Em 1928, no auge dos anos dourados da Repblica, j estavam presentes alguns primeiros sinais da crise que iria assolar

a Alemanha at o !im da Repblica, como a ocorr"ncia de loc#out de empregadores e o ganho de !or$a do %artido &a'ista em reas rurais do pa(s 1) *ontudo, a volta do %artido +ocial,-emocrata da Alemanha . +%- ao governo e o "/ito do plano de pol(tica e/terna elaborado por 0ustav +tresemann2 contribu(ram para o "/ito do projeto Republicano . pelo menos naquele ano) 1 in(cio da crise que culminara no !im da Repblica tem in(cio em 1929, com a chamada 2quinta !eira negra3 e o desenrolar da 0rande -epress4o americana, que rapidamente se espalha para o restante do globo) 5 na primavera de 1967, a crise chega 8 Alemanha, de modo que institui$9es !inanceiras americanas passaram a e/igir o cumprimento das obriga$9es oriundas de empr stimos de curto pra'o tanto do setor privado quanto do governo) A crise que se inicia no :mbito econ;mico rapidamente passa a a!etar o campo pol(tico da Repblica< a coali'4o !ormada pelo +%- se des!a' por problemas envolvendo a pol(tica do seguro desemprego nos tempos da crise) %or um lado, os +ociais,-emocratas e os *at=licos se mani!estavam de !orma !avorvel 8 e/pans4o do programa de assist"ncia, seja por meio aumento do bene!(cio ou do nmero de bene!icirios, mesmo sabendo do comprometimento das contas pblicas em virtude da crise e do dever de ressarcimento imposto pelo >ratado de ?ersailles e regulado pelo plano -a@es) 5 os conservadores . integrantes do %artido Aiberal da Alemanha . B-%, por e/emplo . eram a !avor da redu$4o ou corte de tal bene!(cio at a estabili'a$4o da economia e das contas pblicas) 1967<
&a primavera de 1967, a crise chega a alemanha A coali'4o se des!a' por problemas acerca de seguro desemprego C!alta de recursoD +%- e *at=licos . aumento do bene!(cioE *onservadores . corte de bene!(cios %residente %aul von Findenburg nomeia como chanceler Feinrich GrHning, de centro *orte de gastos . cren$a na regula$4o privada >entativa de se desvencilhar do tratado de versalhes Reichstag dividido, Grunning convoca novas elei$9es, mas a resposta nas urnas se relacionava ao inativismo pol(tico do chanceler +uddenlI, in a national election on 1J +eptember 1967, the &a'i %artI surged ahead, @inning 18)6 percent o! the vote and 17K seats in the Reichstag) Lngovernabilidade do +istema parlamentar ?ontade de Grunning era criar um ambiente autoritrio . utili'a$4o do art) J8 MR? Estado de e/ce$4o permanente . art) J8 como t cnica de governo) -itadura presidencial pelos pr=/imos 1 ano e meio) Findenburg renovava os decretos de emerg"ncia, que !undamentava a a$4o GrHning) Findenburg eleito em 1962, com 87 anos, j marcado pela senilidade) %ol(ticas de austeridade de GrHning &o ver4o de 1962, apro/imadamente 1N6 da popula$4o ativa estava desempregada . segundo estat(sticas o!iciais) Oas os nmeros reais eram piores) +%- era identi!icado como representante de um sistema !alido ?ergonha do +%- ao de!ender Findenbrug e GrHning GrHning perde o apoio de Findenburg e dos conservadores< >@o !actors @ere decisive) Fis interior minister decided that the &a'is @ere becoming too bold and too disruptive) Fe @anted to rein them

6J9 @eimar

JKP dictionaruFe aimed to restore 0ermanIQs great,po@er status, and his strategI centered on ending the struggle in the Ruhr and stabili'ing the economI as prelude to negotiating a compromise @ith Brance and reopening the reparationsR issue) >his @as a courageous plan, part o! his !ul!illment policI,R but its reali'ation ruined his reputation @ith old allies on the Right) Set as leader o! the -?%, he persuaded 0ermanIQs industrialists to help stabili'e the mar# and !orge a ne@ understanding @ith the Mest)

in a bit, so he issued an order banning marches o! the storm troopers) >hat did not go over @ell @ith the manI conservatives @ho @anted to use the &a'is to overthro@ the republic) Oore important, GrHning, in his drive to cut the state budget, sought to eliminate government subsidies to estate o@ners in %russia 67 de maio de 1962 . GrHning demitido Fitler tenta chegar ao poder pela segunda ve' Cdepois do %utsch da cervejariaD, concorrendo com Findenbrug nas elei$9es presidenciais de 1962 . perdeu) Bran' von %apen vira chanceler ?on %apen adota pol(ticas de!lacionrias . acredita que pode destruir a repblica e a submiss4o ao tratado de versalhes Em 5ulho de 1962, ele tira o governo eleito da %russia, basti4o da democracia @eimariana e instala um interventor la *onvocou elei$9es Gut in the middle o! a depression, the population @as unli#elI to support a sitting government @hose policies o!!ered no immediate redress o! their grievances) 0ermans @ent to the polls on 61 5ulI 1962) >he &a'is received 6K)6 percent o! the vote, the highest theI @ould ever achieve in a !ree election) >heI no@ became 0ermanIQs largest partI and had 267 delegates sitting in the Reichstag) >heI celebrated their triumph, but it is @orth underscoring the !act that theI did not achieve, and never @ould achieve, a majoritI in a !reelI contested election) >heI received a verI large chun# o! the vote, more than one,third) Gut the 0erman people never elected the &a'is to po@er) &earlI t@o, thirds o! the electorate cast their votes against the &a'i %artI) &ovo parlamento composto em setembro de 1962) %apen governou por decretos Ferman 0Trring em setembro de 1962 como che!e do partido na'ista 1utra elei$4o) 0ermans voted on U &ovember 1962, and the results are notable) >he &a'i surge had bro#en) >heir share o! the vote !ell to 66)1 percent, their number o! deputies to 19U) Ln the late !all o! 1962, a &a'i assumption o! po@er @as onlI a possibilitIVbI no means @hatsoever a !oregone conclusion) Meimar 0ermanIQs third chancellor in 1962 @as a close aide o! %resident Findenburg and another armI general, Wurt von +chleicher) Fe claimed that he had a plan !or dealing @ith the combined economic and political crisis Oean@hile, in earlI 5anuarI 1966, secret negotiations began bet@een %apen and Fitler, prompted bI a small circle o! advisers around %resident Findenburg) >he established conservatives no@ entered into serious negotiations @ith the radicals +o in 5anuarI 1966, FindenburgQs advisers presented him @ith a plan !or a ne@ government) Adol! Fitler @ould preside as chancellor, Bran' von %apen @ould serve as vice,chancellor 1n 67 5anuarI 1966, in a constitutionallI legal manner, he named Fitler chancellor) Meimar 0ermanI @as !inished)

Ln 1928, at the height o! the 2golden Iears3 o! the Meimar Republic, the +ocial -emocrats returned to the government in a large coalition) >here @ere @orrisome signsVemploIers loc#ed out @or#ers in the Ruhr iron industrI, the &a'is @ere gaining some support in depressed rural areas, a verI large number o! splinter parties had entered into the electionVbut the revival o! the +%-Qs electoral !ortunes, the loss o! votes on the e/tremes o! the political spectrum, and +tresemannQs generallI success!ul !oreign policI all boded @ell !or the republic) >he impact spread verI quic#lI to 0ermanI, and bI spring 1967 its economI @as in a tailspin) >he collapse o! stoc# values soon precipitated a ban#ing crisis, particularlI as American !inancial institutions demanded repaIment o! their short,term loans to 0erman businesses and governments) *apital evaporated, leading to a rapid decline in production and then, !inallI, a demand crisis as both consumers and businesses lac#ed the resources to purchase goods in the mar#etplace) GI the late spring o! 1967, a !ull,scale economic depression @as under @aI in 0ermanI, its most visible signs shuttered !actories and throngs o! unemploIed @or#ers) Ln one generation, 0ermans lived through three social catastrophes< total @ar, hIperin!lation, and, no@, depression on a scale that no one had ever e/perienced previouslI) >he political rami!ications @ere immediate) >he +%-,led coalition government bro#e up over the issue o! unemploIment insurance) Mith ta/ revenues declining drasticallI and ever

increasing numbers o! @or#ers lining up !or unemploIment insurance paIments, the government !aced a severe budgetarI short!all) >he +ocial -emocrats and some *atholics @anted to preserve and even e/pand bene!its) *onservatives @anted paIment levels cut and access to bene!its made more restrictive) Each o! the parties retreated to its o@n baseE consensus and compromise @ere not possible) Ln this situation, the president, Bield Oarshal %aul von Findenburg, named a ne@ chancellor, Feinrich GrHning !rom the *enter %artI, @ho !ormed a ne@ government @ith some o! the same !igures, but @ithout the +ocial -emocrats) And also @ithout 0ustav +tresemann, the most e!!ective advocate o! !oreign policI compromises, @ho had died in the !all o! 1929, just be!ore the onset o! the -epression) GrHning sought to lead 0ermanI out o! the -epression bI !ollo@ing de!lationarI policies, @hich meant balancing the state budget through drastic cutbac#s in personnel and services Cas @e sa@ in chapter JD) >he stateQs model should be carried over into the private sector, GrHning believed) Gusinesses should e/pect no aid !rom the government and @ould have to let their o@n purchases and investments !all to the level @here a mar#et equilibrium @as reached) At that point, businesses @ould again !ind it pro!itable to invest and produce and could then hire more @or#ers) Ln a time o! unprecedented miserI, GrHning believed that onlI !inancial rigor in the public and private sectors could restore 0ermanIQs economI) LnternationallI, GrHningQs policI evolved< +tresemannQs policI o! !ul!illment, he came to believe, had made !ar too manI concessions to the Mestern po@ers) Mhile GrHning #ept up negotiations, he @as also determined to overthro@ the ?ersailles >reatI and revive 0ermanIQs great,po@er status) GI the last months o! his chancellorship, 0ermanI @ould be headed to@ard the con!rontational path that it had abandoned a!ter the hIperin!lation crisis) Fo@ever, GrHning could !ind no legislative consensus !or his policies) >he Reichstag remained deeplI divided) Ln a remar#able displaI o! sel!,delusion and political mIopia, he called !or ne@ elections, !ullI e/pecting that he @ould get @idespread support in the polls) Lt @as a most !oolish act< o! course the population, sliding ever deeper into depression, @as not going to come out in droves to support a man and a government that had no active policI to redress their miserI) +uddenlI, in a national election on 1J +eptember 1967, the &a'i %artI surged ahead, @inning 18)6 percent o! the vote and 17K seats in the Reichstag) >he shoc# @as huge as ne@spapers trumpeted the &a'i success in big, bold headlines) Brom a small sect on the margins o! the political sIstem, the &a'i %artI had no@ become a major !orce) 0ermanI alreadI !aced an e/tremelI di!!icult political situation because o! the large numbers o! parties represented in the Reichstag and the deep social and political divisions among them) &o@ it became ungovernable through normal parliamentarI mechanisms) >he &a'is never had anI intention o! @or#ing productivelI @ithin the sIstem) >heI simplI used all the legislatures in 0ermanI, !rom the Reichstag to the Aandtage to citI councils, as arenas o! propaganda) >he situation, a disaster !or those 0ermans committed to democracI, presented GrHning @ith a @onder!ul opportunitI) Fe @anted to use his o!!ice to overthro@ the republic and create some #ind o! authoritarian political sIstem) Fe happilI deploIed the po@ers granted to him bI %resident Findenburg) >he basis o! GrHningQs rule @as article J8 o! the Meimar *onstitution) Lt gave the president the po@er to declare a national emergencI, in @hich case the chancellor could rule bI decree, so long as his orders did not violate the constitution) >he !ramers envisioned article J8 as a provision that @ould be used onlI in the rarest instance @hen the republic itsel! @as threatened) Lnstead, article J8 became a regular means o! governance because the Reichstag could come to no agreement on anIthing o! substance) Bor the ne/t t@o and one,hal! Iears, 0ermanI still had a Reichstag @ith @hich GrHning had to consult and constitutional liberties remained in !orce) Gut in essence 0ermanI @as governed under a presidential dictatorship) %oliticallI, the republic had been overthro@n @ell be!ore Fitler came to po@er) GrHning relied on %resident Findenburg to rene@ periodicallI the emergencI situation declaration, @hich Findenburg did @illinglI) Fis elections to the presidencI in 192P and 1962 @ere Meimar !iascoes) >he *enter and Right adored him as a !igure o! masculine pro@ess, order, and stabilitI, and a lin# to the bIgone imperial age) >he most that can be said o! him is that he did not activelI undermine the republic during his presidencI, and he too# seriouslI his oath to the constitution) Gut the election o! a general @ho, in his most !undamental belie!s, @as hostile to democracI made a travestI o! the republic) Ooreover, bI the time o! his reelection in 1962, Findenburg @as @ell into his eighties and beset bI senilitI) An image o! leadership that had a comic,opera qualitI to it in 192P lost anI levitI @ith the onset o! the 0reat -epression and the accompanIing political crisis) Meimar needed at its helm a vigorous, committed democrat, not an octogenarian, semilucid !ield marshal) All through the latter hal! o! 1967 and 1961 and on into 1962, GrHning issued one decree a!ter another that led to the !iring o! large numbers o! civil servants and cutbac#s in unemploIment and other social @el!are bene!its) %eople loo#ed high and lo@, but there @as no sign o! an economic revival) Lnstead, 0ermanI slipped deeper into depression and the political sIstem into paralIsis) GI the summer o! 1962, nearlI one, third o! the labor !orce @as unemploIed, according to o!!icial statistics) Gut the real numbers @ere even higher) Momen @ere o!ten the !irst !ired, and relativelI !e@ received unemploIment bene!its) >he common

vie@ @as that the position o! the male bread@inner should be preserved< @omen @ould be 2double,dipping3 i! their husbands @ere emploIed or received unemploIment insurance and theI did as @ell) Oean@hile, the &a'is #ept up their agitation and constant stream o! attac#s on the republic) >heI @ere @inning an ever increasing number o! supporters) &e@spapers reported dailI on bra@ls involving the &a'is) 0ermanI @as in crisis, 0ermans @ere su!!ering, and there seemed no @aI out) +ocial -emocrats, the most !aith!ul supporters o! democracI, @ere no@ identi!ied @ith a sIstem that @as !ailing) OanI +%- members !ought vigorouslI against the &a'is and @anted to engage in !ull,blo@n opposition, perhaps in coalition @ith the W%- C@hich that partI @ould have countenanced onlI i! the alliance @ere on communist termsD) Gut the +%- leadership could thin# o! nothing better than to de!end the republic, even as its substance @as being hollo@ed out bI GrHning and his successors) Ln the Reichstag +%- delegates tolerated GrHningQs government, and in the presidential election o! spring 1962, the partI advocated support !or Findenburg as the lesser evil) Lt @as a sad situation !or +ocial -emocrats to be seen supporting antidemocratic !igures, one connectedto the authoritarian bastions o! the cro@n and armI CFindenburgD and the other in quest o! a modern, t@entieth, centurI dictatorship CGrHningD) A mood o! demorali'ation s@ept through the ran#s o! the +%-) GrHningQs policies @ere also !ailing, and, !inallI, he lost the support o! Findenburg and other conservatives) >@o !actors @ere decisive) Fis interior minister decided that the &a'is @ere becoming too bold and too disruptive) Fe @anted to rein them in a bit, so he issued an order banning marches o! the storm troopers) >hat did not go over @ell @ith the manI conservatives @ho @anted to use the &a'is to overthro@ the republic) Oore important, GrHning, in his drive to cut the state budget, sought to eliminate government subsidies to estate o@ners in %russia) >his @as a program o! @el!are paIments to the most elite group in 0ermanI, %russian nobles, including the president) A small group o! advisers around Findenburg convinced him that GrHning had to go, and he @as dulI !ired on 67 OaI 1962) Fitler had made his second bid !or po@er Cthe !irst @as the putsch attempt in 1926D in the spring o! 1962 bI running against Findenburg !or the presidencI) Fe @as most hesitant to underta#e the campaign, but @as pushed along bI 0oebbels and other top &a'is) Fitler understood that the &a'i %artI @as an engine that had to #eep accelerating) Lt #ept its supporters in a high state o! agitation and mobili'ation) Lt had no intention o! participating in the normal @or# o! governanceE po@er @as its immediate goal and the raison dQ"tre o! its e/istence) L! he did not ma#e his move in 1962, just as 0ermanIQs political and economic situation @as reaching its nadir, his political support could evaporate) Fe tried and he lost) Fe did !orce Findenburg into a runo!! election, but in the end Findenburg trumped him C!igs) 9)1, 9)2D) A distraught Fitler and a chastened &a'i %artI< that seemed li#e the per!ect situation !or established conservatives @ho @anted to use the &a'is to help them overthro@ the republic but had no intention o! !ullI turning po@er over to them) >heI @ere still too uncouth, too unpredictable to trust completelI) Enter Bran' von %apen, a *atholic noble !rom Mestphalia and onetime member o! the *enter %artI @hom Findenburg tapped as GrHningQs successor) %apen, too, believed that the path out o! the -epression laI through de!lationarI policies) %apen, even more !erventlI than GrHning, also @anted to overthro@ the republic and the ?ersailles sIstem, and he thought the &a'is could serve his purposes) Ln 5ulI 1962, he thre@ out the elected government o! %russia, a bastion o! Meimar democracI, and installed his subordinate in its place) Bool that he @as, %apen repeated GrHningQs mista#e< he called elections, believing that he @ould !ind po@er!ul support in the populace that he could then use to implement his program) Gut in the middle o! a depression, the population @as unli#elI to support a sitting government @hose policies o!!ered no immediate redress o! their grievances) 0ermans @ent to the polls on 61 5ulI 1962) >he &a'is received 6K)6 percent o! the vote, the highest theI @ould ever achieve in a !ree election) >heI no@ became 0ermanIQs largest partI and had 267 delegates sitting in the Reichstag) >heI celebrated their triumph, but it is @orth underscoring the !act that theI did not achieve, and never @ould achieve, a majoritI in a !reelI contested election) >heI received a verI large chun# o! the vote, more than one,third) Gut the 0erman people never elected the &a'is to po@er) &earlI t@o,thirds o! the electorate cast their votes against the &a'i %artI) +till, as leader o! the largest partI in 0ermanI, Fitler made another bid !or po@er) Fe believed the chancellorship @as right!ullI his) Fe had an audience @ith Findenburg, that man @ho embodied the bearing and belie!s o! the %russian o!!icer corps) >o him, Fitler @as a lo@lI, uncouth rabble,rouser, @ho in !our Iears o! armI service during Morld Mar L had risen onlI to the ran# o! corporal) Findenburg received him but re!used to name him chancellor) %apen ruled as careta#er until the ne@ parliament convened in +eptember 1962) Ai#e GrHning, he governed bI decree) Gut the &a'is thought theI had been double,crossed bI %apen, because he, rather than Fitler, had received the bid to serve as chancellor) >he Reichstag met in earlI +eptember @ith Fermann 0oering presiding as the parliamentarI leader o! the largest partI) >he &a'is entered a motion o! no con!idence in the government, @hich the *ommunists supported) %apenQs government !ell be!ore it had even begun, and ne@ elections had to be held, the third major election in 1962Vnot e/actlI

a situation to inspire con!idence in the republic) 0ermans voted on U &ovember 1962, and the results are notable) >he &a'i surge had bro#en) >heir share o! the vote !ell to 66)1 percent, their number o! deputies to 19U) 0ermanI @as no closer to political consensus, nor @as there anI clear path to po@er !or the &a'is) Ln !act, the partI descended into disarraI) Fitler had made t@o bids !or po@er in 1962 and had !ailed both times) >he partI co!!ers @ere emptI, and a great deal o! grousing and opposition against Fitler had emerged in the partIQs ran#s) Ln the late !all o! 1962, a &a'i assumption o! po@er @as onlI a possibilitIVbI no means @hatsoever a !oregone conclusion) Meimar 0ermanIQs third chancellor in 1962 @as a close aide o! %resident Findenburg and another armI general, Wurt von +chleicher) Fe claimed that he had a plan !or dealing @ith the combined economic and political crisis) Fe believed that behind his program !or government,supported jobs creation, he could put together a coalition that ranged !rom the social democratic trade unions on the le!t to the anti,Fitler &a'is on the right) +chleicher, too, su!!ered !rom delusions< the cleavages bet@een the political parties @ere much too deep !or his idea ever to become realitI) Oean@hile, in earlI 5anuarI 1966, secret negotiations began bet@een %apen and Fitler, prompted bI a small circle o! advisers around %resident Findenburg) >he established conservatives no@ entered into serious negotiations @ith the radicals) EverI other plan and government in the course o! 1962 had !ailed) >he o!!icers, nobles, and high state o!!icials around Findenburg, supported bI a !e@ other businessmen and ban#ers, believed theI could use the &a'is to carrI out their goal o! overthro@ing the republic !rom @ithin) >he &a'is believed theI could use the conservatives !or the same purpose) >heI all shared the same language and enough o! the same goals that the engineering o! the grand, anti,Meimar coalition became, in the !inal @ee#s, a !airlI simple matter) All o! them despised the republic) >heI @anted an authoritarian sIstem domesticallI and a revival o! 0ermanIQs great,po@er status internationallI) >heI sought to promote a vlkisch politics that meant, most immediatelI, severe restrictions on 5e@s) >rade unions, socialism o! all stripes, modern art, se/ual re!orm movementsVall o! these @ere to be driven !rom public li!e) >he coalition @as antidemocratic, antisocialist, and anti,+emitic) >he established Right @as not enthralled @ith Fitler and the &a'is, @ho remained too radical and unpredictable) Gut a!ter all the !ailed plans and @ith 0ermanI still, !ormallI, a republic, still mired in depression, still living under the strictures o! ?ersailles, Fitler and the &a'is had become acceptable to the established conservatives and large segments o! the middle class) +o in 5anuarI 1966, FindenburgQs advisers presented him @ith a plan !or a ne@ government) Adol! Fitler @ould preside as chancellor, Bran' von %apen @ould serve as vice,chancellor) 1! the ten other members o! the government, onlI t@o @ere &a'is) Findenburg, reassured bI the presence o! so manI conservatives, overcame his distaste !or Fitler) 1n 67 5anuarI 1966, in a constitutionallI legal manner, he named Fitler chancellor) Meimar 0ermanI @as !inished)