
124. Ibi d.
CAOC- 15.
126. MCM 3-1, vol . 1, at t achment 6, A6-33, t hrough -34. (Secret ) Infor -
127. Maj or Ri ncon, Tal ki ng Paper on Joi nt STARS Demonst rat i on i n
NATOs Southern Tier, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force/IASW, 22
Sept ember 1994, AFHRA, NPL-23-06.
128. Ibi d.
129. Gen Hal Hornburg, CAOC di rect or, vi deot aped i nt ervi ew by mem -
bers of t he Bal kans Ai r Campai gn St udy, Maxwel l AFB, Al a. , 14 March 1996
(Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA, Misc-20.
130. Message, 081100Z Sep 95, CINCSOUTH to SACEUR, subject: IADS
West, 8 September 1995 (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA,
NPL-15-01.
132. Ibid. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified. See also mes -
sage, 081639Z Sep 95, CINCSOUTH t o Supreme Headquart ers Al l i ed Pow-
ers Europe, subject: Request for Aircraft, 8 September 1995, AFHRA, NPL-
15- 01.
133. Message, 081706Z Sep 95, CINCSOUTH t o RIFD/ It al i an Mi ni st ry of
Defense, DGS, subj ect : Beddown Request for F-117A Ai rcraft , 8 Sept ember
1995 (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA, NPL-15-01.
134. Message, 090051Z Sep 95, chai rman of t he Joi nt Chi efs of St aff,
Washington, D.C., to USCINCEUR, subject: Deployment of Fighter Aircraft
for Deny Fl i ght , 9 Sept ember 1995. (Secret ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s un-
classified, AFHRA, NPL-15-01.
135. Message, 090935Z Sep 95, USCINCEUR to CINCUSACOM, subject:
Command Rel at i onshi ps, 9 Sept ember 1995 (Secret ) Informat i on ext ract ed
is unclassified, AFHRA, NPL-15-01.
136. Message, ambassador, Uni t ed St at es Embassy, Rome, t o CINC-
SOUTH, subject: Government of Italys Delay in Approving NATO F-117A
Depl oyment s t o It al y, 9 Sept ember 1995 (Confi dent i al ) Informat i on ex-
tracted is unclassified, AFHRA, NPL-15-01.
138. Message, 111125Z Sep 95, Italian Ministry of Defense, Rome, to CINC-
SOUTH, subject: Beddown Request for F-117A Aircraft, 11 September 1995
(Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified, AFHRA, NPL-15-01.
SARGENT
255
139. Message, 050815Z Sep 95, TGS (Turkey) t o Supreme Headquart ers
Allied Powers Europe, subject: Greek Rejection of Turkish Overflight Re -
quest , 5 Sept ember 1995 (NATO Confi dent i al ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s un-
classified, AFHRA, NPL-15-01.
140. Ibi d. (NATO Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.
DELIBERATE FORCE
256
Chapt er 9
Weapons Used i n Del i berate Force
With respect to combat airpower, weapons should be selected
based on t hei r abi l i t y t o i nfl uence an adversarys capabi l i t y
and wi l l .
1
With regard to Deliberate Forces mission-e xecution
i ssues, t he const rai nt s on force appl i cat i on ent ai l ed avoi di ng
collateral ef f ect s and uni nt ended consequences t hat woul d be
count erproduct i ve t o t he pol i t i cal peace process . This effort to
avoid collateral and uni nt ended damage ext ended not onl y t o
t he surroundi ng physi cal t arget s but al so t o concer ns about
fratricide, refugees, and noncombat ant ci vi l i an casual t i es .
2
The
need for precision offensive air operations (OAS) pl at forms and
weapons t o l i mi t col l at eral damage while accomplishing mis -
sion objectives became an overri di ng concern duri ng t he Bal-
kans ai r campai gn. Thus, preci si on-gui ded muni t i ons (PGM)
became t he overwhel mi ng weapons of choi ce duri ng ai r st ri ke
operat i ons. Indeed, Del i berat e Force became t he fi rst ai r cam-
pai gn i n hi st ory t o empl oy more preci si on-gui ded bombs and
mi ssi l es t han ungui ded ones.
Descri bed as revol ut i onary i n Operat i on Desert St orm,
PGMs came to fruition during Deliberate Force. The multina -
tional effort expended 1, 026 bombs and missiles (excluding can-
non shel l s, r ocket s, and hi gh- speed ant i r adi at i on mi ssi l es
[HARM]), of which 708 (69 percent) were precision guided by
laser, electro-optical (EO), or infrared (IR) sensors.
3
Although the
t ot al bomb t onnage amount ed t o fewer t han fi ve hundred t ons
l ess t han 1 percent of t he 70, 000 t ons dropped i n Desert
Storm,
4
the proportion of precision-guided ordnance employed in
Deliberate Force was more than eight times greater than the
percentage of PGMs used in the Gulf War air campaign (8 percent).
5
Thi s chapt er di scusses t he abundance of ai r-t o-surface weap-
ons, both precision and nonprecision, available to North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) forces during Deliberate Force. It
also notes some precision weapons not used by t he combi ned
257
f or ces and concl udes by addr essi ng weapons i ssues t hat ar ose
as a resul t of t he ai r campai gn.
Preci si on-Gui ded Muni ti ons
With respect to force and weapons capabilities, weapons se-
lection comprises one of the highest-leverage means of tailoring
forces to accomplish missions.
6
Precision capability drove the
OAS mission roles of coalition platforms; only the United States,
United Kingdom, France, and Spai n had fi ght er-bombers capa -
ble of employing PGMs. Of the 708 PGMs dropped or fired dur-
ing Deliberate Force, the United States expended 622 (87. 8 per -
cent), followed by the United Kingdom with 48 (6.8 percent),
Spain with 24 (3. 4 percent), and France with 14 (2 percent)
(table 9.1). Given their visual-attack capability, Dutch, Ger man,
Table 9.1
Deliberate Forces Precision Munitions
France Germany Italy Netherlands Spain United
Kingdom
United
States
Total
Laser-
Guided:
GBU-10 303 303
GBU-12 10 115 125
GBU-16 24 48 143 215
GBU-24 6 6
AS-30L 4 4
Totals 14 0 0 0 24 48 567 653
EO/IR:
SLAM 10 10
GBU-15 9 9
AGM-65 23 23
Totals 0 0 0 0 0 0 42 42
TLAM
13 13
Total 14 0 0 0 24 48 622 708
Source: Extracted from Corona briefing slides, Lt Gen Michael Ryan, Headquarters AIRSOUTH, Naples, Italy,
subject: Munitions (left-side slide no. 44), 5 December 1995, United States Air Force Historical Research
Agency (AFHRA), Maxwell AFB, Ala., H-3.
DELIBERATE FORCE
258
Italian , or Turkish aircraft employed nonprecision munitions on
area t arget s in which collateral-damage risks were minimal or
not a concern.
Laser-Guided Bombs
Laser-gui ded bombs (LGB) are bal l i st i c warheads equi pped
wi t h el ect roni c and mechani cal assembl i es desi gned t o provi de
l aser t er mi nal gui dance. One can at t ach such l aser - gui dance
ki t s t o a vari et y of warheads, i ncl udi ng but not l i mi t ed t o
gener al - pur pose ( GP) bombs, speci al - pur pose bombs , a n d
war heads devel oped and pr oduced by ot her al l i ed count r i es.
Such a ki t consi st s of a comput er - cont r ol gr oup and wi ng
assembl y, t he f or mer mount ed at t he f r ont of t he war head and
made up of a det ect or uni t , comput er sect i on, and cont r ol
uni t . The wi ng assembl y i s at t ached bot h t o a GP war head
and t o t he rear of t he bomb body t o provi de st abi l i t y and
i ncreased l i ft .
7
The l aser-gui dance syst em di rect s t he bomb
t owards a l aser spot refl ect ed from t he t arget and recei ved by
t he bombs det ect or. Thi s spot may be proj ect ed by t he del i v -
ery ai rcraft or, more commonl y, by anot her ai rcraft equi pped
wi t h a l aser desi gnat or (referred t o as buddy desi gnat i on) or
by a gr ound uni t .
GBU-10/ 1 0 Ia MK-84 2, 000 lb GP bomb modified for
l aser gui dance. A Paveway II vari ant , t he GBU-10I is
based on t he I-2000 (BLU-109) penet rat i on bomb, whi l e
t he GBU-10 comes i n bot h t he earl i er Paveway I and t he
Paveway II variants.
8
Duri ng t he Gul f War , F-15Es a nd
F-111s us ed GBU- 10/ 10I s ext ensi vel y, mai nl y agai nst
bri dges; Scud mi ssi l es ; and har dened command, cont r ol ,
communi cat i ons, and i nt el l i gence (C
3
I) nodes and bun-
kers. Duri ng Del i berat e Force onl y US ai rcraft used GBU-
10/ 10I s , wi t h most of t he 303 bombs (46 percent of al l
LGBs used) dr opped by F- 15Es and F- 16Cs from Aviano
Air Base (AB), Italy. The F-16Cs first combat use of LGBs
came wi t h t hei r empl oyment of t he GBU-10. NATO air -
craft rel eased onl y 252 GBU-10s over Bosnia-Herzegovina
agai nst br i dges, bunker s, and C
3
I nodes; F- 16s jettisoned
t he remai ni ng 51 i n t he Adri at i c Sea because weat her
SARGENT
259
obscurat i on i n t he t arget area prevent ed t he ai rcraft from
droppi ng t hem. The ai rcraft al so had t o j et t i son t o l i ght en
gross weight for divert fuel if the Aviano AB r unway hap-
pened to close.
GBU-12a US 500 l b MK-82 GP bomb wi t h an added
GBU/ Paveway I or II laser-guidance package.
9
Duri ng Des-
ert St orm, F- 111Fs , F-15Es, and A-6s employed GBU-
12s , most l y agai nst armored vehi cl es. Duri ng Del i berat e
For ce bot h t he Fr ench and t he Amer i cans dr opped t hese
bombs. Of t he 125 GBU-12s expended, French Mi rage
2000D/ Ks dropped 10 (t hei r fi rst combat use of LGBs),
and US ai rcraft dr opped t he r emai ni ng 115 agai nst var i-
ous soft -poi nt t arget s and some ar t i l l er y t ubes.
GBU-16a 1, 000 lb MK-83 GP bomb fitted with a Pave -
way II l aser-gui dance ki t . The GBU-16 i s normal l y associ-
at ed wi t h t he US Navy, US Marine Corps , and some NATO
count ri es; t he US Ai r Force (USAF) does not carry a 1, 000
l b GP bomb i n i t s i nvent ory. In Del i berat e Force, Spani sh,
British, and US ai rcraft dropped a t ot al of 215 GBU-16s .
Spani sh EF- 18s dropped 24 of t hese bombs; Bri t i sh Har-
rier GR-7s expended 48, typically in flights of two accom-
pani ed by a Jaguar GR-1 as t he buddy desi gnat or ; and
US Navy and Mar i ne F/ A-18C and D Hor net s dr opped t he
r emai ni ng 143.
GBU-24a 2, 000 l b GP bomb, ei t her an MK- 84 or a
BLU-109, modi fi ed wi t h a GBU/ Paveway III l ow-l evel
l aser - gui ded bomb ( LLLGB) package, wi t h i mpr oved
gui dance and f l i ght - cont r ol syst ems. The LLLGB wa s
desi gned f or empl oyment at hi gh speed and ver y l ow
a l t i t ude s t o i nc r e a s e s t a ndof f r a nge a nd r e duc e t he
l aunchi ng ai r cr af t s exposur e i n hi gh- t hr eat t ar get ar-
eas. Al t hough ai r cr af t i n t he Gul f War empl oyed nearl y
t wel ve hundr ed GBU- 24s ,
10
Del i ber at e For ce ai r cr af t r e-
l eased onl y si x, al l by F- 15Es and pr i mar i l y agai nst
br i dges . Des pi t e t he F- 15E ai rcrews preference for em-
pl oyi ng GBU-24s , t he deci si on t o use t hem came l at e i n
t he campai gn af t er encount er i ng pr obl ems wi t h t he ef-
fect i veness of GBU-10/ 10I s agai nst br i dges.
DELIBERATE FORCE
260
Laser-Guided Missile
Laser-guided missiles use gui dance syst ems si mi l ar t o t hose
on LGBs but at t ached t o ai r-t o-surface mi ssi l es i nst ead of
unpowered bombs. The onl y l aser-gui ded mi ssi l e us ed dur i ng
Del i berat e Force was t he French AS-30L. Mi r age 2000/ D/ Ks
fitted with laser pods for self-designation fired four of them.
El ectro-Opti cal / Infrared-Sensor-Gui ded Muni ti ons
AGM-65 Mavericka US-made 500 l b or 650 l b ai r-t o-sur-
face missile with a shaped-charge warhead designed for
attacking armored vehicles or other hardened targets. Prior
to launch, an EO- or IR-guided variant of the Maverick
missile must acquire its target, after which the missile
guides autonomously, providing tactical-standoff launch
and leave capability at beyond-visual ranges. The USAF
uses four AGM-65 variants: the EO (TV-sensor) AGM-65A
and B models as well as the IR-sensor AGM-65D and larger
G models.
11
The IR Mavericks can be sl aved t o onboard
aircraft sensors, permitting more rapid target acquisition,
i mpr oved t ar get i dent i f i cat i on, and i ncr eas ed l aunch
ranges. The IR sensor also allows use of the AGM-65 dur i ng
darkness, agai nst camoufl aged t arget s , and i n some ad-
verse weather conditions. During Deliberate Force, A-10s
fired all 23 of the Mavericks t hat were expended.
12
AGM-84E standoff land-attack missile (SLAM)a 1,385 lb
vari ant of t he US Navys Harpoon antiship mi ssi l e de-
si gned for st andoff st ri kes agai nst heavi l y defended l and
targets and ships in harbor. Developed with off-the-shelf
technology, the SLAM uses t he ai r f r ame, engi ne, and 488
lb warhead of the Harpoon missile, the imaging IR terminal-
guidance unit of the AGM-65D Maverick , t he dat al i nk
capabi l i t y of t he AGM-62 Wal l eye gl i de bomb, a nd a
Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver. The SLAM ha s
EO and IR vari ant s. In t he pri mary mode of operat i on,
t echni ci ans l oad t he t arget l ocat i on i nt o t he mi ssi l e pri or
t o l aunch, GPS pr ovi des mi dcour se gui dance updat es,
and seeker IR vi deo i mages provi de t ermi nal t arget acqui-
si t i on.
13
This specialized PGM has a l ong-range st andoff
SARGENT
261
capability with pinpoint accuracy. In Deliberate Force, carrie r-
based US Navy F/ A-18s fired 10 AGM-84Es against Bos -
nian Serb army (BSA) defenses around Banj a Luka.
GBU-15 modul ar gui ded- weapon syst ema USAF glide
bomb wi t h i nt erchangeabl e gui dance (EO or IR), fuzi ng,
and cont rol syst ems sel ect ed accordi ng t o t he needs of a
part i cul ar mi ssi on and fi t t ed t o ei t her an MK-84 2, 000 lb
GP bomb or a BLU-109 I-2000 penet rat or bomb. Thi s
AGM-65 Maverick
DELIBERATE FORCE
262
muni t i on i s desi gned for use agai nst hi ghl y defended,
hardened, hi gh-val ue fi xed t arget s by provi di ng great er
st andoff range t han a convent i onal LGB but wi t h t he
same accuracy. Aft er t he ai rcraft rel eases t he bomb t o-
wards t he t arget area, i t t ransmi t s dat al i nked TV or IR
i mages t hat l ocat e and i dent i fy t he t arget and speci fi c
aiming point. During Deliberate Force, airlifters delivered
25 GBU- 15s to Aviano AB, and USAF F- 15Es dropped
nine IR variants (five BLU-109 and four MK-84s) on sev-
eral key ai r-defense t arget s ar ound Banj a Luka .
Cruise Missile
The BMG-109 Tomahawk land-attack missile (TLAM), the US
Navys conventionally armed cruise missile for attacking la n d
t ar get s , i s car r i ed aboar d cr ui ser s, dest r oyer s, an d s ubma -
r i nes.
14
Wi t h a nomi nal range of si x hundred naut i cal mi l es and
powered by a turbofan engine following launch by a disposable
rocket booster, the TLAM i s a hi ghl y accura t e , aut onomousl y
gui ded weapon t hat navi gat es usi ng a t errain- cont our - mat chi ng
GBU-15
SARGENT
263
syst em. Thi s syst em compares st ored di gi t al ground i mages
wi t h act ual t errai n-fol l owi ng radar i mages t o det ermi ne t he
missiles position and make necessary course correct i ons. Aft er
i dent i fyi ng t he t arget , t he mi ssi l e fl i es over it or ini t iat es a
ver t i cal di ve and at t acks wi t h i t s 1, 000 l b high-explosive
(TLAM-C) or cluster-munition warhead (TLAM-D). On 10 Sep-
tember 1995, in support of NATO ai r operat i ons i n nort hwest
Bosnia , t he crui ser USS Normandy, afloat in the Adriatic Sea,
fired 13 TLAMs against integrated air defense system (IADS)
targets i n and around Banj a Luka. Although TLAMs represent ed
only 1.9 percent of all PGMs , their employment in support of
Deliberate Force represented several firsts: the first Tomahawks
used on Eur opean Command t heat er t arget s ; the first used in
an i nt egrat ed suppressi on of enemy air defenses (SEAD) mis -
si on wi t h coordi nat i on of t act i cal ai r operat i ons; and t he fi rst
used in direct support of NATO operation s.
15
Nonpreci si on Bombs
Nonpreci si on bombs fly unguided ballistic flight trajectories
(free fal l ) aft er rel ease from an ai rcraft . They i ncl ude GP
bombs wi t h hi gh- expl osi ve war heads and cl ust er bomb uni t s
(CBU), whi ch cont ai n a l ar ge number of smal l submuni t i ons
or bombl et s. Thei r accuracy depends on t he ski l l of an ai r -
cr ewman who uses an onboar d si ght i ng cue t o r el ease t he
weapon at t he proper poi nt so t hat t he t raj ect ory carri es i t t o
t he t arget or ai mi ng poi nt . Si nce t he weapon fal l s wi t hout
furt her gui dance aft er rel ease, ungui ded muni t i ons are gener -
al l y l ess accurat e t han gui ded ones. Nonpreci si on muni t i ons
account ed for more t han 90 percent of t he ordnance del i vered
i n Des er t St or m, but i n Del i ber at e For ce, NATO ai rcraft
dr opped 318 nonpr eci s i on muni t i onsl e s s t ha n ha l f t he
number of PGMs (table 9.2).
General-Purpose Bombs
MK-82a US- ma de 500 l b GP bomb cont ai ni ng 192
pounds of Tri t onal hi gh-expl osi ve fi l l er.
16
The Dut c h ,
Fr ench, and It al i an ai r forces dropped 175 MK-82s dur i ng
DELIBERATE FORCE
264
Del i berat e Force, account i ng for 55 percent of al l t he un-
gui ded bombs us ed.
MK-83a 1, 000 l b GP bomb cont ai ni ng 416 pounds of
explosive.
17
Aircraft from Britain, Italy, t he Uni t ed St at es ,
and Fr ance dropped a total of 99 MK-83 i r on bombs dur-
i ng Del i berat e Force, account i ng for 31 percent of al l un-
gui ded bombs.
MK-84a 2, 000 l b bomb, t he l argest used i n t he campai gn,
containing 945 pounds of explosive. F-16As of the Nether -
lands air force dropped 42 MK-84s during Deliberate Force,
accounting for 13 percent of all unguided bombs.
Cl uster Bomb Uni ts
Cluster-munition dispensers carry a large number of small
submunitions that distribute across a relatively wide area to fa -
cilitate attacks on targets such as infantry units; groups of vehi-
cles; antiaircraft artillery (AAA) or surface-to-air missile (SAM)
sites; and petroleum, oil, and lubricant facilities. The 960 lb CBU-
87B/ B consists of an SUU-65/B tactical-munitions dispenser plus
202 BLU-97A/B fragmentation and antiarmor submunitions.
18
Pl anners deci ded not t o use CBUs duri ng Del i berat e Force
because t hei r i naccur acy and wi de di sper si on pat t er n made
them likely to cause collateral damage. However, a USAF A-10A
Table 9.2
Deliberate Forces Nonprecision Bombs
Nation GP Bombs CBUs Total/Nation
MK-82 MK-83 MK-84 Total GPs
France 71 2 73 73
Germany 0 0
Italy 10 40 50 50
Netherlands 94 42 136 136
Spain 0 0
United Kingdom 47 47 47
United States 10 10 2 12
Total 175 99 42 316 2 318
Source: Extracted from Corona briefing slides, Lt Gen Michael Ryan, Headquarters AIRSOUTH, Naples, Italy,
subject: Munitions (right-side slide no. 45), 5 December 1995, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., H-3.
SARGENT
265
dropped two CBU-87s duri ng t he fi rst day of t he campai gn as a
result of a miscommunication with the combined air operations
center (CAOC). Evidently, on 30 August 1995, an A-10 (call sign
Speedy 37) conducting a close air support mission requested
clearance from the CAOC t o drop ordnance on a BSA artil -
lery/ m ortar position. Without regard to the aircrafts weapons
load, CAOC gave approval to expend the ordnance, so Speedy 37
dropped all of its weapons, including a pair of CBU-87s. They
scored a hit on the target but inflicted no collateral damage .
Other Muni ti ons
I n addi t i on t o gui ded and ungui ded bombs and mi ssi l es,
several ot her t ypes of ai r-t o-surface muni t i ons were used i n
Del i berat e Force, i ncl udi ng ant i radi at i on mi ssi l es, r ocket s,
and gun ammuni t i on.
AGM-88 HARMt he pri nci pal ant i radi at i on mi ssi l e used
by t he Uni t ed St at es and several other allied air forces for
SEAD missions. The HARM is designed to detect, home in on,
and destroy radar emitters such as early warning, a cqu i si t i on,
AGM-88 HARM
DELIBERATE FORCE
266
and t r acki ng r adar s operat i ng t hroughout a wi de range of
frequency bands. Duri ng Del i berat e Force, NATO HARM-
equi pped ai rcraft i ncl uded US Navy F/ A-18Cs and EA-
6Bs, US Mari ne Corps F/ A- 18Ds , USAF F-16 HARM Tar-
geting System (HTS) ai r cr af t , and Spani sh EF- 18s. A t ot al
of 56 HARMs were fired, 48 by US Navy and Mar i ne air -
craft , si x by t he F-16 HTS (t hei r fi rst combat use by F-
16s ), and t he remai ni ng t wo by Spai n s EF- 18s.
2.75-inch (70 mm) rockets ungui ded rocket s carri ed i n
under wi ng pods and mai nl y used i n Del i ber at e For ce by
USAF OA-10 ai rborne forward ai r cont rol l ers . These air -
craft used t wo t ypes i n t he campai gn: (1) whi t e phospho-
r ous (WP) rockets for marking targets with smoke for in -
coming strikers and (2) high-explosive (HE) rockets for
dest royi ng l i ght t arget s . A total of 187 WP
19
and 20 HE
rocket s
20
were fi red duri ng t he course of t he ai r campai gn.
Gunsinternally mounted cannons for air combat or straf-
ing. The A-10 and AC-130 gunshi ps normal l y use t hei r
guns as primary air-to-ground weapons; only these aircraft
made si gni fi cant use of guns duri ng Del i berat e Force. The
A-10 carri es a GAU-8/ A Avengera 30 mm, seven-barrel,
Gatling-type cannon designed for attacking tanks and other
2.75-inch rocket
SARGENT
267
ar mor ed vehi cl es. The Avenger magazi ne hol ds up t o
1, 350 rounds of ammuni t i on, normal l y a mi x of armor-
piercing incendiary and HE incendiary shells. Unfortu-
nately, during the first day of the campaign, two A-10s
experienced GAU-8 jams while strafing ground targets. An
inspection revealed ammunition j ammed i n t he gun cham-
bers. Suspecting a bad lot of ammunition, crews replaced all
of the A-10s ammunition with new ammunition, eliminating
any further incidents.
21
A-10s fired a total 10,086 rounds,
strafing such targets as armored vehicles, trucks, and bun-
kers with remarkable precision.
22
The AC-130 Spectre gun-
ship carries a variety of 20 mm and 40 mm rapid-fire can-
nons and a 105 mm M-102 howitzer that fires from the left
side of the aircraft. During Deliberate Force, AC-130s at-
tacked a variety of targets with impressive accuracy, firing 50
rounds of 40 mm and 350 rounds of 105 mm ammuni t i on.
Nonmuni t i on It ems of Int erest
The tactical air-launched decoy (TALD), an expendabl e US
Navy and Mar i ne unpowered-drone gl i de vehi cl e, usual l y i s
Loading an A-10s cannon
DELIBERATE FORCE
268
l a unc he d by a n F- 14 Tomc a t, F/ A- 18 Hor net , or EA- 6B
Prowler t o conf use enemy r adar s. The dr one has a r adar -
cr os s - s ect i on- enhancement payl oad and/ or an el ect r oni c-
count er measur es- enhancement payl oad. Bot h enhancement s
creat e mul t i pl e fal se t arget s for t hreat radars whi l e t he TALD
fl i es a wi de spect rum of mi ssi on profi l es, i ncl udi ng vari at i ons
i n speed, range, and al t i t ude.
23
Duri ng Del i berat e Force, US
Navy ai rcraft l aunched a t ot al of 47 TALDs agai nst t he Bos -
ni an Ser b IADS.
24
US aircraft t hat penet rat ed and operat ed i n Bosni an ai r s pace
had t o have an operabl e chaff-and-fl are di spenser sys t em for
self-defense. Chaff bundl es , di s pens ed manually or according
t o a preset program, enhance decept i on when ai rcraft penet rat e
a r adar net wor k and pr ovi de el ect r oni c- count er measur es self-
prot ect i on when a radar-homi ng, ai r-t o-ai r mi ssi l e or SAM
t racks or at t acks t he ai rcraft .
25
During Deliberate Force, Aviano-
based US ai rcraft equi pped wi t h AN/ ALE di spensers used
10, 922 RR- 170/ A chaf f cart ri dges.
26
The t wo most common
US decoy flares ar e t he MJU- 7/ B, used on f i ght er s, and t he
MJU- 10/ B, used by l ar ger ai r cr af t such as t he AC- 130 or
B-52.
27
Dur i ng t he oper at i on, 1, 591 MJU- 7s and 89 MJU- 10s
lit the skies over Bosnia .
28
Muni ti ons Not Used
Al t hough t he demand f or pr eci si on muni t i ons r emai ned
hi gh duri ng Del i berat e Force, not al l PGMs i n-t heat er or ot her -
wise available to Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH)
were used. Most of t hese have t i es wi t h a part i cul ar weapons
pl at form. For exampl e, a hundred GBU-27 2, 000 l b LGBs de-
si gned for t he F-117 Ni ght hawk sat idle in Avianos bomb
dumps because t he I t al i an gover nment deni ed per mi ssi on f or
F-117 basing. Similarly, USAF B-52s di d not empl oy ai r -
l aunched cr ui se mi ssi l es and Have Nap ai r-t o-surface mi s -
siles . Further, the US Navy had addi t i onal PGM capability in
the form of AGM-62B Walleye EO-guided bombs, AGM- 65E/ F
l aser-gui ded Maveri cks, and AGM-123A Ski pper l aser-gui ded
gl i de bombs but chose not t o empl oy t hem.
SARGENT
269
If all the combined NATO forces had possessed PGM capa -
bility, Gen Michael Ryan, commander of Allied Air Forces
Sout her n Eur ope, and hi s st af f woul d not have pl anned t o use
any GP bombs or cl ust er muni t i ons i n t he campai gn. Thus, i t
i s not sur pr i si ng t hat many nonpr eci si on muni t i ons went un-
used. However, NATO aircraft without PGM capabi l i t y had t he
t ask of st ri ki ng vi sual -at t ack-area t arget s (t hose wi t h a l ow
probability of collateral damage) wi t h GP bombs . Later, to
ensur e t ar get dest r uct i on, a PGM mi ssi on fol l owed up on
t hese st r i kes because of t he l ess- t han- opt i mal accur acy of un-
gui ded bombi ng. The onl y nonpreci si on muni t i on consi dered
for use t owards t he end of Del i berat e Force (around 13 Sep-
t ember 1995) was t he CBU- 89 Gat or mi ne f or ar ea deni al and
f unnel i ng of t r oops and equi pment dur i ng BSA wi t hdr awal s.
Pl anner s deci ded not t o empl oy t he muni t i on, however, be-
cause of t he cease-fi re and t he desi r e t o avoi d noncombat ant
casual t i es , fratricide, and damage t o ci vi l i an vehi cl es.
Finally, because of Deny Flights ai r supr emacy a nd i n t he
absence of any chal l enge from Bosni an Serb MiGs, allied air -
craft fired no air-to-air missiles duri ng Del i berat e Force. Si mi-
l arl y, al t hough most coal i t i on fi ght ers carri ed 20 mm t o 30
mm cannons, t hey di d not use t hem f or st r af i ng.
Weapons Issues
The preponderant usage of PGMs i n Del i berat e Force i ndi-
cat es t hat accuracy pl ayed a key rol e i n t he empl oyment of
combat ai rpower by t he combi ned forcesespeci al l y by US
j oi nt ai r forces. Preci si on weaponry al l owed for a robust opera -
t i ons t empo, reduct i on of ri sks t o ai rcrews, and degradat i on of
BSA capabi l i t y wi t h mi ni mal col l at eral damage . PGMs made
t he Bal kans ai r campai gn possi bl e, al l owi ng a rel at i vel y smal l
force with limited objectives to have operational and strategic
effects in a limited time.
Preci si on versus Nonpreci si on Weapons
Overall, the PGM to non-PGM ratio in Deliberate Force was a
rel at i vel y hi gh 2. 3: 1, compared t o a rat i o of onl y 1: 11. 5 duri ng
the Gulf War air campaign. The heavy reliance on PGMs reflects
DELIBERATE FORCE
270
t he concern of General Ryan and hi s st aff for preci si on accu -
racy and avoi dance of col l at eral damage , whereas i n t he Gul f
War , col l at eral damage became a concern onl y i n at t acki ng a
l i mi t ed number of t arget s, part i cul arl y around Baghdad. More-
over, in Desert Storm the strike mix became an issue of tactical-
bombi ng accur acy bet ween s mar t pl at f or ms empl oyi ng
dumb bombs as opposed t o dumb pl at forms empl oyi ng smart
bombs.
29
Learning from PGM use i n Deser t St or m, Del i berat e
Force pl anners t ri ed t o t ake t he dumb out of t he equat i on as
much as possi bl e, rel yi ng on smart pl at forms empl oyi ng smart
bombs t o provi de pi npoi nt accuracy. As ment i oned above, how-
ever, some smart pl at forms wi t h dumb bombs or vi ce versa
at t acked l ow-ri sk, vi sual -at t ack-area t arget s where col l at eral
damage was not a concer n.
Most of t he al l i ed pl at forms and weapons i n Del i berat e
Force enj oyed t he benefi t s of advanced t echnol ogi es t hat be-
gan i n t he l at t er st ages of t he Vi et nam War. Si nce t he Gul f
War, t he number of smar t ai r cr af t t hat can dr op and t er mi-
nal l y gui de l aser and IR weapons has i ncreased. Most not abl y,
t he F- 15E, F-16C Bl ocks 40 and 50, F-16 HTS , F/ A-18D, and
F-14D can al l desi gnat e t hei r own PGMs. Al t hough t hese ai r -
craft, with their digital-electronic navigation, weapon-delivery
syst ems, and sensor s, have gr own smar t er , t he weapons and
i nt erface wi t h t he ai rcraft have not kept pace. As di scussed
above, smart pl at forms i nt erfaci ng wi t h smart weapons st i l l
have t hei r share of probl ems: (1) most ai rcraft can del i ver al l
muni t i ons, but onl y cert ai n ai rcraft can provi de t ermi nal gui d -
ance; (2) dedicating PGMs t o part i cul ar ai rcraft l i mi t s t hei r
utility; (3) retrofitting precision munitions t o exi st i ng ai rframes
causes vari ous anomal i es i n soft ware and ai rframe i nt eroper -
abi l i t y; and (4) t he cost of smart t echnol ogi es l i mi t s t hei r
quant i t y. Needl ess t o say, t hese const rai nt s t i e cert ai n ai rcraft
t o speci fi c rol es, creat i ng di ffi cul t i es i n a 24-hour ai r-t aski ng
cycl e, as wel l as compl i cat i ng t act i cal consi derat i ons for t hei r
empl oyment .
Despi t e t he probl ems of PGMs, their high probability of hit -
t i ng t he t arget , compared t o t he performance of nonpreci si on
weapons, cr eat es i mpor t ant r esul t s at t he oper at i onal and
strategic levels. Force-multiplier benefits derived from PGM
usage i ncl ude bet t er probabi l i t y of ki l l ; more t arget damage
SARGENT
271
wi t h fewer bombs; fewer sort i es and l ess fuel consumpt i on;
and, most i mport ant l y, enhancement of survi vabi l i t y by pro -
vi di ng some st andoff capabi l i t y, t hereby reduci ng t he ri sk t o
ai r cr ews and pl at f or ms.
Clearly, PGMs are t he wave of t he fut ure, refl ect i ng t he
pri nci pl es of Joi nt Vi si on 2010. Preci si on engagement i s a
core compet ency t hat di rect l y l i nks t he core compet enci es of
the Air Force to joint military operations. In Joint Vision
2010, [former] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen.
John Shal i kashvi l i t er ms pr eci si on engagement one of four
operat i onal concept s t hat j oi nt forces wi l l need t o domi nat e an
adversary i n any confl i ct duri ng t he next cent ury. Accordi ng
t o Gen Ronal d R. Fogl eman, former Air Force chief of staff,
t he essence of preci si on engagement i s t he abi l i t y t o appl y
selective force against specific targets and achi eve di scret e
and di scri mi nant effect s.
30
On appl yi ng t hi s concept t hrough
t he medi um of ai r and space t oday and i n t he fut ure, Fogl e -
ma n not ed t hat our forces wi l l be more preci se and more
effect i ve, at day or ni ght , i n good weat her or bad, whet her
delivering food or lethal ordnance. Technology has dr i ven each
mi l i t ary eras defi ni t i on of preci si on. . . . In t he 21st cent ury, i t
wi l l be possi bl e t o fi nd, fi x or t rack and t arget anyt hi ng t hat
moves on t he sur f ace of t he ear t h. . . . Thi s i s an emer gi ng
reality that will dramatically change the conduct of warfare and
the role of air and space power.
31
In reference to future global
conflicts, former secretary of the Air Force Sheila E. Widnall
observed that the Air Force of the 21st century must offer
options for the employment of force in measured but effective
doses. To do so, the Air Force will rely on global awareness
capabilities to support national decision-making and joint op-
erations to determine military objectives and enable precise tar -
geting. . . . Air and space forces will then apply power that is no
less overwhelming because it is also discriminating.
32
Because preci si on engagement will save the lives of friends,
foes, and civilians by limiting collateral damage , the Air Force
core compet ency of preci si on engagement, i dent i fi ed as such i n
Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force, will
remai n a t op pri ori t y i n t he next cent ury. It j oi ns ai r and
space superiority, global attack, rapid global mobility, informa-
DELIBERATE FORCE
272
t i on superi ori t y and agi l e combat support as one of t he funda -
ment al capabi l i t i es t hat t he Ai r Force provi des t he nat i on.
33
If Del i berat e Force i ndeed set a precedent for t he use of
PGMs i n fut ure confl i ct s, what about t he fat e of nonpreci si on
weapons delivered by aircraft? Given a limited conflict that is
anyt hi ng short of anot her real war l i ke t he one wi t h Iraq,
General Ryan, Del i berat e Forces combi ned force ai r compo-
nent commander , answer ed t hat quest i on by opi ni ng t hat
dumb bombs are dead!
34
Shortage of 24-Hour, Al l -Weather Standoff Weapons
Rei t erat i ng t he concern of Gen Bust er Gl osson, US air com-
ponent commander i n t he Gul f War, General Ryan expressed
genui ne concern for hi s ai rmen, bel i evi ng t hat no t arget i s
wort h a l oss of l i fe. Just as t he obsessi on t o negat e col l at eral
damage drove t he usage of PGMs, so di d concern for t he sur-
vi val of ai rcrews and ai rcraft agai nst an ever present BSA
t hreat dri ve t he need for st andoff PGM capabi l i t y t o ensure
t hat st ri ke ai rcraft remai ned out si de of harms way when t hey
at t acked t hei r t ar get s. Ai r supr emacy and i ngr ess/ egr ess al t i -
t udes above 10, 000 feet mi ni mi zed much of t he ri sk t o ai r -
crews by avoi di ng fi re from smal l arms and most AAA a nd
man-port abl e SAMs . However, even at medi um al t i t udes, t he
t hreat of hi ghl y defended t arget s requi red a change i n t act i cs
for exi st i ng muni t i ons and drove t he desi re for st andoff weap-
ons t o avoi d overfl i ght of t he t arget area. Tact i cs evol ved
around exi st i ng ai rcraft syst ems and weapons capabi l i t y.
To avoi d di rect overfl i ght , t act i ci ans devi sed dynami c ma-
neuvers wi t h some degree of st andoff t o accompl i sh t he mi s -
si on wi t h PGMs . For exampl e, F- 16s empl oyi ng GBU-10s
would miniloft (climb five to 10 degrees) at the release point,
four t o fi ve naut i cal mi l es from t he t arget , and crank (t urn
40 degrees off t he at t ack headi ng) away from t he t arget whi l e
l asi ng duri ng t he bombs t i me of fal l . These empl oyment t ac-
tics offered some standoff from short -range SAMs and r adar -
directed AAA. Aircraft could counter long-range SAM t hr eat s
by poppi ng up from t errai n maski ng t o pl ace t he rel ease poi nt
inside the SAMs mi ni mum engagement range. However, be-
cause ai rcraft i n Del i berat e Force operat ed at medi um rat her
SARGENT
273
t han l ow al t i t udes, t hey woul d f i nd t hemsel ves i n t he SAM-
engagement envel ope unl ess t hey used el ect roni c count ermea -
s ur es or, bet t er yet , st ayed out si de t he SAMs range.
Generically considering SAM t hr eat s f or medi um- al t i t ude
ingress, some SAM syst ems can engage t act i cal ai rcraft at
ranges of more t han 40 naut i cal mi l es. The maj ori t y of preci -
s i on bombs and mi ssi l es of f er l i mi t ed st andof f capabi l i t y
agai nst a sophi st i cat ed and r edundant I ADS. The probl em
with the USAF s GBU-15 modul ar gui ded- weapon syst em and
the US Navys AGM-84 SLAM ext ended-st andoff capabi l i t y is
that only a few aircraft are capable of employing them. Also,
because t hei r cost l i mi t s t he si ze of i nvent ori es, combat and
t rai ni ng experi ence on t hei r empl oyment i s rel at i vel y con -
st rai ned. In an at t empt t o overcome t he l ack of al l -weat her ,
tactical standoff weapons, we now use st r at egi c asset s em-
pl oyi ng l ong-range convent i onal crui se mi ssi l es s uc h a s t he
B-52s Have Naps, ai r-l aunched crui se mi ssi l es , and AGM-
130s as well as the US Navys TLAMs . Unfort unat el y, t hese
preci si on weapons are expensi ve, requi re l ong cycl e t i mes, and
have smal l payl oads.
Because of t he hi gh cost and l i mi t ed number s of cr ui se
mi ssi l es, low-observable-technology or stealth pl at forms l i ke
t he F-117 Ni ght hawk wi t h i t s GBU-27s became a sol ut i on t o
the problem of surgically attacking IADS and st r at egi c t ar -
gets at medi um t o hi gh al t i t udes. St eal t h offers survivability
while overflying the target(s) and employing PGMs with pin -
poi nt accur acy. As a nat i onal asset , t he F- 117 requi res ap -
proval from t he Nat i onal Command Aut hori t i es for depl oyment
ar ound t he wor l d, necessi t at i ng advanced pl anni ng t o i nt e -
grat e t he ai rcraft i nt o an ai r campai gn i n a t i mel y manner. As
ment i oned above, t he It al i an government t hwart ed t he use of
F-117s i n Del i berat e Force, so General Ryans onl y al t erna-
tives were GBU-15s , SLAMs, and TLAMs.
Al t hough we l earned about t he l i mi t ed avai l abi l i t y of 24-
hour, al l -weat her st andof f weapons from the Gulf War , we had
t o rel earn t he l esson nearl y fi ve years l at er i n Del i berat e Force.
For t unat el y, F- 15Es are on-l i ne, F-117s and B- 2s are still
avai l abl e, and F-22s ar e i n t he near f ut ur e; somewhat f ur t her
out lies the possibility of the joint strike fighter . Additionally,
as t he t went y- f i r st cent ur y appr oaches, new st andof f weapons
DELIBERATE FORCE
274
l ook promi si ng. Si nce Desert St orm we have begun t he j oi nt
devel opment or operat i onal t est and eval uat i on of several new
st andoff weapon syst ems, i ncl udi ng t he j oi nt di r ect - at t ack
muni t i on , the joint standoff weapon , t he j oi nt ai r-t o-surface
st andoff mi ssi l e, and t he l ow- cost aut onomous at t ack syst em.
The former t wo are current l y cont ract ed and undergoi ng op-
erat i onal t est and eval uat i on, whi l e t he l at t er t wo are prot o -
t ypes under consi derat i on for acqui si t i on i n t he near fut ure.
This new generation of standoff-weapon technologies will have
fl exi bi l i t y wi t hi n a 24-hour ai r-t aski ng schedul e; adapt abi l i t y
t o exi st i ng pl at forms; t rue al l -weat her , day/ ni ght capabi l i t y;
aut onomous cont rol and navi gat i on t o t he t arget aft er rel ease
f r om hi gh, medi um, or l ow al t i t udes; i ncr eased st andof f ;
enough accuracy t o mi ni mi ze col l at eral damage; and t he capa -
bi l i t y t o hi t bot h fi xed and mobi l e t arget s.
These new st andoff weapons wi l l support t he j oi nt capabi l i t y
of preci si on engagement worldwide. However, like most preci-
si on weaponry, st andoff muni t i ons requi re effect i ve command
and cont r ol as well as precise intelligence , survei l l ance, and
r econnai ssance me a s ur e s t o e ns ur e a c c ur a t e e mpl oyme nt
agai nst t arget s and t o provi de di scri mi nat i on for mi ni mi zi ng
col l at eral damage. I n t he meant i me we must mai nt ai n and
upgr ade pr esent ai r cr af t , cont i nue t o use st eal t h as s et s , and
use al l avai l abl e crui se mi ssi l es (not just TLAMs). Further -
more, crui se mi ssi l es used i n an aut onomous si ngl e- at t ack
mode offer effectiveness against both critical point targets and a
wi del y di spersed t arget set (i . e. , a l arge number of ai mi ng
points)perhaps an important consideration for future air op-
erations. Until the new generation of weapons becomes avail -
abl e, combi ned/ j oi nt ai r component commanders faced with
overcoming a complex IADS must seriously consider all available
standoff weapons and plan well ahead for their employment.
Not es
States Air Force, vol . 1, Mar ch 1992, 6.
2. Briefing slides, Lt Gen Michael Ryan, commander of Allied Air Forces
Southern Europe (COMAIRSOUTH), subject: NATO Air Operations in Bosni a-
Herzegovina, Deliberate Force, October 1995, US Air Force Historical Re -
search Agency (hereinafter AFHRA), Maxwell AFB, Ala., CAOC-13.
SARGENT
275
3. Ibi d.
4. Maj Tim Reagan, USAF/SAA (Studies and Analyses Agency), Charac-
teristics of Deliberate Force, draft report, n. d. , 4, AFHRA, SAGC-03.
5. Evaluation of the Air War, 96-10, US Government Accounting Of-
fice/PEMD (Program Evaluation and Methodology Division) report to con -
gr essi onal r equest er s, Oper at i on Deser t St or m, Jul y 1996, 4, AFHRA,
K168. 310-120. (Secret ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s uncl assi fi ed.
6. AFM 1-1, vol. 2, 92.
7. Fl i ght Manual , Techni cal Order 1-1M-34, Aircrew Weapons Delivery
Manual Non-Nuclear, 31 May 1991, 1-29. (Secret) Information extracted is
uncl assi fi ed.
8. Ibid. , 1-25. (Secret ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s uncl assi fi ed.
9. The t wo generat i ons of GBU-10/ 12 LGBs i ncl ude t he Paveway I wi t h
fixed wings and the Paveway II with folding wings. Paveway II variants have
the following improvements over Paveway I: 30 percent greater field of view,
i ncreased det ect or sensi t i vi t y, reduced t hermal bat t ery del ay aft er rel ease,
i ncreased maxi mum canard defl ect i on, and addi t i onal l aser-codi ng opt i ons.
10. Thomas A. Keaney and El i ot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey,
vol. 5, A Statistical Compendium and Chronology (Washi ngt on, D. C. : Depart -
ment of t he Ai r Force, 1993), t abl e 201, Desert Shi el d/ St orm: USAF Weap-
ons Cost and Ut i l i zat i on, June 1993, 578.
11. Flight Manual, Technical Order 1-1M-34, 1-46. (Secret) Information
12. Although only 23 Maverick shots were reported, Deny Flight logistics
report s of t he 7490t h Composi t e Wi ng (Provi si onal ) from 28 August t o 13
Sept ember 1995 showed a decrease of 60 Maveri ck mi ssi l es i n t hei r muni-
tions inventorya difference of 37 missiles, AFHRA, AVI-05/06. The Maver -
i ck breakout from t he report s i s as fol l ows: 49 AGM-65A/ Bs, ei ght AGM-
6 5 Ds , a n d t h r e e AGM- 6 5 Gs . S e e a l s o 7 4 9 0 t h Co mp o s i t e Wi n g
(Provi si onal )/ DFOC (Deny Fl i ght Operat i ons Cent er), memorandum t o com -
mander, 7490t h Composi t e Wi ng (Provi si onal ), subj ect : Del i berat e Force, 22
Sept ember 1995, for l i st ed muni t i on expendi t ures of 14 AGM-65Gs and
seven AGM-65Ds for a total of 21, not 23, Mavericks shot. At the time of
t hi s wri t i ng, no record exi st s of how many Maveri cks of what t ype were
act ual l y expended or r et ur ned f or mai nt enance.
13. Keaney and Cohen, vol. 4, Weapons, Tactics, and Training, and Space
Operations (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), pt . 1, 80.
14. Sci ence Appl i cat i ons Int ernat i onal Corporat i on, Tomahawk Effec -
tiveness in the War with Iraq, 22 April 1991, 3, AFHRA, Gulf War Airpower
Survey (GWAPS) Archives, NA-28.
15. Message, 111946Z Sep 95, commander, US Si xt h Fl eet t o com -
mander i n chi ef, European Command, subj ect : Del i berat e Force Post -TLAM
St ri ke Report , 11 Sept ember 1995, 4. (Secret ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s un-
classified.
16. Flight Manual, Technical Order 1-1M-34, 1-13, 1-14. (Secret) Infor -
DELIBERATE FORCE
276
18. Ibi d. , 1-86. (Secret ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s uncl assi fi ed.
19. Thi s fi gure represent s t he di fference bet ween t he 7490t h Composi t e
Wi ng (Provi si onal ) uni t l ogi st i cs report s of 28 August 1995 and t he uni t
l ogi st i cs report s i nvent ori es of 13 Sept ember 1995, AFHRA, AVI-05/ 06.
20. Ext ract ed from Corona bri efi ng sl i des, Lt Gen Mi chael Ryan, Head-
quarters AIRSOUTH, Naples, Italy, subject: Munitions (right-side slide no.
45), 5 December 1995, AFHRA, H-3.
21. Message, 301245Z Aug 95, 31st Fi ght er Wi ng t o Uni t ed St at es Ai r
Forces i n Europe AOS (Ai r Operat i ons Support ), 30 August 1995, 2.
22. Corona bri efi ng sl i des.
23. Capt Jeff Hodgon, Drones, AFHRA GWAPS Archives, TF2-64-602,
3-4. (Secret ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s uncl assi fi ed.
24. Corona bri efi ng sl i des.
25. Fl i ght Manual , Techni cal Order 1-1M-34. (Secret ) Informat i on ex-
26. Thi s fi gure represent s t he di fference bet ween t he 7490t h Composi t e
Wi ng (Provi si onal ) uni t l ogi st i cs report s of 28 August 1995 and t he uni t
27. Fl i ght Manual , Techni cal Order 1-1M-34. (Secret ) Informat i on ex-
28. These fi gures represent t he di fference bet ween t he 7490t h Compos -
ite Wing (Provisional) unit logistics reports of 28 August 1995 and the unit
29. A smart pl at form cont ai ns t he di gi t al -el ect roni c hardware and t he
soft ware requi red t o i dent i fy a t hree-di mensi onal muni t i ons rel ease poi nt i n
space from whi ch a bal l i st i c dumb bomb wi l l free-fal l and hi t t he i nt ended
i mpact poi nt . A smart bomb/ mi ssi l e i s capabl e of i nt ernal or ext ernal sen -
sor gui dance t o t he i mpact poi nt ; t her ef or e, i n t he case of a dumb bomb,
t he desi red rel ease poi nt need not be sat i sfi ed. Keaney and Cohen, vol . 4,
pt . 1, pp. 8586.
30. Precision Engagement Reflects Joint Vision 2010, Air Force News
Servi ce, 22 January 1997; on-l i ne, Int ernet , 23 January 1997, avai l abl e
f r om ht t p: / / www. af . mi l / news / J an1997/ n19970122_970075. ht ml .
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Gen Mi chael Ryan, i nt ervi ewed by Lt Col Chri s Campbel l and Maj
Mark McLaughl i n, Col l ege of Aerospace Doct ri ne Research and Educat i on,
Maxwel l AFB, Al a. , 7 February 1996.
SARGENT
277
Chapt er 10
Del i berate Force Targeti ng
Thi s chapt er revi ews t he evol ut i on of Del i berat e Force t arget
lists from concept i on t o execut i on. It summari zes t he hi st ory
of t arget i ng duri ng t he operat i on, di scusses t arget i ng opt i ons
agai nst t he Bosni an Serb army (BSA) , exami nes t he desi red
mean point of impact (DMPI) met hodol ogy, and consi ders cer -
t ai n t ar get i ng i ssues.
Hi story of Del i berate Force Targeti ng
In t he t wo years pri or t o Del i berat e Force, pl anners at Allied
Air Forces Southern Europe (AIRSOUTH) pr oduced numer ous
t ar get set s i n rel at i on t o vari ous pl ans for i nt ervent i on i n t he
Bosni an confl i ct . The most i mport ant of t hese product s were
t he Del i ber at e For ce mast er t ar get base, t he Joi nt Tar get
Board (JTB) approved t arget l i st, and t he Deadeye and Del i b -
erat e Force t arget l i st s.
Master Target Base
With the establishment of the United Nations (UN) saf e ar eas
on 8 August 1993, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
ai r pl anner s began a cont i nuous ai r-pl anni ng process t o cover
a wi de vari et y of act i ons agai nst any Bosni an group t hat mi ght
at t ack one of t hese areas. For most of t hat peri od, t arget i ng
was a piecemeal process driven by functional categories con -
nect ed t o t he safe areas . AIRSOUTH pl anner s divided targets
identified by this evolutionary process into six categories :
Cat egory Oneprel i mi nary preparat i on (suppressi on of
enemy air defenses [SEAD]).
Cat egory Twomi l i t ary uni t s, posi t i ons, and equi pment
such as gun posi t i ons and t r oop concent r at i ons i n t he
safe area (later, zone of action [ZOA]).
279
Category Threemi l i t ar y- uni t posi t i ons and equi pment
not i n t he saf e ar ea / ZOA (e.g., logistics r esuppl y and
command and cont rol [C
2
] at t he t act i cal and oper at i onal
levels).
Category Fourmi l i t ar y i nf r ast r uct ur e/ i nst al l at i ons t hat
provi de support out si de t he safe area / ZOA (e. g. , ammo
depot s, base-suppl y depot s, ai rfi el ds, et c. ).
Category Fiveci vi l i an i nf r ast r uct ur e/ i nst al l at i ons t hat
pr ovi de suppor t i n t he saf e ar ea/ ZOA (e. g. , armament
factories, electricity stations, bridges, etc. ).
Category Six command, cont r ol , and communi cat i ons
(C
3
) i nfrast ruct ure at t he st rat egi c l evel .
1
AIRSOUTH desi gnat ed t he t arget s assi gned t o t hese cat ego -
r i es as t he mast er t ar get base, whi ch event ual l y i ncl uded 444
t arget s. In t he event of act ual ai r operat i ons, AIRSOUTH pl an-
ner s i nt ended t o draw t arget s out of t hi s base, dependi ng on
t he ci rcumst ances, and st ri ke t hem i n order of pri ori t y unt i l
t he campai gn ended or t he subj ect of t hose at t acks fel l back
i nt o l i ne. The mast er t ar get base al so provi ded t he foundat i on
for the JTBs approved t arget l i st and t he Deadeye and Delib -
erat e Force l i st s.
Joi nt Target Board Target Li st
Following the NATO air strikes against Udbina Airfield in
November 1994, NATO and UN political leaders authorized
Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) t o devel op pl ans
for retrospective SEAD st ri kes i n ret al i at i on for at t acks by
Bosni an fact i ons on i nt ervent i oni st ai rcraft . Pri or t o t hat t i me,
t he st andi ng r ul es of engagement allowed only reactive strikes
agai nst ai r defense syst ems act ual l y i n t he act of at t acki ng
NATO ai r uni t s.
2
In December 1995 t he Nort h At l ant i c Counci l
authorized AFSOUTH t o begi n pl anni ng a st and-al one SEAD
campai gn i n addi t i on t o pl anni ng for SEAD oper at i ons i n di-
rect support of Operat i on Deny Fl i ght.
3
Thi s st and- al one pl an
became Deadeye, an ai r campai gn agai nst t he Bosni an Ser b
Republic s integrated air defense system (IADS). It also pro-
vi ded an i mport ant el ement of t he pl anni ng t hat went i nt o
Deliberate Force itself.
DELIBERATE FORCE
280
Pl anni ng f or a r obust , gr aduat ed ai r campai gn agai nst t he
Bosni an Ser bs, support ed by Deadeye , began i n ear nest i n t he
summer of 1995. On 2 June, t he day of t he shoot down of
Basher 52, a US Ai r Force F-16 pat rol l i ng Bosni an ai rspace,
Col Daniel Zoerb, director of the AIRSOUTH Deny Fl i ght op -
er at i ons cel l , and hi s pl anni ng st aff bri efed t hei r t arget i ng
pl an for t he ai r campai gn t o Lt Gen Mi chael Ryan , t he com-
mander of AIRSOUTH (COMAIRSOUTH). Zoerb s t at ed t hat t he
campai gn obj ect i ve was t o adversel y al t er BSA advant age t o
conduct mi l i t ary operat i ons agai nst t he Bi H [Bosni an army],
with a phase-one objective of isolat[ing] leadership.
4
Zoerb
advocat ed t arget i ng t he BSAs heavy weapons (art i l l ery great er
t han 100 mm, mor t ar s gr eat er t han 82 mm, and t anks ) , C
2
a n d C
3
networks and facilities, early warning (EW) net wor ks,
and key l i nes of communi cat i ons (LOC), as wel l as i sol at i ng
t he l eader shi p.
As J une pr ogr es s ed, pl anner s al so refi ned AIRSOUTHs
mast er t arget l i st for a possi bl e ai r campai gn i n t he summer of
1995, reviewed the SEAD pl an, and st udi ed t he LOCs us e d by
t he BSA t o move forces around t he front . Meanwhi l e, a Pent a -
gon pl anni ng t hi nk-t ank st aff cal l ed Checkmat e at Headquar -
ters US Air Force assi st ed i n t hi s pr ocess by pr ovi di ng an
outside review and refinement of AIRSOUTHs pl ans.
5
The JTB l i st evol ved from t hese pl anni ng event s i n t he
heat ed at mosphere t hat preceded Del i berat e Force. On 1 Au -
gust 1995, t he Nort h At l ant i c Counci l aut hori zed safe-area -
prot ect i on ai r at t acks agai nst t arget s t hr oughout t he wi der
ZOAs identified previously to guide Deadeye pl anni ng. AIR-
SOUTH immediately developed a target grid that identified
overl appi ng t arget set s t o be st ruck i n prot ect i on of speci fi c
safe areas .
6
On 10 August 1995, at a meet i ng i n Zagreb, Croa -
tia , Colonel Zoerb briefed the JTB on al l t he t arget s identified
for all four safe areas within the ZOAs (table 10.1).
7
The board,
whi ch consi st ed of General Ryan ; Lt Gen Rupert Smi t h , com-
mander of United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR); and
other senior NATO ai r commanders, approved 155 of t he 168
t ar get s nomi nat ed by Zoer b. The JTB t hen f or war ded t hi s r ec-
ommended list to Adm Leighton W. Smith , commander i n
chief of Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH), and Lt
Gen Ber nar d Janvi er , t he UN mi l i t ary commander, for fi nal
SARGENT
281
appr oval and coor di nat i on wi t h Gen Geor ge Joul wan, Su -
preme Al l i ed Commander Europe.
8
On 14 August 1995, t he
JTB t arget l i st recei ved formal approval .
The deci si on of 14 August al so del i neat ed t he boundari es of
ZOAs covering all of Bosnia and t he safe areas or total exclu -
sion zones (TEZ) assi gned t o t hem (fi g. 10. 1). The nort hwest
ZOA i ncl uded Bi hac and t he Banj a Luka airfield. The south -
east ZOA i ncl uded Saraj evo , Gorazde, Zepa , and Pal e . The
Tuzla TEZ, which NATO ai r pl anner s viewed as a swing ZOA,
encompassed SEAD t arget s t hat woul d be hi t i n t he event of
attacks in either of the other two ZOAs . Despite the delineation
of ZOA boundari es, whi ch mai nl y gui ded prepl anned st ri kes,
NATO pl anner s expect ed t o st ri ke any ai r defense syst em t hat
act i vel y t hreat ened or at t acked i nt ervent i oni st ai rcraft .
9
The ZOA targets were driven by functional categories con nected
to the TEZs . NATO would attack functional target categories only
to the depth required to achieve the desired resul t sand no
more (proport i onal response). The only exception to the ZOA
t argeting rule was IADS attack. Since SEAD was not connect ed
Table 10.1
Safe-Area Target Sets
Gorazde Sarajevo Tuzla Bihac Totals
C
2
3 3 3 3 12
Supporting
LOCs
8 11 10 5 34
Direct and
Essential
Support
12 17 13 8 50
Fielded Forces * * * * *
Subtotals 23 31 26 16 96
First Priority
(Deadeye)
17 17 17 21 72
Total 40 48 43 37 168
*Fielded forces (heavy weapons and troop concentrations) changed daily.
Source: Briefing, Lt Gen Michael E. Ryan, COMAIRSOUTH, to JTB, subject: NATO Air Operations to Stabilize
Bosnia-Herzegovina, 10 August 1995, US Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), Maxwell AFB, Ala.,
NPL-02-23. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.
DELIBERATE FORCE
282
to the ZOAs , NATO coul d neut ral i ze any t hreat of at t ack by
t he warri ng fact i ons. In defense of t he safe areas , t he Mi l i t ary
Commi t t ee Memorandum of 8 August 1993 al so defi ned op-
erat i onal opt i ons for ai r st ri kes i n Bosni a-Herzegovi na. Given
t he t arget opt i ons, TEZs , and ZOAs , AIRSOUTH cr eat ed and
modi f i ed t hr ee t ar get opt i ons encompassi ng t he si x t ar get
categories, t oget her wi t h pri ori t i es t hat woul d have a l ow-t o-
hi gh range of mi l i t ary si gni fi cance. Each of t hese had l at eral
l i nks t hat one coul d event ual l y associ at e wi t h achi evi ng t he
military objective (fi g. 10. 2). More i mport ant l y, t he t arget s
were linked to a degree of risk of collateral damage and t o
i nf r ast r uct ur e t ar get s t hat , i f dest r oyed, woul d cause undue
hardshi p on t he ci vi l i an popul ace.
10
As had been t he case si nce t he summer of 1993, pl anner s
couched all of AIRSOUTHs t arget i ng pl ans i n t he cont ext of
general opt i ons prescri bed by t he UN and NATO:
Opt i on OneFi r st - St r i ke Phase. Ai r st r i kes woul d have
demons t r at i on val ue and l i mi t ed s cope and dur at i on.
Tar get s woul d r epr esent l ow r i sk and l ow col l at er al
Figure 10.1. Zones of Action (From Corona briefing slides, Lt Gen Michael
Ryan, Headquarters AIRSOUTH, Naples, Italy, 5 December 1995)
SARGENT
283
da ma ge and woul d i ncl ude onl y t hose el ement s par t i ci-
pat i ng i n a safe-area si ege, such as mort ar or art i l l ery-
bat t er y posi t i ons.
Opt i on TwoInitial Follow-on Phase. Air strikes would be
l i mi t ed t o t he i mmedi at e envi ronment of t he affect ed TEZ.
Objectives called for relieving the siege and supporting
UNPROFOR. The t arget s woul d car r y medi um r i sk and
medi um col l at eral damage and woul d have mi l i t ar y val ue
(e. g. , heavy weapons, suppl y poi nt s/ ammo si t es cl ose t o
t he area of host i l i t i es, C
2
facilities, and EW r adar / sur f ace-
to-air missile [SAM] sites).
Opt i on ThreeExt ended- Oper at i ons Phase. Ai r st r i kes
woul d expand out si de t he i mmedi at e ar ea under si ege.
The t arget s woul d have mi l i t ary val ue and coul d i nfl uence
the sustainability of siege forces (e. g. , heavy weapons, C
2
faci l i t i es, suppl y-poi nt / muni t i on si t es, and EW r adar and
SAM si t es t hroughout Bosni a-Herzegovi na; military petro-
l eum, oi l , and l ubri cant s ; and count erai r t arget s [ai rcraft
and repair facilities]).
11
Figure 10.2. Deliberate Force Air Strike Concept (From Corona briefing
slides, Lt Gen Michael Ryan, Headquarters AIRSOUTH, Naples, Italy, 5
December 1995)
DELIBERATE FORCE
284
Geographi c proxi mi t y t o a safe area det er mi ned whet her a
given target fell under option two or three. For example, option -
t wo t arget s i n t he Tuzl a TEZ woul d become opt i on-t hree t ar -
get s for pl anners working the defense of Sarajevo. Signifi -
cant l y, no opt i on i ncl uded i nf r ast r uct ur e t ar get s of t he sort
proposed by Col onel Zoerb i n hi s June t arget i ng bri ef.
Deadeye Target Li st
By mi d- August 1995, as t ensi ons mount ed f r om t he war r i ng
f act i ons wi t hi n t he Bal kans, AIRSOUTH cont i nued t o devel op
and refi ne ai r-operat i on and t arget i ng pl ans for t he Bosni a
regi on. In ant i ci pat i on of graduat ed ai r operat i ons, t wo pl ans
emer ged: t he Deadeye ai r - pr ot ect i on pl an and Del i ber at e
Force, an expanded ai r-st ri ke pl an. Devel oped i n t he earl y
spri ng of 1995, Deadeye delineated AIRSOUTHs SEAD cam-
paign to protect NATO ai r forces from t he BSAs IADS, a s
ment i oned above. The campai gn ai med t o ensur e t hat t he
BSA will no longer have an IADS for central direction of air
defenses by striking key BSA ai r defense communi cat i ons
nodes, el ect roni c-warfare s i t e s , C
2
faci l i t i es, mi ssi l e-l aunch
uni t s, and mi ssi l e-reconst i t ut i on capabi l i t i es.
12
AIRSOUTH ex-
t r act ed 36 t ar get s f r om t he mast er t ar get l i st t o f or m t he
foundat i on of Deadeye .
Del i berate Force Target Li st
The foundat i ons of t he Del i berat e Force t arget l i st were laid
in late 1994, when AIRSOUTH began pl anni ng for a wi de
range of offensive air operations in defense of UN saf e ar eas
and enforcement of t he no-fl y ban. By earl y August 1995,
t hese pl ans compri sed a body of opt i ons t hat an AIRSOUTH
briefing referred to as Deliberate Force. The mission of this
operation entailed execut[ing] robust NATO ai r operat i ons
t hat adversel y al t er t he BSAs advant age i n conduct i ng suc-
cessful mi l i t ary operat i ons agai nst t he Bi H , wi t h t he ai m of
get t i ng t he Bosni an Ser bs to sue for cessation of military
operat i ons, compl y wi t h UN mandat es, and negot i at e.
13
To
achieve these objectives, AIRSOUTH ext ract ed 87 t arget s from
t he JTB listprimarily option-two targets, consisting mainly
SARGENT
285
of di r ect and essent i al suppor t and equi pment and a f ew sup-
porting LOCs t o i sol at e t he BSA t hr eat .
14
Targeti ng the Bosni an Serb Army
A s t r ai ght f or war d s t r at egy- t o- t as k mat r i x gui ded AI R-
SOUTHs process of selecting targets for the Deliberate Force
l i st . Begi nni ng wi t h t he basi c st rat egi c goal of degradi ng t he
BSAs military capabilities, the AIRSOUTH matrix identified
t he appropri at e cent er of gravi t y (COG) f or at t ack and appr o -
pri at e t arget s whose dest r uct i on woul d most t hr eat en t hat
COG.
15
The mat ri x i ncl uded t he fol l owi ng pri nci pl es:
The Bosni an Serbs COG i s t hei r hi st ori c fear of domi na-
t i on.
The Bosni an Serbs mi l i t ary advant age wi t h respect t o t he
BiH i s t hei r abi l i t y t o swi ng more capabl e but l ess numer -
ous forces equi pped wi t h heavy weapons t o pl aces of t hei r
need or choosi ng.
At t acki ng t he Bosni an Serbs advant ages woul d l ead t o
changi ng t he bal ance of power t o t hei r di sadvant age.
The Bosni an Serbs realization of a shift in advantage would
eventuate in their suing for termination of hostilities.
The Bosni an Serbs woul d not come t o t hat real i zat i on
unl ess t hey ar e subj ect ed t o r obust at t ack.
The next step involved determining whether the best way to
degrade the ability of the BSA to swing its more capable units
was through attacks on its heavy weapons, troops, or key LOCs.
According to Colonel Zoerb, AIRSOUTHs preferred option called
for attacking the BSAs C
2
structure, infantry, and prime LOCs
al l at t he same t i me.
16
However, political considerations, particu -
larly the presumed sensitivity of the intervening states to collat-
eral damage, made t he t arget i ng i ssue more i nvol ved t han a
simple question of directly tearing the BSA apar t .
To j ump ahead of t he t ar get i ng di scussi on somewhat , t he
i ssue of col l at eral damage i nf l uenced t he sel ect i on and at t ack
of Del i berat e Force t arget s across t he board. In general , AIR-
SOUTH pl anner s under Gener al Ryan s cl ose super vi si on se-
l ect ed each t arget for i ncorporat i on i nt o a t arget l i st wi t h an
DELIBERATE FORCE
286
eye t o maximiz ing effect while minimizing the possibility of
col l at eral damage . Consequent l y, everyt hi ng from rul es of en -
gagement t o ai r cr af t , weapons, and t act i cs sel ect i ons was
dri ven t o some degree by concerns about col l at eral damage. In
t he case of t arget s, AIRSOUTH pl anner s scrubbed t hem t i me
and agai n, onl y t o see t hem rej ect ed or reexami ned by seni or
l eaders. Thi s l abori ous sel ect i on-and-approval process rest ed
on det ai l ed i magery and endl ess di scussi ons of DMPIs , weap -
ons, bl ast and r ubbl e pat t er ns, and a host of ot her i ssues t hat
r el at ed t o whet her or not gi ven t ar get / weapon/ DMPI combi na-
t i ons woul d cause col l at eral damage or casual t i es.
Duri ng t he execut i on of Del i berat e Force, t hese concerns
carri ed over and were reaffi rmed by several ad hoc operat i onal
rul es of engagement al so ai med at l i mi t i ng damage: (1) t arget s
requi red posi t i ve vi sual i dent i fi cat i on before muni t i ons re-
l ease; (2) somet i mes ai rcraft coul d expend onl y one bomb at a
t i me on a t arget ; (3) ai rcraft had t o at t ack cert ai n t arget s
duri ng di fferent t i mes of t he day or ni ght t o negat e possi bl e
noncombat ant casual t i es ; (4) oftentimes the DMPIs were so
cl ose t oget her t hat ai r cr af t f or mat i ons had t o t ake spaci ng
and/ or l oi t er over t he t ar get ar ea unt i l t he debr i s/ smoke
cl eared t o hi t t hei r ai mi ng poi nt s; and (5) pl anners restricted
at t ack axes f or cer t ai n t ar get s such as br i dges t o mi ni mi ze t he
danger t hat l ong or short weapons woul d cause casual t i es
or damage propert y. Before exerci si ng t hese procedures, of
course, AIRSOUTH pl anner s had t o set t l e t he quest i on of
whi ch t ar get set s and speci fi c t arget s NATO forces would
hi t heavy weapons, i nfant ry, or LOCs ?
Heavy Weapons
UN resol ut i ons requi red t he BSA t o wi t hdraw i t s heavy
weapons from t he Saraj evo excl usi on zone, defi ned i n t he
summer of 1995 as an ar ea of 20 ki l omet er s r adi us f r om t he
center of Sarajevo. The UN defi ned heavy weapons as
1. al l ar mor ed vehi cl es , i ncl udi ng t anks and ar mor ed
personnel carri ers
2. al l ant i ai rcraft weapons (except hand-hel d) of cal i ber
12. 7 mm or great er
SARGENT
287
3. all ant i ai r cr af t and ant i t ank r ocket and mi ssi l e syst ems,
whet her hand-hel d, t owed, mount ed, or sel f-propel l ed
4. al l surface-t o-ai r rocket s and mi ssi l es as wel l as t hei r
l aunch syst ems and l aunch vehi cl es
5. r ocket - assi st ed r ai l - l aunch bombs ( e. g. , Kr ema) and
t hei r l aunch syst ems
17
Despi t e i t s si mpl i ci t y, t hi s l i st present ed t wo daunt i ng prob-
l ems for ai r pl anners . Fi rst , i t i ncl uded over 350 heavy weap-
ons ( t anks, ar t i l l er y gr eat er t han 100 mm, and r ocket l aunch -
e r s ) a nd hundr e ds of ot he r we a pons , i nc l udi ng mor t a r s
gr eat er t han 82 mm and ot her t ubes bel ow 100 mm. Fi ndi ng
and servi ci ng so many weapons cert ai nl y woul d degrade t he
BSAs mi l i t ary capabi l i t y, but t he process al so mi ght t ake
more t i me t han t he pol i t i cal const rai nt s of the intervention
al l owed. Second, t arget i ng t hose weapons mi ght act ual l y un-
dermi ne t he i nt ervent i ons obj ect i ve of havi ng t hem moved out
of t he excl usi on zones. As General Smi t h observed, If we are
aski ng t he BSA t o move t hese guns out of t hi s area, t hen
bombi ng t hose guns i s not heal t hy, and maybe we ought not
t o do t hat . Maybe we ought t o st ay away from t he heavy
weapons. That way, t hey wont have t he excusesCant move
the guns! or Youre destroying them! or We cant move them
because we are under at t ack. They wi l l use what ever excuse
t hey can.
18
As a resul t , General s Smi t h and Ryan agr eed t hat , unl ess
t he BSA fi red t hese heavy weapons at ci t i es or peacekeepi ng
forces, t hey woul d not be t arget ed or st ruck. Thi s woul d be t he
case part i cul arl y for weapons di scovered on desi gnat ed heavy-
weapon wi t hdrawal rout es. Secondari l y, NATO commander s
di d not want t o engage Ser bi an heavy weapons because t hey
fel t t here was no st rat egi c need t o dest roy Serb mi l i t ary capa -
bi l i t i es, and t hey saw a real danger i n appeari ng t o operat e i n
coordi nat i on wi t h Bosni an government and Croat i an forces.
19
Infantry
The BSAs best infantry brigades were a valid and, when they
were in their barracks, an attractive target. But based on their
desire to minimize casualties of any kind and despite th e su g-
gestion of some air planners, senior NATO and UN comma nde r s
DELIBERATE FORCE
288
el ect ed not t o t arget Bosni an Serb i nfant ry or ot her t roops
unl ess t hey engaged i n offensi ve operat i ons agai nst i nt erven -
t i oni st mi l i t ary uni t s or t he safe areas .
20
Li nes of Communi cat i ons
Because t he Nort h At l ant i c Counci ls ai r st ri ke gui dance of
1993 di d not i ncl ude i nf r ast r uct ur e t ar get s, LOCs were not
addressed i n most of t he Deny Fl i ght t ar get i ng set s except
opt i on t hree. However, i n earl y August 1995, General Ryan
and Col onel Zoerb briefed Admiral Smith on t ar get i ng pl ans
t hat i ncl uded a not i onal set of LOCs i mport ant t o t he move -
ment and suppl y of BSA f or ces ar ound t he saf e ar eas.
21
Spe-
cific targets on these LOCs i ncl uded sel ect ed bri dges and road
choke poi nt s suscept i bl e t o cl osure by bombi ng. Aft er a di s -
cussi on wi t h General Smi t h , who i ni t i al l y expressed concern
about t he useful ness of st ri ki ng LOC t arget s, General Ryan
agr eed t o coor di nat e st r i kes agai nst such t ar get s on a day- t o-
day basi s. The t wo commander s woul d det er mi ne whi ch t ar -
get s t o st ri ke i n order t o bl ock al l rout es i nt o or out of Sara -
jevo, except t he one desi gnat ed as a heavy-weapon wi t hdr awal
r out e.
22
Accordi ngl y, by earl y Jul y, pl anners compl et ed t arget -
i ng schemes t o drop key bri dges and bl ock ot her choke poi nt s
necessary t o degrade or bl ock BSA mobi l i t y and suppl y opera -
t i ons i nt o, out of, and among t he safe areas. Recogni zi ng t he
sudden ascendancy of LOC t ar get s i n i mpor t ance and t he
coordi nat i on probl ems bet ween t he UN and NATO, Colonel
Zoerb comment ed t hat LOC t ar get i ng was a st r ange one.
Despite the fact that official guidance never really specified
LOCs and t hat no l i st s ot her t han opt i on t hr ee addr essed
t hem, t he ground-force commander approved LOCs as opt i on-
t wo t arget s for a speci fi c purpose i n t hi s case.
23
Targeting Priorities
By mi d August 1995, t he Del i berat e Force and Deadeye
t arget l i st s were fi rml y est abl i shed i n numbers and pri ori t i es:
IADS (17 targets)EW/acquisition radars (four), SAM sys -
tem (one), control reporting posts/control reporting cent er ,
communications (microwave towers, radio relays, etc.) (12).
SARGENT
289
fielded forces heavy weapons , t r oop concent r at i ons, and
t r anspor t at i on.
C
2
(seven)communi cat i ons (t hree), command faci l i t i es
and headquart ers (four).
supporting LOCs (15)transportation choke points, bridges,
and t unnel s.
direct and essential military support (17)ammo depot
and st orage (one), suppl y depot and st orage (one), sup-
porting garrison areas (five), military logistics areas (10).
24
Of t hese t arget s, pl anner s had sel ect ed 36 for at t ack pri or t o
t he st art of Del i berat e Force, as wel l as 20 ot her Deadeye
t arget s. Most were l i nked t o t he Saraj evo TEZ, and all reflected
AIRSOUTHs det ermi nat i on t o mi ni mi ze t he l i kel i hood of col -
l at eral damage and casual t i es (table 10.2).
DMPI Methodology
Si nce General Ryan handl ed t he process for sel ect i ng DMPIs
f or each t ar get , i t was subj ect t o f r equent and sudden change.
Aft er operat i ons began, t he combi ned ai r operat i ons cent ers
(CAOC) gui dance, appor t i onment , and t ar get i ng ( GAT) cel l
nomi nat ed t ar get s for strike. Initially, this cell consisted of
General Ryan , Colonel Zoerb, t wo experi enced ai r-operat i ons
officers, and two intelligence t arget eers. Si t t i ng at a t abl e i n
the office of Maj Gen Hal Hornburg, CAOC di rect or, General
Ryan and t he t arget t eam pi cked t he DMPIs one by one. After
a daily review of the best battle damage assessment (BDA) of
t he t arget s, t he GAT t eam woul d nomi nat e DMPIs t o General
Ryan on the basis of providing militarily significant targets,
Table 10.2
Onset Target and DMPI Data
Deliberate
Force
Deadeye
Southeast
Deadeye
Northwest
Supporting
LOCs
Total
Target Date
(no. tasked)
21 15 5 15 56
DMPI Data
(no. tasked)
261 53 17 15 346
DELIBERATE FORCE
290
meani ngf ul t ar get s, and t he ri ght t arget s from a narrow per -
spect i ve of force appl i cat i on wi t hout bei ng absurd.
25
The t eam
consi dered col l at eral -damage i ssues when sel ect i ng t ar get s,
but i t usual l y rel i ed on General Ryan t o make fi nal det ermi na-
t i ons about whi ch DMPIs posed accept abl e or unaccept abl e
ri sks. Upon recei vi ng each l i st of nomi nat ed t arget s, Ryan
woul d pass j udgement and, i f necessary, di rect t he rest of t he
GAT t eam t o come up wi t h more. Overal l , most observers fel t
t hat Gener al Ryan was not abl y more conservat i ve i n hi s ap-
pr oach t o t ar get i ng t han t he r est of t he t eam.
26
Despi t e some mi l d i ni t i al frust rat i on wi t h hi s bosss conser -
vat i sm, Col onel Zoerb, hi s chi ef pl anner , ul t i mat el y prai sed
Ryans judgement: His sensitivity to the political and mi l i t ar y
gui dance and const r ai nt s t hat he needed t o wor k wi t hi n wer e
cl ear t o hi m, and he appl i ed t hose effect i vel y t o screen t hose
sharp edges t hat I was beat i ng.
27
Hi s fi nal pi cks t hen went t o
t he mast er ai r at t ack pl ans cel l for i nput i nt o t he dai l y ai r-
t aski ng message .
Following up their initial DMPI sel ect i ons, General Ryan
and Col onel Zoerb would review BDA i magery t o det ermi ne i f
t he t arget DMPI(s) had been dest royed; i f not , t hey exami ned
t he t arget (s) as candi dat es for ret arget i ng. Ryan appr oached
such r est r i ke deci si ons wi t h gr eat car eso much so t hat he
kept a personal BDA t racki ng not ebook t hat was hands off
t o everyone el se. He est abl i shed i mport ant cri t eri a for det er -
mi ni ng whet her a t ar get had been dest r oyed:
individual target (DMPI)nonfunct i onal , moderat e t o se-
vere damage, or dest royed.
target complex (multiple DMPIs )nonfunct i onal or t wo-
t hi rds of t he i ndi vi dual t arget s (DMPIs ) wi t hi n t hat com-
pl ex dest royed.
28
Targeti ng Issues
Al so underl yi ng General Ryans t arget i ng deci si ons was hi s
concer n t hat pol i t i cal pr essur es mi ght br i ng an end t o t he
bombi ng campai gn bef or e i t dest r oyed enough t ar get s t o have
a si gni fi cant effect on t he Bosni an Serbs . According to Colo -
nel Zoerb,
SARGENT
291
Our concern was t hat aft er t he fi rst bomb drop t hat everybody woul d
l ose t hei r spi ne. The knock-i t -off woul d happen at 8: 00 a. m. i n t he
morni ng aft er t he fi rst ni ght . As soon as [Cabl e News Net work ] got
t here wi t h t hei r fi l m and saw t he dest ruct i on at some of t hese i sol at ed
pl aces, t hey [UN/NATO] would say, Thats enough! So, we were inter -
est ed i n want i ng t o make our i ni t i al empl oyment as effect i ve as we
could. The IADS were ni ce, operat i ng i n t he sout heast where we coul d
. . . suppress t hat pi ece of t he IADS t hat we needed t o suppr ess t o do
a j ob. We needed t o get bombs on t arget s . We needed t o get somet hi ng
meani ngful earl y-on because our fear was t hat when t hey [UN/NATO]
saw what bombs di d, we woul d have t o t urn i t off.
29
Import ant l y, t hi s concern l ed General Ryan t o br eak wi t h
t he cl assi c ai rpower t arget i ng t enet of t horoughl y t aki ng down
an enemys ai r defenses before shifting the weight of the air
effort t o ground at t acks. Inst ead, he chose t o st ri ke t he mi ni-
mal number of t he BSAs IADS t ar get s necessar y at any t i me
t o al l ow hi m t o conduct t he maxi mum number of gr ound
st ri kes at t he l owest ri sk t o hi s ai rcrews. For exampl e, he di d
not i ni t i al l y t arget t he ai r defense st r onghol d at Banj a Luka in
t he nort hwest ZOA. I nst ead, he f ocused ear l y at t acks on t he
ai r defenses and associ at ed BSA t arget s i n t he l ower-ri sk
sout heast ZOA, whi ch i ncl uded t he Saraj evo ar ea.
Targeti ng Heavy Weapons
Despi t e t he i mport ance of t he BSAs heavy weapons i n t he
excl usi on zones, AIRSOUTH ul t i mat el y rej ect ed t hem as a pri -
mar y t ar get set for Del i berat e Force. In t he fi rst pl ace, t hese
weapons oft en proved di ffi cul t t o fi nd i n t he broken t errai n
and ur ban ar eas i n whi ch t he Bosni an Ser bs generally hid
t he m.
30
That fact or, i n t urn, l i kel y meant t hat i t woul d t ake
l onger t o servi ce t hose weapons t han t he pol i t i cal ci rcum-
st ances of t he ai r campai gn woul d al l ow. Thus, i n pursui t of
the quickest possible results, NATO commander s and pol i t i cal
l eaders eschewed a st rat egy of di rect l y at t acki ng BSA military
capabi l i t i es i n favor of a l ess di rect st rat egy ai med at t he C
2
,
l ogi st i cal , and mobi l i t y underpi nni ngs of t he BSAs s t r engt h.
Also, after 3 September 1995, NATO commander s deci ded t o
l ay off at t acks on t he Serbs heavy weapons i n or der t o deny
t hem an excuse for not movi ng t hem out of t he excl usi on
zones in compliance with UN di rect i ves, ment i oned above.
31
DELIBERATE FORCE
292
Bri dges Revi si t ed
Bri dges present ed t hei r own pecul i ar t arget i ng probl ems.
Until the eve of Deliberate Force, AIRSOUTH generally rele -
gat ed bri dges t o t he opt i on-t hree cat egory, mai nl y because
t hey were i mport ant economi c fact ors i n t he regi on and be-
cause t hey carri ed a si gni fi cant ri sk of col l at eral damage . This
si t uat i on changed when Gener al Smi t h r equest ed at t acks on
some key br i dges i n or der t o channel and hi nder t he BSAs
effort s t o send rei nforcement s i nt o t he excl usi on zones .
Accordingly, AIRSOUTH c onduc t e d nume r ous br i dge a t-
t acks, but t hey general l y di d not produce General Smi t h s
desi red effect s. The bri dges were st rong st ruct ures, and t he
t act i cs empl oyed t o at t ack t hem worked t o mi ni mi ze t he dan-
ger of collateral damage and t o reduce t he effect i veness of
i ndi vi dual st ri kes. Ini t i al t act i cal rest ri ct i ons pl aced on bri dge
Serb artillery
SARGENT
293
at t acks i ncl uded si ngl e-bomb rel eases, off-axi s at t ack runs
down ri verbeds t o mi ni mi ze t he unwant ed consequences of
i naccurat e weapons rel eases or bombs goi ng st upi d, and
ni ght schedul i ng t o reduce t he l i kel i hood of t he presence of
civilians when t he bombs hi t . Because of t he dur abi l i t y of t he
t ar get s and t he var i ous t act i cal const r ai nt s pl aced on t he at-
t acki ng forces, al l i ed bombi ng brought down onl y seven of t he
12 bridges targeted by AIRSOUTH by t he end of t he campai gn.
The targeting history of Deliberate Force reveals an evolution -
ary as well as a centralized and flexible process. The use of a
master target list from which to build individual plans worked
well, giving NATO ai r pl anners the ability to generate new air
plans and adjust priorities almost on demand. The division of
targets into options contributed to this flexibility, both in plan-
ni ng and pract i ce, as evi denced by t he apparent ease wi t h whi ch
AIRSOUTH moved bri dges from opt i on t hree t o opt i on t wo i n
response to the request of General Smith. In reality this buildin g-
bl ock appr oach t o t ar get i ng was an es s ent i al accommoda-
t ion t o t he pol i t i cal and di pl omat i c dynami sm of t he Bal kans
conflict and the intervention. Whether AIRSOUTHs approach t o
Bridge damage
DELIBERATE FORCE
294
t ar get i ng becomes a model f or t he f ut ur e r emai ns t o be seen.
At t he t i me, however, i t seems t o have faci l i t at ed t arget pl an-
ni ng nicely.
Not es
1. Target Categories, OPLAN 40101, Deny Flight, 3 May 1995, a nne x
H, p. H-1, US Air Force Historical Research Agency (hereinafter AFHRA),
Maxwell AFB, Ala., CAOC-01. (Confidential) Information extracted is un-
classified.
4. Briefing, Headquarters AIRSOUTH, Naples, Italy, subject: Air Cam-
pai gn Target i ng, 2 June 1995. (Confi dent i al ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s un-
classified.
5. Col Daniel R. Zoerb, chief, Plans Division, Headquarters AIRSOUTH,
Napl es, It al y, t ranscri pt of oral hi st ory i nt ervi ew by Dr. Wayne Thompson
and Maj Tim Reagan, 20 October 1995. (Secret) Information extracted is
unclassified, AFHRA, NPL-33(T).
7. Briefing, Col Daniel R. Zoerb, chief of plans, AFSOUTH, subject:
NATO Air Operations to Stabilize Bosnia-Herzegovina, 10 August 1995,
AFHRA, NPL-02-23.
8. Briefing to CAOC staff, Gen Michael Ryan, CAOC, 5th Allied Tactical
Air Force, Vicenza, Italy, subject: Deliberate Force, 29 August14 September
1995, 15 Oct ober 1995, AFHRA, CAOC-13.
9. Maj Tim Reagan, Impact of NATO Air Campaign, position paper on
Royal Air Force (RAF) visit, Force Application Directorate, Air Force Studies
and Anal yses Agency, 21 December 1995. (Secret ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s
uncl assi fi ed.
11. The exampl es of t arget s ci t ed i n t hese opt i ons are for i l l ust rat i ve
purposes; t hey do not represent a speci fi c or al l -i ncl usi ve l i st of t arget s.
12. Bri efi ng, Headquart ers AIRSOUTH, Napl es, It al y, subj ect : Graduat ed
Air Operations, 12 August 1995, AFHRA, NPL-02-24. (Secret) Information
14. Briefing slide, Headquarters AIRSOUTH, Naples, Italy, subject: Tar-
get Li st Evol ut i on, n. d. (Secret ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s uncl assi fi ed.
15. Corona briefing, Lt Gen Michael E. Ryan, COMAIRSOUTH, subject:
NATO Air Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Deliberate Force, 29 Au -
gust 14 Sept ember 1995, November 1995.
16. Zoerb interview. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.
17. Gen Rupert Smi t h t o Gen Rat ko Ml adi c, draft l et t er, subj ect : Wi t h-
drawal of Heavy Weapons from t he Saraj evo Excl usi on Zone, 3 Sept ember
1995, AFHRA, NPL 15-02-13. (Secret ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s uncl assi fi ed.
SARGENT
295
19. Di scussi on of t he Ai r St rat egy i n Bosni a, t al ki ng paper, Skunk-
works, USAF/ XOXS, Pent agon, Washi ngt on, D. C. , 17 Sept ember 1995, 4.
20. Ibid.
21. Actually, AIRSOUTH used the term supporting LOCs as a caveat
when t al ki ng about not i onal t arget set s. That i s, once t he bat t l e began,
AIRSOUTH woul d l ook at t he si t uat i on and t ake out onl y t hose choke poi nt s
t hat wer e absol ut el y necessar y t o def end t he saf e ar ea.
24. Corona briefing.
26. Reagan posi t i on paper .
28. Corona briefing.
30. Di scussi on of t he Ai r St rat egy i n Bosni a, 4.
31. Maj Ti m Reagan, Charact eri st i cs of Del i berat e Force, draft paper,
Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency, n. d. , 6. (Secret) Information ex-
DELIBERATE FORCE
296
Chapt er 11
Del i berate Force Tacti cs
Tactics are concerned with doing the job right, and higher
levels of strategy are concerned with doing the right job.
Col Denni s M. Drew and Dr. Donal d M. Snow
Making Strategy: An Introduction to National
Securi t y Processes and Probl ems
St rat egy wi ns wars; t act i cs wi ns bat t l es.
Carl R. Oliver
Plane Talk: Aviators and
Ast ronaut s Own St ori es
Broadly put, tactics is the art or skill of employing available
forces i n combat t o achi eve speci fi c goal s and i s pract i ced by
commander s and war r i or s at bot h t he oper at i onal and t act i cal
levels of war. At the operational level, tactics mainly involves
t he orchest rat i on of forces and combat event s or bat t l es t o
achi eve t he st r at egi c goal s of t heat er and nat i onal command-
ers. That orchest rat i on i nvol ves maki ng deci si ons about t he
most sui t abl e cent ers of gravi t y and t ar get s t o st ri ke, as wel l
as t he best f or ces, weapons, and combat met hods t o make
t hose st ri kes. Thi s l ast set of consi derat i onsforces, weapons,
and combat met hodsmar ks t he usual i nt er f ace bet ween op-
erational and tactical levels of air war. After operational-level
commander s as s i gn t ar get s and al l ocat e f or ces, uni t - l evel
l eader s and pl anner s usual l y make t act i cal deci si ons about
t he number of ai rcraft t o send agai nst speci fi c t arget s , types of
weapons t o use, at t ack and weapons- r el ease pr ocedur es, and
equi val ent i ssues of det ai l . In pract i ce, bot h operat i onal - and
t act i cal -l evel t act i cs are ext remel y compl ex, t i me-consumi ng
processes. Achi evi ng success i n bot h areas i s cri t i cal t o t he
out come of a campai gn.
297
Thi s chapt er descri bes t he dynami cs of t he operat i onal - and
tactical-level tactics of Deliberate Force. It includes both gen-
eral and speci fi c di scussi ons of vari ous fact ors t hat i nfl u -
enced, or shoul d have i nfl uenced, t he devel opment and execu -
t i on of t act i cs dur i ng t hat campai gn. I t t hen addr es s es
mission tactics actually utilized by North Atlantic Treaty Or -
ganization (NATO) ai rmen. The record of t hese mi ssi on t act i cs
i s an i nt erest i ng and useful l egacy of Del i berat e Force, as i s
t he embedded di scussi on of how NATO ai rmen devel oped
t hem. Of part i cul ar not e i n t hi s case, i nst i t ut i onal boundari es
bet ween operat i onal - and t act i cal -l evel t act i cs were bl urred, at
l east i n rel at i on t o general experi ence. Duri ng Del i berat e Force
Lt Gen Michael Ryan , t he combi ned force ai r component com-
mander (CFACC) and commander of Al l i ed Ai r Forces Sout h -
ern Europe (COMAIRSOUTH), and hi s st aff at t he combi ned
air operations center (CAOC) of t en made det er mi nat i ons about
weapons and t act i cs t hat i n ot her confl i ct s woul d have been
l eft t o t act i cal pl anners i n fi el d uni t s. Because t hi s bl urri ng of
i nst i t ut i onal boundari es refl ect ed t he compl ex pol i t i cal and
di pl omat i c ci r cumst ances of Del i ber at e For ce and because
ot her peace operat i ons al so wi l l be pol i t i cal l y and di pl omat i -
cal l y compl ex, i t i s one of t he more sal i ent feat ures of t he
campai gn for st udy.
Tacti cal Pl anni ng and Empl oyment Factors
I n many past ai r campai gns, oper at i onal - l evel commander s
and pl anni ng st affs (General Ryan and hi s CAOC staff in De-
l i berat e Force) focused t hei r t act i cal pl anni ng on doi ng t he
ri ght j ob. Tact i cal pl anners , i n concer t , usual l y wor r i ed
about how t o do t he j ob ri ght , once operat i onal pl anners
det er mi ned what t he j ob was. Thi s chapt er t akes t he posi t i on
t hat , regardl ess of how operat i onal and t act i cal pl anners in
t hi s operat i on di vi ded t hei r responsi bi l i t i es, t hei r ul t i mat e de-
ci si ons had t o and di d refl ect t he effect s of cert ai n key fact ors
of t hreat and envi ronment . Thei r pract i ce of t he pract i cal art
of get t i ng t he ri ght i ron on t he ri ght t arget at t he ri ght t i me
depended f or i t s success on accur at e assessment s and accom -
modat i on of t he nat ure of Bosni an Serb def enses, t he Bosni an
DELIBERATE FORCE
298
cl i mat e and t opography, and t he charact eri st i cs of ai r pl at -
forms and weapons avai l abl e t o t he i nt ervent i oni st coal i t i on.
Bosni an Serb Defenses
Deny Fl i ght oper at i ons commenced on 12 Apr i l 1993 i n a
hi gh- t hr eat envi r onment
1
t hat refl ect ed confusi on over t he ex -
act st at us of Ser bi an and Bosni an Ser b ai r defenses af t er t he
breakup of Yugoslavia . Prior to the breakup, a single air-def ense
operat i ons cent er i n Bel grade cont rol l ed four sect or operat i ons
cent er s, each of whi ch recei ved dat a from ot her such cent ers
as wel l as subordi nat e cont rol and report i ng post s; i t al so
cont rol l ed subordi nat e surface-t o-ai r mi ssi l e (SAM) bat t al i ons
and fi ght ers. Al l of t hese el ement s provi ded i nt egrat ed ai r de-
fense system (IADS) coverage for the entire country. Following
t he breakup, a port i on of t he Yugosl avi an IADS fell into Bos -
ni an Ser b hands. Par t s of t he syst em r emai ned oper at i onal ,
but t o what ext ent and wi t h what degree of resi dual l i nkage t o
t he nat i onal IADS remai ned uncl ear t o Uni t ed Nat i ons (UN)
and NATO pl anner s .
As Operat i on Deny Fl i ght progressed, NATO ai r men l ear ned
more about t he real capabi l i t i es of t he Bosni an Serb armys
(BSA) IADS. From Yugoslavia t he BSA i nher i t ed a subst ant i al
array of ai r defense survei l l ance, communi cat i ons, and com -
bat equi pment . BSA r adar s ys t ems pr ovi ded over l appi ng
sear ch, t r acki ng, and t ar get i ng capabi l i t i es backed up by a
t i ny ai r force; a subst ant i al force of l arge, radar-gui ded mi s -
siles (SAMs); man-portable air defense (MANPAD) missiles ;
and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) of various calibers (fig. 11.1).
2
The Bosni an Serb ai r arm ul t i mat el y proved t o be a mi nor
threat to NATO airmen, particularly after NATO j et s shot down
four of its Galeb/ J a s t r e b st ri ke ai rcraft i n November 1994.
Gr ound- based weapons posed mor e of a t hr eat , evi denced by
t he shoot down of a Bri t i sh Sea Harri er on 16 Apri l 1994 i n t he
vicinity of Gorazde and by t he shoot down of a US Air Force
F-16C by a radar-guided SAM on 2 June 1995 over west er n
Bosni a-Herzegovi na. Thus, i n net , at t he onset of Del i berat e
For ce on 29 August 1995, t he BSAs IADS posed a formi dabl e,
t hough uneven, t hreat t o NATO ai r forces.
SARGENT
299
SAMs present i n t he regi on i ncl uded SA-2f Gui del i nes, SA-
6b Gai nful s , SA-9 Gaski ns (or SA-13 Gophers) , and an un-
known number of infrared (IR) MANPADs SA-7b Strellas (or
SA-14 Greml i ns):
SA-2f Guideline (MOD 5 [fifth in a series of missile-system
modifications])missile with primary mission of low- to
hi ghal t i t ude, medi um- r ange ai r def ense from fi xed or
semi fi xed si t es. These mi ssi l es are best empl oyed agai nst
t arget s at medi um and hi gh al t i t udes, but t hey have l i m-
i t ed l ow-al t i t ude capabi l i t i es. Thei r Fan Song F acqui si-
t i on and t r acki ng r adar s can t r ack f i ght er s out t o medi um
ranges, and t hei r el ect ro-opt i cal t racker can gui de t he
mi ssi l e down t o a l ow al t i t ude. Fi ght er ai rcraft can usu-
ally evade the old and not particularly agile Fox if they
recei ve warni ngs of i t s approach. Evasi on t act i cs i ncl ude
avoi dance of t he mi ssi l e or i t s support i ng radar syst ems
and, i f engaged by t he mi ssi l e, execut i on of mi d-G or-
t hogonal breaks i nt o and over t he mi ssi l e at medi um al t i-
t ude.
3
During Deliberate Force, NATO j et s avoi ded or sup-
pr essed al l known SA- 2 SAM s i t es , i ndi cat ed by t he
apparent absence of any SA-2 l aunches by t he BSA.
Figure 11.1. BSA Order of Battle (From Corona briefing slides, Lt Gen
Michael Ryan, Headquarters AIRSOUTH, Naples, Italy, 5 December 1995)
DELIBERATE FORCE
300
SA-6b Gai nf ula hi ghl y mobi l e, t racked ai r-defense sys -
t em desi gned t o defend agai nst hi gh-performance ai rcraft
oper at i ng at l ow t o medi um al t i t udes. Suppor t ed by ac-
qui si t i on r adar s and a backup el ect r o- opt i cal t r acki ng
syst em, t he SA-6b syst em can engage t arget s f r om me-
di um al t i t udes t o very l ow al t i t udes. An SA-6b bat t er y can
handl e t wo t arget s at once wi t h qui ck react i on t i me be-
t ween i ni t i al acqui si t i on of a t arget and mi ssi l e l aunch.
4
The BSA used an SA- 6b t o shoot down t he US Air Force
F-16C on 2 June 1995, ment i oned above. Despi t e f r e-
quent evidence of SA-6 radar act i vi t y, t he Bosni an Serbs
l aunched no mi ssi l es, probabl y refl ect i ng t he effect i veness
of NATOs suppressi on of enemy ai r defenses (SEAD) cam-
pai gn, part i cul arl y i n i t s use of hi gh-speed ant i radi at i on
missiles (HARM).
SA-9 Gaskin / SA-13 Gophermobile SAM systems organic
to many BSA combat units. These point-defense, highly
mobile, tracked, short-range SAMs use IR seekers to ac-
quire, track, and engage fixed-wing as well as rotary-wing
aircraft . They can be effective against unaware, low-flying
aircraft that transit their short engagement zones. Although
these missiles were present around many potential NATO
targets, t hey proved hi ghl y suscept i bl e t o count ermeasures.
MANPADsshoulder- or tripod-launched, short-range, IR-
guided mi ssi l es present t hroughout t he Del i berat e Force
area of operat i ons. The pri mary syst ems avai l abl e t o t he
BSA were the SA-7b Strella or the SA-14 Gremlin .
5
Con-
si st i ng of a si mpl e l aunch t ube, gri pst ock, and t hermal
battery, the Strella feat ures a very short engagement range
at very low to lower-mid altitudes against slow to fast
t arget s . If a hi gh-performance t arget ai rcraft sees t he mi s -
si l e, i t can usual l y defeat i t wi t h IR count ermeasures or
hi gh- speed escapes.
6
Boast i ng sl i ght l y bet t er performance
than t he SA- 7b and a bet t er s eeker head, t he Gr emlin
can t rack an ai rcraft from any angl e, unl i ke t he SA-7b,
whi ch is a t ai l chas er . As i n t he cas e of t he SA- 7b,
h igh-performance ai rcraft can evade a det ect ed Gremlin
t hr ough hi gh- s peed maneuver i ng and I R count er mea-
s ur es .
7
On the first day of Deliberate Force, a MANPAD
SARGENT
301
shot down a Fr ench Mi r age 2000C 20 naut i cal mi l es
sout heast of Pal e, probabl y at an al t i t ude at or bel ow
t hree t housand feet . Thi s was t he onl y ai rcraft shot down
duri ng t he campai gn, al t hough on 16 Apri l 1994 a MAN-
PAD downed a Deny Fl i ght Sea Harri er, and ot her s uch
missiles damaged several NATO ai rcraft at di fferent t i mes.
AAAsi gni fi cant numbers of l i ght and medi um syst ems
fi el ded by t he BSA. Light AAA i ncl uded aut omat i c weap-
ons f r om 20 mm t hr ough 60 mm char act er i zed by aut o-
mat i c fi re; t i med and i mpact -fuzed, hi gh-expl osi ve proj ec-
t i l es; and ver t i cal r anges up t o f our t housand met er s.
Medium AAA i ncl uded guns l ar ger t han 60 mm char ac-
t eri zed by si ngl e-shot , bat t ery-cont rol l ed fi re; t i med and
proxi mi t y-fuzed, hi gh-expl osi ve proj ect i l es; and vert i cal
r anges up t o ei ght t housand met er s. Dur i ng Del i ber at e
Force the CFACC l argel y avoi ded t hese weapons by re-
st ri ct i ng hi s ai rcraft t o fl i ght above 10, 000 feet or, by
except i on, fi ve t housand feet .
Cl i mate and Topography
Bosni a s Medi t erranean cl i mat e i s charact eri zed by l ong, hot
summer s and mi l d wi nt er s al ong t he coast al r egi on and i n t he
ext r eme sout h, and by har sh wi nt er s ( November Januar y) and
mi l der summer s i n t he i nt er i or hi ghl ands. Del i ber at e For ce
occur r ed dur i ng t he ear l y aut umn, exper i enci ng a t ypi cal ,
moderat e cl i mat e for t hat t i me of year. The t erm moderat e,
however, belied the generally poor flying weather over Bosnia
duri ng t he operat i on. On most days fog covered much of t he
l and, part i cul arl y i n t he morni ngs, and t act i cal ai rcraft en -
count ered mul t i pl e cl oud l ayers t hroughout t hei r fl i ght regi me.
Oft en, surface vi si bi l i t y was bet ween one-hal f t o one and one-
half miles. Sun angle, clouds, visibility, contrail levels, and
wi nd i nfl uenced deci si ons about fl i ght al t i t udes, navi gat i on
r out es and checkpoi nt s, t ar get - ar ea i ngr ess and egr ess r out es,
weapons and sensor sel ect i ons and empl oyment , fl i ght al t i -
t udes, and so fort h (t abl e 11. 1).
Weat her had far-ranging effects on Deliberate Forces opera-
tions and tactics. Because the rules of engagement (ROE) a n d
special instructions (SPINS) required aircrews to identify their
DELIBERATE FORCE
302
assigned targets visually before releasing ordnance to avoid any
chance of col l at eral damage, weat her obs cur at i ons caus ed
nearly 30 percent of the no drops by NATO aircraft over Bosnia-
Herzegovina. With no alternate target on which to expend ord-
nance, some aircraft, like the US Air Forces F-16s and t he US
Navys F/ A-18s, jettisoned theirs in the Adriatic Sea . Just be-
tween the two types of aircraft, a total of 65 precision-guided
munitions (PGM)10 percent of the total expenditures of these
weaponshad to be jettisoned. The F-16s jettisoned 56 GBU-
10s because of safety precautions to avoid runway closure at
Aviano Air Base (AB), Italy, and as a requi rement for gross-
weight considerations for divert fuel. F/A-18s jettisoned eight
GBU-10s and one GBU-24 because of carri er-l andi ng/ arrest i ng-
cable weight limitations. Other coalition aircraft returned to
t hei r assi gned bases wi t h t hei r weapons l oads because t hey
could not visually identify their assigned targets , primarily due
to cloud coverage in the target area. Additionally, poor weather
del ayed at t ack packages on a number of days, part i cul arl y t hose
scheduled for morning strikes.
Bosni a-Herzegovi na cover s an ar ea of 19, 741 squar e mi l es,
most of whi ch l i es i n t he mount ai ns of t he Di nari c Al ps . Half
t he regi on i s forest ed, wi t h anot her 25 percent arabl e. The
Table 11.1
Obscurant Effects on Sensor Performance
Weather
Element
Day
Sight
Image
Intensifier
Laser
Designator/
Range Finder
Thermal
Imagery
Contrast
IR
Transmission
surface wind none moderate none major none
absolute humidity none moderate moderate minor major
clouds/fog major major major major extreme
rain/snow major major major moderate extreme
dust/haze major major major moderate major
visual smoke major major major minor minor
Wily Pete smoke major major major moderate major
IR smoke major major major major extreme
Source: Adapted from Multi-Command Manual 3-1, vol. 1, Tactical Employment Considerations, 17 March
1995, table 3-1, Weather Elements Which Affect IR Systems Performance; and Obscurant Eff ect Table,
handout, Texas Instruments, Dallas, Texas, n.d.
SARGENT
303
coast al regi on support s a Medi t erranean fl ora of pal ms, ol i ves,
cypr ess, and many vi neyar ds. Ot her wi se, deci duous f or est
predomi nat es, but t he hi gher reaches of t he i nt eri or cont ai n
numerous coni fers. These forest ed condi t i ons great l y i nfl u -
enced the tactics of Deliberate Force, mainly by making diffi -
cul t t he acqui si t i on of t act i cal t arget s such as ar t i l l er y and
combat vehi cl es.
8
Earl y at t empt s by NATO t o l ocat e, t arget ,
and dest roy SA-6 t r anspor t er - er ect or l auncher s and r adar s
(TELAR) (pl at forms t hat house and gui de t he mi ssi l e) and
heavy weapons pr oved daunt i ng i n t he r ough t er r ai n and poor
weat her t hat prevai l ed. Rugged t errai n and fol i at i on al so ham-
pered operat i ons because fol i age absorbed t he energy of t ar -
get i ng l asers for gui ded weapons or because t he t er r ai n and
t rees prevent ed at t acki ng ai rcraft from mai nt ai ni ng l i ne-of-
si ght cont act wi t h t hei r weapons.
Ni ght operat i ons during Deliberate Force offered NATO air -
men t he advant ages of conceal ment , t he di sadvant ages of more
difficult target acquisition, and the possibility that using after -
bur ner s or di spensi ng count er measur es mi ght hi ghl i ght t hem
t o enemy gunners. Duri ng t he operat i on, 260 of t he over ni ne
hundred ai r-st ri ke mi ssi ons were fl own at ni ght about t hree-
quar t er s by l and- based US Air Force fi ght ers and a quart er
from US Navy carrier -based fighters. All but four of the attack
mi ssi ons on bri dges were fl own at ni ght , when t raffi c was at a
minimum, to reduce the possibility of civilian casualties . Air
pl anner s deconflicted most night mi ssi ons by operat i ng t hem
at di fferent al t i t udes and by spaci ng t hem i n t rai l .
Weaponeeri ng and t he Joi nt
Muni ti ons-Effecti veness Manual s
Gi ven t he pr essur e f r om commander s t o achi eve maxi mum
resul t s from ai r st ri kes whi l e si mul t aneousl y mi ni mi zi ng t he
likelihood of collateral damage , weaponeeri ngt he mat chi ng
of ai rcraft and weapons t o achi eve desi red t arget effect swas
more cri t i cal t o t he execut i on of Del i berat e Force t han t o many
ot her ai r campai gns.
9
The avai l abl e gui des t o weaponeeri ng
deci si ons, t he j oi nt muni t i ons-effect i veness manual s (JMEM),
proved general l y adequat e t o t he probl em of cal cul at i ng t he
requi red number of weapons and ai rcraft sort i es requi red t o
DELIBERATE FORCE
304
dest roy a t arget . However, for t he purposes of Del i berat e Force
pl anni ng, some mi ssi on pl anner s f ound t he JMEMs not flex-
i bl e enough t o encompass al l t he t arget i ng cri t eri a i mposed on
t hem by t he speci al nat ure of t he operat i on. Thi s short fal l
sprang from t he compl ex nat ure of weaponeeri ng and t he con -
cept ual under pi nni ngs of t he manual s t hemsel ves.
The weaponeeri ng process i ncl udes several st eps, t he fi rst of
whi ch ent ai l s anal ysi s of an assi gned t arget . Weaponeers ex -
ami ne t he nat ure of t he t arget , seeki ng t o i dent i fy i t s most
cr i t i cal and/ or vul ner abl e par t s, and assess t he desi r ed l evel
of dest ruct i on. Di fferent t arget s have di fferent cri t i cal and vul-
ner abl e poi nt s. For exampl e, a bomb hi t on any par t of a t ank
likely will destroy it, while efficiently taking out a factory re-
qui res careful pl acement of weapons on part i cul ar part s of i t .
Logi cal l y, t hen, t he next st ep i n t he weaponeeri ng pr ocess
involves identifying the particular weapons effect needed to
dest roy t he t arget or i t s vari ous part s. Weapons dest roy t hi ngs
i n di fferent ways, mai nl y t hrough bl ast , heat , or penet rat i on
by fragment s or shrapnel . Thei r abi l i t y t o do so depends upon
t he wei ght , const ruct i on, and del i very accuracy of t he war -
heads . Accur acy, i n t ur n, depends upon s uch f act or s as
met hod of rel ease, desi gn charact eri st i cs, di st ance from poi nt
of rel ease t o t arget , weat her and wi nd, and gui dance from
rel ease t o t arget . JMEMs descri be t he accuracy of weapons
al ong wi t h many ot her el ement s of t he weaponeeri ng process.
Perhaps t he mai n accuracy message of JMEMs is the obvi -
ous one: because pr eci si on weapons have a drast i cal l y smal l er
ci rcul ar error of probabi l i t y t han ungui ded weapons , t hey
great l y reduce t he number of weapons and sort i es requi red t o
achi eve a gi ven effect on a t arget or ai mi ng poi nt . Gi ven t he
demonst rabl y great er accuracy of PGMs , therefore, Deliberate
Force weaponeers and operat ors ut i l i zed t hem t o t he maxi -
mum extent possible. In light of the proscription on unnecessary
collateral damage , they had little choice. The accuracy of PGMs
is reflected in General Ryans declaration that any impact be-
yond a weapons circular error of probability f r om an ai mi ng
poi nt const i t ut ed a mi ss. Despi t e t he general ut i l i t y of t he
JMEMs , planners in the 7490th Composite Wing (Provisional)
found the manuals difficult to use, particularly in making rapid
SARGENT
305
weapon and f uzi ng deci si ons dr i ven by t he f ast pace and po-
l i t i cal sensi t i vi t i es of t he bombi ng campai gn.
However, the 31st Fighter Wings Intelligence Group acquired
a technological tool designed to assist in mission planning two
weeks prior to Deliberate Force. It became a great success story.
In a joint venture, Virginia Cambridge Research and the Defense
Mapping Agency developed the Power Scene Mission Planning
System, a hybrid of a mission-rehearsal system, intelligence sys -
tem, and operation system. This operations and intelligence
model overlays spot satellite imagery on a terrain-elevation data -
base, providing a three-dimensional perspective of navigation
rout es, t arget run-i ns, and t hreat bubbl es. Remarkabl y, pi l ot s
could view Bosnia-Herzegovinas database imagery in 10-, five-,
two-, and one-meter-square resolution.
Power Scene flies like an aircraft or a helicopter in either
crui se or hover mode but wi t h very l i mi t ed di spl ays. The mov-
i ng map di spl ay on a l arge TV screen gi ves t he sensat i on of
movement as i t pi t ches and rol l s vi a a l i t t l e j oyst i ck. The vi ew
resembl es one from a cockpi t , al l owi ng for an except i onal vi ew
of t he at t ack axi s. Red and gr een bubbl es di spl ay t hr eat s,
showi ng t he maxi mum engagement range (or ri ngs) of a par -
ticular SAM syst em. Out si de t he t hr eat dome, t he bubbl e i s
r ed but changes t o gr een af t er one ent er s t he bubbl e. The
syst em can al so provi de navi gat i on/ t arget i ng pod vi ews (e. g. ,
for a five-nautical-mile release with a 30-degree crank [hard
t urn]). The screen can capt ure t he fl i ght profi l e on phot os as
wel l as vi deot ape (8 mm and VHS) for mi ssi on bri efi ngs and
t arget fol ders; t hus, Power Scene enhances si t uat i onal awar e-
ness pri or t o fl yi ng t he mi ssi on.
Addi t i onal l y, t he syst em has a uni que way of mensur at i ng
t ar get coordi nat es. In t he hover mode, a 90-degree pi t ch down
wi t h t he grommet (fl i ght -pat h vect or marker) on t he ai mi ng
poi nt provi des coordi nat es i n Uni versal Transverse Mercat or
or l at i t ude/ l ongi t ude wi t hi n 75 feet l at eral l y and one hundred
t o t wo hundred feet vert i cal l y. The abi l i t y t o mensurat e coordi-
nat es al l ows for t arget i ng veri fi cat i on, an advant age t hat be-
came ever apparent duri ng Del i berat e Force. On several occa -
s i ons Powe r Sc e ne r es ol ved ambi gui t i es bet ween t ar get
coordi nat es fragged by t he CAOC. In one case a bridges coor -
di nat es were fi ft een hundred feet i n error. The pi ct ures and
DELIBERATE FORCE
306
mensur at ed coor di nat es pr ovi ded by Power Scene checked t he
accuracy and fl agged t he mi st ake. Power Scene was a huge
success wi t h ai r cr ews of t he 7490t h Wi ng, who cycl ed on and
of f t he syst em 24 hour s a day, seven days a week dur i ng
Deliberate Force. The preview of situational awareness proved
ext remel y val uabl e and great l y assi st ed mi ssi on pl anni ng a t
t he uni t and force l evel s, maki ng Power Scene a welcomed
pl anni ng and preparat i on t ool .
10
In the fog and friction of Deliberate Force, one of the major
f act or s of mi ssi on pr epar at i on and execut i on was t he uni que
requi rement s and rest ri ct i ons of t he t act i cal area of operat i ons
(TAOO)the CFACCs area of responsi bi l i t y. Theat er requi re-
ment s and ai r space pr ocedur es wer e addr essed i n t he ROE
and commander s gui dance pr ovi ded t o t he uni t s and mi ssi on
pl anner s via SPINS. I n or der t o pr event any unaccept abl e out-
comes t o t he pol i t i co-mi l i t ary si t uat i on i n t he t heat er, person -
nel had t o fol l ow t he ROE (see chap. 14 of t hi s vol ume) not
onl y t hr oughout mi ssi on pl anni ng but al so dur i ng execut i on
of t he mi ssi on t act i cs.
Mi ssi on Tacti cs i n Del i berate Force
Aft er Apri l 1993 Deny Fl i ght evol ved from an operat i on
t hat used combat ai r pat r ol s ( CAP) t o enforce t he no-fl y
zones (NFZ) t o a compl ex mi ssi on encompassi ng cl ose ai r
suppor t ( CAS) of t he Uni t ed Nat i ons Prot ect i on Force (UN-
PROFOR), st and- al one SEAD, offensi ve ai r operat i ons (OAS),
and as s oci at ed s uppor t mi s s i ons s uch as t act i cal r econnai s -
s ance a nd c omba t s e a r c h a nd r e s c ue. Deny Fl i ghts r evi sed
concept of operat i ons (CONOPS), cont ai ned i n Oper at i ons
Pl an (OPLAN) 40101, Deny Fl i ght , change f our , 3 May
1995, est abl i shed t hese combat ai r mi ssi ons. Thi s OPLAN
was i n effect duri ng Del i berat e Force.
The CONOPS, a br oad f l ow pl an t hat under l i es t he speci f i c
gui dance of t he SPI NS , pr ovi ded gener al gui dance f or est ab -
l i shi ng t he operat i onal l evel of effort requi red t o conduct
depl oyment , empl oyment , and l ogi st i cs s uppor t i n t he Bal-
kans ar ea of r esponsi bi l i t y. Gi ven t he pol i t i co-mi l i t ary con -
s t r ai nt s in effect, the SPINS cont r ol l ed and di r ect ed much of
SARGENT
307
t he ai r op erat i ons i n and out of t he TAOO. In light of the
SPINS and t act i cal mi ssi on- pl anni ng fact ors previ ousl y men -
t i oned (e. g. , t hreat s, t arget s , etc. ), the general CONOPS det er -
mi ned t he means of t act i cal empl oyment ( i ngr ess/ egr ess hi gh,
medium, or low); location of forces; ways of flowing penetrat-
i ng f or ces i n and out of t he t ar get ar ea; and command, con -
t rol , and coordi nat i on of, as wel l as communi cat i on wi t h, t he
forces (fig. 11.2).
Del i berat e Force ai r operat i ons were an ext ensi on of t he
Deny Fl i ght CONOPS. Hi gh- val ue ai r asset s such as ai r bor ne
bat t l efi el d command and cont rol cent er (ABCCC) EC-130E
aircraft (Bookshelf), NATO airborne early warning (NAEW) E-3A
aircraft , and ai r-t o-ai r refuel i ng t anker s est abl i shed medi um-
altitude orbits over the Adriatic Sea (feet wet). For area de-
confliction over the Adriatic , ABCCC was anchor ed nor t h;
NAEW was anchor ed sout h; and t he t anker s wer e st at i oned
cent ral l y i n t he Sonny and Speedy ai r-t o-ai r refuel i ng
Figure 11.2. Deliberate Force Concept of Operations (From Corona
briefing slides, Lt Gen Michael Ryan, Headquarters AIRSOUTH, Naples,
Italy, 5 December 1995)
DELIBERATE FORCE
308
t r acks. Land- and sea- based tactical air assets would take off,
check in with the CAOC and/or ABCCC, and go feet wet to
rendezvous with their assigned tankers for pre-mission refueling
prior to penetrating Bosnia-Herzegovinas airspace (feet dry).
Aircraft were procedurally rather than positively controlled to
and from t he area because of t he i dent i fi cat i on-fri end-or-foe
t ransponder rest ri ct i ons when t hey operat ed feet dry. However,
when operat i ng feet wet , t he ai rcraft t ransmi t t ed t hei r normal l y
assi gned modes and codes. Regardl ess, t he ai rcraft were pri -
mari l y deconfl i ct ed i n t he ai rspace by al t i t udes, t i me, speci al
corri dors, and gat es/ drop poi nt s. Tact i cal ai rcraft general l y
fl owed and operat ed i n t he medi um-al t i t ude bl ocks, ent eri ng
between five thousand and 10, 000 feet (light AAA and smal l -
arms t hreat s) and exi t i ng above 10, 000 feet , whi l e rot ary-wi ng
Rapid Reaction Force hel i copt ers al ways operat ed bel ow t hree
t housand feet i n t he TAOO.
The aircraft entered and exited the TAOO via special transit
corri dors t hat had est abl i shed gat es/ drop poi nt s (defi ned by
l at i t ude/ l ongi t ude coordi nat es), al t i t ude bl ocks, and corri dor
widths. From flight to flight, controllers told aircraft to deviate
within the limits of the special corridors to avoid being too
predi ct abl e at t he arri val and depart ure poi nt s. If operat i ng a
CAS/battlefield air interdiction (BAI) mission, strike aircraft
had a tactical air control point (TACP), defi ned by a Bosni a-
Herzegovina geographi cal reference and i t s associ at ed coordi-
nates. Additionally, all aircraft/aircrews were responsible for
following SPINS i nsi de t he TAOO.
11
Wi t hi n t he framework of t he Del i berat e Force CONOPS a nd
SPINS, pl anner s conduct ed and or chest r at ed combat ai r mi s -
si ons, i ncl udi ng suppor t mi ssi ons, t o meet and count er t he
t hreat , sei ze t he i ni t i at i ve, gai n t he offensi ve, and meet t act i cal
objectives. For example, the CONOPS for Bouton Dor, t he ai r -
st ri ke pl an for prot ect i ng t he Saraj evo ar ea, mi ght i ncl ude
SEAD agai nst t he BSAs IADS; CAS/BAI agai nst BSA fielded
forces; and air interdiction (AI) agai nst BSA command and
control (C
2
), di r ect and essent i al suppor t , and suppor t i ng l i nes
of communi cat i ons. Thus, gi ven t he combi ned f or ce mi x,
weapons, and t ar get s, combat mi ssi on t act i cs sought t o ac-
complish the mission accomplishment yet enhance survivabilit y.
SARGENT
309
Combat Air Patrol
Operating in the role of offensive counterair and under cl ose
control of NAEW (call sign Magic) or another air control unit
(ACU) such as a US Navy E-2C Skyhawk (call sign Cricket),
CAP mi ssi ons sought t o det ect , i dent i fy, and engage any fi xed-
wi ng or rot ary-wi ng aircraft that violated the NFZs . The pri-
mar y CAP pl ayer s i ncl uded t he Br i t i s h (FMK-3) , Fr ench
(M2000C), Dutch (NF-16A), and Turks (TF-16). Working in the
medi um-bl ock al t i t udes, t hey were rout i nel y assi gned t i me-on-
st at i ons i n t hei r sect ored areas of responsi bi l i t y t o provi de 24-
hour force protection, all the while observing TAOO boundar i es
and borders of the former Republic of Yugoslavia . NAEW/ ACU
approved al t i t ude vari at i ons, but Gen Hal Hornburg, CAOC
director (call sign Chariot), had to approve CAP flights below
10,000 feet or into SAM rings. The NATO fighters utilized two-
and four-shi p rovi ng, racet rack, or bar CAPs, usually over air -
fields in Bosnia-Herzegovina , and any t asked CAS/BAI suppor t
control points, always anchored feet wet over the Adriatic Sea
in particular CAP st at i ons (forward and rear/ nort h and sout h),
t o prot ect hi gh-val ue ai r asset s. Al t hough t hese asset s sup-
ported OAS, t hey funct i oned i n a defensi ve count erai r role.
Additionally, aircraft flying CAP obtained pilot in-flight reports
on t he weat her when so request ed by t he CAOC; during poor
weat her t he fi ght ers di d t hi s every hour on t he hour duri ng
dayl i ght mi ssi ons and peri odi cal l y at ni ght .
Operat i ng i n t he TAOO, CAP ai rcraft had t hei r orbi t s ad -
j ust ed t o prevent spi l l out s i nt o i nt ernat i onal l y cont rol l ed ai r -
space, t aki ng care t o remai n wel l cl ear of t he former Republ i c
of Yugoslavia s ai rspace. When necessary, t he fi ght ers maneu -
vered t o faci l i t at e earl y det ect i on and t i mel y i nt ercept s of un-
a ut hor i z e d f l i ght a c t i vi t y i n t he NFZs whi l e i nf or mi ng
NAEW/ ACU of t hei r i nt ent i ons. Aft er commi t t i ng t o an i nt er -
cept , t hey had t o abi de by SPINS and ai r-t o-ai r ROE.
The primary tactic of the CAP fighters was a visual identifi -
cation (VID) i nt ercept or pass t o a posi t i on behi nd or besi de
t he t arget and wi t hi n weapons range. Aft er i dent i fyi ng NFZ
vi ol at i ons, t he fi ght ers report ed t he l at i t ude/ l ongi t ude of t he
cont act ; course, speed, and al t i t ude; VID or unknown mar k-
i ngs; i nt ercept st at us; and t i me t o t he appropri at e cont rol l i ng
DELIBERATE FORCE
310
agency. Duri ng Del i berat e Force t he NAEW/ ACU and CAP air -
craft det ect ed 46 NFZ vi ol at i ons. Remarkabl y, no i nt ercept
engagement s or empl oyment of ai r-t o-ai r weaponry occurred
duri ng t hat t i me.
Suppressi on of Enemy Ai r Defenses
Prior to Deliberate Force, SEAD mi ssi ons prot ect ed fri endl y
forces from enemy ai r defenses on t he gr ound. They di d so by
neut ral i zi ng, degradi ng, or dest royi ng ground-based el ect ro -
magnet i c emi t t er s such as ear l y war ni ng/ gr ound- cont r ol l ed
i nt er cept ; command, cont r ol , and communi cat i ons s ys t ems ;
SAM/ AAA fi re-cont rol syst ems; and associ at ed surface-t o-ai r
weapons. Commander s aut hor i zed st and- al one SEAD a s a
separ at e mi ssi on when t hey needed cont i nued ai r bor ne oper a -
tions within the range of SAM syst ems and when NATO/ UN-
PROFOR ai rcraft operat i ng wi t hi n t he danger zone (SAM en -
g a g e me n t r i n g ) f o u n d t h e ms e l v e s a t r i s k . Be c a u s e o f
pol i t i co-mi l i t ary const rai nt s, SEAD engagement s had t o be
proport i onal t o t he t hreat . By t he t i me Del i berat e Force com-
menced, pl anner s had desi gned ai r operat i ons pl ans Deadeye
Sout heas t and Deadeye Nor t hwest t o neut ral i ze, di srupt , or
dest roy t he BSAs IADS.
I n t he ear l y mor ni ng hour s of 30 August 1995, Del i ber at e
Force ki cked off wi t h a SEAD st r i ke ai med at neut r al i zi ng
t he BSAs defense net work i n sout heast Bosni a . Under Dead-
eye Sout heas t , a package of 17 ai r cr af t F- 18C Hor net s a n d
EA-6B Prowl ers f r om t he USS Theodore Roosevel t st r uck
SAM s i t es , command pos t s , ear l y war ni ng r adar s i t es , and
c ommuni c a t i ons node s t o t he nor t h, e a s t , a nd s out h of
Saraj evo . SEAD t act i cs, whi ch i ncl uded t he use of AGM- 88
HARMs, t a c t i c a l a i r - l a u n c h e d d r o n e s , a n d l a s e r - g u i d e d
bombs (LGB), opened t he way for fol l ow-on ai r st ri kes by
ot her NATO ai r cr af t at BSA a mmu n i t i o n d u mp s a r o u n d
Saraj evo . After the first SEAD ai r st r i ke ar ound Sar aj evo,
Del i berat e Force i ni t i at ed a seri es of SEAD s t r i kes s pr eadi ng
out f r om t hat ci t y, event ual l y hi t t i ng ear l y war ni ng a nd c om-
muni cat i ons f aci l i t i es ar ound t he heavi l y def ended Banj a
Luka ar ea i n nor t hwes t Bos ni a . Towar d t he end of t he ai r
campai gn, SEAD s t r i ke s us e d s uc h st andof f weapons as
SARGENT
311
Tomahawk l and-at t ack mi ssi l es, st andoff l and-at t ack mi ssi l es
(SLAM), and GBU-15s.
Daily SEAD operations generally consisted of eight to 12 as -
sets supporting three to five strike packages of anywhere from
12 to 20 aircraft penetrating overland in Bosnia-He rzegovina.
Because no NATO ai rcraft coul d operat e feet dry over Bosni a-
Herzegovi na without SEAD support , t he CAOC s pr ead t he
limited SEAD asset s over a cover age wi ndow t hat st ar t ed at
the arrival of the first SEAD pl at forms on st at i on and cl osed
when t he l ast ones depart ed (t abl e 11. 2). Duri ng Del i berat e
Force t he 785 SEAD s or t i es ( i ncl udi ng bot h s hoot er and
j ammer mi ssi ons) averaged seven wi ndows per day wi t h a
dur at i on of 13. 5 hour s per day and an aver age wi ndow t i me
of t wo hours.
SEAD tactics had HARM shoot ers (F-16 HARM Target i ng
System [HTS] aircraft , F-18s , and EA-6s ) and j ammer s ( EF-
111s and EA-6s) get t i ng si t uat i on updat es from Magi c, Book-
shel f, and Ri vet Joi nt electronic-intelligence aircraft on their
F-18 with HARMs
DELIBERATE FORCE
312
way into the TAOOor a handoff si t uat i on report from t he
SEAD pl ayers t hey repl aced. SEAD mi ssi on commander s wer e
to inform NAEW/ ACU on est i mat ed t i me of arri val at t he i n -
gress corri dor. They, i n t urn, woul d t ransmi t t he wi ndow-open
t i me; pri or t o depart ure from t he st at i on, t he SEAD com-
mander woul d advi se NAEW/ ACU about cl osi ng t he wi ndow
time. As the OAS and t act i cal r econnai ssance assets flowed
i nt o t hei r vari ous orbi t s and worki ng areas, SEAD pl ayers
adj ust ed t hei r posi t i ons t o el ect roni cal l y at t ack t hreat s t hat
came up. If t he fi ght ers penet rat i ng Bosni a-Herzegovi na over -
l and were i n several di fferent areas, t he SEAD package an-
chored in a central orbit could flex (switch) in any direction
requi red. The key poi nt was t o al l ow SEAD assets to flow into
t he opt i mum l ocat i on for support rat her t han remai ni ng t i ed
to one fragged location. Controllers deconflicted SEAD as s et s
Table 11.2
SEAD Windows in Deliberate Force
Air Tasking
Message Day
Dates
(1995)
Window
Opportunities
Time on Station
(hours)
SEAD
Probes
1 2930 Aug 3 3.2 1
2 3031 Aug 9 16.6 9
3 31 Aug1 Sep 6 14.6 6
4 12 Sep 7 16.1 4
5 23 Sep 5 18.8 3
6 34 Sep 4 7.6 0
7 45 Sep 2 19.5 0
8 56 Sep 4 16.8 0
9 67 Sep 4 21.0 0
10 78 Sep 4 22.8 0
11 89 Sep 12 13.4 0
12 910 Sep 15 16.6 0
13 1011 Sep 12 14.1 0
14 1112 Sep 13 14.9 0
15 1213 Sep 8 8.5 0
16 1314 Sep 7 5.4 0
17 1415 Sep 0 0.0 0
115 229.9 23
Source: Extracted from CAOC daily summaries, 29 August14 September 1995. (Confidential) Informa tion
extracted is unclassified.
Total
SARGENT
313
by assi gni ng opt i mum empl oyment al t i t udes for t he part i cul ar
pl at f or m syst ems.
All SEAD pl ayers moni t ored a speci fi c frequency for re-
quest s from penet rat i ng fi ght ers, usual l y st ri ke pri maryal so
moni t ored by Magi c. Any fi ght er request i ng assi st ance pushed
t hat frequency and gave hi s request for support di rect l y t o t he
SEAD package, whi ch responded accordi ng t o current ROE
and i n coordi nat i on wi t h Magi c and Chari ot . For prepl anned
OAS and t act i cal r econnai ssance mi ssi ons t hat penet r at ed
known SAM t hreat ri ngs, di rect -support SEAD packages pr o -
vided optimum HARM and j ammi ng coverage t i ed t o t hat mi s -
sion. All SEAD mi ssi on commander s had t he r esponsi bi l i t y t o
ensure t hat t he pl anni ng and posi t i oni ng of SEAD aircraft
i ncl uded consi derat i on of met hods t o engage t he desi red t ar -
get(s), mi ni mi ze t he chances of engagi ng uni nt ended t arget s ,
and mi t i gat e t he i mpact of possi bl e HARM ambi gui t i es.
12
SEAD ai rcraft accompl i sh t hei r mi ssi ons by ei t her dest ruc-
t i ve or di srupt i ve means, t he former by shoot ers such as US
Ai r Force F- 16 HTS ai r cr af t , F- 117s wi t h PGMs , o r US
Navy/ US Mari ne Corps F-18s with HARMs and t act i cal ai r -
l aunched dr ones, and t he l at t er by j ammer s such as US Ai r
Force EF- 111s and Compass Cal l aircraft or US Navy EA-6Bs
(which can also employ HARMs ). Common to all destructive
SEAD platforms is the HARM, whi ch can be empl oyed i n one
of several mi ssi l e modes: range known, range unknown/ sel f-
protect, target of opportunity, or HARM- as- sensor .
13
The success of HARM empl oyment depends pri mari l y on t he
accuracy of threat location provided by intelligence sour ces,
ability of the pilot to achieve HARM- l aunch par amet er s, and
emi ssi on-cont rol t act i cs empl oyed by t he enemy. The empl oy-
ment range for range known i s approxi mat el y t wi ce t hat of
range-unknown l aunches, gi ven t he same fi ri ng paramet ers. In
addi t i on, range-known l aunches provi de an i ncreased prob -
ability that the HARM will acquire the specific targeted radar
site, especially if employed smartly from the F-16 HTS. This
smart -shoot er mode can be cri t i cal for corri dor suppressi on
and t ar get - ar ea- suppr essi on t act i cs. Al so, one can empl oy
hunt er/ ki l l er t act i cs by usi ng an F-16 HTS el ement as t he
hunt er, whi ch passes t arget i nformat i on t o t he ki l l er (at t ack-
ing) element.
14
DELIBERATE FORCE
314
These medi um- al t i t ude t act i cs wer e empl oyed dur i ng De-
l i ber at e For ce wi t h mi xed r esul t s. Af t er t he f i r st f ew days of
the air campaign, the CAOC had to impose HARM-employmen t
r est r i ct i ons on pr eempt i ve shot s, r equi r i ng appr oval f r om
Chari ot or hi gher t o execut e. Whi l e performi ng SEAD mi s -
si ons, US Navy F- 18s fi red a t ot al of 33 preempt i ve HARMs.
Addi t i ona l l y, a i r c r a f t c oul d e mpl oy r e a c t i ve HARMs o n ly
i f ai rcraft were operat i ng i n Bosni a-Herzegovi na or t he Cr oa -
t i a Rest ri ct ed Operat i ng Zone (CROROZ) and one of t he f ol-
l owi ng condi t i ons exi st ed: (1) posi t i ve i ndi cat i on of a host i l e
act (e. g. , confi rmat i on of fi red mi ssi l es or proj ect i l es) or (2)
dual cor r el at i on of host i l e i nt ent .
15
A t ot al of 27 react i ve
HARMs wer e empl oyed ( what ai r cr ews t er med magnum
shot s) by EA- 6s (10), F/ A-18Cs (t wo), F/ A-18Ds (four), F-16
HTS (ni ne), and EF-18As (t wo) duri ng t he course of Del i ber -
at e For ce.
Wi t h regard t o SEAD di s r upt i on, t he pr i mar y concept s of
empl oyi ng j ammersRavens, Prowlers, and Compass Cal l air -
craft are area-suppressi on operat i ons, corri dor-suppressi o n
oper at i ons , and t ar get - ar ea s uppr es s i on. Ar ea s uppr es s i on
di sr upt s and conf uses t he enemy s I ADS over a relatively
large area. Corri dor suppressi on support s speci fi c mi ssi ons
wi t hi n a more l ocal i zed area and usual l y empl oys t act i cs t ai-
l ored for t he mi ssi on package bei ng support ed. Target -area
suppressi on suppresses enemy defenses prot ect i ng a speci fi c
hi gh-pri ori t y t arget or t arget area.
The j ammers mi ssi on profi l es or t act i cs i ncl ude st andoff
j a mming, close-in jamming, and direct support. In Deliberate
Force, EF-111s primarily performed standoff jamming. These
ai rcraft feat ured a crew of t wo and 10 j ammi ng t ransmi t t ers but
had no armament , whereas t he EA-6B featured a crew of four,
eight jamming transmitters, and HARMs and sur f ace- at t ack
weapons. The EF-111A used the ALQ-99E platform jammer,
based upon t he syst em used by t he Navy s EA-6Bthe ALQ-99.
Although similar, these systems differ somewhat, as does the
employment of the two aircraft. Both platforms were tasked to
preemptively or reactively jam the BSAs IADS over areas in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and CROROZ commensurat e wi t h mi ssi on
and ant i ci pat ed t hreat s. The Ravens primarily flew standoff jam-
mi ng and somet i mes det ached di r ect suppor t , wher eas t he
SARGENT
315
Prowlers flew more direct support since they were equipped with
HARMs. The EF-111A ret ai ns t he speed and range of t he F-111
Aardvark. The EA-6B has nar r ower out put beams t han t he EF-
111A, thereby producing higher effective radiated power. The
Raven jams off its wings, while the Prowler jams to the front of
the aircraft.
16
In Deliberate Force the CAOC learned to coordinate
the two aircraft to complement each others strengths and weak-
nesses in a concerted effort.
Compas s Cal l, anot her i mpor t ant SEAD as s et , i s an EC-
130H ai r cr af t wi t h a comput er - assi st ed, oper at or - cont r ol l ed,
sel ect i ve- j ammi ng syst em desi gned t o suppor t t act i cal ai r
oper at i ons . Dur i ng Del i ber at e For ce, Compas s Cal l s u p -
por t ed of f ensi ve ai r oper at i ons as par t of t he SEAD effort,
or bi t i ng al ong t he coast f r om i t s t ar get ar ea and out si de
lethal SAM r i ngs. At l oi t er ai r speeds t he EC- 130H coul d
r emai n on s t at i on up t o ei ght hour s . Coor di nat i ng wi t h
NAEW/ ACU and cont i nual l y checki ng on each mi ssi on f or
t hr eat war ni ngs, Compass Cal l flew 35 SEAD s uppor t mi s -
si ons dur i ng Del i ber at e For ce.
Offensi ve Ai r Operati ons
OAS employed air forces to execute CAS, BAI, and AI com-
bat ai r mi s s i ons i n cl os e coor di nat i on wi t h UNPROFOR
agai nst t ar get s t o rel i eve si eges of ci t i es and areas i n Bosni a-
Herzegovina , and t o r espond t o at t acks/ f or ces t hat t hr eat ened
t he UN saf e ar eas i n Bosni a-Herzegovi na. These pr opor t i onal
ai r-st ri ke mi ssi ons sought t o show resol ve and capabi l i t y as
wel l as di scourage ret al i at i on by t he warri ng fact i ons. Al -
t hough l i mi t ed i n t i me and scope, OAS pr oved r obust enough
to achieve the desired effect.
17
Cl ose Ai r Support. In Deliberate Force, CAS provi ded 24-
hour r es pons i venes s , as r equi r ed, t o UNPROFOR gr ound
units. By OPLAN 40101s definition, a CAS mi ssi on ent ai l s l i ve
ai r act i on agai nst desi gnat ed t ar get s t hat requi re det ai l ed co -
or di nat i on wi t h f r i endl y gr ound f or ces. The pr oxi mi t y of
friendly forces
18
t o t he engaged t arget s necessi t at ed posi t i ve
cont rol t o i nt egrat e each mi ssi on wi t h t he fi re and movement
of those forces. CAS ai rcraft engaged t arget s of i mmedi at e
concer n t o t he gr ound commander t hat hi s f or ces coul d not
DELIBERATE FORCE
316
engage or t hat proved unsui t abl e t arget s for hi s ground-force
weapons. To be effective, CAS shoul d ful fi l l t he needs of t he
s uppor t ed commander .
The signing of the NATO-UN Air/ Land Coordi nat i on Docu -
me nt on 23 August 1995 pr ovi ded Gener al Ryan and Lt Gen
Bernard Janvi er , force commander of Uni t ed Nat i ons Peace
Forces (FC UNPF), wi t h an operat i onal -l evel document t o con -
duct j oi nt ai r-l and operat i ons. In phase four of t he ai r-l and
operat i ons, SEAD is followed by near-simultaneous CAS , BAI,
and AI mi ssi ons. Ai r-l and coordi nat i on occur r ed i n t er ms of
cl ose or near-ground bat t l es. The bat t l es coordi nat ed by t he
l ocal commander requi red bot h a TACP to control CAS mis -
si ons and deconfl i ct i on of t he Rapi d React i on Forces di rect
and indirect fire with NATO ai r (t he fi re-support commander).
The effectiveness of CAS depended upon t he TACPs capabi l i t y
and weat her condi t i ons. The near bat t l e coordi nat ed by FC
UNPF r equi r ed coor di nat i on and communi cat i on among t he
fi re-support coordi nat i on l i ne, out er def ensi bl e zones, and
fi xed t arget s; the forward air controllers (airborne) (FAC-A)
cont rol l ed engagement zones; and t he free-fi re areas.
19
Because of Deny Fl i ght s CAS exercise, all OA/ A-10, F/ A-
18D, AC-130, and cer t ai n F- 16C, A-6E, or F-14 mi ssi ons wer e
FAC-A capable. CAS/BAI mi ssi ons wi t h overl appi ng t i me-on-
target (TOT) coul d have been t asked t o wor k wi t h one of t hese
FAC-A fi ght ers. Chari ot had t he responsi bi l i t y t o ensure t he
deconfl i ct i on of al l assi gned t arget s wi t hi n t he CAS FAC
boxes.
20
Aircraft engaging targets wi t hi n 10 naut i cal mi l es of
each ot her were cont rol l ed by t he same TACP/ FAC- A on a
si ngl e frequency; however, ai rcraft engagi ng t arget s great er
t han 10 but l ess t han 20 naut i cal mi l es of each ot her wer e
controlled by TACP on separ at e f r equenci es. I n t hi s case t he
t aski ng aut hori t y made bot h fl i ght s aware of adj acent mi s -
sions. Normally, all CAS mi ssi ons occur r ed at or above 10, 000
feet to stay above light AAA and smal l -arms fi re and t o al l ow
reaction time to MANPADs.
The fact that NATO ai rcraft fl ew over one hundred Bl ue
SwordsCAS request s from FC UNPF or t he Rapi d React i on
Forcedemonst rat es t he responsi veness of CAS missions. Af -
t er est abl i shment of t he CAS r equest net , such r equest s t ook
over si x hours for approval event ual l y reduced t o t wo hours.
SARGENT
317
CAS asset s, usual l y A-10s , wer e scr ambl ed t o l aunch or wer e
di vert ed from ai rborne hol di ng orbi t s. The ai r t aski ng message
(ATM) usual l y al l ocat ed one-hour al ert (A-60) or t hree-hour
al ert (A-180) for request s from fri endl y ground uni t s.
21
Aircrews thought that CAS mi ssi ons shoul d have had BAI
backup or vi ce versa t o prevent i neffect i ve mi ssi ons wi t h no
dr ops. I n r et r ospect , however , most of t he CAS r eques t s
sought t o show t hat ai r power was r esponsi ve and r eady t o
st ri ke. Onl y four request s, t wo duri ng Deny Fl i ght and t wo
during Deliberate Force, led to live-fire CAS mi ssi ons. The
Del i berat e Force mi ssi ons occurred on 30 August and 10 Sep-
t ember 1995, t he former i nvol vi ng seven A-10s, t wo F-16s ,
and one Mi r age 2000, whi ch empl oyed Mk-82s, CBU-87s ,
2. 75- i nch r ocket s, and 30 mm guns t o hi t 12 of 16 assi gned
t ar get s, dest royi ng four of t hem. Tact i cs vari ed from worki ng a
wheel (circling the targets ) and maneuvering a figure eight (for
t he A-10s gun empl oyment ) t o rest ri ct ed run-i ns cont rol l ed by
the FAC-A (an OA-10). A US Air Force F-16 dropped t he onl y
bomba l aser-gui ded, sel f-desi gnat ed GBU-12. On 10 Sep-
tember, in the last true CAS mission of Deliberate Force,
three aircraft (an NF-16, a US Air Force F-16, and a Royal Air
Force GR-7) responded to a CAS request, employing Mk-82s and
a GBU-12 to destroy two bunkers and hit an artillery position.
Battl efi el d Ai r Interdi cti on. BAI, a NATO di st i nct i on, de-
fi ned at t acks t hat amount ed t o a cross bet ween AI and CAS
but di d not need a FAC-A. Most strike sorties flown in Deliber -
ate Force fell into this category. Like CAS aircraft, BAI aircraft
t arget ed fi el ded forces but recei ved t arget assi gnment s pri mar -
ily through the ATM and t arget i nformat i on from t he Li nked
Oper at i ons I nt el l i gence Cent er s Eur ope ( LOCE). Ai rcrews
woul d wor k up pr epl anned st r i kes or r ai ds t hat , unf or t u -
nat el y, became a nui sance because t he ATM cycl e const ant l y
changed t aski ngs and/ or t ar get s and because LOCE di d not
generat e t he necessary i magery i n a t i mel y manner. For exam-
pl e, ai rcrews woul d show for a t hree-hour al ert wi ndow and
prepare a fl i ght pl an for t he t arget s, but i n an hour and one-
half, the ATM t as ki ng changed, pl aci ng t hem on s t andby
st at us awai t i ng a TOT. Havi ng onl y 20 mi nut es t o st ep t i me,
t hey woul d recei ve t he t aski ng i nformat i on. Wi t h 10 mi nut es
t o coordi nat e, fi ve mi nut es t o pl an, and fi ve mi nut es t o bri ef
DELIBERATE FORCE
318
t he at t ack, t hey woul d st ep t o t he j et s t o st art engi nes. How-
ever, whi l e i n t he j et s wi t h engi nes runni ng, t hey woul d re-
cei ve word of a one-hour post ponement of t he fl i ght and on
and on, one hour t o t he next . These l i ne-of-si ght , i nconsi st ent
changes frust rat ed ai rcrews, who fai l ed t o see t he rat i onal e
behi nd such t ar get changes.
In the air, BAI ai r cr af t mai nt ai ned communi cat i ons wi t h
Bookshelf or Cricket from initial check-in to mission comple -
t i on. C
2
differentiation on a BAI al ert versus a packaged BAI
created many in-flight coordination and deconfliction difficul-
ties. After resolving these, the aircraft would join up with their
assi gned t ankers, feet wet , awai t i ng t he word t o ent er Bosni a-
Herzegovina . After receiving clearance, controllers deconflicted
BAI ai r cr af t by f our quadr ant s ( nor t heast , sout heast , sout h -
west , and nort hwest ) or engagement zones (EZ). During BAI
execut i on, ai rcraft not speci fi cal l y t asked i nt o an EZ were to
remain clear. BAI ai r cr af t t asked i nt o an EZ r emai ned out si de
unt i l t hei r assi gned t arget -at t ack t i me or wi ndow. Any reat -
t acks on t ar get s i nsi de t he EZ were t o be made from out si de
t he EZ whenever pract i cal . Pri or t o reat t ack, ABCCC resolved
confl i ct s bet ween reat t acks out si de of schedul ed TOT windows
and other BAI mi ssi ons. On one occasi on, an A-10 passed
t hrough t he fi el d of vi ew of an F-16s forward-looking infrared
r a da r when t he F- 16 was about t o l aze t he t ar get 10 seconds
prior to impact. Despite this close call, every BAI mi ssi on had
i nst ruct i ons t o make every reasonabl e effort t o l i mi t col l at eral
damage as much as possi bl e, commensur at e wi t h t he need t o
protect friendly forces. Thus, BAI woul d requi re a ground com-
manders TACP/ FAC-A coordination on free-fire zones to limit
col l at eral damage, fratricide, and casual t i es among r ef ugees/
noncombat ant s .
Because t he ROE required VID of a t arget pri or t o rel easi ng
ordnance, BAI fl i ght s oft en cl eared and i dent i fi ed t he t arget
area by havi ng t he fl i ght l ead do a l ow-al t i t ude, hi gh-speed
passmuch l i ke a cl eari ng pass on a Cl ass C convent i onal or
t act i cs rangewhi l e t he remai nder of t he fl i ght wheel ed
overhead. Gi ven t he t hreat envi ronment , t he VID t ar get pass
was a sport y event but a necessary evi l , l eadi ng some t o
argue in favor of generating killer scouts or fast FACs from
CAS/BAI lines (a push-CAS concept).
22
SARGENT
319
The ki l l er-scout ai rcraft (an F-16) l ocat ed t arget s and con -
t rol l ed at t acks on t hem i n a speci fi c operat i ng areai n t hi s
case, t he EZ. The pri mary mi ssi on of t he fast FAC, usual l y
performed beyond t he fi re-support coordi nat i on l i ne wi t hout
operat i ng as a FAC-A, ent ai l ed val i dat i ng t arget s l i st ed i n t he
ATM and ensur i ng t hat no f r i endl y f or ces had moved i nt o an
operat i ng EZ or FAC box. Secondarily, this aircraft provided
cl ose cont rol , area deconfl i ct i on, and vi sual l ookout . If t he
ATM target was validthat is, a confirmed live targetthe
fast FAC woul d mar k t he t ar get and cl ear t he assi gned f i ght er s
t o at t ack i t under fl i ght -l ead cont rol . In a l ow-t hreat envi ron -
ment , a f l i ght of f our woul d use cur vi l i near t act i cs f r om
15, 000 t o 25, 000 f eet and woul d sequent i al l y at t ack t he t ar -
gets f r om r a ndom- a t t a c k he a di ngs . The c ombi na t i ons of
weat her , t errai n, medi um al t i t udes, C
2
del ays, and fi el ded BSA
t ar get s (especially heavy weapons) made BAI and fast FAC
very chal l engi ng mi ssi ons.
Air Interdiction. During Deliberate Force, AI mi ssi ons de-
st r oyed, di sr upt ed, del ayed, and f unnel ed BSA movement s
t hr oughout Bosnia . AI t arget set s i ncl uded C
2
, di rect and es s en -
t i al support , and support i ng l i nes of communi cat i ons (brid ges).
Combi ned forces usi ng PGMs st ruck most of t hese t arget s .
Like BAI, AI mi ssi ons empl oyed t wo-shi p t act i cs ut i l i zi ng LGB
delivery profiles. The tactics employed by US Air Force F- 15Es
and F- 16s reflected the typical tactical profiles exhibited by
the Navys F- 18s, Mar i ne F/ A-18s , and Br i t i sh GR-7s, whi ch
al so expended LGBs .
The 492d Fi ght er Squadr ons F-15E St ri ke Eagl es from
Royal Air Force Lakenheat h, Engl and, empl oyed t wo-shi p, me-
di um-al t i t ude, sel f-desi gnat i on LGB tactics. Utilizing their in -
ertial navigation system, LANTIRN navigation, targeting pod,
and r adar bi t - mappi ng capabi l i t y en r out e, t he F- 15E would
updat e t ar get - ar ea f eat ur es because t he desi r ed mean poi nt s
of impact (DMPI) were t oo smal l t o acqui re vi sual l y at st andoff
ranges. At t acki ng from 20, 000 feet at 0. 9 Mach, t he ai rcraft
woul d rel ease t he LGB approxi mat el y fi ve naut i cal mi l es from
t he t arget and check away 3045 degrees from t he at t ack
headi ng. The weapon syst em offi cer (WSO) woul d capt ure
(i . e. , acqui re) t he t arget ai mi ng poi nt and ensure t hat t he
t ar get i ng pod was t r acki ng t he t ar get . Just pr i or t o t he end of
DELIBERATE FORCE
320
the LGBs time of flight (TOF), the WSO woul d fi re t he l aser
and sel f-desi gnat e hi s own weapon t o i mpact . Ini t i al l y, t he
F- 15Es used a t ermi nal -del ay l azi ng t echni que (fi nal port i on of
TOF), but aft er a few mi sses, possi bl y due t o hi gh-wi nd (about
75 knot s!) correct i ons at end game, ai rcrews adopt ed a con -
t i nuous l azi ng t echni que t o al l ow t he weapon t o make more
const ant adj ust ment s f r om t he wi nd ef f ect s, t hus i mpr ovi ng
t hei r hi t r at es.
By far, t he most di ffi cul t t arget s for the Strike Eagles wer e
bri dges. Al t hough no probl ems exi st ed wi t h at t ack avenues
and l aser l i ne of si ght , t hey needed several t ri al -and-error
mi ssi ons t o drop t he bombs effect i vel y. Despi t e usi ng GBU-
10Is with mixed fusing on different stations, the restrictive
at t ack axi s and l aser - spot di f f usi on r esul t ed i n some mi sses
on smal l t r acks. The F- 15Es weapon of choi ce for bri dge bust -
ing is the GBU-24 Paveway III LGB, but pr obl ems wi t h t he
weapon carri age precl uded use of t hi s bomb unt i l t he very end
of t he ai r campai gn.
Anot her probl em t he F-15s experi enced, t oget her wi t h poor
weat her , was mai nt ai ni ng l i ne of si ght unt i l weapons i mpact
while targeting bridges in deep valleys. During a bridge attack
on 1 Sept ember 1995, an LGB went stupid (i.e., ballistic with -
out guidance), missing the bridge, impacting the far-side em-
bankment , and damagi ng a house. Thi s i nci dent l ed t o rest ri ct ed
run-in headings and single-release ROE for a short t ime.
Duri ng Del i berat e Force, F-15Es al so expended t hei r fi rst
GBU-15s i n combat . Because of orders prohi bi t i ng penet rat i on
of SAM ri ngs duri ng mi ssi ons i n nort hwest Bosni a , t he St r i ke
Eagles used t he GBU- 15, an excel l ent st andoff weapon, t o hi t
t arget s i nsi de t hose ri ngs. Unfort unat el y, i nexperi ence, l ack of
t r ai ni ng, and bad weat her t ai nt ed t hei r debut wi t h t he weapon
syst em. Of t he ni ne GBU- 15s empl oyed duri ng Del i berat e
Force, onl y four found t hei r t arget s . Of the five misses, four
fai l ed t o acqui re t he t arget , and one mal funct i oned.
F-16s of t he 31st Fi ght er Wi ng at Aviano AB, Italy, used
si mi l ar t act i cs and LGB-delivery profiles but experienced their
own uni que probl ems because t hey were empl oyi ng LGBs for
t he fi rst t i me i n combat . Al t hough t he t act i cs of F-16 pi l ot s
f r om t he 555t h Fi ght er Squadr on and t he 510t h Fi ght er
Squadron initially differed because they flew opposing day/ ni ght
SARGENT
321
shi ft s, cross t al k among t he pi l ot s i n bot h squadrons l ed t o
more uni formi t y. Li ke t hat of t he F-15E, t he F- 16s t ypi cal
LGB delivery profile entailed two-to-four-ship, medium-al t i t ude,
del ayed-l azi ng t act i cs. From a 40, 000-foot sl ant range from
t he t ar get , t he F- 16 rel eased t he LGB a nd c r a nke d f or a
spl i t / offset away from t he t arget . Aft er acqui ri ng t he t arget
wi t h hel p from t he t arget i ng pod, t he pi l ot fi red t he l aser pri or
t o t he end TOF of the weapon. The LGB woul d t ravel nearl y
five nautical miles before impact.
Ear l y on i n t he ai r campai gn, t he F- 16s experi enced l ess-
t han- opt i mum r esul t s f r om t hei r GBU- 10 (2,000 lb) deliveries.
Gi ven t hei r l i mi t ed experi ence i n empl oyi ng t hi s weapon, even
t he best of t he pi l ot s st i l l mi ssed about 50 percent of t he
dr ops. Li ke t hei r count er par t s i n t he F- 15Es , F-16 pi l ot s were
not al l owi ng enough t i me for t hei r GBU-10s t o acqui r e t he
l aser ener gy and make upwi nd cor r ect i ons. Consequent l y, t he
31st Fi ght er Wi ng changed from GBU-10s to GBU-12s (500 l b)
wher e weaponeer i ng al l owed. In addi t i on, t he use of GBU-12s
al l owed t he F-16s t o ret urn t o Avi ano wi t hout j et t i soni ng t hei r
bombs i n t he Adri at i c Sea .
Aft er consul t i ng wi t h t he Fi ght er Weapons School at Nellis
Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada, fighter-weapons personnel of
t he 31st Fi ght er Wi ng deci ded not t o change t o cont i nuous
lazing with GBU-10s , as had t he F- 15 pi l ot s, because t he
school was t eachi ng end-game del ayed l azi ng. Inst ead, t hey
opt ed t o subst i t ut e weapons t hat mi ght have compr omi sed
weaponeeri ng at t i mes because t he probabi l i t y of ki l l was l ess
wi t h t he GBU-12s. What coul d t hey have l earned from LGB
employment history? For one, delayed lazing developed from
hi gh-speed, l ow-al t i t ude, l oft -del i very t echni quesnot a me-
di um-al t i t ude t echni que (i n whi ch l ow bal l i st i c energy and
premat ure LGB pi t chover s wer e concer ns) . For anot her , t he
rul e of t humb for l azi ng ever si nce t he days of t he F-4 Phan-
tom cal l ed for cont i nuous l azi ng i f t he weapons TOF lasted
l ess t han 20 seconds and del ayed l azi ng for at l east hal f of t he
TOF i f t he l at t er exceeded 20 seconds. For exampl e, i f a GBU-
10s TOF i s 40 seconds, t he WSO should fire the laser to gain
range accept ance for del i very paramet ers, and aft er weapons
release, the WSO shoul d del ay l aze unt i l t he l ast 20 seconds of
t he TOF. Last l y, l ess end-game, del ayed-l azi ng t i me was not
DELIBERATE FORCE
322
t he answer f or F- 111E/ Fs and F- 15Es t hat f aced t he same
medi um-al t i t ude, hi gh-wi nd del i very condi t i ons i n Operat i on
Desert St orm, empl oyi ng t housands of LGBs. We shoul d not
have had t o rel earn t hi s l esson i n Del i berat e Force.
Another tactical-employment dilemma for the F-16s involved
self-designating versus buddy-lazing techniques. Normally, in a
hi gh-t hreat scenari o, F-16s prefer to employ two-ship LGB t ac-
tics by splitting the target and lazing for each other. This tech -
nique allows mutually supportive deliveries and keeps the sin -
gle-seat pilots head up after weapons release, especially in poor
weather , t hereby enhanci ng si t uat i onal awareness and survi v -
ability. If buddy lazing was the preferred method of delivery, why
did the F-16s end up self-designating? Unfortunately, because of
night-employment conditions (spacing) and the need to employ
four-ship tactics on proximity targeting of DMPIs , buddy-lazing
techniques took a backseat to self-designating. With four-ship
tactics, the lateral and vertical impact effects of a GBU-10 (2,000
lb bomb) at five-thousand-feet mean sea level obscure other
targets. At medi um al t i t ude above t he fragment at i on of t he
weapon, t he four-ship flight would have to deconflict over the
target area by taking spacing (equal to the frag TOF) because t he
DMPI separation is less than the lateral-distance effects of the
munition. Unfortunately, the CAOC did this routinely, especially
wi t h l ast -mi nut e t arget changes .
The answer for the F-16s called for employing two-ship tactic s
with spacing of 1015 nautical miles to ensure that the leaders
bomb fragmentation would not interfere with the wingmans tar -
get acquisition and LGB guidance. Because of weather prob-
lems, reattack options posed other tactical problems. By t he end
of t he ai r campai gn, t he F-16s had adopt ed a shoot er/ cover
tactic for buddy lazing to allow at least one good l aser pod on a
pass. If t he buddy coul d not capt ure, he woul d cal l goal i e,
and t he pi l ot on t he bomb pass woul d desi gnat e hi msel f and
vi ce versa. In hi ndsi ght t he F-16s wi shed t hey coul d have
empl oyed more fi ght i ng-wi ng, buddy-l azi ng t echni ques, espe-
ci al l y from t he begi nni ng; i nst ead, t hey pl anned for si ngl e-shi p
employment, expecting good weather and low threats. However,
night profiles and tight DMPI spaci ng compl i cat ed t hat game
pl an. The l ack of a sound backup pl an and sl ow adapt at i on t o
SARGENT
323
changing combat conditions resulted in the late implementa -
tion of better buddy-lazing tactic sa l esson l earned.
With regard to one other AI tactical highlight, joint employ-
ment of t he GBU-15 and SLAM i n proxi mi t y (same sect or)
pr oduced dat a- l i nked i nt er f er ence pr obl ems t hat sur pr i sed
everyone concerned. The i nt erference resul t ed i n t he el ect ro-
opt i cal present at i on of t he GBU-15 pi ct ur e, nor mal l y pr e-
sent ed on t he F- 15E, i nt r udi ng on t he F/ A- 18s video screen
when t he Hornet was at t empt i ng t o gui de i t s SLAM. Thi s prob-
l em t rashed seven SLAMs because of command-gui dance fai l -
ures. The cost l y j oi nt -empl oyment l esson l earned here i s t hat
i n fut ure confl i ct s one shoul d wri t e SPINS t o coor di nat e and
deconfl i ct pl at forms and st andoff weapons i n t he area, al ong
wi t h t hei r respect i ve el ect ro-opt i cal frequency spect rums.
Tacti cal Issues
Despite adverse weather, C
2
problems, and ROE const rai nt s,
the combined tactics used in Deliberate Force got the job done
with minimal collateral damage. The successful employment of
the combat air missions resulted directly from the multinational
aircrews strong leadership, mutual support, and air discipline,
which remain essential to the effective employment of tactical
aircraft. In retrospect several tactical issues became apparent
during or by the end of the air campaign.
Adverse Weather
The ai rcraft of t he combi ned forces may have been al l -
weat her capabl e ( i . e. , abl e t o l aunch and r ecover i n bad
weat her ), but t hey were not al l -weat her empl oyabl e because
t hey fai l ed t o accompl i sh mi ssi on t aski ng nearl y a t hi rd of t he
t i me because of poor weat her . Given the VID target restric -
t i ons, pi l ot s coul d not drop t hei r bombs i f t he ai rcraft s sen -
sor s coul d not acqui r e t ar get s. Concer ns about col l at er al dam-
age prevent ed t he empl oyment of such ai rcraft as t he F-15E
wi t h i t s synt het i c-apert ure, bi t -mappi ng feat ure because of
unaccept abl e ri sks i nvol vi ng del i very accuracy. At t i mes t hi s
si t uat i on forced ai rcrews t o at t empt t o fl y t hrough hol es i n t he
cl ouds t o drop t hei r bombs, onl y t o l ose si ght of t he t arget i n
DELIBERATE FORCE
324
the last few seconds. Adverse weather combined with the rugged
Bosnian terrain to affect all aspects of air operations, tactics,
and mission effectiveness. Because many CAS mi ssi ons had no
BAI backup wi t h al t ernat e t arget s , NATO aircraft pickled 65
LGBs in the Adriatic Sea. The dismal weather conditions created
high divert fuels, which affected air-to-air refueling operat i ons,
fighter aircrafts combat loiter times, and the gross weight of
weapons carriages for landing. The weather was so doggy that
one F-16 pilot jettisoned his ordnance in the Adriatic four nights
in a row! In addition, aircraft using GBU-15s could not acquire
t hei r assi gned t arget s because of cloud obscuration.
The Gulf War was a wake-up cal l t o war pl anners . Duri ng
Desert Storm, weather /environmental factors affected 37 per -
cent of the sorties flown over Iraq. But somehow the CAOC went
to sleep at the wheel during Deliberate Force in terms of dealing
wi t h t he weat her . The ATM cycle pushed the weather too
much, resul t i ng i n many del ays, cancel l at i ons, and reschedul-
ings, especially in the early morning and late evening. Force-mix
capabi l i t i es shoul d have been adj ust ed t o accommodat e t he
weather /night conditions. Although the ATM cycle usually has a
20 percent weat her-attrition factor built in, perhaps that should
be adjusted upwardssay, to 30 percent. The desire for robust
air operations drove the schedule, regardless of weather condi-
t i onsand this sometimes replaced common sense. If the CAOC
had aut hori zed down days caused by bad weat her , personnel
could have regrouped and exchanged a how goes it with other
p l a y e r s . Un t i l we h a v e t h e t e c h n o l o g y t o p e r mi t a l l -
weather / ni ght -at t ack ai rcraft and preci si on-weapons capability
wi t hi n an accept abl e ci rcul ar error of probabi l i t y, a cookie-
cut t er ATM approach, perhaps on a rot at i ng four-t o-si x-hour
cycl e, woul d be consi derabl y more advant ageous t han a 24-hour
cycl e t hat changes const ant l y. Because t he weat her present s
challenges to all facets of air operations, war planners shoul d
act rat her t han react , st ay i nformed, pl an ahead, and ant i ci pat e
its effect on the tempo of air operations and aircrew morale.
Si ngl e-Stri ke Mental i ty
The fi ght -t he-way-we-t rai n phi l osophy i n a hi gh-t hreat envi -
ronment i mpl i es i ngressi ng qui ckl y at l ow al t i t ude, wi t h mass
SARGENT
325
and economy of force, movi ng across a t arget compl ex i n mi ni-
mum t i me, and egr essi ng j ust as qui ckl y t o enhance sur vi v -
ability. All of the services air-to-ground schools have incorpo-
rat ed t hi s si ngl e-st ri ke ment al i t y, especi al l y t he Ai r Forces
Fi ght er Weapons School. Massi ng fi repower whi l e survi vi ng a
hi ghl y defended t arget i s affect i onat el y known as one pass,
haul ass!a concept ever present on t he mi nds of Del i berat e
Force st ri kers. Aft er al l , past European t hreat scenari os have
us t rai ni ng wi t h t hat mi nd-set . However, ai rcrews have come
t o r eal i zeunl i ke t he peopl e who wr i t e t he t r ai ni ng syl -
l abi t hat i n combat , el ement s of fog, fri ct i on, and chance
(e.g., ROE, di fferent t hreat condi t i ons, poor t arget i ng, and ad -
verse weat her) prevent t hem from i mpl ement i ng t he si ngl e-
st ri ke ment al i t y. As a resul t , pi l ot s may have t o perform mul t i -
pl e passes t o accompl i sh mi ssi on obj ect i ves.
The earl y est abl i shment of ai r supremacy i n t he Gul f War
and Del i berat e Force negat ed or mi ni mi zed t he t hreat from
light AAA, small arms, and some MANPADs, so medium-altit ude
empl oyment has become t he way t o go t o war. Wi t h good
intelligence , survei l l ance, and r econnai ssance in-theater, SAM
t hr eat s can be i sol at ed and pl ot t ed t o enhance avoi dance and
si t uat i onal awar eness; t hus, t he t hr eat envi r onment ( hi gh,
medi um, or l ow) changes, dependi ng on t he l ocat i on of t he
assi gned t arget . Thi s rebuffs t he not i on of once hi gh-t hreat ,
al ways hi gh-t hreat . Tact i cs have t o be fl exi bl e enough t o
adapt to changing conditions of the threat locationsthe battle -
field as well as the TAOO.
So why not adopt a more fl exi bl e and fl ui d t act i cal response
to the TAOO? The probl em l i es not onl y wi t h peacet i me t rai n -
i ng scenari os but al so wi t h t he operat i onal -l evel concept s of
pl anni ng an ai r campai gn. The ai r t aski ng comes down t o
mi ssi on commanders i n st ri ke packages of 60 t o 80 ai rcraft
t hat usual l y at t ack a t arget array i n geographi c proxi mi t y. The
obj ect i ve i s t o hi t assi gned t arget s wi t h al l t hese asset s wi t hi n
a compr essed TOT wi ndow and sat ur at e def enses wi t h many
ai rcraft from di fferent di rect i ons i n t he mi ni mum amount of
t i me. Such gori l l a packages refl ect t he si ngl e-st ri ke ment al-
i t y, but i n t he real worl di n t hi s case t he l ow-t o-medi um
t hr eat i n sout heast Bosni a t he si t uat i on does not demand a
DELIBERATE FORCE
326
si ngl e-st ri ke approach. However, l arge st ri ke packages such
as Bouton Dor empl oyed one-pass-haul -ass t act i cs.
In many cases t he t aski ng i nvol ved ei ght t o 12 ai rcraft goi ng
across a si ngl e t arget compl ex wi t hi n a t wo-t o-fi ve-mi nut e TOT
windowwhich works well if the fighters/ bomber s do not have
t o worry about col l at eral damage . But wi t hi n t he real pol i t i co-
military constraints of Deliberate Force, the actual attack took
20 mi nut es because t he ai rcraft had t o VID the target, deconflict
bomb impacts because of the DMPIs proximity, and circumnavi -
gat e each ot her or t he weat her by reat t acki ng. The massi ng and
concentration of force packages in this type of environment is
counterproductive, needlessly risks lives, and negates effective
mission tactics. Although conditions warranted smart pl at forms
and smart weapons, somehow t he gori l l a concept was not so
smart here. Perhaps a more efficient and effective means of
employment in this type of environment woul d ent ai l t urni ng
the gorillas into chimpsspecifically, a tailored, mission -
specific strike package with 18 to 24 aircraf t spl i t i nt o highly
tactical chimps (two, four, or six ships) deconflicted laterally with
adequat e t i me (2030 mi nut es) t o hi t several t arget areas.
The key to airpower is its inherent versatility, flexibility, and
responsi veness. In fut ure l i mi t ed confl i ct s, wi t h t he except i on
of a SEAD campai gn agai nst sophi st i cat ed IADS or highly de-
fended t arget compl exes, we must al t er t he si ngl e-st ri ke men -
tality of war planners t o a more adapt i ve empl oyment of t act i -
cal asset s engagi ng i n mul t i pl e-t arget at t acks. The pri nci pl es of
mass and economy of force are i mport ant t rut hs i n empl oyi ng
combat forces but are not mandat ory i n every si t uat i on. Some-
t i mes, maneuver and si mpl i ci t y are great force mul t i pl i ers. We
shoul d t hi nk i n t erms of chi mps as wel l as gori l l as.
Not es
1. Wi t hi n surface-t o-ai r mi ssi l e (SAM)-ri ng radar coverage, a hi gh-t hreat
si t uat i on exi st ed, charact eri zed by a radar-i nt ensi ve envi ronment i ncl udi ng
a sophisticated surface-to-air threat (SAMs and antiaircraft artillery [AAA])
and/ or an ai r-t o-ai r t hreat . Out si de t he SAM-ri ng coverage, a l ow-t hreat
envi ronment exi st ed, i ncl udi ng a smal l -arms t hreat , nonradar AAA up t o
and i ncl udi ng 57 mm, and some i nfrared (IR) man-port abl e ai r defense
mi ssi l es.
SARGENT
327
2. Electronic Warfare, OPLAN 40101, Deny Flight, annex F, change
4, 3 May 1995, F-1, F-2. (Confi dent i al ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s uncl assi fi ed.
3. Multi-Command Manual (MCM) 3-1, vol. 2, Threat Reference Guide
and Countertactics (U), 21 October 1994, 5-38 through -44. (Secret) Infor -
4. Combat Informat i on, 29 June 1995, i n MCM 3-1, vol . 2, 5-58
t hrough -62. (Secret ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s uncl assi fi ed.
5. MCM 3-1, vol . 2, 21 Oct ober 1994, 5-94 t hrough -96. (Secret ) Infor -
6. Ibi d. , 5-109 t hrough -11. (Secret ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s uncl ass -
ified.
7. Ibid. , 5-112, -14. (Secret ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s uncl assi fi ed.
works, USAF/ XOXS, Pent agon, Washi ngt on, D. C. , 17 Sept ember 1995, 4.
9. Weaponeeri ng i s t he process of det ermi ni ng t he quant i t y of a speci fi c
t ype weapon requi red t o achi eve a speci fi ed l evel of damage t o a gi ven
t arget , consi deri ng t arget vul nerabi l i t y, weapon effect s, muni t i ons del i very
errors, damage criteria, probability of kill, weapon reliability, etc. When the
obj ect i ve of force empl oyment i s t o empl oy l et hal force agai nst a t arget ,
t arget eers use a vari et y of weaponeeri ng met hodol ogi es t o det ermi ne ex-
pect ed damage l evel s. These weaponeeri ng met hodol ogi es i ncl ude bot h nu -
cl ear and non- nucl ear weaponeer i ng t echni ques. Common t o bot h met hods
i s ai mpoi nt sel ect i on and weapon effect s anal ysi s. Thomas A. Keaney and
Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, vol. 1, Planning (Washi ngt on,
D. C. : Government Printing Office, 1993), pt . 1, fn. 9, p. 13.
10. Power scene demonst r at i on; and Capt Mar k Hal l i sey and SSgt Joe
Gal l i ano, 31st Fi ght er Wi ng/ IN, i nt ervi ewed by aut hor, December 1995.
11. Deny Fl i ght SPINS 028, 26 August 1995, 2-4. (Confi dent i al ) Informa-
t i on ext ract ed i s uncl assi fi ed.
12. Ibid. , 9. (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.
13. Ibid. , 8-17. (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.
15. Ibid. , 9. (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.
16. Operat i on Desert St orm El ect roni c Combat Effect i veness Anal ysi s
(Kelly AFB, Tex.: Air Force Intelligence Command, Air Force Electronic War-
fare Cent er, January 1992), 10-14. (Secret ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s un-
classified.
17. OPLAN 40101, Deny Flight, annex D, appendix 4, change 4, 3 May
1995, D-4-1 through -2. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified. Air
Force Historical Research Agency (hereinafter AFHRA), Maxwell AFB, Ala.,
CAOC-01.
18. Friendly forces include NATO forces; national forces of NATO na-
t i ons; UNPROFOR; West ern European Uni on forces; and part i ci pat i ng forces
of non-NATO nat i ons, nongovernment al organi zat i ons, and pri vat e/ vol un-
t ary organi zat i ons.
DELIBERATE FORCE
328
19. Briefing, COMAIRSOUTH, subject: NATO/UN Air-Land Coordination,
23 August 1995, sl i des 1, 3.
20. Unlike the kill-box divisions of the Gulf War, Bosnia-Herzegovina is
di vi ded i nt o ei ght FAC boxes approxi mat el y 30 naut i cal mi l es square, al ong
wi t h t hree addi t i onal areas coveri ng t he remai nder of t he count ry. Wi t hi n
the boxes, FAC-A and CAS/BAI aircraft operate from five thousand feet
above ground level to a flight level of 20, 000 feet.
21. CAS alert procedures included the following: (1) A-60 aircraft pro-
vided a two-hour response capability to the CAOC for AOCC Sarajevo re -
quest s (t hese ai rcraft were t o be ai rborne one hour aft er not i fi cat i on of
l aunch by t he CAOC) and (2) A-180 ai rcraft were requi red on t arget wi t hi n
four hours of a CAS request from t he AOCC (t hese ai rcraft were t o be
ai rborne t hree hours aft er not i fi cat i on, wi t h one hour al l owed for t ransi t ).
Deny Flight SPINS 028, 26 August 1995, 12, AFHRA, NPL-09-02. (Confiden -
t i al ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s uncl assi fi ed.
22. The Mar i ne Cor ps adapt ed t he push- CAS syst em t o ensur e adequat e
ai r support t o Mari ne ground forces. The 3d Mari ne Ai rcraft Wi ng began
sur ge oper at i ons usi ng t he syst em on 22 Febr uar y, t wo days bef or e t he
st ar t of t he gr ound assaul t dur i ng Oper at i on Deser t St or m. The push- CAS
syst em cal l ed for ai rcraft t o l aunch accordi ng t o a speci fi c schedul e but
wi t hout a speci fi c mi ssi on or t arget . If t he ai rcraft were not used for a CAS
mi ssi on wi t hi n a speci fi ed peri od of t i me, t hey were handed off t o t he di rect
ai rborne support cent er for furt her handoff t o a fast FAC for deep ai r
support . The goal s of t he procedures were t o mai nt ai n and cont i nue t o
push aircraft to effective missions. Keaney and Cohen, vol. 4, Weapons,
Tactics, and Training, and Space Operations (Washi ngt on, D. C. : Government
Printing Office, 1993), pt . 1, US Mari ne Corps Push CAS.
SARGENT
329
Chapt er 12
Del i berate Force Combat Ai r Assessments
Despi t e t he pol i t i co-mi l i t ary const rai nt s and sensi t i vi t i es t o
col l at eral damage i n t he Bal kans regi on, Del i berat e Force was
a successful ai r campai gn because of very careful pl anni ng
and execut i on t hat r emai ned wi t hi n t he r ul es of engagement
and combi ned mul t i rol ed smart pl at forms, weapons, t arget -
i ng, and empl oyment t act i cs. That i s, t he operat i on was a
smar t l y r un, r obust ai r campai gnnot j ust a hi t em har der
with more aerial campaign. Tying together the air campaigns
pl at forms, weapons, t arget s , and t act i cs , t hi s chapt er gr aphi-
cal l y and st at i st i cal l y capt ures Del i berat e Force by exami ni ng
combat ai r assessment s i n t he fol l owi ng areas: ai r operat i ons
summar i es, weapon i mpact s, post st r i ke r esul t s, and t act i cal -
empl oyment effect i veness.
Ai r Operati ons Summari es
Duri ng Del i berat e Force, ai rcraft from ei ght Nort h At l ant i c
Treaty Organization (NATO) nat i ons pl us t he al l i ances own
assets combined to fly a total of 3, 535 sorties (fig. 12. 1), clas -
si fi ed as ei t her penet rat i ng or support (fi g. 12. 2). The 2, 470
penet rat i ng mi ssi ons (70 percent of al l sort i es), whi ch fl ew
feet dry into Bosnia-Herzegovinas ai rspace, i ncl uded cl ose
ai r support (CAS), battlefield air interdiction (BAI) , s uppr es -
si on of enemy ai r defenses (SEAD), r econnai ssance , and com-
bat sear ch and r escue ( CSAR). The 1, 065 suppor t mi ssi ons
(30 percent of all sorties) included NATO airborne early warn -
i ng, ai rborne bat t l efi el d command and cont rol cent er (ABCCC),
electronic intelligence/ el ect r oni c suppor t mi ssi on , air-to-air
refuel i ng, and s ear ch and r es cue. The ratio of penetrating to
support sort i es was 2. 3: 1. The Uni t ed St at es led all nations in
t he number of bot h penet r at i ng and suppor t sor t i es f l own
(figs. 12. 3 and 12. 4).
331
Figure 12.1. National Sortie Distribution
Figure 12.2. Overall Sortie Distribution
Figure 12.3. Distribution of Penetrating Sorties
DELIBERATE FORCE
332
Prior to Deliberate Force, the force structure of Operation
Deny Flight was divided into two tracking categoriesstrikers
and support ers. At some undet ermi ned t i me duri ng Del i berat e
Force, however, the combined air operations center (CAOC)/ Lt
Gen Michael Ryan, combined force air component commander
(CFACC), changed t he st ri kers cat egory t o penet rat ors, i ncl udi ng
not only strikers but also supporters. Although penetrators ma y
be a convenient term to track sorties in and out of the area of
responsibility (AOR), the lumping of attackers (fighters/bombers)
with supporters (passive platforms) makes for a distorted picture
when one t ri es t o exami ne aerospace pl at forms under t hei r re-
spective roles and missions (figs. 12.5 and 12.6, table 12.1). For
instance, offensive counterair mi ssi ons mi ght have penet rat ed
Figure 12.4. Distribution of Support Sorties
Figure 12.5. Deliberate Force Missions
SARGENT
333
Figure 12.6. Deliberate Force Mission Apportionment
Table 12.1
Deliberate Force Mission Apportionment
Nation CAP SEAD CAS/BAI Reconnaissance Support Total
France 60 0 109 81 30 280
Germany 0 28 3 36 0 67
Italy 0 0 26 0 6 32
Netherlands 56 0 86 52 0 194
Spain 0 52 46 0 27 125
Turkey 70 0 4 0 0 74
United
Kingdom
80 0 156 61 39 336
United
States
28 705 935 82 578 2,328
NATO 0 0 0 0 99 99
Flown 294 785 1,365 312 779 3,535
Scheduled 298 858 1,173 368 788 3,485
Source: Operation Deliberate Force Factual Review, vol. 2 of 7, annex A, appendices 26, AIRS OUTH,
Naples, Italy, 14 October 1995, US Air Force Historical Research Agency (hereinafter AFHRA), Maxwell AFB,
Ala., NPL-09. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.
DELIBERATE FORCE
334
Bosni a-Herzegovi na ai rspace, but t hey were not i ncl uded i n
t he penet rat i ng-ai rcraft t ot al s.
Joi nt Operat i ons
Aircraft of the US Air Force, Navy, Army, and Mari ne Corps
f l ew 2, 087 ai r - st r i ke and ai r - suppor t mi ssi ons ( f i g. 12. 7) ,
1, 499 or 71. 8 percent of whi ch were ai r st ri kes, i ncl udi ng
SEAD, CAS, BAI, and AI feet dry over Bosnia-Herzegovina: Air
Force (774 or 51. 6 percent), Navy (583 or 38. 9 percent ), and
Mari ne Corps (142 or 9. 5 percent ). The Army r epl aced t he
Mari ne Corps i n fl yi ng support sort i es (588 or 28. 2 percent ),
i ncl udi ng r econnai ssance, air-to-air refueling, ABCCC, elec-
tronic intelligence, airborne early warning (AEW), and CSAR :
Air Force (392 or 66. 7 percent), Navy (165 or 28. 1 percent ),
and t he Ar my (31 or 5. 2 percent pri mari l y reconnai ssance
fl i ght s by unmanned aeri al vehi cl es ).
Some peopl e heral ded Del i berat e Force as a model of i nt er-
servi ce cooperat i on, whi l e ot hers qui ckl y poi nt ed out t hat t he
ai r-st ri ke operat i ons were st i l l punct uat ed by ri val ri es a nd
mi sunder st andi ngs among t he ser vi ces. Some of t he gr owi ng
pai ns of j oi nt ness t hat occurred over t he 17-day US/ NATO air
campai gn agai nst t he Bosni an Ser bs i ncl uded
Figure 12.7. US Joint Sortie Distribution
SARGENT
335
Navy frust rat i on wi t h t he Ai r Forces cent ral i zed cont rol of
t he mi ssi on t aski ng, especi al l y wi t h an ai r t aski ng mes-
sage (ATM) speci fyi ng t he t ype of ordnance t o be used on
par t i cul ar t ar get s.
Ri val ry over whi ch servi ce and ai rcraft shoul d fl y bombi ng
mi ssi ons because everyone want ed a pi ece of t he act i on.
Communi cat i ons i nt eroperabi l i t y (get t i ng t hrough t o t he
shi ps i n t he Adri at i c was a bi g probl em, especi al l y when
t wo carri ers operat ed t oget her, whi ch put a heavy l oad on
t he l i mi t ed sat el l i t e line available).
Unfamiliarity of Marine aircrews with Air Force flight-line
rul es, especi al l y ent ry-cont rol l ed poi nt s.
Desire voiced by Air Force ai rcrews i n t he aft ermat h of
Deliberate Force for augmenting the services inventory with
a 1,000 lb laser-guided bomb (LGB)the weapon of choice
with respect to joint/combined weapons interoperability.
Fort unat el y, none of t hese cul t ural di fferences seri ousl y
affect ed t he ai r campai gn. But despi t e more t han a decade of
purple experience, joint operations are far from seaml ess
and need furt her at t ent i on pri or t o fut ure confl i ct s.
Combi ned Sorti e Summary
On t he aver age, t he combi ned f or ces had a dai l y mi ssion-
capabl e rat e of over 90 percent i n support of Del i berat e Force
(t abl e 12. 2), wi t h t he l owest number of sort i es fl own on ATM
day 17 and t he hi ghest number on day 10, al ong wi t h t he
hi ghest number of t ar get s t asked (27). The hi ghest number of
t asked desi red mean poi nt s of i mpact (DMPI) (116) occurred
on ATM day eight. The first cease-fire t ot al s occurred on ATM
days f our t hr ough seven, number i ng 737 sor t i es. As a mi nor
poi nt , one mi ght not e t hat t he t ot al number of penet r at i ng
sorties excludes penetrating missions flown by unmanned aeria l
vehicles (28) and CSAR aircraft (19).
CAOC operat i ons, poor weat her, technical (avionic) prob-
l ems , or mechani cal ( ai r cr af t ) pr obl ems r es ul t ed i n 745
ground- or ai r-abort ed sort i es (over 21 percent of t he t ot al
number fl own) (fi g. 12. 8 and t abl e 12. 3). Abort s caused by
such CAOC operat i ons as mi ssi on-schedul ed l i ne changes or
DELIBERATE FORCE
336
Table 12.2
Deliberate Force Sortie Summary
Date
(1995)
ATM
Day
Scheduled Added Ground
Aborted
Flown Air
Aborted
Penetrated
2930 Aug 1 124 1 3 122 0 85
3031 Aug 2 244 24 26 242 4 170
31 Aug1 Sep 3 237 52 16 273 23 202
12 Sep 4 206 5 32 179 6 118
23 Sep 5 272 2 91 183 8 103
34 Sep 6 183 11 5 189 10 122
45 Sep 7 185 20 19 186 3 122
56 Sep 8 191 84 10 265 3 176
67 Sep 9 193 119 25 287 43 213
78 Sep 10 245 103 54 294 0 232
89 Sep 11 226 42 11 257 17 171
910 Sep 12 229 13 31 211 10 145
1011 Sep 13 223 25 26 222 1 152
1112 Sep 14 216 48 9 255 5 180
1213 Sep 15 162 54 6 210 0 151
1314 Sep 16 178 44 82 140 14 81
1415 Sep 17 171 0 151 20 1 0
Total 3,485 647 597 3,535 148 2,423
Source: Extracted from CAOC daily mission summaries, 29 August14 September 1995, AFHRA, CAOC-15.
(Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.
Figure 12.8. Ground- and Air-Abort Summary
SARGENT
337
gr ound cancel l at i ons had t he gr eat est i mpact on ai r oper ations
(46.7 percent), while adverse weather account ed for 43. 2 percent
of all aborts (affecting nearly one out of every 10 sorties).
Weapon Impacts
Deliberate Forces offensive air operationsSEAD, CAS, BAI ,
and AIaccounted for a total of 1, 026 munition expenditures
(excluding high-speed antiradiation missiles [HARM], rockets, an d
guns). Thi s number i ncl uded 708 (69 percent ) preci si on muni-
t i ons and 318 (31 percent) nonprecision munitions , the former
including LGBs /guided-bomb units (GBU) (-10, - 12, -16, -24,
and AS30L), el ect ro-opt i cal / i nfrared weapons (st andoff l an d-
attack missile [SLAM], GBU-15, and AGM-65), and Tomahawk
land-attack missiles (TLAM). Aircraft expended a total of 630
precision-guided munitions (PGM) primarily on three target sets:
(1) air defense si t es and command, cont rol , and communi ca -
tions (C
3
) (215); (2) ammo and supply depots/facilities (351); and
(3) bridges and lines of communications (LOC) (64). Nonpreci-
sion weapons included general-purpose (GP) bombs (Mk-82, -83,
and - 84) and cluster-bomb unit (CBU)-87s. Aircraft expended a
total of 54 GP bombs against two target sets: (1) ammo and
supply depots/facilities (32) and (2) C
3
and ai r defense sites (22).
Ordnance expenditures by US joint forcesAir Force, Navy,
and Mari ne Corpsfor both Deliberate Force and Deadeye re-
sulted in approximately 406 target hits (374 PGMs and 32 GP
bombs). Of the 374 PGM t arget hi t s out of 618 at t empt s, the Air
Force hit 282 of 407 (69 percent) (table 12.4), the Navy hi t 65 of
Table 12.3
Ground- and Air-Abort Summary
Ground % Air % Totals %
Operations 343 57.50 5 3.40 348 46.70
Weather 245 41.00 77 52.00 322 43.20
Technical 5 0.80 33 22.30 38 5.10
Mechanical 4 0.70 33 22.30 37 5.00
Total 597 100.00 148 100.00 745 100.00
% 80.1 19.9 100
DELIBERATE FORCE
338
166 (39 percent), and the Marines 27 of 45 (60 percent), for a
joint PGM effectiveness total of approximately 60 percent (374 of
618). The hit/miss analysis of PGMs was based on a 15-foot
circular error of probability. Among the standoff-weapon PGM
expenditures, the GBU-15, SLAM, and TLAM resul t s were l ess
than ideal, the GBU-15 hitting four of nine (44 percent) with
four misses due to faulty target acquisition, the SLAM hi t t i ng
only two of 10 (20 percent) with seven of eight misses resulting
from command-guidance failure due to GBU-15 data-link inter -
ference, and the TLAM hitting nine of 13 (69 percent). On the
nonprecision side, the Air Force hit 28 of 32 GP bombs (88
percent), and the Navy four of 10 (40 percent), for a joint nonpre-
cision hit percentage of 76 percent (32 of 42). The Marines did
Table 12.4
US Air Force Precision Munitions Analysis
Aircraft Munition Released Hit % Hit
F-15E GBU-10
GBU-12
GBU-15
72
18
9
48
18
5
67
100
56
Totals 99 71 72
F-16 GBU-10
GBU-12
204
81
132
58
65
72
Totals 285 190 67
A-10 AGM-65 23 21 91
Total
407 282 69
No. Misses Munition Reasons:
Aircraft
Crew Weather Weapon
96 GBU-10 4 (4%) 26 (27%) 32 (33%) 34 (36%)
23 GBU-12 0 5 (22%) 10 (43%) 8 (35%)
4 GBU-15 0 1 (25%) 2 (50%) 1 (25%)
2 AGM-65 0 0 0 2 (100%)
Total 125 4 (3%) 32 (26%) 44 (35%) 45 (36%)
Source: Briefing slides, Col Chuck Wald, commander, 7490th Composite Wing (Provisional), Aviano AB, Italy,
subject: Operation Deliberate Force Update, 15 September 1995 (unclassified), AFHRA, AVI-04.
SARGENT
339
not expend any dumb (unguided) bombs. Thus, the joint
combined-munition (precision/nonprecision) hit percentage was
61.5 percent (406 of 660).
Post st ri ke Resul t s
The most basic possible targets of airpower are will and
capability. Will is the determination of an actor to resist
influence; Clausewitzs trinity of the leadership, the people,
and the military represent [sic] the will of the nation. Will is the
ultimate targetnot capability. . . . Capability is the ability to
resist influence. Will can be indirectly targeted by destroying
capability. If a leader believes he cannot effect his military
strategy (offense or defense) because his military capability is
bei ng dest royed, he wi l l of t en cede t o enemy i nf l uence,
especially when his enemys demands are limited.
Skunkwor ks, Di scussi on of t he
Air Strategy in Bosnia
As an i nst rument of Uni t ed Nat i ons (UN)/NATO pol i cy and
objectives in Bosnia , a maj or part of t he ai r st rat egy i nvol ved
t he appl i cat i on of ai rpower t o degrade t he combat capabi l i t y of
t he Bosni an Ser bs, which would jeopardize their ability to
sust ai n combat oper at i ons. Because of t he manner i n whi ch
al l i ance forces woul d empl oy ai rpower, t he Bosni an Serbs
woul d be har d pr essed t o make addi t i onal t er r i t or i al gai ns and
mi ght be unabl e t o defend current l y hel d t erri t ori es. As a
resul t , t he possi bi l i t y of a successful Croat i an or Musl i m
ground offensi ve woul d i ncrease. Thus, t he Bosni an Serbs
would be more likely to negotiate in good faith.
1
By t he t i me of t he second cal l for a cease-fi re duri ng Del i b -
er at e For ce at 2200Z on 14 Sept ember 1995, t he ai r st r at egy
had pai d off. The wi l l of t he Bosni an Serbs ceded to the effi -
cacy of t he bombi ng: t he Bosni an Serb army (BSA) ceased
host i l i t i es, compl i ed wi t h r equi r ement s t o wi t hdr aw heavy
weapons from t he t ot al -excl usi on zones , and began negot i a -
t i ons for a peaceful set t l ement . The demonst rat ed resol ve of
ai rpower i n carryi ng out an effect i ve t arget i ng pl an, al ong wi t h
some limited NATO ground-force artillery efforts, led to the
degradat i on of t he Bosni an Serbs military capability.
DELIBERATE FORCE
340
Wi t h respect t o ai r-st ri ke mi ssi ons, t he combi ned ai r cam-
pai gn dest royed nearl y 87 percent of t he t arget set s wi t hi n t he
range of mi l i t ary si gni fi cance t hat had l at eral l i nks t o t he over -
all military objective (fig. 12.9). BSA t ar get set s i ncl uded di rect
and essent i al mi l i t ary support , C
3
, i nt egrat ed ai r defense sys -
tems (IADS), i nfrast ruct ure (support i ng LOCs ), and fielded
forces (table 12. 5). Aircraft attacked a total of 357 individual
t arget s or DMPIs, 290 of whi ch (81 percent ) met damage cri t e -
ria, while 67 (19 percent) did not. During two days of CAS
mi ssi ons, 30 August and 10 Sept ember 1995, al l i ance ai rcraft
at t acked 19 t ar get s i n t he BSAs fielded forces: seven artillery
t ubes, fi ve bunkers, t hree ant i ai rcraft art i l l ery si t es, t hree mor -
t ar si t es, and one smal l warehouse. Overal l , an i mpressi ve t wo
out of t hree i ndi vi dual t arget s were totally destroyed.
Fixed targets and their respective aiming points (DMPIs ) for
the Sarajevo zone of action (ZOA) and for Deadeye Northwest
and Sout heast (tables 12. 6 and 12. 7) met damage criteria when
two-thirds of the DMPIs had been destroyed. Mission reports,
ground reports, cockpit videos, tactical reconnaissance, nat i onal
imagery, and signal intelligence verified the bomb damage as -
sessments (BDA) . By the time Deliberate Force came t o a cl ose,
308 of the 346 DMPIs had been at t acked, and 305 of t hem met
Figure 12.9. Poststrike Results (From Corona briefing slide no. 49, Lt Gen
SARGENT
341
BDA criteria, obviating the need for reattackthus, only 41
required return visits (fig. 12.10).
2
By the end of Operation Deliberate Force on 14 September
1995, only seven Sarajevo ZOA targets and one Deadeye target
remained, as well as 32 Sarajevo DMPIs and 11 Deadeye DMPIs
(figs. 12.11 and 12.12). The remaining option-two targets could
Table 12.5
Individual Targets Attacked/Destroyed
Did Not Meet
Damage Criteria
Met Damage
Criteria
Target
Categories
Targets
Attacked
No Damage Light Damage Moderate
to Severe
Damage
Destroyed
C
3
9 0 1 0 8
Infrastructure
(Supporting
LOCs)
13 1 3 0 9
Direct and
Essential
246 7 40 42 157
Fielded
Forces
19 4 unknown 9 6
IADS 70 1 10 7 52
Total 357 13
(4%)
54
(15%)
58
(16%)
232
(65%)
Source: Corona briefing slides, Lt Gen Michael Ryan, Headquarters AIRSOUTH, Naples, Italy, 5 December 1995.
Table 12.6
Sarajevo ZOA Targets
Total Fixed
Targets
Total Aiming
Points
Damage
Criteria Met
Targets
Remaining
Command and
Control
4 9 4 of 4 0
Supporting
LOCs
15 15 9 of 15 6 of 15
Direct and
Essential
17 258 16 of 17 1 of 17
Ammo Storage
Area
10 190 10 of 10 0
Total 46 472 39 of 46 7 of 32
Source: Corona briefing slides, Lt Gen Michael Ryan, Headquarters AIRSOUTH, Naples, Italy, 5 December
1995.
DELIBERATE FORCE
342
have l ast ed anot her t wo or t hree days before pl anners would
have had t o nomi nat e opt i on-t hree t arget s, whi ch carri ed mod -
erat e t o hi gh ri sks for col l at eral damage. Fort unat el y, b a d
weat her and t he second cease-fi re abat ed an ot herwi se di ffi -
cul t near - t er m t ar get i ng si t uat i on.
Table 12.7
Deadeye Targets
Total Fixed
Targets
Total Aiming
Points
Damage
Criteria Met
Targets
Remaining
Command and
Control
3 14 3 of 3 0
Early
Warning
4 24 4 of 4 0
Radio Relay 12 38 11 of 12 1 of 12
Surface-to-Air
Missiles
1 1 1 of 1 0
Total 20 77 19 of 20 1 of 12
Figure 12.10. Deadeye Results (From Corona briefing slide no. 22, Lt Gen
SARGENT
343
Figure 12.11. Targets Remaining (From Corona briefing slide no. 46, Lt Gen
Figure 12.12. DMPIs Remaining (From Corona briefing slide no. 47, Lt Gen
DELIBERATE FORCE
344
Tact i cal - Empl oyment Ef f ect i veness
According to Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace
Doctrine of the United States Air Force, Del i berat e Force was a
medi um-i nt ensi t y, combi ned ai r operat i on t hat empl oyed con -
vent i onal smart weapons wi t h l i mi t ed resources t o achi eve
l i mi t ed, l ower-l evel obj ect i ves i n a si t uat i on i n whi ch nucl ear,
chemi cal , or bi ol ogi cal warfare was not an i ssue.
3
By Gulf War
st andar ds, t he i nt ensi t y of t he Bal kans ai r campai gn was ver y
modest. In two-fifths the time, Deliberate Force involved only
one-fourt h t he asset s, one-t went y-fi ft h t he sort i es, and l ess
t han one- hundr edt h t he bomb t onnage compar ed t o Oper at i on
Desert Storm. Nevert hel ess, t he t wo operat i ons were bot h suc-
cessful coal i t i on ai r campai gns, ai ded by an i nt ri cat e combi-
nat i on of weapon s ys t ems , s uppor t s ys t ems , and t act i cs .
Thus, Del i berat e Force provi des a snapshot opport uni t y for
revi ewi ng t he performance of t he mul t i nat i onal ai r show of
weapons and t act i cs used i n achi evi ng Gener al Ryans tactical
objective of leveling the playing field in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Although the CFACC usually works at the operational level of
war, the politico-military environment and constraints of Delib -
erate Force drove General Ryan to focus his attention at all
levels, leading to his tight control of the air campaign and or -
chestration of the combined NATO forces to accomplish mission
objectives within the Balkans AOR. This entailed effective con -
ception, organization, and conduct of the major air operations
t hat gui ded successful t act i cal event s agai nst Bosni an Serb
ground forces. Here, the focus is on those tactical missions that
applied combat power as military leverage to alter the advan-
tages gained by the BSA from violating UN resolutions.
Combat Ai r Patrol / Offensi ve Counterai r
All told, the multinationals flew 294 CAP sort i es, provi di ng
cont i nuous ai r cover and pr ot ect i on 88 per cent of t he t i me
over t he course of t he campai gn. Remarkabl y, duri ng t he 17
days of the operation, the only CAP gaps (on-st at i on l osses)
amount ed t o 39 hour s and 45 mi nut es. Ei ght y- ei ght per cent
of t he gap t i me st emmed f r om abor t s or cancel l at i ons because
of poor weather ; t he rest ai r-abort ed for mechani cal reasons
SARGENT
345
and one for l ack of an avai l abl e t anker. NATO ai rborne earl y
war ni ng/ ai r cont r ol uni t and CAP aircraft detected 46 no-fly-
zone vi ol at i ons duri ng t he course of t he ai r campai gn. No
i nt ercept engagement s or empl oyment of ai r-t o-ai r weaponry
occurred. Overal l , t he mul t i nat i onal ai r pat rol s accompl i shed
t hei r assi gned mi ssi ont o deny t he warri ng fact i ons t he capa -
bi l i t y t o fi ght i n t he ai r and t o prot ect t he Uni t ed Nat i ons
Protection Force from ai r at t acks.
Suppressi on of Enemy Ai r Defenses
During Deliberate Force, SEAD asset s ( bot h shoot er s and
jammers) flew 785 sorties, providing 115 SEAD window oppor -
tunities (e.g., SEAD prot ect i on) for i ngressi ng and egressi ng
aircraft flying feet dry over Bosnia-Herzegovina. The window
(on-st at i on prot ect i on) t ot al ed 229 hours and 39 mi nut esan
average of 13. 5 hours per day and a t ypi cal wi ndow t i me of t wo
hour s.
4
Conduct i ng 23 probe at t acks, SEAD aircraft employed
65 AGM-88 HARMs , t he Uni t ed St at es firing 63 of them36
preempt i ve and 27 react i ve. Spai n s EF-18 Hornet s fired only
two.
5
The Uni t ed St at es flew 89 percent of the SEAD mi ssi ons
wi t h t he remai nder spl i t bet ween Spai n (7 percent) and Ger -
ma n y (4 percent). Among the 705 US SEAD sorties, the Navy
flew 56 percent (395), the Air Force 35 percent (244), and t he
Mari ne Corps 9 percent (66).
6
Duri ng t he Deadeye campai gns,
not one mul t i nat i onal ai rcraft was l ost t o t he BSAs radar-
gui ded surface-t o-ai r mi ssi l es or antiaircraft artillery.
Offensi ve Ai r Operati ons
US joint forces account ed for nearl y hal f t he st ri ke pl at -
forms used i n Del i berat e Force and fl ew 68. 5 percent of t he ai r
st ri kes, out fl yi ng t he al l i es 2. 2: 1. The Ai r Force flew the major -
i t y of t he st ri kes (44. 5 percent ), wi t h F-16s fl yi ng t he most
st ri ke mi ssi ons (25 percent ) of al l pl at forms. The Fi ght i ng Fal-
con out fl ew i t s cl osest compet i t ort he Hornet nearl y 2: 1.
The Royal Air Force fl ew 36. 3 percent of t he st ri ke sort i es not
flown by the United States , followed by the French air force
(25 percent ) and t he Dut ch ai r force (20 percent). The GR-7
Harrier II and t he NF- 16A led all allied aircraft in total strike
DELIBERATE FORCE
346
sorties. The following statistics suggest the effectiveness of the
t act i cal empl oyment of st ri ke ai rcraft duri ng Del i berat e Force:
Average number of PGMs per dest royed DMPI2. 8
Average number of GP bombs per dest royed DMPI6.6
Average number of at t ack sort i es per dest royed DMPI
1. 5
Combi ned preci si on bombi ng (GBU/ LGB) per destroyed
DMPI3.7
Pr eci si on muni t i ons ( ot her t han GBU/ LGB) per destroyed
DMPI3.9
Tot al combi ned preci si on weapons (all PGM) per DMPI (hit
effectiveness)2.9
Total combined bombing (all types) per DMPI (hit effec-
t i veness)3. 5 (nearl y hal f t hat of t he Gul f War)
Support mi ssi ons fl own i n Del i berat e Force al so proved qui t e
effective.
Air-to-Air Refueling
Mul t i nat i onal t anker s pr ovi ded mor e t han suf f i ci ent ai r-
refuel i ng capabi l i t y for fi ght er mi ssi ons 24 hours a day over
t he Adri at i c Sea. The onl y t anker probl ems i nvol ved an i nfl exi -
bi l i t y i n changi ng t rack al t i t udes t o get cl ear of cl ouds t o
enhance vi sual rej oi ns, as wel l as a l ack of ent ry/ exi t gat es t o
t he t anker t r acks t o accommodat e a vast number of ai r cr af t
needi ng fuel before and aft er mi ssi ons.
Reconnai ssance
Usi ng i nfrared, el ect roni c, radar, or opt i cal sensors, recon -
nai s s ance asset s fl ew 312 sort i es, whi ch amount ed t o nearl y
half (48. 2 percent) of all intelligence, surveillance, and recon -
nai ssance (ISR) sort i es and l ess t han a t hi rd (28. 6 percent ) of
al l Del i berat e Force support sort i es. Tact i cal -reconnai ssance
asset s averaged 18 sort i es and approxi mat el y 35 t arget re-
quest s per daynearl y t wo t arget s per sort i e.
7
SARGENT
347
El ectroni c Intel l i gence, El ectroni c
Warfare/ El ect roni c Support Measures
By the end of Deliberate Force, airborne intelligence , i ncl udi ng
Compass Call aircraft , accounted for 169 (26.1 percent) of the
ISR sorties and 15. 5 percent of the campaigns support sorties.
Not surprisingly, the United States led all NATO nations with
155 sorties (92 percent), with the United Kingdom and France
each flying seven of the remaining 14 sorties. The US Navy
provided 89 electronic warfare/ el ect roni c support measures sor -
ties (57.4 percent) versus the Air Force s 66 (42.6 percent).
Airborne Early Warning
By the end of Deliberate Force, NATO E- 3A/ D ai r bor ne
war ni ng and cont r ol syst em ai r cr af t a nd US Na vy E- 2 C
Hawkeyes had provi ded cont i nuous survei l l ance coverage over
t he Bal kans AOR, flying a total of 165 missions
8
t hat ac-
count ed for 25. 7 percent of t he ISR sor t i es and 15. 2 per cent of
t he campai gn sort i es. Of t he t ot al ai rborne earl y warni ng sor -
t i es, t he E-3A/ D Sent ri es flew 99 (60 percent), the US Navys
Hawkeyes flew 61 (37 percent), and the French air forces
E- 3F flew five (3 percent).
9
By obt ai ni ng needed combat i nf or mat i on, I SR pl at f or ms
pl a ye d a ke y r ol e i n t he pl a nni ng, e xe c ut i on, a nd c ombat -
assessment phases of Del i berat e Force. Overal l , ISR sort i es
account ed for 647 (59. 3 percent ) of t he t ot al support sort i es
and 18. 3 percent of t he t ot al campai gn sort i es.
Ai rborne Battl efi el d Command and Control Center
Four EC-130Es , whi ch had depl oyed t o t he 7490t h Compos -
ite Wing (Provisional) at Aviano Air Base, Italy, flew a total of
32 sor t i es, pr ovi di ng ar ound- t he- cl ock command and cont r ol
with limited gaps in coverage. Although ABCCC aircraft a c-
count ed for onl y 3 percent of Del i berat e Forces support sor -
t i es, t hi s hi ghl y dependabl e ai rcraft enhanced 24-hour ai r op-
erat i ons by averagi ng t wo sort i es per day, each fl i ght coveri ng
a 12-hour wi ndow wi t h refuel i ng. Al t hough one sort i e was
abort ed and rel aunched l at er on ATM day one, t he onl y ot her
t i me an ABCCC di d not get ai rborne occurred on t he l ast day
DELIBERATE FORCE
348
of t he campai gn because of ext remel y bad weat her condi t i ons
at Avi ano and wi t hi n t he Bal kans AOR.
10
Combat Search and Rescue
Four US HC-130Ps assigned to the joint special operations
task force based at Brindisi, Italy, worked in concert with MH-
53J s during CSAR missions. The rescue Hercules flew a total of
nine CSAR sorties in a coordinated effort with the Pave Low III
helicopters, but bot h were unabl e t o l ocat e and recover t he
aircrew of Ebro 33, a French Mirage 2000 hi t by a man-port abl e,
infrared surface-to-air missile .
11
In hi s Corona briefing, General
Ryan said that CSAR was broken and needed fixing.
Thus, Del i berat e Force pl ayers performed a vari et y of mi s -
si ons whi l e f ul f i l l i ng var i ous ai r r ol es i n suppor t of t he
CFAACs ai r campai gn. Gener al Ryan cont r ol l ed t he combat
envi r onment wi t h ai r supr emacy asset s, appl i ed fi repower
t hrough offensi ve ai r st ri kes, mul t i pl i ed combat effect i veness
wi t h speci al i zed suppor t er s and hi gh- val ue ai r asset s, and
sust ai ned forces t hrough al l i ed bases. No one rol e st ood al one
duri ng Del i berat e Force; rat her, rol es and mi ssi ons were i nt er -
dependent l y appl i ed i n a concert ed effort t hroughout t he pl an-
ni ng and execut i on of t hi s ai r campai gn.
Deliberate Force was NATOs f i r st sust ai ned ai r - st r i ke op-
erat i on and t he fi rst t o use more preci si on t han nonpr eci si on
muni t i ons. Its multinational force consisted of over five thou -
sand per sonnel f r om 15 nat i ons and over f our hundr ed ai r -
cr af t ( near l y 260 l and- based) f r om ei ght nat i ons, beddi ng
down at 18 ai r bases i n f i ve count r i es as wel l as on as many
as four ai rcraft carri ers i n t he Adri at i c Sea at any one t i me.
The combined NATO forces flew a total of 3, 535 sorties, aver -
agi ng more t han 207 sort i es per day over t he 17-day ai r cam-
pai gn. Of t he t ot al sort i es, 2, 470 fl i ght s penet rat ed ai rspace
over Bosnia-Herzegovina whi l e anot her 1, 065 provi ded sup -
port out si de t hat count rys ai rspace. Over a t hi rd (36 percent )
of t he penet rat i ng sort i es were of t he fi ght er/ at t ack vari et y
t hat rel eased 1, 026 bombs and mi ssi l es (excl udi ng HARMs ,
rocket s , and guns), of whi ch 708 (69 percent ) were preci si on
muni t i ons and t he remai ni ng 318 (31 percent ) were nonpreci -
sion . El even of t he 17 days of t he ai r campai gn saw combi ned
SARGENT
349
ai r st ri kes hi t t i ng 48 t arget compl exes, i ncl udi ng 338 i ndi vi d -
ual DMPIs wi t hi n t hose compl exes. Preci si on bombi ng effec-
tively limited collateral damage and al l owed Del i berat e Force
t o accompl i sh i t s obj ect i ves: prot ect i ng t he safe areas from
t hr eat s or at t acks, r emovi ng heavy weapons from t he t ot al-
exclusion zones , openi ng t he Saraj evo ai rport , and provi di ng
unhi nder ed r oad access t o Sar aj evo. In short , Del i berat e Force
was not onl y a det ermi ned force but al so a deci si ve force. The
ai r campai gn met i t s obj ect i ves by per suadi ng t he war r i ng
fact i ons t o cease host i l i t i es and agree t o condi t i ons set out i n
t he UN-brokered framework agreement , t he l at t er event ual l y
l eadi ng t o t he Dayt on Peace Accords, whi ch cont r i but ed t o t he
overal l peace process i n t he Bal kans .
Not es
works, USAF/ XOXS, Pent agon, Washi ngt on, D. C. , 17 Sept ember 1995, 3,
United States Air Force Historical Research Agency (hereinafter AFHRA),
Maxwell AFB, Ala., Misc-01.
2. Ext ract ed from Target and DMPI Summary St at i st i cs, BDA t rack
sheet, crisis action team cell, CAOC, C-5, 5th Allied Tactical Air Force,
Vicenza, Italy, 29 September 1995, AFHRA, CAOC-19. (Secret) Information
States Air Force, vol . 1, Mar ch 1992, 2.
4. Ext r a c t e d f r om CAOC da i l y mi s s i on s umma r i e s , 29 Augus t 14
Sept ember 1995. ( Conf i dent i al ) I nf or mat i on ext r act ed i s uncl as s i f i ed.
5. Bri efi ng sl i de (muni t i ons summary), Col Chuck Wal d, commander,
31st Fi ght er Wi ng, Avi ano AB, It al y, subj ect : 7490t h Lessons Learned, 14
October 1995 (unclassified), AFHRA, AVI-77.
6. Ibi d.
7. Ext r act ed f r om CAOC dai l y mi s s i on s ummar i es , 29 Augus t 14
Sept ember 199 5. ( Conf i dent i al ) I nf or mat i on ext r act ed i s uncl assi f i ed.
8. A total of 166 airborne early warning sorties were logged. A Navy
ES-3A fl ew t he ext ra sort i e on ATM day 12 as a backfi l l t o t he E-2C when
t he Navy carri ers were swappi ng out i n t he Adri at i c Sea.
9. Ext r a c t e d f r om CAOC da i l y mi s s i on s umma r i e s , 29 Augus t 14
Se p t e mb e r 1 9 9 5 . (Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
DELIBERATE FORCE
350
Chapt er 13
Aspects of Leadi ng and Fol l owi ng:
The Human Factors of Del i berate Force
Lt Col John C. Orndorff
The military art is deeply concerned with the performance of
t he human group under st ress.
Gen Si r John W. Hacket t
Operation Deliberate Force presents an interesting and in -
structive view of the relationships among the nature of war,
leadership style, and victory. A notable aspect of this air cam-
paign was the strong and comprehensive leadership exercised
by Lt Gen Michael Ryan, commander of Air Forces Southern
Europe (AIRSOUTH), from his combined air operations center
(CAOC) with regard to strategy making, operational planning,
and even tactical actions. In his cognizance of and direct in -
volvement with such a full range of campaign details, General
Ryan exhi bi t ed a st yl e of l eader shi p mor e r emi ni scent of
Napolon Bonapartes personalized great captainship t han t he
generalship model given the modern world through the ground-
breaking reforms of the Prussian military leaders of the nine-
teenth century, ending with Helmuth von Moltke (the elder).
Although great captains up to and including Napolon em-
braced every detail of war, the Prussian staff system accommo-
dated the industrialization and democratization of Western war -
fare that began during Napolon s reign by distributing and
compart ment al i zi ng i nformat i on processi ng and deci si on mak-
ing in ways that allowed a group of ordinary men to embrace
and cont rol somewhat t he expandi ng scope and durat i on of
modern war. Gi ven t he fact t hat i ndust ri al war became t he
norm, at least in the West, after Napolon exhaust ed hi msel f
trying to fight in the old way, the Moltkian staff system became
the accepted mechanism for controlling military forces.
Thus, General Ryan s apparent reversion to a highly central-
ized and personal direction of such a broad range of military
351
act i vi t i es duri ng Del i berat e Force rai ses i nt ri gui ng quest i ons.
Fi rst , why di d he adopt t he l eadershi p st yl e of Napol on i n a
Mol t ki an age, and, second, di d t hi s apparent reversi on hel p or
under mi ne t he campai gn? Answer i ng t hese quest i ons begi ns
with clarification of the differences between the Napoleonic
and Mol t ki an st yl es of l eadershi p.
The Napol eoni c Model
Napolon, as had count l ess mi l i t ar y l eader s bef or e hi m,
commanded i n a st yl e appropri at e t o t he demands of prei n -
dust ri al i zed war. Such wars were charact eri zed by smal l ar -
mi es of r ar el y mor e t han 80, 000 sol di er s and bat t l es t hat wer e
s i mul t aneous l y conduct ed on bat t l ef i el ds of a f ew mi l es
breadt h at most . Oft en, t hese bat t l es proved cruci al l y deci si ve
t o t he out come of a gi ven campai gn and even t o t he pol i t i cal
dest i ny of a st at e. One i ndi vi dual coul d manage and command
such bat t l es, assumi ng he had t he exper i ence and geni us t o
mi ss few det ai l s, ant i ci pat e event s at l east bet t er t han hi s
count er par t i n t he opposi ng ar my, and expl oi t t he r udi men -
t ary command and cont rol (C
2
) syst ems (vi sual si gnal s and
messengers, mai nl y) of t he t i me. Thus, t he st yl e of l eadershi p
cal l ed Napol eoni c i n t hi s st udy was appropri at e t o a mi l i t ary
envi ronment i n whi ch i ndi vi dual t act i cal engagement s were
oft en st rat egi cal l y i mport ant and i n whi ch t he avai l abl e C
2
s yst ems adequat el y embraced t he scal e and durat i on of combat .
Napolon was t he mast er of t hi s par t i cul ar envi r onment , hi s
chi ef charact eri st i c bei ng hi s det ai l ed pl anni ng and i ns t r uc-
t i ons t o hi s t roops. He was hi s own commander i n chi ef and
took little council of anyone.
1
Napoleon made al l t he key deci -
si ons; he devel oped hi s own est i mat es and usual l y di ct at ed t o
hi s subordi nat es. . . . He never used [hi s st aff] for anyt hi ng
but f or col l ect i ng t he i nf or mat i on he demanded and communi-
cat i ng hi s i nst r uct i ons.
2
The l at t er were so det ai l ed regardi ng
where t o go and what t o do t hat Mart i n van Crevel d referred t o
hi m as t he most compet ent human bei ng who ever l i ved.
3
Through hi s abi l i t y t o vi sual i ze how he want ed t he bat t l e t o
t ake pl ace and hi s capabi l i t y t o mai nt ai n cont rol over hi s
forces, Napolon had t he fl exi bi l i t y t o respond appropri at el y t o
DELIBERATE FORCE
352
each si t uat i on. As hi st ory bears out , hi s general shi p proved
effect i ve as l ong as t he scope of bat t l e remai ned wi t hi n hi s
abi l i t y t o react qui ckl y and mai nt ai n cont rol .
Unfortunately for Napolon , t he i ndust ri al i zat i on and de-
mocrat i zat i on of war, whi ch began i n t he l at e ei ght eent h cen -
t ury, creat ed mi l i t ary forces t hat , by t he l at t er years of hi s
rei gn, out st ri pped t he abi l i t y of even t he great est i ndi vi dual t o
mai nt ai n cont i nual and det ai l ed cont r ol . I nnovat i ons t hat be-
gan i n t he mi d-sevent eent h cent ury wi t h t he begi nni ngs of
st eam power l ed t o an accel erat i on i n t he effi ci ency and preci -
si on of manufact uri ng and t he i nt roduct i on of i nt erchangeabl e
machi ned par t s.
4
These i nnovat i ons made t he product i on of
cannons, musket s, and suppl i es t o equi p l ar ge ar mi es bot h
easi er and cheaper . The expansi on of r epubl i can and demo-
crat i c i deal s as wel l as pol i t i cal phi l osophi es duri ng t hi s same
peri od creat ed l arge armi es t o absorb al l t hi s new mat eri el .
Epi t omi zed by t he experi ence of France under Napol on , t hes e
i ndust ri al and pol i t i cal devel opment s creat ed huge armi es, i n
rel at i on t o t hose of t he previ ous age, popul at ed by ent husi as -
tic citizen-soldiers or quasi-citizen-soldiers fired by national or
i deol ogi cal l oyal t i es rat her t han fi ckl e mercenary obedi ence t o
a soverei gn or ari st ocrat . These armi es (France s number ed at
least a million at Napolon s zeni t h) were spread across vast
areas in independent field corps and garrisons. Clearly, the time
had come for a new method of exercising military comma nd.
The Prussi an or Mol tki an Model
In the half century following the Napoleonic Wars , whi ch
ended i n 1815, a seri es of Prussi an mi l i t ary reformers devel -
oped a phi l osophy and met hodol ogy of command t hat sought
to institutionalize Napolon s geni us and cont r ol of ar mi es
on a scal e sui t abl e t o t he st eadi l y expandi ng mi l i t ary forces
and confl i ct boundari es of t he age.
5
By professi onal l y educat -
ing officers in formal schools and rotating them between field
and st af f posi t i ons, t he Pr ussi ans anchor ed t hei r command
syst em on a corps of mi l i t ary professi onal s who coul d bot h
advise senior field commanders on matters of strategy and who
could themselves undertake the smaller details of suppl yi ng and
ORNDORFF
353
conduct i ng warfare formerl y handl ed, al bei t haphazardl y, by
t he gr eat capt ai ns of t he past . Informed by t hei r commanders
objectives, these officers were trained to take the initiative in
accompl i shi ng t hei r subordi nat e mi ssi ons and st aff assi gn -
ment s, more or l ess i ndependent l y, gui ded onl y by broad di-
rect i ves from t hei r superi ors. The Prussi ans cal l ed t hi s syst em
of seni or commander s i ssui ng br oad or der s t o subor di nat e
offi cers responsi bl e for and capabl e of act i ng wi t h i ndependent
initiative Auf t ragst akt i k (mi ssi on t act i cs).
6
Al t hough t hi s syst em of di st ri but ed responsi bi l i t y and sub-
ordi nat e i ni t i at i ve deni ed commanders t he cl ose, det ai l ed con -
trol of all facets of military affairs exercised by Napolon , it did
provi de modern mass armi es wi t h adequat e cont rol i n general
and wi t h fl exi bi l i t y i n t he face of changi ng ci rcumst ances.
Mor eover , commander s suppor t ed by such a syst em wer e abl e
t o orchest rat e t hei r campai gns by provi di ng general gui dance
t o ski l l ed subor di nat es r at her t han by at t empt i ng, pr obabl y
wi t h di sast rous resul t s, t o exerci se det ai l ed cont rol over i ndi-
vi dual bat t l es. Thi s pat t ern of cent ral i zed gui dance and decen -
t r al i zed execut i on by subor di nat es became t he pat t er n f or
modern mi l i t ary syst ems.
7
It s mai n st rengt h, von Mol t ke rea -
soned, was t hat i n t he uncert ai nt i es of war, i t prot ect ed seni or
commander s f r om suf f er i ng t he consequences of deci si ons
made obsol et e by a changi ng envi ronment by al l owi ng subor -
di nat es t o react and make deci si ons of t hei r own.
8
I n essence,
t hi s syst em, whi ch t he Uni t ed St at es al so adopt ed i n t he l at t er
ni net eent h cent ur y, al l owed t he commander s of gr eat ar mi es
t o f ocus on st r at egy whi l e t hei r subor di nat es handl ed t he de-
t ai l s of operat i onal pl anni ng and t act i cal engagement s.
Leadershi p Requi rements of Del i berate Force
At f i r st exami nat i on t he oper at i onal condi t i ons sur r oundi ng
Del i berat e Force were hardl y di fferent from t he mai n t hemes
of i ndust ri al -age war, whi ch t he decent ral i zed or Mol t ki an
model of command and l eadershi p proved so effect i ve i n con -
trolling. On the NATO side at least, military forces were fully
equipped with cutting-edge technology. Corresponding to t hese
advanced systems, NATO boast ed compet ent and motivated
DELIBERATE FORCE
354
st aff and operat i onal personnel at al l l evel s, especi al l y wi t hi n
the key CAOC and wi ng st affs. Moreover, i n a mi l i t ary sense
anyway, i ndi vi dual engagement s were not l i kel y t o have a pro -
found st rat egi c or operat i onal i mpact si nce t hey i nvol ved smal l
packages of ai rcraft st ri ki ng poi nt t arget s.
Yet , Del i berat e Force al so mani fest ed some operat i onal and
political similarities of pre-Napoleonic warfare. First, for the
allies the political objectives of t he ai r campai gnbri ngi ng
peace to a historically troubled regionwere limited. Second,
i n a way remi ni scent of warfare i n t he West ern Age of Enl i ght-
enment , t he Bal kans confl i ct was i mport ant i n t he abst ract t o
NATO government al l eaders because i t affect ed t he st abi l i t y of
Europe and NATO but garnered l i t t l e popul ar i nt erest from t he
domest i c popul at i ons of t hese gover nment s, par t i cul ar l y t hat
of the United States . Thi rd, as a consequence of i t s l i mi t ed
scope and dur at i on, t he command, cont r ol , communi cat i ons,
and intelligence (C
3
I) requi rement s for di rect i ng t he campai gn
fell well within capabilities available to the allies. Further,
because Gener al Ryan , t he key ai r commander i nvol ved, as-
sumed t hat each t act i cal engagement coul d have pr of ound
strategic political importance, he imposed close control over
t he t act i cal as wel l as st rat egi c di rect i on of t he campai gn.
General Ryans Leadershi p and Its Effects
At the beginning of Deliberate Force, the three senior officers
in the CAOC included Maj Gen Hal M. Hornburg, the director;
Brig Gen David Sawyer , his deputy; and Col Douglas Richard -
son , chief of operations. These officers had led the CAOC dur i ng
the preceding months of Operation Deny Flight. However, Gen -
eral Ryan, the senior air commander, moved to the CAOC from
hi s headquart ers i n Napl es at the outset of Deliberate Force to
exercise personal control over tactical-level decisions, such as
the selection of targets and aiming poin t s, and t o approve sort i e
l aunches. The move gave Ryanwho brought along his closest
staff officersclose, direct control over the air campaign. In a
sense the CAOC provided General Ryan with what Napolon al so
woul d have sought at t he begi nni ng of a bat t l ea promi nent
poi nt for overseei ng and cont rol l i ng event s.
ORNDORFF
355
General Ryans move to the CAOC had an i mmedi at e effect
on t he dut i es of Maj Gen Mi chael Short, hi s pr i nci pal deput y
and AIRSOUTH vi ce commander . I n t hi s i nst ance, Gener al
Shor t worked hard t o provi de det ai l s of t he campai gn t o Adm
Leighton Smith , commander i n chi ef of Al l i ed Forces Sout hern
Eur ope, who const ant l y demanded campai gn updat es. How-
ever, Short had probl ems obt ai ni ng t i mel y i nformat i on from
the CAOC; i n some cases when he di d obt ai n needed det ai l s of
t he campai gn s st at us, t he dat a was over come by ot her event s
due t o t he hi gh t empo of t he oper at i on. I n ot her i nst ances, by
t he t i me Shor t had obt ai ned t he i nformat i on, Admi ral Smi t h
had got t en t he dat a di rect l y from t he CAOC and moved on t o
ot her t hi ngs. Thus, by t he end of Del i berat e Force, General
Shor t not ed he was about t hree cycl es of i nformat i on behi nd
Admiral Smith s request s. Wi t h t he advant age of hi ndsi ght ,
one can see t hat General Short should have positioned a contact
in the CAOC to feed him information when he needed it.
9
This
experience points out one particular difficulty attendant upon an
operat i onal commanders move to tactical-level headquarte r s .
As several peopl e report ed, General Ryans di rect i on of t he
campai gn from t he CAOC at fi rst gl ance appeared t o const i -
t ut e mi cr omanagement , r emi ni scent of Vi et nam.
10
However,
consi deri ng t he pol i t i cal l y sensi t i ve background of Del i berat e
Force (e. g. , et hni c and nat i onal sensi t i vi t i es, a concern for
civilian casualties and col l at eral damage , et c. ), as wel l as t he
j oi nt and combi ned charact er of t he CAOC, Ryan felt he had to
keep a cl ose hol d on operat i ons, i ncl udi ng t he sel ect i on of
t ar get s and per sonal management of bat t l e damage assess-
ment (BDA).
11
By centralizing control of the target list a nd t he
sel ect i on of desi red mean poi nt s of i mpact (DMPIi. e. , aiming
poi nt s), Ryan coul d shape t he campai gn as he bel i eved appro -
priate, particularly in light of the operations political sensitiv-
i t y. For exampl e, he especi al l y wi shed t o prevent t he t ype of
col l at eral damage t hat mi ght occur wi t h a mi sdi r ect ed bomb,
resulting in media coverage of civilian targets accidentally hit
by t he al l i es or sparki ng a Bosni an Serb at t ack on Uni t ed
Nations (UN) troops. Above all else, General Ryan want ed t o
remai n personal l y responsi bl e for al l maj or deci si ons i n t he
campai gnpr i mar i l y t o t ake appr opr i at e bl ame shoul d any-
t hi ng go wrong or come under quest i on.
12
DELIBERATE FORCE
356
Al t hough nei t her under st ood nor appr eci at ed by member s
of the CAOC at t he t i me, Gener al Ryans physi cal presence at
the CAOC allowed him to buffer the centers staff, especially
i t s seni or offi cers, from di rect and possi bl y di st ract i ng i nt erac-
t i on wi t h mor e seni or commander s i nt er est ed i n t he cam-
pai gnpart i cul arl y Gen George A. Joul wan , Supreme Allied
Commander Eur ope, and Admi ral Smi t h .
13
Di rect l y i n cont act
wi t h event s, a ver y seni or commander such as Ryan could
provi de Smi t h and ot her s wi t h t he r eal - t i me, i nf or mal summa-
r i es and det ai l s of t he campai gn t hey r equest ed wi t hout bur-
dening CAOC personnel wi t h provi di ng formal answers t o t he
same quest i on f or t hei r l ess seni or commander s t o t ake t o t he
seni or commander s. I n t hat sense, Ryan s pr esence act ual l y
instilled the CAOC wi t h a mor e r el axed and f r ee oper at i ng
at mosphere. Whet her or not t hese act i ons added t o t he effi -
ciency of the CAOC r emai ns a mat t er of per sonal opi ni on,
dependi ng on whom one asks.
Some CAOC members compl ai ned of several drawbacks t o
General Ryans const ant and domi nat i ng presence i n det ai l ed
s t af f pr oces s es . For exampl e, al t hough Ryan s i nner ci r -
c l e c ons i s t i ng ma i nl y of hi s s ma l l c ot e r i e f r om AI R-
SOUTHwas general l y aware of current i t erat i ons t o ai r t ask-
i ng messages (ATM) a n d o t h e r p l a n n i n g d o c u me n t s a n d
act i ons, peopl e out si de t hat ci rcl e i n some cases di d not know
about changes t hat t he gener al had madeeven t hough t hey
depended upon t hose changes as t hey pl anned t hei r own
par t s of t he campai gn.
14
Predictably, other CAOC members felt
t ha t Rya n s cent r al i zat i on of so many det ai l ed deci si ons
t ended t o sl ow t he pl anni ng pr ocess, l eadi ng t o numer ous
compl ai nt s about l at e t arget l i st s and l ast - mi nut e changes t o
ATMs. St i l l , for t he reasons al ready gi ven, General Ryan be-
l i eved t hat hi s pr esenceas wel l as t hat of f ami l i ar and
t rust ed st aff offi cers and noncommi ssi oned offi cersat t he
CAOC was essent i al .
15
Col Daniel Doc Zoerb, di rect or of t he Deny Fl i ght air op -
erat i ons cel l and a key member of Gener al Ryan s i nner ci rcl e,
agreed wi t h t he general on t hi s mat t er. If one can l i ken Ryan
to Napolon as regards di rect l eadershi p st yl e and broad cog-
ni zance of event s and pl anni ng det ai l s, t hen Doc Zoerb was
Ryan s Marshal Louis-Alexandre Berthier, the brilliant chief of
ORNDORFF
357
st aff who t ranscri bed and t ransmi t t ed Napol on s orders t o
everyone else.
16
Colonel Zoerb underst ood t he pol i t i cal and
mi l i t ary si t uat i on surroundi ng t he campai gn, at l east from
General Ryan s per spect i ve, bet t er t han anyone ot her t han t he
general hi msel f. Li ke hi s i mmedi at e superi or, he not ed t hat
si nce Del i ber at e For ce was mor e about peacemaki ng t h a n
maki ng war, every bomb dropped had t o be hel pful .
17
Famil -
i ar wi t h worki ng cl osel y wi t h General Ryan, Zoerb developed
most of t he pl ans for t he operat i on from hi s commanders
det ai l ed deci si ons. More t han a mere t ranscri ber of orders,
however, Zoerb pl ayed such a maj or rol e i n key t arget i ng deci-
si ons and st rat egy del i berat i ons t hat one offi cer cal l ed hi m t he
Dave Deptula of Del i berat e Force, t hus l i nki ng hi m t o an-
other officer who played a pivotal role in planning the coalition
ai r offensi ve agai nst Iraq i n 1991.
18
Zoerbs abi l i t y t o pl an and
communi cat e Gener al Ryan s di rect i ons was perhaps vi t al t o
t he success of Del i berat e Force; t hus, t he col onel s ent husi -
asm for hi s bosss cl ose l eadershi p i s hardl y surpri si ng.
The combi ned nat ure of t he CAOC st aff has al so produced
di f f er i ng per cept i ons about t he i mpact of l eader s hi p. A
number of US and non-US offi cers fel t t hat CAOC l eader s
appropriately included all officers in the organizations staff
funct i ons. Indeed, General Hornburg not ed t hat he made ef-
fort s before t he st art of Del i berat e Force t o get t he al l i es more
involved in the CAOC by asking NATOunsuccessful l yfor a
col onel t o serve as chi ef of pl ans. In hi s opi ni on, unt i l Deny
Fl i ght act ual l y heat ed up i nt o Del i berat e Force, most NATO
count ri es had l i t t l e i nt erest i n sendi ng seni or offi cers t o 5t h
Allied Tactical Air Force (5 ATAF) and t he CAOC.
19
Moreover,
Lt Col Ber nd Jansen , liaison officer (LNO) for t he German ai r
force at t he CAOC dur i ng t he oper at i on, not ed t hat command-
ers made effort s t o ensure part i ci pat i on by al l al l i eseven t o
the extent of sacrificing operational effectiveness.
20
Col Arjen
Koopmans, LNO for t he Net herl ands ai r force, was al so sat i s -
fied with the allies role in Deliberate Force, noting that all
nat i ons par t i ci pat ed as pl anned. He added t hat t he Uni t ed
St at es performed t he great est number of mi ssi ons because of
i t s uni que capabi l i t i es. In t hi s case he di d not feel t hat he and
hi s ai r force i n any way had been l eft out of t he operat i on.
21
DELIBERATE FORCE
358
However, count ervai l i ng percept i ons exi st ed regardi ng t he
degree t o whi ch non-US offi cers part i ci pat ed i n t he CAOCs
pl anni ng a nd c ont r ol pr oc e s s e s . Wi ng Comma nde r Andy
Bat chel or of the Royal Air Force (RAF), assi gned t o t he CAOC
BDA cel l , ment i oned t hat US offi cers seemed t o feel t hat t he
CAOC st aff operat ed as a bi furcat ed US and NATO entity
rat her t han a t rul y combi ned NATO entity with a fully inte-
gr at ed i nt er nat i onal st af f . Sever al Amer i can of f i cer s who
worked at t he CAOC al so r epor t ed t hat some of t he Eur opean
al l i ed offi cers fel t l eft out and t hat t he Uni t ed St at es had t aken
over t he operat i on.
22
An i nt erest i ng i ndi cat i on of t he act ual
Americanization of the CAOC st aff was t he fact t hat i t had
no US LNO si nce, accordi ng t o General Hornburg, i t was un-
necessary i n an organi zat i on whose seni or l eaders were al l
Ameri cans. In ret rospect , t herefore, i t seems reasonabl e t o say
t hat , for several reasons, t he CAOC di d not funct i on as a ful l y
i nt egrat ed, combi ned st aff at t he st art of Del i berat e Force and
t hat t he press of event s permi t t ed onl y a mi ni mal i ncrease i n
non-US part i ci pat i on before t he operat i on ended.
General Ryan s tight control of targets , DMPIs , and BDA
al so caused concern for a number of i ndi vi dual s i n t he CAOC
and at t he uni t s. Thi s t i ght cont rol served Ryans desire to
r emai n per sonal l y answer abl e f or anyt hi ng t hat mi ght go
wrong and t o reduce t he chance of col l at eral damage. How-
ever, i t al so resul t ed i n a frequent l y changi ng t arget l i st a nd
del ayed mi ssi on-rel ease deci si ons t hat caused peopl e i n t he
CAOC and t he f i ght er squadr ons t o wonder what was goi ng
on. Speaki ng of hi s and Ryan s effort s t o mi t i gat e such uni n -
t ent i onal conf usi on, Gener al Hor nbur g st at ed t hat I know we
j erked around t he guys i n t he fi el d, but we t ri ed not t o.
23
He
al so not ed t hat he and hi s commander t r i ed t o avoi d changes
t o t he t arget l i st by i ssui ng t hem l at e, af t er most of t he
changes had been made. In spi t e of t hei r effort s, t he t arget s
st i l l changed several t i mes. Thus, ai rcrews i n part i cul ar fel t
t hat t hey were at t he end of a whi p.
Li eut enant Commander Mi chael Gat or Dunn, of the CAOC
crisis-action team (CAT) cell, said that receiving late target
lists made it difficult for his office to process the ATM i n a
t i mel y manner. At Avi ano, some pi l ot s became frust rat ednot
with receiving the targets l at e but wi t h t he const ant l y changi ng
ORNDORFF
359
nat ur e of t he t ar get l i st. Sever al not ed t hat t hei r t ar get s
changed as t hey prepared t o l aunch, compoundi ng t he di ffi -
cul t y of t hat process. Capt Todd Gent ry of t he 510t h Fi ght er
Squadr on descri bed t hi s i nst abi l i t y as t he most frust rat i ng
par t of t he oper at i on.
24
It probabl y di d not hel p t hat few, i f
any, peopl e i n t he fi el d knew t hat del ays and changes t o t he
target list arose from General Ryans careful efforts to avoid
col l at eral damage and t o r educe t he number of per t ur bat i ons
i n mi ssi on pl anni ng t hey act ual l y di d experi ence.
The vi ews of seni or commanders and uni t -l evel offi cers di-
verged on t he mat t er of force prot ect i on as wel l . General Ryan
hel d back from whol esal e at t acks on Serbi an surface-t o-ai r
missile (SAM) si t es t o mi ni mi ze bot h t he ri sk t o hi s crews and
t o avoi d unnecessar y Ser bi an casual t i es and col l at er al dam-
age. Underst andabl y, a number of pi l ot s fel t t hat t hey shoul d
have been allowed to destroy SAM si t es at wi l l t o remove t hem
as t hreat s t o coal i t i on ai rcraft , and t hey expressed frust rat i on
at not bei ng abl e t o do so. Ryan preferred t o have hi s ai rcrews
fly outside the SAM ri ngs and t hus avoi d t he danger, i f possi -
bl e. Even t hough Ryans pol i cy accept ed t he cont i nued t hreat
of t he Serbi an defenses, most pi l ot s agreed t hat he di d hi s
best t o keep t hem out of danger .
25
General Ryans deci si on t o keep BDA on cl ose hol d became
a par t i cul ar l y sensi t i ve l eader shi p- r el at ed i ssue wi t hi n t he
CAOC and at t he uni t s. Wi ng Commander Bat chel or s ai d he
was sur pr i sed at t he i mpor t ance of BDA t o Ryan and hi s
rest ri ct i ve i nst ruct i ons for di ssemi nat i ng i t . The l at t er forbade
t he whol esal e and unfi l t ered passi ng of BDA from the CAOC,
even t o fi el d uni t s l aunchi ng mi ssi ons. Expl ai ni ng t hi s pol i cy,
Colonel Zoerb sai d t hat hi s commander had t hr ee r easons f or
j eal ousl y guardi ng BDA: (1) Ryan di d not want hi s j udgment
second-guessed, (2) he di d not want out si de organi zat i ons
maki ng assessment s of BDA, and (3) he di d not want t o be
hel d t o hi s fi rst assessment , shoul d i t change. Wi ng Com-
mander Bat chel or agreed with Zoerbs assessment , but he st i l l
quest i oned a cl ose hol d of BDA from fi el d uni t s.
26
General l y, personnel at Avi ano shar ed Bat chel or s concerns.
Charged wi t h assessi ng t he ongoi ng st at us of 31st Fi ght er
Wing t arget s and accompl i shment s, Capt Mar k Hal l i sey a nd
Capt Pet e Ornel l f r om t he 31st Wi ngs intelligence flight found
DELIBERATE FORCE
360
the close hold of BDA one of t he most frust rat i ng aspect s of
Del i berat e Force. Gi ven hi s responsi bi l i t i es, Capt ai n Ornel l
found t he CAOCs frequent response of you guys dont need
t o know t hi s t o hi s request s for t arget and st ri ke i magery
particularly galling.
27
Captain Hallisey conceded t hat he un-
derst ood General Ryan s reason for not want i ng some pi l ot
standing in front of Cable News Network (CNN) saying, Look
what I di d, yet he bel i eved t hat pi l ot s and t act i cal -l evel pl an-
ner s needed t o know how t hey were doi ng. Al t hough he coul d
not rel ease act ual BDA i nformat i on, Hal l i sey r epor t ed t hat
Wi ng Commander Bat chel or al l evi at ed t he fri ct i on bet ween t he
CAOC and t he 31st Wi ng somewhat by comment i ng on t he
wings BDA assessment. Hallisey woul d fax hi s assessment t o
Batchelor , who, after reviewing the data, would say something to
the effect that youre 99 percent correct in your assessmen t .
28
Pi l ot s fl yi ng combat mi ssi ons al so doubt ed t he wi sdom of
General Ryans close hold of BDA. Capt Scot t MacQueen of
t he 510t h Fi ght er Squadr on sai d t hat somet i mes he and hi s
fel l ow pi l ot s had no i dea of t he real si t uat i on on t he ground
due t o t he l ack of BDA.
29
Not knowi ng t he si t uat i on on t he
ground had speci fi c meani ng for Capt ai n Hal l i sey: al t hough
the ATM might direct a particular flight to hit DMPIs t hr ee and
f our at a par t i cul ar t ar get, t he pi l ot s mi ght see t hose DMPIs a s
t he f i r st and second ai mi ng poi nt s si nce t hey had no pr est r i ke
BDA phot os showi ng t hat previ ous st ri kes had obl i t erat ed
original DMPIs one and t wo. Fort unat el y, aft er Hal l i sey ex-
plained this problem to the CAOC pl anner s, they released more
BDA to the wing.
30
Nevertheless, BDA remai ned a sore i ssue
among field personnel well after the operation had ended.
Subordi nate Leadershi p and
Followership in the CAOC
The l eadershi p of General Hornburg and General Sawyer
ni cel y compl ement ed t hat of t hei r commander, General Ryan ,
and proved cri t i cal t o t he successful operat i on of t he CAOC,
even t hough t hei r l eadershi p st yl es di ffered somewhat . Duri ng
a postoperation interview, Hornburg i ndi cat ed t hat he probabl y
would have taken a more decentralized approach to pla nni ng
ORNDORFF
361
t han di d Ryan. For example, he would have allowed his staff
t o present hi m wi t h DMPIs for hi s approval , al t hough he al so
poi nt ed out t hat he was not sur e whet her t he t ar get eer s would
have sel ect ed t he DMPIs as careful l y as di d Ryan . Hor nbur g
al so st at ed t hat he woul d have spent mor e t i me wi t h t he
non-US LNOs t o l et t hem know what t hey were doi ng, l argel y
i n response t o t hei r compl ai nt s about bei ng l eft out .
31
Si mi-
larly, Capt Patricia Mauldin , the CAOC squadron sect i on com -
mander, descri bed Sawyer as an al t oget her di fferent l eader
t han hi s t wo superi orsmore personabl e and more wi l l i ng t o
get i n and ask quest i ons of peopl e as wel l as l et peopl e know
what was goi ng on.
32
Despi t e t hese l eadershi p di fferences,
observers in the CAOC general l y saw t hat Hornburg and Saw-
yer provi ded very st rong l eadershi p i n i mpl ement i ng t he cam-
pai gn as Ryan di rect ed.
33
Many of these CAOC st af f member s al so saw t hat t he t hr ee
general offi cers had more or l ess subconsci ousl y di vi ded re-
sponsi bi l i t i es among t hemsel ves i n ways t hat mat ched t hei r
dut i es and l eader shi p st yl es. Gener al Ryan pl anned and r an
t he ai r war . Gener al Hor nbur g flew cover for his boss by
at t endi ng meet i ngs, host i ng vi si t i ng di gni t ari es, and oversee-
ing the CAOC st affs execut i on of t he campai gn. General Saw-
yer ran t he CAOC ni ght shi ft and spent more t i me wi t h t he
t roops.
34
To imply, however, that these officers kept shifts is
somewhat mi sl eadi ng si nce al l of t hem spent over 16 hour s
per day i n or ar ound t he CAOC. Hor nbur g saw things a little
di fferent l y. He agreed t hat a di vi si on of l abor exi st ed among
the CAOC seni or commander s, par t i cul ar l y t o t he ext ent t hat
he and Sawyer made sur e t hat one of t hem was al ways avai l -
abl e at t he CAOC. Ot her t han t hat , he r emember ed no f or mal
agreement concerni ng who woul d t ake a part i cul ar rol e.
35
Al t hough General Sawyer made efforts to keep people in -
f or med about t he st at us of t he oper at i on, compl ai nt s ar ose
t hat t he word was not get t i ng out wi t hi n t he CAOC. As noted
earl i er, part of t he probl em l ay i n General Ryans tendency to
focus the flow of information on himself and his inner circle,
whi ch i ncl uded onl y Hor nbur g, Sawyer, Zoerb, and t wo or
t hr ee ot her i ndi vi dual s. Thus, t he i nner ci r cl e knew t he st at us
of event s, but ot her members of t he CAOC st aff oft en di d not .
Thi s fai l ure i n communi cat i on got t o t he poi nt t hat some cel l s
DELIBERATE FORCE
362
worked wi t h out dat ed i t erat i ons of t he ATM and ot her pl an-
ni ng el ement s.
36
Despite these problems with the flow of information within the
CAOC, one found no general problem with morale or motivation
among the assigned personnel. For instance, key cell directors
such as Colonel Richardson made up the shortfall with their
own efforts to keep people informed and motivated. Several
CAOC members cited Richardson not only for carrying out Gen -
eral Hornburgs instructions but also for keeping people up to
speed
37
just one example of the informal leadership efforts by
subordinate CAOC officers that enhanced the overall operati on.
Gen Si r John Hacket t , i n hi s book The Prof essi on of Arms,
st at ed t hat t her e must be a r equi r ement t o be l ed f or t he
l eader t o emerge and di scharge l eadershi p.
38
Beyond Col onel
Ri chardson , several people in the CAOC emerged t o fi l l t he
r equi r ement f or i nt er medi at e l eader shi p. Li eut enant Com-
ma nde r Dunn, for exampl e, drew prai se as t he person who
made t hi ngs happen. Wi ng Commander Bat chel or ment i oned
hi m as one of t he best exampl es of mi ddl e-management l ead-
ershi p wi t hi n t he CAOCsomeone qui t e out st andi ng, knowl -
edgeabl e, professi onal , fi rm, and t act ful . Bat chel or al so not ed
t hat Li eut enant Commander Dunn was ver y f ocused and
knew how t o get ot hers t o work as wel l and t hat , al t hough
some superi or offi cers seemed t o fl ounder from t he i nadequat e
i nformat i on fl ow, Dunn qui ckl y and t i rel essl y kept a handl e on
situations and did effective staff work.
39
Lt Col John Gi bbons al so st ood out as a st r ong l eader
wi t hi n t he CAOC. Li eut enant Commander Dunn ment i oned
Gi bbons as a key pl ayer i n accompl i shi ng t he mi ssi on i n De-
l i berat e Force. Despi t e const ant l y changi ng t arget l i st s, Gib-
bons coul d mat ch ai r cr af t , muni t i ons, and t ar get s on t he
spot .
40
Maj Keith Kiger , who augment ed t he CAOC from Six -
t eent h Ai r Force, descri bed Gi bbons as a speci al asset dur i ng
t he oper at i on, not i ng t hat , as a per manent assi gnee t o 5
ATAF, he knew how t o get t hi ngs done dur i ng t he l ong hour s,
days on end, t hat he spent on t he j ob.
41
Many such peopl e successful l y met t he l eadershi p chal l enge
of Deliberate Force. However, key leaders in the CAOC prob -
abl y spent most of t hei r t i me worryi ng about t he t echni cal
demands of t hei r posi t i ons as opposed t o l eader shi p i ssues.
ORNDORFF
363
Fr om Gener al Ryans at t ent i on t o det ai l i n t he sel ect i on of
t ar get s and DMPIs t o Li eut enant Commander Dunns rigorous
t arget eeri ng, most CAOC offi cers appear t o have been more
concer ned about get t i ng t he j ob done t han act i ng as l eader s i n
t he t r adi t i onal sense. However , t hi s does not i mpl y t hat t hey
negl ect ed t hei r l eader shi p r esponsi bi l i t i es. The f ocus and
st yl es of General Ryan and hi s subor di nat es seem t o have
been appropri at e, gi ven t he general l y hi gh qual i t y of t he CAOC
st aff, t he i nt ensi t y of t he campai gn and operat i ons wi t hi n t he
CAOC, and t he t echnol ogi cal abi l i t y t o exerci se cont rol i n a
mor e cent r al i zed manner .
42
Indeed, once t hey became engaged
i n t he act ual campai gn, t he professi onal i sm of most or al l of
the CAOC member s seems t o have sust ai ned t hem i n t hei r
dut i es wi t hout t he need for any formal mot i vat i on.
Personnel management, however, did suffer from the techni-
cal focus of the CAOC l eadershi p i n ways t hat coul d have under -
mined the organizations efficiency had the operation gone on
longer. Based on the dictum of Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1,
Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, t hat
man, not his machines, sets the ultimate limits on battle per -
formance . . . [and] commanders effectiveness depends in large
part on t hei r underst andi ng of t he human l i mi t at i ons of t hei r
subordinates, CAOC l eaders probabl y shoul d have pai d more
at t ent i on t o l eadershi p i ssues such as t he di st ri but i on of work,
length of the workday, and personnel augmentation.
43
Most CAOC st affers i nt ervi ewed for t hi s st udy i ndi cat ed t hat
personnel were st ret ched as far as t hey coul d go. Duri ng t he
first few days of the operation, Maj Dave Goldfein , Gener al
Ryans ai de, not ed t hat he and hi s boss, as wel l as ot hers i n
the CAOC, worked 20-to-30-hour days,
44
recognizing that few
peopl e coul d mai nt ai n such a pace for very l ong. In fact , Chap-
lain, Lt Col Bobby Edwards not ed t hat t he l evel of work i n t he
CAOC was so i nt ense duri ng Del i berat e Force t hat peopl e
woul d have t o go out of t he bui l di ng t o t hei r cars t o cat ch a
l i t t l e sl eep because t hey had nei t her a break area nor t i me t o
go home. St i l l , he remarked t hat al l personnel remai ned very
professi onal , worki ng cl osel y t oget her and t aki ng pri de i n what
they were doing.
45
Import ant l y, bot h General Hornburg a nd
subordi nat e members of t he CAOC staff acknowledged t hat
t hese man-breaki ng workl oads were not di st ri but ed evenl y.
DELIBERATE FORCE
364
For some peopl e, t he r ecr ui t ment of 120 augment ees t o t he
CAOC duri ng Del i berat e Force rei nforced t he percept i on t hat
the workload was not well balanced. MSgt Steve Wells , t he
CAOC fi rst sergeant , sai d he fel t t hat t he personnel syst em
was mi smanaged duri ng t he i ni t i al spi n-up peri od i n t he fi rst
days of t he campai gn. Accordi ng t o hi m, col onel s i n t he CAOC
on t emporary dut y (TDY) woul d cont act t hei r home bases out-
si de of nor mal per sonnel channel s t o r equest peopl e, who
woul d t hen unexpect edl y arri ve sayi ng, They cal l ed and sai d
for me t o show up.
46
Many of t hese l at e arri vers had l i t t l e t o
do duri ng t he operat i on, whi l e ot hers were overworked. Thi s
deci si on by t he CAOCs Ameri can l eaders t o go out si de normal
NATO channel s t o augment t he st aff compl i cat ed t he si t uat i on
even furt her. But Capt ai n Maul di n not ed t hat , had t hes e en -
t repreneuri al col onel s gone t hrough normal NATO channel s t o
fi nd hel p, t hey woul d have wai t ed for t hree t o si x mont hs t o
get needed peopl e.
47
Nevert hel ess, t he sudden i nfl ux of aug-
ment ees creat ed confusi on among many of t he personnel i n
the CAOCt oo many peopl e arri ved t oo qui ckl y for t he busy
i ndi vi dual s al ready t here t o t rai n t hem for t hei r new j obs. At
t i mes, some peopl e wondered whet her anyone was i n cont rol
of t he personnel si t uat i on.
48
Leadershi p and Fol l owershi p at Avi ano
The out st andi ng l eadershi p and fol l owershi p charact eri st i c
of the CAOC st aff was al so evi dent wi t hi n t he 31st Fi ght er
Wing and 7490t h Wi ng (Provi si onal ) at Aviano Air Base (AB) as
wel l . Int ervi ews reveal ed a st rong sense of pri de and mot i va -
t i on t o accompl i sh t he mi ssi on at al l l evel s of bot h uni t s. Col
Charl es Wal d , t he 7490t h commander , sai d t hat Gener al Ryan
told him the wing belonged to him (Wald ) and t hat he shoul d
do what he needed t o do. Wal d added t hat he had t ot al access
t o Ryan and t hat he r ecei ved what ever he needed t o accom -
pl i sh hi s mi ssi on.
49
Col David Moody, 31st Fi ght er Wi ng vice
commander, al so prai sed General Ryan s l eader shi p, sayi ng
t hat t he wi ng i mpl ement ed what ever hi gher headquar t er s di-
rect ed and t hat t he campai gn went very smoot hl y. He men -
t i oned t hat when a wi ng commander has t he t i me and peace
ORNDORFF
365
of mind to fly with his wing, as did Wald, i t s a si gn t hat t hi ngs
are good.
50
Ot her Avi ano per sonnel i ndi cat ed t hat Col onel
Wald di d an excel l ent j ob l eadi ng t he wi ng. Accordi ng t o Cap-
t ai n MacQueen, Wald was a t ake-charge ki nd of l eader who l et
peopl e know what t o do and t hen l et t hem do i t . Rat her t han
mi cromanage, t he wi ng l eadershi p l et peopl e do t hei r j obs.
Pi l ot s such as MacQueen st at ed t hat t hey had t he ri ght peo -
pl e at t he ri ght pl ace at t he ri ght t i me.
51
Lt Col Gary West, t he 510t h Fi ght er Squadr on commander ,
al so had pr ai se f or t he wi ng l eader shi p but f r om a somewhat
different perspective, describing Colonel Wald as an i n- your -
face kind of guy.
52
He went on t o st at e t hat Wal d spent so
much t i me i n t he squadr on at f i r st t hat he ( West ) felt he
shoul d be abl e t o fl y more because a wi ng commander [ran]
t he squadron. However, once t he 31st Wi ngs Deny Fl i ght
oper at i ons cent er was up and r unni ng, West sai d t hat Wal d
spent more t i me t here. Overal l , personnel at t he 31st Fi ght er
Wing agreed t hat t hey enj oyed good l eadershi p whi ch al l owed
t hem t o do t hei r j obs.
53
Thi s assessment seems t o under scor e
West s own effect i veness as a l eader and a fol l ower, i n t hat hi s
squadr on seemed unawar e of hi s f r ust r at i ons over what he
may have percei ved as Wal d s mi cr omanagement .
As far as hi s own l eadershi p was concerned, Li eut enant
Colonel West sai d hi s most i mport ant responsi bi l i t y was t o get
everyone i nvol ved i n t he campai gn,
54
a sent i ment echoed by
ot her member s of hi s squadr on. Capt ai n MacQueen prai sed
West , sayi ng, It was good havi ng a squadron commander
wi t h combat experi ence. He fel t t hat West, a vet eran of Desert
St or m, knew how t o f i ght a war , manage a squadr on, and
keep everyone i nvol ved. He poi nt ed out t hat West l ed by exam-
pl e, t el l i ng t he fl i ght l eads how t o t ake care of t hei r peopl e and
how t o det ect i ndi cat i ons of emot i onal st ress i n t hei r pi l ot s.
55
Many ot her squadr on member s expr essed t he same opi ni ons
about West s leadership.
56
Not onl y di d part i ci pant s appreci at e t hei r l eadershi p but
al so t he personnel at Avi ano expressed sat i sfact i on wi t h t he
j oi nt and combi ned nat ur e of t he campai gn. Al t hough some
report s i ndi cat ed t he presence of fri ct i on bet ween t he Ai r
Force and ot her servi ces, ai rcrews at Avi ano believed that in -
t eract i on wi t h t he Mari ne Corps and Navy went smoot hl y.
DELIBERATE FORCE
366
Colonel Wald ment i oned t hat he t r eat ed t he Navy and Mar i ne
TDY crews l i ke any ot her squadron i n t he wi ng fami l y, addi ng
t hat Avi ano took pains to take care of the TDY folks.
57
Capt ai n
MacQueen decl ar ed t hat t he mar i nes and Navy personnel al-
ways di d wel l and were never l at e. He al so comment ed t hat
aft er communi cat i on was est abl i shed wi t h NATO allies flying
i n combi ned packages wi t h t he Avi ano cr ews, mi ssi ons r an
very smoot hl y wi t h t hem as wel l .
58
Pilots also seemed satisfied
wi t h t he j oi nt and combi ned nat ure of t he operat i on, al t hough
Aviano per sonnel dr ew t hei r mot i vat i on and ent husi asm f r om
the Deliberate Force mission itself.
From t he CAOC t o t he Avi ano flight line, American partici-
pant s acr oss t he boar d i n Del i ber at e For ce ascr i bed much of
t hei r mot i vat i on t o knowi ng t hey were doi ng an i mport ant j ob.
In the CAOC, peopl e wor ked hour s on end i n an i nt ense and
st r essf ul envi r onment because t hey knew t hat t hei r act i ons
woul d affect t he l i ves of bot h ai rcrews and count l ess ci vi l i ans
on t he ground. Al t hough everyone agreed on t he i mport ance of
l eadershi p, peopl e found sat i sfact i on i n t hei r j obs and t hei r
own sense of professi onal i sm, as wel l as exci t ement i n doi ng
what t hey were t rai ned t o do. Capt ai n MacQueen compared
hi s uni t s rol e i n Del i berat e Force t o an at hl et es get t i ng t o do
what he t rai ned for.
59
Similarly, Lieutenant Colonel West not ed
t hat a real warri or never want s t o ki l l anybody, but when
t heres a war goi ng on, t heres no ot her pl ace hed want t o
be,
60
whi l e Capt Ti m St ret ch comment ed t hat everyone was
l eani ng forward i n t he st raps.
61
Impact of t he Presence
of Dependent s at Avi ano
The presence of Ameri can dependent s at Avi ano, t he mai n
combat base, dur i ng t he campai gn was a uni que aspect of t he
operat i on. Peopl e who had combat experi ence i n Desert St orm
preferred t o have t hei r fami l i es wi t h t hem,
62
while those for
whom Del i berat e Force was t hei r fi rst combat t hought t hey
shoul d have been el sewhere.
63
Many member s of t he 510t h Fi ght er Squadr on appreci at ed
t he support and psychol ogi cal boost provi ded by t he squadron
ORNDORFF
367
supper s pr epar ed each ni ght by t he spouses,
64
but younger
pi l ot s favored not havi ng t he wi ves around. Capt ai n Gent ry,
for i nst ance, found i t di st ract i ng t o have hi s wi fe at Avi ano.
Speci fi cal l y, he was concerned for her safet y si nce burgl ars
t arget ed t he easi l y i dent i fi abl e Ameri can homes i n t he Avi ano
ar ea. Fur t her , he f ear ed t hat t er r or i st s coul d easi l y det ermi ne
wher e US f ami l i es l i ved and at t ack t hem.
65
Capt ai n Mac-
Queen , who shar ed t hi s f ear , f el t t hat combat uni t s shoul d
operat e from i sol at ed l ocat i ons wi t hout fami l y di st ract i ons.
66
Al t hough he di d not know of any pi l ot s who t ook t hei r frust ra -
t i ons out on t hei r fami l i es, he t hought i t prudent t o remi nd
ai r cr ewmen not t o t ake t hei r wor k home wi t h t hem.
Li eut enant Col onel West , however, enj oyed havi ng hi s fam-
i l y wi t h hi m, poi nt i ng out t hat hi s wi fe di d not worry as much
about hi m si nce, unl i ke t he si t uat i on i n Deser t St or m , s he
saw him every day during Deliberate Force. Also, West s s ons
were very i nt erest ed i n hi s act i vi t i es duri ng t he operat i on,
usual l y aski ng Di d you drop? when he ret urned from fl yi ng a
mi ssi on. West t hought t hat ot her crewmen who had fl own i n
Desert Storm shared his appreciation of his familys presence.
67
General l y, t he spouses of ai rcrewmen fl yi ng combat mi s -
si ons agr eed t hat t hey pr ef er r ed t o r emai n wi t h t hei r hus-
bands. Rei nforci ng her husbands eval uat i on, Col et t e West
confi rmed t he anxi et y she fel t duri ng Desert St orm, when s he
had no i nf or mat i on about what her husband was doi ng, ex -
cept what she hear d on CNN. Addressi ng ot her sources of
st r ess, she comment ed t hat sayi ng good- bye i n t he mor ni ngs
duri ng Del i berat e Force was no di fferent t han at ot her t i mes,
si nce, as t he wi fe of a pi l ot , she knew t hat somet hi ng mi ght go
wrong. Moreover, she sai d i t was i mport ant t o ki ss her hus-
band good-bye and t el l hi m she l oved hi m.
68
Vickie Jo Ryder, wife of Lt Col Edward Ryder , also preferred
bei ng wi t h her husband. She sai d t hat some of t he newer
spouses seemed concerned at fi rst , but al l t he wi ves event u -
al l y handl ed t he st ress of bei ng around ongoi ng combat opera -
t i ons very wel l . She not ed t hat t he best t hi ng she coul d do for
her husband was pr ovi de a st abl e home f or hi m. Ot her t han
t hat , because t he spouses want ed t o hel p t he ef f or t i n any way
t hey coul d, t hey began pr epar i ng meal s f or t he squadr on, as
DELIBERATE FORCE
368
ment i oned above. She fel t t hat i t was i mport ant for t he wi ves
t o st i ck t oget her and r espond t o each ot her s needs.
69
I n addi t i on t o suppor t i ng t hei r husbands dur i ng Del i ber at e
Force, some spouses were di rect l y i nvol ved i n support opera -
t i ons. TSgt Janel l e Bearden , US Air Force Reserve (USAFR),
wi fe of Capt Bryan Bearden , and Capt Tami Turner , USAFR,
wi fe of Col James Turner, bot h served wi t h i nt el l i gence dur i ng
t he operat i onBearden i n t he 31st Wi ng and Tur ner in Six -
teenth Air Force . They, t oo, t ri ed not t o t hi nk about t he possi -
bi l i t y of t hei r husbands not ret urni ng. Bearden r emar ked t hat
she t ri ed t o st ay t ot al l y focused on accompl i shi ng t he mi ssi on
and suppor t i ng t he pi l ot s. I n t hi s r espect she sai d she di d not
t hi nk of her husband any di f f er ent l y t han she t hought of any
other pilot flying in Deliberate Force.
70
Tur ner agreed t hat whi l e she was at work duri ng Del i berat e
Force, she focused on t he j ob at hand. However, she di d men -
t i on t hat she was i n t he ai r operat i ons cent er when Capt Scot t
OGrady was shot down i n June 1995 and wonder ed whet her
her husband was f l yi ng t hen. I n t hi s sense she wor r i ed about
her husband but mai nt ai ned t hat she woul d r at her r emai n
wi t h hi m i n a si t uat i on l i ke t hi s. She went on t o ment i on t hat
because of cr ew r est , her husband had mor e t i me of f dur i ng
t he campai gn t han dur i ng nor mal oper at i ons. I n Del i ber at e
Force he woul d have 12 hours off for crew rest more free
t i me t han he nor mal l y had. Accor di ng t o Tur ner , enl i st ed
fami l i es probabl y shoul dered t he great est burden, consi deri ng
t hey had no cr ew r est , endur ed l ong commut es t o wor k, and
experi enced great er fi nanci al st ress.
71
Al t hough most wi ves preferred t o be wi t h t hei r husbands
duri ng a combat operat i on, t hey di d concede t hat t hei r at t i -
t ude mi ght have changed had t he wi ng suffered l osses. How-
ever, in the case of families assigned to the 8th Fighter-Bomber
Wing at It azuke AB, Japan , dur i ng t he Kor ean War i n 1950,
wi ves want ed t o st ay wi t h t hei r husbands dur i ng combat even
t hough t he wi ng experi enced casual t i es. Al t hough t he wi ves
t ook t he fi rst casual t i es very hard, one wi fe whose husband
di ed mai nt ai ned she st i l l woul d have want ed t o st ay at It azuke
because of t he Ai r Force communi t y s suppor t and under -
st andi ng.
72
Like the pilots in Aviano, t hough, t hose i n Japan
preferred not having their families with them during wa rt i me.
73
ORNDORFF
369
St i l l , i n bot h i nst ances spouses suppor t ed t hemsel ves and t he
war fi ght ers i n ways t hat woul d be di ffi cul t t o dupl i cat e.
Speci f i c Ci rcumst ances
and Leadershi p Eval uati on
In addi t i on t o t he presence of fami l i es at Avi ano, Operat i on
Del i berat e Force mani fest ed el ement s of prei ndust ri al and i n -
dust ri al -age warfare. Pol i t i cal consi derat i ons, t he t echnol ogi cal
capabilities of communications, and the scope of the campaign
moved senior leaders to adopt, more or less subconsciously, a
leadership style more akin to the great captaincy of Napolon
than to the less centralized, Prussian-derived system formalized
under von Moltke. The degree of centralization reached the point
t hat , i n t he words of Capt ai n MacQueen , it completely took the
j udgment out of t he cockpit.
74
This implies no criticism of the leadership style employed in
Deliberate Force. Although the highly professional followers in
the CAOC and at Avi ano clearly would have been more comfort -
able with a less centralized, delegating style of leadership, they
were quite capable of functioning under General Ryans central-
ized approach. Given the intensity and confusion reported in the
CAOC and, at times, at the wing level, the professional qualities
of his followers allowed Ryan t o command as he di d. Less ma -
ture and professional personnel probably could not have en -
dured the stress and performed their duties so well in the face of
such an unprecedent edfor t heml eadershi p st yl e.
Ti me al so shaped General Ryans l eadershi p st yl e duri ng
t he operat i on. Aft er t he wi ndow of opport uni t y opened t o begi n
bombi ng Bosni an Serb posi t i ons, he faced t he possi bi l i t y t hat
it would quickly close. Ryan f el t t hat he coul d not t ake t he
chance t hat col l at er al damage r epor t ed by t he ubi qui t ous
press mi ght t ermi nat e t he campai gn before i t accompl i shed i t s
military objectives . Thus, he consci ousl y t ook on t he most
sensi t i ve el ement s of Del i berat e Forcet arget s and mi ssi on
rel easesas a personal responsi bi l i t y. The el ement of t i me
i nfl uenced l eadershi p deci si ons i n ot her ways as wel l . Li eut en -
ant Col onel West, for one, di dnt know how l ong t he campai gn
woul d l ast , so he deci ded t o have everyone fl y on t he fi rst
DELIBERATE FORCE
370
ni ght so no one woul d be l ef t out . He mai nt ai ned t hat t hi s
aspect of hi s l eadershi p was t he most i mport ant t hi ng he di d
or coul d have done dur i ng t he oper at i on.
75
Consi derati ons for Future Commanders
Because a number of f act or s i nf l uenced Gener al Ryans
l eader shi p st yl e i n t hi s campai gn, one must exami ne t he con -
t ext of t he campai gn t o benefi t from t he l essons of Del i berat e
Force, a rel at i vel y short ai r campai gn conduct ed i n a l i mi t ed
t heat er of operat i ons wi t h easi l y managed resources. Al t hough
not al l weapon and suppor t syst ems wer e f ul l y f unct i onal
when t he operat i on began, t he CAOC was avai l abl e and i deal l y
sui t ed f or C
2
of the campaign. As Major Goldfein observed,
Ryan could pick DMPIs t he way he di d because of t he r e-
st ri ct ed scal e and scope of t he campai gnwhi ch was not t he
same as Deser t St or m. Ryan had t he t i me t o pay cl ose at t en -
t i on t o what was goi ng onsomet hi ng he coul dnt have done
had t he campai gn gone on any l onger .
76
Fur t her , as we have
seen, l eader s must not t ake t he devel opment of subor di nat e
personnel for grant edanot her reason t hat cont ext i s of cri t i -
cal i mport ance i n t he consi derat i on of t he l eadershi p st yl e.
The i ssue of cent ral i zed cont roland, t o some degree, de-
cent ral i zed execut i on al so war r ant s consi der at i on. I n t he
case of Del i berat e Force, such cont rol proved an i rri t ant t o
ai rcrews. However, t he abi l i t y of US pi l ot s t o t hi nk and exe -
cut e i ndependent l y has al ways been a great st rengt h. AFM 1-1
not es t he ri sk i n pl aci ng t oo much cont rol i n one pl ace, whi ch
can become a pr obl em dur i ng a l oss of communi cat i ons.
77
By
exerci si ng t oo much cent ral i zed cont rol , a commander r i sks
l osi ng opport uni t i es t hat onl y subordi nat es can sei ze at t he
tactical level.
One fi nal consi derat i on for fut ure campai gns has t o do wi t h
t he presence of dependent s i n t he t heat er of operat i ons. General
Hacket t not ed t hat bei ng i n t he mi l i t ary duri ng peacet i me i s i n
many ways more di ffi cul t t han duri ng wart i me because of t he
at t ent i on one must pay t o fami l i es, wel fare, educat i on, bar -
r acks mai nt enance, and so f or t h. I n war , such concer ns go by
the wayside.
78
However, to some degree we see the complexities
ORNDORFF
371
of bot h peacet i me and wart i me mi xed i n Del i berat e Force,
creat i ng an added burden, accordi ng t o some of t he younger
pi l ot s. Al t hough t he presence of fami l y members provi ded a
psychol ogi cal boost , of even more concern was t he pot ent i al
di sast er associ at ed wi t h t hei r becomi ng casual t i es.
Even t hough spouses preferred remai ni ng wi t h t hei r pi l ot
husbands, what woul d have happened had we suf f er ed l osses,
as i n t he Korean confl i ct ? Woul d wi ves who were al so mi l i t ary
member s have been expect ed t o cont i nue wi t h t hei r dut i es
af t er l ear ni ng t hei r spouse was mi ssi ng or dead? I n t hi s case
an adver sar y coul d r easonabl y expect t hat some shoot downs
woul d af f ect US oper at i ons mor e t han ot her s. Fur t her mor e, as
Capt ai n Gent r y feared, what woul d have happened i f t errori st s
had t arget ed t he fami l i es of ai rcrews? Fort unat el y, none of
t hese probl ems arose duri ng Del i berat e Force, but t hey war -
r ant f ur t her st udy.
From t he CAOC st aff t o t he wi ves of ai rcrew members, t he
peopl e i nvol ved i n Del i berat e Force proved t hemsel ves ex -
t remel y compet ent and dedi cat ed. By empl oyi ng a st yl e of
l eader shi p per haps mor e cent r al i zed t han t he i ndust r i al - age
nor m, Gener al Ryan cor r ect l y r ead t he envi r onment and un-
der st ood t he r equi r ement s f or t he t ype of campai gn he di-
rect ed. Li ke t he change i n warfare t hat di ct at ed t he shi ft from
Napolons general shi p t o von Mol t kes general staff, Deliber -
at e Force requi red a reversi on t o somet hi ng si mi l ar t o t hat of
t he great capt ai n . Thi s seems t o i ndi cat e t hat , at t he pr esent
t i me, one shoul d eval uat e each campai gn on i t s own mer i t s
and sel ect a met hod of command accordi ngl y. That i s not t o
say t hi s wi l l remai n t he best approach. The real chal l enge for
f ut ur e commander s l i es i n under st andi ng when t hi s st yl e of
l eadershi p i s cal l ed for and when i t i s not .
The key, t hen, t o underst andi ng t he i mpact of l eadershi p i n
Del i berat e Force resi des i n t he cont ext of t he campai gn as
General Ryan saw i t . Fi rst , he underst ood t hat t he l i mi t ed
objectives of NATO and t he UN were hi ghl y sensi t i ve. Second,
t he use of ext reme force coul d l eave one vul nerabl e t o domes -
t i c and i nt ernat i onal cri t i ci sm, part i cul arl y i f any col l at eral
damage occurred. Thi rd, because t i me was short , Ryan s e-
lected every target for maxi mum effect i n order t o achi eve
obj ect i ves. Fi nal l y, abundant resources enabl ed t he servi ci ng
DELIBERATE FORCE
372
of vi rt ual l y al l t he t arget s available to him, at least politically,
by 12 Sept ember .
Gi ven t hi s cont ext , General Ryans leadership style proved
nat ural and effect i ve, part i cul arl y so i n l i ght of t he avai l abl e
equi pment and per sonnel . Usi ng C
2
capabi l i t i es t hat he and
Gen Joseph W. Ashy, hi s predecessor as AIRSOUTH com-
mander, bui l t up over a peri od of years, Ryan placed com-
mand at t ent i on on cri t i cal deci si ons t hat woul d l ead t o achi ev-
i ng t he campai gn s obj ect i ves. Fur t her mor e, as ment i oned
above, he expl oi t ed t he l eadershi p and fol l owershi p of t he
uni quel y capabl e subor di nat es under hi s command. Thus, i n
t he cont ext of envi ronment and capabi l i t i es, General Ryans
l eadershi p was i ndeed what Del i berat e Force needed at t he
t i me. St i l l , one must acknowl edge t he exi st ence of drawbacks
t o t hi s st yl e of l eadershi p al t hough some el ement s di d not
emerge because of t he short durat i on of t he campai gn.
These drawbacks had t o do wi t h personnel i ssues and t he
unusual demands of t he si t uat i on. Fi rst , cl ose at t ent i on t o t act i -
cal det ai l s of t he campai gn t ended t o rob ot her i mport ant areas,
such as manni ng and mor al e, al t hough t he ent husi asm and
professionalism of subordinates mitigated its impact. Second,
t he i nt ensi t y of t he campai gn pushed key part i ci pant s t o near
exhaustion, while others remained virtually idlea situation
t hat coul d have undermi ned l at er deci si ons. Thi rd, unusual de-
mands (e. g. , BDA di ssemi nat i on and channel i zat ion of the infor -
mation flow to and from General Ryan) tended to frustrate junior
and senior staff alike. In the final analysis, however, criticism of
General Ryans style of leadership is inappropria te.
General Ryans direction of Deliberate Force was appropri-
at e f or sever al r easons. Under t he ci r cumst ances, hi s cl ose
di rect i on made sense, fi t hi m i n t erms of abi l i t y t o manage t he
si t uat i on, and made a maj or cont r i but i on t o t he success of t he
campai gn. Thus, t he i ssue her e i s not t o make t oo much of t he
Napol eoni c and Mol t ki an st yl es of l eadershi p but t o acknowl -
edge t he exi st ence of t he t wo opt i ons and underst and t hat t he
highly centralized style of a great captain may have a new
vi abi l i t y i n modern operat i ons ot her t han war , part i cul arl y
t hose whose t act i cal det ai l s have such l at ent or act ual st r at e -
gi c i mpor t ance. I ndeed, f ut ur e commander s, r egar dl ess of
t hei r t rai ni ng or procl i vi t i es, may have l i t t l e choi ce ot her t han
ORNDORFF
373
replicating some of General Ryans arrangements and focus. In
so doing, however, they should be fully aware of the Napoleonic
styles circumstantial suitability, advantages, and drawbacks.
Not es
1. Mart i n van Crevel d, Command i n War (Cambri dge, Mass. : Harvard
2. Albert Sidney Britt III, The Wars of Napoleon, The West Poi nt Mi l i t ary
Series (Wayne, N. J. : Avery Publishing Group, Inc. , 1985), xvi.
3. Van Crevel d, 64.
4. Col Owen E. Jensen, Information Warfare: Principles of Third-Wave
War, Airpower Journal 8, no. 4 (Wi nt er 1994): 36.
5. T. N. Dupuy, A Geni us f or War: The German Army and General St af f ,
18071945 (Fairfax, Va. : Hero Books, 1984), 18.
6. Ibid. , 304, 116.
7. Ibi d.
8. Ant ul i o J. Echevarri a II, Mol t ke and t he German Mi l i t ary Tradi t i on:
His Theories and Legacies, Parameters 24, no. 1 (Spri ng 1996): 97.
9. Maj Gen Michael Short, vice commander, AIRSOUTH, interviewed by
Lt Col Robert Owen, Napl es, It al y, 4 December 1995.
10. Lt Comdr Michael Gator Dunn, CAOC crisis-action cell, telephone
i nt er vi ew wi t h aut hor , 3 Januar y 1996; and Capt Scot t MacQueen, 510t h
Fi ght er Squadron, i nt ervi ewed by Lt Col Bradl ey Davi s and aut hor, Avi ano
Air Base (AB), Italy, 20 February 1996. Interestingly, General Ryan related
t hat duri ng a vi si t wi t h hi s fat hercommander i n chi ef of Paci fi c Ai r
Forceswhen Ryan was servi ng i n Vi et nam, he (t he younger Ryan) men -
t i oned t hat i t seemed someone was t r yi ng t o get hi m and hi s br ot her ( who
was also in Vietnam) killed with the type of missions they were flying.
Ryans father replied, Thats me. Gen Michael Ryan, interviewed by Maj
Ti m Reagan and Dr . Wayne Thompson, 18 Oct ober 1995.
11. Maj Mi chael Hol mes, European Command (EUCOM) Operat i ons Di-
vi si on, i nt ervi ewed by Lt Col Bradl ey Davi s and aut hor, St ut t gart -Vai hi ngen,
Ger many, 16 Febr uar y 1996.
12. Ryan i nt ervi ew. General Ryan hi msel f st at ed t hat Del i berat e Force
was very di fferent from Operat i on Rol l i ng Thunder i n Vi et nam because t he
former was a very specific operation for a very specific resultstop the
Bosni an Serbs from shel l i ng Saraj evo. Regardi ng hi s t i ght cont rol over t he
campai gn, he st at ed t hat you can not del egat e t he sel ect i on [of t arget s].
[The] commander must ask al l of t he det ai l ed quest i ons. There wi l l be no
t i me i n t he fut ure when he wi l l have t he opt i on t o say, I del egat ed t hat
responsi bi l i t y. . . . The commander must be account abl e for al l act i ons
t aken by hi s forces. Thi s i s part i cul arl y not abl e, gi ven our use of [preci si on-
gui ded muni t i on] st ri kes from t he ai r. Gen Mi chael Ryan, i nt ervi ewed by
aut hors of t he Ai r Uni versi t y Bal kans Ai r Campai gn St udy at Ai r Command
and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB), Ala., 7 February 1996.
DELIBERATE FORCE
374
13. Maj Gen Hal Hornburg, CAOC di rect or, meet i ng wi t h aut hors of t he
Ai r Uni versi t y Bal kans Ai r Campai gn St udy at t he Ai r Force Wargami ng
Inst i t ut e, Maxwel l AFB, Al a. , 12 March 1996.
14. Col Charl es Wal d, commander, 7490t h Wi ng (Provi si onal ), sai d t hat
t he chaot i c nat ure of t he CAOC was due t o t he nat ure of ai rpowerspeci fi -
cally, flexibility and change. At the CAOC, things would change daily. Inter -
viewed by Maj Tim Reagan and Dr. Wayne Thompson, Aviano AB, Italy, 6
Oct ober 1995.
15. Ryan i nt ervi ew, 18 Oct ober 1995.
16. See J. F. C. Ful l er, The Conduct of War (London: Met huen, 1961), 53.
17. Col Daniel Doc Zoerb, director, Decisive Endeavor air operations
cel l , i nt ervi ewed by Lt Col Chri s Campbel l , Headquart ers AIRSOUTH,
Napl es, It al y, 7 February 1996.
18. Hol mes i nt ervi ew. Dept ul a was Gen Bust er Gl ossons chi ef pl anner
i n Desert St orm and i s wi del y recogni zed for hi s work on t he ai r campai gn.
See Ri chard P. Hal l i on, Storm over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War (Wash-
i ngt on, D. C. : Smi t hsoni an Inst i t ut i on Press, 1992), 153, 209.
19. Hornburg meet i ng; and Maj Gen Hal Hornburg, i nt ervi ewed by Dr.
Wayne Thompson and Maj Ti m Reagan, Vi cenza, It al y, 16 Oct ober 1995.
Royal Ai r Force wi ng commander Andy Bat chel or, who ran BDA duri ng t he
operat i on, sai d peopl e fel t t hat t hi s was a US and NATO operat i on and t hat
he had correct ed ot hers who remarked t hat t hi s i s a NATO operat i on.
When asked what coul d have been done t o make i t a mor e combi ned
operat i on, he suggest ed t hat havi ng a di vi si on chi ef from anot her NATO
count ry mi ght have hel ped. Int ervi ewed by aut hor, Ramst ei n AB, Germany,
14 Febr uar y 1996.
20. Lt Col Bernd Jansen, German air force, Air Branch action officer, AF -
SOUTH, not ed t hat somet i mes commanders di d not use t he opt i mum ai r-
craft / weapons mi x t o ensure t hat al l t he nat i ons got a part of t he operat i on.
Interviewed by Lt Col Christopher Campbell, Sarajevo, 9 February 1996.
21. Col Arjen Koopmans, Netherlands air force, interviewed by Lt Col
Bradl ey Davi s and aut hor, Vi cenza AB, It al y, 21 February 1996. The obser -
vations of Colonel Koopmans were confirmed by other NATO officers as well.
Maj Marc Ant hony of t he Bel gi an ai r force st at ed t hat he worked i n t he C-5
pl ans and proj ect s cel l duri ng t he operat i on and di d not feel excl uded at a ll.
Interviewed by Lt Col Christopher Campbell, Heidelber g, Ger many, 13 Feb-
r uar y 1996.
22. Maj Mi chael Hol mes rel at ed t hat j ust pri or t o Del i berat e Force, he
went t o t he Dut ch offi cers t o have t hem revi ew a pl an, and t hey responded
by aski ng, Are al l t he Ameri cans si ck? They t hen l ect ured hi m about t hi s
bei ng t he fi rst t i me he had consul t ed t hem si nce t hei r arri val . He went on t o
add that NATO officers felt they were not included, while US officers felt the
Europeans were never around. Hol mes i nt ervi ew. Li eut enant Commander
Dunn sai d much t he same t hi ng. Dunn i nt er vi ew.
23. Hor nbur g interview.
ORNDORFF
375
24. Capt Todd Gent ry, 510t h Fi ght er Squadron, i nt ervi ewed by Lt Col
Bradl ey Davi s and aut hor, Avi ano AB, It al y, 20 February 1996; and Mac-
Queen interview.
25. Lt Col Gary West , commander, 510t h Fi ght er Squadron, i nt ervi ewed
by Lt Col Bradl ey Davi s and aut hor, Avi ano AB, It al y, 20 February 1996. At
one poi nt t he 510t h was t asked t o use an ei ght - shi p f or mat i on t o make a
r econnai ssance pass over t he t ar get t o make sur e t her e was no col l at er al
damage, r et ur n, dr op a si ngl e bomb, make anot her pass t o dr op a second
bomb, and t hen make a f i nal r econnai ssance pass. Commander West sai d
t he or der di dn t make sense t o hi m because i t put hi s peopl e i n t oo much
danger. He cal l ed t he CAOC for cl ari fi cat i on and was t ol d t hat General
Ryan, who was now asl eep, had made t he deci si on and t hat t hey woul d not
wake hi m. In t hi s i nst ance, West fel t he di d not recei ve a good answer.
26. Bat chel or i nt ervi ew; and Col Dani el Zoerb, memorandum t o Lt Col
Robert C. Owen, di rect or, Ai r Uni versi t y Bal kans Ai r Campai gn St udy, sub-
j ect : Del i berat e Force BDA Process, 25 March 1996.
27. Capt Pete Ornell, 31st Fighter Wing, interviewed by Lt Col Bradley
Davi s and aut hor, Avi ano AB, It al y, 20 February 1996.
28. Capt Mark Hallisey, 31st Fighter Wing, interviewed by Lt Col Bradley
Davi s and aut hor, Avi ano AB, It al y, 22 February 1996.
29. MacQueen i nt ervi ew.
30. Hallisey interview.
31. Hor nbur g meet i ng.
32. Capt Pat ri ci a Maul di n, CAOC, i nt ervi ewed by aut hor, Ramst ei n AB,
Germany, 14 February 1996; MSgt St eve Wel l s, CAOC, t el ephone i nt ervi ew
wi t h aut hor , 24 Januar y 1996; and Chapl ai n, Lt Col Bobby O. Edwar ds,
t el ephone i nt er vi ew wi t h aut hor , 29 Januar y 1996.
33. Mauldin interview.
34. Thi s observat i on i s based on di scussi ons wi t h t he fi rst sergeant ,
squadr on sect i on commander , and chapl ai n. Whi l e Gener al Ryan and Gen -
er al Hor nbur g wer e consumed wi t h dut i es r el at i ng t o t he campai gn, Gener al
Sawyer t al ked t o peopl e about t hei r wor k and t he ai r campai gn.
35. Hornburg meet i ng; and Col Dougl as Ri chardson, chi ef of operat i ons,
CAOC, interviewed by Maj Ron Reed and Maj Mark Conversino, Vicenza,
I t al y, 16 Januar y 1996. Ri char dson not ed t he t r emendous st r ess dur i ng
Del i berat e Force on general offi cers, who worked 15-t o-18-hour days and
got phone cal l s al l ni ght . General Hornburg al so not ed t hat he woul d some-
t i mes sl eep for t wo hours, get a phone cal l , and t hen ret urn t o t he CAOC.
36. Li eut enant Commander Dunn not ed t hat no one i n t he CAOC
seemed t o have t he bi g pi ct ure and t hat he had a hard t i me fi ndi ng peopl e
t o push i nformat i on t o hi m. Dunn i nt ervi ew. Maj Mi chael Hol mes al so
ment i oned t hat get t i ng i nformat i on down t o t he worker bees was a prob -
l em i n t he CAOC duri ng hi s st ay t here j ust pri or t o Del i berat e Force.
Hol mes i nt ervi ew. Wi ng Commander Bat chel or ment i oned t hat he was not
part i cul arl y i mpressed wi t h t he l eadershi p ot her t han General Ryan. Ac -
cor di ng t o hi m, maj or s and l i eut enant col onel s, who r an her e and t her e
DELIBERATE FORCE
376
t ypi ng up not es or worki ng on t he comput er, were doi ng work bet t er l eft t o
l i eut enant s and capt ai ns . He t hought t hat t he CAOC was di s or der l y.
Batchelor interview.
37. Maul di n i nt ervi ew. Capt ai n Maul di n went on t o not e t hat Col onel
Ri chardson was deepl y i nvol ved i n t he det ai l s, want i ng t o know everyt hi ng
t hat was goi ng on and t hen ensur i ng t hat hi s peopl e wer e equi pped t o do
t hei r j obs.
38. Gen Si r John Hacket t , The Profession of Arms (New York: Macmillan
Publ i shi ng Co. , 1983), 218.
39. Bat chel or i nt ervi ew; and Col St even Teske, CAOC chi ef of pl ans,
i nt ervi ewed by Lt Col Chri st opher Campbel l , Lt Col Bradl ey Davi s, and
aut hor , Ramst ei n AB, Ger many, 14 Febr uar y 1996. Maj or Hol mes al so
ment i oned t hat Dunn was an especi al l y good offi cer, sayi ng t hat he di d
everyt hi ng, i ncl udi ng put t i ng t he pl an t oget her and moni t ori ng i t . The fact
t hat he had a st rong operat i onal background and fami l i ari t y wi t h j oi nt force
ai r component commander i ssues hel ped hi m on t he j ob. To hi m, Dunn was
essent i al t o t he execut i on of t he campai gn. Hol mes i nt ervi ew.
40. Dunn i nt ervi ew.
41. Maj Keith Kiger, CAOC crisis-action team cell, interviewed by Lt Col
Bradl ey Davi s and aut hor, Headquart ers Si xt eent h Ai r Force, Avi ano AB,
It al y, 21 February 1996. Maj or Hol mes al so sai d t hat Col onel Gi bbons was
good at put t i ng t he dai l y schedul e t oget her and coul d do i t i n hi s head.
Hol mes i nt ervi ew. Col onel Teske al so ment i oned t hat Gi bbons was a st rong
leader. Teske interview.
42. Gener al Hor nbur g ment i oned t hat he wi shed he coul d have spent
more time with the NATO liaison officers as well as other personnel so as to
keep t hem i nformed. There was j ust no t i me for anyt hi ng ot her t han focusi ng
on t he j ob at hand. Hornburg meet i ng. Col onel Teske sai d t hat i f i t had been
possible, General Ryan would have been out front leading the attacklike
Al exander t he Great . As i n anci ent t i mes, once t he orders were gi ven and t he
battle joined, the focus shifted to the technical side of fighting the battle. By
l eadi ng t he charge, Ryan focused on t echni cal dut i es. Teske i nt erview.
States Air Force, vol. 2, Mar ch 1992, 1920.
44. Maj Dave Goldfein, interviewed by author, Air Force Wargaming In -
st i t ut e, Maxwel l AFB, Al a. , 7 February 1996.
45. Edwards i nt ervi ew.
46. Wells interview.
47. Mauldin interview.
48. Ibid.
49. Wald interview.
50. Col David Moody, vice commander, 31st Fighter Wing, interviewed
by Maj Ron Reed and Maj Mark Conversi no, Avi ano AB, It al y, 18 January
1996. Wal d fl ew wi t h hi s wi ng on 30 August 1995.
51. MacQueen i nt ervi ew. Ot her wi ng personnel were j ust as compl i men-
t ary of t he l eadershi p at t hi s l evel .
ORNDORFF
377
52. West interview.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibi d. Col onel Wal d al so sai d t hat he di d not want anyone l eft out .
Wald interview.
56. Capt Ti m St ret ch, 510t h Fi ght er Squadron, i nt ervi ewed by Lt Col
Bradl ey Davi s and aut hor, Avi ano AB, It al y, 20 February 1996. St ret ch sai d
t hat Col onel West kept t he bi g pi ct ure i n mi nd, const ant l y wat ched out for
hi s peopl e, and made sure everyone kept a l evel head. Capt ai n Gent ry al so
not ed t hat West , a war vet eran, was professi onal , fat herl i ke, and an excel -
l ent l eader. Gent ry i nt ervi ew.
57. Wald interview.
58. MacQueen i nt ervi ew. Capt ai n Gent ry and Capt ai n St ret ch al so i ndi -
cat ed i n t hei r i nt er vi ews t hat t he j oi nt and combi ned nat ur e of t he oper at i on
was no probl em. However, Jon R. Anderson report ed t he servi ces frust ra-
t i on regardi ng ordnance, mi ssi ons, and Ai r Force fl i ght -l i ne rul es. Int erest -
i ngl y, as f ar as t he ai r cr ews wer e concer ned, t he campai gn r an ver y
smoot hl y. Ri val ri es on US Si de Emerged duri ng Ai rst ri kes, Air Force
Ti mes, 9 Oct ober 1995, 6.
60. West interview.
61. Stretch interview.
62. West interview.
64. Ibi d. ; St ret ch i nt ervi ew; Gent ry i nt ervi ew; and West i nt ervi ew. Cap-
t ai ns St r et ch and MacQueen, bot h si ngl e, st at ed t hat t hey sur vi ved on
t hose meal s!
65. Gent ry i nt ervi ew.
67. West interview. Colonel Wald also thought that having families there
was a good i dea. He not ed t hat i t was probabl y harder on t he fami l i es i n
t erms of anxi et y and at t i mes a di st ract i on for t he ai rcrews, but i n t he
bal ance i t was probabl y bet t er havi ng t hem t here, especi al l y si nce t he fami-
l i es coul d see what t he pi l ot s were goi ng t hrough. Wal d i nt ervi ew.
68. Colette West, interviewed by Lt Col Bradley Davis and author, Avi -
ano AB, It al y, 22 February 1996.
69. Vi cki e Jo Ryder, i nt ervi ewed by Lt Col Bradl ey Davi s and aut hor,
Aviano AB, Italy, 22 February 1996. In an article, Charles R. Figley listed
several t hi ngs one coul d do t o deal wi t h st ress whi l e a spouse was engaged
i n a confl i ct . These i ncl uded i ncreasi ng cont act wi t h ot hers, avoi di ng worry
by channel i ng energy, mai nt ai ni ng cont act wi t h t he spouse [easy t o do i n a
si t uat i on l i ke Del i berat e Force], and focusi ng on heal t hy habi t s. Int erest -
i ngl y, Del i berat e Force spouses di d j ust t hese t hi ngs t o cope wi t h st ress.
Copi ng wi t h St ressors on t he Home Front , Journal of Social Issues 49, no.
4 (Wi nt er 1993): 61.
DELIBERATE FORCE
378
70. Janel l e Bearden, i nt ervi ewed by Lt Col Bradl ey Davi s and aut hor,
Aviano AB, Italy, 22 February 1996.
71. Tami Turner, interviewed by Lt Col Bradley Davis and author, Avi -
ano AB, Italy, 22 February 1996. An article in Ai rman magazi ne report ed on
t he st resses experi enced by fami l i es at Avi ano duri ng Deny Fl i ght . As was
t he case wi t h some of t he peopl e i nt ervi ewed for t hi s st udy, t he art i cl e
poi nt ed out t hat l i fe at Avi ano i s st ressful t o begi n wi t h, ment i oni ng prob -
l ems wi t h housi ng, faci l i t i es, and l ong commut es. The art i cl e al so not ed t hat
although families could not have a normal life, they still felt they could have
a happy one: I t hi nk about what coul d happen, but I refuse t o l et i t
preoccupy my t hought s. TSgt Ti mot hy P. Barel a, Cal m before t he St orm,
Ai rman, Oct ober 1995, 39.
72. Larry Keighly, The Wives Wait Out the War, Sat urday Eveni ng Post ,
30 Sept ember 1950, 116. See al so Robert Frank Fut rel l , The United States
Air Force in Korea, 19501953 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force His -
tory, 1983), 137.
73. Keighly, 116.
75. West interview.
76. Goldfein interview.
77. AFM 1-1, vol. 2, 115.
78. Hacket t , 21516.
ORNDORFF
379
Chapt er 14
Chari ots of Fi re:
Rul es of Engagement i n
Operati on Del i berate Force
Lt Col Ronald M. Reed
The title of this chapter doesnt refer to an Academy-Award-
wi nni ng Hol l ywood movi e deal i ng wi t h a race t o vi ct ory.
Rather, it refers to the effective, albeit highly centralized and
rest ri ct ed, rul es of engagement (ROE) t hat appl i ed t o mi l i t ary
air operations during the North Atlantic Treaty Organizations
(NATO) Operat i on Deny Fl i ght f r om 1992 t o 1995 and i t s
suboper at i on, Del i ber at e For ce, i n August and Sept ember
1995. Maj Gen Hal Hornburg, code name Chari ot , director of
the combined air operations center (CAOC) at Vicenza, Italy,
was t he l owest -l evel commander who had t he aut hori t y t o ap-
prove weapons rel ease duri ng t hese t wo operat i ons.
1
Unl ess a
superi or commander aut hori zed such a rel ease, NATO aircraft
st ruck not hi ng i n t he t act i cal area of operat i ons wi t hout Char -
iot s approval . Thi s fact , combi ned wi t h some uni que provi -
si ons for cl ose cont rol and coordi nat i on wi t h Uni t ed Nat i ons
(UN) f or ces ( t he dual - key phenomenon, di scussed l at er ) ,
meant t hat ROE had t o be rest ri ct i ve enough t o sat i sfy t he
political and operational sensitivities of both NATO and UN
pol i t i cal and mi l i t ar y aut hor i t i es. At t he same t i me, ROE
needed to be flexible enough to provide for force protection as
wel l as t he accompl i shment of assi gned mi l i t ary obj ect i ves. The
Deny Flight/Deliberate Force ROE , which successfully walked
this tightrope of competing influences, offers some insight into
appropri at e ROE for coalition peace operations of the future.
Before di scussi ng t he i mpl ement at i on of ROE i n Del i berat e
Force, one must provide a framework for analyzing these rules.
This chapter does so by examining the general nature of ROE,
particularly its function and importance in military operat i ons;
by presenting several historical examples that illu st rat e cert ai n
381
i ssues whi ch have affect ed mi l i t ary operat i ons; by addressi ng
t he act ual ROE for ai r operat i ons i n Del i berat e Force and
following the evolution of ROE from the beginning of NATO air
operat i ons i n Bosni a i n 1992 unt i l t he concl usi on of Del i ber -
at e Force i n Sept ember 1995; by i dent i fyi ng several key i ssues
t hat hi ghl i ght t he more probl emat i c si t uat i ons faced by mi l i -
t ar y pl anner s and oper at or s i n t he Bal kans; and by di scussi ng
i mpl i cat i ons for t he fut ure devel opment of ROE .
Nature and Defi ni ti on of ROE
Abraham Li ncol n sai d t hat force i s al l -conqueri ng, but i t s
victories are short-lived.
2
Thi s assert i on i l l ust rat es t he con -
cept that unbridled force may help achieve short-term, tactica l-
l evel success, but wi t hout some st rat egi c di rect i on or gui d -
ance, t he chance of real i zi ng overal l obj ect i ves i s di mi ni shed.
Carl von Cl ausewi t z recogni zed t hi s fact i n hi s di scussi on of
the relationship of policy and war: At the highest level the art
of war t urns i nt o pol i cybut a pol i cy conduct ed by fi ght i ng
bat t l es rat her t han by sendi ng di pl omat i c not es. . . . The
assert i on t hat a maj or mi l i t ary devel opment , or t he pl an for
one, shoul d be a mat t er for purely military opi ni on i s unac-
cept abl e and can be damagi ng (emphasi s i n ori gi nal ).
3
The
contemporary mechanisms that interconnect the political-polic y
sphere of i nfl uence wi t h t he mi l i t ary-st rat egi c sphere of i nfl u -
ence and t hat ensur e compl i ance wi t h nat i onal and i nt er na-
t i onal l egal const rai nt s are rul es of engagement.
By del i neat i ng t he ci r cumst ances and l i mi t at i ons under
whi ch one may use mi l i t ary force, ROE provi des t he met hod t o
ensur e r el evancy and congr uency bet ween t he means ( mi l i t ar y
force) and t he ends (pol i t i cal / di pl omat i c obj ect i ve) one seeks,
whi l e al ways ensuri ng compl i ance wi t h i nt ernat i onal l aw a nd
t he l aw of armed confl i ct. These pol i t i cal / di pl omat i c, mi l i t ary,
and l egal i nfl uences converge t o form t he basi s for ROE. Capt
J. Ashl ey Roach , a j udge advocat e i n t he US Navy , not es t hat
ROE resul t s from a composi t e of t hese t hree fact ors (fi g.
14.1).
4
The relative influences of each of these factors will vary
accordi ng t o t he ci rcumst ances; t herefore, t he di amet ers of t he
ci rcl es, as wel l as t he degree of convergence, di ffer accordi ng
DELIBERATE FORCE
382
t o t he si t uat i on.
5
The pol i t i cal / di pl omat i c ci rcl e represent s t he
assur ance t hat mi l i t ar y oper at i ons ar e conduct ed i n accor d-
ance with national policy. According to Roach , ROE shoul d be
fl exi bl e enough t o accommodat e changi ng ci rcumst ances and
shoul d be desi gned t o al l ow mi l i t ary courses of act i on t hat
advance pol i t i cal i nt ent i ons wi t h l i t t l e chance for undesi red
escal at i on or react i on.
6
The mi l i t ary ci rcl e t akes i nt o consi derat i on t he pract i cal ,
operat i onal consi derat i ons for a part i cul ar mi l i t ary si t uat i on.
ROE r epr esent s t he upper bounds on t he f r eedom of t he com -
mander t o use mi l i t ary force t oward successful mi ssi on ac-
compl i shment .
7
ROE provi des gui dance t o t he commander i n
bal anci ng t he enemy t hr eat ( and t he concur r ent needs f or
self-defense) with the need to avoid conflict escalation. Accord-
i ng t o ROE expert D. P. OConnell, t he conduct of operat i ons
i n t ensi on si t uat i ons al ways i nvol ves a ni ce bal ance of t hreat
and count er - t hr eat on t he par t of bot h si des, and t he mai n
purpose of rul es of engagement i s t o pr event t hat bal ance
[from] bei ng di st urbed by t hrust i ng t he apparent necessi t y of
sel f-defense t oo obvi ousl y upon one pl ayer rat her t han upon
t he ot her.
8
OConnell woul d consi der a t ensi on si t uat i on t o
be a confront at i on bet ween t wo or more mi l i t ary forces i n
Figure 14.1. ROE Influences (Adapted from Capt J. Ashley Roach, Rules
of Engagement, Naval War College Review 36, no. 1 [JanuaryFebruary
1983]: 4648)
REED
383
whi ch bot h t he t hreat of t he use of force and t he desi re t o
avoi d escal at i on are present . The mi l i t ary ci rcl e, t herefore,
r epr esent s t hi s bal ance of t hr eat , capabi l i t y, and i nt ent t hat
one must consi der when devel opi ng appropri at e ROE .
The l egal ci rcl e represent s t he combi ned domest i c and i nt er -
nat i onal l egal consi der at i ons t hat one must adher e t o i n any
military operation. The laws of war provi de t he absol ut e l i mi t
on t he use of force i n any confl i ct scenari o. Domest i c l aws and
regul at i ons al so provi de rest ri ct i ons on t he empl oyment of
force (such as rest ri ct i ons on t he use of cert ai n weapons,
i ncl udi ng approval requi rement s of t he Nat i onal Command
Authorities [NCA] f or use of nucl ear weapons or chemi cal and
ri ot -cont rol agent s). Al t hough obl i gat i ons of US and i nt erna-
t i onal l aw al ways i nfl uence and l i mi t ROE , t he rul es normal l y
operat e wel l wi t hi n t he boundari es of t he l aw.
9
Commanders oft en l i mi t t he use of force by maki ng deci -
si ons t hat are more rest ri ct i ve t han l egal or ROE const r ai nt s.
For exampl e, W. Hays Parks ci t es t he freedom-of-navi gat i on
exerci se conduct ed agai nst Li bya s claim over the Gulf of Sidra
i n 1981.
10
Even t hough bot h i nt er nat i onal l aw and ROE in
effect at t he t i me al l owed t he use of force i n sel f-defense
agai nst demonst r at ed host i l e i nt ent , t he commander i ssued
orders t hat US forces not fi re unl ess fi rst fi red upon. In t hi s
case t wo Li byan Su-22 Fi t t ers engaged t wo Navy F- 14s on a
head-t o-head i nt ercept , cl earl y demonst rat i ng host i l e i nt ent .
The F-14s wi t hhel d fi re unt i l t he Su-22s fi red ai r-t o-ai r mi s -
si l es. In response, t he Navy fighters quickly evaded the on -
comi ng mi ssi l es and t hen downed bot h Fi t t ers. Thi s exampl e
shows t he di st i nct i on among a commander s r i ght s under t he
l aw, hi s or her aut hor i t y under ROE, and t he exerci se of hi s or
her di scr et i on.
11
The l egal ci rcl e al so represent s ROEs raison dtre: the in -
herent ri ght t o sel f-defense, whi ch i s t he foundat i on for US
St andi ng Rul es of Engagement ( SROE). When consi der i ng
ROE, one normal l y fi rst t hi nks of t he need t o rest ri ct t he use
of force and provi de gui dance t o commanders on t he con -
st rai nt s wi t hi n whi ch t hey must operat e. In real i t y, however,
wri t t en SROE does not exi st t oday because of a need t o re-
st ri ct mi l i t ary operat i ons pol i t i cal l y; rat her, SROE resul t ed
from i nci dent s i nvol vi ng t he USS Stark and t he US Mar i ne
DELIBERATE FORCE
384
Corps bar r acks i n Bei r ut, Lebanon, as wel l as t he need t o
ensur e t hat commander s under st and t he r i ght and obl i gat i on
t o prot ect t hemsel ves and t hei r forces.
12
The commanders
pri nci pal t ask i n any mi l i t ary operat i on i s t o t ake al l necessary
and reasonabl e act i ons t o prot ect hi s or her forces from at t ack
or from t hreat of i mmi nent at t ack. The l egal st andard for t he
use of armed force i n sel f-defense remai ns t he same whet her
prot ect i ng t he i ndi vi dual , t he uni t , t he ai rcraft , or t he nat i on:
a si t uat i on must requi re t he use of force (necessi t y) and t he
amount of force must correspond t o t he si t uat i on gi vi ng ri se t o
t he necessi t y (proport i onal i t y).
13
Necessi t y ar i ses not onl y when an ar med at t ack occur s
(host i l e act ), but al so when one confront s t he t hreat of i mmi-
nent at t ack (host i l e i nt ent ). In ot her words, a commander need
not absorb t he fi rst shot before ret urni ng fi re. The oft en per -
ceived requirement to fire only if first fired upon is legally
fal sean i mport ant concept i n t odays worl d of hi gh-speed
and hi gh-l et hal i t y weaponry. Wai t i ng t o be fi red upon can
have di sast rous resul t s. Nevert hel ess, several nat i ons vi ew t he
i ssue of host i l e i nt ent i n a di fferent l i ght , especi al l y i n mi l i t ary
peace oper at i ons. At a recent l egal conference i n t he Net her -
l ands, Canadi an and Br i t i sh r epr esent at i ves i ndi cat ed t hat
t hey do not f ol l ow ROE ba s e d on hos t i l e i nt e nt i n a ny
peacekeepi ng operat i on, even t o t he poi nt of sufferi ng casual-
ties before using military force.
14
In t hei r opi ni on t he need t o
mai nt ai n i mpart i al i t y and t o avoi d becomi ng a part y t o t he
conflict carries a higher priority than the right of self-defense.
They vi ew casual t i es i ncurred as a resul t of t hi s i nhi bi t i on on
t he use of force as t he cost of doi ng busi ness. As di scussed
l at er, i nt ernat i onal l aw does not requi re t hi s rest ri ct i on, and i t
i s i nconsi st ent wi t h US SROE.
Joi nt Publ i cat i on (Pub) 1-02, Department of Defense Diction-
ary of Military and Associated Terms, defines ROE as direc-
t i ves i ssued by compet ent mi l i t ary aut hori t y whi ch del i neat e
t he ci r cumst ances and l i mi t at i ons under whi ch Uni t ed St at es
forces wi l l i ni t i at e and/ or cont i nue engagement wi t h ot her
forces encount ered.
15
Al t hough t hi s defi ni t i on adequat el y de-
fines ROE at t he st r at egi c/ oper at i onal l evel , one can mor e
practically define ROE at t he operat i onal and t act i cal l evel s as
t he commander s r ul es f or what can be shot and when.
16
REED
385
Several i ssues rel at i ng t o t he US defi ni t i on of ROE become
appar ent i mmedi at el y. Under t he cur r ent US SROE, compe-
t ent mi l i t ary aut hori t y refers t o t he NCA.
17
Al t hough combat-
ant commander s may augment SROE to reflect unique politi-
cal and mi l i t ary pol i ci es, t hreat s, and mi ssi ons speci fi c t o
t hei r areas of responsi bi l i t y, one must submi t any changes
resul t i ng i n di fferent rul es governi ng t he use of force t o t he
NCA for approval .
18
Obvi ousl y, pol i t i cal pol i cy makers use
SROE as a mechani sm t o ensur e t hat mi l i t ar y commander s
compl et el y under st and when and how t o use f or ce t o suppor t
pol i cy obj ect i ves. Ther ef or e, pol i cy maker s have t he f i nal
aut hori t y on ROE for use of force i n any gi ven si t uat i on.
Next , del i neat i ng t he ci r cumst ances under whi ch one may
use mi l i t ary force rel at es t o t he fact t hat si t uat i ons oft en dri ve
ROE. The amount of force one can use i n a gi ven si t uat i on
depends upon a vari et y of pol i t i cal , mi l i t ary, and l egal fact ors
t hat mel d t o cr eat e t he cont ext ual envi r onment f or t hat en -
gagement . The si t uat i on may have geographi c i mpl i cat i ons.
For exampl e, duri ng t he Rol l i ng Thunder campai gn i n Vi et -
na m, ai r commander s coul d not at t ack t ar get s wi t hi n a 30-
mi l e radi us from t he cent er of Hanoi , a 10-mi l e radi us from
the center of Haiphong, and within 30 miles of China.
19
Another
type of geographical implication is the exclusion zone. In t he
Bal kans conflict, the entire area of Bosnia-Herzegovina repre-
sented a no-fly zone (NFZ); ROE provided for engagement of any
unauthorized aircraft operating within that zone.
20
Similarly,
ROE also applied to other geographic zones in the Balkan s .
21
Anot her aspect of t he si t uat i onal nat ure of ROE rel at es t o
the type of conflict. ROE for peacekeepi ng differs from ROE for
peace enf or cement or limited war . Peacekeepi ng generally in -
volves the most restrictive ROE due t o t he need t o mai nt ai n
st ri ct i mpart i al i t y on t he part of t he peacekeepi ng force. Be-
cause of the need to restrict the use of force, ROE for peacekeep-
i ng operations typically limits it to self-defense only. Peace en -
forcement and limited war, however, presuppose the use of force
as a coerci ve mechani sm t o change t he behavi or of a part i cul ar
party. ROE for these operations often is less restrictive and
authorizes the use of force in a wider range of situati ons.
Adam Robert s not es t hat peacekeepi ng i s, not ori ousl y, a
very different type of activity from more belligerent or coercive
DELIBERATE FORCE
386
use of force, and t he di fferences cause seri ous probl ems. The
t hr ee pr i nci pl es on whi ch peacekeepi ng oper at i ons have t r adi-
t i onal l y been based (i mpart i al i t y, consent of host st at es, and
avoidance of use of force) are different from the principles on
whi ch ot her uses of force have been based. Furt her, t he di s -
per si on of f or ces and t hei r l i ght l y ar med char act er , mean t hat
t hey are i nt ensel y vul nerabl e t o repri sal s i n t he event force i s
used on t hei r behal f.
22
Thi s probl em, di scussed l at er, pl ayed a
significant role in the development of ROE for NATO military
operat i ons i n t he Bal kans . The i nherent i ncompat i bi l i t y be-
t ween t he UNs role in providing peacekeepers on t he gr ound
and NATOs role in providing peace enforcers i n t he ai r be-
came obvi ous dur i ng Deny Fl i ght, whi ch occur r ed pr i or t o t he
execut i on of Del i berat e Force i n August 1995.
Addi t i onal l y, del i neat i ng t he ci rcumst ances refers t o t he
basi c purpose of any ROE: t he i nherent ri ght t o sel f-defense.
Accordi ng t o t he i nt roduct i on t o t he US SROE, t he pur pose of
t hese rul es i s t o i mpl ement t he i nherent ri ght of sel f defense
and provide guidance for the application of force for mission
accompl i shment .
23
Furt her, t hese rul es do not l i mi t a com-
manders i nherent aut hori t y and obl i gat i on t o use al l neces -
sary means avai l abl e and t o t ake al l appropri at e act i on i n
sel f-defense of t he commanders uni t and ot her U. S. forces i n
the vicinity.
24
The concept of sel f-defense i n SROE covers
si t uat i ons i nvol vi ng bot h host i l e act and host i l e i nt ent . As
ment i oned above, SROE defi nes t he el ement s of sel f-defense
as (1) necessi t y (a host i l e act occurs or a force or t errori st uni t
exhi bi t s host i l e i nt ent ) and (2) proport i onal i t y (the force used
must be r easonabl e i n i nt ensi t y, dur at i on, and magni t ude,
based on al l fact s known t o t he commander at t he t i me, t o
deci si vel y count er t he host i l e act or host i l e i nt ent and t o en -
sure t he cont i nued safet y of US forces).
25
SROEs provisions apply not only to individual self-defense
but also to national, collective, and unit self-defense. Na -
t i onal sel f-defense i s defi ned as t he act of defendi ng t he
Uni t ed St at es, U. S. forces and i n cert ai n ci rcumst ances, U. S.
ci t i zens and t hei r propert y, U. S. commerci al asset s, and ot her
desi gnat ed non-U. S. forces, forei gn nat i onal s, and t hei r prop-
erty, from a hostile act or hostile intent.
26
Collective self-defen se,
a subset of national self-defense, authorizes the NCA t o provide
REED
387
for the defense of designated non-US forces, personnel, and
their property. Unit self-defense entails the act of defending a
particular unit of US forces, including elements or personnel
thereof, and other US forces in the vicinity against hostile act
or hostile intent.
27
In essence, US forces have t he aut hori t y and
obligation under SROE t o use al l necessary means avai l abl e and
to take all appropriate action to defend themselves, their unit,
other US forces in the vicinity, and (with NCA approval) non-US
forces against hostile act or hostile intent .
The preci se meani ng of al l necessary means depends upon
t he uni que ci r cumst ances of a par t i cul ar si t uat i on. SROE pro-
vides guidelines for self-defense: (1) Attempt to Control with-
out t he Use of Force; (2) Use Proport i onal Force t o Cont rol t he
Si t uat i on; and (3) At t ack t o Di sabl e or Dest roy,
28
each of
whi ch focuses on mi l i t ary necessi t y and proport i onal i t y. Nor -
mal l y, t he use of force i n a sel f-defense scenari o i s a measure
of l ast r esor t . When t i me and ci r cumst ances per mi t , one
shoul d warn a host i l e force and gi ve i t a chance t o wi t hdraw
or cease t hr eat eni ng act i ons. When one must use f or ce, t he
nat ur e, dur at i on, and scope of t he engagement shoul d not
exceed what ever i s needed t o deci si vel y count er t he host i l e
act or host i l e i nt ent and t o ensure t he cont i nued safet y of U. S.
forces or ot her prot ect ed personnel or propert y.
29
Any at t acks
i n t he name of sel f-defense t o dest roy or di sabl e a host i l e force
ar e al l owed onl y when t hey must be used t o pr event or t er mi-
nat e a host i l e act or host i l e i nt ent . When a force ceases t o
pose an i mmi nent t hr eat , one must t er mi nat e any engagement
of t hat force. Thus, t he provi si ons for sel f-defense permi t no
ret al i at ory st ri kes. If a host i l e force remai ns an i mmi nent
t hr eat , however , US f or ces may pur sue and engage i t under
t he concept of i mmedi at e pursui t of host i l e forei gn forces.
30
The discussion of self-defense in SROE assumes t he commi t -
ment of a host i l e act or t he exi st ence of t he t hreat of force by a
foreign or terrorist uni t .
Al t hough i t i s general l y easy t o i dent i fy and defi ne a host i l e
act on t he gr ound and i n t he ai r , t he el ement s t hat const i t ut e
host i l e i nt ent vi s--vi s aeri al ROE are not easi l y del i neat ed.
For exampl e, at what poi nt does an enemy ai rcraft or surface-
t o-ai r weapon provi de suffi ci ent i ndi cat i ons of host i l e i nt ent t o
warrant the use of force in self-defense? Normally, maneuver i ng
DELIBERATE FORCE
388
i nt o weapons-rel ease posi t i on or i l l umi nat i ng fri endl y ai rcraft
wi t h fi re-cont rol radar i ndi cat es host i l e i nt ent . The presence of
ot her fact ors, however, such as defensi ve maneuveri ng capa -
bi l i t i es of t he fri endl y ai rcraft or st eal t hy charact eri st i cs, mi ght
negat e t he t hr eat .
To gi ve adequat e gui dance on what i s and i s not al l owed,
one mi ght be t empt ed t o defi ne and l egi sl at e every concei vabl e
t ype of t hreat t hat a pi l ot coul d encount er. However, not onl y
i s i t i mpossi bl e t o predi ct every event ual i t y, but al so t he more
det ai l ed ROE becomes, t he more such rul es rest ri ct t he fl exi -
bi l i t y and j udgment of t he person best abl e t o correct l y assess
t he t hreat t he pi l ot i n t he ai r. Thi s di ffi cul t y i l l ust rat es one of
t he most t roubl esome di l emmas i n draft i ng effect i ve ROE t he
desi re for cl ear, unequi vocal gui dance as t o what pi l ot s may or
may not do and for maxi mum l at i t ude i n exerci si ng t hei r j udg-
ment and di scr et i on.
31
Duri ng t he st ages l eadi ng up t o Del i berat e Force, t he US
Navy on several occasi ons request ed more speci fi c ROE re-
gardi ng ai r-t o-ai r and ai r-t o-ground t hreat s of host i l e i nt ent .
Gener al Hor nbur g, sensitive to the need for flexibility and
j udgment , responded by st at i ng, You guys are professi onal
pilots; Im not going to give you a cookbook, and Im not going
t o t i e your hands.
32
Thi s gui dance i s consi st ent wi t h t he con -
cl usi ons of Parks: In prepari ng ROE for a part i cul ar si t uat i on,
t hreat , or operat i on, l ess al ways i s bet t er t han more, i n order
t o al l ow t he i ndi vi dual i n t he hot seat maxi mum l at i t ude i n
maki ng deci si ons when bei ng confront ed wi t h a t hreat .
33
As
ment i oned l at er i n t hi s chapt er, even t hough ROE for Deliber -
at e Force ext ensi vel y rest ri ct ed t he empl oyment of mi l i t ary
force, t he rul es never i nfri nged upon t he j udgment of t he pi l ot
t o r espond t o an i mmedi at e and unavoi dabl e t hr eat .
Ultimately, ROE bri dges t he gap bet ween t he pol i cy maker
and t he mi l i t ary commander. The pri mary consi derat i on for
t he pol i cy maker i s ensuri ng cont rol over t he use of mi l i t ary
force so i t best serves nat i onal or al l i ance obj ect i ves. The pri-
mar y consi der at i on f or mi l i t ar y commander s i s ensur i ng t hat
t hey can def end t hei r f or ces and empl oy t hem t o accompl i sh
t he assi gned mi ssi on i n t he most effect i ve manner. Accordi ng
t o a RAND st udy by Bradd C. Hayes, t hese t wo consi derat i ons
provi de bot h t he foundat i on and di l emma for peopl e who draft
REED
389
ROEa di l emma of act i on versus react i on.
34
To mai nt ai n cl ose
political control and avoid the escalation of hostilities, ROE in
peacet i me (i ncl udi ng peacekeepi ng oper at i ons) t ends t o be
more rest ri ct i ve. However, as Hayes correct l y poi nt s out , t he
pol i t i cal pri ce for react i on and hesi t ancy can prove unaccept -
abl y hi ghwi t ness t he i nci dent s i nvol vi ng t he USS Stark a nd
t he Mar i ne bar r acks i n Bei r ut.
35
Conversely, preemptive self-
defense can al so have hi gh pol i t i cal cost swi t ness t he shoot -
down of the Iranian commercial airliner by the USS Vincennes .
36
Because one must of t en sacr i f i ce mi l i t ar y obj ect i ves t o
achieve political objectives ,
37
writers of ROE must devel op and
eval uat e t hese rul es wi t hi n t he cont ext of bot h t he pol i t i cal
and mi l i t ary consi derat i ons of a part i cul ar operat i on. Accord-
ing to Clausewitz, war i s not merel y an act of pol i cy, but a
t rue pol i t i cal i nst rument , a cont i nuat i on of pol i t i cal i nt er -
course carri ed on wi t h ot her means. . . . The pol i t i cal obj ect i s
t he goal , war i s t he means of r eachi ng i t , and means can
never be consi dered i n i sol at i on from t hei r purpose.
38
Consis -
t ent wi t h t he descri pt i on of t he nat ure and purpose of rul es of
engagement , several hi st ori cal exampl es i l l ust rat e t hei r i nfl u -
ence and impact on past military operations in ways that build
on the framework used here to analyze ROE in Deliberate Force.
Background/ Hi stori cal Exampl es
The bombi ng of t he US Mari ne barracks i n Bei rut, t he at -
t ack on t he USS Stark , and t he shoot down of t he ci vi l i an
Irani an ai rl i ner by t he USS Vi ncennes i l l ust rat e several i mpor -
t ant mat t ers pert ai ni ng t o t he i mpact of ROE on military op -
erat i ons. Each of t hese i nci dent s provi des i nsi ght i nt o how
ROE can af f ect mi l i t ar y oper at i ons and suggest s i ssues one
shoul d consi der when draft i ng ROE.
The bombi ng of t he Mari ne barracks i n 1983, whi ch cost
241 sol di ers, sai l ors, and mari nes t hei r l i ves, shows how i n -
terpretation of ROE can have di sast r ous r esul t s. Because t he
commander of t he 24t h Mar i ne Amphi bi ous Uni t consi dered
hi s mi ssi on t o mai nt ai n presence i n a peace operat i on, h e
did not want his troops to look or act like an occupation force.
39
Al t hough t he Mari nes i ni t i al l y faced a permi ssi ve envi ronment
DELIBERATE FORCE
390
i n Bei r ut, i t became i ncreasi ngl y host i l e t he l onger US forces
r emai ned.
40
Nei t her t he i mmedi at e commander nor t he chai n
of command not i ced t hi s shi f t i n t he t hr eat envi r onment , and
this lack of sensitivity led to ROE , i n effect at t he t i me of t he
i nci dent , t hat di d not r equi r e t he sent r i es on dut y t o have a
round i n t he chamber of t hei r weapons or a magazi ne i nsert ed
i nt o t hei r weapons.
41
At about 0621 on 23 Oct ober 1983, a heavy t r uck l oaded
wi t h expl osi ves ent ered t he parki ng l ot at Bei rut I nt er nat i onal
Ai r por t , made a r i ght - hand t ur n, cr ashed t hr ough a concer -
t i na-wi re barri er, drove past t wo sent ri es and t hrough an open
gat e, t ravel ed about 450 feet , and passed t hree l arge drai nage
pi pes bef or e r ammi ng i nt o t he bui l di ng t hat housed t he bat t al-
i on l andi ng t eam. The t r uck i mmedi at el y det onat ed, dest r oy-
i ng t he bui l di ng and ki l l i ng 220 mari nes, 18 sai l ors, and t hree
soldiers. The Department of Defense (DOD) Commi ssi on Re-
port i ndi cat ed t hat duri ng t he few seconds i t t ook t he t ruck t o
ram i nt o t he t eams bui l di ng, t he sent ri es coul d t ake no act i on
t o st op t he t r uck because t hei r weapons wer e unl oaded.
42
Even t hough wri t t en ROE speci fi cal l y st at ed t hat t he mari nes
coul d defend t hemsel ves agai nst bot h host i l e act s and demon -
st rat ed host i l e i nt ent , t he commanders i nt erpret at i on (or mi s -
i nt erpret at i on) of t he mi ssi on and t he t hreat envi ronment re-
sul t ed i n an overl y rest ri ct i ve appl i cat i on of t he rul es. Havi ng
t he sent ri es put t hei r bul l et s i n t hei r pocket s vi ol at ed t he fi rst
rule of any ROE t he i nherent ri ght of sel f-defense.
The crew of t he USS Stark found i t sel f operat i ng i n t he
Persi an Gul f in support of reflagging operations for Kuwaiti oil
t ankers. On 17 May 1987, an Iraqi F-1 Mi rage l aunched t wo
Exocet mi ssi l es at t he St ark . The Uni t ed St at es accept ed Iraqs
apol ogy, whi ch cl ai med t hat t he at t ackresponsi bl e for t he
deat hs of 37 sai l or s and t he woundi ng of 21 ot her swas un-
i nt ent i onal .
43
A Navy st udy chai r ed by Rear Adm Gr ant Shar p
concl uded t hat t he r ul es of engagement t hat were i n exi st -
ence on May 17, 1987 were suffi ci ent t o enabl e St ark t o pr op-
erly warn the Iraqi aircraft, in a timely manner, of the presence
of a US warship and if the warning was not heeded, the rules of
engagement were sufficient to enable Stark to defend herself
agai nst host i l e i nt ent and i mmi nent danger wi t hout absorbi ng
the first hit.
44
The st udy det ermi ned t hat t he commander of t he
REED
391
Stark f ai l ed t o appr eci at e t he obvi ous change i n t he t hr eat
envi ronment i n t he cent ral Persi an Gul f. I t al so concl uded t hat
t he commander / wat ch t eam i mpr oper l y under st ood t he use of
fi re-cont rol radar t o i l l umi nat e a t hreat eni ng ai rcraft as a
measur e shor t of deadl y f or cean act t hat coul d have secur ed
the ships safety.
45
Li ke t he Bei rut bombi ng, t hi s i nci dent i l l us-
trates the potential pitfalls of commanding officers failing to
ensur e t he i nher ent r i ght t o sel f - def ense under ROE i n a non -
combat envi ronment wi t h a dynami c t hreat .
In bot h of t he previ ous exampl es, t he probl em di d not ari se
so much from overl y rest ri ct i ve ROE as from a lack of sensitiv-
i t y on t he par t of t he commander s t o a changi ng t hr eat envi -
r onment . Bot h exampl es i l l ust r at e t he t endency i n noncombat
si t uat i ons and peace oper at i ons to be overly controlling and to
curtail reaction to the threat. An effective ROE , t herefore,
shoul d be hi ghl y fl exi bl e so t hat one can meet changes i n t he
t hreat envi ronment wi t h an effect i ve response. At t he same
t i me, bot h exampl es i l l ust r at e t hat no mat t er how r obust l y
one wri t es ROE, not hi ng can compensat e f or t he poor j udg-
ment of a commandi ng offi cer, who must ul t i mat el y deci de
how t o react and empl oy forces i n any gi ven si t uat i on. The
underuse or overuse of force i n any scenari o may negat i vel y
af f ect mi ssi on accompl i shment . The geni us of t he com-
mander , as Cl ausewi t z woul d say, det ermi nes t he effect i ve -
ness of t he use of mi l i t ary force i n any mi l i t ary operat i on.
I n cont r ast t o t he Bei r ut a nd t he Stark i nci dent s, t he one
involving the USS Vi ncennes shows how aggressi ve, preemp -
tive self-defense can be militarily and politically costly. In this
case mi si nt erpret at i on of t he t hreat caused a US Navy Aegis
crui ser t o shoot down an Irani an ci vi l i an ai rl i ner. Regardl ess
of whet her t he bl ame l i es wi t h an overaggressi ve, t ri gger-
happy commander or wi t h human and/ or mechani cal er r or
duri ng a confused naval bat t l e, t hi s t ragi c mi st ake resul t ed i n
t he deat h of 290 ci vi l i ans aboard t he ai rl i ner.
Although the official investigation of the Vi ncennes i nci dent
absol ved t he capt ai n and crew from faul t , several quest i ons
arose aft er compl et i on of t he i nvest i gat i on.
46
Nearl y four years
aft er t he i nci dent , News week r an an ar t i cl e t hat descr i bed t he
st ory of a naval fi asco, of an overeager capt ai n, pani cked
crewmen, and t he cover-up t hat fol l owed.
47
I n r esponse, t he
DELIBERATE FORCE
392
di rect or of t he Oceans Law and Pol i cy Depart ment at t he Na -
val War Col l ege dr af t ed a memor andum r ef ut i ng many of
Ne ws we e k s cl ai ms.
48
Despi t e di fferences i n i nt erpret at i on,
everyone agrees upon cert ai n mat t ers of fact .
On t he mor ni ng of 3 Jul y 1988, t he USS Vi ncennes was on
dut y i n t he Persi an Gul f, assi st i ng i n escort operat i ons for
refl agged Kuwai t i oi l t ankers. Respondi ng t o not i fi cat i on by
t he USS Montgomery t hat appr oxi mat el y 13 I r ani an gunboat s
mi ght be pr epar i ng t o at t ack a mer chant shi p, t he Vi ncennes
proceeded nort h t o i nvest i gat e. Aft er one of t he Irani an vessel s
fi red upon a hel i copt er performi ng rout i ne morni ng pat rol
from t he Vi ncennes , t he l at t er became i nvol ved i n a surface
engagement wi t h t he gunboat s. Dur i ng t hi s t i me an I r ani an
civilian airliner took off from Bandar Abbas (a joint mili -
t ary/ ci vi l i an ai rfi el d i n Iran) on a fl i ght pat h t hat woul d t ake
t he ai rl i ner over t he area of t he naval engagement . Mi si dent i -
fyi ng t he ai rl i ner as an Irani an F-14, t he Vi ncennes i ssued 11
war ni ngs t hat i t shoul d r emai n cl ear of t he ar ea and t hen f i r ed
t wo SM-2 mi ssi l es, shoot i ng i t down. Approxi mat el y t hree
mi nut es and 45 seconds el apsed from i ni t i al i dent i fi cat i on of
t he ai rcraft as possi bl y host i l e unt i l shoot down.
49
The previ ousl y ment i oned RAND st udy of naval ROE not ed
t hat t he r ul es i n t he Per si an Gul f appl i cabl e duri ng t he Vin -
cennes i nci dent had been changed aft er i nci dent s i nvol vi ng
t he USS Stark and USS Samuel B. Roberts (t he l at t er had
st r uck a mi ne i n t he Gul f appr oxi mat el y one mont h bef or e t he
Vi ncennes arri ved) t o encourage ant i ci pat ory sel f-defense.
50
This study, however, did not blame hair-trigger ROE f or t he
shoot down of t he I r ani an ai r l i ner . Rat her , i t concl uded t hat
t he host i l e envi r onment and ongoi ng sea bat t l e pl ayed a
promi nent rol e i n t he deci si on and t hat ROE probabl y di d not
significantly affect the decision to use force to deal with the
pr es umed t hr eat .
51
The official DOD r epor t concl uded t hat , under ROE, t he
pri mary responsi bi l i t y of t he commandi ng offi cer i s defense of
t he shi p f r om at t ack or f r om t hr eat of i mmi nent at t ack.
52
Based on i nformat i on he bel i eved t o be t rue at t he t i me, t he
capt ai n of t he Vi ncennes shot down t he Irani an ai rl i ner i n
sel f-defensea cl ear case of t he damned i f you do, damned i f
you dont di l emma faced by mi l i t ary commanders operat i ng
REED
393
i n noncombat envi ronment s euphemi st i cal l y cal l ed opera -
t i ons ot her t han war. The best a commander can hope for i s
ROE fl exi bl e enough t o be rel evant t o a changi ng t hreat envi -
r onment , i nf or mat i on and communi cat i ons t o appr eci at e
when t hose changes t ake pl ace, and exper i ence and j udgment
t o make t he cor r ect deci si on when f aced wi t h a t hr eat t hat
mi ght requi re forci bl e response.
The Bei rut, Stark , a nd Vi ncennes i nci dent s al l i l l ust rat e t he
importance not only of having effective and flexible ROE b u t
al so of t he j udgment of t he commander i n every confl i ct . Of
c o u r s e t h e c o mma n d e r s o r , f o r t h a t ma t t e r , t h e p i-
l ot sj udgment depends on t he real -t i me i nformat i on avai l -
able at the point of decision. The fog and friction of war often
i nhi bi t or di st ort t he fl ow of accurat e and t i mel y i nformat i on.
ROE, t herefore, must provi de gui dance consi st ent wi t h t he
political and military realities of the conflict to bridge the gap
bet ween mi l i t ar y means and pol i t i cal ends i n an uncer t ai n
envi ronment . The rest of t hi s essay uses t hi s t est of consi s -
t ency and rel evance t o expl ore and eval uat e t he evol ut i on and
execution of ROE i n Operat i on Del i berat e Force.
Evol uti on of ROE i n
Operati on Del i berate Force
The rul es of engagement for Deliberate Force arose from
vari ous changes and addi t i ons i n NATO mi l i t ary operat i onal
t aski ng i n t he Bal kans br ought about by numer ous Uni t ed
Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCR) relating to Bosnia -
Herzegovina . Consequent l y, any ful l anal ysi s of ROE for Delib -
erat e Force must begi n wi t h an exami nat i on of t he genesi s
and evolution of ROE from the inception of NATO ai r opera -
t i ons i n Operat i on Sky Moni t or , t hr ough Deny Fl i ght, and
cul mi nat i ng i n t he ai r st r i ke oper at i ons conduct ed i n August
and Sept ember of 1995. To t rul y comprehend ROE r equi r es an
underst andi ng of t he compl ex pol i t i cal and mi l i t ary envi ron -
ment t hat f aced t he mi l i t ar y pl anner s and oper at or s dur i ng
t he ent i re peri od of operat i ons. The changi ng charact er of t hi s
pol i t i cal and mi l i t ary envi ronment , i n t urn, caused ROE to
evolve from a policy of not using force in the simple monit or i ng
DELIBERATE FORCE
394
of the UN-decl ared NFZ t o a robust use of force i n t he ai r
st r i ke campai gn execut ed i n August and Sept ember of 1995.
The changi ng envi r onment shaped t he i nt ent and pur pose of
formal ROE and refl ect ed t he i mpact of mul t i nat i onal / mul t i al-
l i ance i nfl uences on i t s formul at i on.
A fl ow of cont ri but i ons and gui dance provi ded t he frame-
work for ROE devel opment i n Deny Fl i ght/ Del i ber at e For ce
(fig. 14.2). The UNSCRs ser ved as t he l egal basi s under t he UN
Char t er and i nt er nat i onal l aw for use of military force by na-
t i ons and/ or r egi onal or gani zat i ons or ar r angement s i n sup-
port of speci fi c provi si ons out l i ned i n t he resol ut i ons. In re-
sponse t o a UNSCR, a regi onal organi zat i on (i n t hi s case,
NATOs North Atlantic Council [NAC]) i ssues t o forces under
i t s cont rol a mandat e aut hori zi ng t he use of mi l i t ary force, t he
latter limited by the UNSCR and f ur t her r est r i ct ed by any
NATO concer ns. The mandat e i s t r ansl at ed i nt o a mi l i t ar y
operations plan (OPLAN) , whi ch i ncl udes an annex det ai l i ng
ROE to be used in the NATO mi l i t ary operat i on. For Del i berat e
For ce t he commander i n chi ef of Al l i ed For ces Sout her n
Europe (CINCSOUTH) promul gat ed OPLAN 40101, Operation
Deny Fl i ght , and t he support i ng ROE annex.
53
An operat i ons
order (OPORD) cont ai ns t he next l evel of ROEi n t hi s case,
OPORD 45101. 5, Deny Fl i ght , i ssued by t he commander of
5th Allied Tactical Air Force (COM5ATAF).
54
One shoul d not e
t hat each subordi nat e l evel of ROE can be no l ess restrictive
t han t he combi ned ROE for each of t he hi gher l evel s. Subordi-
nat e ROE, however, can be more rest ri ct i ve as l ong as t he
r ul es r emai n congr uent wi t h t he i nt ent of super i or command-
er s and over al l pol i t i cal obj ect i ves . Speci al i ns t r uct i ons
(SPINS) pr ovi de addi t i onal ROE gui dance. For Del i ber at e
Force, COM5ATAF and t he CAOC di rect or i ssued peri odi c
SPINS t hat i ncl uded a sect i on on ROE and Commanders
Guidance (SPINS 028 was i n effect duri ng Del i berat e Force).
55
Lastly, each air tasking message (ATM), which provides daily,
speci fi c i nformat i on on t arget s sel ect ed for at t ack, may con -
t ai n i nformat i on regardi ng speci al ROE for t hat part i cul ar at -
tack. To fully examine ROE for Del i berat e Force, one must
therefore follow the rules evolution through each of these steps ,
beginning with NATOs fi rst i nvol vement i n Oct ober 1992.
REED
395
On 16 October 1992, NATO forces began Operation Sky Moni-
tor in response to UNSCR 781, whi ch request ed member st at es
to assist the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in
monitoring the ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
56
Although the resolution created an NFZ, it did not
authorize the engagement of unauthorized flights. Rather, it
called upon member states to nationally or through regional
agencies or arrangements [read NATO] provide technical moni-
toring and other capabilities to monitor compliance with the
NFZ.
57
Accordingly, ROE for Sky Monitor limited the use of force
to self-defense, with no provisions for engagement of aircraft
based solely upon their violation of the NFZ.
58
The rul es t hat
applied during this period of operations derived from Supreme
Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) Support Pl an 10001D,
NATO Europe Integrated Air Defense,
59
whi ch at t empt ed t o
balance the desire to limit the possibility of provocation and
escalation with the sovereign right to take action in self-defense.
60
Under this ROE , one could engage aircraft only for self-protection.
For all other situations, including the protection of other friendly
forces, pilots had to request specific approval.
61
The restriction
on the defense of friendly forces is clearly contrary to the pre-
vi ousl y di scussed US SROE notion of collective and unit self-
def ense.
62
However, it illustrates the type of ROE expected in a n
obser vat i on/ peacekeepi ng mi l i t ar y oper at i on i n whi ch any use
of force i s ext remel y ci rcumspect .
Figure 14.2. Development of ROE
DELIBERATE FORCE
396
NATO airborne early warning (NAEW) aircraft already in -
vol ved i n Operat i on Sharp Guard (t he naval moni t ori ng and
s ubs equent embar go operat i ons i n t he Adri at i c ) carri ed out
t he moni t ori ng of t he NFZ. The addition of an NAEW orbit
est abl i shed over Hungary wi t h t he suppor t of t he Hungar i an
and Aust r i an gover nment s i n l at e Oct ober 1992 enhanced t he
moni t ori ng of t he NFZ. The UN not ed t hat more t han fi ve
hundred fl i ght s vi ol at ed t he NFZ from 16 Oct ober 1992 t o 12
April 1993.
63
The numerous vi ol at i ons of t he NFZ ban r esul t ed i n t he
enact ment of UNSCR 816, adopt ed on 31 Mar ch 1993, whi ch
provi ded an ext ensi on of t he NFZ ban t o i ncl ude al l fi xed-wi ng
and rot ary-wi ng ai rcraft i n t he ai rspace of t he Republ i c of
Bosni a-Herzegovi na. It al so i ncl uded provi si ons for member
st at es, subj ect t o cl ose coordi nat i on wi t h UN secret ary-general
Willy Claes and UNPROFOR, t o t ake al l necessary measures
t o ensure compl i ance wi t h t he NFZ ban on flights.
64
The resolu -
tion led to an NAC decision on 8 April 1993 to enforce the NFZ
with NATO military aircraft. This decision resulted in the devel-
opment and i mpl ement at i on of OPLAN 40101, whi ch began at
noon Greenwich mean time (GMT) on 12 April 1993 with air -
craft from France , t he Net herl ands , and t he Uni t ed St a t es .
65
Annex E to OPLAN 40101 cont ai ned ROE appl i cabl e t o t he
enforcement of t he NFZ. The pl anners who wrote the ROE
vigorously supervised by UN, NATO, and i ndi vi dual nat i onal
aut hori t i es
66
at t empt ed t o i ncl ude t he maxi mum amount of
military flexibility within the politically charged planning envi -
ronment . Si nce t he NAC approved al l ROE, any one of t he 16
sovereign NATO member nat i ons had vet o power over t he
rul es. The mi l i t ary feared t hat t hi s l owest common denomi na-
t or appr oach woul d pr oduce i nef f ect i ve, wat er ed down
ROE.
67
Fort unat el y, t hi s fear was never real i zed, and t he re-
sul t i ng ROE provi ded, for t he most part , robust rul es for sel f-
defense and mi ssi on accompl i shment . A fi ve- or si x-man t eam
t hat compri sed a smal l Bl ack Hol e t ype of pl anni ng group
l ed by Lt Gen Joseph Ashy, commander of Allied Air Forces
Sout hern Europe (COMAIRSOUTH), t i ght l y cont r ol l ed t he
whol e pl anni ng process for ROE at Headquart ers Al l i ed Forces
Sout hern Europe (AFSOUTH).
68
REED
397
Wi t hi n t he fi rst t wo weeks of operat i ons, a si gni fi cant prob-
l em arose wi t h enforcement of t he NFZ. ROE provided for
t ermi nat i on of all ai r use by t he part i es wi t hi n Bosni a , maki ng
no di st i nct i on bet ween fi xed- and rot ary-wi ng ai rcraft . In fact ,
the UNSCR speci fi cal l y addressed t he ban of al l unaut hori zed
fixed-wing and rot ary-wi ng ai rcraft wi t hi n Bosni an ai rspace.
Unfort unat el y, t he engagement of hel i copt ers proved probl em-
atic. Ultimately, COMAIRSOUTH i ssued gui dance (endorsed
by t he UN and NATO) t hat defi ned away t he probl em by det er -
mi ni ng t hat hel i copt ers had no mi l i t ary si gni fi cance.
69
The
thinking was that the risks for accidentally shooting down a UN
helicopter or some other helicopter transporting civilians or
casualties were so great that they outweighed the milita ry sig-
nificance of rotary-wing aircraft. The memory of the shootdown
of the US Army Blackhawk helicopter i n Iraq by US Air Force
F-15s in April 1993 had some bearing on this conclusion.
70
Even though COMAIRSOUTH deci ded not t o engage hel i cop-
t ers, t he wri t t en ROE remai ned unchanged. Duri ng NATOs
moni t ori ng and report i ng of hel i copt er fl i ght s, t he aut hori t y
remai ned i n pl ace t o engage hel i copt ers under cert ai n ci rcum-
st ances.
71
Thi s si t uat i on i l l ust rat es t he poi nt t hat wri t i ng, i n -
t erpret i ng, and i mpl ement i ng ROE are not al ways coext ensi ve,
highlighting the importance of judgment on the part of on-scene
commanders. Since legislating the military significance of any
particular item is impossible, a responsible commandersuch
as COMAIRSOUTHmust ensure t he i nt erpret at i on and execu -
tion of ROE in accordance with the overall concept of operations
and political sensitivity associated with a given situat i on.
The next si gni fi cant change i n ai r operat i ons occurred as a
result of UNSCR 836,
72
whi ch responded t o t hreat s agai nst t he
previously created safe areas of Sarajevo, Bihac, Srebrenica,
Gorazde, Tuzla , and Zepa .
73
It did so by authorizing the use of air-
power to support the UNPROFOR mandat e of det erri ng at t acks
agai nst t he safe areas and responding in self-defense to any
at t ack, i ncursi on, or del i berat e obst ruct i on i n or around t hose
ar eas t hat af f ect ed t he f r eedom of movement of UNPROFOR
or protected humanitarian convoys . At a meet i ng on 10 June
1993, NATO foreign ministers agreed that NATO would provide
protective airpower in case of attacks against UNPROFOR in
Bosni a-Herzegovi na i n accordance wi t h t he request for UN
DELIBERATE FORCE
398
member-st at e assi st ance.
74
A report by the UN secretary-general
on 14 June 1993 asked NATO to prepare plans for provisions of
t he necessar y ai r suppor t capaci t y, in close coordination with
me and my Speci al Represent at i ve f or t he f ormer Yugosl avi a
(emphasi s added).
75
UNSCR 836 and t he r equest of t he UN
sec retary-general led to the deployment of close air suppor t
(CAS) aircraft to the Southern Region and NATOs air cover for
UNPROFOR.
76
The specific requirement for close coordination
with the UN resul t ed i n t he i nfamous dual -key process.
In addition to the deployment of CAS aircraft, NATO decided
t o make i mmedi at e preparat i ons for st ronger measures, i ncl ud-
i ng ai r st ri kes, agai nst t he peopl e responsi bl e for t he st rangu -
lation of Sarajevo and other areas in Bosnia-Herzegovi na, a s
wel l as t hose responsi bl e for wi de-scal e i nt erference wi t h hu-
mani t ar i an assi st ance. At an NAC meet i ng on 23 August
1993, NATO mi l i t ary aut hori t i es had t he t ask of drawi ng up,
i n cl ose coordi nat i on wi t h UNPROFOR, operat i onal opt i ons for
ai r st ri kes, i ncl udi ng appropri at e command and cont rol (C
2
)
and deci si on- maki ng ar r angement s f or t hei r i mpl ement at i on.
On 9 August 1993, t hey pr oduced a memor andum l i st i ng op-
erational options for air strikes approved by NAC .
77
Out of t hi s
memor andum f l owed sever al cr uci al i deas and t hemes t hat
ul t i mat el y affect ed bot h ROE and ai r oper at i ons execut ed dur-
i ng Del i berat e Force. These i ncl uded C
2
coordi nat i on bet ween
UN and NATO ( t he dual key), proportionality of force used in
ai r st ri kes, sensi t i vi t y t o col l at eral damage, mi l i t ary necessi t y,
phased appr oach t o expanded ai r st r i kes, and br eakout of
t ar get cat egori es i nt o opt i on-one, -t wo, and -t hree t arget s .
OPLAN 40101, change t wo, annex E, Rul es of Engagement
r ef l ect s t hese i ssues and t hemes.
78
The breakout of pot ent i al t arget s i nt o t hree cat egori es had
i t s basi s i n t he concept s of proport i onal i t y, mi l i t ary necessi t y,
and gradual appl i cat i on of force.
79
The NAC memorandums
di scussi on on t he use of force art i cul at ed t hese concept s.
80
The di scussi on on ai r st ri ke opt i ons not ed t hat t he sel ect i on of
t ar get s needed t o t ake i nt o consi derat i on proport i onal i t y a s
wel l as t he i mport ance of showi ng resol ve and capabi l i t y; t he
sel ect i on shoul d al so di scourage ret al i at i on.
81
The concept of
oper at i ons ent ai l ed a phased appr oach i n whi ch t he f i r st
phase commenced wi t h an i ni t i al use of ai rpower, l i mi t ed i n
REED
399
t i me and scope but robust enough t o achi eve t he desi red ef-
fect . Thereaft er, i f requi red and when aut hori zed by t he appro -
priate political authority, NATO woul d conduct ai r st ri kes i n
phases t hat focused fi rst on t he i mmedi at e envi rons of Sara -
jevo or ot her areas. These st ri kes woul d have t he speci fi c
purpose of assisting relief of the siege, facilitating the delivery
of humani t ar i an assi st ance, and support i ng UNPROFOR in
t he performance of i t s mandat e. NATO mi ght have t o empl oy
subsequent phases t o expand oper at i ons t o encompass t ar -
gets t hat i nfl uenced t he sust ai nabi l i t y of t he si ege forces.
82
Pl anner s , t herefore, needed t o group and pri ori t i ze t arget s to
show t arget t ype and geographi c l ocal i t y t o assure congruence
wi t h pol i t i cal and l egal mandat es.
As a result of these considerations, NAC decision MCM-
KAD-084-93 est abl i shed opt i on-one, -t wo, and -t hree t arget
s et s t o meet t hese r equi r ement s. Opt i on- one t ar get s encom-
passed t he fi rst -st ri ke phase and i ncl uded not onl y mi l i t ari l y
significant targets but al so t hosesuch as speci fi c art i l l ery
bat t eri es part i ci pat i ng i n a si eget hat vi si bl y i mpeded or pre-
vent ed t he i mpl ement at i on of UNSCRs .
83
Opt i on-t wo t arget s
covered t he i ni t i al fol l ow-on phase and i ncl uded di rect and
essent i al suppor t i t ems such as ar t i l l er y/ heavy weapons, s u p-
pl y poi nt s and muni t i ons si t es, C
2
faci l i t i es, and earl y warni ng
r a da r and surface-to-air missile (SAM) si t es.
84
Opt i on-t hree
t ar get s cover ed t he expanded oper at i ons phase and i ncl uded
t ar get s of st rat egi c val ue out si de t he i mmedi at e areas under
si ege. Many of t he same t ypes of t arget s di scussed i n opt i on
t wo but not l ocat ed i n t he i mmedi at e ar ea of t he si ege f el l
in t o opt i on t hree, as wel l as i t ems such as mi l i t ary-rel at ed
pet rol eum, oi l , and l ubri cant s and anyt hi ng t hat woul d t end
t o degr ade over al l mi l i t ar y capabi l i t y t hr oughout Bosni a-
Herzegovin a. By breaki ng out t he pot ent i al t arget s i nt o sepa -
rat e opt i on set s, mi l i t ary and pol i t i cal aut hori t i es coul d con -
t rol t he escal at i on of vi ol ence by aut hori zi ng at t acks i n a
phased and gr adual appr oach. For each of t he t ar get opt i ons,
one f act r emai ned const ant no mat t er t he opt i on chosen, no
at t ack coul d occur wi t hout cl ose coordi nat i on wi t h t he UN
t hrough UNPROFOR.
The i ssue r egar di ng C
2
coordi nat i on bet ween t he UN a nd
NATO r esul t ed i n what has come t o be known as t he dual - key
DELIBERATE FORCE
400
process . From t he very begi nni ng of Deny Fl i ght, an ongoi ng
di al ogue had occur r ed r egar di ng what t he t er m close coordina-
tion meant and who cont rol l ed t he use of mi l i t ary force wi t hi n
Bosni a-Herzegovi na.
85
As not ed above, t he requi rement t o co -
or di nat e cl osel y wi t h t he UN before initiating CAS or ai r
st ri kes came from t he l anguage i n t he UNSCR and t he r epor t
of the UN secret ary-general . In pract i ce, t he dual -key process
requi red approval of t he appropri at e l evel of aut hori t y i n t he
NATO and UN chains of command (fig. 14. 3) before execution
of any weapons rel ease.
The NATO chai n of command pr oceeded di r ect l y f r om
SACEUR t h r o u g h CI NCSOUTH t o COMAI RSOUTH t o
COM5ATAF and finally to the CAOC director. The approval
authority for CAS support on the NATO side was delegated all
the way down to COM5ATAF and t he CAOC director.
86
On t he
UN si de, however, t he approval aut hori t y proved somewhat
problematic. The UN secretary-general himself held approval
authority for the first use of CAS. Thus, if a UNPROFOR gr ound
unit came under attack, a tactical air control party (TACP) or
forward air controller (FAC) assigned to the unit would initiate a
Blue Sword CAS request. The request would go through the air
operations control center to Sarajevo for evaluation by the UN-
PROFOR commander and, if approved, to the force commander
of United Nations Peace Forces (F C UNPF) in Zagreb, wher e a
Figure 14.3. NATO and UN Chains of Command
REED
401
cri si s-act i on t eam cel l woul d al so eval uat e t he request . It t hen
went t o Yasushi Akashi, the UN secret ary-general s speci al
representative (SGSR) to the former Yugoslavia and, finally, to
New York for approval by the UN secret ary-general hi msel f.
The f i r st at t empt ed r equest f or CAS by a UNPROFOR
ground uni t provi des an exampl e of t he di ffi cul t i es associ at ed
wi t h t he dual -key appr oach. On 12 Mar ch 1994, a Fr ench
TACP i n t he Bi hac area called for CAS t o st op a Ser bi an
40-millimeter antiaircraft artillery (AAA) at t ack on UNPROFOR
t roops. Even t hough an AC-130 was i n t he ar ea and had t he
offending artillery piece in its sights, approval from the UN
si de of t he dual key was not fort hcomi ng. Due t o probl ems i n
l ocat i ng Akashi, t he r equest was not appr oved unt i l si x hour s
after the TACPs request . In t he meant i me, t he AC-130 l eft t he
ar ea and came back t wo or t hr ee t i mes. Unf or t unat el y, when
t he approval fi nal l y came t hrough, t he TACP and t he AC-130
coul d no l onger posi t i vel y i dent i fy t he t arget, so t he former
called off the CAS r equest .
87
The dual -key process al so caused some i ni t i al confusi on
regardi ng t he di st i nct i on bet ween recei vi ng approval t o drop
weapons and act ual cl earance t o do so. OPLAN 40101, change
two, provided ROE condi t i ons requi red for weapons rel ease.
88
Concerns for col l at eral damage and t he i mperat i ve t o avoi d
fratricide resul t ed i n ROE t hat not onl y requi red approval from
bot h UN and NATO channel s but al so requi red posi t i ve i dent i -
fi cat i on and cl earance from t he FAC . Because t her e was no
requi rement t o ask t he FAC whet her he had recei ved pri or
approval t hrough t he UN chai n of command, t he pi l ot coul d
assume t hat i f t he FAC gave cl earance for at t ack, t he l at t er
had requi si t e approval from t he UN to do so. After receiving
Chari ot s approval, the pilot could attack a positively identified
t ar get if the FAC gave cl earance t o do so.
For t he ent i re peri od l eadi ng up t o Del i berat e Force, UN-
PROFOR ground personnel received approval for CAS a total of
three times. The first use of CAS occurred on 10 Apri l 1994 i n
response t o a request made by UNPROFOR mi l i t ary observers
in Gorazde . After approval by the SGSR, two US Air Force F-
16Cs dropped bombs under the control of a UN FAC. Approval
from the UN chai n of command t ook l ess t han t wo hour s .
89
The
next day, UNPROFOR again requested air protection for UN
DELIBERATE FORCE
402
personnel i n Gorazde. Two US Marine Corps F/ A-18A aircraft ,
al so under t he cont r ol of a UN FAC, bombed and st rafed
t ar get s. The last CAS r equest came i n Jul y 1995 dur i ng t he
siege of Srebrenica by t he Bosni an Serb army (BSA) .
90
Oft en,
in lieu of an approved CAS mission, NATO ai rcraft woul d en -
gage i n ai r presence demonst rat i ons, conspi cuousl y showi ng
t hemsel ves t o t he offendi ng ground forces by fl yi ng over t he
area at hi gh speed wi t h aft erburners t o scare t he enemy i nt o
st oppi ng t he at t ack. Even t hough t he ai rcraft rel eased no weap-
ons in these passes, the demonstrations often proved effective in
temporarily halting attacks on UNPROFOR positions .
91
The i neffect i veness of t he dual -key process came under i n -
tense fire after the fall of the Srebrenica and Zepa saf e ar eas
i n Jul y 1995. Even t hough NATO ai rcraft were avai l abl e and
pr esent dur i ng t he Bosni an Ser b siege of Srebrenica , t he UN
di d not t ur n i t s key unt i l nearl y t hree days aft er t he at t ack
had begun. By this time CAS coul d not save t he safe area . A
report present ed by t he Dut ch Mi ni st ry of Defense i n Decem-
ber 1995 bl amed t he UNs mi si nt erpret at i on of Bosni an Serb
obj ect i ves and t he UN command st r uct ur e f or wi t hhol di ng
NATO ai rpower t o det er t he BSA at t ack.
92
The report st at ed
t hat des pi t e r epeat ed r eques t s f or CAS f r o m t h e Du t c h
peacekeeper s on t he ground i n Srebreni ca with NATO CAS
ai rcraft on ai rborne al ert over t he Adri at i ct he UN approved
onl y one l a s t - mi nut e CAS mi s s i o n ,
93
wh i c h h e l p e d t h e
peacekeeper s regroup nort h of Srebreni ca but di d not st op t he
BSA from t aki ng t he t own. As a consequence of t hi s i nci dent ,
Secret ary-General Cl aes t ransferred t he UN key f r om Akashi
t o Gen Bernard Janvi er , the FC UNPF. At t hi s poi nt , deci si ons
about how and when t o use mi l i t ary force fel l t o t he UN a nd
NATO mi l i t ary commanders.
94
The cl ose coordi nat i on and consul t at i on procedures al so ap-
pl i ed t o t he use of ai r st ri kes i n response t o vi ol at i ons of t he
UNSCRs . Because UNPROFOR, a lightly armed UN peacekeep-
i ng force, coul d prot ect nei t her i t sel f nor t he safe areas from
BSA attacks, NATO ai r power became bot h a mechani sm f or
providing force protection (i.e., CAS ) for UN per s onnel and a
t hreat t o det er t he BSA.
95
In February 1994 NAC deci ded t o
est abl i sh a 20-ki l omet er (km) excl usi on zone ar ound Sar aj evo,
decl ar i ng t hat 10 days af t er 2400 GMT on 10 Febr uar y 1994,
REED
403
heavy weapons not removed from t hi s zone or t urned over t o
UN cont rol woul d be subj ect t o NATO ai r s t r i kes .
96
NAC
authorized CINCSOUTH, i n cl ose coordi nat i on wi t h t he UN, to
l aunch ai r st ri kes agai nst art i l l ery or mort ar posi t i ons i n or
ar ound Sar aj evo (i ncl udi ng areas out si de t he excl usi on zone)
t hat UNPROFOR consi der ed r esponsi bl e f or at t acks agai nst
ci vi l i an t arget s i n t hat ci t y.
97
Because t he t hreat of ai rpower
proved successful i n forci ng effect i ve compl i ance wi t h t he
NATO ul t i mat ums, t he ai r st r i kes wer e not r equi r ed. Ul t i -
mately, NAC est abl i shed excl usi on zones ar ound each of t he
r emai ni ng saf e ar eas. The t hr eat of usi ng ai r st r i kes agai nst a
l i mi t ed excl usi on zone or a speci fi c pi ece of mi l i t ary hardware
i nfl uenced mi l i t ary operat i ons t hroughout Deny Fl i ght a nd
Del i berat e Force.
After Krajina Serbs fi red on t he Bi hac safe area from Croa -
t i an t erri t ory and i n l i ght of t he hi st ory of probl ems experi -
enced by UN forces i n t he Kraj i na ar ea dat i ng back t o Sept em-
ber 1993, UNSCR 908 ext ended CAS support t o t he t erri t ory
of the Republic of Croatia on 31 Mar ch 1994. Lat er t hat year
UNSCR 958 ext ended t he mandat e under UNSCR 836 for CAS
and ai r st ri kes t o t he Republ i c of Croat i a .
98
Change four t o
OPLAN 40101 reflected these UNSCRs, both of which prompted
subsequent NAC mandat es .
99
The resol ut i ons and mandat es
t ended t o react i n a l i mi t ed and proport i onal manner t o t he
nature of the situation in Bosnia and Croatia . Each time the UN
r es ponded t o an act of Ser bi an aggr es s i on, i t r ai s ed t he
ant ebut never i n a proact i ve or prevent i ve manner .
Throughout t he remai nder of Deny Fl i ght, NATO conduct ed
l i mi t ed ai r st ri kes i n accordance wi t h t he provi si ons of UNSCR
836 and 958. One such st r i ke occur r ed i n r esponse t o at t acks
by Bosni an Serb aircraft flying out of Udbina ai rfi el d i n Serb-
held Croatia . Although NATO car r i ed out t he at t ack of Udbi na
under UNSCR 958, t he UNnot wanting to kill anyonepro -
hi bi t ed st r i kes agai nst ai r cr af t on t he gr ound.
100
Al t hough
NATO compl i ed wi t h t hi s rest ri ct i on, i t refused t o conduct t he
ai r st r i ke wi t hout hi t t i ng t he enemy ai r def ense syst em t hat
prot ect ed t he ai rfi el d. Al t hough t he UN had t he same r eser va -
t i ons about ki l l i ng peopl e who operat ed t he i nt egrat ed ai r de-
fense system (IADS) equipment, NATO prevai l ed i n t he di scus-
si on by poi nt i ng out t hat i t woul d conduct suppressi on of
DELIBERATE FORCE
404
enemy ai r defenses (SEAD) st ri kes st ri ct l y t o defend t he at-
t acki ng ai rcrews.
101
Thi s rel uct ance by t he UN t o caus e any
ki nd of casual t y (whet her mi l i t ary or ci vi l i an) carri ed t hrough
t o t he execut i on of Del i berat e Force.
In addition to CAS and ai r st ri kes, ai r-t o-ai r engagement s
al so t ook pl ace pri or t o Del i berat e Force. On 28 February
1994, t he engagement and s hoot down of f our f i xed- wi ng
Gal eb/ Jast r eb ai r cr af t i n t he ai rspace of Bosni a-Herzegovi na
demonst r at ed ROEs air-to-air procedures. After NAEW air -
craft det ect ed unknown ai rcraft sout h of Banj a Luka on t he
morning of the 28th, two NATO aircraft (US Air Force F-16s )
i nt er cept ed and i dent i f i ed si x Gal eb/ Jast r eb ai rcraft i n t he
area. In accordance wi t h t hi s phase of ROE , t he NAEW aircraft
i ssued t wo warni ngs t o l and or exi t t he NFZ, i gnored by t he
Gal eb/ J as t r eb pi l ot s. Indeed, duri ng t he warni ngs, t he vi ol at-
i ng ai rcraft dropped bombs i n Bosni a-Herzegovi na. Following
t he ROE and aft er recei vi ng Chari ot s approval, the NATO
f i ght er s engaged t he pl anes and shot down t hr ee of t hem. A
second pair of NATO fighters (also US Air Force F-16s ) arrived
and shot down a fourt h vi ol at or. The t wo remai ni ng enemy
aircraft left the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
102
Thi s i nci dent i l l ust r at es t he phased and st epped nat ur e of
ROE developed for Deny Flight. The pol i t i cal and mi l i t ary sen -
si t i vi t y of operat i ons i n t he Bal kans required flexible ROE able
t o cont r ol t he use of f or ce as t he t hr eat war r ant ed and abl e t o
avoid the escalation of hostilities. ROE drafted for OPLAN
40101, aft er t he enact ment of UNSCR 836 and t he r esul t i ng
NATO Military Committee Memorandum MCM-KAD-084-93,
cont ai ned basi cal l y t he same provi si ons exi st i ng at t he t i me
NATO execut ed Del i berat e Force. Pl anners linked ROE t o a
phased appr oach t o oper at i ons t hat depended upon t he si t u -
at i on at hand.
Each of t he ROE phases refl ect s several of t he el ement s
noted earlier in reference to MCM-KAD-084-93. The concepts
of proportionality, mi l i t ary necessi t y, and col l at eral damage
domi nat ed t he t hought pr ocess sur r oundi ng t he devel opment
and execution of ROE for ai r st ri ke opt i ons. The si ngl e most
defi ni ng el ement of every pl anni ng and execut i on deci si on was
t he overri di ng need t o avoi d col l at eral damage and escal at ory
force. Thus, by focusi ng on t he concept s of proport i onal i t y,
REED
405
mi l i t ar y necessi t y, and col l at er al damage , NATO pl a nne r s
hoped t o keep mi l i t ary opt i ons congruent wi t h pol i t i cal obj ec-
tives . The degree to which NATO adher ed t o t hese pr i nci pl es i s
l i kel y t he ul t i mat e reason for t he success of t he mi ssi on and
t he i ni t i at i on of t he peace process i n Dayt on, Ohi o.
After the fall of Srebrenica a nd Ze pa, ROE r emai ned basi -
cal l y unchanged and ready for t he upcomi ng execut i on of De-
l i berat e Force. The fal l of t hese t wo safe areas preci pi t at ed t he
di scussi ons and deci si ons t hat l ed t o t he pl anni ng and ul t i -
mat e execut i on of t hi s operat i on.
Impl ementati on of ROE
i n Operati on Del i berate Force
After the fall of the Srebrenica and Zepa saf e ar eas i n J ul y
1995, i ni t i al di scussi ons by NATO and UN officials dealt with
an appr opr i at e r esponse t o t he Bosni an Ser bs shoul d t hey
make any moves t oward t aki ng Gorazde (later extended to
i ncl ude Saraj evo , Tuzla , and Bi hac). The NATO London Con -
f er ence on 21 Jul y 1995 deci ded t hat an at t ack on Gor azde
wi l l be met by subst ant i al and deci si ve ai rpower.
103
NAC deci-
si ons of 25 Jul y and 1 August speci fi ed meet i ng furt her Bos -
ni an Ser b act i on wi t h a f i r m and r api d r esponse ai med at
det er r i ng at t acks on saf e ar eas and empl oyi ng, i f necessary,
t he t i mel y and effect i ve use of ai rpower unt i l at t acks on or
t hr eat s t o t hese ar eas had ceased.
104
The conference may have
been a way t o fi nesse t he UN and avoi d a conf r ont at i on i n t he
UN Security Council , wher e t he Russi ans pr obabl y woul d have
vet oed any i ncreased use of force over t he Bosni an Serbs .
105
By creating an NAC deci si on t hat i nt erpret ed al ready exi st -
ing UNSCR mandat es, t he conference avoi ded t he possi bi l i t y
of a probl em wi t h t he UN Securi t y Counci l .
The NAC decision established trigger events that would
i ni t i at e graduat ed ai r operat i ons as det ermi ned by t he com -
mon judgment of NATO and UN military commanders: (1) Any
concent rat i on of forces and/ or heavy weapons, and t he conduct
of ot her mi l i t ary preparat i ons whi ch, i n t he common j udgment
of the NATO and UN Mi l i t ary Commanders, pr esent ed a di rect
t hreat t o t he remai ni ng UN Safe Areas or (2) Direct attacks (e. g. ,
DELIBERATE FORCE
406
ground, art i l l ery or ai rcraft ) on t he desi gnat ed safe-areas .
106
The t ri gger event s appl i ed equal l y t o each of t he safe areas .
Adm Lei ght on Smi t h, CINCSOUTH, poi nt ed out t hat confi rm-
ing the first trigger would have been difficult for each of the
safe areas because t he BSA al r eady had a hi gh concent r at i on
of f or ces and heavy weapons l ocat ed t here. Ul t i mat el y, i t
woul d have come down t o t he di ffi cul t mat t er of gaugi ng t he
i nt ent of t he BSA (although NATO di d have several i ndi cat ors
for doing so).
107
In accordance wi t h t he London agreement , once t he UN a nd
NATO mi l i t ary commanders agreed t hat a t ri gger event had
occurred, NATO aut hor i zed t he at t ack of t ar get s associ at ed
with option two from MCM-KAD-084-93, including concentra -
tions of forces. The NATO/ UN mi l i t ary commanders coul d
cont i nue t he ai r st r i kes as l ong as t hey t hought t hey wer e
needed t o defend a safe area and a wi der geogr aphi c ar ea
(zone of action [ZOA]). The st ri kes al so coul d t arget any con -
cent r at i ons of t r oops deemed t o pose a ser i ous t hr eat t o t he
UN safe area.
108
The NAC deci si on assi gned execut i on aut hor -
i t y for ai r act i ons t o Lt Gen Mi chael Ryan, COMAIRSOUTH.
109
Because of t he negat i ve experi ence wi t h t he dual -key pro-
cess and t he percei ved i nabi l i t y of t he UN pol i t i cal st ruct ure t o
make timely decisions, NAC st r essed t he i mpor t ance of t he
UNs t ransferri ng execut i on aut hori t y for ai r act i ons t o i t s
mi l i t ar y commander s.
110
I n appar ent agr eement wi t h t hi s r e-
ques t , t he UN secr et ar y- gener al t r ansf er r ed t he key from
Akas hi t o General Janvi er, as ment i oned above. Thi s act i on
showed t he UNs t rust and confi dence i n t he abi l i t y of mi l i t ary
l eaders t o ensure t hat any mi l i t ary use of force woul d compl y
with UN mandat es and pol i cy gui dance wi t hout t he need for
direct political oversight. Although never executed, the NAC
deci si on al so i ncl uded provi si ons t o aut hori ze expanded op-
erat i ons agai nst opt i on t hree or el ement s t hereof i f any of t he
warri ng fact i ons cont i nued offensi ve operat i ons agai nst t he
safe areas i n spi t e of ai r st ri kes under opt i on t wo.
111
Lastly, the NAC deci si on addressed t he use of SEAD aircraft
agai nst t he BSAs IADS.
112
NATO woul d at t ack enemy IADS if
and when ai r st r i kes i n suppor t of a saf e ar ea commenced and
woul d cont i nue t o at t ack onl y for t he durat i on of t hat opera -
t i on. One can consi der at t acks on enemy IADS a form of
REED
407
preemptive self-defense since IADS posed a t hreat t o fri endl y
air forces operating in proximity. This policy proved trouble -
some for many UN pol i t i cal l eaders who vi ewed at t acks on
anyt hi ng not di rect l y l ocat ed i n or around t he safe area exclu -
si on zone as vergi ng on opt i on t hree.
The NAC deci s i on gener at ed a memor andum of under -
st andi ng (MOU) bet ween General Janvi er and Admi ral Smi t h ,
providing UN interpretation of the NAC deci si ons di scussed
above.
113
Thi s MOU covered t he phasi ng of operat i ons, opera -
tion considerations (including ZOAs , IADS, and ai r-l and coor -
di nat i on), t arget i ng ar r angement s ( i ncl udi ng t ar get i ng boar ds
and approved t arget l i st s ), and conditions for initiation (trigger
event s) . The memor andum l ed t o di scussi ons bet ween Gener al
Janvi er and Admi r al Smi t h regardi ng t he t ypes of t arget s t h a t
coul d be st ruck and t he ZOAs t hat woul d appl y i f a t ri gger
event occur r ed.
Initially, the UN want ed t he ZOA limited in order to closely
r el at e t o t he at t acked or t hr eat ened saf e ar ea; i t al so fel t t hat
NATO shoul d di rect ai r st ri kes onl y t oward t hose forces t hat
committed the trigger offense. According to Admiral Smith ,
General Janvi er t hought t hat t he ZOA shoul d ext end t he cur-
rent excl usi on zone t o 25 km r at her t han 20 km. Admi r al
Smi t h and NATO, however, thought ZOAs shoul d appl y t o a
much wi der geogr aphi c ar ea as l ong as one coul d est abl i sh a
connect i on t o t he t hr eat ened saf e ar ea and t he t ar get.
114
After
s ome debat e, t he UN proposed t wo ZOAs di vi di ng Bosni a-
Herzegovina i n hal f wi t h overl ap i n t he area around Tuzl a (fig.
14.4).
115
Accordingly, should a trigger event occur in Sarajevo or
Gorazde, pl anners would activate the southeast ZOA, and air -
craft would strike targets associated with that zone. Alterna -
tively, if Bihac were the location for the trigger event, air strikes
would focus on the northwest ZOA. If Tuzla were attacked or
threatened, either one or both ZOAs could be activated.
Regardless of the location of the trigger event, NATO could
strike IADS wherever i t affect ed fri endl y ai r operat i ons. Conse-
quently, NATO devel oped Deadeye Sout heast and Deadeye
Nort hwest as two IADS t ar get set s, bot h of whi ch were t i ed t o
t he sel f-defense needs of t he ai rcrews operat i ng i n t he t act i cal
area of operat i ons rat her t han t o ZOAs .
116
For al l ot her t arget s ,
DELIBERATE FORCE
408
t he abi l i t y t o t arget was based upon l ocat i on of t he t ri gger
event and t he act i ve ZOA.
Target i ng for Del i berat e Force di d not amount t o an al l -out
st rat egi c bombi ng campai gn desi gned t o dest roy t he Serbs
i ndust ri al i nfrast ruct ure and capabi l i t y t o wage war. Rat her,
NATO l i mi t ed t he t arget s and used f or ce i n a gr aduat ed man-
ner t o compel t he behavi or of t he Bosni an Serbs . Gener al
t ypes of t arget s for Deliberate Force included IADS (early
war ni ng r adar / acqui si t i on r adar / SAM s i t es / communi cat i ons ,
etc.), fielded forces (heavy weapons / t r oop concent r at i ons) , C
2
( headquar t er s / command f aci l i t i es / communi cat i ons ) , di r ect
and essent i al suppor t ( ammo/ suppl y depot and st or age/ sup-
port i ng garri son areas/ l ogi st i cs areas), and l i nes of communi-
cat i ons (t ransport at i on choke poi nt s and bri dges).
117
In sel ect -
ing specific targets wi t hi n t hese cat egori es, t he Joi nt Target i ng
Board (UN and NATO) worked hard t o fi nd easi l y hi t t arget s
with limited potential for collateral damage.
Figure 14.4. Zones of Action for Deliberate Force (From Corona briefing
slides, Lt Gen Michael Ryan, Headquarters AIRSOUTH, Naples, Italy, 5
December 1995, United States Air Force Historical Research Agency,
Maxwell AFB, Ala., H-3)
REED
409
In addi t i on t o t he normal concerns about col l at eral damage ,
Gener al Janvi er remai ned ext remel y sensi t i ve t o casual t i es
(including BSA casual t i es). When t he general revi ewed one of
the initial target lists , he demanded t hat a t ar get l abel ed bar -
racks be removed because he want ed t o avoi d ki l l i ng peo -
ple.
118
Admi ral Smi t h had fai l ed t o expl ai n t o General Janvi er
t he di st i nct i on bet ween t arget s and desi r ed mean poi nt of
impact (DMPI). Target s coul d i nvol ve a number of i ndi vi dual
DMPIs wi t hi n a t arget compl ex. The fact t hat pl anners de-
scr i be a t ar get as a bar r acks does not mean t hat ai r cr af t
woul d st r i ke a bar r acks bui l di ng. I n f act , t he same bar r acks
compl ex mi ght i ncl ude a very l ucrat i ve ammuni t i on st orage
area with a different DMPI t han t hat of t he bar r acks. Under -
st andi ng Gener al Janvi er s concern, Admi ral Smi t h merel y re-
defined the DMPIs sel ect ed for at t ack, and General Janvi er
agreed t o t he t arget s.
119
The trigger event for Deliberate Force was the shelling of a
Saraj evo market pl ace, presumabl y by t he BSA. When Admi r al
Smi t h saw t he resul t s of t he shel l i ng on Cabl e News Net work
(CNN), he called the NATO liaison to the FC UNPF and told
hi m t o t el l General Janvi er that if the UN det er mi ned t hat BSA
had fired the shell, then NATO request ed ai r st ri ke opt i ons
according to the MOU.
120
Once Lt Gen Ruper t Smi t h, com-
mander of UNPROFOR (who was si t t i ng i n for t he vacat i oni ng
General Janvi er ), confirmed BSA responsibility, the UN a nd
NATO t urned t hei r keys , and Operat i on Del i berat e Force be-
gan. General Janvi er l at er concurred wi t h t hi s deci si on.
Duri ng Del i berat e Force several i ssues rel at i ng t o t he i nt er -
pret at i on and execut i on of ROE ar ose, t he most pr omi nent
bei ng t he degree t o whi ch concerns over col l at eral damage
dr ove t he pl anni ng and execut i on of ai r st ri kes. The most
t el l i ng i ndi cat i on of t he concern over col l at eral damage was
t he f act t hat Gener al Ryan personally selected every DMPI
because he fel t t hat t he pol i t i cal sensi t i vi t y of t he operat i on
demanded st ri ct account abi l i t y on t he part of t he ai r com -
mander . He bel i eved t hat ever y bomb dr opped or mi ssi l e
l aunched not onl y had a t act i cal -l evel effect but a possi bl e
strategic effect. Accordingly, Ryan di rect ed hi s st aff t o eval uat e
al l proposed t arget s and DMPIs for their military significance
and t hei r pot ent i al f or hi gh, medi um, or l ow assessment s of
DELIBERATE FORCE
410
col l at eral damage. For exampl e, i nt el l i gence per s onnel de-
scri bed t he Pal e army suppl y depot as a key BSA s uppl y but
wi t h hi gh pot ent i al for col l at eral damage.
121
Si mi l arl y, t hey
assessed t he Pal e ammo depot sout h as havi ng medi um po-
t ent i al for col l at eral damage and t he J ahor i na r adi o communi-
cation (RADCOM) st at i on as havi ng l ow pot ent i al .
122
These ex-
amples illustrate the spectrum of collateral-damage probabilities
for vari ous t arget s. Based upon t he i mpor t ance of each t ar get
and i t s pot ent i al for col l at eral damage , General Ryan selected
the specific DMPIs for at t ack.
In addition to the actual selection of DMPIs , t he concern for
col l at eral damage oft en drove weapons sel ect i on and t act i cs
f or weapons r el ease. Cl ear l y, pr eci si on- gui ded muni t i ons
(PGM) were t he weapons of choi ce. Of t he more t han one
t housand muni t i ons dr opped dur i ng Del i ber at e For ce, near l y
70 per cent wer e pr eci s i on muni t i ons .
123
Of al l muni t i ons
dropped by US ai rcraft , more t han 98 percent were preci si on
muni t i ons.
124
Al t hough ROE did not specifically require PGMs ,
i t di d st at e t hat t arget pl anni ng and weapons delivery will
i ncl ude consi derat i ons t o mi ni mi ze col l at eral damage .
125
At one poi nt duri ng t he operat i on, an ai rcraft bombed a
bri dge, usi ng t he st andard profi l e of at t acki ng al ong t he l engt h
of t he span, and rel eased t wo PGMs on t he desi gnat ed DMPI.
Unfort unat el y, t he second PGM went l ong and dest royed a
farmhouse l ocat ed next t o t he end of t he bri dge.
126
As a r esul t ,
ROE underwent modi fi cat i on vi a t he ATM/ SPI NS t o r equi r e a
much more rest ri ct i ve approach for at t acki ng bri dges.
127
Air -
crews woul d now have t o make a dry pass over t he t arget ed
br i dge, at t ack on an axi s per pendi cul ar t o t he br i dge r at her
t han al ong i t s l engt h, and r el ease onl y one bomb per pass.
When fi rst not i fi ed of t hi s change i n ROE, t he commander s
and ai rcrews at Avi ano Ai r Base (AB) became very concerned,
feel i ng t hat i t pl aced pi l ot s at i ncreased ri sk. Despi t e Avi anos
initial refusal to fly the mission as directed, pilots eventually flew
the mission successfully.
128
Upon heari ng t he concerns of t he
aircrews over the dry-pass ROE, General Ryan and Gener al
Hor nbur g deci ded t o resci nd t he ROE restriction in the ATM of
12 Sept ember 1995, t he next day.
129
Thi s i nci dent i l l ust rat es
t he di ffi cul t y commanders faced i n reconci l i ng t he compet i ng
REED
411
demands of force protection and minimiza tion of collateral
damagea bal ance t hat shi ft ed as operat i ons progressed.
Every section of ROE i ncl uded a st at ement concer ni ng t he
need t o mi ni mi ze col l at eral damage. These i ncl uded sect i ons
deal i ng wi t h t he engagement of ai r-t o-ai r and surface-t o-ai r
syst ems (t ake i nt o account t he need t o mi ni mi ze col l at eral
damage);
130
with CAS (limit collateral damage t o t he mi ni-
mum that is militarily feasible);
131
and wi t h SEAD (no unac-
cept abl e col l at eral damage).
132
Cl earl y, concerns about col l at -
eral damage represented the defining issue for Deliberate Force.
Thi r t y- f i ve hundr ed sor t i es and mor e t han one t housand
dropped muni t i ons produced onl y t wo confi rmed i nst ances of
any si gni f i cant col l at er al damage ( t he f ar mhous e i nci dent
ment i oned above and an acci dent al st ri ke on a wat er-t reat men t
plant).
133
When quest i oned by a CNN j our nal i st about r epor t s
of significant amounts of collateral damage , Admi ral Smi t h
poi nt ed out t hat i f such damage had i ndeed occur r ed, CNN
woul d be fi l mi ng t he damage i nst ead of i nt ervi ewi ng hi m.
134
The careful selection of DMPIs by General Ryan , combi ned
with careful attacks by NATO ai rcrews, resul t ed i n one of t he
most preci se operat i ons ever conduct ed.
Concern for minimizing collateral damage al so resul t ed i n one
of the more controversial ROE issues in Deliberate Forcethe
dual correlation requirement for reactive SEAD strikes. SPINS
required all SEAD mi ssi on commander s t o see t hat pl anni ng
and positioning of SEAD ai rcraft i ncl uded consi derat i on of
met hods t o ensure engagement of t he desi red t arget , mi ni mi ze
chances of engagi ng uni nt ended t ar get s, and mi t i gat e t he i m -
pact of possi bl e hi gh-speed ant i radi at i on mi ssi l e (HARM) a m-
bi gui t i es.
135
Due t o t hese concerns, ai rcraft det ect i ng a possi -
ble SAM engagement were di rect ed t o depart t he i mmedi at e
t hreat area, usi ng an appropri at e defensi ve profi l e and coun-
t ermeasures as requi red. Onl y i n ext reme si t uat i ons (e. g. , ex -
per i enci ng a t hr eat wi t hout r easonabl e means of escape) wer e
ai rcrews aut hori zed t o use any measure for sel f-defense.
136
Preemptive HARM st ri kes were not aut hori zed wi t hout Char -
iots approval , and pi l ot s coul d empl oy react i ve HARM st ri kes
i n Bosni a-Herzegovi na or Croatia only if one of the following
condi t i ons exi st ed:
DELIBERATE FORCE
412
A. Positive indication of a hostile act (confirmed missile or projectiles
fired), or
B. Dual correlation of posi t i ve i ndi cat i ons of host i l e i nt ent , furt her
defi ned as ai rcraft i l l umi nat ed by surface-t o-ai r (SAM)/ ant i -ai r art i l -
lery (AAA) f i r e cont r ol r adar and/ or any ai r def ense syst em r adar
directly related to these SAM/ AAA s ys t ems .
C. Ot her i nst ances of demonst rat ed host i l e i nt ent , i ncl udi ng ot her
i nst ances by syst ems ot her t han t hose descri bed i n para B of t hi s
sect i on, when approved by Chari ot .
137
Al t hough t he dual -correl at i on requi rement i nfri nged upon
t he i nherent ri ght t o sel f-defense, i t di d reduce t he l i kel i hood
t hat react i ve and preempt i ve SEAD oper at i ons woul d cause
ot herwi se avoi dabl e col l at eral damage . Dual-correlation ROE
was rest ri ct i ve, but l eadershi p preferred t o err on t he conser -
vative side.
138
Even though NATO had a l i mi t ed number of
SEAD aircraft, the chance of HARM ambi gui t y represent ed t oo
great a ri sk for frat ri ci de or col l at eral damage t o al l ow more
extensive use of lethal SEAD by aircraft without dual-correlation
capability.
139
Dual correl at i on pot ent i al l y reduced col l at eral damage ; how-
ever, it definitely imposed tactical handicaps on NATO fliers.
US Navy ai rcrews, for exampl e, were not pl eased by t he re-
s t r i c t i on t he pol i c y pl a c e d on t he i r us e of pr e e mpt i ve
HARMs.
140
Most SEAD ai r cr af t had no pr obl ems wi t h dual
correlation si nce bot h t he ai r cr af t and t he weapon t hey car -
ried, typically a HARM, had separat e i nt ernal capabi l i t i es t o
achieve correlation. However, for other less capable aircraft,
ROE requi red t hat unl ess an off-board pl at form provi ded t he
second correl at i on, t he ai rcraft woul d have t o depart t he i m-
medi at e t hr eat ar ea.
The section of ROE deal i ng wi t h combat sear ch and r escue
(CSAR) al so caused some concern. NATO ROE aut hor i zi ng
search and rescue (SAR) ai rcraft and naval vessel s t o use
sel f -def ense force as necessary (emphasi s added)
141
t o ens ur e
t he recovery of survi vors was i nconsi st ent wi t h US ROE for
CSAR, which provided for a greater degree of force in recover -
ing survivors by allowing mi ni mum force as necessary (em-
phasi s added).
142
Since US ROE appl i ed t o Operat i on Provi de
Promi se (t he humani t ari an ai rl i ft operat i on i nt o Bosni a ) mis -
sions and NATO ROE applied to Deny Flight and Del i berat e
REED
413
Force mi ssi ons, speci al operat i ons forces desi gnat ed t o go i nt o
t he same t hreat area t o recover survi vors coul d t heoret i cal l y
be aut hori zed a di fferent l evel of force, dependi ng upon what
t he ai rcraft was doi ng when i t was shot down. For exampl e, i f
a speci al -ops hel i copt er gunshi p were approachi ng t he l oca -
t i on of t he survi vor of a downed ai rcraft , t he hel i copt erunder
NATO ROEcoul d not fi re upon an enemy t ruck wi t h armed
personnel unl ess i t commi t t ed a host i l e act or demonst rat ed
host i l e i nt ent t oward t he hel i copt er (react i ve). Under US ROE ,
however, t he hel i copt er coul d use t he mi ni mum force neces -
sary t o prevent t he enemy t ruck from capt uri ng t he pi l ot or
interfering with the pickup (preemptive).
The di fference bet ween t he l evel s of force aut hori zed i n t he
two ROEs resul t ed, i n part , from t he fact t hat NATO doct r i ne
does not address t he combat part of CSAR. Under st andabl y,
SARwi t hout t he combat perspect i verel at es t o i ssues of
self-defense. CSAR, a more robust form of SAR t hat i s uni que
t o t he US mi l i t ary, seeks t o recover survi vors wi t hi n a host i l e
t hr eat envi r onment .
The Navys Si xt h Fl eet made sever al r equest s t o use US
rat her t han NATO ROE for CSAR operations. In a NATO con -
ference t hat addressed t he i ssue of US versus NATO ROE,
NATO member s agr eed t hat US ROE woul d appl y t o any US
forces engaged in a CSAR mi ssi on.
143
However, no one made
changes t o t he wr i t t en ROE in OPLAN 40101. During Deliber -
at e Force t he act ual ROE for a CSAR mission proved very
sketchy, especially considering the political sensitivity of the
oper at i on.
144
The Navy cont i nued t o press for more speci fi c
ROE and urged t he adopt i on of US SROE . According to Maj
Da n Bus h, legal advisor to the CAOC duri ng Del i berat e Force,
Gener al s Ryan and Hor nbur g deci ded t hat because Del i berat e
Force was a NATO operation, NATO ROEi n accordance wi t h
OPLAN 40101would apply to everyone involved. Anyone not
using NATO ROE would fail to appear on the ATM schedul e.
145
Fort unat el y, ROE for CSAR was not put t o t he t est dur i ng
Target i ng and execution differed from ROE i n t he cont ext of
cas ual t i es . Commander s f or Del i ber at e For ce r epeat edl y
st ressed t hat st uff (t hi ngs) rat her t han peopl e were t he t ar -
gets for t hi s operat i on.
146
Al t hough t he Bosni an Serbs lack of
DELIBERATE FORCE
414
personnel , compared t o t he Bosni an Musl i m and Cr oat i an
forces, constituted a potential center of gravity, pl anners decided
not to target them. In essence, NATO strategy sought to wage
aggressive peace rather than war. Since one of the key strengths
of the BSA was i t s armor and heavy weapons, NATO pl anned t o
t ake away as much of t hat st rengt h as qui ckl y as possible.
NATOs desire to minimize the loss of civilian and military
l i fe const rai ned t act i cs and t arget sel ect i on i n ot her ways. In
t he parl ance of t he CAOC st af f , st r uct ur es associ at ed wi t h
soft pudgies (people) were not intentionally targeted.
147
If
t hey were, ai rcraft oft en hi t t hem at ni ght , when peopl e were
l ess l i kel y t o be around. For t he same reason, General Ryan
deci ded t o move at t acks on bri dges, ori gi nal l y schedul ed for
t he dayt i me, t o ni ght .
148
At t he same t i me ROE and mi l i t ary commanders rest ri ct ed
t ar get i ng opt i ons and execut i on t o mi ni mi ze col l at eral dam-
age, commanders cont i nual l y st ressed t he i mport ance of force
prot ect i on. Admi ral Smi t hs t hree pri ori t i es for Del i berat e
Force, in order of precedence, were (1) force protection, (2)
mi ni mi zat i on of col l at eral damage , and (3) effective strikes on
t ar get s.
149
Specifically designed to ensure the safety of NATO
forces, ROE maximized force protection by limiting the expo-
sure of NATO ai rcraft t o t hreat eni ng si t uat i ons and by al l ow-
i ng ai rcraft t o use force i n sel f-defense agai nst bot h host i l e
act s and demonst r at ed host i l e i nt ent . ROE l i mi t ed t he expo-
sure of NATO ai rcraft t o t hreat s by prohi bi t i ng operat i on over
l and i n Bosni a or Croatia without SEAD pr ot ect i on and by
prohi bi t i ng non-SEAD ai rcraft from operat i ng wi t hi n known
SAM t hr eat r i ngs.
150
If an ai rcraft were engaged or t hreat ened
wi t h demonst r at ed host i l e i nt ent wi t hout a r easonabl e means
of escape (as det ermi ned by t he pi l ot at t he t i me), ai rcrews
coul d use any measure for sel f-defense,
151
t he l at t er defi ned i n
OPLAN 40101 as act i on t aken i n consonance wi t h i nt ernat i onal
law to protect oneself, or other Friendly Force in the vicinity.
152
This definition closely tracks the definition of self-defense
found i n US SROE di scussed earl i er i n t hi s chapt er. ROE
t herefore proved robust enough t o aut hori ze t he use of force t o
protect NATO forces from any at t ack or demonst rat i on of hos -
tile intent. ROE t hat pr ovi ded t he aut hor i t y t o act and t he
fl exi bi l i t y t o use sound j udgment i n det ermi ni ng when and
REED
415
how t o use force i n sel f-defense al l evi at ed concerns about
force prot ect i on. The l essons of t he USS Stark and t he Mar i ne
bar r acks i n Bei r ut were not forgot t en.
The combi ned concerns of force prot ect i on, col l at eral dam-
age, and overal l success of t he mi ssi on resul t ed i n very re-
s t r i ct ed oper at i ons . Ai r cr af t coul d s t r i ke onl y as s i gned
DMPIs no targets of opportunity.
153
SPINS cont ai ned speci fi c
reference to these constraints: For fixed sites, aircrews will
attack ATM specified DMPIs only, even if these DMPIs have
previ ousl y been hi t .
154
In fact, the ATM reinforced the ROE :
The only valid target DMPIs are those assigned via the ATM
process or di rect l y assi gned, real t i me, by t he CAOC bat t l e
staff director. . . . Target DMPIs assigned via the ATM are onl y
valid for the period of that ATM.
155
Thi s t i ght cont rol resul t ed i n what offi ci al s at Avi ano AB
t ermed t he effect i ve but i neffi ci ent use of ai rpower. From t he
t act i cal perspect i ve, const ant changes i n t arget s as wel l as
i nt erference i n weapons and t act i cs proved frust rat i ng. From
the strategic perspective, however, NATO ai r pl anner s felt they
coul d accept a l i t t l e i neffi ci ency, part i cul arl y i f t hat was t he
pri ce of avoi di ng an i nci dent such as t he one t hat occurred i n
the Al Firdos bunker during Operation Desert Storm. To ensure
effectiveness, leadership gave supreme importance to the mini-
mization of collateral damage and ordered t he devel opment and
implementation of ROE t o t ransl at e t hese concerns i nt o mean -
ingful guidance for the effective prosecution of Deliberate Force.
Impl i cati ons for the Future
Having explored ROE for Operat i on Del i berat e Force, one
becomes aware of several i mpl i cat i ons for t he use of ai rpower
i n fut ure peace operat i ons . Fi rst , and perhaps t he most obvi -
ous, i s t he degree t o whi ch t he mi l i t ary rest ri ct ed i t s own
operat i ons i n Del i berat e Force. The rest ri ct i ons pl aced on t ar -
get i ng remi nd one of t hose used i n Vi et nam. Unlike the politi-
cal rest ri ct i ons pl aced on mi l i t ary operat i ons i n Vi et nam, how-
ever, i n Del i berat e Force t he mi l i t arys own rest rai nt l i mi t ed
operat i ons. We may, t herefore, be wi t nessi ng a 180-degree
s hift in the relationship between political and military infl uences
DELIBERATE FORCE
416
in ROE . Rat her t han pol i t i ci ans t yi ng t he hands of t he mi l i -
t ary, t he mi l i t ary may now be t yi ng i t s own hands.
156
The Air
Force Studies and Analysis Division came t o a si mi l ar concl u -
si on i n i t s report on Del i berat e Force: There was not hi ng i n
the upper levels of DELIBERATE FORCEs command and con -
trol st r uct ur e t o compar e wi t h Pr esi dent Lyndon Johnson s
somet i mes weekl y sessi ons pi cki ng t ar get s for the Rolling
Thunder campai gn over Nort h Vi et nam i n t he 1960s. To an
i mpressi ve degree, gui ded bombs had permi t t ed Ai r Force offi -
cers t o i nt ernal i ze t he ki nd of rest rai nt Johnson wished to
i mpose upon t hem. In DELIBERATE FORCE, i t was General
Ryan hi msel f who exerci sed most of t he rest rai nt .
157
Thi s i nt ernal i zat i on of rest rai nt by t he mi l i t ary l eadershi p i s
due i n many respect s t o t he years of i ncul cat i on i n t he l aw of
armed conflict .
158
NATO pol i t i cal aut hori t i es t rust ed t he abi l -
i t y of t hei r mi l i t ary l eadershi p t o t ake general gui dance and
pl an and execut e mi l i t ar y oper at i ons consi st ent wi t h t hat
gui dance. One can at t r i but e par t of t hi s t r ust t o t he per cep-
tion that US and NATO mi l i t ary forces underst and and compl y
wi t h t he l aws of war. Since Vietnam, US forces have consis -
t ent l y shown t hat t hey conduct mi l i t ary operat i ons i n an ex -
t r emel y pr of essi onal manner and exer ci se t he ut most r est r ai nt
i n usi ng force t o achi eve an obj ect i ve. The t i ght cont rol t hat
General Ryan placed over military operations likely will rein -
force t he percept i on t hat , i n many respect s, t he mi l i t ary i s a
sel f-regul at i ng i nst rument of power. In t he fut ure t hi s demon -
st rat i on of rest rai nt may al l ow t he NCA t o feel confi dent t hat ,
gi ven mi ssi on-t ype orders, t he mi l i t ary wi l l pl an and execut e
operat i ons consi st ent wi t h pol i t i cal obj ect i ves and i n compl i -
ance wi t h t he l aws of armed confl i ct. The commander on t he
scene, cognizant of the political objectives and sensi t i ve t o t he
uni que t hreat condi t i ons faci ng forces i n t he area of opera -
t i ons, i s i n t he best posi t i on t o draft effect i ve ROE. The lati-
t ude gi ven by pol i t i cal aut hori t i es and t he degree t o whi ch t he
mi l i t ary cont rol s i t s operat i ons are key fact ors i n t he devel op-
ment of accept abl e and effect i ve ROE.
A rel at ed i ssue i s t he i mport ance of congruence of cont ext ,
obj ect i ves, and means i n confl i ct s such as Del i berat e Force. A
compl et e di vergence of obj ect i ves and means occurred be-
tween NATO and UN forces duri ng Deny Fl i ght. On t he one
REED
417
hand, UN forces, who sought t o keep a peace t hat di d not
exist, operated under very restrictive, self-defensive ROE a nd
had l i mi t ed mi l i t ary capabi l i t y. Despi t e operat i ng as t he UN
Protection Force , t hey coul d not even prot ect t hemsel ves. On
the other hand, NATO forces, present under peace-enforcemen t
provi si ons, sought t o det er or compel behavi or t hrough t he
use of military force. NATO ROE, therefore, provided for a
much more robust use of force to achieve the desired objectives.
Differences in ROE on when and how t he UN and NATO
coul d use mi l i t ary force doomed t he dual -key process f r om t he
start. NATO al ways vi ewed t he use of force i n t erms of compel -
l i ng t he Bosni an Serbs t o do or not do somet hi ng. But t he UN
vi ewed force i n t he much more l i mi t ed cont ext of sel f-defense.
Onl y aft er Srebreni ca and Zepa fell and the UN decided to pull
back its forces to allow NATO t o conduct ai r st ri kes, di d con -
gruence occur among t he si t uat i on i n Bosni a , t he pol i t i cal
objectives , and t he use of mi l i t ary force t o obt ai n t hose obj ec-
tives. Clearly, ROE for a peace operation shoul d rel at e not t o
i t s t i t l e (peacekeepi ng, peace enforcement, et c. ) but t o t he
real i t y of t he si t uat i on on t he ground. If no peace agreement
exi st s and fi ght i ng cont i nues, t hen one shoul d wri t e ROE to
provide for the compellent use of military force until the fac-
tions agree to a truce. If a UNSCR proves insufficient to war -
rant t he more aggressi ve t ype of ROE , t hen one shoul d depl oy
no mi l i t ary forces unt i l t he adopt i on of such a resol ut i on.
The ROE concept of cat egori es of t arget opt i ons, desi gned t o
keep t he l evel of force t o t he mi ni mum amount necessary, was
an excel l ent met hod of ensuri ng maxi mum cont rol over esca -
lation. However, the use of target-option cat egori es can be
ha r mf ul i f one e xha us t s t he t a r ge t l i s t wi t h o u t h a v i n g
achieved the political objectives . At t hat poi nt one ei t her esca -
lates the level of force to the next target-option cat egory or t he
use of force l oses credi bi l i t y. Such was t he case i n Del i berat e
Force: negot i at ors had great concerns t hat NATO woul d r un
out of opt i on-t wo t arget s before convi nci ng t he Bosni an Serbs
t o accept a t ruce and j oi n peace t al ks. An i nt ervi ew wi t h Am -
bassador Chri st opher Hi l l r eveal ed t hat t he US St at e Depar t -
me nt and Ambassador Ri char d Hol br ooke harbored exact l y
t hese concer ns.
159
DELIBERATE FORCE
418
The fact t hat offi ci al s at t he St at e Depart ment had concer ns
about t he execut i on of t he ai r operat i on hi ghl i ght s t he need
f or a St at e Depar t ment l i ai son t o t he ai r operat i ons cent er in
any operat i on i n whi ch one uses ai rpower as a coerci ve t ool t o
achi eve di pl omat i c l everage. Fut ure operat i ons si mi l ar t o De-
l i berat e Force probabl y wi l l use ai rpower t o provi de an envi -
ronment conduci ve t o di pl omat i c negot i at i ons. To ensure com-
pl et e congr uence bet ween t he desi r es and concer ns of t he
negot i at i on t eam and t he execut i on of t he ai r operat i on, t he
l i ai son shoul d coordi nat e t hese concerns wi t h mi l i t ary person -
nel who pl an and execut e t he ai r oper at i ons. Such a per son
woul d not necessari l y exerci se pol i t i cal oversi ght but act as a
condui t t o ensure connect i vi t y among di pl omat i c negot i at or s,
mi l i t ar y commander s, and pl anner s.
The l ast maj or i mpl i cat i on of t he i mpl ement at i on of ROE in
Del i berat e Force i s t he hi gh percent age of preci si on weapons
used i n t he operat i on. To rei t erat e, nearl y 70 percent of al l
muni t i ons us e d a nd mor e t ha n 98 pe r c e nt of muni t i ons
dropped by t he Uni t ed St at es were preci si on weapons . Con -
cerns over t he mi ni mi zat i on of col l at eral damage l ed t o t hi s
unpr ecedent ed r el i ance on PGMs . The i s s ue f or ROE i s
whet her t he use of PGMs has mi ni mi zed t he chance for col l at-
er al damage t o t he poi nt t hat one expect s zero col l at eral dam-
age and l egal l y requi res i t for fut ure operat i ons.
The law of armed conflict does not r equi r e t hat one conduct
mi l i t ary operat i ons so as t o el i mi nat e t he possi bi l i t y of col l at -
er al damage . Argument s t hat t he exi st ence of PGMs have in -
cr eased t he st andar d of car e r equi r ed t o conduct mi l i t ar y op-
er at i ons t o t hi s poi nt or t hat one cannot use dumb bombs
because t hey ar e i ndi scr i mi nat e r emai n l egal l y unt enabl e. The
law of armed conflict requi res t hat t he appl i cat i on of force be
i n accordance wi t h t he t est s of mi l i t ary necessi t y, humani t y,
and proport i onal i t y.
160
Military necessity involves the right to
use any degree or means of force not forbi dden by i nt erna-
t i onal l aw to achieve a military objective. Humani t y, rel at ed t o
necessi t y, ent ai l s t he i nfl i ct i on of sufferi ng, i nj ury, or dest ruc-
t i on not act ual l y necessary for accompl i shi ng l egi t i mat e mi l i -
t ary purposes. Proport i onal i t y provi des t he l i nk bet ween t he
concept s of mi l i t ar y necessi t y and humani t y by bal anci ng t he
degree of l i kel y damage t o noncombat ant s wi t h t he mi l i t ary
REED
419
val ue of t he proposed t arget .
161
The general i mmuni t y of non -
combat ant s f r om at t ack does not pr ohi bi t oper at i ons t hat may
cause col l at eral damage (i ncl udi ng deat h, i nj ury, or dest ruc-
t i on of propert y). Int ernat i onal l aw requi res onl y t hat t he mi l i -
t ary bal ance t he val ue of t he proposed t arget wi t h t he l i kel i -
hood and degree of col l at eral damage. Therefore, al t hough
PGMs may act ual l y i ncr ease t he number s of t ar get s t ha t one
could justifiably strike by lowering to tolerable levels the col-
l at eral damage coi nci dent t o st ri ki ng t hem, i nt ernat i onal l aw
i ncl udes not hi ng t hat r equi r es t hei r use agai nst any t ar get of
mi l i t ary val ue. Thus, j udge advocat es shoul d assi st i n t he
drafting of ROE t o ensur e t hat no one mi si nt er pr et s t he r e-
qui rement s of i nt ernat i onal l aw and t hat no one pl aces rest ri c -
t i ons based upon er r oneous appl i cat i ons of t he l aw on pl an-
ni ng and execut i ng ai r oper at i ons.
The expectation of zero col l at eral damage, however , i s an-
ot her mat t er. The more t he mi l i t ary uses PGMs and s hows ,
t hr ough t he i nt er nat i onal pr ess medi a , gui ded bomb uni t s
hi t t i ng t he crosshai rs overl ayi ng t arget s of al l ki nds, t he mor e
t he publ i c wi l l expect such preci si on i n t he fut ure. As di s -
cussed earl i er, such expect at i ons creat e pol i t i cal pressures
t hat have j ust as much i mpact on ROE and mi l i t ary opera -
t i ons as do l egal obl i gat i ons. The real i t y of t he si t uat i on i s t hat
gui ded bombs sometimes miss. In fact, US Air Force anal ysi s
of PGMs aft er Del i berat e Force reveal ed t hat nearl y one-t hi rd
mi ssed t hei r i ndi vi dual ai mi ng poi nt s on t arget s (because of
huma n e r r or , we a t he r p r o b l e ms , a n d we a p o n p r o b l e ms
equally).
162
The careful DMPI sel ect i on process and t he profes -
s i onal weapons - empl oyment t act i cs by ai r cr ews kept t he
amount of col l at eral damage l ow. Unfort unat el y, mi l i t ary l ead-
ershi p somet i mes overst at es i t s case t o show t he effect i veness
of operat i ons, as di d Secret ary of Defense Wi l l i am Perry after
t he concl usi on of Del i berat e Force: From Avi ano and f r om t he
decks of carri ers i n t he Adri at i c, we l aunched one of t he most
effect i ve ai r campai gns t hat weve ever had. It was over one
t housand sor t i es. Ever y t ar get t hat had been desi gnat ed was
dest royed, and t here was zero col l at eral damage. Thi s was a
rare i nst ance where by combi nat i on of excl usi ve use of preci -
si on gui ded ammuni t i ons and very st ri ct rul es of engagement ,
DELIBERATE FORCE
420
we conduct ed t hi s massi ve campai gn wi t h no damage, no
damage t o ci vi l i ans, no col l at eral damage of any ki nd.
163
Al t hough t he ai r operat i ons i n Del i berat e Force achi eved a
hi gh degree of success i n mi ni mi zi ng col l at eral damage, one
cannot say t hat no col l at er al damage of any ki nd occurred.
Such over st at ement may cr eat e unr eal i st i c and pot ent i al l y
dangerous expect at i ons for fut ure ai r operat i ons. Pol i t i cal and
mi l i t ary l eaders need t o be sensi t i ve t o t he fact t hat t he mi l i -
t ary can mi ni mi ze but never el i mi nat e col l at eral damage . Gen -
eral Hornburg st r essed t hat t hi s was t he mi nd- set of per son -
nel at t he CAOC.
164
Regar dl es s of pol i t i cal pr es s ur es t o
mi ni mi ze col l at eral damage i n t he f ut ur e, one shoul d base
ROE on r eal i t y r at her t han abst r act i deal s and t her ef or e r e-
frai n from wri t i ng rul es of engagement under t he const r ai nt s
of zero collateral damage. Mi ni mi zi ng col l at eral damage in -
st ead of achi evi ng zero col l at eral damage shoul d become t he
pol i t i cal st andard for ROE.
In concl usi on, ROE draft ed and i mpl ement ed i n Del i berat e
Force effectively balanced the competing interests of force pro-
tection, minimization of collateral damage , and mi ssi on ac-
compl i shment . The CAOC military leaders close control over
operat i ons proved appropri at e, consi deri ng t he pol i t i cal and
mi l i t ary real i t i es of t he si t uat i on i n Bosni a-Herzegovi na. Al-
t hough t he ci rcumst ances i n Bosni a are unlikely to be repeated,
many lessons relating to the evolution and implementation of
ROE will remain applicable to future uses of airpower in support
of peace operations . As long as we evaluate these lessons from
the perspective of the context in which they arose, Operation
Deliberate Force offers an example of the value of well-conceived
and mast erful l y i mpl ement ed rul es of engagemen t.
Not es
1. Commander in chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH)
Operations Plan (OPLAN) 40101, Operation Deny Flight, change four, 3
May 1995. (NATO Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified. (Op -
erat i on Del i berat e Force was a subset of Operat i on Deny Fl i ght . The OPLAN
for t he l at t er cont ai ned ROE t hat appl i ed duri ng Del i berat e Force. )
2. Correct Quotes, version 1.0; CD-ROM (Novato, Calif.: Wordstar Inter -
national, Inc. , 1994).
REED
421
3. Carl von Cl ausewi t z, On War, t r ans. and ed. Mi chael Howar d and
Pet er Paret (Pri ncet on, N. J. : Pri ncet on Uni versi t y Press, 1989), 607.
4. Capt ai n Roach uses four ci rcl es i n hi s di agram, di vi di ng t he pol i t i cal
and di pl omat i c i nfl uences i nt o t wo ci rcl es. Si nce t hese i ssues are usual l y
very cl osel y rel at ed, I have combi ned t hem i nt o one ci rcl e. Each of t he
ci rcl es compri ses a mul t i t ude of i ndi vi dual fact ors t hat fal l under t he um-
brel l a of t hat part i cul ar generi c fact or. Capt J. Ashl ey Roach, Rul es of
Engagement , Naval War Col l ege Revi ew 36, no. 1 ( J anuar yFebr uar y
1983): 4648. The t hree-ci rcl e approach i s consi st ent wi t h current doct ri ne
as expr essed i n t he Joint Commanders Handbook for Peace Operations (Fort
Monroe, Va. : Joi nt Warfi ght i ng Cent er, 28 February 1995), 74.
5. Roach, 46.
6. Ibid. , 47.
7. Ibid. , 48.
8. D. P. OConnell, The Inf l uence of Law on Sea Power (Annapolis: Naval
Inst i t ut e Press, 1975), 180.
9. W. Hays Parks, Ri ght i ng t he Rul es of Engagement , US Naval Inst i-
t ut e Proceedings 115, no. 5 (May 1989): 87.
10. Ibi d. , 88.
11. Ibid.
12. Col Phi l i p Johnson, chi ef, Int ernat i onal and Operat i ons Law, Head-
quart ers Uni t ed St at es Ai r Force (USAF)/ JAI, i nt ervi ewed by aut hor, Pent a-
gon, Washi ngt on, D. C. , 20 December 1995.
13. Roach, 50.
14. Johnson i nt ervi ew.
15. Joi nt Publ i cat i on 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military
and Associ at ed Terms, 23 Mar ch 1994, 329.
16. Scott R. Morris, ed. , Operational Law Handbook (Charlottesville, Va.:
US Army Judge Advocat e General s School , 1998), 8-1.
17. Chai rman of t he Joi nt Chi efs of St aff Inst ruct i on (CJCSI) 3121. 01,
Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces, 1 Oct ober 1994, par . 6.
18. Ibi d. , par. 6a.
19. Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Airpower: The American Bombing of
North Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 1989), 119.
20. Col Roberto Corsini, The Balkan War: What Role for Airpower?
Airpower Journal 9, no. 4 (Wi nt er 1995): 55.
21. These i ncl ude t he 20 km excl usi on zone f or heavy weapons ar ound
each UN-desi gnat ed safe area, t he Croat i an rest ri ct ed-operat i ng zones, and
t he zones of act i on rel at ed t o t ri gger event s for Del i berat e Force, di scussed
l at er i n t hi s chapt er .
22. Adam Robert s, From San Franci sco t o Saraj evo: The UN and t he
Use of Force, Survival: The IISS Quarterly 37, no. 4 (Wi nt er 19951996): 14.
23. CJCSI 3121. 01, par . 1a.
24. Ibi d. , encl osure A, par. 2a. To emphasi ze t hi s passage, t he wri t ers
pl aced i t i n al l -capi t al l et t ers and bol dface.
25. Ibi d. , encl osure A, par. 5d.
DELIBERATE FORCE
422
26. Ibi d. , encl osure A, par. 5b.
27. Ibi d. , encl osure A, par. 5c.
28. Ibi d. , encl osure A, par. 8.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibi d. , encl osure A, par. 8b.
31. Par ks, 84.
32. Maj Dan Bush, USAF, i nt ervi ewed by aut hor, Depart ment of St at e,
Washi ngt on, D. C. , 18 December 1995. Maj or Bush was t he l egal advi sor t o
t he CAOC, Vi cenza, It al y, from June 1995 unt i l Oct ober 1995.
33. Par ks, 93.
34. Bradd C. Hayes, Naval Rules of Engagement: Management Tools for
Crisis, RAND Note N-2963-CC (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, July 1989), 21.
35. Bot h t he St ark and Bei rut Mari ne barracks i nci dent s, as wel l as t he
Vi ncennes i nci dent , recei ve more ext ensi ve anal ysi s l at er i n t hi s chapt er.
36. Hayes, 21.
37. Ibi d. , 24.
38. Cl ausewi t z, 87.
39. Martha Lynn Craver and Rick Maze, Reports Criticize Military for
Beirut Security, Air Force Times, 2 J anuar y 1984, 4.
40. Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist
Act, October 23, 1983 (Washi ngt on, D. C. : Commi ssi on on Bei rut Int erna-
t i onal Ai rport Terrori st Act , 20 December 1983), 47.
41. Ibi d. , 89. The commander expl ai ned t hat he deci ded not t o permi t
i nsert i on of magazi nes i n weapons on i nt eri or post s t o precl ude acci dent al
di scharge and possi bl e i nj ury t o i nnocent ci vi l i ans.
42. Ibi d. , 94.
43. Ri chard C. Gross, Lessons Learned t he Hard Way: The USS St ark,
Defense Science & Electronics 6, no. 12 (December 1987): 9.
44. Ibi d. , 10.
45. Ibid.
46. Rear Adm William M. Fogarty, Investigation Report: Formal Investi-
gat i on i nt o t he Ci rcumst ances Surroundi ng t he Downi ng of Iran Ai r Fl i ght
655 on 3 Jul y 1988 (U) (Washi ngt on, D. C. : Depart ment of Defense, 28 Jul y
1988).
47. John Barry and Ri chard Charl es, Sea of Li es, News week, 13 J ul y
1992, 2939.
48. Ri chard J. Grunawal t , di rect or, Oceans Law and Pol i cy, Naval War
Col l ege, memorandum t o dean, Cent er for Naval Warfare St udi es, subj ect :
USS Vincennes (CG 49) and t he Shoot down of Irani an Ai rbus Fl i ght 655, 18
Sept ember 1995.
49. Fogart y, 7.
50. Hayes, 54. The RAND st udy not ed t hat t he defi ni t i ons of hostile act
and hostile intent were revi sed and t hat one shoul d now consi der al l ai rcraft
and shi ps pot ent i al l y host i l e. Al l neut ral and fri endl y shi ppi ng became el i gi -
bl e for US assi st ance.
51. Ibi d. , 55.
REED
423
52. Fogart y, 13.
53. CINCSOUTH OPLAN 40101, change four. (NATO Confidential) Infor -
54. COM5ATAF OPORD 45101. 5, Deny Flight, 30 September 1993.
(NATO Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.
55. COM5ATAF SPINS 028, 241530Z August 1995. (NATO Confidential)
56. UNSCR 781, 9 Oct ober 1992. Thi s resol ut i on est abl i shed t he NFZ i n
t he ai rspace of Bosni a-Herzegovi na i n order t o ensure t he safet y of t he
del i very of humani t ari an assi st ance and as a deci si ve st ep for t he cessat i on
of hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The ban of military flights did not apply
t o UNPROFOR fl i ght s or ot hers i n support of UN operat i ons, i ncl udi ng
humani t ari an assi st ance. The UNSCR di d not aut hori ze enforcement of t he
ban but r equest ed t hat UNPROFOR and member st at es moni t or compl i ance
with the NFZ.
57. Ibid.
58. Operation Deny Flight fact sheet; on-line, Internet, 25 February 1999,
avai l abl e from ht t p: / / chi nfo. navy. mi l / navpal i b/ i nt l / bosni a/ denyfl t . t xt .
59. SACEUR Support Plan 10001D, NATO Europe Integrated Air De -
fense. (NATO Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.
60. Ibi d. (NATO Confi dent i al ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s uncl assi fi ed.
COM5ATAF OPORD 45101. 5, par. 4, i ncorporat es t he rest ri ct i ons of t he
NATO Europe Integrated Air Defense ROE.
61. SACEUR Support Plan 10001D. (NATO Confidential) Information ex-
62. CJCSI 3121. 01, A-4. These provi si ons di scuss t he i nherent ri ght t o
use al l necessary means avai l abl e and t o t ake al l appropri at e act i on t o
defend ones sel f, ones uni t , and ot her fri endl y forces, i ncl udi ng personnel
and t hei r propert y.
63. Deny Fl i ght fact sheet .
64. UNSCR 816, 31 March 1993. Thi s resol ut i on, whi ch provi des t he
legal basis to engage violators of the NFZ, specifically indicates that it acts
under chapt er seven of t he Uni t ed Nat i ons Chart er, whi ch provi des for
peace-enforcement powers t hrough a general syst em of col l ect i ve securi t y.
66. Lt Col Lowell R. Boyd Jr. , tape-recorded interview by Lt Col Robert
Owen, Headquart ers AIRSOUTH, Napl es, It al y, 6 December 1995, Uni t ed
States Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), Maxwell Air Force
Base (AFB), Ala.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibi d. At t hat t i me, General Ashy was COMAIRSOUTH, and Li eut en-
ant Col onel Corzi ne worked on t he pl anni ng st aff. The t erm Black Hole came
from t he ni ckname of t he l ocat i on where a smal l cadre of personnel pl anned
t he ai r operat i on agai nst Iraq. Personnel i n t he Bl ack Hol e produced al l of
t he dai l y t aski ngs for ai r st ri kes.
DELIBERATE FORCE
424
69. Lt Gen Michael Ryan, presentation at the School of Advanced Air -
power Studies, Maxwell AFB, Ala. , 8 February 1996.
70. Boyd interview.
71. COM5ATAF SPINS 028, par. 3D(2)(B)1. (NATO Confidential) Informa-
72. UNSCR 836, 4 June 1993. Thi s resol ut i on provi ded t he basi s for
NATO CAS support of UN ground forces as wel l as t he aut hori t y t o respond
t o at t acks, i ncur si ons, or obst r uct i on of f r eedom of movement i n or ar ound
t he safe areas. In essence t he seeds for Operat i on Del i berat e Force were
pl ant ed wi t h t he enact ment of t hi s UNSCR.
73. UNSCR 819, 16 Apri l 1993; and UNSCR 824, 6 May 1993. These
resol ut i ons creat ed t he l i st ed safe areas wi t hi n Bosni a-Herzegovi na.
75. S/ 25939, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Coun -
cil Resolution 836 (1993) (New York: Uni t ed Nat i ons, 14 June 1993), par. 4.
76. Nort h At l ant i c Mi l i t ary Commi t t ee, memorandum t o UN secret ary-
general, subject: MCM-KAD-084-93, Operational Options for Air Strikes in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, 8 August 1993. (NATO Secret) Information extracted
i s uncl assi fi ed. Thi s memorandum l ed t o t he depl oyment of CAS ai rcraft t o
t he Sout hern Regi on and served as t he basi s for provi di ng CAS support .
78. CINCSOUTH OPLAN 40101, change two, 13 August 1993. (NATO
Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.
79. MCM-KAD-084-93, enclosure, par. 2. (NATO Secret) Information ex-
80. Ibid. , par. 5. (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.
81. Ibid. , par. 9b. (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.
83. Ibid. , par. 9b(1). (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.
84. Ibid. , par. 9b(2). (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.
85. Lt Col Chris Red Campbell, interviewed by author, Maxwell AFB,
Al a. , 22 March 1996. St at i oned i n Zagreb duri ng t hi s t i me, Campbel l i ndi -
cat ed t hat a l ack of underst andi ng exi st ed bet ween NATO and t he UN as t o
who was real l y i n charge wi t h respect t o t he enforcement of t he UNSCRs,
speci fi cal l y concerni ng t he use of ai rpower i n t he t act i cal area of operat i ons.
UN personnel general l y t ook t he posi t i on t hat t hey cont rol l ed t he t ri gger
mechani sm for use of force and t hat every act i on had t o be coordi nat ed wi t h
t hem before execut i on. The i ssue of whet her ROE al l owed ai r-t o-ai r engage -
ment without the coordination and/or approval of the UN was hotly debat ed.
86. CINCSOUTH OPLAN 40101, change two, E-1. (NATO Confidential)
87. Boyd interview.
88. CINCSOUTH OPLAN 40101, change t wo, phase t hree, st ep four,
subpar. (6). (NATO Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified.
89. Boyd interview.
REED
425
91. Boyd interview.
92. Jori s Janssen Lok, The Net herl ands: Learni ng t he Lessons of Sre -
brenica, Janes Defence Weekly 25, no. 5 ( 31 Januar y 1996) : 35.
93. Ibid.
94. Adm Lei ght on Smi t h, CINCSOUTH, Operat i on Del i berat e Force,
videotaped lecture presented at the Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala. , 9
November 1995, AFHRA.
95. Ibid.
97. Ibid.
98. UNSCR 958, 19 November 1994. Thi s resol ut i on ext ended t he provi -
si ons of UNSCR 836 t o Croat i a and was t he basi s for est abl i shi ng rest ri ct ed
operat i ng zones t here.
99. CINCSOUTH OPLAN 40101, change four. (NATO Confidential) Infor -
100. Smi t h l ect ur e.
101. Ibi d.
103. Oper at i on Del i ber at e For ce f act sheet , AFSOUTH/ PI O, Napl es,
I t al y, 6 November 1995; on- l i ne, I nt er net , 4 Mar ch 1996, avai l abl e from
gophe r : / / ma r vi n. s t c . na t o. i nt : 70/ 00/ yugo/ df 0 611.
104. NATO NAC Notice C-N(95)65, 26 July 1995, AFHRA, CAOC-06
(NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified; and MCM-KAD-057-95,
NATO Air Operations to Stabilize Bosnia-Herzegovina beyond Gorazde, 31
July 1995, AFHRA, CAOC-06-03 (NATO Secret) Information extracted is
uncl assi fi ed.
105. Lt Gen Mi chael Ryan, l ect ure, School of Advanced Ai rpower St ud-
ies, Maxwell AFB, Ala. , 7 February 1996.
106. MCM-KAD-057-95, annex A-1. (NATO Secret) Information extracted
i s uncl assi fi ed.
108. MCM-KAD-057-95, annex A-2. (NATO Secret) Information extracted
i s uncl assi fi ed.
109. Ibid. , annex A-3. (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclass -
ified.
ified.
111. Ibi d. (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.
ified.
113. CINCSOUTH, memorandum of underst andi ng wi t h FC UNPF, sub-
ject: UN Interpretations of NAC Decisions, 10 August 1995. (NATO Secret)
115. From Corona bri efi ng sl i des, Lt Gen Mi chael Ryan, Headquart ers
AIRSOUTH, Naples, Italy, 5 December 1995, AFHRA, H-3.
DELIBERATE FORCE
426
116. Ibi d.
117. CINCSOUTH, memorandum of underst andi ng, par. 14. (NATO Se-
cret ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s uncl assi fi ed.
119. Ibi d.
120. Ibi d.
1 2 1 . Target description, Pale army supply depot, target no. C0006, Aviano
AB, Italy, AFHRA, AVI-43. (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.
122. Target descri pt i on, Pal e ammo depot sout h, t arget no. C001, Avi ano
AB, Italy (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified; and target
descri pt i on, Jahori na RADCOM st at i on, t arget no. D087, Avi ano AB, It al y
123. Oper at i on Del i ber at e For ce f act sheet . Of t he 1, 026 muni t i ons
dropped, 708 were preci si on (i ncl udi ng l aser-gui ded bomb/ gui ded bomb
uni t [GBU] -10, -12, -16, and -24; AS30L; st andoff l and-at t ack mi ssi l e;
GBU-15; Maveri ck; and Tomahawk l and-at t ack mi ssi l e), and 318 were non -
precision (MK-82, MK-83, MK-84, and cluster-bomb unit [CBU]-87).
124. Ryan interview.
125. COM5ATAF OPORD 45101. 5, change one t o annex E, par. 6a(3), 6
Jul y 1994. (NATO Confi dent i al ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s uncl assi fi ed.
126. Maj Gen Hal M. Hornburg, videotaped interview by Lt Col Robert
Owen and author, 12 March 1996, Maxwell AFB, Ala. , AFHRA.
127. CAOC air tasking message, 11 September 1995, MSGID/AIRTASK/
HQ 5ATAF/ 11/ SEP/ / PERID/ 110300Z/ TO: 120259Z/ / . (NATO Secret ) Infor-
mation extracted is unclassified.
128. Lt Col Gary West , commander, 510t h Fi ght er Squadron, recorded
interview with Lt Col Bradley Davis and Maj John Orndorff, Aviano AB,
It al y, 20 February 1996.
129. CAOC ai r t aski ng message, 12 Sept ember 1995, MSGID/ AIRTASK/
HQ 5ATAF/ 12/ SEP/ / PERID/ 120300Z/ TO: 130259Z/ / . (NATO Secret ) Infor-
mation extracted is unclassifi ed.
130. CINCSOUTH OPLAN 40101, change four, annex E, par. 5a(6).
131. Ibid. , annex E, par. 5d(4). (NATO Confidential) Information ex-
132. Ibid., annex E, par. 6a(1)(d). (NATO Confidential) Information ex-
133. Hornburg i nt ervi ew.
135. COM5ATAF/CAOC Deny Flight SPINS 028, 241530Z August 1995,
par. 3D(2)(D)1 (NATO Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified; and
Capt Ken Calise, US Navy, C-5 and battle-staff director, CAOC, Vicenza, Italy,
interviewed by Maj Mark Conversino and author, 16 January 1996.
136. COM5ATAF/CAOC Deny Flight SPINS 028, par. 3D(3). (NATO Con -
fi dent i al ) Informat i on ext ract ed i s uncl assi fi ed.
REED
427
137. Ibid., par. 3D(2)(D)4. (NATO Confidential) Information extracted is
uncl assi fi ed.
139. Ibi d.
140. Bush interview; and Maj Keith Kiger, Sixteenth Air Force, Weapons
and Tact i cs, i nt ervi ewed by Maj Mark Conversi no and aut hor, Avi ano AB,
I t al y, 19 Januar y 1996.
141. CINCSOUTH OPLAN 40101, change four, annex E, par. 5a(8).
142. Maj Steve Irwin, CAOC legal advisor, tape-recorded interview with
aut hor, Avi ano AB, It al y, 18 January 1996.
143. Ibi d.
144. Bush i nt ervi ew.
145. Ibi d.
147. Kiger interview.
150. COM5ATAF/CAOC SPINS 028. (NATO Confidential) Information ex-
152. CINCSOUTH OPLAN 40101, change four, appendi x one t o annex E,
par. 11. (NATO Confidential) Information extracted is unclassified. Note the
changes i n t he defi ni t i on of friendly forces t hat occur r ed f r om change t wo t o
change four of the OPLAN.
154. COM5ATAF/CAOC SPINS 028, par. 3D(2)(C)2. (NATO Confidential)
155. CAOC ai r t aski ng message, 8 Sept ember 1995, MSGID/ AIRTASK/
HQ 5ATAF/ 8/ SEP/ / PERI D/ 80300Z/ TO: 90259/ / . ( NATO Secr et ) I nf or ma-
156. Congress, Senat e, Senator Thurmond of South Carolina Speaking in
Reference to the Rules of Engagement for the Vietnam War, 94t h Cong. , 1st
sess. , Congressional Record, 6 June 1975, vol . 121, pt . 14, 17558. Senat or
Thurmond st at es t hat t he publ i c woul d not approve of i t . They woul d not
approve of sendi ng t hei r men i nt o bat t l e wi t h t hei r hands behi nd t hei r
backs t o fi ght t hat way, t o make gun fodder, so t o speak, out of t hem. The
parent s woul d not approve of i t ; t he count ry di d not approve of i t .
157. Dr. Wayne Thompson and Maj Ti m Reagan, Del i berat e Force: A
Di st i nct i ve Campai gn, Washi ngt on, D. C. , December 1995. (Secret ) Informa-
t i on ext ract ed i s uncl assi fi ed
158. Lt Col John G. Humphri es, Operat i ons Law and t he Rul es of
Engagement i n Oper at i ons Deser t Shi el d and Deser t St or m, Ai rpower Jour-
nal 6, no. 3 (Fal l 1992): 38. Humphri es di scusses t he i mport ance of t he
t rust bet ween t he NCA and t he mi l i t ary t hat devel oped part l y due t o t he
DELIBERATE FORCE
428
mi l i t arys i nt ensi ve effort s aft er Vi et nam t o t rai n and i ncul cat e t he i deas
associ at ed wi t h t he l aw of armed confl i ct .
159. US Ambassador Chri st opher Hi l l , i nt ervi ewed by Lt Col Robert
Owen, 27 Febr uar y 1996.
160. Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 110-31, International Law: The Conduct of
Armed Conflict and Air Operations, 1976, par s. 1- 5, 1- 6, 5- 3, 6- 2.
161. Ibi d.
163. Wi l l i am J. Perry, secret ary of defense, DOD news bri efi ng, speech
t o t he Adj ut ant s General Associ at i on of t he Uni t ed St at es, 7 February 1996.
REED
429
Chapt er 15
Roads Not Taken: Theoreti cal Approaches
to Operati on Del i berate Force
Lt Col Robert D. Pollock
They want war t oo mechani cal , t oo measured; I woul d
make i t bri sk, bol d, i mpet uous, perhaps even audaci ous.
Baron Henri Jomi ni
Hi st ori ans vi ol at e t he adage never second-guess success
at some peri l , part i cul arl y i n t he case of t he hi ghl y successful
appl i cat i on of ai rpower duri ng Operat i on Del i berat e Force.
Fr om most per spect i ves, t he pl anner s and executors of Delib -
erat e Force seem t o have assessed t he di pl omat i c and pol i t i cal
goals of t he operat i on correct l y and t o have worked an exqui-
si t e mat ch of mi l i t ary operat i ons t o t hose goal s. St i l l , at l east
from t he perspect i ve of t heoret i cal opport uni t i es, l ooki ng agai n
at t he st rat egy and operat i onal execut i on of t hi s i mport ant ai r
campai gn has some val ue. Indi rect l y, Gen Davi d Sawyer, dep -
uty commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organizations
(NATO) combi ned ai r operat i ons cent er (CAOC), which directed
Del i berat e Force, suggest ed t he val ue of such a second l ook by
poi nt i ng out t hat t he campai gn mi ght not have been necessar y
at al l had key pol i t i cal and mi l i t ary l eaders underst ood ai r
strategy more completely. In Sawyer s opi ni on, a more forceful
use of ai rpower i n t he earl i er phases of Operat i on Deny Fl i ght ,
of which Deliberate Force was a phase, might have obviated the
need for the later bombing campaign. Moreover, General Sawyer
felt that a fundamental difference of view among many United
Nations (UN) and NATO l eaders and Ameri can ai r commanders
delayed NATOs and t he UNs approval of Deliberate Force in its
ultimate form. Most NATO and UN leaders expected a direct
campai gn t hat t arget ed t he act ual guns and mort ars whi ch t hei r
political leaders wanted silenced, whil e Ameri can ai r command -
ers want ed an i ndi rect campai gn t hat targeted more easily
431
l ocat ed t hi ngs, such as bri dges and suppl y bunkers, to coerce
the Serbians to stop shelling the UN safe areas .
1
General Sawyer s comment s, al t hough i nt ended t o i l l ust r at e
the coordination required to win approval of a coalition mili -
t ary pl an, al so poi nt out t he l i kel y exi st ence of ot her ways t o
concei ve, pl an, and execut e Del i berat e Force. The t ensi on be-
t ween di rect and i ndi rect ai r st rat egy i l l ust rat es t hi s poi nt , but
i t does not encompass al l possi bl e appr oaches. Ot her r ecent l y
art i cul at ed ai r t heori es, for exampl e, mi ght have suggest ed
usi ng di fferent concept s or t arget l i st s to win the political a nd
diplomatic goals of Del i berat e Force. Such t heori es i ncl ude t he
so-called five-ring theory of Col John Warden III, t he effect s-
bas ed concept emanat i ng from t he facul t y of Ai r Command
and Staff College (ACSC) at Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB),
Al abama, and t he deni al st rat egy of Dr. Robert A. Pape Jr.
Whet her t hese appr oaches t o ai r war f ar e woul d have en -
j oyed mor e success t han t he one act ual l y used i n t he Bal kans ,
of course, l i es beyond t he scope of responsi bl e hi st ori cal
anal ysi s. But l ayi ng out t hei r di fferences has val ue, bot h t o
i l l ust rat e and exerci se t hei r t heoret i cal const ruct i on and t o
bet t er under st and t he ci r cumst ances under whi ch one st r at e -
gi c appr oach mi ght pr ove mor e usef ul t han anot her . Thus,
one of t he overri di ng quest i ons t o consi der here i s, What were
t he most i mport ant t heoret i cal model s avai l abl e for pl anni ng
t hi s ai r campai gn? And t he ot her i s, Were t hey sui t abl e t o i t s
mi l i t ary, di pl omat i c, and pol i t i cal envi ronment ? Thi s chapt er
seeks t o answer t hose quest i ons by bri efl y descri bi ng t he cam-
pai gn as pl anned and execut ed, exami ni ng t he t hree prevai l i ng
strategic concepts in general, and describing what the campaign
woul d have been l i ke had pl anners used t hese ot her approaches
i n t he Bal kans duri ng August and Sept ember of 1995.
Context and Operati onal Restri cti ons
Before proceedi ng, one must bri efl y revi ew t he cont ext ual
and oper at i onal - ar t el ement s t hat af f ect ed t he act ual pl anni ng
of t he campai gn,
2
especially the political and mi l i t ary obj ec-
tives of t he operat i on as wel l as rest ri ct i ons i mposed on t he
campai gn. These el ement s capt ure t he const rai nt s of Deli ber at e
DELIBERATE FORCE
432
Force and provi de t he not i onal framework for eval uat i ng vi -
abl e, al t ernat i ve st rat egi es for act i on.
Al l t heor et i cal appr oaches t o ai r campai gn pl anni ng a r e
founded upon st rat egi c and mi l i t ary obj ect i ves pr ovi ded by
deci si on makers. NATO r esol ut i ons cl ear l y ar t i cul at ed t he
st rat egi c obj ect i ves: (1) assure freedom of access t o t he ci t i es
i n Bosni a-Herzegovi na and (2) remove t he heavy weapons from
around Saraj evo . Based on t hese cl ear obj ect i ves, Gen Mi chael
Ryan , commander of Al l i ed Ai r Forces Sout hern Europe, and
t he CAOC distilled the following military objective : Take away
what t he Bosni an Ser bs hel d dear and dri ve t hem t o mi l i t ary
par i t y wi t h t he Bosni an Cr oat s and Musl i ms.
3
To meet t hi s
objective, CAOC pl anner s desi gned a campai gn t hat i dent i fi ed
t he Bos ni an Ser b mi l i t ar y advant ages: command, cont r ol ,
communi cat i ons, comput ers, and i nt el l i gence (C
4
I); weapon-
st orage i nfrast ruct ure; di rect and essent i al support ; fi repower;
and mobility. By having NATO f or ces at t ack t hese el ement s,
General Ryan and hi s st aff bel i eved t hat t he UN woul d achi eve
its military objective. The resul t i ng campai gn pl an rel i ed on
havi ng t he Bosni an Ser bs under st and and r ecogni ze t he l oss
of t hei r mi l i t ary advant ages and t hei r hol d on t he regi ons
bal ance of power . I f t hey want ed t hi s sur gi cal r educt i on
hal t ed, t hey had t o ensur e f r eedom of access t o t he ci t i es and
remove t hei r weapons from around Saraj evo .
4
Rest r i ct i ons on t he pl anni ng for Del i berat e Force, i ncl udi ng
met hods for sel ect i ng and approvi ng t arget s and t he desi r e t o
reduce or even el i mi nat e col l at eral damage , became l i mi t i ng
fact ors i n devel opi ng pot ent i al courses by t he CAOC pl anni ng
st aff. Del i berat e Force t arget s wer e appr oved f or pl anni ng
t hr ough t he Joi nt Tar get i ng Boar d pr ocess est abl i shed by t he
UN and NATO to permit joint validation of targets and l i nkage
t o mi ssi on obj ect i ves mandat ed by t he UN and NATO.
5
Due t o hei ght ened worl dwi de pol i t i cal t ensi ons and medi a
at t ent i on on Bosni a , General Ryan per sonal l y chose and ap-
proved each t arget and pl aced cert ai n rest rai nt s on del i very
means and met hods (read t act i cs) i nvol vi ng i t s associ at ed de-
si red mean poi nt of i mpact (DMPI), t he act ual poi nt at whi ch
pi l ot s woul d ai m t hei r weapons.
6
He consi dered hi msel f t he
campai gn pl anner and woul d not del egat e t he approval pro-
cesses because of pol i t i cal i mpl i cat i ons, feel i ng t hat he shoul d
POLLOCK
433
be hel d account abl e. Ryan cl earl y st at ed hi s rat i onal e for as-
sumi ng such expansi ve dut i es: I f we had commi t t ed one
at roci t y from t he ai r, NATO woul d forever be bl amed for
cri mes, and t he mi l i t ary t hreat woul d be l essened.
7
Essent i al l y t he same pl anni ng staff, CAOC, and rules of en -
gagement in place for Deny Flight also applied to Deliberate
Force.
8
General Ryan took the reins for overall campaign plan-
ni ng and target selection, and t he rest of t he st aff support ed
hi m.
9
According to Maj Gen Hal Hornburg, director of the CAOC,
ai r campai gn pl anni ng started with a desired military end state
of halting the Bosnian Serb army (BSA) shelling of UN safe
areas. The pl anners used t hi s end st at e t o det ermi ne what t hey
want ed t he campai gn t o do.
10
Pl anni ng began i n Febr uar y 1995
for Operation Deadeye (the suppression-of-enemy-air-defenses
portion of what became Deliberate Force) at the CAOC.
11
General
Ryan expanded Deadeye s scope, transforming it into the plan
that eventually became Deliberate Force .
12
Carl von Cl ausewi t z wrot e t hat war i s a cont i nuat i on of
pol i cy by ot her means,
13
whi ch usual l y i mpl i es t hat mi l i t ari es
wi l l recei ve pol i t i cal di rect i on duri ng t he pl anni ng and execu -
t i on of operat i ons. Del i berat e Force, however, l acked formal
nat i onal and i nt er nat i onal pol i t i cal gui dance t hr oughout t he
pl anni ng process. CAOC pl anner s and General Ryan designed
a campai gn t hat pri mari l y t arget ed percei ved cent ers of gravi t y
(COG) i n t he BSA as wel l as some pot ent i al COGs i n t he
Bosni an a nd Cr oa t i a n a r mi e s .
14
Pl anner s i dent i f i ed t hes e
COGs and t hei r associ at ed t ar get s by cat egory, put t i ng ant i -
ai rcraft weapons and heavy-art i l l ery posi t i ons at t he t op of t he
list, followed by the BSA communi cat i ons syst em, mi l i t ary
i nf r ast r uct ur e, and mi l i t ar y st or es.
15
Because of hi s deepl y hel d concer n over unnecessar y and
unaccept abl e col l at eral damage,
16
General Ryan pl aced spe-
ci fi c rest rai nt s on weapons del i very, ai rcraft approach pat -
t er ns, number of passes per mi t t ed, and number of weapons
r el eased on a si ngl e pass.
17
These const r ai nt s met wi t h some
r esi st ance f r om t heat er ai r men, but t he l at t er managed t o
achi eve t he desi red effect s, i nfl i ct l i t t l e anci l l ary damage, and
l eave t he worl ds percept i on of t he use of ai rpower unt ai nt ed.
NATO forces conduct ed Operat i on Del i berat e Force as a day-
and- ni ght ai r campai gn f r om 31 August 1995 t o 14 Sept ember
DELIBERATE FORCE
434
1995 (hal t i ng t emporari l y for di pl omat i c negot i at i ons) a nd
cont i nued i t unt i l 21 Sept ember 1995, when t he Bosni an Ser b
government and mi l i t ary agreed t o wi t hdraw heavy weapons
f r om t he mount ai ns sur r oundi ng Sar aj evo and t o ent er i nt o
peace t al ks wi t h t he Bosni an Cr oat s and Musl i ms.
18
The Fi ve-Ri ng Approach
To achieve strategic objectives, Colonel Warden, aut hor of
The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat, and concept ual ar chi-
t ect of t he st rat egi c ai r campai gn agai nst Iraq i n 1991, empha-
si zes t he preci se appl i cat i on of ai rpower t o cause syst emi c
paral ysi s i n an opponent s psychol ogi cal and physi cal abi l i t i es
t o resi st . Warden s pl anni ng appr oach as s umes t hat t he f un-
dament al obj ect of warfare i s t o convi nce t he enemy l eader -
shi p t o do what i t ot herwi se woul d not do.
19
In his view, air
warfare can exert such an i nfl uence by at t acki ng key t arget
syst ems he refers t o as ri ngs. Warden ar gues t hat one can
descri be al l physi cal t hi ngs, from nat i on-st at es t o mi l i t ary or -
gani zat i ons t o i ndi vi dual sol di ers i n t erms of fi ve such ri ngs,
each, i n t urn, a fract al of t he same fi ve ri ngs (fi g. 15. 1).
Leadership controls, directs, and sets objectives for any given
syst em. Wardens model provides a framework for a systematic
analysis of leadership to identify its key elements, vulnerabilities,
Figure 15.1. Wardens Five Rings (Adapted from Richard P. Hallion, Storm
over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War [Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian
Institution Press, 1992], 152)
POLLOCK
435
and i nt errel at i onshi ps. A syst ems approach yi el ds l i nks and
nodes that one can exploit to influence the enemy.
20
Syst em essent i al s are faci l i t i es or processes requi red by t he
system to functionfor example, electricity, petroleum, food,
wat er, and i nformat i on. Degradi ng cri t i cal syst em essent i al s
pl aces consi der abl e st r ai n on t he syst em and i nf l uences i t s
l eadershi p, t hus hel pi ng t o achi eve st rat egi c obj ect i ves.
21
Traditionally, one often thinks of infrastructure as t he en -
emy st at es t ransport at i on net work, but t hi s i s not al ways t he
case. Anyt hi ng requi red t o support syst em funct i ons fi t s i nt o
t hi s cat egory, i ncl udi ng t he el ect ri cal net , pol i t i cal -part y head-
quar t er s, r el i gi ous cent er s, super mar ket s, i ndust r y, por t s,
r ai l r oads, hi ghways, br i dges, t el ecommuni cat i on net wor ks,
and so f or t h. By i t s nat ur e, t he i nf r ast r uct ur e ring has signifi -
cant l y mor e r edundancy t han do t he syst em- essent i al s and
l eadershi p ri ngs, t hus maki ng i t harder t o affect wi t h a gi ven
wei ght of at t ack.
22
Population is a critical category in Wardens approach. By ana -
lyzing and influencing the social, cultural, and political makeup
of a given population, one can identify critical nodes and poten -
tial COGs that can directly affect the systems leadershi p.
23
War den vi ews di rect at t acks on fielded forces as t he l east
effective use of airpower. He feels that this form of attack is
useful onl y as a means of affect i ng an opponent s i nner ri ngs;
i nst ead, one shoul d st ri ke di rect l y at pot ent i al l y more l ucra -
t i ve and deci si ve t arget s i n t he ot her ri ngs.
24
War den s appr oach assumes t hat ( 1) t he mi l i t ar y pl anner
l i nks mi l i t ary st rat egy t o t he t ask and l i nks mi l i t ary obj ect i ves
to political objectives and (2) t he out er ri ngs prot ect i nner
ones, especi al l y t he al l -i mport ant l eadershi p ri ng. For Warden ,
combat effect i venessconsi st i ng of t wo equal el ement s, t he
physical and the moral (or psychological)is the key to mili -
t ar y execut i on. Thus, one can r epr esent hi s model as an equa-
t i on: combat effect i veness = physi cal x moral . By sel ect i ng
physi cal t arget s t o bri ng combat effect i veness t o zero, t he
moral aspect s wi l l t hen suffer. The reverse i s al so t rue.
War dens approach al so refl ect s hi s i dea t hat syst ems and
ri ngs are fract al i n nat ure (i . e. , charact eri st i cs of l ower sub-
syst ems ar e si mi l ar t o t hose of hi gher syst ems, t hough on a
l esser scal e). For exampl e, part of a nat i ons i nfrast ruct ure
DELIBERATE FORCE
436
consi st s of a r oad syst em t hat , i n t ur n, consi st s of nat i onal ,
st at e or provi nci al , count y, and l ocal road net s, each wi t h i t s
own unique set of five rings . Under st andi ng a gi ven syst em as
a l ayered congeri es of fract al s reveal s, i n Warden s opinion,
common t hreads or pat t erns t hat , i f effect i vel y at t acked, can
produce cascadi ng effect s whi ch can paral yze an ent i re syst em
wi t h a mi ni mum of force. To use t he i nfrast ruct ure exampl e,
by knocki ng out a cri t i cal j unct ure of a l ocal or regi onal road
syst em, t he effect s of t he new bot t l eneck coul d ri ppl e t hrough -
out t he ent i re t ransport at i on syst em, dependi ng l argel y on t hat
syst ems abi l i t y t o work around or compensat e for t he damage.
Utility of Wardens Approach
For ai r pl anner s , Wardens model offers advant ages and po-
t ent i al di sadvant ages, one of t he former i ncl udi ng i t s expl i ci t l y
hol i st i c pi ct uri ng of enemi es, ri ngs, syst ems, and subsyst ems.
This view provides a good starting point for detailed campaign
pl anni ng and hel ps pl anner s cat egori ze t he el ement s of a po-
t ent i al adversarys syst em so t hey can proj ect a means of
upsetting it in a way that will achieve military objectives . Pl an-
ner s knowl edge of t he adversarys weaknesses and t hei r per -
sonal i nt ui t i on are key i nfl uences t hat t ransl at e t he fi ve-ri ngs
model i nt o a campai gn pl an.
A key disadvantage of Warden s appr oach i s i t s t endency t o
assume t hat ot her nat i on- st at es r espond t o US at t acks i n t he
same way t he Uni t ed St at es woul d respond t o a si mi l ar at t ack.
Furt her, gi ven t he compl exi t y and robust ness of enemy sys -
t ems, t hi s st r at egi c appr oach does not i nher ent l y consi der
t hat enemi es can r eact and r api dl y adj ust t o damage f r om ai r
at t acks i n unexpect ed ways. Thi s t oo i s l eft t o t he i nt ui t i on of
t he campai gn pl anner . Thus, i f uni magi nat i vel y appl i ed, War -
dens t heory seems t o promi se great er cert i t ude regardi ng t he
strategic effects of air attack than living, reactive enemies will
actually allow.
Gi ven t hese advant ages and l i mi t at i ons, usi ng t he fi ve-ri ng
appr oach i s most appr opr i at e when one knows a good deal
about t he enemy or duri ng cri si s-act i on pl anni ngwhen t i me
i s of t he essence. Because of i t s i nherent si mpl i ci t y, one can
appl y t he appr oach t o any number of si t uat i ons. However , a
POLLOCK
437
five-ring anal ysi s requi res cont i nual updat i ng, revi si ng, and
mai nt ai ni ng dur i ng bot h peace and war .
Warden s approach is most useful in determining COGs at t he
strategic, operational, and tactical levels of the adversarys sys -
tems. Establishing firm linkages to UN objectives, developing an
effective strategy, and determining an effective means of target -
ing these COGs require the planner to go beyond the five-ring
model for guidance. That is, Wardens approach does not pro-
vide an appropriate vehicle for understanding how the broader
concerns of grand strategy, national strategy, an d operational
strategy are linked to form an effective campaign plan designed
to achieve national objectives and t he desi red end st ate.
Applying Wardens Approach to Deliberate Force
War den has l ong bel i eved t hat any campai gn wort h t he ex -
pendi t ure of our most preci ous asset smi l i t ary men, women,
and equi pment i s wor t h consi der abl e advanced r esear ch and
det ai l ed pl anni ng.
25
Thi s research must fi rst provi de t he pol i t i -
cal objective for t he campai gn and t he desi red pol i t i cal and
mi l i t ary end st at e t o t he cri si s. From t hese he woul d deri ve t he
military objectives for a campai gn.
Gi ven t he cont ext of Jul y 1995, t he pol i t i cal obj ect i ves
would call for a halt to the shelling of UN- mandat ed saf e
ar eas . One can ext rapol at e t he pol i t i cal end st at e from t he
nat i onal securi t y st rat egy of t he Uni t ed St at es : a peacef ul
resol ut i on t o t he et hni c cri si s and a democrat i cal l y el ect ed,
mul t i et hni c government for Bosni a-Herzegovi na , free to exer -
ci se al l i nst rument s of power wi t hi n i t s i nt ernat i onal l y recog-
ni zed borders. Havi ng det ermi ned t hese pol i t i cal obj ect i ves
and t he end st at e, one coul d deri ve t he mi l i t ary obj ect i ve :
neut ral i zi ng mi l i t ary t hreat s t o t hi s vi si on and dri vi ng t he
opposi ng si des t o a mut ual l y accept abl e, peaceful resol ut i on.
The next logical step would entail identifying the COGs .
Si nce Col onel Warden cont ends t hat one can r epr esent mi l i -
t ar i es and nat i ons as syst ems, t hi s r esear ch woul d f ocus on
fi ndi ng syst emat i c poi nt s t hat coul d l ead t he BSA a nd t he
Bosni an Serb government t o reconsi der t hei r shel l i ng of UN
safe areas and adopt a peaceful sol ut i on t o t he cri si s.
DELIBERATE FORCE
438
In The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat, Warden makes a
st rong case t hat t he fi rst obj ect i ve of any ai r campai gn i s t o
achi eve ai r superi ori t y, whet her t ot al , t emporary, or even l o -
cal i zed. Thus, one woul d l ogi cal l y desi gn a campai gn t hat be-
gan wi t h a st rong paral l el at t ack agai nst enemy ai r defenses
t hroughout t he zones i n whi ch t he ai r campai gn woul d operate.
This analysis would identify (to Warden s way of t hi nki ng)
l eader shi p as t he BSAs principal COGspecifically, the abil -
ity of President Radovan Karadzic and Gen Rat ko Ml adi c to
l ead t hei r f or ces. Di sr upt i ng t he communi cat i ons t hat t hese
men needed t o l ead and cont rol t hei r forces and popul at i on
woul d cause a br eakdown i n t he adver sar y s syst em. The
anal ysi s woul d al so i dent i fy t he BSAs i nher ent st r engt hi t s
heavy weaponry and copi ous suppl i esas t he secondar y, sup-
porting COG. Denyi ng t hese el ement s woul d el i mi nat e t he
BSAs st rengt h, pl ace i t on par wi t h t he Bosni an and Croat i an
forces, and t hus put i t i n an unt enabl e si t uat i on l i kel y t o l ead
t o overt ures for peace.
Thus, a campai gn based on War dens five-ring approach
woul d st ri ke enemy ai r defenses at zero hour and conduct an
i mmedi at e, paral l el, preci si on ai r at t ack agai nst al l mi l i t ary C
4
I
and mi l i t ary-st ores t arget s i n and ar ound t he Bosni an Ser b
capital of Pale. By showi ng mi ght and convi ct i on and by el i mi-
nat i ng al l l ocal support , t hi s at t ack woul d di rect l y i nfl uence
Karadzics ci vi l i an l eadershi p, l eavi ng hi m i sol at ed, i ncommu-
ni cado, unsupport ed, psychol ogi cal l y shaken, and more wi l l -
i ng t o reconsi der hi s posi t i on. At zero pl us 10 mi nut es, NATO
ai rcraft armed wi t h preci si on-gui ded muni t i ons (PGM) would
st r i ke known heavy- weapons si t es ar ound Sar aj evo t o el i mi-
nat e t he Ser bs ability to retaliate against civilian and military
t ar get s i n Saraj evo. El i mi nat i on of t hese t arget s woul d prob-
ably require follow-on strikes. News of the strikes on Pale a nd
t he weapons ar ound Sar aj evo would have filtered to the field
commander s by zero plus one hour. Usi ng st eal t hy ai rcraft a s
t he vanguar d, coal i t i on ai r f or ces woul d conduct par al l el
st ri kes agai nst out l yi ng BSA C
4
I t arget s and mi l i t ary-suppl y
casser nes known t o cont ai n l ar ge st ockpi l es of ammuni t i on,
ar ms, and heavy weapons . Thi s at t ack woul d deny t he BSA
l ong- t er m sust ai nment and agai n i nf l uence i t s l eader shi p t o
accept our will. At zero pl us si x hours and onward, follow-on
POLLOCK
439
operat i ons woul d cont i nue t he reduct i on i n BSA sust ai nabi l i t y
and command and cont r ol ( C
2
). Thus, i ni t i al st ri kes woul d
show coal i t i on capabi l i t y and mi ght , whi l e fol l ow-on st ri kes
would show the will to carry on until UN mandat es ar e upheld
perhaps even unt i l part i es agree t o a negot i at ed peace.
The Effects-Based Approach
Ai r Command and St aff Col l eges effect s-based appr oach
pr opos es t hat campai gn pl anni ng i s an i nt egr at ed pr ocess t hat
begi ns wi t h st rat egi c obj ect i ves and devel ops an ent i re cam-
pai gn whi ch carri es t hrough t o a cl earl y art i cul at ed and de-
fi ned end st at e.
26
The appr oach st r esses t hat campai gn pl an-
ni ng i s a t o p - d o wn p r o c e s s i n a wo r l d a c c u s t o me d t o
bot t om-up operat i ons, st ressi ng t he synergi st i c power behi nd
a coordi nat ed economi c, pol i t i cal , and mi l i t ary campai gn. The
process forms a l oop t hat const ant l y eval uat es st rat egi c and
military objectives and campai gn pl anner s i nt ended resul t s
agai nst desi red economi c, pol i t i cal , and mi l i t ary end st at es. In
linking strategic objectives and military objectives , pl anner s
need t o eval uat e si x cont ext ual el ement s. I n t ur n, t r ansl at i ng
s t r a t e gi c obj e c t i ve s i nt o s uc c e s s f ul mi l i t a r y c a mpa i gns
t hrough COG anal ysi s and t r ansl at i ng t o a pr act i cal mast er
at t ack pl an requi re t he i nnovat i ve appl i cat i on of si x el ement s
of operational art (fig. 15.2).
In effect s-based pl anni ng, one cannot consi der t hese con -
t ext ual and oper at i onal - ar t el ement s i n i sol at i on si nce t hey
are i nt erl i nked i n a mat ri x of relationships. Additionally, each
of t he el ement s cont ai ns t wo di mensi onst he US perspect i ve
and an enemy per spect i veeach of whi ch one must under -
st and bot h i n and of i t sel f and from t he ot her perspect i ve.
Thus, Sun Tzu s di ct um know t he enemy and know yoursel f;
i n a hundred bat t l es you wi l l never be i n peri l remai ns a key
i ngredi ent of pl anni ng.
27
Aft er ascert ai ni ng t he pol i t i cal end st at e, one t hen det er -
mi nes t he mi l i t ary obj ect i ve of t he campai gn pl an. Thi s may be
easi er sai d t han done for several reasons: (1) st rat egi c obj ec-
t i ves, defi ned by pol i t i cal l eadershi p, may be vague and un-
cl ear t o mi l i t ary pl anners, (2) political problems may create
DELIBERATE FORCE
440
st rat egi c obj ect i ves t hat do not have a cl ear pol i t i cal , eco -
nomi c, and mi l i t ary end st at e t o pl an agai nst , and (3) mi l i t ary
objectives must al i gn wi t h st rat egi c obj ect i ves, or t he ent i re
campai gn pr ocess br eaks down or becomes i r r el evant . These
probl ems, i f not overcome, may confuse and di srupt t he pl an-
ni ng process and l ead t o mi l i t ary fai l ure.
28
To address t hese t hree obst acl es, we need t o recogni ze t hat
t he form of government t hat creat ed t hese obj ect i ves exert s an
i nfl uence on t hem. The creat i on of cl ear st rat egi c obj ect i ves
can become a di f f i cul t pr ocess i n a democr at i c/ par l i ament ar y
government because of t he probl ems present ed by pol i t i cs and
consensus bui l di ng. These fact ors cl oud t he i ssue of cl ear
obj ect i ves i n t he mi l i t arys pl anni ng pr ocess.
The ACSC model s si x cont ext ual el ement swhi ch affect po-
t ent i al mi l i t ary operat i ons but usual l y remai n beyond t he i n -
fl uence of t he mi l i t ary pl anner and commander ai d mi l i t ar y
pl anner s in deriving military objectives from t he st rat egi c ob-
j ect i ves pr ovi ded t hem. The commander must bui l d upon
t hese pol i t i cal , i nt er nat i onal , soci ocul t ur al , envi r onment al ,
l eader shi p, and economi c f oundat i ons. Each el ement can have
ei t her posi t i ve or negat i ve effect s on t he commanders abi l i t y
t o execut e hi s or her mi ssi on. A cl ear underst andi ng of t he
Figure 15.2. The Campaign-Planning Model (From Lt Col Larry A. Weaver
and Maj Robert D. Pollock, Campaign Planning for the 21st Century: An
Effected-Based Approach to the Planning Process, in War Theory, vol. 3
[Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, September 1998], 28)
POLLOCK
441
cont ext ual el ement s of campai gn pl anni ng al l ows t he cruci al
and t i me- consumi ng pr ocess of COG identification to begin.
The oper at i onal - ar t el ement s of ef f ect s- based campai gn
pl anni ng t el l t he pl anner what i s possi bl e and when success
has occur r ed. The i dea i s t o maxi mi ze oper at i onal st r engt hs
and appl y t hem agai nst an adver sar y s weaknesses. These
elementslogistics (i ncl udi ng personnel and t rai ni ng),
29
t ech -
nology (i ncl udi ng t he mi l i t ary t echni cal revol ut i on),
30
i nforma-
tion (qui ckl y obt ai ni ng t he ri ght dat a at t he ri ght t i me t o
exploit an enemys vulnerabilities),
31
targeting science and i t s
related concept of targeting for effect (identifying effects be-
forehand, whet her st rat egi c, operat i onal , or psychol ogi cal ),
32
decept i on,
33
and measur i ng successbecome t he l i nk bet ween
an abst r act pl an and concr et e t ar get i ng i n t he mast er at t ack
pl an and ai r t aski ng or der .
An effect i ve el ement wi l l advance t he accompl i shment of t he
strategic objective. Targeting science cat egori zes effect s i n a
number of ways. For exampl e, most effect s are ei t her i nt ended
or uni nt ended. Oft en, t he uni nt ended effect of a course of
act i on causes a pl anner t he most pr obl ems dur i ng a cam-
pai gn. Key i ssues for campai gn pl anners become how t o accu -
rat el y predi ct t he effect s of act i ons t aken, how t o ant i ci pat e
unwant ed effect s, how t o sel ect t he mi l i t ary opt i on t hat best
achi eves t he desi red effect s, and how t o assess t he effect i ve -
ness of cumul at i ve act i ons. Ai r-warfare pl anners f ace t hi nki ng
and react i ve enemi es; t herefore, t hey must ant i ci pat e l i kel y
enemy courses of act i on and t he pot ent i al effect s of t hose
act i ons on fri endl y operat i ons.
Targeting for effect i s a t wo- way st r eet . One must assess
ones own vul nerabi l i t i es, ant i ci pat e l i kel y enemy act i ons, and
underst and pot ent i al effect s of enemy act i ons on ones own
obj ect i ves. Al t hough i t i s i mpossi bl e t o avoi d an uni nt ended
effect entirely, planners must r ecogni ze t he t hi nki ng and r e-
act i ng power s of an adver sar y and consi der t he many ways
t he adversary coul d i nt erpret t hei r proposed act i ons. For i n -
tended effects, planners can consi der t hree ways t hat t he pro-
posed action might alter the campaign equation: strategic, op-
erational, or psychological.
34
Any act i on t aken can produce all
three effects simultaneously, and the course of action proposed
DELIBERATE FORCE
442
by campai gn pl anner s wi l l const ant l y change t he equi l i bri um
of t hese t hree effect s.
In cont rast t o t radi t i onal approaches, t arget i ng for effect
l i nks ant i ci pat ed physi cal damage t o t he broader st rat egi c,
operat i onal , and psychol ogi cal effect s ant i ci pat ed from t he at -
t ack. It mat ches t he desi red physi cal and psychol ogi cal effect s
wi t h t he appropri at e appl i cat i on of force t hat wi l l achi eve
t hese effect s. A feedback mechani sm hel ps pl anners recognize
the effectiveness of their course of action. This strategy con -
si ders t he effect i veness of gi ven at t acks i n t erms of t hei r net
i nfl uence upon st rat egi c obj ect i ves. Target i ng sci ence, t hen,
combi nes t radi t i onal t arget eeri ng with targeting for effect.
For exampl e, i n Del i berat e Force, t arget i ng sci ence mat ched
the desired operational effect (selective destruction of heavy
weapons and rel at ed st orage si t es) wi t h careful l y sel ect ed de-
si red mean poi nt s of i mpact and speci fi c weapon pl at forms
del i veri ng preci si on weapons (F-16s at t acki ng a surface-t o-ai r
bat t erys acqui si t i on-and-t racki ng radar wi t h hi gh-speed ant i -
radi at i on mi ssi l es ) . Al l of t hese act i ons wer e desi gned t o
achieve the strategic effect of halting heavy-weapon fire into
UN saf e havens. Reconnai ssance i ndi cat ors reveal ed opera -
t i onal effect s, and di pl omacy reveal ed st rat egi c effect s. Thus,
targeting for effect recogni zes t hat t he core obj ect i ve of t arget
pl anni ng ent ai l s affect i ng, changi ng, modi fyi ng, or i mpedi ng
an enemy act i vi t ynot j ust maxi mi zi ng t he physi cal dest ruc-
tion of targets for a gi ven number of sort i es and weapons.
Measuri ng successan ongoi ng el ement best defi ned as
knowi ng when one i s donerequi res pl anners to know their
enemy and assess whet her t hey are achi evi ng t he desi red effect s
(developed in targeting science). Planners need t o compare ac-
t ual and predi ct ed resul t s and provi de feedback i nt o t he ongoi ng
campai gn pr ocess.
35
Measures-of-meri t anal ysi s and effect -
cause-effect models
36
provide planners an analytical tool for
evaluating how well the military accomplishes its objectives.
Effect s-based pl anni ng pr oduces one maj or out put : a pl an
for operat i ons, whet her a concept of operat i ons or a mas t er
ai r - at t ack pl an, bot h of whi ch convert i deas i nt o t arget s a nd
sor t i es. These document s must concur wi t h t he desi r ed end
state. The entire process is useful only if leaders at all levels
know what end st at e t hey seek. The quest i on becomes, What
POLLOCK
443
do we want the world to look like politically, militarily, and
economi cal l y at t he end of t he war ? The answer must be
speci fi c i n t erms of pol i t i cal st ruct ure, mi l i t ary capaci t y, and
t he economy. For t he pl anner , t he end st at e r ei nt r oduces t he
i ssue of t he st rat egi c obj ect i ve. If t hey mat ch, t he nat i on has
achi eved i t s war ai ms.
Uti l i ty of the Effects-Based Model
For a campai gn pl anner , t he effect s-based appr oach has
several key advant ages over Warden s five-ring appr oach, t he
most i mport ant of whi ch i s i t s al l -encompassi ng const ruct i on.
The effects-based model st ar t s wi t h a def i ned st at ement of t he
desi r ed end st at e f or an oper at i on and cycl es t he pl anner
t hr ough key st eps needed t o desi gn a campai gn pl an t hat
acknowl edges t he needed synergy among t he pol i t i cal , mi l i -
t ary, and economi c i nst rument s of power. Unl i ke Warden s
appr oach, whi ch l eaves much t o t he pl anner s i nt ui t i on, t he
effect s-based approach gi ves t hi s i nt ui t i on a boost , provi di ng
pl a nne r s wi t h a ser i es of memor y- j oggi ng cont ext ual and
operation al-art elements to consider while refining the military
objectives , selecting the COGs, and est abl i shi ng vi abl e cour ses
of act i on. The l ast si gni fi cant advant age of t he effect s-based
approach i s t he concept of t arget i ng for effect and al l t he
military benefits derived from a logical application of military
mi ght agai nst a desi gnat ed COG di rect l y l i nked t o achi evi ng
obj ect i ves and t he desi red end st at e.
Some limitations of the effects-based appr oach i ncl ude t he
gi ant si ze of t he pl anni ng t ask associ at ed wi t h i t s appl i cat i on.
Campai gn pl anner s not wel l versed i n t he i nt errel at i onshi p of
mi l i t ary, economi c, and pol i t i cal power may fi nd t hi s approach
frust rat i ng. Al so, pl anners wi t h l i mi t ed dat a avai l abl e on an
adver sar y mus t tailor the approach to use it effectively.
Gi ven t hese advant ages and l i mi t at i ons, t he ef f ect s-based
approach is most appropriate during deliberate planning, when
one can spend time on researching a potential adversary, or in
crisis-action planning, when one al ready knows much about
t he enemy. Because of i t s t hor oughness, one can appl y t he
appr oach t o any number of anal ysi s si t uat i ons. As wi t h any
DELIBERATE FORCE
444
anal ysi s, t he effect s-based appr oach r equi r es cont i nual updat -
i ng, revi si ng, and mai nt ai ni ng duri ng bot h peace and war.
One most appr opr i at el y woul d use ef f ect s- based t heory t o
desi gn an overal l j oi nt , operat i onal -l evel campai gn pl an. It
woul d pr ove equally useful in designing service- or functional-
component campaigns that link political objectives wi t h nat i onal
strategy and operat i onal st rat egy t o form a campai gn pl an de-
signed to achieve national objectives and t he desi r ed end state.
Appl yi ng the Effects-Based Approach
to Del i berate Force
As mentioned previously, the effects-based approach calls for
the synergistic employment of all instruments of national power
(political, economic, informational, and military) in order to
achieve the stated national objectives, and the political objec -
tives and des i r ed end s t at e mus t s er ve as t he f oundat i on of
t he campai gn pl an. Si nce Wardens approach i s a subset of t he
effects-based approach, one would derive the same objectives
and COGs . That is, the political objective of Deliberate Force
woul d ent ai l br i ngi ng about a hal t t o t he s hel l i ng of UN-
mandat ed saf e ar eas, and the political end state would include a
peaceful resolution to the ethnic crisis and a democratically
elected, multiethnic government in Bosnia-Herzegovin a, free to
exerci se al l i nst rument s of power wi t hi n i t s i nt ernat i onal l y
recogni zed borders. Agai n, one coul d st at e t hat t he mi l i t ary
objective woul d cal l for neut ral i zi ng t he mi l i t ary t hreat s t o t hi s
vision and driving the opposing sides to a mutually accep table,
peaceful resolution. The COG woul d be t he BSAspecifically,
the ability of President Karadzic and General Ml adi c t o l ead
t hei r forces, dependent upon effect i ve communi cat i on wi t h
t hei r t r oops and t he popul at i on. The secondar y, suppor t i ng
COG woul d be t he BSAs i nher ent st r engt hi t s heavy weap-
onry and copi ous suppl i es. Prevent i ng t he BSA f r om usi ng
t hem woul d el i mi nat e i t s st r engt h and pl ace i t on an even
pl ayi ng fi el d wi t h t he Bosni an and Croat i an forcesa si t u -
at i on l i kel y t o faci l i t at e t he peace process.
Pl anner s woul d have desi gned t he campai gn much as NATO
forces act ual l y prosecut ed i t . As wi t h t he Warden model , t he
effect s-based pl an woul d cal l for i mmedi at e st ri kes agai nst
POLLOCK
445
enemy ai r defenses . However, i n t hi s case, st ri kes woul d range
acr oss al l BSA-hel d t erri t ory. The remai ni ng t arget set s would
be si mi l ar t o Wardens (suppl y poi nt s, depot s, C
4
I nodes, etc. ),
addi ng some power st at i ons servi ng t he pol i t i cal cent er at Pal e
and t he mi l i t ar y cent er at Banj a Luka. Pl anner s mi ght t ar get
ot her l i mi t ed mi l i t ary/ ci vi l i an i nfrast ruct ure t arget s ( s uch as
bri dges and t el evi si on/ radi o st at i ons) for mi l d damage on t he
second and t hi r d days i n or der t o dr i ve home t o t he BSA t he
coal i t i ons det ermi nat i on and wi l l . Coal i t i on forces woul d
s t r i ke i n par al l el, appl yi ng maxi mum ef f or t on t he f i r s t
ni ght / day t hr oughout t er r i t or y hel d by t he Bosni an Ser bs .
Diplomatic efforts (backed by air operations specifically aimed
at military t arget s around Saraj evo and Pal e) woul d cont i nue
t hr oughout t he ef f or t unt i l t he Bosni an Ser bs withdrew their
heavy weapons f r om t he hei ght s ar ound Sar aj evo. Initial air
strikes would show coalition capability and might, while follow-
on st r i kes woul d demonst r at e t he wi l l t o car r y on unt i l t he
Ser bs agreed t o UN mandat es and a peacef ul sol ut i on.
Coercive Airpower: Denial Theory
As an assi st ant professor at t he School for Advanced Ai r -
power St udi es, Dr. Robert A. Pape Jr. devel oped an effect s-
bas ed t heory of operat i onal campai gni ng t hat focused on co -
erci ng t he adversary t hrough t he empl oyment of ai rpower.
Specifically, Papes t heory focuses on denyi ng an adversarys
strategic and military goals by destroying his fielded military
f orces. Papes st eadf ast concent r at i on on t he dest r uct i on of
t he adversarys mi l i t ary t o achi eve st rat egi c obj ect i ves st ands
i n st ark cont rast t o bot h t he fi ve-ri ng and effect s-based a p-
proaches. Mi l i t ary personnel fi nd hi s i nherent l y puri st mi l i t ary
approach very at t ract i ve, compared t o ACSCs more compl ex
and fusi oni st effect s-based theory.
37
To Pape the most effective way to defeat enemies lies in
confoundi ng t hei r st rat egi es by doi ng t he most harm t o t hei r
mi l i t ary forces and t he l east harm t o t hei r ci vi l i ans.
38
Hi s pre-
ferred i nst rument s of coerci on i ncl ude aeri al -del i vered, con -
vent i onal , preci si on weapons. The coercer must nul l i fy t he
enemys mi l i t ary st rat egy and undermi ne hi s confi dence t hat
DELIBERATE FORCE
446
he can achi eve hi s goal s. Accordi ng t o t he Deni al t heory, t he
real key to coercion lies in exploiting military vulnerability as
t he means of dri vi ng down t he enemys probabi l i t y of achi ev-
ing his desired benefit.
39
Qui ck, har d at t acks agai nst an en -
emys mi l i t ary deny t hat enemy t he abi l i t y t o appl y hi s mi l i t ary
st rat egy of choi ce. When t he enemy real i zes t hat he has no
effect i ve means t o st ri ke back, he i s more wi l l i ng t o accept t he
coercers goal s. Put anot her way, i n convent i onal di sput es,
t he success of coerci on i s l i kel y t o be a funct i on of mi l i t ary
vulnerability and will be largely unaffected by civilian vulner -
ability. If hitting military targets i n t he vi ct i ms homel and dra -
mat i cal l y i mpai rs hi s confi dence of bat t l efi el d success, t hen he
i s l i kel y t o change hi s behavi or.
40
Dr. Pape assumes t hat a nat i on s l eader s ar e r at i onal act or s
who cont i nual l y cal cul at e t he ri sks and benefi t s of t hei r ac-
t i ons and respond accordi ngl y. To Pape coerci on i s al l about
al t eri ng an opposi ng st at es resol ve, and deni al wi t h i t s
rapid elimination of military capabilityis the best way to
al t er t hat st at es resol ve.
41
Theoret i cal l y, t he syst emat i c t arget -
i ng (and dest ruct i on) of an adversarys mi l i t ary asset s wi l l
make hi s remai ni ng asset s even more vul nerabl e, t hereby con -
vincing the adversary to yield. Failure to yield will result in
mi l i t ary defeat and a t ot al deni al of al l benefi t s from t he ent er -
pri se i n whi ch he i s engaged. By denyi ng t he adversary t he
abi l i t y t o respond mi l i t ari l y, t he deni al st rat egi st makes t he
adversarys pl anned mi l i t ary st rat egy i neffect i ve and t he ex -
pect ed cost s of hi s count ervai l i ng mi l i t ary act i on prohi bi t i ve
and not wort h t he effort .
42
Maj Mar k Sul l i van not es t hat t he
Deni al t heory argues t hat i n convent i onal confl i ct s t he most effect i ve
means of coerci on i s reduci ng t he vi ct i ms expect ed benefi t s . . . bel ow
expect ed cost s . . . i n hi s deci si on cal cul us. First, specific benefits . . .
may be targeted as a means to reduce expected benefits, but Pape mai n -
tains that states are incapable of manipulating opponents perceived
benefits. The assailant cannot gain coercive leverage by attempting to
alter the targets basic interests; it can only hope to persuade th e target
to ignore or stop acting on these interests. The value of the benefits is
relatively static during conflicts and belligerent s can do little to change
their opponents perception of the at t ract i veness of t hese benefi t s. . . .
Percei ved benefi t s are rel at i vel y const ant duri ng confl i ct s.
43
POLLOCK
447
Uti l i ty of the Coerci ve-Deni al Model
Some advant ages of t he coerci ve-deni al appr oach i ncl ude i t s
focus on denyi ng an enemy any net benefi t from hi s mi l i t ary
act i ons. Campai gn pl anner s usi ng Papes appr oach can r ap-
i dl y concent rat e on dest royi ng t he adversarys mi l i t ary wi l l
and coerci ng hi m t o accept a desi red posi t i on or t ake a desi red
act i on. Pl anners need not consi der any act i ons by t he adver -
sary i n t he pol i t i cal or economi c arena because t hese have no
rel evance t o t he approach. Coerci ve deni al maxi mi zes on-t he-
j ob mi l i t ary knowl edge and i nt ui t i on by permi t t i ng pl anners
wi t h l i mi t ed dat a on an adversary t o mi rror-i mage possi bl e
responses t o t he coerci on. Wi t h some knowl edge of t he adver -
sar y, pl anner s can make fai rl y accurat e predi ct i ons of t he
enemy s r esponse t o an act i on. Papes approach al so permi t s
concent rat i on of forces and appl i cat i on of mass agai nst a si n -
gl e t arget set.
A l i mi t at i on t o t he Pape appr oach i s i t s si ngul ar f ocus and
dependence on denyi ng adver s ar i es ef f ect i ve mi l i t ar y r e-
sponses t o t he Pape-strategists actions. As long as friendly
forces deny an adversary weapons of mass dest ruct i on (which
he mi ght use as a weapon of l ast choi ce or as a t hr eat ) and as
l ong as he has no al l y or coal i t i on wi l l i ng t o i nt ervene on hi s
behal f, t he approach remai ns vi abl e.
Gi ven t hese advant ages and l i mi t at i ons, the coercive-denial
approach i s most appropri at e duri ng cri si s-act i on pl anni ng,
when t i me i s of t he essence, and i n desi gni ng an operat i onal -
l evel campai gn pl an t hat rapi dl y emascul at es an adversarys
military might and forces the adversarys leadership to capitu-
late rather than face continued destruction. Because of i t s nar -
row scope, l i mi t ed t arget set s, and concent r at i on on mi l i t ar y
t ar get s, one can appl y Pape s appr oach t o any number of
si t uat i ons. As wi t h any anal ysi s, i t requi res cont i nual updat -
i ng, revi si ng, and mai nt ai ni ng duri ng bot h peace and war.
Appl yi ng the Coerci ve-Deni al Approach
to Del i berate Force
Dr. Papes approach rel i es heavi l y on prohi bi t i ng t he opposi -
t i on unrest ri ct ed access t o i t s mi l i t ary forces; i t requi res no
dat a beyond t he mi l i t ary obj ect i ve and a knowl edge of what
DELIBERATE FORCE
448
part of t he enemys mi l i t ary i s most i mport ant and t herefore
most l i kel y t o cause a change of wi l l if denied him. Although
Pape does not explicitly call this vital point a COG, his coer -
ci ve t heory does i n fact seek t o deny a COG.
A key feat ure of t hi s approach i s t he need for t he Bosni an
Ser b l eaders t o recogni ze and acknowl edge t he mi l i t ary hope-
l essness of t hei r si t uat i on. Hence, t he campai gn pl an woul d
at t empt t o l eave cl ear l i nes of communi cat i ons ope n a mong
Pale , Banj a Luka , and t he forces i n t he fi el d. In t hi s regard t he
coercive-denial theory varies significantly from Wardens t he-
ory, the effects-based t heor y, and t he appr oach chosen by t he
CAOC and Gener al Ryan. Convent i onal wi sdom st rongl y advo -
cat es bl i ndi ng, deaf eni ng, and mut i ng t he communi cat i ons
and cont rol net works of ones opponent , t hus denyi ng hi m
centralized control of his forces. The Pape appr oach r equi r es
t ha t t he s e C
2
net works be degraded but l eft st andi ng (and
wor ki ng) so t hat t he enemy can under st and what i s happen -
i ng t o hi s forces and react . At t hi s poi nt t he campai gn pl anner
must knowi ngl y add t he ri sk of a qui ckl y react i ng enemy t o
t he pl an. Of cour se, t he qui ck r eact i on t hat t he pl anner want s
from t he enemy i s an acknowl edgment of hi s reduced capabi l -
i t y and subsequent capi t ul at i on. The campai gn woul d al so
seek t o deny t he BSAs COG by dest royi ng heavy weapons a nd
suppl y depot s.
Del i ber at e For ce appear s t o have cl osel y f ol l owed Papes
coer cive- deni al appr oach i n i t s desi gn and execut i on. Had
Pape hi msel f desi gned t he campai gn, no doubt i t woul d have
st rongl y resembl ed t he act ual prosecut i on. Target set s would
have been si mi l ar, i f not i dent i cal , wi t h t he except i on of re-
qui ri ng l ess damage t o C
2
net wor ks f or t he r easons ment i oned
above. Fur t her , Papes t i mi ng of t he ai r campai gn woul d have
been far more del i berat e and much sl ower, al l owi ng t he Bos -
ni an Ser bs t o assi mi l at e damage report s from wi t hi n. As t he
campai gn went on, pr epl anned pauses ( uni l at er al cease- f i r es)
woul d have al l owed di pl omat s t i me t o ent r eat t he enemy.
Through t hi s sl ower, more del i berat e process of coerci on, t he
Bosni an Ser bs event ual l y woul d have been dri ven t o wi t hdraw
t hei r r emai ni ng heavy weapons from around Saraj evo a nd
adopt t he UN mandat es .
POLLOCK
449
Concl usi on
Assessi ng al t er nat e appr oaches t o any past campai gn can
verge on second-guessi ng t he peopl e who act ual l y prosecut ed
t he bat t l ecert ai nl y not t he i nt ent of t hi s chapt er. Inst ead, i t
exami ned vi abl e opt i ons t hat coul d have produced ot her, per -
haps equal l y vi abl e, courses of act i on. It i s up t o t he pl anni ng
st aff t o deci de whi ch of t hese approaches t o use.
A revi ew of t he Del i berat e Force campai gn as desi gned
shows t hat pl anner s empl oyed el ement s of t he fi ve-ri ng model
t o i dent i fy t he key Bosni an Serb COGs and el ement s of t he
effect s-based approach t o achi eve end-st at e-based mi l i t ary ob-
jectives. In i t s operat i onal approach, Del i berat e Force execut ed
a coerci ve-deni al ai r campai gn t o achi eve i t s obj ect i ves. Thus,
t he CAOCs pl anni ng st aff empl oyed al l t hree of t he current
t heori es di scussed above, al t hough i t di d so subconsci ousl y
and by happenst ance. The bot t om l i ne for our Ai r Force is to
underst and t he robust and vi abl e opt i ons avai l abl e for pl an-
ni ng ai r campai gns and t he pl anni ng condi t i ons under whi ch
t hey are best appl i ed t o t he probl em of t aki ng down an enemy.
We have t he abi l i t y t o vary our pl anni ng pat t er nsand we
shoul d, si nce appl yi ng a vari et y of campai gn st yl es al l ows us
t o orchest rat e unpredi ct abl e and synergi st i c ai r campai gns t hat
wi l l di spat ch our enemi es wi t h surpri se, speed, and might .
Not es
1. Quot ed by Col Dougl as Ri chardson, di rect or of operat i ons, CAOC,
i nt ervi ewed by Lt Col Robert C. Owen and Ri chard L. Sargent , 7 December
1995.
2 . Cont ext ual and oper at i onal - ar t el ement s ar e key t o ACSC s air -
campai gni ng framework. See Lt Col Larry A. Weaver and t he aut hor, Cam-
pai gn Pl anni ng for t he 21st Cent ury: An Effect ed-Based Approach t o t he
Pl anni ng Process, i n War Theory (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air Command and
Staff College, September 1998), 3:2733.
3. Gen Mi chael Ryan, i nt ervi ewed by aut hors of t he Ai r Uni versi t y Bal-
kans Ai r Campai gn St udy at Ai r Command and St aff Col l ege, Maxwel l AFB,
Al a. , 7 February 1996.
4. Ibi d.
5. Briefing, Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) Public Affairs,
Oct ober 1995.
DELIBERATE FORCE
450
6. Maj Gen Hal Hornburg, CAOC director, interviewed by Lt Col Robert
Owen et al. , Air Force Wargaming Institute, Maxwell AFB, Ala. , 14 March
1996.
7. Ryan i nt ervi ew. General Ryan went on t o say t hat hencefort h, t he ai r
commander wi l l bemust beappl yi ng t he overarchi ng ai r st rat egy at t he
t act i cal l evel . You cannot del egat e t he sel ect i on. The commander must ask
al l of t he det ai l ed quest i ons. There wi l l be no t i me i n t he fut ure when he wi l l
have t he opt i on t o say, I del egat ed t hat responsi bi l i t y. The commander
must be account abl e for al l act i ons t aken by hi s forces. Thi s i s part i cul arl y
not abl e, gi ven our use of [preci si on-gui ded muni t i on] st ri kes from t he ai r.
8. Lt Col Thomas D. Ent wi st l e, i nt ervi ewed by Lt Col Robert C. Owen,
Washi ngt on, D. C. , 1 December 1995.
9. Ryan interview.
10. Maj Gen Hal M. Hornburg, present at i on t o Joi nt Doct ri ne Ai r Cam-
pai gn Course st udent s, Col l ege of Aerospace Doct ri ne Research and Educa-
tion, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 14 March 1996.
13. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and t r ans. Mi chael Howar d and
Pet er Paret (Pri ncet on, N. J. : Pri ncet on Uni versi t y Press, 1976), 87.
16. Ibid.
18. AFSOUTH briefing.
19. John A. Warden III, Air Theory for the Twenty-first Century, in
Challenge and Response: Anticipating US Military Security Concerns, ed. Karl
P. Magyar et al. (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1994), 319.
20. ACSC Teachi ng Pl an, SS525: Leadershi p as a Cent er of Gravi t y
(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, 6 October 1995).
21. See Col John A. Warden III, The Enemy as a Syst em, Ai rpower
Journal 9, no. 1 (Spri ng 1995): 4055.
22. Ibid.
23. ACSC Teachi ng Pl an, SS526: Popul at i on as a Cent er of Gravi t y
(Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, 24 October 1995).
24. Warden, Enemy. In this case Colonel Warden follows in the foot -
st eps of Gi ul i o Douhet , Hugh Trenchard, John Sl essor, and Bi l l y Mi t chel l ,
al l of whom t hought t hat ai rpower coul d be used more effect i vel y agai nst
t arget s ot her t han fi el ded forces.
25. Bri efi ng, John A. Warden III t o ACSC course di rect ors, subj ect :
ACSC Curri cul um Goal s for Academi c Year 1996, 2 May 1995.
26. For an expanded di scussi on of t he effect s-based model , see Weaver
and t he aut hor .
27. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford
POLLOCK
451
28. See Col Denni s M. Drew and Dr. Donal d M. Snow, Maki ng St rat egy:
An Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems (Maxwell AFB,
Ala. : Air University Press, August 1988), 23.
29. Weaver and t he aut hor. Logi st i cs serves as t he gl ue of armi es and
societies. In Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War
(New York: Vi ki ng, 1990), John El l i s argues t hat t he Uni t ed St at es won t he
war because i t s abi l i t y t o generat e war mat eri el overwhel med t he enemy. In
addi t i on t o t he t r adi t i onal not i ons of equi pment , shi ps, weapons, and
spares, l ogi st i cs al so i ncl udes t he personnel t o use t he mat eri el , t rai ni ng,
t ransport at i on, communi cat i ons, and more. Thi s el ement of operat i onal art
al so consi ders t he fact ori es, l aborat ori es, workers, farmers, and sci ent i st s i n
t he equat i on. Pl anni ng requi res t hat one al so exami ne t he opposi t i ons
logistics system for vulnerabilities.
30. Weaver and t he aut hor. Technol ogy i s not j ust t echnol ogi cal ad-
vancement but t he mi l i t ary appl i cat i on of t echnol ogy. It i ncl udes t he t rai ned
i ndi vi dual who can empl oy t he new t echnol ogy usi ng new t act i cs, as wel l as
new organi zat i ons t hat expl oi t t hi s new t echnol ogy.
31. Ibi d. Informat i on and i t s subset i nt el l i genceare not new prob -
l ems. However, growt h i n t he amount of dat a avai l abl e makes i t cri t i cal t hat
operat ors ask t he ri ght quest i ons and t hat i nt el l i gence offi cers l earn t o t ai l or
t hei r answers for t he i nt ended user. Syst emat i c anal ysi s of our enemy wi l l
i dent i fy vul nerabi l i t i es t o expl oi t . The mi l i t ary pl anner must qui ckl y obt ai n
t he ri ght dat a at t he ri ght t i me t o expl oi t t hese vul nerabi l i t i es. We must
t rai n our mi nds t o make t he best use of t he i nformat i on provi ded. Ri sk wi l l
al ways be part and parcel of t he pl anners and t he commanders l i ves.
Informat i on can hel p reduce t he ri sk.
32. Ibi d. Target i ng sci ence i s t he heart of operat i onal art . For years t he
US Ai r Force concent rat ed on t arget eeri ngt he sel ect i on and mat chi ng of
t he t arget and t he servi ci ng weapon, as wel l as t i mi ng. ACSC emphasi zes
t hat t hi s i s but one el ement of t he l arger concept of t arget i ng sci ence. The
quest i on t oday i s not how much damage one can i nfl i ct but how wel l one
achi eves t he desi red effect by servi ci ng a t arget .
33. Ibid.
34. One may defi ne strategic effect as t he consequence of an act i on fel t
t hroughout t he ent i re syst em. Achi evi ng such effect s wi l l i mpact a nat i ons
ability to efficiently and effectively apply the political, military, economic,
and i nformat i onal i nst rument s of power. For exampl e, st rat egi c effect can
range from i mpai ri ng a nat i ons abi l i t y t o funct i on normal l y, t hrough para-
lyzing key political and economic systems, to rendering the nation unable to
provide the most basic services. It seeks to create systemwide paralysi s. Typi-
cally, the closer one targets to the center ring, the greater the strategic effe ct .
One may defi ne operational effect as t he consequence of an act i on t hat
impairs ones ability to use a specific instrument of power (political, mili-
t ary, economi c, and i nformat i onal ) i n a gi ven regi on. Operat i onal effect s
t ypi cal l y focus on i mpai ri ng t he abi l i t y t o appl y mi l i t ary power wi t hi n a
t heat er of operat i ons. For exampl e, operat i onal effect s mi ght range from
DELIBERATE FORCE
452
reduci ng an enemys mi l i t ary capabi l i t y, t hrough i ncreasi ng at t ri t i on, t o
anni hi l at i ng hi s forces i n an area. Operat i onal effect may al so resul t i n t he
diversion of military forces from the main effort. Psychological effect i s t he
consequence of an act i on t hat negat i vel y i mpact s t he enemys st at e of mi nd
or posi t i vel y i mpact s t he ment al st at e of fri endl y forces or al l i es. For exam-
pl e, psychol ogi cal effect s can range from achi evi ng surpri se and confusi on
i n t he mi nd of t he enemy l eader shi p, commander s, popul at i on, and/ or
t roops; t hrough di ssuadi ng t he enemy from resi st i ng; t o i nspi ri ng fri endl y
l eader shi p, commander s, popul at i on, and/ or t r oops t o hol d out agai nst
great odds.
35. Thi s assessment shoul d exami ne ones effect i veness i n hi t t i ng cer -
t ai n t arget s. Thi s i ncl udes t he appropri at eness of ones choi ce of COGs and
t he ent i re COG-sel ect i on process, from t he est abl i shment of mi l i t ary obj ec -
tives, to the selection of COGs, to the prioritization of COG targets. Ones
assessment shoul d t hen anal yze t he act ual ef f ect s, t hei r causes, and gaps
i n t he l ogi c chai n. Most i mport ant l y, i t shoul d assess t he val i di t y of t he
measur es and i ndi cat or s one uses and t he val i di t y of one s assumpt i ons.
36. See ACSC Teaching Plan, Measuring Success (Maxwell AFB, Ala.:
Ai r Command and St aff Col l ege, 9 February 1996) for addi t i onal det ai l s on
the effect-cause-effect scenario.
37. Purist and f usi oni st ar e t er ms t hat descr i be how mi l i t ar y member s
vi ew t hei r professi on. A puri st concent rat es on t he mi l i t ary means avai l abl e
t o meet an obj ect i ve, whi l e t he fusi oni st l ooks at al l appl i cabl e i nst rument s
of power (mi l i t ary, pol i t i cal , and economi c) and recommends t he approach
to apply them synergistically to achieve the desired objective.
38. Robert A. Pape, Coercion and Military Strategy: Why Denial Works
and Puni shment Doesn t , Journal of St rat egi c St udi es 15, no. 4 (December
1992): 465.
39. Maj Mark P. Sullivan, The Mechanism for Strategic Coercion: Deni al
or Second-Order Change? (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, April
1995), 18.
40. Pape, 424. Thi s concept dovet ai l s ni cel y wi t h t he effect s of PGMs.
Mar y Fi t zGer al d comment s on t he Russi an vi ew t hat PGMs used agai nst
key command, cont rol , communi cat i ons, and i nt el l i gence syst ems have t he
same ef f ect s as a nucl ear weapon. I f used agai nst a nucl ear - capabl e enemy,
PGMs coul d force an escal at i on t o nucl ear war. Russi an Vi ews on Fut ure
War (paper presented at Air University, Maxwell AFB, Ala., March 1995).
41. Robert A. Pape, Coercive Air Power (PhD diss., University of Chi-
cago, December 1988), 57.
42. Sul l i van, 11.
43. Ibid. , 17. See also Robert A. Pape, Coercive Airpower in the Vietnam
War, International Security 15, no. 2 (Fall 1990): 110. In order to analyze
t he deni al effect empirically, Pape uses territory as the primary benefit over
whi ch nat i ons st ruggl e.
POLLOCK
453
Chapt er 16
Summary
Col Robert C. Owen*
Thi s chapt er summar i zes and suggest s i mpl i cat i ons of t he
fi nal report of t he Bal kans Ai r Campai gn St udy (BACS).
1
The
former deput y commander i n chi ef of Uni t ed St at es European
Comma nd, Gen J ames J amer s on , and t he f or mer commander
of Air University, Lt Gen Jay W. Kelley, char t er ed t hi s st udy i n
Oct ober 1995. The pur pose was t o capt ur e t he pl anni ng,
execut i on, and r esul t s of Oper at i on Del i ber at e For ce, t he
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ai r campai gn con -
duct ed agai nst t he Bosni an Ser bs bet ween 30 August and 14
Sept ember 1995, as par t of a br oader i nt er nat i onal i nt er ven -
t i on i nt o t he Bosni an confl i ct . The speci fi c chart ers were t o
expl ore broadl y t he sal i ent event s and i mpl i cat i ons of t hi s
br i ef but uni que ai r campai gn and t o gat her a compr ehensi ve
document ar y and or al ar chi ve t o suppor t l at er i n- dept h r e-
sear ch. The gener al s i nt ent i on was t hat t he t eam woul d l ay
out a mile-wide-and-foot-deep baseline study of Deliberate
Force, one ai med more at i dent i fyi ng and del i neat i ng i ssues
t han at put t i ng t hem t o r est .
The BACS t eam adopt ed a cor e r esear ch quest i on t hat hi gh -
l i ght ed t he st udy s f ocus on t he pl anni ng and execut i on of an
ai r campai gn: How and wi t h what consi derat i ons di d t he
pl anner s and execut ors of Del i berat e Force l i nk mi l i t ary op-
erat i ons wi t h t he st rat egi c, pol i t i cal, and di pl omat i c goal s t hey
were charged t o at t ai n? To be useful t o a pot ent i al l y broad
audi ence, t he answer t o t hi s quest i on requi red a survey of t he
geopolitical, sociological, diplomatic, technological, and opera -
t i onal fact ors i nfl uenci ng t hi s part i cul ar ai r campai gn. Thus
t he general organi zat i on of t he st udy and t he chapt ers of i t s
report were divided into sections that primarily dealt with (1) t he
*An earl i er versi on of t hi s essay appeared i n t he Summer and Fal l 1997 i ssues of
Airpower Journal.
455
pol i t i cal and i nst i t ut i onal cont ext of Del i berat e Force pl an-
ni ng, (2) t he act ual pl anni ng of the campaign, (3) its execu-
t i on, and (4) t he i mpl i cat i ons of t hose experi ences. To t he
ext ent t hat t hese chapt er s had a uni f yi ng t heme, i t was an
effort t o det ermi ne t o what ext ent t he pl anners and execut or s
of Del i berat e Force were cogni zant of and/ or wi el ded i nfl uence
over t he forces t hat shaped t he form, execut i on, and effect s of
t he ai r campai gn. In ot her words, t o what ext ent were t hey i n
charge of event s, and t o what ext ent were event s i n charge of
t hem? The answer t o t hat quest i on and ot her s r ai sedand t o
vari ous ext ent s answered by t he BACS teamcarries signifi -
cant i mpl i cat i ons for t he t heori es and doct ri nes of ai rpower
st r at egy and pl anni ng.
Pol i ti cal and Insti tuti onal Context
In an i deal worl d, mi l i t ary pl anners base t hei r work on
conci se and cl ear art i cul at i ons of t he pol i t i cal and di pl omat i c
goals set by their political leaders. If they are to organize
forces, devel op st rat egi es, sel ect i nt ermedi at e obj ect i ves, and
execut e oper at i ons, t hey need t o know t hose goal s and t he
degree and t he nat ure of t he force t hey can empl oy i n t hei r
at t ai nment . Al t hough t he t rut h of t hi s concept l i kel y woul d be
Gen James Jamerson Lt Gen Jay W. Kelley
DELIBERATE FORCE
456
t r anspar ent t o any mi l i t ar y t hi nker , most woul d al so agr ee
t hat t he i nherent compl exi t y, chaos, and obscurat i ons of wars
and confl i ct s oft en make t he cl ear and l ast i ng art i cul at i ons of
specific political and di pl omat i c goal s di ffi cul t . In t he pract i cal
worl d, as a consequence, mi l i t ary pl anners usual l y base t hei r
work on expressi ons of goal s t hat are somet i mes cl ear, some-
t i mes obscur e, and somet i mes unknowabl e or onl y assumed.
Thi s mi x of t he knowabl e and t he unknowabl e was par t i cu -
l ar l y evi dent i n t he pl anni ng context of Deliberate Force. In
t he ori gi ns and nat ure of t he confl i ct and i n t he mul t i coal i t i on
st ruct ure of t he out si de i nt ervent i on i nt o i t , t here l ay a com-
pl ex and changi ng web of obj ect i ves, commi t ment s, and re-
st r ai nt s t hat shaped mi l i t ar y pl anni ng, even t hough t he pl an-
ner s involved perceived some of its strands only imperfectly or
had no knowl edge of t hem.
In general t erms t he Bosni an confl i ct was a by-product of
the economic and political decline of the Yugoslav Federation
duri ng t he 1980s. The net effect of t hi s prol onged cri si s on
Yugosl avi an nat i onal and provi nci al pol i t i cs was t he breakup
of the country. The republics of Slovenia and Croat i a left in
t he summer of 1991, whi l e Bosni a and Macedoni a pul l ed out
i n t he wi nt er of 199192. Left behi nd i n a rump st at e referred
to as the former Yugoslavia were Serbia , Vojvodina, Mon -
t enegr o, and Kosovoal l under t he domi nat i on of Serbi a a nd
its president, Slobodan Milosevic . The br eakup was not peace-
ful. The Yugoslavian Peoples Army (JNA) f ought a 10- day war
i n June and Jul y 1991 t o keep Sl oveni a i n t he federat i on, and
i t f ought a much l onger and bi t t er er war t o quash t he Cr oa -
t i an secessi on bet ween August 1991 and Januar y 1992. I n
cooperat i on wi t h t he JNA, Serbi an mi nori t y groups i n Croat i a
and Bosni a fought t o hol d t hose provi nces i n t he federat i on
and under the pale of Milosevic or, fai l i ng t hat , t o carve out
t hei r own et hni c encl aves (Kraj i nas ) for ul t i mat e uni fi cat i on
with greater Serbia . All of these conflicts were characterized
by an appal l i ng vi ci ousness on al l si des, i ncl udi ng massacres
of ci vi l i ans and capt ured sol di ers, mass robbery and rape, and
scor ched- ear t h conquest sal l encapsul at ed i n a new i nt er na-
t i onal t erm: ethnic cleansing. Di smay and di sgust at t hat vi o -
lence and its implications for regional stability prompted out si de
OWEN
457
st at es and i nt ernat i onal organi zat i ons t o i nt ervene i n t he Bal-
kans cri si s i n general and i n Bosni a i n part i cul ar.
From t he perspect i ve of t he i nt erveni ng st at es and t he l at er
pl anner s of Del i berat e Force, knowi ng t hat t he Bosni an con -
fl i ct sprang from t he col l apse of t he Yugosl avi an Federat i on
provi ded l i t t l e foundat i on for st rat egi c pl anni ng. Cr udel y put ,
a pol i t i cal br eakup, i n and of i t sel f , pr ovi des f ew t ar get s
agai nst whi ch ai r st rat egi st s may pl y t hei r t rade. Bui l di ng ai r
st rat egy i n t he case of Bosni a requi red more det ai l ed under -
st andi ng of t he confl i ct , begi nni ng wi t h a cl ear descri pt i on of
i t s sust ai ni ng causes. Sust ai ni ng causes i s a t erm useful i n
t hi s di scussi on t o desi gnat e t he f or ces and mechani sms t hat
move a confl i ct from i t s root cause t o i t s ul t i mat e form.
These causes dri ve t he evol ut i on of a confl i ct , sust ai n i t , and
charact eri ze i t s key feat ures, such as obj ect i ves, scope, i nt en -
si t y, and pol i t i cal dynami cs. In t he present di scussi on, t he
sust ai ni ng causes of t he Bosni an conf l i ct ar e t he t hi ngs t hat
l ed t he count r y s peopl e and l eader s t o t ake t he cour se t hat
t hey di d i n r esponse t o t he uncer t ai nt i es and f ear s engender ed
by t he col l apse of t he exi st i ng federal pol i t i cal syst em. They
had choices, after all. To resecure its future, the collective
Bosni an pol i t y coul d have chosen t o cont i nue t he peacef ul
coexi st ence of i t s peopl e i n a uni t ary st at e, t o di vi de i nt o a
Swi ss-l i ke confederat i on of cant ons, or t o sel ect some ot her
opt i on t o gross i nt eret hni c vi ol ence. Inst ead, Bosni ans went
for each ot hers t hroat s, arguabl y at t he i nst i gat i on of el e -
ment s of t he Ser b communi t y. Expl anat i ons as t o why t hey
di d so vary, but most i dent i fy some combi nat i on of t hree un-
derl yi ng forces as t he predomi nant cause of t hei r choi ce: (1)
et hni c t ensi on, (2) inflammation of ethnic tension by nat i onal
and provi nci al pol i t i ci ans i n pursui t of personal power and
ot her pol i t i cal ends, and (3) a mi l i t ary i mbal ance grossl y i n
favor of one Bosni an et hni c groupnamel y t he Serbs.
2
Et hni c t ensi on may have been hi st ori cal l y endemi c t o Bos -
ni an pol i t i cs, but i nt eret hni c vi ol ence was epi sodi c. In t hei r
anci ent r oot s i n t he bar bar i an i nvasi ons of t he Roman Empi r e,
the people of Bosnia were all South Slavs . In t he l at t er t went i -
et h cent ury, t hey st i l l l ooked l i ke each ot her, and t hey spoke
di al ect s of t he same root l anguage. But , as was t he case for
t he Sout h Sl avs of t he Bal kans regi on i n general , cent uri es of
DELIBERATE FORCE
458
t he di vi de-and-rul e pol i ci es of t hei r Ot t oman and Hapsburg
overl ords, i nt ernal mi grat i on, di fferi ng rel i gi ous experi ences,
and war s had di vi ded Bosni ans i nt o di st i nct t hough geo -
graphi cal l y i nt ermi xedcommuni t i es of fai t h and, t o a l esser
degree, cul t ure. Proport i onal l y i n 1991 t he t hree l argest et hni c
groups i n Bosni a were t he Musl i m Serbs (referred t o i n t he
report as Mosl ems),
3
Ort hodox Chri st i an Serbs , and Cat hol i c
Croat s , who compr i sed 44 per cent , 31 per cent , and 18 per cent
of t he popul at i on, respect i vel y. Nevert hel ess, fol l owi ng t he
creation of Yugoslavia aft er Worl d War I, t hese communi t i es
general l y l i ved i n peace and i ncreasi ngl y i nt ermarri ed, par -
t i cul arl y when t i mes were good and t he federal government
was st r ong. But when t i mes wer e t ough and t he cent r al gov-
er nment weakened, as was t he case dur i ng Wor l d War I I a nd
duri ng t he economi c and pol i t i cal cri si s of t he 1980s, et hni c
l oyal t i es regai ned preemi nent i mport ance for enough Bosni ans
t o ori ent pol i t i cal compet i t i on and wi despread vi ol ence al ong
communal rat her t han i deol ogi cal , economi c, or cl assl i nes.
The f act t hat et hni c chauvi ni sm emer ged as a pr edomi nant
theme of Bosnian politics in the latter 1980s was to some degree
t he consequence of t he mani pul at i ons of federal and provi n -
cial politicians. Indeed, the chronology of the Bosnian conflict
has i t s t angi bl e begi nni ngs i n t he demagoguery of Mi l osevi c .
Maneuveri ng for power, i n 1987 he began usi ng hi s posi t i on
as presi dent of t he Yugosl avi an League of Communi st s a s a
pl at form t o whi p up t he et hni c pri de and paranoi a of t he Serb
community of Serbia . Milosevics rhet ori c al so hel ped st i r up
Serbi an groups l i vi ng i n t he Kraj i na of sout hwest ern Croat i a
and i n a number of smal l er Kraj i nas in Bosnia . By mi d-1990
Cr oat i an Ser bs were commi t t i ng act s of defi ance and l i mi t ed
vi ol ence agai nst t he Croat i an government . When Croat i a de-
cl ared i t s i ndependence from Yugosl avi a i n June 1991, Cr oa -
t i an Serbs cooper at ed wi t h t he JNA i n an open war t o cr us h
t he i ndependence movement or at l east t o est abl i sh Ser bi an
cont rol over t he Kraj i na. Thi s war ended i n Januar y 1992 wi t h
t he est abl i shment of a t ense t r uce i n t he Kr aj i na and creat i on
of a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) t o super vi se
i t . By t hat t i me, el ement s of t he Bosni an Serb communi t y,
under t he general i f somet i mes very l oose l eadershi p of Ra -
dovan Karadzic , were prepari ng t o resi st a si mi l ar decl arat i on
OWEN
459
of i ndependence by Bosni a . I n t he ear l y mont hs of 1991, t he
majority of Croats and Musl i ms, under t he l eadershi p of Presi -
dent Alija Izetbegovic , had vot ed f or i ndependence. Pr eempt i ng
that vote, Karadzic est abl i shed an i ndependent Ser bi an Re-
public . Bosnia formally withdrew from Yugoslavia i n March
1992, and heavy fighting followed immediately after. Forces of
t he Serb Republ i c, wi t h overt assi st ance from t he JNA, ad -
vanced t o expand i t s borders, whi l e t he rel at i vel y weak Bos -
ni a n a r my f ought t o pr eser ve t he t er r i t or i al i nt egr i t y and
aut hori t y of i t s newl y i ndependent st at e. Wi t hi n a few weeks,
Ser bs cont rol l ed al most t wo-t hi rds of t he t erri t ory of Bosni a .
The bol dness and success of t he Bosni an Ser bs mi l i t ary
offensive were consequences to some degree of their great mili -
t ary advant age over t he Mosl em and Cr oat f act i ons. Dur i ng
1991 a number of Serb mi l i t ary and parami l i t ary uni t s formed
in Bosnia and prepared t o fi ght . The JNA, whi ch remai ned
present i n t he count ry unt i l aft er i ndependence, great l y hel ped
t hei r preparat i ons. Before and as i t wi t hdrew, t he JNA opened
ar senal s t o Ser b mi l i t ar y uni t s and r el eased sympat het i c per -
sonnel t o j oi n i t . Meanwhi l e t he Bosni an government di d l i t t l e
to arm itself. In reality, President Izetbegovic had l i t t l e oppor -
t uni t y t o do ot herwi se. The onl y si gni fi cant l ocal source of
arms was t he JNA, and it gave willingly only to Serbs . More-
over, the United Nations (UN) i n Sept ember 1991 had i mposed
an ar ms embar go t hat made i t di ffi cul t and expensi ve for t he
Bosni an gover nment t o i mpor t ar ms and mat er i el f r om t he
out si de. Thus when t he count ry fract i onat ed, t he Bosni an Serb s
had t he wi l l and overwhel mi ng mi l i t ary powerpart i cul arl y i n
a vast preponderance of ai rcraft and heavy fi el d weaponsto
advance ar ound t he nor t her n and east er n par t s of Bosni a .
There t hey carved out an et hni c st at e wi t h di rect connect i ons
to Serbia pr oper and t o t he Ser bi an Kr aj i na of Croatia . I n a
mat t er of weeks, t hen, t he Bosni an government found i t sel f
sur r ounded by unf r i endl y and mut ual l y suppor t i ng Ser bi an
encl aves and st at es.
By t hat t i me t he di rect i nt ernat i onal i nt ervent i on t hat even -
t ual l y woul d have a crescendo i n Del i berat e Force was under
way. Concerned wi t h t he growi ng vi ol ence and t he possi bi l i t y
of intervention by Yugoslavia , sever al Eur opean st at es and t he
Uni t ed St at es recognized Bosnia i n Apr i l 1992, and on 20 May
DELIBERATE FORCE
460
the UN Security Council r ecommended Bosni a for admi ssi on
t o t he Gener al Assembl y. On 29 June t he Secur i t y Counci l
resol ved t o provi de peacekeepi ng forces to protect the flow of
humani t ar i an r el i ef suppl i es i nt o Saraj evo Ai r por t , under t he
protection of UNPROFOR, whose chart er was ext ended t o i n -
cl ude peace oper at i ons in Bosnia . NATO ai rpower became i n -
vol ved i n t he regi on at about t he same t i me i n t he form of
ai rborne warni ng and cont rol syst em ai rcraft fl yi ng i n support
of Shar p Guar d , a NATO and West er n Eur opean Uni on opera -
t i on t o enforce t he regi onal arms embargo and economi c s anc-
t i ons against the former Yugoslavia . Direct cooperation be-
t ween t he UN and NATO began on 16 Oct ober , when by
pr ear r angement t he UN i ssued Uni t ed Nat i ons Securi t y Coun-
cil Resolution (UNSCR) 781, banni ng al l mi l i t ary fl i ght opera -
tions over Bosnia , and NATO act i vat ed Operat i on Sky Wat ch
t o observe and report vi ol at i ons of t hat ban. Aft er observi ng
hundreds of no-fl y vi ol at i ons over t he next several mont hs,
part i cul arl y by combat ai rcraft of t he Bosni an Serb fact i on,
t he UN and NATO agai n cooperat ed t o t oughen t he no-fl y ban.
On 31 Mar ch 1993, t he UN i ssued UNSCR 816, banni ng all
fl i ght s not aut hori zed by t he UN and aut hor i zi ng member
st at es t o t ake al l necessar y act i ons t o enf or ce t hat ban. Si mul-
taneously, NATO repl aced Sky Wat ch wi t h Oper at i on Deny
Fl i ght t o si gni fy t he new el ement of force. Over subsequent
mont hs NATO and t he UN added ot her mi ssi ons t o Deny
Fl i ght, i ncl udi ng cl ose ai r support (CAS) to protect UN person -
nel under at t ack, offensi ve ai r support (OAS) t o puni sh f ac-
tions violating UNSCRs , and suppr essi on of enemy ai r de-
fenses (SEAD) t o pr ot ect NATO ai r cr af t f l yi ng t he ot her
mi ssi ons. To coordi nat e pl anni ng and, par t i cul ar l y, t he t ar get s
identified for attack in these missions, NATOs Nort h At l ant i c
Council (NAC) al so act i vat ed at t he st art of Deny Fl i ght a j oi nt
t arget coordi nat i on board composed of senior NATO and UN
t act i cal commanders concerned wi t h t he use of ai rpower i n
t he r egi on and i t s consequences. These devel opment s and t he
pl anni ng t hat went i nt o t hem const i t ut ed an i ncr ement al , evo -
l ut i onar y pr ocess t hat l ai d t he f oundat i ons of Del i ber at e
Force, whi ch t echni cal l y was but a phase of Deny Fl i ght.
I nt er vent i on ai r pl anni ng evol ved for nearl y t hree years,
roughl y from t he earl y fal l of 1992 t o t he end of August 1995.
OWEN
461
An i mport ant reason for t hat prol ongat i on was t he di ffi cul t y
experienced by NATO, t he UN, and t he i nt er nat i onal commu-
ni t y as a whol e i n reachi ng consensus on what t he confl i ct
was about. Observable events made it obvious that the princip al
sust ai ni ng el ement s of t he Bosni an war wer e et hni c t ensi ons ,
pol i t i cal mani pul at i on of t hose t ensi ons, and t he i mbal ance of
mi l i t ary power. But whi ch sust ai ni ng el ement or el ement s ex -
ert ed t he most i nfl uence on i t s shape, scope, and vi rul ence? In
his research for the first chapter of this book, Prof. Karl Mueller
i dent i fi es t wo di st i nct school s of t hought on t hi s i ssue, par -
t i cul arl y among i nt ervent i oni st government s. One school em-
phasi zed et hni c confl i ct. Somehow, i n t hi s vi ew, Sl avs were
predi sposed cul t ural l y t o sl i ce each ot hers t hroat s. Bosni a
was j ust a case i n poi nt a pl ace where col l apse of t he Yugo -
sl av f eder al syst em s r est r ai nt s mer el y unf et t er ed t he lon g-
restrained-but-never-forgotten ethnic hatreds i n a per ennially
unst abl e and vi ol ent regi on. At t he begi nni ng of t he Bosni an
conflict, Mueller argues, this was the official view of most
European i nt ervent i oni st government si mport ant l y, Bri t ai n
and Fr ancewhi ch provi ded most of t he peacekeepi ng t roops
for Bosnia . The second school emphasi zed t he pol i t i cal ma-
ni pul at i ons of Serbi an pol i t i cal l eaders such as Mi l osevi c a nd
Karadzic. What ever t he i nherent i nst abi l i t i es of t he regi on,
t hi s school of t hought hel d t hat t he cur r ent r ound of f i ght i ng
had been spar ked and sust ai ned by t he venal r aci sm of i r r e-
sponsi bl e demagogues. Thi s vi ew of t he confl i ct , whi ch re-
fl ect ed t he predomi nant , offi ci al posi t i on of t he Uni t ed St at es
aft er t he spri ng of 1993, t hus hel d t hat vi ol ence i n t he regi on
was epi sodi cnot perenni al .
For ai r pl anner s t hese t wo vi ews of t he sust ai ni ng el ement s
of t he Bosni an war were di rect l y si gni fi cant because each i m-
pl i ed a di fferent st rat egy of i nt ervent i on. If t he war were t he
consequence of endemi c cul t ur al f or ces, t hen i t had no cul-
prits. All sides were equally guilty and equally innocentvictims
of forces beyond t hei r cont rol . If t hat were t he case, t hen t he
proper rol e of an i nt ervent i on was t hat of a neut ral medi at or.
To t he ext ent t hat one used force i n such an i nt ervent i on, one
shoul d do so onl y t o prot ect t he i nnocent , separat e t he war -
r i ng f act i ons, and encour age communi cat i ons and conf i dence
bet ween t hem. In current US mi l i t ary usage, t hen, t he vi ew
DELIBERATE FORCE
462
t hat confl i ct was perenni al t o Bosni a l ed t o a peacemaki ng
st rat egy ai med at amel i orat i ng sufferi ng and faci l i t at i ng a
cease-fire and pol i t i cal set t l ement as soon as possi bl e. In con -
t rast , i f t he war were t he consequence of pol i t i cal mani pul a -
t i on, t hen i t had cul pri t st he pol i t i ci ans expl oi t i ng t he si t u -
at i on t o sust ai n war for t hei r own i nt erest s and t hose of t hei r
const i t uent s. If t hat were t he case, t hen coerci on was al s o a
legitimate role of military intervention, along with relief and
confi dence bui l di ng. Assumi ng t hat one coul d i dent i fy t he
ri sk-benefi t cal cul i of t he pol i t i cal cul pri t s, t hen one mi ght be
able to identify military targets t hat , i f at t acked or t hr eat ened,
woul d shi ft t he bal ance of t hei r cal cul at i ons t oward peace.
One coul d al so use i nt ervent i on mi l i t ary force t o remedi at e t he
consequences of war cri mes and t erri t ori al conquest by t he
wars aggressors. In t hat case an i mmedi at e cessat i on of fi ght-
i ng mi ght not be appropri at e i f i t deni ed t he i nt ervent i oni st s
t he t i me requi red t o set , or hel p set , t hi ngs ri ght . In current
US mi l i t ary usage, t hen, t he vi ew t hat confl i ct i n Bosni a was
epi sodi c and opport uni st i c l ed i n part t o a st rat egy of peace
enf orcement ai med at coerci ng t he appropri at e warl ords t o
accept peace and r edr ess wr ongs.
These t wo vi ews of t he causes of t he war al so had i ndi rect
si gni fi cance for ai r pl anners because t hei r cont rari et y under -
mined the ability of NATO and t he UN as corporat e organi za -
t i ons t o devel op consensus bet ween t hemsel ves and among
t hei r members on what exact l y t o do about Bosni a . Cons ens us
was a necessar y pr el ude t o act i on because bot h or gani zat i ons
are vol unt ary associ at i ons of soverei gn st at es. Once st at ed,
t hi s seems an obvi ous t rut h. But i n t he heat of event s, mi l i -
t ar y pl anner s somet i mes forget t hat , compared t o t he hi erar -
chi cal or der of mi l i t ar y or gani zat i ons, t hese i nt er nat i on al
organizations operate on a basis akin to institutionalized anarchy.
No mat t er how orderl y and cooperat i ve t he i nt ernal processes
of t hese or gani zat i ons, t hei r member st at es ar e not subor di-
nat e t o t hem or t he maj ori t y wi l l of t he ot her members. Even
smal l st at es can bl ock corporat e act i ons si mpl y by wi t hhol d -
i ng t hei r suppor t f r om t hem. As a consequence, most of t he
senior diplomats interviewed for the BACS pointed out, explicitly
or implicitly, that no general plans or policies for Bosnia , in -
cl udi ng t hose rel at ed t o t he use of ai rpower, had any hope of
OWEN
463
success unl ess t hey were endorsed by al l t he pri nci pal st at es
i n t he i nt ervent i onpart i cul arl y t hose i n t he Securi t y Counci l
and NATO. Accordi ng t o Robert Hunt er, t he US ambassador
t hroughout Deny Fl i ght , bui l di ng such consensus suppor t f or
i ncreasi ngl y robust use of ai rpower over Bosni a was a difficult
and mont hs- l ong di pl omat i c pr ocessbut an absol ut e pr ecur-
sor t o act i on.
4
Li t t l e wonder t hat Muel l er descri bes t he debat e
over t he sust ai ni ng causes of t he war as one of t he maj or
obst acl es t o West ern effort s t o deal wi t h t he cri si s.
The slow pace of policy development had one advantage for
NATO airmen, including those who eventually put together De -
liberate Force: it gave them time to overcome the institu t i onal
and doct ri nal i mpedi ment s t hey faced i n pl anni ng and execut i ng
sustained air operations over Bosnia . In the second chapt er of
this book, Lt Col Bradley Davis describes the organi zat i onal
st ruct ure NATO had i n pl ace dur i ng Deny Fl i ght. The Bosni an
region fell under the purview of NATOs 5th Allied Tactical Air
Force (5 ATAF), wi t h headquart ers at t he It al i an ai r forces Dal
Molin Air Base (AB), Vicenza , Italy. The Italian general com-
manding 5 ATAF, who at t he t i me of Del i berat e Force was Maj
Gen Andrea Fornasi ero, report ed t o t he commander of Al l i ed
Air Forces Southern Command (AIRSOUTH). From December
1992 the AIRSOUTH commander was Lt Gen Joseph Ashy
unt i l hi s repl acement by Lt Gen Mi chael E. Ryan i n Sept ember
1994. These t wo Uni t ed St at es Ai r Force offi cers, i n t urn,
report ed t o Uni t ed St at es Navy admi ral s commandi ng Al l i ed
Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), headquart ered i n Napl es ,
Italy. The commander in chief of AFSOUTH (CINCSOUTH) at
t he begi nni ng of Deny Fl i ght was Adm Jer emy Boor da unt i l
hi s repl acement by Adm Lei ght on W. Smi t h Jr. To compl et e
t he chai n of command, AFSOUTH r epor t ed t o t he Supr eme
Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), al so an Ameri can four-
st ar commander. SACEUR t ook hi s general gui dance from t he
ambassadors si t t i ng on t he NAC.
The problem, Davis assesses, was that neither 5 ATAF nor
AFSOUTH was organi zed, manned, or equi pped t o handl e t he
scale and complexity of an operation like Deny Flight, let alone
Deliberate Force. In late 1992, 5 ATAF was charged to oversee
and control indirectly the air defense of Italy. Accordingly it had
modest communi cat i ons connect i ons wi t h ai r defense cent ers
DELIBERATE FORCE
464
and radar si t es t hroughout It al y. But the 5 ATAF headquart ers
was small, and its control center was equipped with obsolescent
equipment. It possessed none of the state-of-the-art automated
ai r-pl anni ng a nd i nf or ma t i on downl i nk sy s t e ms t h a t h a d
pr oven so successf ul i n t he 199091 Per si an Gulf War . Simi-
larly, AIRSOUTH was a smal l pl anni ng headquart ers, charged
with doing air planning for AFSOUTH and overseeing the activi -
ties of 5 ATAF and two other ATAFs based in Greece and Turkey.
Neither AIRSOUTH nor AFSOUTH had crisis-planning cells t o
deal with the rapid onset and fast-paced political and military
evolution of something like Deny Flight.
5
Overall, the established
st r engt hs and equi pment of the two headquarters fell far short
of the likely demands of continual observation and no-fly en -
forcement operations over Bosnia .
NATOs formal doct ri nal foundat i ons for peace operat i ons
over Bosnia wer e al so uneven. Si nce most key commander s
and st af f pl anner s were Americans, Lt Col Robert Pollock ex-
ami nes i n hi s chapt er t he formal body of t heori es t hat mi ght
have been rel evant t o pl anni ng Del i berat e Force and avai l abl e
to AIRSOUTH pl anner s . He expl ores t hree t heoret i cal con -
st ruct s avai l abl e i n open l i t erat ure at t he t i me: Robert Papes
deni al st rat egy, John War den s fi ve-ri ng paradi gm, and t he Ai r
Command and St aff Col l eges syst ems approach t o ai r t ar -
get i ng. Despi t e t hei r markedl y di fferent t heoret i cal proposi -
t i ons and pl anni ng approaches, Pol l ock fi nds t hat t hese t hree
t heori es general l y produced t arget set s si mi l ar t o one anot her
and t o t he t arget s act ual l y bombed duri ng Del i berat e Force.
The di fferences among t hem were margi nal i ssues of t i mi ng
and f ocus. For al l t he pot ent i al l y usef ul gui dance and r eassur-
ance t hese t hree concept s coul d have offered, however, nei t her
Pollock nor other members of the BACS t eam uncover ed or al
evidence that AIRSOUTH pl anner s had any worki ng knowl -
edge of t hem.
In his examination of written NATO doctrines , Col Maris
McCr abb det er mi nes t hat Deny Fl i ght pl anner s al so found
l i t t l e gui dance i n t hei r manual s and publ i cat i ons. That gui d -
ance was part i cul arl y spot t y for operat i ons ot her t han war
(OOTW), of whi ch peace operat i ons ar e a s ubs et . Summar i zi ng
hi s fi ndi ngs, McCrabb not es t hat NATO . . . ai r pl anni ng
doct ri ne . . . focuses on coal i t i on consi derat i ons but remai ns
OWEN
465
l argel y si l ent on OOTW, whi l e US j oi nt doct ri ne feat ures
great er emphasi s on t he uni que aspect s of OOTW but does not
ful l y consi der coal i t i on consi derat i ons. An addi t i onal i ssue
t hat bedevi l s bot h set s of doct ri ne i s t he rol e of ai rpower i n
ei t her OOTW or convent i onal war.

These doct ri nal short fal l s
were gl ari ng i n rel at i on t o t he uni que and unprecedent ed rel a -
tionship of NATO, pri mari l y a regi onal mi l i t ary al l i ance, act i ng
i n mi l i t ary support of t he UN, primarily a global political or -
gani zat i on. Not abl y, est abl i shed doct ri nes were largely silent
on how ai rmen coul d reconci l e, i n t hei r pl ans and t arget l i st s ,
t he confl i ct i ng obj ect i ves and rest rai nt s t hat l i kel y woul d crop
up bet ween t wo powerful organi zat i ons i n a peacemaki ng si t u -
at i on i n whi ch at l east one combat ant di d not want t o make
peace. Thus, addressing one of the principal corollary resear ch
questions of the BACS, McCrabb concl udes t hat t he quest i on
. . . of whet her t hese pl anners consul t ed t he exi st i ng body of
doctrine or just winged it is largely mootthey had almost
not hi ng t o whi ch t hey coul d refer.
Thi s vi rt ual absence of gui dance for conduct i ng mul t i coal i -
t i on peace operat i ons was under st andabl e, gi ven t he unpr ece-
dent ed nat ur e of t he UN-NATO r el at i onshi p. But i t was an
important void in the context of NATO ai r pl anni ng becaus e
the overall focus of UN st rat egy and t he operat i onal focus of
NATO ai r commander s began t o di ver ge al most at t he st ar t of
Deny Fl i ght. Under Sky Wat ch t he st rat egi c focus of t he i nt er -
vention and NATO f l yer s was on peacemaki ngobserve and
report , but dont engage. But t he deci si on t o act i vat e Deny
Fl i ght added peace enf or cement as a pot ent i al feat ure of i nt er -
vent i on st rat egy. Though t hey never chal l enged t he UNs over-
al l commi t ment t o mai nt ai ni ng i t s posi t i on as a neut r al peace-
maker , Gener al Ashy and other senior NATO commander s
i mmedi at el y recogni zed t hat t hei r operat i onal focus woul d be
on peace enforcement .
6
Moreover, si nce t he Bosni an Serbs
possessed far and away t he l argest ai r arm i n Bosni a , Deny
Fl i ght cl ear l y was ai med pr edomi nant l y at t hem.
7
That f ocus
shar pened i n t he spr i ng and summer of 1993, when CAS a nd
OAS mi ssi ons wer e added t o t he Deny Fl i ght menu; t he UN
desi gnat ed cert ai n ci t i es under t he cont rol of t he Bosni an gov-
er nment as saf e ar eas and commi t t ed i t sel f t o prot ect t hem.
With those developments NATO was flying in great part to
DELIBERATE FORCE
466
rest ri ct bot h t he Serb fact i ons empl oyment of a key mi l i t ary
advant age and i t s abi l i t y t o assai l ci t i es hel d by i t s enemi es.
That har dl y was an act of peacemaki ng i mpart i al i t y, and i t s
cont rast wi t h t he overal l UN mi ssi on became a sour ce of f r us-
tration for NATO ai rmen and of st rat egi c debat e, part i cul arl y
within NAC.
Gi ven al l t hese el ement s of t hei r pl anni ng context, NATO
ai r men seem t o have r ecei ved t hei r pl anni ng and oper at i onal
responsi bi l i t i es for Deny Fl i ght under unenvi abl e ci r cum-
st ances. The confl i ct t hey were engagi ng was compl i cat ed
enough i n i t s ori gi ns and convol ut ed regi onal pol i t i cs. But
t hei r t ask was compl i cat ed furt her by t he presence of at l east
t wo broad i nt erpret at i ons of t he confl i ct at pl ay among t hei r
di rect and i ndi rect pol i t i cal l eaders, and each one of t hose
i nt erpret at i ons spoke t o a di fferent approach t o t he use of
ai rpower. In t hei r formal chai n of command, t he Ameri can fl ag
officers in charge of Deny Flight worked for NAC, whi ch was
act i ng i n support of t he UN Securi t y Counci l . At t he begi nni ng
of Deny Flight, most of t he member government s of bot h or -
gani zat i ons were det ermi ned t o rest ri ct t he i nt ervent i on t o
peacemaki ng operat i ons and, consequent l y, t o avoi d any mi l i -
t ary operat i ons t hat woul d appear t o favor one Bosni an fact i on
over t he ot her. Yet i n t hei r i nformal chai n of command, t hese
offi cers were Ameri can, and by mi d-1993 t hei r government
was on record i n support of t he use of ai rpower t o hal t or
puni s h Ser b aggressi ona posi t i on wi t h whi ch AFSOUTH
l eaders were i ncl i ned t o agree. Compoundi ng t hi s st rat egi c
issue, AFSOUTH was nei t her mat eri al l y nor doct ri nal l y ready
for Deny Fl i ght. Consequent l y, whi l e t he st r at egi c debat e
rol l ed on and t he Bosni an cri si s unfol ded, t hese ai rmen woul d
have t o bui l d up t hei r concept ual under st andi ng of t he con -
f l i ct as wel l as t he command i nf r ast r uct ur e and f or ce st r uc-
t ure requi red t o pl an and execut e operat i ons. To put i t mi l dl y,
t hey faced a great chal l enge.
Pl anni ng
To st udy t he pl anni ng of Del i berat e Force i s t o st udy Deny
Fl i ght. Unt i l j ust a few weeks before t he act ual execut i on of
OWEN
467
t he campai gn, t her e exi st ed no pl an or pl an annex cal l ed
Deliberate Force. When t he t erm di d appear i n t ext , i t seems t o
have done so first in the title of an AIRSOUTH briefing given in
earl y August 1995Ai r Operat i ons i n Bosni a-Herzegovi na
8
But t he br i ef i ng di d not del i neat e t he
t heat erwi de bombi ng campai gn t hat Del i berat e Force became.
It mai nl y l i st ed t he vari ous cont i ngency ai r pl ans t hus f ar
developed by AIRSOUTH t o execut e vari ous aspect s of t he
Deny Fl i ght mi ssi on. As a menu of speci al i zed pl ans to enforce
UNSCRs , prot ect speci fi c safe areas, and suppr ess Bosni an
Ser b air defenses, this briefing offered NATO ai r commander s
a foundation for responding to a future crisis, but it did not
propose a specific action for a specific crisis. Accordingly, a few
weeks later when the operation since recognized as Deli ber at e
Force began, one saw t he act i vat i on and rapi d modi fi cat i on of
several pl ans ori gi nal l y devel oped under t he aegi s of Deny
Fl i ght. Despi t e i t s obvi ous di fferences i n focus and i nt ensi t y
from t he mai n body of Deny Fl i ght, t herefore, one can under -
st and Del i berat e Force onl y as an evol ut i onary out growt h of
t he pr epar at i ons and pl anni ng t hat went i nt o t he mor e pr o -
l onged operat i on. Col Chri s Campbel l and Li eut enant Col onel
Davis detail various aspects of this planning effort in their chap-
ters, which form the foundation for much of what follows here.
Del i ber at e pl anni ng for Deny Flight began al most f r om t he
i ncept i on of Operat i on Sky Wat ch i n mi d-Oct ober 1992. By
mi d-November aft er observi ng cont i nued no-fl y vi ol at i ons by
al l Bosni an fact i ons but part i cul arl y by Serb combat ai r cr af t ,
t he UN and NATO began devel opi ng t he det ai l s of a more
r obust enf or cement pl an. Ai r pl anner s at Supr eme Headquar -
t ers Al l i ed Powers Europe (SHAPE), Mons, Bel gi um, bega n
devel opi ng or gani zat i onal , oper at i onal , and f or ce- st r uct ur e
concept s f or s uch a pl an. Among ot her i s s ues , t hey s ug-
gest ed t hat i t woul d be necessar y, i n accor dance wi t h st an-
dard NATO pract i ce, t o est abl i sh a st and-al one combi ned ai r
operat i ons cent er (CAOC) t o cont rol expanded ai r operat i ons
over t he regi on.
9
This suggestion raised an issue of whether such a CAOC, if
established, should be an expansion of the 5 ATAF command
and cont rol center at Vicenza or a new and separat e creat i on.
Responding to a NATO request to look into the issue, Gen Robert
DELIBERATE FORCE
468
C. Oa ks, commander of Uni t ed St at es Ai r For ce s Eur ope
(USAFE), di spat ched Maj Gen James E. Bear Chamber s , hi s
Sevent eent h Ai r For ce c omma nde r , t o vi s i t a nd a s s e s s 5
ATAFs sui t abi l i t y for t aki ng on t he expanded responsi bi l i t i es
of t he ant i ci pat ed operat i on. An experi enced ai r commander
who knew ai rpower as wel l as t he regi on and who was al ready
runni ng USAFEs part of t he Provi de Promi se humani t ar i an
airlift into Sarajevo, Chamber s was a l ogi cal choi ce for t he
t ask. By December, pl anni ng t o i ncrease AIRSOUTHs ability
t o i mpose a no-fl y enforcement regime over Bosnia was pr o -
ceedi ng al ong several t racks.
General Ashy received command of AIRSOUTH a t j us t t ha t
t i me. Li t eral l y on t he day t hat he t ook over, Ashy sat down
wi t h Admi ral Boorda and di d some ser i ous pl anni ng for an
ai r oper at i on i n t he Bal kans . . . to police a no-fly zone.
10
On e
of hi s fi rst concerns was t o set t l e t he CAOC organi zat i onal
i ssue. Hol di ng General Chambers i n hi gh r egar d and want i ng
t o ut i l i ze hi s fami l i ari t y wi t h operat i ons at Vi cenza , Ashy
el ect ed t o set up a st and-al one CAOC under Chamber s s di r ec-
t i on.
11
On paper t hi s CAOC was t o be a subor di nat e ext ensi on
of the existing 5 ATAF command cent er , but i n pr act i ce Gen -
er al Chamber s woul d report di rect l y t o AIRSOUTH. As hy
chose t hi s arrangement over expandi ng t he 5 ATAF facility
because he bel i eved i t woul d gi ve hi m t i ght er cont rol over
what he ant i ci pat ed was goi ng t o be a fast -paced and pol i t i -
cal l y hypersensi t i ve si t uat i on. Ashy al so consi der ed ei t her
bri ngi ng t he CAOC down t o Napl es or movi ng hi s own head-
quart ers up t o Vi cenza , t o pl ace bot h t he pl anni ng and execu -
t i on st aff funct i ons of t he fort hcomi ng operat i on i n one pl ace.
Aft er some t hought he deci ded t o accept t he physi cal di vi si on
of hi s st aff i n order t o preserve ot her advant ages. Leavi ng t he
CAOC in Vicenza had t he advant age of pr eser vi ng at l east t he
form of the existing NATO command st r uct ur e by keepi ng t he
Italian commander of 5 ATAF i n t he f or mal chai n of command.
Keepi ng hi s own pl anni ng headquar t er s i n Napl es would facili -
t at e t he dai l y, face-t o-face cont act wi t h Admi ral Boorda t h a t
Ashy fel t he needed t o do hi s j ob.
12
The next or der of busi ness was t o enhance t he st af f , pl an-
ni ng, and communications capabilities of AIRSOUTH a nd t he
CAOC t o mat ch t he l i kel y demands of Deny Fl i ght. Fi ndi ng t he
OWEN
469
CAOC operat i ng wi t h anci ent equi pment , Ashy and hi s st af f
pressed t o bri ng up-t o-dat e communi cat i ons and i nt el l i gence
dat a t ermi nal s i nt o t he CAOC and t o connect t he cent er t o
AIRSOUTH and to the NATO f i el d uni t s and squadr ons t hat
had begun depl oyi ng t o bases ar ound I t al y. As part of this
process, t he CAOC recei ved anal yst s and t ermi nal s for NATOs
Li nked Operat i ons-Int el l i gence Cent ers Europe system. AIR-
SOUTHs intelligence capabi l i t i es were st rengt hened furt her by
t he transfer of intelligence personnel from Headquart ers Si x-
teenth Air Force at Aviano AB, Italy, to Naples .
13
Recognizing
that the permanently authorized strengths of the AIRSOUTH
and CAOC staffs were still too small for the task at hand, Ashy
al so began t o augment t hem on a rot at i ng basi s wi t h personnel
comi ng i n on 30-t o-90-day assi gnment s. These t emporary- dut y
(TDY) personnel soon comprised the overwhelming majority of
the CAOC staff and a significant portion of the AIRSOUTH force.
Meanwhile, AIRSOUTH pl anner s began t o l ay t he documen -
t ary foundat i ons for Deny Fl i ght and possi bl e combat opera -
tions. The focus of their work was CINCSOUTH Oper at i ons
Plan (OPLAN) 40101, Deny Flight, the overall guide for NATO
ai r operat i ons i n support of UN peace operat i ons in Bosnia .
Much of t hi s document and i t s i t erat i ons remai ns cl assi fi ed
and, consequent l y, out si de t he scope of t hi s chapt er (see Col o -
nel Campbel l s chapt er on t he ai r campai gn pl an for more
i nformat i on). But i t i s appropri at e t o say here t hat OPLAN
40101 st ar t ed out as a skel et al document l ayi ng out r ul es of
engagement (ROE) and t he CINCs concept of operat i ons, and
t hen evol ved i nt o a mor e t hor ough document t hat l ai d out t he
si t uat i on appr ai sal s, st r at egy choi ces, coor di nat i on pr oce-
dures, l ogi st i cs i ssues, ROE, and so on that CINCAFSOUTH
bel i eved were pert i nent t o t he new, compl ex operat i on before
hi s command. Si nce Deny Fl i ght was pri mari l y an ai r opera -
tion, a few members of the AIRSOUTH st aff or ot her part s of
AFSOUTH di d most of t he work on 40101, wi t h t he cl ose
i nvol vement of General Ashy and hi s s ubor di nat es .
14
The first two versions of OPLAN 40101 came out i n rapi d
successi on, refl ect i ng t he qui ck expansi on of t he Deny Fl i ght
mi ssi on i n t he fi rst hal f of 1993. The fi rst versi on, approved by
NAC on 8 April, mainly described how AIRSOUTH would inter -
cept , i nspect , and engage ai rcraft vi ol at i ng t he no-fl y mandat e .
DELIBERATE FORCE
470
The second versi on came out on 13 August wi t h provi si ons
reflecting the UNs and NACs addition of CAS and OAS t o t he
menu of possible NATO ai r mi ssi ons.
The addition of CAS and OAS to the OPLAN necessi t at ed
that AIRSOUTH cr eat e a t ar get l i st and get NAC s appr oval ,
t he l at t er obt ai ned t hrough an NAC deci si on st at ement i ssued
on 8 August , j ust days before t he rel ease of t he second i t era -
tion of OPLAN 40101. Thi s deci si on st at ement spel l ed out
t hr ee t ar get i ng opt i ons for offensi ve ai r st ri kes. Opt i on one
provided for CAS st ri kes of l i mi t ed durat i on and scope agai nst
mi l i t ary forces and weapon syst ems di rect l y vi ol at i ng UN reso-
l ut i ons or at t acki ng UN peace forces or ot her personnel . Op-
t i on-t wo t arget s were mechanisms for lifting sieges. Their fo -
cus r emai ned on mi l i t ar y f or ces and suppor t i ng el ement s, but
t hei r scope expanded t o i ncl ude t arget s t hr oughout t he i mme-
di at e envi rons of a besi eged safe area. Opt i on-t hree t arget s
mar ked out a br oader campai gn agai nst t ar get s out si de t he
i mmedi at e area of a si ege.
15
Over t he comi ng mont hs, AF -
SOUTH produced many vari at i ons of i t s t arget l i st s, but t he
essential categorization of these targets i nt o t hree opt i ons re-
mai ned a predomi nant , perhaps uni versal , t heme i n al l of t hem.
By t he t i me al l t hese organi zat i onal and pl anni ng event s had
t aken pl ace, t he i nherent t ensi on bet ween t he UNs peacekeep-
in g focus and t he peace-enforcement charact er of Deny Fl i ght
was affect i ng operat i ons profoundl y. The est abl i shment and,
more t o t he poi nt , t he i nt erpret at i on of ROE for t he operat i on
provi ded an earl y i ndi cat i on of t hat t ensi on. In hi s chapt er on
ROE, Lt Col Ron Reed expl ai ns t hat t hese r ul es ar e a nat ur al
bel l wet her of probl ems i n a mi l i t ary operat i on. Thei r funct i on
i s t o l i nk obj ect i ves, st rat egy, operat i ons, and i nt ernat i onal
l aw t o est abl i sh t he met hods and l i mi t s of force usabl e i n a
conflict. To be viable, coalition ROE must reflect the views of
al l members and t he real i t i es of t he si t uat i on. If ei t her of t hose
condi t i ons i s not met , t hen di sput es wi l l qui ckl y ri se over and
ar ound t hem. I n t he case of Bosni a , NATO officially endorsed
t he UNs st rat egi c vi si on. So i n t he absence of overt confl i ct ,
General Ashy and hi s st af f wor ked out and got UN and NAC
approval for an initial set of ROE by Febr uar y 1993.
16
The r eal
t ensi on came from what proved t o be t he UNs gr eat er r el uc-
t ance, at l east compared t o t he i ncl i nat i on of i nvol ved ai r
OWEN
471
commander s, act ual l y t o act on ROE. NATO, Colonel Reed
concl udes i n hi s st udy, al ways vi ewed t he use of force i n
t erms of compel l i ng t he Bosni an Serbs . . . . But the UN viewed
force in the much more limited context of self-defense. In -
deed, despi t e many opport uni t i es t o do so, t he UN di d not
release a CAS at t ack i n defense of peacekeepi ng forces on t he
gr ound unt i l 12 Mar ch 1994.
17
The fact that UN political leaders exercised such close control
of ai r operat i ons was anot her mani fest at i on of t he i nt ernal
peacekeeper / peace-enforcer post ure of t he i nt ervent i on. In June
1993 NATO and t he UN adopted a so-called dual-key procedure
for releasing CAS and OAS strikes. Drawing metaphorically on
the procedural requirement for two individual s t o turn keys to
rel ease or l aunch nucl ear weapons, t he arrangement requi red
appropriate officials in both the UN and NATO t o t ur n t hei r
keys before any NATO ai rcraft coul d rel ease weapons agai nst
an ai r or gr ound t ar get . For NATO any mi l i t ar y commander ,
from the CAOC di rect or up, coul d aut hori ze CAS st ri kes i n
r esponse t o a UN request. CINCAFSOUTH r et ai ned r el ease
aut hori t y for offensi ve ai r st ri kes. For t he UN t he deci si on
t hreshol ds were rai sed one organi zat i onal l evel . Secret ary-
General Bout ros Bout ros-Ghal i aut hor i zed hi s speci al r epr e-
sent at i ve, Ambassador Yasushi Akashi, to release CAS st r i kes,
while retaining for himself the authority to release offensive air
st ri kes.
18
Thus t he dual - key ar r angement was an overt effort
t o count erbal ance UN and NATO cont rol over ai r operat i ons.
As such, i t i ndi cat ed at l east a cor por at e pr esumpt i on among
t he member st at es of each organi zat i on t hat some possi bi l i t y
of mi sunderst andi ng or i rresponsi bi l i t y exi st ed i n t he way one
organi zat i on or t he ot her mi ght i nt erpret t he st andi ng ROE
and t he i mmedi at e ci r cumst ances of a pr oposed st r i ke.
A quest i on ari ses here: If t he corporat e membershi p of bot h
organi zat i ons feared t he possi bi l i t y of an i rresponsi bl e or i l l -
advi sed use of ai rpower, who di d t hey t hi nk woul d do i t ? To a
l arge ext ent , t he evi dence avai l abl e t o t he BACS s ugges t s t hat
t he mai n concern cent ered around t he Ameri cani zat i on of
t he i nt ervent i ons ai r opt i on. Si nce t he summer of 1993, and
with greater fervor after the following winter, US political lead-
ers were t he most out spoken advocat es of t he puni t i ve use of
ai rpower i n t he Bal kans. From t he begi nni ng of Deny Fl i ght ,
DELIBERATE FORCE
472
NATO ai r power i n t he Bal kans was under t he cont r ol of
American flag officers, albeit ones serving as NATO c omma nd-
ers. Moreover, most of the alliances offensive air strength
resi ded i n a powerful Ameri can composi t e wi ng based at Avi -
ano AB i n nort heast ern It al y . Sever al Eur opean st at es, par -
t i cul arl y t hose wi t h l i ght l y armed peacekeepi ng forces commit -
t ed on t he gr ound, had f ear s ( i l l gr ounded or not ) t hat t hese
ci r cumst ances coul d l ead t o a uni l at er al , Amer i can use of t he
ai r weapon i n a manner t hat mi ght escal at e t he l evel of vi o -
l ence i n t he regi on or t he i nt ervent i ons rol e i n i t . Thus, ac-
cordi ng t o Ambassador Hunt er , several members of NAC pro-
posed t he dual - key pr ocedur e to both NATO and t he UN i n a n
effort t o set up an arrangement t hat most peopl e bel i eved
woul d precl ude any offensi ve ai r act i on.
19
US ambas s ador
Ri chard Hol brooke shar ed Hunt er s assessment .
20
Par t of t he
dual - key ar r angement was about cont rol l i ng a powerful and
politically sensitive weapon in the coalitions arsenal, and
part of i t was about cont rol l i ng t he hol ders of t hat weapon.
If ROE and t he dual - key arrangement refl ect ed t he t ensi on
bet ween and wi t hi n t he UN and NATO over t he proper st rat egy
of intervention in Bosnia , t hey al so hel ped t o i ncrease t hose
t ensi ons on many occasi ons. Thi s par t i cul ar l y was t he case
whenever t he t wo organi zat i ons act ual l y prepared t o use ai r -
power agai nst t he Bosni an Ser bs . In the press of events, NATO
ai r commander s and Amer i can di pl omat s gener al l y f ound
t hemsel ves pushi ng for aggressi ve and st rong ai r st ri kes whi l e
most ot her i nt ervent i on part ners and l eaders of t he UN called
f or caut i on and r est r ai nt .
The air strike against Udbina Airfield on 21 November 1994
highlighted this tension. NATO and t he UN or der ed t he st r i ke
t o puni sh recent vi ol at i ons of t he no-fl y ban by Bosni an Serb
and Kraj i na Serb ai rcraft , some of whi ch were based at t he
airfield in the Serb-controlled Krajina region of Croatia . Gen-
eral Ryan, who had taken over AIRSOUTH only weeks before,
ant i ci pat ed an act i ve defense of t he fi el d and request ed a com-
prehensi ve t akedown of i t , t o i ncl ude st ri kes agai nst t he
offendi ng ai rcraft t hemsel ves, t he runway and t axi ways, and
t he ai r def ense syst ems and weapons i n t he ar ea. Echoi ng hi s
ai r commanders approach, Admi ral Smi t h sai d t he pr oper
goal of t he at t ack was t o make a parki ng l ot out of Udbi na
OWEN
473
Airfield.
21
I nt endi ng t o show r est r ai nt and t o l i mi t Ser b casu-
al t i es, however, Secret ary-General Bout ros-Ghal i approved at -
t acks onl y agai nst Udbi nas runway and taxiwaysnot agains t
ai r cr af t and l ocal ai r def ense syst ems, whi ch pr esumabl y
woul d be manned dur i ng t he at t ack. Among ot her consi der a -
t i ons, t he secret ary-general hoped t o avoi d provoki ng t he Bos -
ni an Ser bs i nt o t aki ng UN host ages, as t hey had done once
already in retaliation for a NATO CAS st ri ke near Gorazde t he
previous April. Viewing the UNs r est r i ct i ons as r ender i ng t he
proposed ai r st ri kes l argel y i neffect i ve and i ncreasi ng t he ri sks
t o t hei r ai rcrews, Smi t h and Ryan pr essur ed t he secr et ar y-
gener al and Ambassador Akashi t o put ai r cr af t and def ense
syst ems back on t he t ar get l i st . The UN leaders finally agreed
t o preapprove at t acks agai nst defense syst ems of i mmedi at e
threat to NATO ai rcraft onl y. They cont i nued t o bar at t acks
agai nst Ser b ai rcraft .
22
NATO j et s st ruck several ant i ai rcraft
artillery si t es and a surface-t o-ai r site in the immediate vicin -
i t y of t he ai rfi el d, but ot herwi se t hey st ruck onl y t he run-
ways.
23
It was a l ess-t han-convi nci ng demonst rat i on of NATO
ai rpower or resol veone t hat l eft Ameri can ai r commanders
and some di pl omat s very frust rat ed.
24
The gulf between the views of NATO ai r commander s and
t he UN on t he proper use and aggressi veness of ai rpower
cont i nued t o wi den af t er Udbi na. The UNs r el uct ance t o em-
pl oy t he weapon came out cl earl y aft er t he at t ack, when Am -
bassador Akashi poi nt edl y drew a l i ne bet ween t he UN a nd
t he peace- enf or cement action just performed by NATO j et s. He
wrote to Karadzic that NATO ai rcraft remai ned under UN con -
t rol but woul d act onl y i n defense of UNSCRs and UNPRO-
FOR. Despi t e t he i mpl i cat i ons of t he ai r at t acks on t he Serbs ,
he reported that NATO ai rcraft were nei t her t he enemy nor
t he al l y of any combat ant .
25
NATO commander s i ncr easi ngl y
became frust rat ed wi t h t he UNs l ong deci si on process i n rel a -
t i on t o rel easi ng ai r st ri kes. Thi s frust rat i on reached a peak i n
t he s ummer of 1995, Admi r al Smi t h r ecal l ed, when UN
peacekeeper s prot ect i ng t he ci t y of Srebreni ca cal l ed desper -
ately for CAS. NATO j et s were ready for at t ack wi t hi n mi nut es,
but t he UN refused t o t urn i t s key for t wo days, by whi ch t i me
t he fal l of t he ci t y t o t he Serbs was as s ur ed.
26
Reflecting the
views of many American leaders involved in Bosnia , Ambassador
DELIBERATE FORCE
474
Holbrooke decl ared t he dual -key arrangement an unmi t i gat ed
disaster that placed the UN and NATO in a stressful and im -
proper relationship of overlapping responsibility and friction .
27
The political sensitivity of the airpower issue also influenced
Deny Fl i ght pl a nni ng act i vi t i es. Thr oughout t he oper at i on
Gener al s Ashy and Ryan t ook pai ns t o ensur e t hat t hei r pl an-
ni ng effort s and operat i ons di d not undermi ne t he confi dence
of NATO and UN pol i t i cal l eaders i n t he professi onal i sm and
sel f-cont rol of t hei r command. To t hat end, al l i t erat i ons of
OPLAN 40101, endi ng wi t h change four i n May 1995, careful l y
tied anticipated AIRSOUTH operat i ons t o t he prot ect i on of UN
forces and the enforcement of specific UNSCRs, whet her t hey
were air-to-air, SEAD, CAS , or OAS missions. The OPLAN al so
admoni shed NATO ai r men t o ensur e t hat t hei r st r i kes, when
aut hori zed at al l , were proport i onal (i.e., that they avoided
unnecessar y casual t i es and col l at er al damage).
28
Al so, t he
t hree t arget opt i ons listed in AIRSOUTH at t ack pl ans offered
reassurance t hat NATO forces were a fl exi bl e i nst rument and
t i ght l y under cont rol . Accordi ng t o Ambassador Hunt er, t he
i mpl i ci t reassurances of t hese provi si ons were essent i al un-
derpi nni ngs of hi s effort s t o garner and mai nt ai n support
among NAC member s f or mor e r obust ai r oper at i ons.
29
From t he i ncept i on of Deny Fl i ght, Gener al s Ashy and Ryan
had asked NATO t o send non-US col onel s and general offi cers
on a per manent basi s t o f i l l key command and st af f bi l l et s at
AIRSOUTH and t he CAOC. Despi t e t hei r cont i nued r equest s,
on t he eve of Del i berat e Force, al l maj or st aff posi t i ons at t he
CAOC and most at AIRSOUTH were filled by US Air Force
col onel s.
30
Mos t of t hei r s ubor di nat es at t he CAOC wer e
Ameri can j uni or offi cers and sergeant s. Thi s was an anoma-
lous situation in the NATO command st r uct ur e, i n whi ch com -
manders and t hei r deput i es usual l y are of di fferent nat i onal i -
t i es, as are commanders at succeedi ng l evel s of organi zat i on.
The essent i al l y Ameri can manni ng of t he CAOC and t he ai r
command st r uct ur e may have been as much a pr oduct of t he
unease some NAC member st at es f el t about t he ai r weapon as
i t was a cause of t hat unease. Several BACS r esear cher s hear d
secondary report s t hat t he si t uat i on at t he CAOC gr at ed t he
non-US offi cers t here, but t he t eams l et t ers aski ng such i ndi-
vi dual s di rect l y about t hei r percept i ons and at t i t udes were not
OWEN
475
answered. Si gni fi cant l y, however, Ambassador Hunt er never
heard compl ai nt s voi ced by t he nat i onal represent at i ves on
the NAC, wher e such compl ai nt s woul d have necessi t at ed cor -
rective action. In his opinion the willingness of NATO pol i t i cal
l eaders t o accept t he arrangement may wel l have refl ect ed
bot h t hei r unwi l l i ngness t o have t hei r nat i onal s t oo cl osel y
associ at ed wi t h what mi ght become a pol i t i cal l y expl osi ve em-
pl oyment of ai rpower and t hei r recogni t i on t hat US Ai r Force
per sonnel wer e best t r ai ned and equi pped t o handl e t he an-
t i ci pat ed ai r operat i ons.
31
The BACS t eam f ound no documen -
t ary support for Hunt ers percept i on, but most seni or ai r com-
mander s shar ed i t , accor di ng t o t he i nt er vi ews. Fur t her , one
cannot escape t he fact t hat ot her NATO st at es di d not send
officers to fill key command positions.
NATOs ambivalence about the potential use of combat air -
power in Bosnia also seems to have undermined whatever will -
i ngness UN leaders had to allow NATO to use air more freely in
defense of their resolutions. As in the case of the use of any
military force, a halfhearted or incomplete air operation would
be indecisive, politically and diplomatically vulnerable to global
criticism, susceptible to breaking up what support existed in the
UN and NATO for cont i nued i nt ervent i on, and, as a consequence
of all other effects, more likely to stir up the Bosnian hornets
nest t han cal m i t . Thus, Ambassador Hunt er reported, a large
measure of Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali s unwillingness to
authorize CAS operations in defense of UN troops, let alone to
consider a robust OAS campai gn against Serb targets through -
out t he area, was due t o hi s bel i e ft hrough t he spri ng of
1995that NATO did not have the political cohesion or commit -
ment t o carry such operat i ons t o a successful concl usi on. The
secretary-general made it clear to Hunter that he would never
approve such operat i ons unl ess he was convi nced t he UN would
stick them out for their full course. Most of Hunter s diplomatic
efforts in NAC during 1994 and 1995, therefore, focused on
bui l di ng such cohesi on and commi t ment among t he ot her mem-
ber governments. Until enough or all of them decided to back a
robust air operation, he did not expect the UN to release NATO
j et s t o pound t he Bosni an Serbs.
32
Consensus support for offensive air strikes to protect the safe
areas began to build among NATO member st at es i n t he spri ng
DELIBERATE FORCE
476
and early summer of 1995, as a result of several considera -
tions and events. In general, three years of brazen Serbian
defiance of UN resolutions and the laws of war pr obabl y had
worn the patience of most of the governments intervening in
Bosnia and had infused the intervention with a sense of des -
peration. By mid-May 1995 the international press reported
that, as a result of the seemingly unstoppable fighting, the
nearly 40, 000 UN peacekeepers i n t he regi on are descendi ng
into a state of ever more irrelevance and danger, that Ambassa -
dor Akashi had become a comic figure, and that there was a
willingness to declare the Contact Group [see below] dead.
33
To
punish the Bosnian Serbs for violating the Sarajevo safe area,
NATO jets struck Serb ammunition depots around the city of Pale
on 24 May 1995. The Serbs responded by t aki ng 370 UN
peacekeepers hostage and ch aining some of them to potential
targets, thereby paralyzing the intervention. This humiliation, as
it played out, led Secretary of Defense William Perry to declare
t hat t he credi bi l i t y of t he i nt ernat i onal communi t y was at
st ake.
34
It also moved most interventionist governments nearer
t o t he st andi ng US posi t i on t hat onl y a robust ai r campai gn
would force the Serbs to obey UN resolutions.
Support for forceful act i on grew t hrough June and i nt o mi d-
Jul y i n t he face of cont i nued Serb at t acks on t he safe areas of
Zepa , Gorazde, and Srebreni ca , and wi t h t he shoot down of a
US F-16 by t he Bosni an Ser bs.
35
Fi nal l y, aft er t he UN rejected
an AFSOUTH r equest of 20 June f or ai r st r i kes t o puni sh Ser b
violations of the no-fly edict, aft er Srebreni ca fel l t o brut al
assaul t on 11 Jul y, and wi t h Zepa appar ent l y next on t he l i st
for Serbi an conquest , t he forei gn mi ni st ers of 16 i nt erveni ng
st at es met at London duri ng 2125 Jul y, l argel y at t he prod-
di ng of Secret ary of St at e Warren Chri st opher . The purpose of
t he meet i ng was t o prepare t he way for and l ay out t he form of
a mor e f or cef ul i nt er vent i on i n t he Bosni an conf l i ct . The
weapon of necessi t y, as every di pl omat probabl y underst ood at
t hat t i me, woul d have t o be NATO ai rpower.
By t he t i me t he forei gn mi ni st ers gat hered at London , NATO
ai r pl anner s had amassed a compr ehensi ve set of pl ans for
deal i ng wi t h speci fi c aspect s of t he Bosni an confl i ct , al ong
wi t h a cl ear i dea of how t hey want ed t o appl y t hose pl ans. Al l
of t hese pl ans were subel ement s of t he basi c OPLAN 40101,
OWEN
477
t hough most had been i ni t i at ed aft er General Ryan took over
AIRSOUTH i n Oct ober 1994. St andi ng out among t hese pl ans
was Operat i on Deadeye , the SEAD pl an i ni t i at ed by General
Ryan following the strikes on Udbina Airfield . Deadeyes p u r -
pose was t o prot ect NATO ai rcraft from Bosni an Serb ai r de-
fenses as t hey fl ew i n prot ect i on of t he safe areas or on ot her
mi ssi ons. A sal i ent feat ure of t he operat i on, one t hat set i t
apart from t he geographi c rest ri ct i ons pl aced on CAS and OAS
st ri kes, was i t s provi si on for comprehensi ve at t acks agai nst
integrated air defense system (IADS) t arget s t hroughout Bosnia ,
i f necessary. In earl y 1995, as t he pl an evolved in detail, it
incorporated a division of Bosnia i nt o sout heast and nor t hwest
zones of action (ZOA), based on t he Saraj evo and Banj a Luka
a reas, respectively. As described by Col Daniel R. Zoerb, dir ector
of the AIRSOUTH Deny Fl i ght operations cell, Maj Keith Kiger
of his staff proposed these ZOAs to facilitate deconfliction of
pl anned si mul t aneous fi ght er at t acks on t he IADS, but t hey
did not imply any restrictions on the overall freedom of NATO
ai rmen t o at t ack el ement s of t he IADS t hr oughout Bosni a to
defend themselves. If his aircraft flew in defense of a city in
ei t her ZOA, General Ryan expect ed t o l aunch at t acks agai nst
ai r defenses t hr oughout t he embat t l ed count r y.
36
On an ongoi ng basi s, AIRSOUTH pl anner s al so cr eat ed
pl ans t o prot ect speci fi c safe areas and updat ed t hem as nec-
essary. Following the Pale bombi ngs at t he end of May 1995,
General Ryans pl anners developed a briefing called NATO Air
Operat i ons i n Bosni a-Herzegovi na , whi ch mai nl y l i st ed and
de s c r i be d t he va r i ous a t t a c k opt i ons a va i l a bl e but not
Deadeye . Dur i ng Jul y and ear l y August , t hi s br i ef i ng ex -
panded t o i ncl ude a concept of operat i ons suggest i ng t hat
ground-at t ack pl ans t o defend Bosni an ci t i es al so be based on
t he ZOA boundari es l ai d out for Deadeye . Under existing ar -
rangement s, NATO ai rcraft st ri ki ng i n defense of a safe area
were l i mi t ed t o hi t t i ng t arget s wi t hi n t he 20- or 30-ki l omet er
excl usi on zone around i t . AFSOUTH pl anner s cal l ed for t he
freedom t o st ri ke a broader array of t arget s t hr oughout t he
ZOA t hat i ncl uded t he besi eged ci t y. Thus by t he t i me t he
London conference convened, NATO ai r pl anner s in AFSOUTH
wer e t hi nki ng i n t er ms of br oad- r angi ng gr ound at t acks sup-
port ed by a t heat erwi de SEAD campai gn i n defense of Bosni an
DELIBERATE FORCE
478
ci t i es, r at her t han t he hal t i ng and pi ecemeal appl i cat i ons t hat
had charact eri zed t he use of ai rpower t o t hat poi nt .
From t he Ameri can perspect i ve, London began as an effort
t o i ssue a powerful t hreat of ai r st ri kes agai nst t he Serbs for
what Secret ary Chri st opher cal l ed t hei r out rageous aggres -
si on.
37
At the end of the conferences first day, Christopher
asser t ed t hat t he mi ni st er s had agr eed t hat an at t ack agai nst
Gorazde wi l l be met by deci si ve and subst ant i al ai r power.
38
Moreover he announced t hat exi st i ng command-and-cont rol
arrangements for the use of NATO ai r power wi l l be adj ust ed
t o ensure t hat responsi veness and uni t y are achi eved. By t hi s
he meant t hat t he Uni t ed St at es expect ed t he UNs role in
t act i cal deci si on maki ng t o di mi ni sh, per haps by endi ng t he
dual - key pr ocedur e.
39
Last , Chr i st opher a s s e r t e d t ha t t he
gat hered mi ni st ers agreed t hat t he t aki ng of host ages will no
l onger be al l owed t o prevent i mpl ement at i on of our pol i ci es.
All this, he stated, reflected a general belief that so long as
t he Bosni an Ser b aggressi on cont i nues, any pol i t i cal process
[for peace] is doomed to failure.
40
I n sum, Chr i st opher was
forecast i ng an i nt ervent i on st rat egy i n whi ch ai rpower woul d
force the Serbs t o hal t t hei r at t acks on Bosni an ci t i es, t her eby
openi ng t he way t o product i ve peace negot i at i ons.
In cont rast t o Secret ary Chri st opher s confi dent predi ct i ons,
however, ot her event s at t he London conf er ence i ndi cat ed t hat
t he gat hered mi ni st ers were not al l ful l y behi nd t he Ameri can
pr oposal t o unl eash a det er mi ned ai r assaul t on t he Bosni an
Ser bs. British foreign secretary Malcolm Rifkind announced
t hat al t hough t her e was st r ong suppor t f or ai r power , t her e
were al so reservat i ons . . . [and] i t woul d be used onl y i f i t was
fel t necessary.
41
In a si mi l ar vei n of caut i on, t he French del e -
gat i on reconfi rmed a demand t hat ground rei nforcement s pre-
cede any bombi ng operat i ons, part i cul arl y regardi ng t he en -
danger ed ci t y of Gor azde.
42
As a c o n s e q u e n c e o f t h e s e
reservat i ons, t he conferences decl arat i on act ual l y ext ended
the threat of air strikes only in protection of Gorazde, a limita -
tion that prompted the Bosnian prime minister, Haris Silajdzic,
to declare it a green light to attacks everywhere else. Publically
at least, Bosnian Serb leaders also were not intimidat ed by t he
London conferences threats, as evidenced by the Bosnian Serb
armys (BSA) cont i nued at t acks on UN-protected cit i es.
43
OWEN
479
Meanwhi l e at NATO headquar t er s , Ambas s ador Hunt er ,
Secretary-General Willy Claes, and ot her l eader s wer e or ches -
trating events in NAC t o gi ve some credence t o t he London
conferences threat of decisive air action. Following an NAC
meet i ng on 25 Jul y, t he day t he conf er ence ended, Cl aes a n -
nounced t hat NAC had appr oved t he necessar y pl anni ng to
ensure t hat NATO ai r power woul d be used i n a t i mel y and
effect i ve way shoul d t he Bosni an Serbs t hr eat en or at t ack
Gorazde. The secret ary-general al so i ndi cat ed t hat pl anni ng
woul d begi n t o prot ect t he ot her safe areas, and he war ned
t hat such operat i ons, once t hey are l aunched wi l l not l i ght l y
be di scont i nued.
44
Not i ncl uded i n Secret ary-General Cl aes s
press rel ease were t he operat i onal det ai l s set t l ed by NAC .
These i ncl uded adopt i on of t he so-cal l ed t ri gger event s t hat
woul d st art t he bombi ng. NAC also approved AFSOUTHs pl an
t o defend each Bosni an ci t y by st ri ki ng Serb t ar get s t hr ough -
out t he ZOA t hat i ncl uded t he ci t y.
45
Finally, NATO sent t hr ee
ai r commander s t o Bosni a t o convi nce t he Bosni an Serb mili -
t ary commander, Gen Rat ko Ml adi c , of t he al l i ances det ermi-
nat i on t o car r y out i t s t hr eat s.
46
All of these events were welcome news for General Ryan a nd
Admi ral Smi t h . They were particularly pleased by NAC s cl ear -
ance t o st ri ke t hroughout a gi ven ZOA i n defense of a ci t y
wi t hi n i t . Had t hey been hel d t o hi t t i ng onl y t arget s i n t he
military exclusion zones sur r oundi ng t he saf e ar eas, t hey be-
l i eved t hat t hei r sort i es woul d be expended agai nst hard-t o-
fi nd-and-at t ack t act i cal t arget s , such as ar t i l l er y pi eces and
armored vehi cl es. The t wo commanders ant i ci pat ed t hat ai r
at t acks agai nst t hose ki nds of di rect t arget s woul d be sl ow t o
i nfl i ct enough pai n on t he Serbs to force them to comply
wi t h UN demands. Consequent l y t hey wel comed t he oppor t u -
nity to plan against a wider range of indirect targets , such as
bri dges, command faci l i t i es, suppl y dumps, and so on, t hat t hey
also knew would be easier to find and destroy. Moreover, Ryan
and Smi t h anticipated that, sortie-per-sortie, such a campaign
woul d i nfl i ct more coerci ve pai n on t he Serbs and at l es s cos t
i n bl ood and t i me t han one f ocused on di r ect ta r get s.
47
Ryan
and Smi t h bel i eved t hat bl ood and t i me woul d be t hei r gr eat-
est concer n because t hey ant i ci pat ed t hat publ i c suppor t f or
DELIBERATE FORCE
480
t he campaign would quickly dwindle, particularly if NATO
bombs began to kill civiliansor even Bosnian Serb soldiers .
48
I n addi t i on t o br oadeni ng AFSOUTH s pl anni ng leeway,
NACs act i ons on 25 Jul y al so opened t he way for UN l eader s
t o drop t hei r resi st ance t o a heavy campai gn of offensi ve ai r
st r i kes. As publ i c and st r ong st at ement s of i nt ent t o puni sh
Ser b at t acks on t he saf e ar eas , NACs deci si ons went a l ong
way t oward showi ng t he UN secret ary-general t hat most , i f not
all, NATO member st at es had f ound t he commi t ment and do-
mest i c pol i t i cal st ami na t o i ni t i at e and st ay wi t h an ai r cam-
pai gn l ong enough t o have an effect on Serbi an act i ons and
pol i cy. In response, t he secret ary-general on t hat same day
t r ansf er r ed t he UN keys for approving offensive air strikes and
CAS f r om hi s hands and t hose of Ambassador Akashi, respec-
t i vel y, t o t hose of Gen Bernard Janvi er , force commander of
United Nations Peace Forces (UNPF, previ ousl y known as UN-
PROFOR).
49
The power t o l aunch st r i kes agai nst t he Ser bs
now l ay i n t he hands of mi l i t ar y commander s on t he scene.
As Col onel Campbel l descri bes i n hi s chapt er, General Ryan
responded t o t hese rapi d shi ft s i n t he pol i t i cal and di pl omat i c
envi ronment of t he i nt ervent i on by accel erat i ng t he ongoi ng
ai r - pl anni ng effort . Hi s st aff cont i nued t o refi ne i ndi vi dual
safe-area pl ans and Deadeye. Expl oi t i ng t he freedom t o pl an
at t acks across a ZOA, AIRSOUTH st affers al so produced a
pl an cal l ed Vul can , whi ch post ul at ed wi de-rangi ng st ri kes i n
t he sout heast er n ZOA to protect Sarajevo. Anot her new bri ef-
i ng t i t l ed Graduat ed Ai r Operat i ons proposed a st epwi se es -
cal at i on of at t acks across a ZOA t o force t he Serbs t o back
away from one or more safe areas. By 3 August t hese pl anni ng
act i ons had r eached a poi nt t hat Admi r al Smi t h and Gener al
Ryan could brief Secretary-General Claes and Gen Geor ge
Joul wan, SACEUR, on how they intended to apply offensive air
st ri kes i n t he Bal kans. With the endorsements of these leaders
in hand, Admiral Smith si gned a memorandum on 10 August
wi t h General Janvi er and Bri t i sh l i eut enant general Rupert
Smi t h, his deputy in Sarajevo, that clarified the over arching
purpose, phasing, assumptions, and so on to guide the
looming air campaign.
50
At the same time, AIRSOUTH worked
out further air-ground coordination arrangements and target lists
with UN ground commanders and with British major gener al
OWEN
481
David Pennyfather , chief of staff of the NATO Rapid Reaction
Force (RRF), which had been deploying into Sarajevo for several
weeks.
51
By the third week of August, then, at least General
Ryan had the plans in place to fight on behalf of the UN.
As t he summer passed, Gener al Ryan t ook advant age of t he
rel axed di pl omat i c rest rai nt s on pl anni ng l arge-scal e offensi ve
operat i ons by expandi ng t he CAOCs manni ng and equi pment
as qui ckl y as possi bl e. Gui ded and under pi nned, i n par t , by
t he r ecommendat i ons of a Pent agon st udy t eam t hat assessed
the CAOCs readi ness for expanded ai r operat i ons i n l at e Jul y,
Ryan dr ew heavi l y on US manpower and equi pment t o expand
the CAOCs capabi l i t i es.
52
Several hundred TDY augment ees
began flowing in from US bases everywhere, along with a flood
of state-of-the-art communications, intelligence, and automat ed
pl anni ng syst ems. Per haps most i mpor t ant l y, el ement s of a
US Air Force Contingency Theater Air Planning System (CTAPS)
began to arrive, which, when fully assembled and operating,
would vastly enhance the CAOCs abi l i t y t o pl an, moni t or, and
control high-intensity air operations in near real time.
Taken t oget her , t hese act i ons pr et t y much compl et ed t he
effective Americanization of the CAOC, but t hat was a pr i ce
Ryan and Lt Gen Hal Hor nbur g, director of the CAOC, felt
ready t o pay i n t he rush t o get ready. For mont hs, pol i t i cs had
rest rai ned t hei r abi l i t y t o prepare for an enl arged ai r war, and
now pol i t i cs had suddenl y present ed t hem wi t h t he l i kel i hood
of j ust such a war much f ast er t han t hey coul d adj ust t hei r
forces t o accommodat e.
53
Nevert hel ess, despi t e t he fact t hat
the vast majority of their CAOC per sonnel had been i n I t al y for
l ess t han a few weeks or even days, and despi t e t he pi l es of
unopened CTAPS equi pment boxes l yi ng ar ound, Admi r al
Smi t h, General Ryan , Gener al Hor nbur g, and Brig Gen David
Sawyer deputy director of the CAOC and deput y commander
of 5 ATAFwere ready for a fight by the third week of Augu s t
about a week before they found themselves in the middle of one.
Operati ons
Gi ven t he prot ract ed pol i t i cal and mi l i t ary run up t o i t , t he
act ual st art of Del i berat e Force was al most ant i cl i mact i c. The
DELIBERATE FORCE
482
speci fi c t ri gger event for t he campai gn was t he expl osi on of a
mor t ar bomb i n Sar aj evos Mrkal e market pl ace t hat ki l l ed 37
peopl e on t he mor ni ng of 28 August 1995. I n t he nor mal
course of event s for t he unfort unat e ci t y, a mort ar expl osi on
was unr emar kabl e, but t hi s one caused except i onal and i m -
medi at el y t el evi sed bl oodshed. It s t i mi ng made an i nt erven -
t i oni st response vi rt ual l y cert ai n. Si nce General Janvi er was
i n Pari s, Admi ral Smi t h cont act ed General Smi t h , Janvier s
deput y i n Saraj evo, as soon as he hear d t he news. The t wo
commanders agreed t hat , whi l e UN investigators worked to
assi gn cert ai n bl ame for t he at t ack, Admi ral Smi t h woul d be-
gi n prepari ng for bombi ng operat i ons, i f requi red. At 0200 on
t he 29t h, Gener al Smi t h called Admiral Smith t o r epor t t hat
he was now cer t ai n t hat Bosni an Ser b forces had fi red t he
shel l and t hat he was t ur ni ng hi s key. The UN general , how-
ever, asked Admi ral Smi t h t o del ay l aunchi ng at t acks f or 24
hours t o gi ve peacekeepi ng uni t s i n Bosni a t i me t o pul l i nt o
posi t i ons t hey coul d defend, shoul d t he Serbs l aunch r et al i a-
t ory at t acks agai nst t hem. Al so, General Janvi er had t o ap -
prove the final list of targets for t he i ni t i al st ri kes. Aft er a
number of conversat i ons wi t h Admi ral Smi t h dur i ng t he day,
Janvi er fi nal l y di d approve 10 of 13 i ni t i al t arget s pr oposed by
Gener al s Ryan and Smi t h and al r eady t ent at i vel y appr oved by
Admiral Smith .
54
Meanwhi l e, General Ryan and hi s st aff at t he CAOC worked
feverishly to ready the assigned NATO air forces for battle. In
fact , Ryan had come t o t he CAOC on t he mor ni ng of t he 29t h
t o l ead a prepl anned exerci set he Vul can prot ect i on pl an for
Saraj evo. Wi t h an act ual cr i si s at hand, t he gener al cancel ed
Vul can and focused hi s st aff on act i vat i ng and modi fyi ng as
necessar y t he oper at i onal pl ans and uni t r ei nf or cement s t hat
compri sed what amount ed t o t he Del i berat e Force pl an. Whi l e
wai t i ng for orders t o st art operat i ons and approval of t he i n -
itial target list by General Janvi er and Admi r al Smi t h, t he
AIRSOUTH commander concent r at ed on al er t i ng hi s uni t s, r e-
fi ni ng t he ai r t aski ng message t hat woul d gui de t hei r opera -
t i ons for t he fi rst day of bombi ng, and bri ngi ng addi t i onal ai r
and support forces i nt o t he t heat er as requi red. The del ay i n
st art i ng operat i ons proved useful , i n t hat i t provi ded t i me t o
flow additional US Air Force , Navy, and Mari ne aircraft into
OWEN
483
Aviano and t o swi ng t he carri er Theodore Roosevelt i nt o t he
Adriatic i n t i me t o l aunch ai rcraft for t he fi rst st ri kes. Ryan
al so r eaf f i r med t o hi s st af f t hat he i nt ended t o ensur e t hat t he
weapons and t act i cs ut i l i zed by NATO woul d be sel ect ed and
fl own t o accompl i sh t he requi red l evel s of dest ruct i on at mi ni-
mum r i sk of unpl anned or col l at er al damage t o mi l i t ary and
civilian people and property. Ryan and Admi ral Smi t h fully
agreed t hat t he di pl omat i c sensi t i vi t i es of t he campai gn made
col l at eral damage an i ssue of pi vot al st rat egi c i mport ance.
Ryan bel i eved t hat a st ray bomb causi ng ci vi l i an casual t i es
woul d t ake t he i nt ervent i oni st s off t he moral hi gh ground,
mar shal wor l d opi ni on agai nst t he ai r campai gn, and pr obabl y
bri ng i t t o a hal t before i t had i t s i nt ended effect s.
55
Ryans command was ready for operations by the end of the
29t h. Af t er wai t i ng out t he 24- hour del ay t o al l ow UN
peacekeepers time to hunker down in their defensive positions,
the first NATO jets went feet dry over the Bosnian coast at
0140 on t he 30t h, l aden wi t h bombs t o make t he fi rst st rike.
The physi cal and t empor al di mensi ons of t he ensui ng cam-
pai gn were fai rl y compact , part i cul arl y when compared t o t he
scal e and scope of a maj or ai r campai gn, such as Oper at i on
Desert Storm duri ng t he Gul f War of 199091. Compared t o
the vast reaches of Southwest Asia, NATO ai r at t acks i n Del i b -
er at e For ce occur r ed i n a t r i angul ar ar ea onl y about 150 nau-
t i cal mi l es wi de on i t s nor t her n base and st r et chi ng about 150
miles to the south. The weight of the NATO at t ack al so was
relatively limited. Desert Storm l ast ed 43 days, but dur i ng t he
22 calendar days of Deliberate Force, NATO ai rcraft and a
single US Navy ship firing a volley of Tomahawk land attack
missiles (TLAM) act ual l y r el eased weapons agai nst t he Ser bs
on j ust 12 days. Two days i nt o t he campai gn, NATO mi l i t ary
commanders hal t ed offensi ve ai r operat i ons agai nst t he Serbs
for four days t o encourage negot i at i ons . When useful negot i a -
t i ons f ai l ed t o mat er i al i ze, t hey r esumed bombi ng on t he
mor ni ng of 5 Sept ember and cont i nued t hr ough 13 Sept em-
ber. When not i fi ed by General Smi t h on 14 Sept ember t hat
General Mladic and Presi dent Karadzi c of t he Serb Republ i c
had accept ed t he UNs terms, CINCSOUTH and Gener al J an-
vier j oi nt l y suspended offensi ve operat i ons at 2200. They de-
cl ar ed t he campai gn cl osed on 20 Sept ember .
DELIBERATE FORCE
484
The t ot al ai r forces i nvol ved i ncl uded about 220 fi ght er ai r -
craft and 70 support ai rcraft from t hree US servi ces, Great
Britain , Italy, Ger many, Holland, Greece, Turkey, Spain , and
Fr anceall directly assigned to AIRSOUTH and based mai nl y
in Italyand a st eady st ream of ai rl i ft ai rcraft bri ngi ng for -
war d uni t s and suppl i es. On days when st r i kes wer e f l own,
AIRSOUTH-assi gned forces l aunched an average of four or fi ve
ai r-t o-ground packages i nvol vi ng perhaps 60 or 70 bomb-
dr oppi ng sor t i es and anot her one hundr ed t o 150 ot her sor t i es
t o provi de combat ai r pat rol, defense suppressi on , t anker , r e-
connai ssance, and survei l l ance support t o t he shoot ers. In
t ot al , Del i berat e Force i ncl uded 3, 535 ai rcraft sort i es, of whi ch
2, 470 went feet dry over t he Bal kans region to deliver 1, 026
weapons agai nst 48 t ar get s , i ncl udi ng 338 i ndi vi dual desi red
mean points of impact (DMPI).
56
These fi gures equat ed t o j ust
about a busy days sort i e count for coal i t i on ai r forces duri ng
t he Gul f Warand onl y a t i ny f r act i on of t he 227, 340 weapons
t hose ai r forces rel eased agai nst t he Iraqi s i n t he 43 days of
Desert St orm.
For al l of t he brevi t y, l i mi t ed scal e, and operat i onal one-si d -
edness of Del i berat e Force, t he vari ous researchers of t he
BACS al l di scovered t hat t he execut i on phase of t he operat i on
offered many i nsi ght s i nt o t he appl i cat i on and useful ness of
ai rpower i n a compl ex regi onal confl i ct . Thi s summary i n -
cl udes onl y t hose di scoveri es t hat seem t o have t he broadest
i mport ance t o t he general communi t y of ai rpower t hi nkers.
Some of t hese di scoveri es st em from t he operat i onal cont ext of
t he confl i ct ot hers from t he cont i nued, even i ncreased, pol i t i -
cal and di pl omat i c compl exi t y of Del i berat e Force i n i t s execu -
t i on phase.
From t he i ncept i on of i t s st udy, t he BACS t eam ant i ci pat ed
t hat l eadershi p woul d be a broadl y i nt erest i ng area of i nqui ry.
Report s from t he fi el d and subsequent i nt ervi ews hi ghl i ght ed
t he except i onal l y cl ose cont rol exerci sed by General Ryan over
Del i berat e Forces t act i cal event s. Refl ect i ng hi s and Admi ral
Smi t hs convi ct i on t hat every bomb was a pol i t i cal bomb,
General Ryan personally oversaw the selection of every DMPI
i n every t arget. He al so personal l y scrut i ni zed every sel ect i on
or weaponeering decision made for the actual weapons to be
used against DMPIs , and he exami ned or di rect ed many t act i cal
OWEN
485
deci si ons about such t hi ngs as t he st r i kes l aunch t i mes, t he
speci fi c composi t i on of at t ack format i ons, and t he sel ect i on of
bomb- r un r out es. I n hi s wor ds, Ryan felt obliged to exercise
such cl ose cont rol to minimize the risk of error and, if mis -
t akes wer e made, t o ensur e t hat t hey woul d be at t r i but abl e t o
hi mand hi m al one.
57
That is, Ryan consci ousl y chose t hi s
approach t o l eadershi p, whi ch he consi dered appropri at e t o
t he ci r cumst ances as he saw t hem.
Pl aci ng General Ryan s acut e at t ent i on t o t act i cal det ai l s i n
a broader hi st ori cal cont ext , Lt Col Chri s Orndorff poi nt s out
in hi s chapt er t hat Ryan s act i ons had much i n common wi t h
t he gr eat capt ai ncy of fi el d commanders i n t he peri od up t o
and i ncl udi ng t he Napol eoni c era. Great capt ai ns and gr eat
capt ai ncy, Ordorff explains, were epitomized by Napolon t he
mast er pr act i t i oner of an ar t of command char act er i zed by
cl ose at t ent i on t o t he l ogi st i cal and t act i cal det ai l s of armi es,
as wel l as t he mast er of st rat egi c gui dance. Great capt ai ns
pract i ced t hi s broad range of i nt ervent i on because i t was vi t al
t o t hei r success and because t hey had t he means t o do so.
Because ar mi es wer e smal l , i ndi vi dual t act i cal event s as-
sumed gr eat i mpor t ance, and cont empor ar y communi cat i ons
al l owed a si ngl e commander t o moni t or and cont r ol such de-
t ai l s i n a t i mel y manner .
But as t he i ndust r i al r evol ut i on pr ogr essed t hr ough t he
ni net eent h cent ury, t he si ze of armi es and t he scope of t hei r
operat i ons vast l y i ncreased. Great capt ai ncy, at l east t o t he
extent that it involved close oversight of logistical and tactical
det ai l s, became i mpract i cal i n wars bet ween l arge i ndust ri al
st at es. In response, t he Prussi ans l ed t he worl d i n devel opi ng
a mi l i t ar y syst em based on cent r al i zed st r at egi c command,
general i zed pl anni ng by t rai ned st aff offi cers, and decent ral-
i zed execut i on of operat i ons and l ogi st i cal support by st an-
dardi zed uni t s i n accordance wi t h t he gui dance of t he fi rst t wo
groups. Among t he many feat ures of t hi s syst em was a di vi -
si on of l abor t hat had seni or commander s t hi nki ng st r at egi -
cal l y and eschewi ng cl ose management of t act i cal det ai l s.
These cul t ur al ar r angement s, coupl ed wi t h a sophi st i cat ed ap-
pr oach t o mi l i t ar y t r ai ni ng and educat i on, wer e, i n t he sum-
mat i on of one hi st ori an, an effort by t he Prussi ans t o i nst i t u -
t i onal i ze a syst em whereby ordi nary men coul d repl i cat e t he
DELIBERATE FORCE
486
mi l i t ary geni us of a great capt ai n , such as Napol on , o n a
sust ai ned basi s and on an i ndust r i al scal e.
58
Gi ven t hat per -
spect i ve, Orndorff suggest s t hat General Ryan s cl ose supervi -
si on of Del i berat e Forces t act i cal det ai l s meri t s cl ose exami-
nat i on of t he condi t i ons t hat made i t apparent l y successful i n
an age when t he st af f syst em seems t o have ot her wi se sup-
pl ant ed gr eat capt ai ncy i n war .
In net , Col onel Orndorffs concl usi ons echo t he opi ni on of
everyone interviewed for the BACS t hat Gener al Ryans excep -
t i onal i nvol vement i n t he t act i cal det ai l s of Del i berat e Force
r ef l ect ed bot h hi s pr er ogat i ves as commander and an appr o -
pri at e response t o t he pol i t i cal and mi l i t ary ci rcumst ances of
t he operat i on. Such was t he case, Orndorff bel i eves, because
t he ci rcumst ances of Del i berat e Force conformed i n i mport ant
ways t o ci rcumst ances t hat gave ri se t o prei ndust ri al com -
mand pract i ces. Tact i cal event s, namel y t he dest ruct i on of
specific targets and the possibility of suffering NATO cas ual-
t i es, pot ent i al l y carri ed profound st rat egi c i mpl i cat i ons. The
NATO ai r forces i nvol ved were smal l i n rel at i on t o t he capaci -
t i es of t he command, cont rol , communi cat i ons, and i nt el l i -
gence syst ems avai l abl e t o fi nd t arget s, moni t or and di r ect
f or ces, and mai nt ai n command l i nkages. Dr awi ng on t he anal-
ogy of an earl i er commander st andi ng on a hi l l , Orndorff sug-
gest s t hat General Ryan had t he sensor y and cogni t i ve capa -
bi l i t y t o embrace t he ai r bat t l e comprehensi vel y, assess t he
tactical and strategic flow of events, and direct all of his forces
i n a t i mel y manner. In t he words of one seni or US Ai r Force
l eader, t herefore, General Ryan not onl y coul d exerci se cl ose
t act i cal cont rol over his forces but also was obliged to do so.
59
Col onel Orndorff and ot her members of t he t eam di d i den -
t i fy some pot ent i al drawbacks of General Ryans gr eat cap -
t ai ncy. Most not abl y i t focused a t remendous amount of work
on t he general and a few members of hi s st aff. Indi vi dual s
working closely to Ryan in the CAOC, such as Col onel Zoerb,
AIRSOUTH di rect or of pl ans; St even R. Teske, CAOC director
of pl ans; and Col Dougl as J. Ri chardson , CAOC di rect or of
oper at i ons, wor ked 18- hour days t hr oughout t he campai gn.
60
By t hei r own account s, aft er t wo weeks t hey were very t i red.
At t he same t i me, ot her members of t he CAOC st aff were
underut i l i zed, as t he smal l group of offi cers worki ng around
OWEN
487
Ryan absorbed some of t hei r corporat e t act i cal responsi bi l i -
t i es, at l east i n t hei r cul mi nat i ng st eps.
Meanwhi l e some of t he hi gher responsi bi l i t i es t hat mi ght
have fal l en on Ryan i n hi s capaci t y as t he seni or oper at i onal
commander devol ved on Maj Gen Mi chael Short , his chief of
staff in Naples . Act i ng as t he rear-echel on commander of AIR-
SOUTH, General Short became r esponsi bl e f or , among many
things, aspects of the public affairs, logistical, political, and
mi l i t ary coordi nat i on funct i ons of Del i berat e Force. In ret ro -
s pect, although he believed that this division of labor made good
sense under t he ci rcumst ances, General Short felt th at he a nd
General Ryan had not fully anticipated all of the sta ff and com-
muni cat i ons requi rement s needed t o keep Ryan u p-t o-dat e on
oper at i ons and ot her i ssues. As a consequence, Gener al Shor t
somet i mes found i t di ffi cul t t o prepare t i mel y answers t o
hi gher - l evel i nqui r i es about oper at i ons or Gener al Ryans
pl ans.
61
Together with the effect of General Ryans centralized
l eadershi p st yl e on t he CAOCs di vi si on of l abor, General
Shor t s experi ence i ndi cat es a need for ai rmen t o ant i ci pat e
t hat l eadershi p st yl e i s an i mport ant choi ceone t hat can
shape st aff processes and moral e si gni fi cant l y.
Lt Col Mark Conversinos chapter on Deliberate Force op-
erat i ons focuses pri mari l y on t he act i vi t i es of t he 31st Fi ght er
Wing at Avi ano AB.
62
I n net , hi s r esear ch r eveal s t hat t he
wi ngs great success i n t he campai gn refl ect ed t he professi on -
al i sm and ski l l s of i t s personnel , rangi ng from i t s commander
t o i ndi vi dual j uni or t echni ci ans worki ng on t he fl i ght l i ne.
Fr om Jul y 1995 t he 31st Wi ng formed t he core of t he 7490t h
Wing (Provisional), an organi zat i on est abl i shed t o embrace t he
numerous US Ai r Force f i ght er and suppor t squadr ons and
US Navy and Mar i ne ai r uni t s brought t o Avi ano for Deny
Fl i ght. These uni t s made Avi ano a busy pl ace.
At i t s peak st r engt h, t he 7490t h Wi ng i ncl uded about one
hundr ed ai r cr af t , al l cr owded ont o a base wi t h onl y one r un-
way and desi gned nor mal l y t o handl e a wi ng of about 75
f i ght er s. The cr owded condi t i ons of t he base made t he chor e-
ography of mai nt ai ni ng, servi ci ng, and movi ng ai rcraft about
t he fi el d so t i ght and di ffi cul t t hat many of t he peopl e worki ng
t here began cal l i ng i t t he USS Aviano, al l udi ng t o t he condi-
t i ons normal l y prevai l i ng on t he deck of an ai rcraft carri er.
DELIBERATE FORCE
488
Moreover, Col Charles F. Wald , commander of t he 7490t h, and
his staff were responsible for tactical coordination with other
NATO squadrons scat t ered around It al y . Ti me pressures and
limited communications channels made this task daunting. Had
t he 31st Wi ngs permanently and temporarily assigned personnel
not performed at such a high level across the board, Deliberate
Force in reasonable probability would have fallen flat on its face.
At t he same t i me, Col onel Conversi nos chapt er i dent i fi es
several sources of psychol ogi cal st ress at Avi ano t hat , over a
mor e pr ot r act ed campai gn, mi ght have under mi ned t he pr ovi -
si onal wi ngs hi gh performance and moral e. The presence of
fami l i es was one pot ent i al source of st ress. Because Avi ano
was t he 31st Wi ngs permanent base, t he fami l i es of many of
the wings personnel lived in the vicinity. During Deliberate
Force, t hese fami l i es coul d be bot h a source of emot i onal
st rengt h for combat ai rcrews and a pot ent i al source of worry
and di st r act i on. On t he one hand, spouses br ought meal s and
mor al suppor t t o t he uni t s. On t he ot her hand, t hey and t hei r
chi l dren were there, compl et e wi t h t hei r school probl ems, bro -
ken cars, anxi et i es, and so on. Al t hough moral e general l y
st ayed hi gh at Avi ano, one must r eal i ze t hat t he campai gn
l ast ed onl y t wo weeks and t hat t he wi ng t ook no casual t i es.
Many of t he i ndi vi dual s and some commander s i nt er vi ewed by
Conversi no and ot her BACS member s expr essed concer n at
what woul d have happened t o t he emot i onal t enor of t he base
communi t y and t o t he concent r at i on of t he combat ai r cr ew-
men had t he campai gn gone on l onger , wi t h casual t i es or wi t h
t he mat eri al i zat i on of t errori st t hreat s agai nst fami l i es. Duri ng
oper at i ons, one squadr on commander even consi der ed evacu -
at i ng dependent s i f Del i berat e Force dragged on.
63
Anot her sour ce of st r ess st emmed f r om t he unf ami l i ar na-
t ure of t he Del i berat e Force mi ssi on. Act ual l y, at t he l evel of
t act i cal operat i ons, t he operat i onal t empo, t act i cs, and t hreat s
of t he campai gn were much l i ke t hose t hat 31st Wi ng ai r men
woul d have expect ed t o face i n a hi gh-i nt ensi t y confl i ct . Dai l y
flights as elements of gorillas of attack, defense suppression ,
el ect roni c warfare, escort , and t anker ai rcraft pot ent i al l y i n
t he face of radar-di rect ed ant i ai rcraft defensesl ook pret t y
much t he same t act i cal l y, regardl ess of t he l i mi t ed or con -
vent i onal nat ure of a confl i ct at t he operat i onal and st rat egi c
OWEN
489
l evel s. But t hese confl i ct s do di ffer at t he operat i onal and
st rat egi c l evel s, and t herei n l ay a source of confusi on and
t ensi on bet ween t he fi el d uni t s and t he CAOC.
Ai rmen i n t he fi el d found t hemsel ves fi ght i ng a t act i cal l y
convent i onal campai gn at pot ent i al l y subst ant i al ri sk from en -
emy action. The CAOC made pl ans and i s s ued or der s t hat
refl ect ed t he operat i onal - and st rat egi c-l evel const rai nt s and
rest rai nt s i nherent i n t he ai r campai gns i dent i t y as t he mi l i -
t ary arm of a l i mi t ed peace operat i on . The difference between
t hese per spect i ves was mani f est ed i n t he conf usi on and f r us-
t rat i on fel t by some i nt ervi ewed ai rmen over such t hi ngs as
ROE, out si de i nt erference wi t h t hei r det ai l ed t act i cal pl ans
and deci si ons, apparent rest ri ct i ons on t he fl ow of i nt el l i gence
i nformat i on t o t he fi el d, and so on. Si nce t hese t hi ngs came t o
the field via the CAOC, a number of the BACS interviewees
expressed a sense t hat t hey were fi ght i ng one war and t hat t he
CAOC was fighting another one, with the CAOCs version of the
war t endi ng t o put t he fl yers at great er and unnecessary ri sk.
64
Colonel Conversino also identifies several logistical prob-
l ems t hat mi ght have under mi ned t he power of t he ai r cam-
pai gn had i t gone on l onger. Under t he US Ai r Forces lean
l ogi st i cs concept , ai r bases normal l y do not have l arge st ocks
of suppl i es and spar e par t s on hand. The concept assumes
t hat moder n l ogi st i cs t echni ques can move suppl i es and par t s
f r om homel and depot s qui ckl y enough t o meet demands and
t her eby r educe t he si ze of t he war ehouse and mai nt enance
oper at i ons a base has t o mai nt ai n t o sust ai n oper at i ons. At
Aviano, one mani fest at i on of l ean l ogi st i cs was t hat t he base
exper i enced shor t ages i n sever al ar eas of suppl y as soon as
operat i ons began. One of t he more cri t i cal short ages i nvol ved
ai rcraft t ow vehi cl es (bobt ai l s) and t hei r t i res. Compoundi ng
t he pr obl em, t he war began on a Wednesday, meani ng t hat
st at esi de depot s, whi ch st ayed on a peacet i me schedul e, wer e
cl osed for t he weekendj ust as urgent request s for suppl i es
began to flow in from Aviano. Quick calls to supervisors opened
up t he depot s, but some suppl y probl ems, such as bobt ai l t i res,
remained unsolved during Deliberate Force operations .
Complementing Colonel Conversinos broad review of Deliber -
ate Force operations, Lt Col Rick Sargents chapters shift the
focus of BACS to a more microscopic assessment of the wea pons,
DELIBERATE FORCE
490
tactics, and targeting aspects of the air campaign. After a de-
t ai l ed di scussi on of t he t ypes of manned and unmanned ai rcraft
empl oyed duri ng t he operat i on, Sargent descri bes t he preci si on-
guided munitions (PGM) used and t hei r fundament al i mpor -
tance to the conduct and outcome of Deliberate Force. Because
NATO ai r commanders were concerned wi t h get t i ng t he fast est
possible results from their operations while minimizing collateral
damage and casual t i es, Sargent argues t hat preci si on gui ded
munitions became the overwhelming weapons of choice during
air strike operations. Of the 1, 026 bombs and missiles ex-
pended during Deliberate Force, 708 were PGMs.
Most of Col onel Sargent s det ai l ed di scussi on of speci fic
weapons and employment tactics remains classified. In general ,
however , hi s wor k demonst r at es t hat PGM empl oyment has
become a compl ex sci ence. Numerous t ypes of PGMs are now
avai l abl e, each wi t h di st i nct charact eri st i cs of t arget acqui si -
t i on, range, t ermi nal effect s, and cost . Tact i ci ans and weapon -
eer s must know and under st and t hose char act er i st i cs t o be
abl e t o make sui t abl e deci si ons about empl oyi ng PGMs within
t he boundar i es of t i me, t ar get s, and ROE . The criticality of
those decisions will only increase for many likely conflicts, for,
as Sar gent quot es Gener al Ryan , Dumb bombs ar e dead.
Ungui ded weapons l i kel y wi l l ret ai n t hei r ut i l i t y i n many ci r -
cumst ances, but i n cases i n whi ch t i me and t ol er ance f or
unwant ed ef f ect s ar e i n shor t suppl y, t hey ar e becomi ng un-
necessari l y ri sky t o use.
Sargent s research and t hat of ot her members of t he BACS
t eam al so hi ghl i ght ed t he need for ai r pl anners and weapon -
eers to recognize that PGMs not onl y di ffer i n t hei r t echni cal
charact eri st i cs and effect s, but al so may di ffer i n t hei r pol i t i cal
and emot i onal effect s. The case i n poi nt here was t he empl oy-
ment of 13 TLAMs on 10 Sept ember . Gener al Ryan request ed
and Admi ral Smi t h approved t he use of t hese l ong-range,
shi p- l aunched mi ssi l es mai nl y on t he mi l i t ar y gr ounds t hat
t hey wer e t he best weapons avai l abl e t o t ake out key Bosni an
Ser b ai r defense syst ems i n t he Banj a Luka area wi t hout ri sk
to NATO ai rcrews. As i t t urned out , however, t hese mi ssi l es
were more t han j ust anot her weapon i n t he cont ext of Bosni a .
TLAMs represent ed t he hi gh-end of PGM technology. Their
sudden use i n Bosni a si gnal ed t o many peopl e t hat NATO was
OWEN
491
i ni t i at i ng a si gni fi cant escal at i on of t he confl i ct , al t hough such
was not t he i nt ent of t he mi l i t ary commanders. Addi t i onal l y,
many NAC member s wer e upset by t he f act t hat t hey had not
been consul t ed bef or ehand on t he use of t hese advanced
weapons.
65
At t he same t i me, Admi ral Smi t h r epor t s t hat he
subsequent l y l ear ned f r om an Amer i can di pl omat i n cont act
wi t h t he Bosni an Ser bs that the TLAMs scared t he sh out
of t he Serbs . According to Smith t he use of t he mi ssi l es
showed t he Ser bs that NATO was seri ous and t hat t hey di d
not have a cl ue where we coul d go next .
66
Cl earl y t he t erm
weaponeeri ng must car r y a br oad meani ng f or seni or com -
mander s and t echni ci ans i nvol ved i n t he pr ocess.
In a si mi l ar vei n t o Col onel Sargent s effort , Maj Mark
McLaughl i ns chapt er exami nes t he nat ure of NATO combat
assessment dur i ng t he ai r campai gn. Begi nni ng at t he t heo -
ret i cal l evel , McLaughl i n wri t es t hat combat assessment i s t he
pr ocess by whi ch ai r commander s det er mi ne how t hey ar e
doi ng i n rel at i on t o at t ai ni ng t hei r obj ect i ves. Through a t hree-
st ep process of bat t l e damage assessment (BDA), muni t i ons
ef f ect i venes s as s es s ment , and r eat t ack r ecommendat i ons ,
commander s l ear n i f t hei r at t acks and weapons ar e br i ngi ng
t he enemy cl oser t o defeat at t he best possi bl e rat e. Effect i ve
combat assessment , t herefore, remai ns a vi t al t ool for eval uat -
i ng and refi ni ng t act i cs and operat i onal concept s.
At t he pract i cal l evel , McLaughl i n wri t es t hat , whi l e t he
CAOCs combat -assessment process worked wel l , probl ems
exi st edpart i cul arl y i n t he area of BDA. Notable even before
Deliberate Force were the near absence of NATO BDA doct r i ne
and t he uneven experi ence and t rai ni ng l evel s of t he vari ous
nat i onal per sonnel doi ng BDA i n t he CAOC. The different
NATO ai r f or ces had di f f er ent st andar ds and met hods f or as-
sessi ng damage. For t he sake of st andardi zat i on, CAOC BDA
manager s at t empt ed t o t r ai n t hei r subor di nat es i n US doct r i ne
and procedures. But t he rapi d t urnover of t hei r st affs, engen -
dered by t he pract i ce of manni ng t he CAOC mainly with TDY
per sonnel , under mi ned t hat pr ocess. The net ef f ect of t hese
probl ems, accordi ng t o McLaughl i n, was a somewhat sl uggi sh
pace i n t he fl ow and assessment of BDA dat a i nt o, wi t hi n, and
out of the CAOC. In t urn, t he pot ent i al l y negat i ve effect s of t he
slow pace of BDA, at l east i n t erms of avoi di ng confl i ct i ng
DELIBERATE FORCE
492
publ i c assessment s of how t he bombi ng campai gn was goi ng,
were mi ni mi zed by t he compact ness of t he ai r campai gn and
its target list , by General Ryan s decision to make all definitive
BDA det ermi nat i ons hi msel f, and by Admi ral Smi t hs close
hol d on t he out fl ow of combat -assessment i nformat i on t o t he
pr es s and even to NATO member gover nment s. Whet her or not
t he fl ow of t he combat -assessment process was pai nful l y sl ow,
nei t her commander i nt ended t o or had t o make j udgment s
under t he pr essur e of publ i c scr ut i ny and per haps count er -
vailing analysis.
In anot her chapt er Maj or McLaughl i n offers a succi nct as-
sessment of t he effect i veness of Del i berat e Force. Recogni zi ng
t hat t he perspect i ves of Bosni an Serb l eader s had t o be t he
foundat i on for assessi ng t he campai gn, McLaughl i n proposes
that one should judge NATO air operations in light of their
di rect i mpact as wel l as t he concurrent vi ct ori es by Croat i an
and Musl i m (federat i on) ground forces, Ameri can-sponsored
di pl omat i c i ni t i at i ves, and Serbi as pol i t i cal pressure on i t s
Bosni an Serb cousi ns. Fol l owi ng t hi s prescri pt i on, McLaugh -
l i n i l l ust rat es t he effect s of t he bombi ng on t he psyche and
cal cul at i ons of t he Serb l eaders t hrough t he account s of vari -
ous di pl omat s who deal t wi t h t hem. Not i ng t he campai gns
pr ogr essi on t hr ough act i ve bombi ng, pause, and mor e bomb-
i ng, McLaughl i n t races a st eady det eri orat i on i n t he wi l l of
President Milosevic, Presi dent Karadzi c, and General Ml adi c to
resist NATO and UN demands. Cr oat i an and Musl i m ( f eder a -
t i on) ground offensi ves goi ng on at t he same t i me served t o
i ncr ease pr essur e on t he Ser b l eader s even f ur t her .
I n r api d shut t l e di pl omacy, Ambassador Hol br ooke ex-
pl oi t ed t hese pressures t o coax and bul l y t he Serbs i nt o mak-
i ng concessi ons. A maj or barri er t o progress went down on 8
Sept ember, when regi onal l eaders met wi t h Hol brooke at Ge-
neva and agreed t hat t he fut ure Federat i on of Bosni a would
i ncl ude Cr oat s and Musl i ms and a separ at e and coequal Ser b
Republic . The agreement al so al l owed t he t wo ent i t i es t o es -
t abl i sh paral l el speci al rel at i ons wi t h nei ghbori ng count ri es,
and i t recogni zed t hat t he federat i on and t he Serb Republ i c
woul d cont rol 51 percent and 49 percent of Bosni a s t erri t ory,
respect i vel ya di vi si on of l and l ong est abl i shed i n t he Cont act
Gr oups pr oposal s.
67
Thus t he Bosni an Ser bs had i n hand
OWEN
493
what t hey most want edaut onomy. Under cont i nui ng pr es -
sure from ground and ai r at t acks, t hey found i t easi er t o
accept UN demands, and on 14 Sept ember Hol br ooke a nd
Milosevic successful l y pressured Karadzi c and Mladic t o end
t hei r act i ve mi l i t ary pressure on Saraj evo.
Di pl omacy
Del i berat e Force was about di pl omacyget t i ng t he Bosni an
Ser bs t o end t hei r si eges of t he safe areas and t o ent er i nt o
product i ve negot i at i ons for peace. Consequently several BACS
researchers, Maj or McLaughl i n part i cul arl y, exami ned t he i n -
t erconnect i ons bet ween Del i berat e Force and t he ongoi ng di p -
l omat i c process.
68
In general t hey found t hat t hese i nt ercon -
nect i ons were di ffi cul t t o package and descri be i n a manner
di st i nct and separat e from ot her event s and forces i nfl uenci ng
t he course of di pl omacy. Despite its brevity and limited mili -
tary scope, Deliberate Force turned out to be a complex diplo -
mat i c event i nfl uenced by mi l i t ary operat i ons ot her t han t he
ai r campai gnand by t he conduct of di pl omat i c act i vi t i es i n
several venues. A useful and defensi bl e descri pt i on of t he rel a -
t i onshi p bet ween ai rpower and di pl omacy i n t hi s case, t her e-
fore, requi res a cl ear underst andi ng of t hese ot her operat i ons
and act i vi t i es.
One of t he more i mmedi at e effect s of t he bombi ng campai gn
was t hat i t under scor ed and, t o some degr ee, mandat ed a
t emporary shi ft of t he i nt ervent i ons di pl omat i c l ead from t he
UN t o t he so-cal l ed Cont act Group. For med i n t he summer of
1994, t he Cont act Gr oup represent ed t he forei gn mi ni st ri es of
t he Uni t ed St at es, Great Britain , France , Ger many, and Rus -
sia . The groups sol e purpose was t o provi de an al t ernat i ve
mechani sm t o t he UN for negot i at i ng a peace set t l ement i n t he
r egi on. Si nce i t had none of t he UNs humani t ar i an a n d
peacekeepi ng responsi bi l i t i es t o di vert i t s at t ent i on or weaken
i t s freedom t o negot i at e forcefully, the groups relationship
wi t h t he Bosni an Serbs was more overt l y confront at i onal t han
t he UNs. Thi s sui t ed Ambassador Hol brooke, t he US r epr e-
sent at i ve t o t he group, j ust fi ne. As t he assi st ant secret ary of
st at e for European and Canadi an affai rs, he had been i nvol ved
DELIBERATE FORCE
494
cl osel y wi t h Bal kans di pl omacy f or some t i me and was an
out spoken proponent of aggressi ve act i on agai nst t he Serbs .
69
Upon heari ng of t he Mrkal e shel l i ng, for exampl e, he sug-
gest ed publ i cl y t hat t he pr oper r esponse mi ght be a bombi ng
campai gn agai nst t he Ser bs of up t o si x mont hs.
70
Holbrookes
opi ni on was i mpor t ant because by t he summer of 1995, he
was t he de fact o l ead agent of t he Cont act Group, and i t was
hi s smal l t eam of Ameri can di pl omat s and mi l i t ary offi cers
t hat conduct ed f ace- t o- f ace shut t l e negot i at i ons wi t h t h e
Ser bs and ot her bel l i gerent l eaders duri ng t he bombi ng cam-
pai gn. These negot i at i ons t ook t he Hol brooke team to Yugosla -
via at t he st art of t he bombi ng, t o Brussel s and NAC dur i ng
t he pause, to Geneva for a major face-to-face meeting of the
factional leaders on 8 September, to the United States , back t o
Belgrade on t he 13t h, and t o a host of ot her poi nt s i n bet ween.
The irony of Holbrookes cal l f or r obust bombi ng was t hat
t he UN and NATO coul d not and di d not i ni t i at e Del i berat e
Force to influence the peace process. Officially and publicly,
NATO i ni t i at ed t he campai gn t o prot ect t he safe areas. But as
Ambassador Hunt er poi nt ed out , i t woul d have been nai ve t o
t hi nk t hat t he ai r at t acks woul d not under mi ne t he Ser bs
mi l i t ary power and coerce t hem di pl omat i cal l y. Nevert hel ess,
Hunt er bel i eved, t he bombi ng had t o be represent ed merel y
as an ef f or t t o pr ot ect t he saf e ar eas. The consensus wi t hi n
NAC for ai r act i on rest ed sol el y on support for t he UNSCRs .
There was no overt , general commi t ment t o bomb t he Bosni an
Ser bs i nt o t al ki ng.
71
Also during the time of Deliberate Force, the intervention
conduct ed t wo mi l i t ar y oper at i ons of consequence t o t he
course of di pl omacy. UN peacekeepi ng f or ces r emai ned i n t he
regi on t hough t hei r rol e was mai nl y passi ve duri ng t he peri od
of offensi ve ai r operat i ons. In t he weeks pri or t o t he st art of
bombi ng, t he UN had qui et l y dr awn i t s scat t er ed peacekeepi ng
uni t s i n f r om t he f i el d and concent r at ed t hem i n mor e def ensi -
bl e posi t i ons. Thi s process rushed t o concl usi on i n t he fi nal
hours before bombi ng act ual l y began. Duri ng t he bombi ng,
t hese forces mai nl y hel d t hei r posi t i ons or conduct ed l i mi t ed
pat rol operat i ons, but t hey di d not go on t he offensi ve. At t he
same time, elements of NATOs Rapi d React i on Force t ook an
active though limited role in the interventions offensive. The
OWEN
495
RRF depl oyed i nt o t he Saraj evo ar ea, begi nni ng i n mi d- June.
Duri ng t he fi rst t wo days of Del i berat e Force, i t s art i l l ery uni t s
shel l ed Bosni an Serb mi l i t ary forces i n t he Saraj evo ar ea.
These bombardment s cert ai nl y had some effect on Serb mi l i -
t ary capabi l i t i es, and t hey probabl y had some effect on t hei r
di pl omat i c cal cul at i ons. Gi ven t he l ack of emphasi s pl aced on
t hem by t he di pl omat s i nt ervi ewed by t he BACS t eams, how-
ever, t he effect s of t hese act i vi t i es on di pl omat i c event s prob-
abl y were l i mi t ed, at l east i n rel at i on t o t he effect s of t he ai r
campai gn and mi l i t ary operat i ons of regi onal ant i -Serb forces.
At t he same t i me, t he passi ve val ue of t he peacekeepi ng forces
t o prevent t he Serbs from more or l ess wal ki ng i nt o and t aki ng
t he r emai ni ng saf e ar eas or t aki ng i nt ervent i on peacekeepers
hostage cert ai nl y must have been a fact or i n t hei r mi l i t ary
cal cul at i ons, t hough one not expl ored i n dept h by t he BACS.
Al l di pl omat s and seni or mi l i t ary commanders i nt ervi ewed
by the BACS at t ri but ed great mi l i t ary and di pl omat i c i mpor -
t ance t o Croat i an and Bosni an offensi ve operat i ons agai nst
l ocal Serb forces, whi ch had begun before Del i berat e Force
and whi ch cont i nued par al l el t o and af t er t he oper at i on. These
of f ensi ves began i n t he spr i ng of 1995, and t hey mar ked t he
end of t he overwhel mi ng mi l i t ary advant ages of Serbi an forces.
I n May t he Cr oat i an ar my began a successful offensi ve t o
reest abl i sh government cont rol of west ern Sl avoni a . In l at e
Jul y t he Cr oat i an ar my l aunched a maj or offensi veOpera -
t i on St ormt o ret ake t he Kraj i na and t o rel i eve t he Serbi an
siege of the so-called Bihac Pocket a smal l ar ea under Bos -
ni an cont rol . In a few days, a Croat i an force of nearl y one
hundr ed t housand wel l - equi pped t r oops penet r at ed t he Kr a -
j i na at dozens of pl aces and capt ured Kni n a vital center of
Croat i an Serb power. Over t he next several weeks, t he Croa -
t i ans syst emat i cal l y cl eared t he Kraj i na of Serb resi st ance,
movi ng general l y from west t o east .
72
At t he same t i me, forces
of t he Bosni an Federat i on l aunched a ser i es of oper at i ons
agai nst t he Bosni an Ser bs . Under pressure from t he Uni t ed
St at es and ot her i nt er veni ng gover nment s, t he Bosni an Cr oat
and Musl i m f act i ons had r ees t abl i s hed t he f eder at i on i n
Mar ch 1994 and, si nce t hat t i me, had wor ked t o i mpr ove t he
combat capabi l i t i es of t hei r army. By t he summer of 1995, t he
Bosni an ar my was ready t o go on t he offensi ve, andas t he
DELIBERATE FORCE
496
Croat s swept around t he nort hern borders of Serb-hel d Bos -
nia i t st r uck west and nor t h t o push t he Ser bs back f r om t he
cent er of t he count r y. Caught bet ween a hammer and an
anvi l , t he Serbs ret reat ed preci pi t ousl y, and by mi d-Sept em-
ber t he Croat i an government cont rol l ed i t s t erri t oryand t he
portion of Bosnia under Ser b cont r ol had shr unk f r om 70
per cent t o about 51 per cent .
The existence of a powerful ground offensive in parallel to
Del i berat e Force compl i cat es any det ermi nat i on of t he ai r
campai gns di st i nct i nfl uence on di pl omacy. Undoubt edl y t he
Bosni an Cr oat offensives drastically altered the military pros -
pect s not onl y of t he Serb fact i ons i n t he t wo count ri es but
al so t hose of t he Serbi an l eaders of t he former Yugosl avi a .
Even before t he Croat i ans l aunched t hei r Kr aj i na offensive,
Slobodan Milosevic offered t o act as a peace broker bet ween
t he Bosni an Ser bs and t he i nt er vent i on. At t he t i me, some
observers attributed Milosevic s move t o hi s concerns over t he
growi ng st rengt h of non-Serb mi l i t ary forces and over t he
worseni ng economi c condi t i on of hi s count ry, brought on by
UN sanct i ons .
73
In t hi s l i ght Norman Ci gar, a l ong-t i me ana-
l yst of t he Bal kans regi on, argues t hat t he Serbi an mi l i t ary
r ever ses on t he gr ound wer e mor e i mpor t ant t han t he ai r
operat i ons of Del i berat e Force i n get t i ng t he Serbs t o accept
UN demands. Gr ound oper at i ons, Cigar argues, confirmed for
t he Ser bs t hat t hey were l osi ng cont rol of t he mi l i t ary si t u -
at i on and t hus had a pr of ound i mpact on t hei r di pl omat i c
cal cul at i ons. In hi s vi ew t he ai r campai gn had mi ni mal di rect
effect on t he Serbs mi l i t ary capabi l i t i es and consequent l y had
l i t t l e i mpact on t hei r di pl omacy.
74
Seni or di pl omat i c and mi l i t ary l eaders i nt ervi ewed by t he
BACS, as wel l as some anal yst s, general l y saw a more syner -
gi st i c rel at i onshi p bet ween ai r, ground, and di pl omat i c opera -
t i ons i n t erms of t hei r effect s on t he cal cul at i ons of t he Serbs .
Al t hough most of t hem emphasi zed t hat t he si mul t anei t y of
t he t wo campai gns was unpl anned, t hey al so r ecogni zed t hat
t hei r conj unct i on was i mpor t ant t o t he ul t i mat e out come of
negot i at i ons.
75
J us t as t he Bos ni an Ser bs were facing their
great est mi l i t ary chal l enge on t he ground, t he ai r campai gn
drast i cal l y undermi ned t hei r abi l i t y t o command, suppl y, and
move t hei r forces. The combi nat i on of effect s pl aced t hem i n a
OWEN
497
much more i mmedi at e danger of mi l i t ary col l apse t han woul d
have been t he case wi t h separat e l and or ai r offensi ves. The
Bosni an Federat i on offensive also established a division of
t erri t ory bet ween i t and t he Serb fact i on t hat al most exact l y
equal l ed t he 51/ 49 percent spl i t cal l ed for i n i nt ervent i on
peace pl ans and reconfi rmed at t he Geneva peace t al ks on 8
Sept ember 1995. Ambassador Hol br ooke mai nt ai ned t hat t hi s
event gr eat l y eased t he subsequent peace negot i at i ons at Day-
ton, Ohio , si nce i t pl aced t he Serbs in the position of merely
acknowl edgi ng an exi st i ng di vi si on of t er r i t or y r at her t h a n
gi vi ng up hard-won t erri t ory t hat t hey previ ousl y had refused
t o r el i nqui sh.
76
Mor eover , ever y di pl omat and seni or commander i nt er -
vi ewed bel i eved t hat t he ai r campai gn di st i nct l y affect ed t he
mor al r esi st ance of t he Ser b l eader s and, consequent l y, t he
pace of negotiations . Pri or t o t he bombi ng, Ambassador Chri s -
topher Hill observed that President Milosevic al ways had a
rat her cocky vi ew of t he negot i at i ons, sort of like hes doing us
a favor, but aft er t he bombi ng began, we found hi m . . .
totally engaged . . . [with an] attitude of lets talk seriously.
77
Not surpri si ngl y, Hol brooke and Ambas s ador Hunt er per -
cei ved t hat Ser b di pl omat s r el axed somewhat when t he bomb-
i ng paused on 1 Sept ember . When t he bombi ng r esumed on 5
Sept ember, Hol brooke percei ved t hat Serbi an di pl omat i c resi s -
t ance weakened rapi dl y, t o t he verge of col l apse.
78
This effect
was cl ear at t he meet i ng bet ween Hol br ookes negot i at i ng
t eam and t he Ser bs on 1314 Sept ember. At t he meet i ng Hol -
brooke found Mladic i n a r ush t o end t he bombi ng
79
so
much so t hat t he meet i ng had har dl y begun when Mi l osevi c
produced Presi dent Karadzi c and hi s mi l i t ar y commander ,
General Mladic , to participate directly in the talks. Mladic ,
who had t he f i gur at i ve noose of an i ndi ct ed war cr i mi nal
around hi s neck, arri ved at t he meet i ng l ooki ng l i ke hed been
t hr ough a bombi ng campai gn.
80
After six hours of negotia -
t i ons, t he Ser bs uni l at er al l y si gned an agr eement t o cease
t hei r at t acks on and r emove t hei r heavy weapons from Sara -
jevo, wi t hout a qui d pro quo from Hol brooke or the UN of
st oppi ng t he bombi ng. Ambassador Hi l l at t r i but ed t hi s capi t u -
l at i on t o t he t hreat of furt her bombi ng.
81
Int erest i ngl y, as he
DELIBERATE FORCE
498
left the meeting, Karadzic pl ai nt i vel y asked Hol brooke, We are
ready for peace. Why di d you bomb us?
82
NACs NATO di pl omat s al so recogni zed t he i mport ance and
value of the bombing campaign. Their collective decision to
aut hori ze ai r operat i ons i n t he fi rst pl ace was cl ear evi dence of
t hei r expect at i on t hat t he pot ent i al benefi t s out wei ghed t he
r i sks. Ambassador Hunt er l earned t he dept h of hi s compa -
t ri ot s commi t ment t o t he bombi ng operat i ons at t he very be-
gi nni ng of t he bombi ng pause. On t he same aft ernoon of t he
pause, Secret ary-General Cl aes called a meeting of NAC to
confi rm t hat t he members remai ned wi l l i ng t o l et operat i ons
r esume when t he commander s deemed necessar y. For hi s par t
Hunt er ant i ci pat ed some resi st ance t o al l owi ng t he campai gn
t o r est ar t . To hi s sur pr i se al l member s f avor ed r esumi ng t he
bombi ng i f t he Serbs failed to show evidence of complying with
UN demands. Havi ng got t en over t he quest i on of rest art i ng t he
campai gn wi t h unexpect ed ease, Hunt er r ecal l ed t hat t he r eal
debat eone t hat consumed about an hour - and- a- hal f of t he
counci l s t i mewas over whet her t o gi ve t he Serbs 48 hour s
or 72 hours t o compl y.
83
Havi ng t aken t he i nt er nat i onal and
domest i c pol i t i cal r i sks of i ni t i at i ng Del i ber at e For ce, t he
members of NAC wer e det er mi ned t o see i t t hr ough.
Ambassadors Hol brooke and Hunt er offered t wo di st i nct but
i nt errel at ed expl anat i ons for t he profound and i mmedi at e i n -
fl uence of t he bombi ng on Serbi an di pl omat i c resi st ance. Am -
bassador Hol brookes expl anat i on was t o t he poi nt . Ser b l ead -
ers, he fel t , were t hugs and murderers who responded wel l
to force.
84
Ambas s ador Hunt er pai nt ed a more cal cul at i ng pi c -
t ure of t he Serbi an l eaders. In hi s vi ew t hey underst ood i n t he
l at e summer of 1995 t hat t hei r sol e r emai ni ng di pl omat i c ad-
vant age i n t he Bosni an confl i ct l ay i n t hei r abi l i t y t o mani pu -
l at e t he i nt ernal di vi si ons wi t hi n and among t he NATO a nd UN
member st at es. The Ser bs knew, Hunt er bel i eved, t hat nei t her
organi zat i on coul d t ake deci si ve act i on agai nst t hem unl ess
consensus existed in the NAC and at l east i n t he UN Securi t y
Council. For t hat reason t hey shoul d have t aken NACs endorse-
ment of t he London agreement and t he UN secreta ry-generals
transfer of the air-strike keys to his military commander as
di st urbi ng omens. Based on past experi ence, however, the Serbs
al so had r eason t o hope t hat nei t her organi zat i on was real l y
OWEN
499
serious and would back off after a few halfhearted air strikes.
The bombing pause probably rekindled that hope. NAC s debate
of 2 Sept ember, whi ch Hunt er believed the Serbs were privy to,
and the resumption of the bombing itself shattered that hope.
85
The action offered hard evidence that the UNs and NAC s ex-
pressi ons of unani mi t y and commi t ment were real.
Thus, even more t han t he ongoi ng advances of t he Bosni an
Federation forces and the initial start of the bombing, the knowl-
edgeable participants interviewed by the BACS team all agreed
t hat resumpt i on of t he bombi ng became t he pi vot al moment of
the campaign. In Ambassador Hills est i mat e, t he bombi ng was
really the signal the Bosnian Serbs needed t o get t o underst and
t hat t hey had t o reach a peace agreement .
86
Hunt er believed
that the decision and the act of resuming the attack clearly
signaled to the Serbs t hat t he UN and NATO were committed to
winning a decision and that their opportunities for military suc-
cess and di pl omat i c maneuver were runni ng out .
An i nt erest i ng feat ure of Del i berat e Force, gi ven t he cl ose
connect i on bet ween ai r operat i ons and di pl omacy, was t hat
t he di r ect oper at i onal commander , Gener al Ryan, a n d t h e
pri nci pal negot i at or, Ambassador Hol brooke, never spoke t o
one another during the operation. Holbrooke spoke frequently
during the campaign with UN commanders and on several occa -
sions with Admiral Smith and Gener al Joul wan, SACEUR. He
even conferred with NAC dur i ng t he bombi ng pause but never
spoke wi t h t he i ndi vi dual who made i mmedi at e deci si ons
about t he sequence, pace, weapons, and ot her t act i cal char ac-
t eri st i cs of t he ai r at t acks. General Ryan , f or hi s par t , t hus
never spoke t o t he i ndi vi dual most di rect l y responsi bl e for
expl oi t i ng t he di pl omat i c effect s of hi s operat i ons. What t hey
knew of one anot hers percept i ons, pri ori t i es, and i nt ent i ons,
t hey deri ved i ndi rect l y from i nformat i on fl owi ng up and down
t hei r respect i ve chai ns of command.
From a l egal i st i c perspect i ve, t he l ack of cont act bet ween
Holbrooke and Ryan was proper and pol i t i cal l y necessary.
Fi r st , as a US St at e Depar t ment r epr esent at i ve and t he l eader
of t he Cont act Gr oup, Holbrooke had no formal pl ace i n ei t her
t he UN or the NATO chai n of command. Properl y, any cont act
bet ween hi m and Ryan shoul d have moved up t hr ough St at e
Depar t ment channel s over t o t he secret ary of defense or t o
DELIBERATE FORCE
500
NAC and t hen down t hr ough t hose chai ns of command t o
Ryan , who act ed bot h as t he commander of Si xt eent h Ai r
Force and as a NATO ai r commander . Gi ven t he ci r cum-
st ances, t he NATO chai n of command was real l y t he operat i ve
one. Second, any di rect cont act wi t h t he ai r commander possi -
bl y woul d have est abl i shed t he per cept i on t hat t he bombi ng
support ed Hol brookes diplomacysomet hi ng t hat nei t her t he
UN nor NATO want ed t o happen. Ambassador Hunt er s u g-
gest ed t hat members of NAC woul dnt have want ed any di rect
cont act bet ween Ryan and Hol brooke ot her t han t o keep one
anot her vaguel y i nformedt hat i s, t o exchange i nformat i on.
All political decisions related to the air campaign, he said, had to
be made at NAC . Hunter believed that any tactical cooperation
between the general and the diplomat would have been a very
big mistake; had Ryan adj ust ed hi s operat i ons i n response t o
information passed to him by any negotiator, NAC would have
had his headespecially if something went wron g.
87
Dur i ng Del i ber at e For ce, cons equent l y, Admi r al Smi t h
want ed no di r ect cont act bet ween hi s ai r commander and
Holbrooke. The admi ral hi msel f avoi ded operat i onal or t arget -
i ng di scussi ons wi t h Hol brooke or hi s mi l i t ary deput y, US
Ar my l i eut enant general Wes Cl ark, because he di d not want
ei t her of t hem t o even t hi nk t hey had an avenue by whi ch t hey
coul d i nfl uence me.
88
Ful l y aware of hi s excl usi on from t he
NATO and UN command channel s, Ambassador Hol br ooke
never based hi s preDel i berat e Force negot i at i ng pl ans o n a
bombi ng campai gn, even t hough he bel i eved t hat one woul d
faci l i t at e t hei r successful out come great l y.
89
Unavoi dabl e as i t was under t he ci rcumst ances, t he l ack of
contact between Holbrooke and Ryan appears to have allowed
disconnects in their understanding of key issues. Those discon -
nects, in turn, appear to have influenced the way the two indi-
vi dual s pursued t hei r mi ssi ons. For exampl e, General Ryans
concern over collateral damage probably exceeded that of at
least the US diplomats involved. Although the general was con -
cerned that a significant collateral-damage event, part i cul arl y
one causi ng t he deat hs of ci vi l i ans, mi ght rob t he ai r cam-
paign of its political support before it had decisive effect, t he
US diplomats involved generally believed that the air campaign
had enough pol i t i cal support t o carry i t t hrough perhaps even
OWEN
501
a seri ous i nci dent of col l at eral damage.
90
As regards t he cl i -
mate of opinion in NAC , Ambassador Hunt er poi nt ed out t hat
t he member st at es had i nvest ed t oo much domest i c pol i t i cal
capi t al i n st art i ng bombi ng operat i ons t o bri ng t hem to a halt
by t he uni nt ended deat h of ci vi l i ans and sol di ers.
91
No one
advocat ed casual sl aught er, but t he net focus of t he i n ter ven -
tions diplomatic community remained on getting res ults from
what may have been NATOs last bolt in Bosnia , r at her t han on
preventing or reacting to incidents of collateral damage.
Whether closing this disconnect between NATO air leader s ,
mainly Ryan and Admiral Smith , and their diplomatic count er -
part s, mai nl y Hol brooke and Hunt er , woul d have changed t he
fl ow of event s i s, of course, specul at i ve. Even had t hey known
t hat t he di pl omat s wer e not poi sed t o end t he ai r campai gn at
the first incident of significant collateral damage (whatever
si gni fi cant meant i n t hi s case), Smi t h and Ryan certainly
woul d not have reduced t hei r effort s t o mi ni mi ze col l at eral
damage and cas ual t i es . For mi l i t ary, l egal , and moral reasons,
nei t her l eader had any i nt ent i on of doi ng mor e har m t o t he
Bosni an Ser bs t han t hei r mi ssi on t o pr ot ect t he saf e ar eas
requi red. Li kel y, Admi ral Smi t h st i l l woul d have expect ed
Ryan t o make every DMPI, weapon, and ot her deci si on wi t h
t he i nt ent of get t i ng maxi mum effect at mi ni mum col l at eral
cost . Knowi ng t hat t he di pl omat s were not as sensi t i ve t o
col l at eral damage as t hey t hought , however, mi ght have gi ven
t he mi l i t ar y commander s a sense t hat t hey had mor e t i me t o
conduct t hei r oper at i ons. That , i n t ur n, mi ght have l et t hem
sl ow t he pace of t he bombi ngsomet hi ng t hat mi ght have
been desi rabl e, even i f j ust t o reduce t he wear and t ear i m-
posed by t he act ual pace of operat i ons on everyone from Gen -
eral Ryan t o t he personnel i n t he fl yi ng uni t s i n t he fi el d.
Indeed, at one poi nt duri ng t he bombi ng, some CAOC st affers
bri efl y di scussed sl owi ng t he pace of t he campai gn i n t he
interest of safety. People, including the aircrews, were begin -
ni ng t o show si gns of fat i gue. But t hey rej ect ed t he i dea i n
short order, bel i evi ng t hat t he di pl omat i c vul nerabi l i t y of t he
oper at i on r equi r ed maxi mum ef f or t t o ensur e t hat i t had a
decisive effect before political reasons shut it down.
92
A disconnect also existed between Ryans and Holbrookes
underst andi ngs of t he dynami cs of t he bombi ng campai gn and
DELIBERATE FORCE
502
its possible duration. With his jets focusing their attacks al-
most exclusively on the targets covered i n opt i ons one and t wo
of OPLAN 40101, around 10 Sept ember General Ryan passed
t he word t o hi s commanders t hat he woul d run out of such
approved targets i n a coupl e of days at t he present pace of
operations. For their part, Ryan and hi s pl anner s did not neces -
sari l y equat e runni ng out of current l y approved t arget s with
ending the campaign automatically. Several available targeting
opt i ons could have permitted a continuation of the bombing.
These opt i ons i ncl uded (1) hi t t i ng or rehi t t i ng undest royed
DMPIs among t he t arget s al ready approved, (2) addi ng and/ or
approving new option-one and -two targets to the list, or (3)
hitting option-three targets. In fact AIRSOUTH pl anners were
already looking at new option-one and -two targets, and General
Joul wan had already raised the option-three issue with NAC ,
with a negative response.
93
Nevertheless, in the second week of
September, AFSOUTH had several options for usefully extending
the air campaign, should that be politically or militarily required.
That was not t he i nformat i on t hat got t o Ambassador Hol -
brooke and hi s boss, Secret ary of St at e Chri st opher, however.
Based on hi s conversat i ons wi t h Admi ral Smi t h and a r epor t
t o t he Nat i onal Securi t y Counci l on 11 Sept ember by Adm
William Owens , vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Ambassador Hol brooke r ecal l s t hat he and t he secr et ar y un-
der st ood unequi vocal l y t hat r unni ng out t he exi st i ng t ar get
l i st meant t he end of bombi ng oper at i ons. Because t hat news
had such drast i c i mpl i cat i ons for hi s negot i at i ons, Hol brooke
rel at es, he i mmedi at el y asked Admi ral Owens t o see i f t here
was some way t o ext end t he campai gn.
94
Int erest i ngl y, General
Ryan l at er coul d not r ecal l ever hear i ng about t he ambassa-
dors i nt erest i n st ret chi ng t hi ngs out .
95
What ever t he causes of t he i nformat i onal di sconnect be-
t ween Ryan and Hol br ooke, i t had an i mmedi at e effect on
Ameri can and, i t fol l ows, Cont act Group diplomacy. After the
meet i ng of t he Nat i onal Securi t y Counci l , Holbrooke r el at es,
Secr et ar y Chr i st opher di r ect ed hi m t o r et ur n i mmedi at el y t o
Bel grade t o r esume negot i at i ons wi t h Presi dent Mi l osevi c.
Th e t wo st at esmen had pl anned t o wai t a week l onger bef or e
ree ngaging the Serbians , i n t he hope t hat t he cont i nued bomb-
ing would further soften their obstinate resistance to meeting
OWEN
503
bot h t he UNs and t he Cont act Groups demands. In other
words, Holbrooke was det ermi ned t o get t he Serbs to halt their
at t acks on t he safe areas and to begin making territorial conces -
sions necessary to give reality to the just completed Geneva
Agreement. But with the end of offensive air operations apparently
imminent, Christopher adjusted his diplomatic plan, and Hol-
brooke immediately left for Serbia to get what he coul d from t he
Serbs before the bombing ended.
96
Fortunately, al t hough i t was
already becoming public knowledge that NATO was r unni ng out
of option-two targets and was unlikely to shift to option three,
t he Serbs were beat en and ready t o accept at l east t he UNs
demands .
97
Consequently, Holbrooke got little for the Contact
Group other than promises to participate in some sort of peace
conference, but he did get a commitment from the Serbs to lift
the sieges and pull their heavy weapons out of the Sarajevo
exclusion zone. Attributing his partial success to the need to get
a settlement before the Serbs became aware of t he i mpendi ng
halt to the bombing, Holbrooke later related, I would have been
. . . willing to continue the negotiations if Smith or Joul wan h a d
said, Boy, we have a lot of great targets left out there!
98
Agai n, argui ng t hat cl osi ng t he di sconnect bet ween Ryan
and Hol brooke on t hi s i ssue mi ght have r eshaped t he ai r
campai gneven had i t been possi bl e t o do soremai ns a
mat t er of specul at i on. Aft er al l , Ryan was st i l l funct i oni ng as a
NATO commander and Hol br ooke was not i n hi s chai n of
command; furt hermore, for reasons of pol i t i cal sensi t i vi t y, he
was not even free t o di scuss operat i ons openl y wi t h t he ai r
commander. In act ual pract i ce, however, t he operat i onal and
pol i t i cal boundari es bet ween t he UN and NAC, on t he one
hand, and t he Uni t ed St at es and t he Cont act Gr oup, on t he
ot her , wer e not as shar p as t he f or mal di pl omat i c ar r ange -
ment s suggest ed. To be sur e, t he bombi ng was under way t o
secur e t he saf e ar eas and pr ot ect peacekeeper s, but mos t
l eaders i nvol ved underst ood t hat t he coal i t i on was not l i kel y t o
obt ai n t hose obj ect i ves unl ess t he Serbs were humbl ed mi l i -
t ari l y and agreed t o seri ous negot i at i ons over t he pol i t i cal and
t erri t ori al proposal s of t he Cont act Group. Similarly, although
t he UN offi ci al l y had t he pol i t i cal l ead i n t erms of sanct i oni ng
and benefi t i ng from t he bombi ng, Ambassador Hol brooke ex-
erci sed t he pract i cal di pl omat i c l ead duri ng Del i berat e Force.
DELIBERATE FORCE
504
It was he, i n fact , who ext ract ed concessi ons from t he Serbi an
l eaders on 14 Sept ember t hat al l owed t he UN and NATO to
announce success and t ur n of f t hei r keys. He was, t her ef or e,
act i ng as a de fact o di pl omat for t he ot her i nt ernat i onal or -
gani zat i ons, even i f none coul d say so.
Thus, whi l e t he pol i t i cal - mi l i t ar y ar r angement s exi st i ng
around Del i berat e Force made good formal sense at t he t i me,
t hei r art i fi ci al i t y, i n t erms of what was goi ng on operat i onal l y,
cl earl y i nfl uenced t he course of di pl omacy and ai r oper at i ons
i n ways t hat arguabl y were undesi rabl e. In poi nt of fact , t he
i ndi rect ness of t he fl ow of i nformat i on bet ween Ryan and Hol -
brooke cr eat ed a si t uat i on wher eby t he commander s pr essed
t hei r operat i ons t o get t hei r ful l di pl omat i c effect before t he
diplomats arbitrarily cut off the bombing, even as the diplo -
mat s scrambl ed t o get what di pl omat i c effect t hey coul d before
t he commanders arbitrarily cut off the bombing. The irony of
t he si t uat i on i s not abl e.
Even aft er i t ended, Del i berat e Forceor at l east i t s mem-
or yr emai ned an act i ve f act or i n t he shape and pace of sub-
sequent negot i at i ons for Bosni an peace. Formal t al ks were
t aken up i n November at Wri ght -Pat t erson Ai r Force Base
(AFB), near Dayton, Ohio. Holbrooke consi dered i t a fort ui t ous
choice of venue. Arriving Serb diplomats walked from their
ai r pl anes past oper at i onal combat ai r cr af t par ked on t he r amp
nearby. Ambassador Hi l l ar r anged t o hol d t he wel comi ng ban-
quet on the floor of the United States Air Force Mus e um,
wher e t he Ser bs l i t eral l y sat surrounded by an awesome di s -
pl ay of ai rpower, i ncl udi ng some of t he very ai rcraft and
weapons r ecent l y us ed agai ns t t hem.
99
Accordi ng t o t hei r
Ameri can escort offi cer, t he Serbs r emai ned t i ght - l i pped about
t hei r i mpressi ons of t he event .
100
But one cannot doubt t he
i mpor t ance t hat key i nt er vent i oni st di pl omat s at t ached t o
keepi ng ai rpower before t he Serbi an di pl omat s.
Observati ons and Impl i cati ons
Duri ng t he course of t hei r research, t he BACS t eam mem-
bers observed and descri bed a number of t hi ngs about Del i b -
erat e Force t hat carry i mport ant i mpl i cat i ons for t he pl anners
OWEN
505
of fut ure ai r campai gns. Once agai n, t hi s chapt er onl y summa -
ri zes t hose i mpl i cat i ons t hat somet hough not necessari l y
allof the team members felt had value beyond the specific
circumstances of Deliberate Force. For all its uniqueness, Delib -
erate Force offers broadly useful implications because one ca n
describe its key characteristics with some precision. For the NATO
airmen involved, it was a strategically limited, tact ically intense,
high-technology, coalition air campaign conducted under tight
restraints of time and permissible collateral damage; further, it
was aimed at coercing political and military compliance from a
regional opponent who had no airpower. To the extent that
military planners will plan future air campaigns in the context of
some or all of these characteristics, they should first understand
what t he Del i berat e Force experi ence suggest s t heoret i cal l y
about how t hi ngs mi ght work under si mi l ar ci rcumst ances.
As a fi rst observat i on, t he det ermi ned and robust charact er
of Deliberate Force was essential to its near-term success. The
campaigns objectives were limited, but to achieve them, NATO
ai rmen had t o be free t o make t hei r pl ans and execut e t hei r
operat i ons wi t hi n t he ful l l i mi t s of appropri at e boundari es of
political objectives and t he l aws of war all of which should
have been, and general l y were, encapsul at ed i n ROE . A half-
heart ed, overl y rest rai ned, or i ncompl et e ai r campai gn l i kel y
woul d have been di sast rous t o NATO and UN credibilityand
i t cert ai nl y woul d have prol onged t he war. As RAND r e-
sear cher St ephen Hosmer concl udes, a weak ai r campai gn
pr obabl y woul d have adver sel y condi t i oned t he Bosni an
Ser bs and ot her fact i ons t o bel i eve t hat bot h bombi ng and t he
i nt er vent i oni s t s wer e i ndeci s i ve and, t her ef or e, t hat t hey
should fight on. To reap the psychological benefits of air -
power, Hosmer wri t es, i t i s al so i mport ant t o avoi d adverse
condi t i oni ng. The enemy must not see your ai r at t acks as
weak or i mpot ent . The hesi t ant . . . bombi ng campai gn agai nst
Nort h Vi et nam i n 1965 i s a pri me exampl e of adverse condi-
tioning. The hesitant use of NATO airpower in the former Yugo-
slavia prior to mid-1995 is another example of adverse condi-
tioning.
101
In parallel, Ambassador Holbrooke felt that t he act ual
targets struck during Deliberate Force were less impor t ant t o t he
effect on Bosnian Serb leaders than the fa c t that the NATO
campaign was sustained, effective, and selective.
102
DELIBERATE FORCE
506
As a second observat i on, precision-guided munitions ma d e
Deliberate Force possible . Gi ven t he campai gns rest rai nt s of
time, forces available, and its political sensitivities, NATO
coul d not have under t aken i t wi t hout a r el at i vel y abundant
supply of PGMs and ai r pl at forms t o del i ver t hem. Preci si on
weapons gave NATO airmen the ability to conceive and execut e
a maj or ai r campai gn t hat was qui ck, pot ent , and unl i kel y t o
ki l l peopl e or dest roy propert y t o an ext ent t hat woul d cause
worl d opi ni on t o ri se agai nst and t ermi nat e t he operat i on. The
BACS t eam f ound no subst ant i at ed est i mat es of t he number
of people killed by Deliberate Force.
103
The si mpl e f act t hat
Bosni an Ser b l eaders made no effort t o expl oi t col l at eral dam-
age politically indicates that they had little to exploit. Had
NATO and UN l eaders expect ed enough col l at eral damage to
gi ve t he Serbs a political lever, they probably would not have
approved t he i ni t i at i on of Del i berat e Force, or i f such damage
had begun, t hey pr obabl y coul d not have sust ai ned t he oper a -
tion politically for long. Indeed, as Ambassador Hunter r e-
called, trust in the implied promise of NATO ai r men t o execut e
t he ai r campai gn qui ckl y and wi t h mi ni mal col l at eral damage
permi t t ed members of NAC t o approve i t s i ni t i at i on i n t he fi rst
place.
104
Had t hose di pl omat s doubt ed t hat pr omi se, t her ef or e,
Del i berat e Force never woul d have happened, and i f NATO
ai rmen had fai l ed t o del i ver on ei t her part of t hei r promi se, t he
campai gn al most cert ai nl y woul d have come t o a qui ck end.
The third observation follows from the first two: NATOs
primary reliance on air-delivered precision weapons during De -
liberate Force shielded the international intervention in Bosnia
from mission creep. Had NATO chosen t o conduct a j oi nt ai r
and ground offensi ve agai nst t he Serbs or t o rel y on nonpreci -
si on aer i al weapons i n t he bombi ng campai gn, Del i ber at e
Force cert ai nl y woul d have i nvol ved great er casual t i es on bot h
si des. Inst ead of a seri es of j ust over one t housand careful l y
pl aced expl osi ons and a few seconds of ai rcraft cannon fi re,
Del i berat e Force l i kel y woul d have i nvol ved prot ract ed opera -
t i ons by t ens of t housands of t roops, syst emat i c ai r and art i l -
l ery barrages i n support of t hei r advance across t he l and, and
t housands more expl osi ons of not so preci sel y pl aced bombs
and ar t i l l er y shel l s. Put anot her way, i n any f or m but an
i ndependent ai r campai gn, Del i berat e Force woul d have gi ven
OWEN
507
t he Serb fact i on a vast l y great er opport uni t y t o fi ght back and
inflict casualties on NATO a nd UN forces. Reasonabl y, t he
Ser bs woul d have fought back, at l east l ong enough t o see i f
ki l l i ng some number of i nt ervent i oni st t roops woul d break t he
wi l l of t hei r pol i t i cal l eaders. The probl em wi t h such casual-
t i es, however, i s t hat t hey coul d have reshaped t he pol i t i cal ,
nor mat i ve, and emot i onal nat ur e of t he campai gn agai nst t he
Ser bs. Televised reports of rows of dead Bosnian Serb sol di ers,
shelled towns, lines of refugees, and NATO body bags likely
woul d have reshaped every part i ci pant s vi ew of t he confl i ct ,
and t here woul d have been more t i me for t hose changed vi ews
to have political effect. Of course there is no way to tell if a
prot ract ed ai r-l and campai gn or nonpreci si on-bombi ng cam-
pai gn woul d have changed NATOs disciplinary peace-en-
f or cement mission into real war missions of retreat, con -
quest , or ret ri but i on. The very uncert ai nt y of t he di rect i on i n
whi ch t he i nt ervent i oni st mi ssi on woul d have crept under -
scores the value of airpowers characteristics of precision, con -
t rol , and securi t y i n t hi s part i cul ar peace operat i on .
The f our t h obser vat i on i s t hat contacts between military
l eaders and some key di pl omat s do not seem t o have kept up
with the pace of events just before and during Deliberate Force .
Because of l i mi t at i ons of t he i nt ervi ew i nformat i on t he BACS
t eam col l ect ed, t he wi dt h of t he gap i n t he di pl omat i c and
mi l i t ary di scourse i s not cl ear, but i t i s cl ear from t he evi dence
col l ect ed t hat t he gap exi st ed and t hat i t shaped pol i t i cal and
mi l i t ary event s t o some degree. Perhaps most si gni fi cant l y,
Ambassador Hol brooke and Gener al Ryan made pl ans and
t ook act i ons i n i gnorance of one anot hers posi t i ons i n key
ar eas such as pr event i ng col l at er al damage and ext endi ng t he
ai r campai gn. Refl ect i ng on t he possi bl e di pl omat i c conse-
quences of t he di sconnect bet ween hi m and Ryan over t he
pract i cal i t y of t he campai gn, Hol brooke writes, I regret greatly
t hat . . . I di d not have di rect cont act wi t h Ryan ; i t mi ght have
al l owed us t o fol l ow a di fferent , and perhaps t ougher, st rat -
egy.
105
Moreover, although the bureaucratic distance between
t hese i ndi vi dual s may have been underst andabl e under t h e cir -
cumst ances of t hi s operat i on, i t may not have needed t o ext end
t o an absol ut e pr oscr i pt i on of cont act bet ween t hem. Speak -
i ng from hi s perspect i ve as a member of NAC , Ambass a dor
DELIBERATE FORCE
508
Hu n ter, for one, i ndi cat ed t hat a passage of fact ual i nforma-
t i on bet ween t he commander and t he di pl omat pr obabl y
shoul d have happened. At t he same t i me, i t i s cl ear f r om t he
context of Hunter s st at ement t hat he st i l l t hought t hat any
s uch cont act bet ween Ryan a nd Hol br ooke s houl d ha ve
avoi ded gi vi ng t he i mpressi on t hat t hey were act ual l y coordi-
nat i ng t hei r effort s.
106
I n cont r ast t o t he r ef l ect i ons of t he di pl omat s, Admi r al
Smi t h and Gener al Ryan r emai ned convi nced, near l y t wo
years aft er t he fact , t hat any di rect cont act bet ween Hol brooke
and AIRSOUTH woul d have been i mproper and di pl omat i cal l y
ri sky. Bot h commanders bel i eved t hat such cont act woul d
have vi ol at ed t he est abl i shed mi l i t ary chai n of command and
t he proper i nt erface bet ween t he di pl omat i c and mi l i t ary l ead-
ershi p. In Admi ral Smi t h s vi ew, had he al l owed Hol brooke
and Ryan t o t al k, he woul d have pl aced t he whol e operat i on at
ri sk di pl omat i cal l y, and he woul d have undermi ned hi s boss,
Gener al Joul wan .
107
I n separ at e comment s, Gener al Ryan ech -
oed t hat posi t i on, mai nt ai ni ng t hat t o even hi nt at di rect
coor di nat i on bet ween hi m and Hol br ooke was l udi cr ous.
Si nce part of Hol brookes sanct i on t o negot i at e i n t he Bal kans
came from t he UN and since NATO was l i kewi se operat i ng at
t he behest of t he UN, Ryan argued t hat t he proper l evel of
coordi nat i on bet ween t he di pl omat and sol di er shoul d have
and coul d have occurred onl y at t he st rat egi c l evel . Thus
Ryan suggest s t hat t he r eal ar ea of i nqui r y i n t hi s i ssue may
l i e i n t he possi bl e i nadequacy of t he i nformat i on fl ow bet ween
the NAC and UN l eader s.
108
The operat i ve poi nt remai ns, however, t hat Ryan s and Hol -
brookes act i vi t i es were i nt ert wi ned duri ng t he bombi ng, re-
gar dl ess of t he bur eaucr at i c and di pl omat i c ar r angement s and
f i ct i ons mai nt ai ned, and t hat t hose ar r angement s di d not ade-
quat el y support t hei r requi rement s for i nformat i on. The i mpl i -
cation for future architects of politically charged, fast-paced
mi l i t ary i nt ervent i ons i s t hat t hey must pay cl ose at t ent i on t o
keepi ng t he f or mal and i nf or mal communi cat i ons channel s
and boundar i es bet ween sol di er s and di pl omat s cur r ent , coor -
di nat ed, and fl exi bl e. It al so wi l l be i mport ant t o make sure
t hat t he ri ght sol di ers and di pl omat s are t al ki ng t o each ot her
at t he ri ght t i me, wi t hi n l i mi t s and on t opi cs appropri at e t o
OWEN
509
t he ci r cumst ances. Thi s may mean t hat t hey r emai n l i nked
cleanly and traditionally at the tops of their respective chains of
command. But it also may be that in the close-coupled political-
military environments of future peace operations, for example,
some linkages at subordinate levels will be appropriate. This
obser vat i on cer t ai nl y does not j ust i f y di pl omat s mucki ng
about wi t h t act i cs or sol di ers hi j acki ng di pl omacy. Nor does it
bow t o general i zed bel i efs t hat di pl omat s and sol di ers operat e
i n separat e real ms. In real i t y, war i s about di pl omacy, and
di pl omacys fi nal sanct i on i s war. Di pl omat s and sol di ers wi l l
al ways be i n each ot hers mess ki t s. The real i ssue i s how
bot h gr oups can ant i ci pat e and educat e t hemsel ves and one
anot her on t he appr opr i at e boundar i es and r ul es of t hei r r el a -
t i onshi p under gi ven ci rcumst ances. The pol i t i cal -mi l i t ary ex -
peri ence of Del i berat e Force shoul d prove t o be an i nt erest i ng
case st udy i n t hat educat i onal pr ocess.
Fi ft h, and i n a si mi l ar vei n, although the focus and style of
General Ryans l eadershi p was mandat ed by and appropri at e
to the immediate task of keeping the air campaign politically
viable, they also created stresses within AIRSOUTH staff ele -
ment s t hat may have become probl ems, had t he campai gn con -
t i nued much l onger. Gi ven t he necessi t y of ensuri ng t hat t he
t ar get s, weapons, and t act i cs of every at t ack sort i e were se-
l ect ed and cont rol l ed t o mi ni mi ze t he possi bi l i t y of col l at eral
damage, General Ryan s deci si on t o cent ral i ze such deci si ons
(i . e. , make t hem hi msel f) made sense. But maki ng al l t hose
deci si ons day-t o-day l ocked t he general i nt o 18-hour work-
days wi t h mi ni mal t i me and energy t o consi der ot her responsi -
bi l i t i es t hat fal l t o a seni or component commander. Part of
this load fell to General Short , Ryans chief of staff, who stayed
i n Napl es to oversee AIRSOUTHs admi ni st rat i ve, l ogi st i cs,
per sonnel , and publ i c- r el at i ons t asks and t o mai nt ai n day- t o-
day l i ai son wi t h Admi ral Smi t h . Short was up t o t he t as k, but
he di d comment t o t he t eam t hat at t i mes he l acked t he
cont i nual cont act wi t h t he CAOC t hat he needed t o ful fi l l hi s
l i ai son and press responsi bi l i t i es i n a t i mel y manner. From
the CAOC i t sel f, several st affers comment ed t hat Ryans cen-
tralization of technical decisions of targeting and weapon eeri ng
created a division within the CAOC st aff. On one si de of t hi s
division, they felt, was a small group of a half-dozen officers
DELIBERATE FORCE
510
who al so wor ked unsust ai nabl y l ong days t o hel p t he gener al
make hi s t act i cal deci si ons. On t he ot her si de was t he bul k of
t he several -hundred-st rong CAOC st aff who di d l i t t l e more
t han gat her and di st r i but e dat a and who t ended t o f eel under -
ut i l i zed i n compari son t o General Ryans arguabl y overworked
i nner core.
Obvi ousl y, one can make t oo much of t hi s i ssue, part i cu -
larly since the BACS was not char t er ed and equi pped t o col -
l ect t he comprehensi ve soci ol ogi cal and organi zat i onal dat a
necessary t o credi bl y descri be t he real effect s of Ryans or
anyone el ses l eadershi p. But t he pat chy evi dence col l ect ed by
t he t eam does suggest t hat f ut ur e ai r commander s and t hei r
subor di nat es shoul d be awar e t hat t he st yl i st i cas wel l as t he
subst ant i veel ement s of l eadershi p wi l l have far-reachi ng ef-
fect s on t he work, moral e, and endurance of t hei r st affs. Fur-
ther, it suggests a potentially valuable line of inquiry for fu -
t ur e r es ear ch.
Si xt h, despite the relative smallness of their force structure,
NATO commanders chose to conduct operations for operational-
and strategic-level effects rather than tactical ones. In US force-
pl anni ng terms, AFSOUTH conduct ed Del i berat e Force wi t h
about a t wo-fi ght er-wi ng-equi val ent combat force and an ap-
propri at e support sl i ce of reconnai ssance, survei l l ance, elec-
t roni c warfare, SEAD, lift , and other aircraft. AIRSOUTH com-
mander s had t he opt i on of conduct i ng t hei r at t acks f or
pri mari l y t act i cal effect s by concent rat i ng on t he Serbi an ma-
teriel targets encompassed i n opt i on one. Inst ead t hey el ect ed
t o focus t hei r at t acks on opt i on-t wo t arget s t o achi eve broader
and qui cker operat i onal and st rat egi c resul t snamel y, by de-
st royi ng t he mobi l i t y and command i nfrast ruct ure of t he BSA
and t hereby coerci ng i t s l eaders t o accede t o UN demands. In
other words the NATO air force was not the giant fielded for
Desert St orm, but i t st i l l had a st rat egi c opt i on. Thi s i s an
i mpor t ant poi nt f or US ai r pl anner s ponderi ng t he probl ems of
conduct i ng ai r war i n secondary t heat ers, where t hey perhaps
will be allocated relatively small forces to accomplish big jobs
i n a hurry. It i s al so i mport ant for t he pl anners and com -
manders of smal l er ai r forces. The possessi on of a st rat egi c or
lead-force option depends less on the size of an air force than on
t he mi l i t ary-pol i t i cal ci rcumst ances, doct ri ne, mat er i el , and
OWEN
511
available targeting options. It follows then that the leaders and
budget masters of air forces of even moderate size should not
reject the strategic- and operational-level options of air warfare
out of hand. If their anticipated employment opportunities sug-
gest the utility of strategic attack, broad-ranging interdiction
operations, or other asymmetric ways of bringing airpower to
bear agai nst t hei r enemi es, t hen t hey shoul d st ep up t o maki ng
t he appropri at e i nvest ment s i n ai r vehi cl es, muni t i ons, support
i nfrast ruct ure, command and cont rol syst ems, and so on.
Sevent h, and at a more t act i cal l evel , for NATO ai rmen, t he
operational features of this limited conflict differed little from
t hose of maj or war. They at t acked t he Bosni an Serbs i n 1995
wi t h t he ai rcraft , t act i cs, weapons, and operat i onal t empos
t hey woul d have empl oyed agai nst t he Warsaw Pact seven
years before, at t he cl ose of t he col d war . That observat i on
suggests several things about the flexibility of airpower. It
i mpl i es t hat ai rpowers rol e i n t he sphere of l ow i nt ensi t y con -
flict cont i nues t o expand as new st r at egi es, weapons, and
sensor syst ems i mprove t he abi l i t y of ai rmen t o fi nd and de-
st r oy i mpor t ant t ar get s of al l t ypes under varyi ng condi t i ons.
To t he ext ent t hat a gi ven l ow i nt ensi t y confl i ct or operat i on
ot her t han war requi res mi l i t ary survei l l ance and at t acks ( and
most do), t he Del i berat e Force experi ence suggest s t hat ai r -
power i s becomi ng an ever more equal part ner wi t h ground
power. Moreover, t he fact t hat ordi nary ai r t act i cal uni t s fl ew
i n Del i berat e Force speaks t o t he rel at i ve ease wi t h whi ch one
may s hi f t s uch uni t s bet ween conf l i ct s , as compar ed t o
gr ound f or ces. Gr ound uni t s of t en r equi r e mont hs of t r ai ni ng
t o prepare for t he di fferi ng t act i cal t asks of vari ous t ypes of
confl i ct s. Trai ni ng a bat t al i on for peace operat i ons, t herefore,
can reduce i t s capabi l i t i es and avai l abi l i t y for convent i onal
war. That i s l ess oft en and l ess ext ensi vel y t he case for ai r
uni t s. Squadrons prepari ng for st ri ke operat i ons i n Korea, for
exampl e, woul d not fi nd st ri ke operat i ons over Bosni a muc h
di fferent i n concept and basi c t echni que; of course, t hey mi ght
fi nd some adj ust ment for l ocal condi t i ons of geography and
weat her. Once agai n, one shoul d not overst at e t hi s poi nt . For
exampl e, ai rmen i nvol ved i n Deny Fl i ght report t hat some of
t hei r speci fi c bat t l e ski l l s, such as fl yi ng hi gh-performance
ai r-combat maneuvers, degraded i n t he course of pat rol l i ng
DELIBERATE FORCE
512
the skies over Bosnia for mont hs on end. Moreover, t he rel a -
tive flexibility of surface forces, as compared to that of air
forces, becomes a vari abl e fact or as one begi ns t o l ook at
speci f i c mi ssi ons and t asksand at di f f er ent br anches, such
as i nfant ry and art i l l ery.
Thi s summary of t he BACS now t urns t o a fi nal observat i on
about the decisiveness of Deliberate Forces contribution to
ending the conflict in Bosnia . In general , ai rpower was a deci-
si ve fact or i n endi ng t he 199295 Bosni an confl i ct , but one
must under st and i t s speci f i c cont r i but i on i n r el at i on t o t he
st at e of t he confl i ct and t o ot her event s unfol di ng i n t he re-
gi on. Li ke al l st ruggl es t he Bosni an confl i ct was goi ng t o end
someday. Ei t her exhaust i on or t he vi ct ory of one si de or t he
ot her woul d bri ng i t t o a cl ose. Creat i on of t he Bosni an Fed-
eration i n Mar ch 1994 and t he sudden successes of i t s f or ces
i n t he spr i ng and summer of 1995i n concer t wi t h t hose of
Croatia suggest ed t hat mi l i t ar y domi nance and vi ct or y wer e
sl i ppi ng, perhaps permanent l y, from t he grasp of t he Bosni an
Ser bs. Norman Ci gar convi nci ngl y argues t hat some Bosni an
Ser bs and certainly Slobodan Milosevic r eal i zed t hat at t he
time.
109
Moreover, for domestic political reasons of his own,
Milosevic needed t he fi ght i ng t o st op and, accordi ngl y, t ri ed t o
posi t i on hi msel f as a peace broker i n Jul y.
110
Nevert hel ess, t he l ong-t erm out come of t he confl i ct and i t s
l i kel y l engt h st i l l were not i n si ght at t he end of August 1995.
No one had sol i d reasons t o t hi nk t hat t he bl oodshed i n Bos -
nia woul d not cont i nue f or at l east anot her campai gn season
or longer. Significantly, the Serbs were st i l l advanci ng agai nst
t he saf e ar eas i n east ern Bosni a , even as t hey gave up ground
i n t he west ern areas. But peopl e i n t he out si de worl d had seen
enough of t he but cher y and mi ndl ess i nhumani t y i n Bosni a .
To put i t bl unt l y, t hey want ed t he war t o end or at l east get off
Cable News Network. At the London conference i n Jul y, t he
i nt er vent i oni st s announced t hat t hey i nt ended t o mi t i gat e or ,
i f possi bl e, end t he horrorby usi ng ai rpower.
And t hat s what Del i berat e Force di d. It di d what t hree years
of fact i onal ground fi ght i ng, peacekeepi ng, and i nt er nat i onal
di pl omacy had yet t o achi eve. Al most at t he i nst ant of i t s
appl i cat i on, ai r power st opped t he at t acks on t he saf e ar eas
and made furt her l arge-scal e fi ght i ng over Bosni an t erri t ory
OWEN
513
l argel y poi nt l ess. In so doi ng, i t drast i cal l y al t ered t he mi l i t ary
si t uat i on on t he ground, and i t gave t he UN and NATO cont rol
of t he pace and cont ent of t he peace process.
The peri od of peace t hat came t o Bosni a in the fall of 1995
probabl y emerged i n t he fol l owi ng way: Fi rst , Bosni an Federa -
tion and Cr oat i an gr ound advances i n t he spr i ng and summer
of 1995 gave t he Serbs a l ong-t erm si gnal t hat t hei r opport u -
ni t i es for furt her mi l i t ary gai ns were comi ng t o an end. Ameri -
can di pl omat s i nt ervi ewed by t he BACS t eam s ugges t ed t hat
t he f eder at i on advance al so had t he f or t unat e consequence of
bri ngi ng t he di st ri but i on of l and under federat i on and Serbi an
cont rol al most exact l y t o t he 51/ 49 percent spl i t cal l ed for at
t he t i me i n UN and Cont act Gr oup peace pl ans .
111
This devel-
opment probabl y i nfl uenced t he peace cal cul at i ons of several
Serb l eaders, but t he di pl omat s general l y agreed t hat i t s great -
est val ue may have been t o faci l i t at e t he fi nal set t l ement at t he
Dayt on peace t al ks i n t he fol l owi ng November. Second, t he
Del i berat e Force ai r campai gn broke t he Serbs and was t he
proxi mal cause of t he cessat i on of l arge-scal e fi ght i ng i n Bos -
nia and of t he Ser b agr eement t o par t i ci pat e i n f ut ur e peace
t al ks accordi ng t o a t i met abl e set by t he i nt ervent i on. Thi rd,
t he provi si on for a federal government i n t he peace pl an made
acqui escence t o UN and Cont act Gr oup demands mor e pal at-
abl e for t he Serbs. Since the federation potentially offered
t hem one of t hei r dearest obj ect i vesa degree of pol i t i cal
aut onomyi t seems reasonabl e t o t hi nk t hat i t l owered t hei r
willingness to fight on in the face of simultaneous NATO air
at t acks and ground offensi ves by t hei r regi onal enemi es.
Thi s l ast poi nt requi res furt her research once i t becomes
possi bl e t o i nt ervi ew Bosni an Serb leaders on their views of
t he l i nkage bet ween Del i berat e Force and t hei r pol i t i cal deci -
si ons. As one shoul d expect i n any confl i ct , t hen, t he i nt erven -
t i oni st coal i t i ons achi eved t hei r ai m of st oppi ng t he fi ght i ng i n
Bosni a by bl endi ng di pl omacy and mi l i t ary force, by pl an and
by happenst ance, i nt o a combi nat i on t hat si mul t aneousl y co -
er ced t he Bosni an Ser bs and made i t easi er for t hem t o gi ve i n
t o UN and Cont act Gr oup de ma nds .
Deliberate Force ultimately impressed the BACS t eam as t he
creation of doctrinally and operationally sophisticated diplomats,
ai r l eaders, and pl anners . As t hey had done i n t he general case
DELIBERATE FORCE
514
of Deny Flight, NATO ai rmen craft ed and execut ed t he bombi ng
campai gn agai nst t he Bosni an Serbs i n an opt i mal manner t hat
accommodated the conflicting political, diplomatic, operational,
and technological limitations and constraints of their situation.
At t he same t i me, many of t he key forces and event s t hat shaped
the context and success of Deliberate Force were, in fact, beyond
the control or even the cognizance of the senior planners in -
volved. As in most, if not all, military operations, the outcome of
Deliberate Force was the product of good planning, courage, and
luck. Certainly, the campaign plan was not perfect in its concep-
tion and execution. Where possible the BACS team tried to iden -
tify and describe its more important imperfections, all the while
keepi ng i n mi nd t hat hi ndsi ght does not guarant ee a cl ear vi si on
of what was or was not the best way to do something. In the
mai n, however, t he vari ous t eam members t ended t o be more
impressed by the success of the campaign than with possible
errors of planning and execut i on.
The concl usi on of t hi s report , t hen, i s t hat ai rpower del i v -
ered what i t promi sed i n Del i berat e Force. It was a deci si ve
el ement i n bri ngi ng a new peri od of peace t o Bosni a quickly,
cl eanl y, and at mi ni mal cost i n bl ood and t r easur e t o t he
i nt erveni ng st at es and, i ndeed, t o t he Bosni an Serbs . For t he
Uni t ed St at es , i f i t s nat i onal securi t y st rat egy of gl obal engage -
ment is to last very long, its military forces will have to provide
si mi l ar successes at si mi l arl y l ow cost sperhaps many t i mes.
It i s useful t o know, t herefore, t hat i n t he case of Bosni a in
mi d-1995, ai rpower not onl y was t he l ead arm of Ameri can
i nvol vement i n t he regi on but al so was al most cert ai nl y t he
only politically viable offensive arm available for use by the
Uni t ed St at es and any of i t s part ners t o end i n a cont rol l abl e
way an ugl y war of i ndet er mi nat e cause and uncer t ai n f ut ur e.
Not es
1. For all official documents, interviews, and studies, see the BACS file
at the United States Air Force Historical Research Agency (hereinafter AFHRA),
Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB), Ala.
2. Some i mport ant anal yst s of t hi s confl i ct woul d add a fourt h sust ai n -
i ng cause: t he mi sgui ded i nt ervent i on of out si de st at es and organi zat i ons i n
t he confl i ct . In t hei r vi ew, t he col l apse of Yugosl avi a creat ed a const i t ut i onal
cri si s del i neat ed by t hose who want ed t o preserve a mul t i et hni c federal
OWEN
515
st at e where i ndi vi dual ri ght s and economi c opport uni t i es were prot ect ed by
l aw, and t hose who sought secur i t y and oppor t uni t y i n t he cr eat i on of
et hni c-based nat i on-st at es carved out of t he exi st i ng republ i cs of t he federa-
t i on. In t hi s vi ew, i ndi vi dual European st at es, not abl y Germany, st rengt h-
ened t he nat i onal i st posi t i on and assur ed t he br eakup of Yugosl avi a by
recogni zi ng t he i ndependence of Sl oveni a and Croat i a. Si mi l arl y, war be -
came i nevi t abl e i n Bosni a when t he Uni t ed St at es successful l y pressured
t he UN and t he European Communi t y i nt o recogni zi ng i t s i ndependence i n
Mar ch and Apr i l 1992. Thi s i s an i mpor t ant ar gument t hat r el at es di r ect l y
to the effects of Deliberate Force. But the gross effect of the intervention on
Bosni an pol i t i cs was not a st rat egy consi derat i on for NATO ai r pl anners.
They were not asked i f t hey shoul d i nt ervenet hey were si mpl y gi ven t he
paramet ers of t hei r part of t he i nt ervent i on and t ol d t o do i t . Thus t hi s
par t i cul ar i ssue i s not i ncl uded i n t he l i st of sust ai ni ng causes i n t hi s st udy
of ai r pl anni ng, t hough i t no doubt i s a cri t i cal consi derat i onpart i cul arl y
at t he l evel of grand st rat egy. For t he det ai l s of t hi s case, see Susan L.
Woodward, Bal kan Tragedy: Chaos and Di ssol ut i on af t er t he Col d War
( Washi ngt on, D. C. : Br ooki ngs I nst i t ut i on, 1995) ; and Chr i st opher Ben -
net t , Yugosl avi a s Bl oody Col l apse: Causes, Course and Consequences
(New York: New York Uni versi t y Press, 1995).
3. Termi nol ogy for descri bi ng t he Mosl em-Serb communi t y i s a probl em.
Some anal yst s use Bosni aks, apparent l y t o gi ve t hem a nonrel i gi ous l abel ,
like Serbs and Croats . The probl em wi t h t hat t erm i s t hat i t i mpl i es a cl oser
l i nk bet ween t he Mosl em communi t y and t he cause of preservi ng t he mul t i-
et hni c uni t y and t erri t ori al i nt egri t y of Bosni a t han i t does for Serbs and
Cr oat s. Wi t h many i ndi vi dual except i ons, such may have been t he case at
t he st art of t he Bosni an confl i ct , but i n t he pressure cooker of war, Mosl em
l eaders adopt ed i ncreasi ngl y et hni c pol i t i cal obj ect i ves and rhet ori c. So
t hi s chapt er refers t o Mosl ems as such, when appropri at e, and refers t o t he
nat i onal gover nment or cause as Bosni an .
4. Robert A. Hunt er, t ape-recorded i nt ervi ew by aut hor, 23 Jul y 1996,
si de A, i ndex 50.
5. Lt Col Lowell R. Boyd, AIRSOUTH planner, Headquarters AIRSOUTH,
Napl es, It al y, t ranscri pt of i nt ervi ew by aut hor, 6 December 1995.
6. Gen Joseph W. Ashy, commander , US Space Command, t r anscr i pt of
interview by author, 29 April 1996, 10; and Adm Leighton Smith, NATO
Operat i ons i n Bosni a-Herzegovi na: Del i berat e Force, 29 August 14 Sept em -
ber 1995, presentation to Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 9 November
1995, AFHRA, videotape, index 1046, BACS file Misc-19.
7. Publicly, however, NATO commanders never wavered from their com -
mi t ment t o support UN peacekeepi ng. Even wi t h t he Del i berat e Force bomb-
i ng under way, Admi ral Smi t h st at ed, I do not consi der mysel f t o be t aki ng
sides. Bruce W. Nelan, More Talking, More Bombing, Ti me Magazi ne, 1 8
Sept ember 1995, 76.
8. Briefing, NATO Air Operations in Bosnia-HerzegovinaDeliberate Force
(U), c. 1 August 1995. (NATO Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.
DELIBERATE FORCE
516
9. Col Lar r y Bi ckel , di scussi on wi t h aut hor , Ramst ei n AB, Ger many,
2 4 August 1996. At t he t i me of t hi s di scussi on, Bi ckel was assi gned t o
Hea dquart ers Uni t ed St at es Ai r Forces Europe (USAFE), but i n t he fal l of
1992, he served at SHAPE as a Bal kans-regi on ai r pl anner. He (probabl y
al ong wi t h ot hers) suggest ed t he i ni t i al i sm CAOC, in conformity with NATO
t ermi nol ogy and pract i ce.
10. Ashy interview, 4.
11. Ibid. , 6.
12. Ibi d. , 2557.
13. Ibi d. , 2832; and Boyd i nt ervi ew, 1213.
14. Boyd i nt ervi ew, 6. Throughout t he peri od under di scussi on, Col onel
Boyd act ed as one of General Ashys pri nci pal pl anners, and he was par-
t i cul arl y responsi bl e for ROE devel opment . Boyd al so ment i ons t hat Maj
Richard Corzine was involved in AFSOUTH ROE development in the early
phases of Deny Fl i ght .
15. Memorandum for t he NATO secret ary-general , NAC Deci si on St at e -
ment , MCM-KAD-084-93, subj ect : Operat i onal Opt i ons for Ai r St ri kes i n
Bosni a-Herzegovi na, 8 August 1993.
16. Ashy i nt ervi ew, 36.
17. In t he course of i t s research, t he BACS t eam real i zed t hat not al l
par t i ci pant s under st ood t he boundar i es of t he dual - key ar r angement i n t he
same way. Some interviewees implicitly or explicitly extended its coverage to
i ncl ude t he rel ease of at t acks agai nst ai rcraft vi ol at i ng t he no-fl y edi ct . In
real i t y t he dual key appl i ed onl y t o ai r-t o-ground at t acks. What seems fai r
t o say, however, i s t hat t he dual key refl ect ed a pervasi ve caut i on i n t he UN
and NATO over t he use of any mi l i t ary force t hat , i n t urn, made l eaders i n
bot h organi zat i ons caut i ous about enforci ng t he no-fl y edi ct as wel l . As i t
was, t herefore, NATO l eaders di d not rel ease an at t ack on vi ol at i ng ai rcraft
unt i l 28 February 1994, when al l i ance j et s downed four Bosni an Serb
ai rcraft i n t he act of droppi ng bombs on faci l i t i es cont rol l ed by t he Bosni an
government . Import ant l y, t he CAOC di rect or rel eased t hi s at t ack wi t hout
coordi nat i on wi t h t he UN.
18. Smi t h pr esent at i on, i ndex 865900.
19. Hunt er i nt ervi ew, si de A, i ndex 350450.
20. Ambassador Ri char d Hol br ooke, t ape- r ecor ded i nt er vi ew by Maj
Mark McLaughl i n and Dr. Karl Muel l er, 24 May 1996, si de A, i ndex 584.
BACS r esear cher s al so hear d st at ement s t hat t he dual - key set up may have
been a way of gi vi ng t he French an i ndi rect vet o over NATO ai r operat i ons.
Wi t h l i ght l y armed peacekeepi ng forces on t he ground, t he French had
r eason t o be concer ned over any act i on t hat mi ght pr ompt at t acks on t hem.
Wi t hout a chai r on t he NAC, however, t he French had no di rect say i n t he
use of NATO ai rpower. But t hrough i t s permanent seat on t he UN Securi t y
Counci l , t he French government coul d i nfl uence t hose operat i ons t hrough
t he UN key. The BACS t eam uncovered no document ary or di rect oral
evi dence t hat French concerns i nfl uenced NATOs deci si on t o propose t he
OWEN
517
dual -key set up, but t he i dea seems pl ausi bl e. Cl earl y, t hi s i s an at t ract i ve
ar ea f or f ur t her r esear ch.
21. Smi t h pr esent at i on, i ndex 1280.
22. Ibi d. , i ndex 12701330.
23. Maj Scott G. Walker, Maxwell AFB, Ala. , interviewed by author, 28
Febr uar y 1997. Wal ker was t he deput y mi ssi on commander of t he Udbi na
ai r at t ack. See al so NATO Jet s Knock Out Base for Serb Pl anes, The Stars
and St ri pes, 22 November 1994, 12.
24. Holbrooke interview, side A, index 567.
25. Yasushi Akashi t o Radovan Karadzi c, l et t er, 10 December 1994.
26. Smi t h present at i on, i ndex 10801105.
27. Hol brooke i nt ervi ew, si de A, i ndex 029040.
28. Headquart ers Al l i ed Forces Sout hern Europe, CINSOUTH OPLAN
40101, Deny Fl i ght , change four, 3 May 1993. (Secret ) Informat i on ex-
29. Hunter interview, side B, index 035; and idem, tape 2, side A, index
2835.
30. Briefing, Lt Gen Hal Hornburg to BACS team, Air Force Wargaming
Institute, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 14 March 1996. General Hornburg was deputy
commander of 5 ATAF and director of the CAOC at the time of Deliberate Force.
31. Hunt er i nt ervi ew, t ape 2, si de A, i ndex 949.
32. Ibi d. , si de A, i ndex 11571559.
33. James L. Graff, A Good Season for War, Time Magazine, 15 May 1995.
34. Quot ed i n Pi t y t he Peacekeepers, Time Magazine, 5 J une 1995, 39.
35. In November 1995 Adm Lei ght on Smi t h report ed t hat t he brut al i t y of
t he Serbi an conquest of Srebreni ca was t he deci si ve event i n bri ngi ng t he
forei gn mi ni st ers t o London. By 14 Jul y, he l at er report ed, he and General
Janvi er recogni zed t hat t he Serbs coul d wal k i n and t ake Zepa, so t he
focus t hereaft er and at London was on prot ect i ng Gorazde. Smi t h present a-
t i on, i ndex 1570; and Adm Lei ght on Smi t h, Fur t her Comment s on 2nd
Draft of BACS, fax t ransmi ssi on, 2 August 1997, 1.
36. Admi ral Smi t h report s t hat he t ook t he ZOA concept t o General
Joul wanhi s commanderand t hen t o NAC i n t he peri od aft er t he fal l of
Srebreni ca and aft er t he London conference. Wi t h NAC approval i n earl y
August and af t er some di scussi on, he convi nced Gener al Janvi er t o si gn a
memor andum of under st andi ng i n suppor t of t he concept . Thi s t ook some
doi ng, Smi t h report ed, because t he peacekeepi ng focus of t he UN com -
manders l i mi t ed t hei r underst andi ng of t he ut i l i t y of ai r st ri kes t o puni sh -
ment of onl y t he forces act ual l y vi ol at i ng UNSCRs. Event ual l y, Smi t h sai d,
he convi nced Janvi er t hat at t acks agai nst t he second echel on of t he Serb
forces actually would be the better way to secure the safe areas. For this
account see Smiths presentation, index 17002100. For details of the act ua l
pl ans devel oped, see Col onel Campbel l s chapt er on pl anni ng, much of
whi ch, unfort unat el y, remai ns cl assi fi ed at t hi s wri t i ng.
37. For i mpr essi ons and r epor t age on t he conf er ence, see Mi chael
Evanss t wo art i cl es i n t he London Ti mes of 22 Jul y 1995: Mut ed Threat
DELIBERATE FORCE
518
Fal l s Short of Summi t Hopes and Ameri can Deal Sours over Di nner. See
al so t ext of Secret ary Chri st ophers speech of 22 Jul y: The Int ernat i onal
Conference on Bosnia: Now We Must Act, U.S. Department of State Dis -
pat ch, 24 Jul y 1995, 58384.
38. Chr i st opher , 583.
39. This reflects Michael Evanss view in American Deal Sours.
40 . Chr i st opher , 584.
41. Quot ed i n Evans, Mut ed Threat .
42. Evans, Ameri can Deal Sours.
43. Evans, Mut ed Threat .
44. NATO, Press St at ement by t he Secret ary General Fol l owi ng Nort h
At l ant i c Meet i ng on 25 Jul y 1995, Brussel s, 26 Jul y 1995.
45. Gen George Joul wan, SACEUR, t ape-recorded i nt ervi ew by Jerry
McGi nn, SHAPE, Cast eau, Bel gi um, 24 Jul y 1996, si de A, i ndex 8321128.
46. Gen James L. Jamer son, deput y commander i n chi ef , US Eur opean
Command, i nt er vi ewed by aut hor , 23 Jul y 1996. Gener al Jamer son was one
of the officers sent, as was Air Marshal William Wratten, CINC of the Royal
Air Forces Strike Command.
47. Smi t h present at i on, i ndex 19502065.
48. Lt Gen Michael Ryan, Headquarters AIRSOUTH, Naples, Italy, inter -
vi ewed by Maj Ti m Reagan, Ai r Force St udi es and Anal ysi s Agency, and Dr.
Wayne Thompson, Cent er for Ai r Force Hi st ory, 18 Oct ober 1995.
49. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, UN secretary-general, to Willy Claes, NATO
secret ary-general , l et t er, 26 J ul y 1995.
50. Adm Lei ght on W. Smi t h Jr. , CINCSOUTH, memorandum of under -
st andi ng wi t h Gen Bernard Janvi er, force commander, UNPF, subject: NAC
Decisions of 25 July and the Direction of the UN Secretary-General, 10
August 1995.
51. AIRSOUTH, Operat i on Del i berat e Force fact sheet , n. d. , 2.
52. For t he st udy, see Col John R. Baker, deput y di rect or of current
operations, Headquarters US Air Force, Report of Assistance Visit to Op -
eration Deny Flight Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC), Vicenza, Italy,
2430 Jul y 1995.
53. CAOC organi zat i on chart s exi st i n several document s col l ect ed by
t he BACS t eam. For exampl e, see USAFEs Response t o t he Bal kans Cri si s:
A Brief History of Operations Provide Promise and Deny Flight, August
1995, AFRHA, BACS file CAOC-24, folder B-1b(2)-3.
54. See Rick Atkinsons Air Assault Sets Stage for Broader Role, Wash -
ington Post, 15 November 1995, for an earl y publ i shed account of t hese
event s, whi ch Admi ral Smi t h expanded upon i n hi s present at i on t o Ai r War
Col l ege on 9 November 1995. See al so Smi t h, Furt her Comment s, 2.
55. General Ryan has made t hese poi nt s numerous t i mes, as he di d duri ng
an interview with the author and Colonel Sargent at Naples. See the authors
Synopsis of Interview of General Michael Ryan, COMAIRSOUTH, AFSOUTH
HQ, Naples IT, 10301200, Tuesday, 5 Dec 1995, AFHRA, BACS files.
56. AIRSOUTH fact sheet, 28.
OWEN
519
57. Gen Michael Ryan, Headquarters AIRSOUTH, Naples, Italy, inter -
vi ewed by aut hor and Ri char d Sar gent , 5 December 1995.
58. For this argument, see Col Trevor N. Dupuy, A Genius for War: The
German Army and General Staff, 18071945 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall, 1977).
59. Maj Gen Charl es D. Li nk, assi st ant deput y chi ef of st aff, pl ans and
oper at i ons, Headquar t er s USAF, di scussi on wi t h aut hor on t he pr ogr ess of
t he BACS st udy, 28 Febr uar y 1996.
60. Richardson was both outspoken in his praise of the leadership of Gen -
eral s Ryan and Hornburg, and i n hi s amazement at how t hey sust ai ned t hei r
workloads. See Col Douglas J. Richardson, transcript of oral history interview
by Maj Mark Conversino, Vicenza, Italy, 16 January 1996, AFHRA.
61. Maj Gen Michael C. Short, chief of staff, AIRSOUTH, interviewed by
aut hor, Napl es, It al y, 4 December 1995.
62. The focus on Aviano was a product of the research time and resources
available to the BACS team. Certainly US naval forces and air units of the
other participating countries also have stories to tell. Because the BACS had
little time to reach out to those forces, the author decided early on to focus the
team on Aviano and rely on the US Navy and the other countries to report on
their experiences and lessons learned from Deliberate For ce.
63. See Col onel Conversi nos chapt er.
64. Maj Gen Hal Hornburg, di rect or, CAOC, i nt ervi ewed by aut hor et al . ,
USAF Wargami ng Inst i t ut e, Maxwel l AFB, Al a. , 14 March 1996; and Con -
versino.
66. Smi t h, Furt her Comment s.
67. For det ai l s, see Presi dent Wi l l i am Cl i nt ons press st at ement , Est ab-
lishing a Basis for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, U. S. Department of State
Di spat ch, 11 Sept ember 1995, 679; and Nel an, 7677.
68. See Maj or McLaughl i ns chapt er on pol i t i cal -mi l i t ary connect i ons i n
Deliberate Force.
69. For an ear l y expr essi on of Hol br ooke s posi t i on, see Rober t J.
Gut t man, Ri chard Hol brooke, Europe, December 1994Januar y 1995, 12.
70. St even Greenhouse, U. S. Offi ci al s Say Bosni an Serbs Face NATO
Attack If Talks Stall, New York Ti mes, 28 August 1995.
71. Hunt er i nt ervi ew, si de B, i ndex 11141300.
72. Kevin Fedarko, The Guns of August, Ti me, 14 August 1995, 4446.
73. Kar st en Prager, Message from Serbia, Time, 17 Jul y 1995, 2425.
74. Norman Ci gar, How Wars End: War Termi nat i on and Serbi an Deci -
si onmaki ng i n t he Case of Bosni a, South East European Monitor, J a n u a r y
1996, passi m.
75. Holbrooke said the relationship between the bombing and diplomacy
was an accident. Negotiations were already under way when the bombing
began in response to the Mrkale mortar attack. The conjunction of eve nts jus t
happened. Holbrooke interview, side A, index 064080. See also Silence of the
Guns, Time Magazine, 25 September 1995, 41, for a journalistic discussi on of
DELIBERATE FORCE
520
t he mi l i t ary di l emma present ed t o t he Bosni an Serbs by t he conj unct i on of
t he bombi ng and t he l and war .
76. Holbrooke interview, side B, index 1534. See also Bruce W. Nelan,
Not-So-Rapid Response, Ti me, 19 J une 1995, 30.
77. Chri st opher Hi l l , t ranscri pt of i nt ervi ew by aut hor and Maj Mark
McLaughlin, 27 February 1996, 45, AFHRA, BACS files.
78. Holbrooke interview, side A, index 001028, 13540.
79. Richard Holbrooke, Annals of Diplomacy: The Road to Sarajevo,
The New Yorker, 21 and 28 Oct ober 1996, 100.
80. Hill interview, 9.
81. Hol brooke i nt ervi ew, si de A, i ndex 300360; and Hi l l i nt ervi ew, 910.
82. Holbrooke, Annals of Diplomacy, 104.
83. Hunt er i nt ervi ew, si de A, i ndex 20452120, 22453100.
84. Hol brooke i nt ervi ew, si de A, i ndex 400413; and i dem, Annal s of
Di pl omacy, 104.
88. Smi t h, Furt her Comment s.
90. Ibi d. , i ndex 369400, 484500; and Hunt er i nt ervi ew, t ape 2, si de A,
i ndex 800. The BACS t eam di d not at t empt t o i nt ervi ew t he domest i c l ead-
ers of t he NAC member st at es t o det ermi ne i f t hey al so were prepared t o
ri de out t he pol i t i cal repercussi ons of a maj or col l at eral -damage i nci dent .
91. Hunt er i nt ervi ew, si de A, i ndex 15501595, 18001815, 28303000.
92. Col Douglas Richardson, director of operations, CAOC, said that this
deliberation took place as an informal hallway discussion between him and
several other senior CAOC leaders, perhaps including Generals Sawyer and
Hornburg. Int ervi ewed by aut hor and Ri chard L. Sargent , 7 December 1995.
93. Admi ral Smi t h report s t hat al l of t hese opt i ons had drawbacks. As
regards addi ng new opt i on-one and -t wo t arget s t o t he l i st or revi si t i ng
t ar get s, Smi t h advi sed hi s commander s t hat t her e wer e not many l ef t on t he
exi st i ng l i st t hat woul d have enough effect t o ri sk ai rcrews. Consi st ent wi t h
t he opi ni on of Ambassador Hunt er and hi s own f eedback f r om Gener al
Joul wan, Smi t h di d not bel i eve t hat any pol i t i cal support exi st ed for st ri ki ng
opt i on-t hree t arget s. See Smi t h, Furt her Comment s; and Hunt er i nt er -
view, side B, index 10261112.
94. Richard Holbrooke, Comments to 2nd Draft of BACS, 11 July 1997, 2.
95. Gen Mi chael E. Ryan, di scussi on duri ng i nt eri m bri efi ng of BACS by
the author, USAFE/XO conference room, Ramstein AB, Germany, 24 August
1996.
96. Hol brooke, Comment s, 2.
97. As an exampl e of t he permeabi l i t y of NATO securi t y on t hi s i ssue,
Ti me Magazi ne publ i shed an art i cl e, cl earl y wri t t en before t he resul t s of t he
1314 Sept ember meet i ng were known, not i ng expl i ci t l y t hat t he al l i es wi l l
run out of so-cal l ed Opt i on 2 t arget sas earl y as next week and t hat a
OWEN
521
decision to move to option three presented NATO with a problem. See
Nelan, More Talking, More Fighting.
98. Holbrooke interview, side A, index 30657; and Hill interview, 8.
99. Holbrooke interview, side A, index 104; and Hill interview, 17.
100. Capt Dave Mi l l er, t el ephone i nt ervi ew by aut hor, 21 March 1996,
synopsis in AFHRA, BACS files. The other two liaison officers interviewed
were Maj Keith Yockey, who escort ed t he Croat i ans, and Maj Mark Di padua,
who escor t ed t he Bosni an Cr oat s and Musl i ms dur i ng t he Dayt on t al ks.
101. St ephen T. Hosmer, Psychological Effects of U.S. Air Operations in
Four Wars, 19411991: Lessons f or U. S. Commanders (Santa Monica, Calif. :
RAND, 1996), 198.
103. At the time of this writing, the number of casualties caused by Delib -
erate Force remains uncertain. The BACS team received an unsolicited vide-
otapeUS/NATO Bomb Serb Civilians, 9/95that purported to show that
civilian casualties and collateral damage were widespread and intentional. The
origins of the tape, on file in the BACS archive at AFHRA, are unclear, as is its
usefulness as an indicator either of the truth or of general Bosnian Serb
perceptions of the intent and impact of the air campaign. Ambassador Christo-
pher Hill recounted to his BACS interviewers that President Milosevic told him
that his investigation indicated that about 25 people died as a result of the
bombing. Hill interview, 16. This estimate conforms in magnitude with the
findings of an investigation conducted by the Red Cross shortly after the
bombing, which identified 27 civilian deaths and damage to civilian property as
probably caused by the bombing. From the Red Crosss account, it appears
that all of these deaths and damages were collateral consequences of attacks
on other targets of military significance, including bridges, cantonment areas, a
water reservoir, and a former Bosnian Serb field headquarters. International
Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC Report on Certain Aspects of the Conduct
of Hostilities and the Consequences from a Humanitarian Point of View of
NATO Air Strikes, November 1994, AFHRA, BACS files. What seems reason -
able to say, then, is that the 1, 026 weapons released during Deliberate Force
killed fewer than 30 people.
105. Hol brooke, Comment s, 2. One shoul d not e t hat Hol brooke was
respondi ng t o my i ni t i al anal ysi s of t hi s i ssue, so hi s assessment ri ses or
fal l s on t he credi bi l i t y and accuracy of my i nformat i on and case. I woul d
remai n responsi bl e for any error t hat someone mi ght l at er prove or at t ri but e
t o hi s posi t i on.
107. Smi t h, Fur t her Comment s.
108. Gen Mi chael E. Ryan, Furt her Comment s on 2nd Draft of BACS,
E-mai l message, 20 August 1997.
109. Ci gar , passi m.
110. Ibi d.
DELIBERATE FORCE
522
Contri butors
Col Christopher M. Campbell i s di rect or of academi cs at t he
NATO School (Supreme Headquart ers Al l i ed Powers Europe) at
Ober ammer gau, Ger many. He pr evi ousl y ser ved as an i nst r uc-
t or i n t he Joi nt Doct ri ne Ai r Campai gn Pl anni ng Course and
as director of the Information Warfare Division for the College
of Aerospace Doct ri ne Research and Educat i on at Maxwel l
AFB, Al abama; as deput y chi ef ai r l i ai son el ement t o Head-
quarters Allied Land Forces Central Europe, in Heidelberg, Ger-
many; as a st aff member on t he Uni t ed Nat i ons Prot ect i on
Force, Zagreb, Croatia; and as chief, War Plans Branch, Head-
quarters 4th Allied Tactical Air Force, Heidelberg, Germany. He
al so has hel d a number of posi t i ons i n t he F-15A communi t y.
A command pi l ot wi t h over t went y-four hundred fl i ght hours,
pr i mar i l y i n t he F- 15A/ C and F- 4D/ E, Col onel Campbel l
hol ds a BS i n i nt ernat i onal rel at i ons from t he Uni t ed St at es
Ai r Force Academy and an MBA i n management from Gol den
Gat e Uni versi t y. Hi s mi l i t ary educat i on i ncl udes Squadron Of-
ficer School, Air Command and Staff College, Armed Forces
Staff College, and Air War College.
Lt Col Mark J. Conversino i s commander of t he 93d Mai nt e-
nance Squadron, 93d Logi st i cs Group, 93d Ai r Cont rol Wi ng
a t Robins AFB, Georgia. He has served as a flight-line mainte-
na nce officer; an avionics maintenance supervisor; an assistant
professor of history at the United States Air Force Academy; a
maintenance operations officer at Fairchild AFB near Spokane,
Washington; director of maintenance at Riyadh Air Base, Saudi
Arabi a; and professor of ai rpower t heory and empl oyment ,
School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.
Colonel Conversino, who holds a bachelors degree in history
from Eastern Kentucky University as well as a masters degree
in US history and a PhD in US political history from Indiana
University, is the author of the book Fighting wi t h t he Sovi et s:
The Failure of Operation FRANTIC, 19441945 a nd nume r ous
art i cl es on ai rpower and defense-rel at ed i ssues.
523
Lt Col Bradley S. Davis is the senior arms-control policy advi-
sor, Verification and Compliance Division, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C. A career missileer and
strategic-policy analyst, he has held a variety of positions at
operational Minuteman missile wings; Headquarters Strategic
Air Command; Headquarters United States Air Force; and re-
cent l y as Academi c Depart ment chai rman at Ai r Command and
Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He has written extensively
on st rat egi c nucl ear and convent i onal arms cont rol and on
chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. He is also
coeditor of three textbooks on national security matters publish-
ed by Macmillan and Air University Press. Colonel Davis holds a
BA in history from UCLA and an MS in organizational behavior
and human-resource management from Chapman Uni versi t y.
Col Maris Buster McCrabb, USAF, Retired, taught economic
warfare and campaign planning at Air Universitys Joint Doc-
trine Air Campaign Course, Air Command and Staff College, and
School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, Alabama,
from 1992 to 1996. A fighter pilot and Fighter Weapons School
graduate, he flew F-4s and F-16s in the United States, United
Ki ngdom, Phi l i ppi nes, and Spai n. He saw combat and served as
the campaign planner for the 7440th Composite Wing (Provi-
sional), Joint Task Force Proven Force during the Persian Gulf
War. One of the Air Forces leading experts on campaign plan-
ning, he has published extensively on the subject. Since retiring
as chief of the Force Development and Experimentation Division
in the Aerospace Command and Control Agency, where he was
responsible for the vision, doctrine, education, training, readi-
ness, and new t echnol ogy t o support al l Ai r Force command and
control, he has worked for Logicon Advanced Technology, where
he is chief of the Advanced Concept Development Division. Colo-
nel McCrabb holds a BA from Bowling Green State University,
an MS and MPA from Troy State University, and a DPA from the
University of Alabama.
Maj Mark C. McLaughlin is an intelligence officer and chief of
the Subcontinent Division at the Joint Intelligence Center Pa -
cific , Pearl Harbor, Hawai i . When he worked on t he Bal kans
524
Ai r Campai gn St udy, he was chi ef of Resear ch and Pr esent a-
t i ons wi t hi n t he Col l ege of Aerospace Doct ri ne Research and
Educat i on at Maxwel l AFB, Al abama. Dur i ng hi s 16- yea r
militar y car eer , he has hel d assi gnment s at t he uni t , maj or -
command, and Air Staff levels, and served as a communication s-
el ect r oni cs of f i cer and a gr ound l aunched cr ui se mi ssi l e
l aunch-cont rol offi cer. Maj or McLaughl i n and hi s wi fe, Karen,
have a son, Mat t hew.
Dr. Karl Mueller i s assi st ant professor of comparat i ve mi l i t ary
studies at the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell
AFB, Al abama, where he t eaches i nt ernat i onal rel at i ons, de-
fense pol i cy, and st rat egi c ai rpower t heory and appl i cat i on. He
previ ousl y t aught at t he Uni versi t y of Mi chi gan and Kal ama-
zoo Col l ege. He has wri t t en art i cl es on a vari et y of nat i onal
securi t y t opi cs, i ncl udi ng al l i ance pol i t i cs, nucl ear st rat egy,
det errence t heory, economi c sanct i ons, coerci ve ai rpower, and
t he i mpl i cat i ons of space weaponi zat i on. He i s compl et i ng a
book about t he det er r ence st r at egi es of Eur opean smal l and
middle powers from the 1930s through the cold war. Dr. Mueller
received his BA in political science from the University of
Chicago and his PhD in politics from Princeton University.
Lt Col John C. Chris Orndorff i s t he chi ef of Requi rement s
for Headquart ers Ai r Force Offi ce of Speci al Invest i gat i ons
(AFOSI), Andrews AFB, Maryland. He has served as an in-
st r uct or at Squadr on Of f i cer School and Ai r Command and
Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama; as an AFOSI special
agent and det achment commander ; and as an admi ni st r at i ve
offi cer. He has publ i shed art i cl es i n Airpower Journal, TIG
Brief, Intercom, Global Reliance, a nd Command. Colonel Orn-
dorff hol ds a BA i n rel i gi on and an MA i n humani t i es from
West ern Kent ucky Uni versi t y.
Col Robert C. Owen (see About the Editor, p. xv).
Lt Col Robert D. Pol l ock i s deput y pr ogr am manager f or
wi ng/ uni t command and cont r ol ( C
2
) syst ems, Combat Ai r
Forces C
2
Systems Program Office, Electronic Systems Center,
525
Hanscom AFB, Massachusetts. He is responsible for managing
t he research, devel opment , t est , and eval uat i on as wel l as
supportability of a 31-program portfolio with annual budgets
in excess of $60 million annually. He has over 15 years of
acquisition experience in fighters, bombers, transports, weap-
ons, mi ssi l es, and C
2
systems. A former director of war theory at
Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, Colonel
Pol l ock has publ i shed several papers on ai r campai gni ng.
Lt Col Ronal d M. Reed is staff judge advocate at Pope AFB,
Nor t h Car ol i na. He has pr evi ousl y ser ved as an i nt er nat i onal
and operat i ons l aw at t orney wi t h t he Offi ce of t he St aff Judge
Advocat e at Uni t ed St at es Paci fi c Command, Camp H. M.
Smi t h, Hawai i ; as a depl oyed st aff j udge advocat e duri ng Op -
er at i on Deser t St or m; and as an i nst r uct or at t he Ai r For ce
Judge Advocate Generals School. Colonel Reed received a BS
i n chemi st ry from t he Uni versi t y of Not re Dame, a JD from De
Paul Uni versi t y, and a Mast er of Ai rpower Art and Sci ence
from the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB,
Al abama.
Lt Col Richard L. Hollywood Sargent i s a combat hi st o-
r i an at t he Uni t ed St at es Ai r For ce Hi s t or i cal Res ear ch
Agency, Maxwel l AFB, Al abama. A mast er weapon syst ems
officer (WSO) with over twenty-three hundred hours of fighter
t i me, he i s a graduat e of t he USAF Fi ght er Weapons School at
Nel l i s AFB, Nevada. He has wri t t en art i cl es on combat ai r
operat i ons i n t he Gul f War and Worl d War II and i s current l y
wor ki ng on a monogr aph deal i ng wi t h weapons and t act i cs
used i n t he Bal kans ai r oper at i ons. Col onel Sar gent hol ds a
BS i n busi ness from Fl ori da St at e Uni versi t y and an MBA
from Troy State University.
526
Index
1st Speci al Operat i ons Wi ng, 216
2d Wi ng, 212
5th Allied Tactical Air Force (5 ATAF),
19, 4648, 55, 77, 80, 91, 94, 97,
13233, 165, 167, 179, 358, 363,
46465, 46869, 482
8t h Fi ght er-Bomber Wi ng, 369
9t h Fi ght er Squadr on, 151
12t h Wi ng, 222
16t h Speci al Operat i ons Squadron, 216
23d Fi ght er Squadr on, 212
24t h Mari ne Amphi bi ous Uni t , 390
31st Fi ght er Wi ng, 52, 134, 140, 214,
306, 32122, 36061, 36566, 369,
48889
31st Gr oup, 212, 222
31st Logi st i cs Group, 140
31st Oper at i ons Gr oup, 136, 140
32d Air Operations Group (AOG), 56, 97,
181, 183
33d Reconnai ssance Squadr on, 224
43d El ect roni c Combat Squadron, 233
48t h Fi ght er Wi ng, 216
49t h Fi ght er Wi ng, 151
86th Airlift Wing, 142
104t h Fi ght er Gr oup, 149, 214
131st Fi ght er Squadr on, 214
429t h El ect roni c Combat Squadron, 232
492d Fi ght er Squadr on, 320
494t h Fi ght er Squadr on, 147, 216
510t h Fi ght er Squadr on, 136, 143,
14748, 214, 321, 36061, 36667
533d Fi ght er Ai r Squadron, 212
555t h Fi ght er Squadr on, 143, 147, 214,
321
7490th Composite Wing (Provisional),
160, 202, 212, 214, 237, 305, 307,
348, 489
7490t h Operat i ons Group (Provi si onal ),
140
7490t h Wi ng (Provi si onal ), 52, 54, 134,
365, 488
Abdi c, Fi kret , 22
Adri at i c Sea, 1819, 24, 94, 125, 136,
146, 157, 162, 200202, 207,
20910, 21920, 22831, 234, 246,
259, 264, 303, 308, 310, 322, 325,
336, 347, 349, 397, 403, 420, 484
Agnel l i , Susanna, 24445
airborne early warning (AEW), 49, 111,
137, 157, 219, 234, 335, 348
Ai r Campai gn Pl anni ng Tool , 56
Air Command and Staff College (ACSC),
432, 44041, 446, 465
air control unit (ACU), 31011, 313, 316,
346
aircraft
A-6, 240, 260, 317
A-10, 22, 134, 137, 149, 199, 214,
248, 261, 26568, 31819
AC-130, 42, 124, 157, 202, 216,
26769, 317, 402
ai rborne bat t l efi el d command and
control center (ABCCC), 46, 80,
111, 132, 145, 155, 16163, 202,
219, 23436, 249, 3089, 319,
331, 335, 348
Aries II, 229
AV-8, 240
B- 2, 274
B-52, 240, 242, 269, 274
Bl ackhawk hel i copt er, 398
Boei ng 707, 222
Bosni an Ser b, 134
Bri t i sh, 2012, 260, 310, 320
C- 5, 237
C-17, 237
C-21, 132, 202, 23738
C-130, 134, 158, 235, 23738
C-135FR, 222
C- 141, 237
C-160, 228, 231
carri er, 202
CASA C-212, 219, 23739
CH- 47, 134
DC- 8, 231
Dut ch, 218, 246, 258, 310
E- 2C, 234, 310, 348
E- 3 ai r bor ne war ni ng and cont r ol
system (AWACS), 80, 13334, 137,
162, 23334, 308, 348, 461
E-8 j oi nt survei l l ance, t arget at t ack
radar syst em (JSTARS), 241
EA-6, 132, 134, 202, 211, 219, 233,
267, 269, 31112, 31416
EC-130, 132, 2012, 204, 210, 233,
235, 308, 31416, 348
527
ECR-Tornado (ECRT), 21213, 219
EF-18, 134, 201, 218, 260, 267, 315,
346
EF-111, 134, 137, 2012, 204, 210,
213, 23133, 312, 31416
el ect roni c combat and
reconnai ssance (ECR), 212, 224,
246
EP-3, 22830
Etendard IVP, 21
F-1CR, 22324
F-4, 13132, 2012, 211, 240, 322
F-14, 20910, 217, 22425, 269, 271,
317
F- 15, 134, 137, 147, 15254, 199,
203, 207, 214, 216, 24041, 248,
25960, 263, 271, 274, 32024,
398
F-16, 21, 24, 97, 102, 111, 13132,
134, 13637, 14748, 199, 2013,
20710, 214, 21819, 224, 226,
237, 24546, 248, 259, 265, 267,
271, 273, 281, 299, 301, 303,
310, 31723, 325, 346, 402, 405,
443, 477
F-16 HARM Targeting System (HTS),
201, 203, 21112, 267, 271, 312,
31415
F- 18, 152, 207, 210, 212, 21718,
31112, 31415, 320
F-22, 274
F-111, 240, 25960, 316, 323
F-117, 15153, 167, 204, 240,
24345, 269, 274, 314
FA-2, 21, 209, 219, 224, 299, 302
F/ A-18, 134, 147, 153, 155, 21112,
217, 226, 248, 260, 262, 267,
269, 271, 303, 315, 317, 320,
324, 403
FMK-3, 209, 310
French, 2012, 217, 310
G- 222, 23738
Gal eb, 21, 207, 299, 405
Ger man, 212, 219, 258
GR-7, 132, 155, 202, 21819, 260,
318, 320, 346
GR. Mk1, 218, 224
GR. Mk7, 224
HC-130, 137, 149, 23637, 349
IB707, 218, 222
i nt ercept or ai r defense and ai r st ri ke
(IDS) Tornado, 246
It al i an, 218, 222, 259
Jaguar , 22, 132, 2012, 217, 224, 260
joint strike fighter, 274
KC-10, 132, 2023, 22021
KC-130H, 222
KC-135, 202, 218, 22022
L-1011K, 222
Mari ne Corps, 212, 217, 267
MC-130, 132, 202, 240
MH-53, 137, 149, 23637, 349
MiG, 270
Mi rage 2000, 118, 132, 137,
200202, 208, 21718, 224, 236,
26061, 302, 310, 318, 349
Mirage F-1, 132, 2012
Navy, 267, 269
Net her l ands, 2012, 208, 218
OA-10, 267, 31718
Puma hel i copt er, 236
RC-135W, 229
remotely piloted vehicle (RPV), 226
RF-4C, 24041
RG-8, 22527
Ri vet Joi nt , 223, 22829, 312
R. Mk1, 228, 23031
rot ary-wi ng, 207, 301, 30910
S- 3B, 213, 228
Sepecat Jaguar , 200, 217, 224
Ser b, 134
Spani sh, 201, 212, 21819, 260, 267
st eal t h, 244, 439
Tornado, 137, 201, 213, 222
Turki sh, 2013, 209, 219, 245, 259,
310
U- 2, 137, 157, 223, 225, 228
unmanned aer i al vehi cl e, 137, 147,
153, 192, 199200, 223, 22628,
33536
US, 202, 208, 240, 260, 267, 269,
299, 301, 304
vert i cal / short t akeoff and l andi ng
(V/STOL), 209, 21819
ai rcraft carri ers, 19, 349
ai r defense, 204, 231, 233, 242, 280,
282, 285, 292, 299301, 311, 338,
446, 478, 491
ai r-defense operat i ons cent er, 299
Ai r Force doct ri ne, 69, 116, 122
Ai r Forces Sout hern Europe
(AIRSOUTH), 5455, 58, 77, 91,
9495, 97, 100, 103, 1056, 110,
115, 11718, 12223, 149, 18084,
190, 223, 238, 270, 27981, 283,
28587, 290, 29294, 351, 35657,
528
373, 433, 46465, 46871, 473, 475,
478, 481, 483, 485, 48788, 503,
50911
Air Force Studies and Analysis Division,
417
air interdiction (AI), 78, 206, 213, 248,
309, 31618, 320, 324, 335, 338
ai r-l and coordi nat i on, 317
Ai r/ Land Operat i ons Coordi nat i on
Document , 106, 118
ai rl i ft , 233, 237, 239, 246, 511
ai r operat i ons cel l , 357
ai r operat i ons cent er (AOC), 95, 98, 100,
110, 134, 369, 419
air operations control center (AOCC),
4648, 133, 154, 162, 167, 401
ai r order of bat t l e, 240
ai rspace cont rol order, 80
Air Staff, 180
ai r superi ori t y, 73, 116, 122, 208, 439
ai r support operat i ons cent er (ASOC),
7980
ai r supr emacy, 184, 207, 270, 273, 326,
349
ai r survei l l ance, 93
air tasking message (ATM), 5052, 54,
58, 80, 11113, 118, 135, 13739,
144, 14648, 155, 16061, 18283,
185, 248, 291, 318, 320, 336, 348,
357, 359, 361, 363, 411, 414, 416,
395, 483
air tasking order (ATO), 6768, 7475,
79, 81, 118, 18687, 442
air-to-air refueling (AAR), 137, 157, 204,
21920, 222, 235, 246, 308, 325,
331, 335, 347
Air University, 455
Akashi , Yasushi , 22, 39, 41, 45, 48, 56,
92, 138, 4023, 407, 472, 474, 477,
481
Albania, 4
allied air forces
Bri t i sh, 248
Dut ch, 24, 264, 346
Fr ench, 217, 22224, 236, 248, 264,
346, 348
Ger man, 199, 224, 358
It al i an, 91, 132, 199, 218, 222, 238,
246, 264
Net herl ands, 265, 358
Spani sh, 199, 248
Al l i ed Command Europe Rapi d React i on
Cor ps, 77
Allied Forces Central Europe, 77
Allied Forces Northwest Europe, 77
Al l i ed Forces Sout hern Europe
(AFSOUTH), 19, 2426, 59, 7778,
94, 97, 105, 181, 194, 269, 280, 356,
397, 46465, 467, 47071, 47778,
48081, 503, 511
antiaircraft artillery (AAA), 124, 13435,
210, 231, 265, 273, 299, 302, 309,
311, 317, 326, 341, 346, 402, 413,
434, 474
area of operat i ons, 50, 417
area of responsibility (AOR), 60, 106,
146, 162, 199, 203, 231, 233, 237,
307, 310, 333, 386
arms embargo, 18, 26, 46061
Ashy, Joseph, 9495, 373, 397, 464,
466, 46971, 475
at roci t i es, 14, 16, 90
Auftragstaktik (mi ssi on t act i cs), 354
Aust ri a, 2, 4, 16
aut onomous at t ack syst em, 275
Aviano Air Base, Italy, 52, 13334, 136,
138, 14043, 14546, 151, 153,
16062, 18485, 200202, 204,
21012, 214, 21617, 222, 23537,
239, 241, 244, 25960, 263, 269,
303, 32122, 34849, 35960,
36570, 411, 416, 420, 470, 473,
484, 48890
Avord, France, 231
Baker, James, 10
Baker , John R. , 5556
Baker St udy, 97
Bal kans, 9, 77, 87, 89, 95, 113, 116,
121, 126, 159, 190, 196, 226, 285,
294, 331, 350, 355, 382, 38687,
394, 405, 432, 458, 469, 47273,
481, 485, 495, 497, 509
Bal kans Ai r Campai gn St udy (BACS),
45556, 463, 46566, 472, 47576,
485, 487, 48991, 494, 49697, 500,
505, 5078, 511, 51315
Balkans area of responsibility (AOR),
236, 307, 345, 34849
Banj a Luka, Yugosl avi a, 24, 102,
15052, 157, 194, 204, 223, 244,
26264, 282, 292, 311, 405, 446,
449, 478, 491
Bart hol omew, Regi nal d, 24445
Basher 52, 102
529
Bat chel or, Andrew, 165, 183, 35961,
363
bat t l e/ bomb damage assessment (BDA),
48, 75, 111, 137, 145, 160, 165,
17786, 193, 238, 29091, 34142,
356, 35961, 373, 49293
battlefield air interdiction (BAI), 79, 103,
106, 144, 146, 15456, 206, 21314,
216, 30910, 31620, 325, 331, 335,
338
Battle of Kosovo Polje, 7
Bei rut bombi ng, 385, 39092, 394, 416
Belgrade, Yugoslavia, 2, 45, 812, 14,
159, 191, 193, 299, 495, 503
Bi hac Pocket , 496
Bihac, Yugoslavia, 15, 22, 2527, 41,
4345, 1034, 282, 398, 402, 404,
406, 408
Black Hole, 95
Bl ue Sword, 317, 401
Boban, Mat e, 16
bombi ng pause, 140, 146, 15759
bombs
AGM-62, 261, 269
AGM-123A, 269
AS30L, 338
BLU-109, 26263
CBU-87, 160, 21819, 26566, 318,
338
CBU-89, 270
cl ust er , 134, 214, 264, 270
convent i onal , 214, 218
GBU-10, 136, 199, 216, 25960, 273,
303, 32223, 338
GBU-10I, 25960, 321
GBU-12, 147, 199200, 216, 260,
318, 322, 338
GBU-15, 15254, 199, 216, 26263,
274, 312, 321, 32425, 33839
GBU-16, 155, 260, 338
GBU- 24, 216, 260, 303, 321, 338
GBU-27, 269, 274
general -purpose (GP), 25960,
26465, 270, 33839, 347
gui ded, 149, 216, 21819, 264, 304,
417, 420
laser-guided (LGB), 166, 199200,
214, 217, 25961, 263, 269, 311,
32023, 325, 336, 338, 347
low-level laser-guided (LLLGB), 260
MK-82, 264, 338
MK-83, 166, 265, 338
MK-84, 26263, 265, 338
nonpr eci si on, 166, 248, 257, 259,
264, 27071, 273, 338, 349
pr eci si on, 166, 184, 269, 271, 274
speci al -purpose, 259
ungui ded, 149, 242, 257, 265, 270,
305, 340, 419, 491
Boorda, Jeremy M. , 9394, 464, 469
Bosni a, 1, 5, 9, 1320, 2228, 38, 41,
4546, 5556, 59, 65, 72, 9092,
9497, 104, 114, 13537, 139,
14851, 154, 158, 160, 162, 16668,
180, 19096, 22627, 229, 239, 241,
24547, 264, 269, 282, 285, 302,
311, 32021, 326, 340, 382, 398,
404, 413, 415, 418, 421, 433,
45766, 46971, 47374, 47678,
480, 483, 491, 493, 497, 502, 507,
51215
Bosnia-Herzegovina, 34, 9, 1214, 39,
4146, 48, 52, 5455, 58, 90, 93, 95,
99, 1014, 110, 119, 123, 136, 144,
149, 158, 180, 19192, 201, 203,
207, 223, 228, 231, 259, 28384,
299, 303, 306, 30910, 31213,
31516, 319, 331, 335, 34546, 349,
386, 394, 396401, 405, 408, 412,
421, 433, 438, 445, 468, 478
Bosni an ai r force, 134
Bosni an army (Bi H), 15, 20, 2729, 87,
107, 119, 157, 160, 190, 281,
28586, 434, 460, 496
Bosni an Croat forces (HVO), 16, 20, 27,
119
Bosni an Cr oat s, 15, 20, 23, 28, 58, 195,
433, 435, 49697
Bosni an Feder at i on, 496, 498, 500,
51314
Bosni an Musl i ms, 1314, 17, 123, 139,
159, 415
Bosni an Serb army (BSA), 1516, 2029,
41, 4344, 47, 58, 60, 72, 87, 101,
107, 109, 11617, 119, 13435,
13839, 14548, 151, 15758, 179,
190, 19395, 199200, 231, 244,
262, 266, 270, 273, 279, 281,
28589, 29293, 299302, 309, 311,
315, 320, 34041, 34546, 403, 407,
41011, 415, 434, 43840, 44546,
449, 479, 511
Bosni an Ser b Assembl y, 22
Bosni an Ser b Republ i c, 138, 280
Bosni an Serbs, 5, 1218, 2022, 24,
2829, 37, 4445, 5759, 79, 87, 90,
530
93, 100103, 105, 1078, 11011,
11317, 12324, 126, 13435, 138,
145, 149, 157, 161, 17980, 183,
18991, 19396, 201, 236, 243,
26970, 281, 28586, 289, 29192,
29899, 301, 335, 340, 345, 356,
370, 4034, 406, 409, 414, 418, 433,
435, 43839, 446, 44950, 455,
45961, 466, 468, 47274, 47681,
483, 49197, 500, 502, 5068,
51215
Bouton Dor, 136, 309, 327
Bout ros-Ghal i , Bout ros, 39, 41, 56, 92,
472, 474, 476
Bri ndi si , It al y, 149, 216, 236, 349
Br i t i sh ar my, 92
Broz, Josi p. See Tito
Brussel s, Bel gi um, 25, 495
Bulatovic, Momir, 12
Bul gari a, 3
Bus h, Dan, 414
Cable News Network (CNN), 159, 292,
361, 368, 410, 412
Cal i se, Ken, 136, 161, 165
campai gn obj ect i ves, 350, 506
Carri ngt on, Pet er, 12, 15
Cart er, Ji mmy, 23
casual t i es, 248, 257, 270, 28788, 290,
304, 319, 356, 502
cease-fi re, 270, 336, 340, 343, 463
center of gravity (COG), 57, 6970,
7273, 101, 107, 109, 114, 117,
12223, 286, 297, 415, 434, 436,
43840, 442, 44445, 44950
Central Intelligence Agency, 182
cent ral i zed cont rol , 80, 371
Cervia, Italy, 208, 218, 224
chaff, 21314, 236, 269
Chamber s, James E. , 9394, 469
Chari ot (code name), 132, 136, 154,
16162, 381, 402, 405, 41213
Checkmat e, 55, 98, 102, 281
Chet ni ks, 3
Chi na, 138
Chi r ac, Jacques, 2526
Chri st opher, Warren, 477, 479, 5034
Churkin, Vitaly, 21
circular error of probability, 305, 325,
339
Cl aes, Wi l l y, 41, 5657, 59, 92, 13839,
14647, 397, 403, 48081, 499
Cl ark, Wes, 501
Cl ausewi t z, Carl von, 162, 382, 390,
392, 434
Cl i nt on, Bi l l , 21, 26
cl ose ai r support (CAS), 19, 21, 24, 41,
56, 59, 75, 79, 97, 100103, 1056,
114, 124, 13738, 14446, 15458,
163, 167, 206, 209, 21314, 21618,
233, 24849, 266, 307, 30910,
31619, 325, 331, 335, 338, 341,
399, 4015, 412, 461, 466, 47172,
47476, 478, 481
cl ose cont rol , 472, 48587
coercive-denial model, 44849
col d war, 46, 7678, 119, 121, 512
col l at eral damage, 58, 87, 99100, 106,
109, 111, 115, 125, 136, 144,
15051, 15961, 166, 168, 242, 248,
257, 259, 26566, 27073, 275,
28384, 28687, 29091, 293, 3035,
319, 324, 327, 331, 343, 350, 356,
35960, 370, 372, 399, 402, 4056,
40913, 41516, 41921, 43334,
475, 484, 491, 5012, 5068, 510
combat ai r pat rol (CAP), 111, 146,
15758, 20610, 21719, 24647,
307, 31011, 34546, 485
combat search and rescue (CSAR), 24,
137, 14849, 158, 216, 219, 23637,
307, 331, 33536, 349, 41314
combined air operations center (CAOC),
19, 4652, 5458, 77, 7980, 91,
9495, 9798, 100103, 1056,
10913, 115, 11819, 12225, 132,
13439, 14449, 152, 15463,
16567, 17986, 192, 22729, 235,
238, 243, 246, 266, 290, 298, 306,
30910, 312, 31516, 323, 325, 333,
336, 351, 35565, 367, 37072, 381,
395, 401, 41416, 421, 431, 43334,
44950, 46870, 472, 475, 48283,
48788, 490, 492, 502, 51011
combi ned force ai r component
commander (CFACC), 87, 91, 94, 98,
109, 113, 124, 178, 200, 222,
24647, 273, 298, 302, 307, 333,
345, 349
Comi nform, 4
command and cont rol (C
2
), 37, 4648,
52, 59, 6869, 80, 94, 97, 99, 101,
11011, 11719, 13234, 137, 155,
16263, 167, 235, 275, 28081,
28486, 290, 292, 309, 31920, 324,
531
348, 352, 371, 373, 399400, 409,
417, 440, 449, 468, 479, 512
command, cont r ol , and communi cat i ons
(C
3
), 58, 108, 115, 147, 210, 231,
23334, 28081, 311, 338, 341
command, cont r ol , communi cat i ons,
computers, and intelligence (C
4
I),
433, 439, 446
command, cont r ol , communi cat i ons,
and i nt el l i gence (C
3
I), 259, 355, 487
commander, Al l i ed Ai r Forces Sout hern
Europe (COMAIRSOUTH), 48, 51, 55,
91, 9495, 102, 107, 11012,
11415, 11920, 12526, 131, 133,
144, 15052, 15860, 167, 184, 201,
281, 298, 39798, 401, 407
commander, Al l i ed Joi nt Force
(COMAJF), 78
commander in chief, Allied Forces
Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH), 37,
41, 4344, 4748, 79, 91, 9394,
106, 11417, 125, 13132, 2014,
245, 281, 395, 401, 404, 407, 464,
470, 472, 484
commander in chief, US Air Forces
Europe (CINCUSAFE), 93, 98
commander i n chi ef, US European
Command (USCINCEUR), 244
commander, 5th Allied Tactical Air Force
(COM5ATAF), 395, 401
Communi st Par t y, 4
concept of operations (CONOPS), 52, 55,
68, 74, 78, 96, 99, 1023, 3079,
39899, 443, 470, 478
confidence building, 463
Cont act Gr oup, 27, 92, 120, 125,
15152, 190, 19495, 245, 477,
49395, 500, 5034, 514
Cont i ngency Theat er Ai r Pl anni ng
System (CTAPS), 56, 75, 482
Cor ona, 349
cr i si s- act i on pl anni ng/ t eam, 112, 359,
402, 437, 444, 448, 465
Croat i a, 3, 814, 1718, 20, 2223, 28,
45, 92, 100, 107, 134, 137, 180,
19295, 227, 404, 412, 415, 457,
45960, 473, 513
Croatian air force (HRZ), 27
Croat i an army (HV), 27, 157, 434, 496
Croat i a Rest ri ct ed Operat i ng Zone
(CROROZ), 315
Croat s, 3, 69, 1011, 14, 16, 18,
13435, 139, 157, 15960, 193,
45960, 493, 49697
Czechoslovakia, 2
Dal Mol i n Ai r Base, It al y, 48, 91, 132,
464
Dayt on Peace Accords, 60, 126, 167,
350, 498, 505, 514
decent ral i zed execut i on, 371
Defense Intelligence Agency, 180
Defense Logistics Agency, 142
Defense Planning Committee (DPC), 42,
4 7
def ense suppr essi on, 485, 489
defensive counterair (DCA), 206, 208,
310
deni al st rat egy, 447, 465
Department of Defense (DOD), 70, 222,
391, 393
Depart ment of St at e, 183, 187, 41819,
500
Dept ul a, Dave, 98, 358
desired mean points of impact (DMPI),
109, 11112, 114, 125, 136, 14445,
14748, 15357, 15960, 18285,
279, 287, 29091, 320, 323, 327,
336, 34142, 347, 350, 356, 359,
36162, 364, 371, 41012, 416, 420,
433, 443, 485, 5023
Dezney, Turkey, 22627
Dinaric Alps, 303
Dini, Lamberto, 24445
di pl omacy, 5960, 139, 146, 155, 158,
167, 19496, 419, 43132, 435, 443,
446, 45557, 476, 49495, 497,
500501, 503, 505, 510, 51314
Doboj, Yugoslavia, 156
doct ri ne, 8789, 111, 116, 11923, 126,
17780, 18687, 414, 46566, 492,
511
Donji Vakuf, Yugoslavia, 152, 157
Dover Air Force Base, Delaware, 142
dual correl at i on, 41213
dual -key syst em, 25, 37, 5657, 5960,
97, 110, 114, 117, 125, 131, 135,
381, 399, 4013, 407, 410, 418,
47275, 479, 481, 483, 499
Dubrovni k, Croat i a, 11
Dunn, Mi chael , 359, 36364
earl y warni ng (EW), 99, 231, 247, 281
earl y warni ng radar, 311, 400
532
East ern Europe, 2, 4, 67, 76
East ern Sl avoni a, 9
Ebr o 33, 118, 137, 146, 14849, 157,
164
economi c sanct i ons, 18, 22, 28, 19495,
461
effect s-based model , 432, 440, 44246,
449
electronic combat (EC), 1015, 201,
21011, 224, 23132, 240
el ect roni c count ermeasures (ECM), 213,
21819, 229, 269, 274
el ect roni c defenses, 232
electronic intelligence (ELINT), 213, 219,
22425, 22829, 23031, 233, 247,
331, 335
el ect roni c reconnai ssance, 229
el ect roni c support measures (ESM), 213,
219, 23133, 348
electronic warfare (EW), 101, 109, 132,
15254, 219, 228, 231, 233, 28485,
289, 348, 511
embargo, 18, 397
engagement zone (EZ), 319
et hni c cl eansi ng, 11, 457
et hni c confl i ct , 67, 445, 458, 462
Eur opean Command ( EUCOM) , 199,
227, 244, 264
European Communi t y (EC), 1013
Eur opean Uni on, 245
exclusion zone (EZ), 2021, 24, 29293,
31920, 386, 4034, 408, 478, 480,
504
Fer di nand, Fr anz, 2
Fi ght er Weapons School , 322, 326
fi re-support coordi nat i on l i ne, 317, 320
five-ring theory, 432, 43739, 444, 446
Fogl eman, Ronal d R. , 126, 272
force commander, Uni t ed Nat i ons Peace
Forces (FC UNPF), 202, 317
Fornasi ero, Andrea, 48, 91, 94, 132,
16566, 464
forward air controller (airborne) (FAC-A),
31720
forward air controller (FAC), 156, 317,
31920, 4013
forward-l ooki ng i nfrared radar, 319
France, 2, 1819, 39, 44, 47, 49,
13133, 164, 191, 208, 220, 228,
233, 245, 258, 265, 348, 353, 397,
462, 485, 494
frat ri ci de, 106, 111, 113, 125, 257, 270,
319, 402, 413
Fr ench ar my, 92
Fr ench navy, 21
Geneva Agreement , 504
Geneva, Swi t zerl and, 155, 493, 495, 498
Genoa, It al y, 222
Gent ry, Todd, 360, 368, 372
Ger many, 23, 12, 17, 19, 49, 133, 164,
191, 213, 24546, 346, 485, 494
Ghedi , It al y, 203, 209, 218
Gi bbons, John, 363
Gioia del Colle, Italy, 209, 219
Gj ader, Al bani a, 228
Glamoc, Yugoslavia, 153
Global Positioning System (GPS), 236,
261
Gl osson, Bust er, 273
Gol dfei n, Dave, 364, 371
Gorazde, Yugosl avi a, 15, 21, 25, 4345,
1024, 156, 282, 299, 398, 4023,
406, 408, 474, 477, 47980
Great Bri t ai n, 12, 18, 133, 164, 191,
228, 265, 462, 485, 494
gr eat capt ai ns, 351, 354, 370, 37273,
48687
Gr eece, 3, 17, 203, 246, 465, 485
ground operat i ons, 248, 497
Gucci , 5051
guerri l l a war, 4
gui dance, appor t i onment , and t ar get i ng
(GAT), 29091
Gul f War, 156, 24041, 257, 25960,
27071, 27374, 32526, 345, 347,
48485
Hacket t , John, 363, 371
Hallisey, Mark, 36061
Han Pijesak, Yugoslavia, 136
Hawl ey, Ri chard E. , 98
heavy weapons, 2021, 4344, 99, 103,
1068, 11617, 124, 133, 135,
13839, 14446, 149, 158, 179,
19091, 193, 28890, 292, 304, 320,
340, 350, 400, 404, 4067, 409, 415,
43335, 439, 443, 44546, 449, 460,
498
Herceg-Bosna, 16
hi gh-speed ant i radi at i on mi ssi l e
t arget i ng syst em (HTS), 111, 199
Hi l l , Chri st opher, 19193, 196, 418,
498, 500, 505
533
HMS Invincible, 209, 219, 224
Hol brooke, Ri chard, 2728, 60, 92, 114,
122, 139, 151, 161, 19096, 245,
418, 473, 475, 49395, 498506,
5089
Hol l and, 485
Hol l ey, I. B. , Jr. , 88
Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico,
151
Hoog, Steve, 143
Hornburg, Hal , 48, 52, 55, 5758, 91,
119, 132, 13536, 161, 16566, 181,
192, 194, 243, 290, 310, 355,
35859, 36164, 381, 389, 411, 414,
421, 434, 482
host ages, 106, 110, 131, 474, 477, 479,
496
humani t ar i an assi st ance, 1819, 39, 45,
90, 93, 191, 398400, 413, 461, 469,
494
Hungar y, 23, 162, 397
Hunt er, Robert , 464, 473, 47576, 480,
495, 498502, 507, 509
Hurd, Dougl as, 20
Icel and, 47
i nf r ast r uct ur e, 109, 43637, 446
integrated air defense system (IADS), 24,
58, 101, 1089, 111, 114, 131, 134,
14445, 15052, 154, 164, 2012,
243, 264, 269, 27475, 280, 282,
285, 289, 292, 299, 309, 311, 315,
327, 341, 404, 4079, 478
i nt el l i gence, 49, 52, 55, 66, 70, 73,
7576, 95, 109, 111, 124, 133,
14445, 153, 163, 166, 17779,
18186, 223, 228, 275, 290, 306,
312, 314, 326, 341, 348, 360, 369,
411, 470, 482, 490
i nt el l i gence, survei l l ance, and
reconnai ssance (ISR), 219, 22223,
225, 234, 34748
i nt ercept or ai r defense and ai r st ri ke
(IDS), 213
i nt erdi ct i on, 233, 249, 512
i nt ernat i onal l aw, 382, 38485, 395,
415, 41920, 471
Int ernat i onal Monet ary Fund, 5
i nt ernat i onal press medi a, 420
interservice rivalry, 335
Iran, 393
I r aq, 201, 273, 325, 358, 391, 398, 435
Ist rana, It al y, 217, 224
I st r es, Fr ance, 220, 222
Italian Foreign Ministry, 151
Italian Ministry of Defense (MOD),
24445
It al y, 24, 19, 133, 149, 15152, 164,
167, 201, 220, 241, 24546, 265,
46465, 470, 482, 485, 489
It azuke Ai r Base, Japan, 369
Izetbegovic, Alija, 1415, 17, 27, 460
Jahori na, Yugosl avi a, 136
Jajce, Yugoslavia, 157
J amer s on, J ames , 455
J ans en, Ber nd, 358
Janvi er , Ber nar d, 26, 44, 48, 5658, 92,
110, 115, 126, 13133, 13839,
14647, 158, 19092, 202, 228, 281,
317, 403, 4078, 410, 481, 48384
J apan, 369
JNA (Yugoslavias national army), 45,
812, 1415, 18, 457, 45960
Johnson, Lyndon, 417
joint air operations center (JAOC), 74, 80
j oi nt ai r operat i ons pl an (JAOP), 6769,
7375
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 5556, 180,
503
j oi nt di rect -at t ack muni t i on, 275
j oi nt doct ri ne, 6566, 6869, 71, 75, 81,
11617, 122, 126
j oi nt force ai r component commander
(JFACC), 7274, 93, 178
j oi nt force ai r component commander
(JFACC) Planning Tool, 56, 115
joint force commander (JFC), 6870,
7275, 79, 81, 17879
joint forces, 338, 346
j oi nt gui dance, apport i onment , and
targeting (JGAT), 74
j oi nt muni t i ons-effect i veness manual
(JMEM), 3045
j oi nt operat i ons, 336
j oi nt pl anni ng, 79
Joi nt Si t uat i onal Awareness Syst em, 56
Joi nt Speci al Operat i ons Task Force
(JSOTF), 118, 124, 216, 236, 349
j oi nt st andoff weapon, 275
Joi nt St rat egi c Capabi l i t i es Pl an, 67
Joi nt Target Board (JTB), 57, 107, 115,
118, 27982, 285, 409, 433, 461
Joi nt Task Force Provi de Promi se, 93
534
Joul wan, George, 43, 57, 9192, 132,
139, 244, 282, 357, 481, 500, 5034,
509
Jovic, Borisav, 9
Jul y Cri si s of 1914, 1
Karadzi c, Radovan, 14, 16, 21, 2627,
29, 45, 135, 138, 193, 439, 445,
45960, 462, 474, 484, 49394,
49899
Kelley, Jay W., 455
Kiger, Keith, 166, 363, 478
kill boxes, 156
Kiseljak, Yugoslavia, 46, 133, 154, 162,
167
Knin, Yugoslavia, 9, 27, 496
Koopmans, Arj en, 358
Korean War, 369, 372
Kosovo, Yugoslavia, 4, 78, 457
Kr aj i na, 9, 11, 2223, 27, 100, 107, 134,
194, 404, 457, 45960, 473, 49697
Kraj i na Serbs, 11, 27, 180, 194, 404, 473
Krajisnik, Momcilo, 135
Kucan, Mi l an, 10
l aw of armed confl i ct , 382, 384, 417,
419, 477, 506
League of Nations, 2
liaison officer (LNO), 4748, 13233,
165, 167, 35859, 362
Li bya, 384
l i mi t ed war, 386
l i nes of communi cat i ons (LOC), 58, 103,
109, 134, 281, 28687, 28990, 309,
320, 338, 341, 449
Linked Operations Intelligence Centers
Europe (LOCE), 18182, 318, 470
Little Entente, 2
Livno valley, 27
l ogi st i cs, 73, 78, 239, 241, 280, 290,
307, 442
London, 44, 47780, 499, 513
low intensity conflict, 512
Macedoni a, 13, 45, 457
MacQueen, Scot t , 361, 36668, 370
maj or regi onal cont i ngenci es, 67, 70
Markovic, Ante, 6
mast er ai r at t ack pl an, 68, 75, 291
mast er at t ack pl an (MAP), 105, 11113,
148, 183, 440, 44243
mast er t arget l i st , 27981, 285, 294
Maul di n, Pat ri ci a, 362, 365
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 432
medi a, 185, 493
Meilinger, Phillip, 122
Military Committee, 47, 57, 76, 105,
283, 405
military objectives, 47, 60, 65, 71, 87,
99100, 113, 115, 156, 18990, 283,
341, 370, 381, 390, 419, 43233,
43638, 44041, 44445, 448, 450
mi l i t ary peace operat i ons, 385
Military Professional Resources,
Incorporat ed, 23
military technical revolution, 442
Milosevic, Slobodan, 812, 14, 16, 22,
2728, 138, 161, 19195, 457, 459,
462, 49394, 49798, 503, 513
Mi nst er, Dave, 180
missiles
AGM-65F, 217, 261, 269
AGM-84, 26162, 274
AGM-88, 199, 213, 26667, 311, 346
AGM-130, 274
AIM-7, 210, 216
AIM-9, 21011, 21314, 216
AIM-120, 209, 211, 214, 217
ai r - l aunched cr ui se, 242, 269, 274
air-to-air (AAM), 21719, 26970
ai r-t o-ground, 217
air-to-surface (ASM), 21819, 261
ALARM antiradiation, 218
ant i radi at i on, 266
AS-30L, 261
BMG-109, 26364
cr ui se, 242, 263, 27475
Har poon, 261
Have Nap ai r-t o-surface, 269
high-speed antiradiation (HARM), 22,
131, 145, 152, 162, 164, 201,
207, 21012, 247, 257, 301, 312,
31416, 338, 349, 41213, 443
j oi nt ai r-t o-surface st andoff, 275
l aser-gui ded, 261
Magic infrared, 208
man-portable air defense (MANPAD),
135, 137, 218, 299302, 317, 326,
349
Mat r a Super 530D, 208
Maverick air-to-surface (ASM), 214
Phoenix air-to-air (AAM), 209
SA-2, 135, 300
SA-2f, 300
SA-6, 24, 13536, 145, 201,
300301, 304
535
SA-7b, 300301
SA-9, 135, 300301
SA-13, 300301
SA-14, 300301
Scud, 259
Si dewi nder, 209
standoff land attack (SLAM), 15254,
274, 312, 324, 33839
surface-to-air (SAM), 22, 99, 101,
105, 109, 119, 124, 134, 137,
150, 152, 160, 163, 203, 210,
223, 231, 236, 24344, 265, 269,
27374, 284, 289, 299301, 306,
31011, 314, 316, 321, 326, 346,
360, 400, 409, 41213, 415, 474
Tomahawk land attack (TLAM),
15053, 199, 242, 27475, 312,
33839, 484, 49192
mi ssi on obj ect i ves, 245, 257, 345
Ml adi c, Rat ko, 11, 15, 26, 119, 126,
13839, 14647, 158, 19093, 195,
439, 445, 480, 484, 49394, 498
Mol t ke, Hel mut h von, 351, 354, 370, 372
Mons, Bel gi um, 468
Montenegro, Yugoslavia, 1, 4, 8, 18,
192, 457
Moody, David, 365
Morillon, Philippe, 15
Moscow, 135, 159
Mr kal e at t ack, 37, 41, 131, 135, 483,
495
Mrkonjic, Yugoslavia, 15354
muni t i ons effect i veness assessment
(MEA), 17778
Musl i ms, 34, 1416, 22, 24, 58, 135,
157, 193, 195, 433, 435, 45960,
493, 496
Mut ual Assi st ance Pact , 4
Napl es, It al y, 4748, 5455, 77, 95, 100,
110, 165, 181, 238, 355, 464,
46970, 488, 510
Napol on, 35155, 35758, 370, 372,
48687
Napol eoni c Wars, 353
Nat i onal Command Aut hori t i es, 179,
274, 384, 38688, 417
nat i onal obj ect i ves, 438, 445
National Security Agency, 182
nat i onal securi t y st rat egy, 81, 438, 445
NATO airborne early warning (NAEW),
19, 16263, 308, 31011, 313, 316,
331, 346, 397, 405
NATO doctrine, 66, 7781
NATO-UN Air/Land Coordination
Document , 317
negot i at i ons, 18, 243, 257, 418, 484,
49495, 49798, 501, 5035, 514
Net herl ands, 19, 39, 49, 13233, 164,
208, 24546, 397
ni ght operat i ons, 304
no-fl y ban, 473, 465, 46970, 477
no-fly zone (NFZ), 24, 43, 9495, 100,
102, 180, 2078, 307, 31011, 346,
386, 39598, 405, 469
North Atlantic Council (NAC), 1921,
2526, 39, 4144, 4647, 50, 5657,
59, 76, 78, 87, 92, 94, 97, 99, 101,
103, 125, 28081, 289, 395, 397,
399400, 4034, 4068, 461, 464,
467, 47071, 473, 47576, 48081,
492, 495, 499504, 5079
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), 1, 4, 1622, 2429, 37, 39,
4152, 5460, 65, 7580, 87107,
110, 11322, 12526, 13136,
13839, 14448, 15051, 15459,
16268, 17982, 18587, 18996,
199204, 206, 20910, 218, 220,
22223, 227, 231, 23335, 23948,
257, 25960, 264, 267, 270, 27983,
285, 28789, 292, 294, 298304,
31012, 31718, 325, 331, 335, 340,
345, 34849, 35455, 35859, 365,
367, 372, 38182, 387, 394410,
41218, 431, 43334, 439, 445, 455,
46184, 487, 489, 49193, 495,
499502, 5049, 51112, 51415
Nort h Vi et nam, 506
nucl ear weapons, 384
Oaks, Robert C. , 9394, 469
objective wing, 140, 143
observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop,
123
OConnell, D. P., 383
offensi ve ai r operat i ons, 7980, 2067,
210, 213, 218, 246, 25758, 307,
310, 31314, 316, 461, 466, 47172,
47576, 478
offensive counterair (OCA), 206, 247,
310, 333
OGrady, Scot t , 180, 369
operat i onal art , 6869, 72, 81, 432, 440,
442, 444
operat i onal cent ers, 6566
536
operat i onal cont rol , 132
operational options, 99
operat i ons
Deadeye, 1013, 105, 108, 133,
13536, 15254, 15657, 27981,
285, 28990, 338, 342, 346, 434,
478, 481
Deadeye Nort hwest , 101, 103,
15052, 154, 204, 311, 341, 408
Deadeye Sout heast , 101, 103, 111,
136, 311, 341, 408
Deny Flight, 17, 19, 2122, 2426,
39, 43, 4849, 52, 5455, 65,
7879, 8995, 102, 120, 132,
13435, 158, 180, 18486, 199,
2012, 207, 22628, 237, 270,
28081, 289, 299, 302, 3078,
31718, 333, 355, 35758, 366,
381, 387, 39495, 401, 4045,
413, 417, 431, 434, 461, 46472,
475, 478, 488, 512, 515
Deser t St or m, 95, 98, 143, 182, 189,
226, 185, 257, 260, 264, 271,
275, 323, 325, 345, 36668, 371,
416, 48485, 511
Fl ash, 23
Provi de Promi se, 413, 469
Rol l i ng Thunder, 139
Shar p Guar d, 397, 461
Sky Moni t or, 19, 93, 394, 396
Sky Wat ch, 461, 466
St or m, 27, 496
Vul can, 105, 11011, 136
operations order (OPORD), 395
operat i ons ot her t han war (OOTW),
6566, 6974, 78, 81, 119, 12123,
12526, 373, 394, 465, 512
operations plan (OPLAN), 44, 67, 79,
307, 395, 471
Operations Plan (OPLAN) 40101 (Deny
Fl i ght ), 55, 9496, 98, 102, 1056,
316, 307, 395, 397, 399, 402, 4045,
41415, 47071, 475, 477, 503
order of bat t l e, 240
Ornel l , Pet e, 36061
out -of-area operat i ons, 65, 76, 89, 120
Owen, Davi d, 16
Owens, William, 503
Pal e, Yugosl avi a, 14, 24, 102, 110, 131,
136, 139, 159, 180, 191, 282, 302,
411, 439, 446, 449, 47778
Palermo, Italy, 222
Pape, Robert A. , Jr. , 432, 44649, 465
paral l el at t ack, 439, 446
Pari s, 483
peace enforcement , 13, 18, 143, 38687,
418, 463, 466, 47172, 474, 508
peacekeepi ng, 13, 1721, 24, 26, 39, 42,
60, 76, 90, 110, 112, 12021, 133,
15455, 167, 38587, 390, 396, 403,
418, 46162, 47174, 477, 48384,
49496, 504, 513
peacemaki ng, 143, 358, 463, 46667
peace oper at i ons, 390, 392, 416, 418,
421, 461, 46566, 470, 490, 508, 512
Pennyfat her, Davi d, 482
Pent agon, 482
Perry, Wi l l i am J. , 25, 151, 244, 420, 477
Persi an Gul f, 39193
Persi an Gul f War, 180, 226, 465
pet rol eum, oi l , and l ubri cant s, 265, 284,
400
Pi acenza, It al y, 213, 224
Pi sa, It al y, 220, 222, 238
pl anners/ pl anni ng, 26, 2829, 3739,
48, 5052, 5460, 6575, 7778,
8081, 8794, 96103, 1056,
10913, 11526, 132, 135, 14554,
156, 15861, 163, 16567, 177, 179,
18485, 187, 227, 234, 240, 242,
24647, 249, 27071, 27983,
28591, 29495, 29799, 3045,
3079, 311, 32527, 331, 343,
34849, 35152, 35961, 363, 382,
394, 397, 400, 4056, 408, 41012,
41516, 41920, 43138, 44046,
44850, 45558, 46163, 46471,
475, 47778, 48082, 486, 491, 503,
5056, 511, 51415
Pol and, 3
pol i t i cal const rai nt s, 78, 239, 24243,
286, 288, 291, 294, 3067, 311, 327,
331, 345
pol i t i cal obj ect i ves, 44, 47, 57, 60, 156,
189, 355, 390, 406, 41718, 43132,
436, 438, 445, 45557, 506
Posavi na Corri dor, 104
Power Scene Mi ssi on Pl anni ng Syst em,
3067
preci si on-gui ded muni t i ons (PGM), 161,
164, 166, 168, 203, 248, 25758,
261, 264, 26974, 303, 305, 314,
320, 325, 33839, 347, 349, 411,
41920, 439, 443, 446, 491, 507
Prnjavor, Yugoslavia, 153
537
proport i onal i t y, 282, 385, 38788, 399,
4045, 419, 475
r adar , 203, 233, 267
radio communication (RADCOM), 411
radio relay (RADREL), 105, 108
Ramst ei n Ai r Base, Germany, 93, 97,
142, 181
RAND, 506
Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), 2526, 52,
77, 106, 11314, 11718, 133, 137,
146, 167, 209, 224, 227, 246, 309,
317, 482, 49596
r econnai ssance, 113, 124, 132, 137,
14548, 153, 155, 158, 209, 21619,
22327, 233, 24041, 24647, 249,
275, 307, 31314, 326, 331, 335,
341, 347, 443, 511
reconnaissance attack cycle (RAC), 113
regi onal operat i ons cent ers, 80
Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK), 12,
23, 27
Republ i ka Srpska, 14, 192
Ri char dson, Dougl as J. , 132, 161, 165,
355, 363, 487
Rifkind, Malcolm, 479
Roach, J. Ashl ey, 38283
rocket s, 218, 26667, 288, 318, 338, 349
Romani a, 2
Rome, 151
Rome Summi t of 1991, 76
Royal Air Force (RAF), 22, 165, 209,
21819, 222, 224, 230, 318, 320,
346, 359
Al conbury, 225
Fairford, 225
Lakenheat h, 216, 320
Mildenhall, 220, 229
Mol eswort h, 182, 227
Royal Navy, 209, 219, 224
rul es of engagement (ROE), 50, 71,
9596, 114, 15859, 184, 200, 207,
280, 287, 302, 307, 310, 314, 319,
321, 324, 326, 331, 38199, 402,
4056, 41021, 434, 47073, 49091,
506
Russi a, 2, 21, 135, 138, 191, 494
Ryan, Mi chael , 47, 50, 5455, 5758,
9192, 95, 9798, 115, 120, 13133,
13536, 145, 14754, 156, 15861,
16465, 16768, 18386, 190, 194,
201, 213, 24344, 247, 27071,
27374, 281, 286, 28892, 298, 305,
317, 333, 345, 349, 351, 35562,
36465, 37074, 407, 41012,
41415, 417, 43334, 449, 464,
47375, 478, 48088, 491, 493,
5005, 50811
Ryder, Edward, 368
safe areas, 15, 21, 23, 2526, 28, 4345,
5556, 5960, 72, 96, 99100, 1026,
110, 131, 138, 14647, 156, 158,
167, 19091, 199, 226, 228, 27985,
289, 316, 350, 398, 4034, 4068,
432, 434, 438, 443, 445, 466, 468,
471, 47678, 48081, 49496, 502,
504, 513
sanct i ons, 22, 195, 497
San Vito dei Normanni Air Base, Italy,
124
Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2, 5,
1315, 18, 2022, 2426, 29, 37, 41,
4445, 48, 5960, 92, 99, 1035,
110, 11415, 12324, 131, 133,
13539, 14546, 149, 15658,
17980, 19093, 195, 199, 223, 228,
282, 285, 287, 28990, 292, 309,
311, 34142, 350, 398401, 4034,
406, 408, 410, 433, 435, 439, 446,
449, 461, 469, 47778, 48183, 494,
496, 498, 504
sat el l i t es, 223, 336
Sawyer, Davi d, 91, 154, 166, 355,
36162, 43132, 482
search and rescue (SAR), 331, 41314
sect or operat i ons cent er, 80, 299
Serbi a, 12, 79, 1118, 2123, 26, 107,
189, 192, 19495, 457, 45960, 504
Serbi an League of Communi st s, 8
Serb Republ i c, 460, 484, 493
Serb Republ i c Assembl y, 135
Serbs, 23, 67, 9, 1116, 18, 2122, 24,
2627, 29, 93, 117, 131, 13335,
13739, 14547, 14950, 15354,
156, 159, 161, 16364, 16768, 189,
19192, 194, 196, 213, 226, 228,
243, 245, 292, 409, 439, 446,
45860, 46768, 474, 477, 47981,
48384, 49293, 495500, 5035,
5078, 51314
Sevent eent h Ai r Force, 93, 469
Shal i kashvi l i , John, 272
Shar p, Gr ant , 391
Short , Mi chael , 182, 356, 488, 510
538
signals intelligence (SIGINT), 178, 228,
231
Sigonella Naval Air Station, Sicily, 229
Sigonella, Sicily, 220
Silajdzic, Haris, 479
Sipovo, Yugoslavia, 152
Si xt eent h Ai r Force, 5455, 363, 369,
470, 501
Si xt h Fl eet , 152, 414
Skopje, Yugoslavia, 45
Sl avoni a, 23, 134, 496
Sl oveni a, 8, 1014, 457
Smith, Leighton, 37, 4748, 50, 5558,
9193, 110, 115, 126, 13133, 139,
147, 151, 15758, 164, 181, 18386,
194, 201, 228, 244, 281, 289,
35657, 4078, 410, 412, 415, 464,
47374, 48085, 49193, 500504,
50910
Smi t h, Ruper t , 37, 48, 57, 92, 110,
13133, 139, 149, 281, 28889,
29394, 410, 481, 48384
Sokolac, Yugoslavia, 136
sout heast zone of act i on, 29
Sout hern Regi on, 48, 97, 399
Soviet Union, 34, 6
Spai n, 19, 49, 52, 133, 164, 21213,
220, 222, 238, 245, 258, 346, 485
Spangdahl em Ai r Base, Germany, 212
speci al i nst ruct i ons (SPINS), 80, 159,
16263, 302, 30710, 324, 395,
41112, 416
speci al operat i ons, 74, 240
speci al operat i ons forces, 12425, 236,
414
Srebrenica, Yugoslavia, 15, 2426, 43,
102, 398, 403, 406, 418, 474, 477
St al i n, Joseph, 4
standing rules of engagement (SROE),
38488, 396, 41415
st andoff capabi l i t y, 242, 27375
st eal t h t echnol ogy, 151, 204, 243,
27475
St rasbol i ng, France, 224
st rat egi c cent ers, 66
st rat egy cel l , 5758, 74, 95
St ret ch, Ti m, 367
St ri nger, Davi d, 140, 142
suppressi on of enemy ai r defenses
(SEAD), 26, 101, 103, 111, 13638,
146, 15154, 15758, 16264, 201,
2067, 21013, 21718, 23133, 243,
247, 249, 266, 264, 27982, 285,
301, 307, 309, 31117, 327, 331,
335, 338, 346, 405, 407, 41213,
415, 434, 461, 475, 478, 511
Supreme Al l i ed Commander Europe
(SACEUR), 43, 47, 50, 76, 91, 114,
121, 132, 151, 244, 282, 357, 396,
401, 464, 481, 500
Supreme Headquart ers Al l i ed Powers
Europe (SHAPE), 180, 183, 245, 468
survei l l ance, 22527, 233, 275, 299,
326, 348, 51112
Sweat , Mark, 180
Sweden, 3
tactical air control party (TACP), 46,
15556, 309, 317, 319, 4012
tactical air-launched decoy (TALD),
26869
t act i cal ai r reconnai ssance, 79
t act i cal ai r reconnai ssance pod syst em
(TARPS), 22425
tactical area of operations (TAOO),
30710, 313, 326, 381, 408
t arget cat egori es/ opt i ons, 58, 158, 279,
28283, 29394, 342, 418, 471, 475,
503, 512
t ar get eer i ng/ t ar get eer s, 111, 152, 180,
362, 364, 443
t arget i ng, 19, 58, 66, 101, 104, 115,
117, 125, 149, 159, 178, 180,
18586, 279, 358, 408, 41416,
44244, 447, 465, 491, 501, 510
t arget i ng sci ence, 44243
t arget l i st s/ set s, 26, 55, 57, 66, 7475,
100, 103, 1089, 11215, 117, 133,
144, 166, 17778, 27980, 28182,
28587, 289, 292, 320, 338, 341,
35657, 35960, 363, 400, 408, 410,
418, 432, 435, 446, 44849, 46566,
471, 474, 481, 483, 493, 503
t arget s, 2021, 25, 29, 41, 43, 48, 51,
55, 5759, 6567, 7172, 7475, 79,
95, 99101, 1035, 1079, 11118,
125, 133, 13539, 14445, 14750,
15258, 16062, 178, 18286, 189,
200, 206, 216, 223, 23334, 24143,
257, 25961, 26365, 26768,
27175, 28087, 28992, 294, 297,
300301, 3036, 308, 31421,
32326, 331, 336, 34142, 347, 350,
35556, 35961, 36364, 370,
37273, 395, 399400, 4024,
40712, 41417, 420, 43334, 436,
539
439, 443, 44648, 458, 461, 463,
465, 47172, 47678, 480, 483, 485,
487, 491, 5034, 506, 51012
t echnol ogy, 272, 442
t errori sm/ t errori st s, 11, 143, 368, 372,
38788, 489
Teske, St eve, 110, 487
Tito, 37
total-exclusion zone (TEZ), 44, 103, 117,
14546, 179, 183, 19092, 223, 226,
28285, 290, 340, 350
t r anspor t er - er ect or l auncher s and
radars (TELAR), 304
Tudj man, Franj o, 89, 11, 14, 16, 27,
191
Turkey, 17, 19, 49, 13233, 164, 203,
208, 24546, 465, 485
Tuzla, Yugoslavia, 15, 24, 26, 4345,
1034, 137, 15557, 282, 285, 398,
406, 408
Tzu, Sun, 440
Udbi na, 22, 100, 180, 223, 404, 474
Udbi na Ai rfi el d, 280, 47374, 478
Uni t ed Ki ngdom, 17, 19, 39, 49, 52,
132, 137, 182, 204, 208, 220, 245,
258, 348
Uni t ed Nat i ons (UN), 15, 18, 2122, 24,
26, 3739, 4149, 52, 5460, 6566,
79, 87, 90, 9294, 96100, 1024,
1067, 11011, 11314, 11721,
12526, 13133, 135, 13839,
14547, 150, 15459, 16667,
19092, 19495, 223, 226, 246,
27981, 283, 285, 28789, 292, 299,
316, 340, 345, 350, 356, 372, 381,
387, 395, 397410, 41718, 43134,
438, 440, 443, 44546, 449, 46063,
46668, 47077, 47984, 49395,
497501, 5049, 511, 514
Uni t ed Nat i ons Chart er, 38, 395
Uni t ed Nat i ons Confi dence Rest orat i on
Oper at i on, 45
Uni t ed Nat i ons Hi gh Commi ssi oner for
Refugees, 18
United Nations Peace Forces (UNPF),
4445, 48, 51, 5657, 59, 9293,
106, 110, 11617, 121, 190, 401,
403, 410, 481
Uni t ed Nat i ons Prevent i ve Depl oyment
Forces, 45
Uni t ed Nat i ons Prot ect i on Force
(UNPROFOR),12, 15, 1719, 2226,
29, 37, 39, 41, 4346, 48, 56, 60,
9294, 99, 106, 110, 113, 115,
13133, 139, 144, 156, 167, 191,
193, 208, 22627, 284, 307, 311,
316, 346, 396404, 410, 418, 459,
461, 474, 481
Uni t ed Nat i ons resol ut i ons, 19, 471, 477
Uni t ed Nat i ons Securi t y Counci l , 15, 22,
3839, 4142, 4546, 56, 60, 76, 78,
87, 9294, 101, 126, 406, 461, 464,
467, 499
Uni t ed Nat i ons Securi t y Counci l
resolutions (UNSCR), 19, 3739, 41,
4546, 57, 59, 9496, 99100,
394401, 4036, 418, 461, 468,
47475, 495
Uni t ed St at es, 4, 910, 14, 17, 1921,
39, 67, 91, 93, 97, 111, 118, 120,
13233, 16466, 18687, 190, 213,
220, 223, 228, 240, 245, 258,
26566, 331, 346, 348, 35455,
35859, 385, 387, 391, 397, 419,
43738, 460, 462, 479, 49496, 504,
515
Uni t ed St at es Ai r Force, 21, 24, 48, 52,
69, 91, 97, 111, 122, 126, 131, 133,
137, 13940, 142, 144, 151, 153,
164, 166, 199, 213, 229, 247,
24849, 26061, 263, 265, 269, 272,
274, 281, 299, 301, 3034, 314, 318,
320, 326, 33536, 33839, 346, 348,
366, 369, 398, 402, 405, 417, 420,
450, 464, 47576, 48283, 48788,
490, 505
United States Air Force Reserve
(USAFR), 52, 369
Uni t ed St at es Ai r Forces Europe
(USAFE), 52, 56, 98, 469
Uni t ed St at es Army, 43, 79, 91, 22628,
501
Uni t ed St at es Eur opean Command, 180,
455
Uni t ed St at es Mari ne Corps, 24, 52,
13334, 147, 164, 213, 226, 240,
260, 268, 314, 320, 33536, 33839,
346, 366, 385, 390, 403, 483, 488
Uni t ed St at es Naval Forces Europe, 93
Uni t ed St at es Navy, 24, 49, 52, 91, 93,
118, 133, 136, 152, 162, 16466,
20911, 213, 217, 219, 224, 226,
22829, 23334, 236, 242, 26063,
26869, 274, 3034, 310, 31415,
320, 33536, 33839, 346, 348,
540
36667, 382, 384, 389, 39192,
41314, 464, 48384, 488
uni t y of command/ ef f or t , 48, 59
USS America, 211, 224, 228, 234
USS Normandy, 153, 264
USS St ark, 384, 39094, 416
USS Theodore Roosevelt, 134, 136, 148,
2012, 21011, 224, 228, 234, 311,
484
USS Vi ncennes, 390, 39294
Vance, Cyr us, 16
Venice, Italy, 133
Vi cenza, It al y, 19, 46, 4850, 55, 77, 80,
91, 100, 132, 134, 136, 139, 165,
179, 227, 238, 243, 381, 464, 46869
Vi et nam, 356, 386, 41617
Vi et nam War, 139, 143, 271
Villafranca, Italy, 209, 218, 224
visual identification (VID), 310, 319,
324, 327
Vojvodina, Yugoslavia, 4, 8, 457
Vukovar, Yugoslavia, 1112
Wal d, Charl es, 134, 143, 36567, 489
Wallace, Robert, 184
War den, John, 432, 43539, 44446,
449, 465
Warsaw Pact , 4, 6, 76, 87, 89, 121, 512
Washi ngt on Treat y, 65, 76
weaponeer i ng/ weaponeer s, 52, 111,
160, 3045, 322, 485, 510
weapons of mass dest r uct i on, 448
weapon system officer (WSO), 32022
weat her condi t i ons, 11415, 117,
13738, 144, 146, 14849, 152,
15457, 163, 167, 182, 207, 214,
219, 223, 226, 232, 236, 259, 261,
272, 27475, 3024, 310, 317,
32021, 32327, 336, 338, 343, 345,
349, 420
Wells, Steve, 365
West er n Eur opean Uni on, 18, 461
West , Gary, 143, 36668, 370
Wi dnal l , Shei l a E. , 272
World War I, 1, 5, 459
World War II, 3, 7, 459
Wrat t en, Wi l l i am, 26
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio,
195, 505
Yugoslav air force, 21
Yugoslav Communist Party, 3
Yugosl avi a, 115, 1718, 3739, 42, 44,
48, 5960, 65, 93, 121, 135, 151,
192, 299, 310, 399, 402, 45761,
495, 497, 506
Yugosl avi an League of Communi st s, 459
Yugoslavian Peoples Army (JNA), 457
Yugoslav Party Congress, 8
Yugoslav State Council, 9, 11
Zagreb, Croat i a, 9, 11, 20, 39, 45, 48,
92, 94, 126, 13334, 13839, 191,
281, 401
Zepa, Bosni a, 15, 25, 43, 45, 102, 282,
398, 403, 406, 418, 477
Zhi ri novsky, Vl adi mi r, 21
Zoerb, Daniel Doc, 3455, 95, 110,
18485, 281, 28586, 28991,
35758, 360, 362, 478, 487
zones of action (ZOA), 25, 55, 1035,
111, 114, 14950, 15758, 27983,
292, 34142, 4079, 478, 48081
541
DELIBERATE FORCE
A Case St udy i n Effect i ve Ai r Campai gni ng
Air University Press Team
Chief Editor
Marvi n Basset t
Copy Editor
Debbi e Banker
Cover Art and Book Design
St even C. Gar st
Illustrations
Dani el M. Armst rong
Composition and
Prepress Production
Linda C. Colson

Deliberate Force

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Deliberate Force

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Del i berate Force

You might also like