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ChrisArchuleta ShannonAtkinson Philosophy2350 TheproblemoffreewillandGodsomniscience,isoneoftheoldestand mostcomplexdebateswithinthephilosophyofreligion.Manyhavearguedthatifa Goddoesexist,whilealsopossessingOmniscience,thatfreewillisanillusion, thatbothfreewillandanOmniscientGodcannotexistatthesametime.Others havearguedthecontrary,thatfreewillandGodsOmnisciencearecompatible,that theyarenotmutuallyexclusive.Stillthereareotherswhoargue,notonlythatGods Omniscienceisdirectlyincontradictionwithfreewill,butthattheexistenceofnatural laws(andcausalchains)dictate(determine)everyeffectfollowinganinitialcause, therebyeradicatinganypossibilityoffreewillwithorwithoutGod.Itwillbemygoal inthispaper,toshowthattheviewoftheincompatibilist,theideathatGods Omniscienceandfreewillareincompatible,isfarmorepersuasivethanthe argumentsgivenbybothdeterministsandcompatibilists. Firstly,letusexaminetheproblemoffreewillmoreclosely.Theproblemof freewill,istheideathatbecauseGodknowseverythingthatis,wasorwillbe,we cannothavefreewill.IfwecannotdodifferentlythanwhatGodknows,thenwehave noactualabilitytochoose,andareessentiallydevoidoffreewill.Onecritique broughtupimmediately,istheintuitiveideathatknowledgedoesnotimply causation.Whileitisthecasethatsimpleknowledge(ajustifiedbelief)doesnot implycausation,thisisnotthecasewhenspeakingofGodsknowledge.Ifone

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acceptstheideathatGodisessentially(incapableofnotbeing)Omniscient,he mustthenalsoacceptthatGodisincapableofholdingfalsebeliefs.Therefore,if Godbelievessomething,itfollowsthatthatbeliefistrue.Thedifferencelieswithin theideathatbecauseGodisomniscient,hisbeliefsarenecessarilytrue,whilethe beliefsofnonomniscientbeingsarenot.Godsbeliefsareincapableofbeing false,whileoursaremostcertainlycapableofbeingfalse. WhendiscussingincompatibilismandGodsOmniscience,NelsonPike providedthefollowingexample: LastSaturdayafternoon,Jonesmowedhislawn.AssumingGodexistsand is(essentially)omniscientinthesenseoutlinedabove,itfollowsthat(letus say)eightyyearspriortolastSaturdayafternoon,Godknew(andthus believed)thatJoneswouldmowhislawnatthattime.Butfromthisitfollows, Ithink,thatatthetimeofaction(lastSaturdayafternoon)Joneswasnot ablethatis,itwasnotwithinJonesspowertorefrainfrommowingthelawn. (Pike) Inthequoteabove,PikeistalkingabouthowGodsknowledge/beliefofsomething entailsitstruth.BecauseitisimpossibleforGodtohaveafalsebelief,itwouldbe impossibleforJonestoactinsuchawaythatwouldentailthatGodwouldhave heldafalsebelief.Thismeans,thatbecauseGodbelievedJoneswouldmowthe Lawn,andbecauseheisincapableofholdingafalsebelief,Joneswasincapable tochoosenottomowthelawn.ThisseemstoimplythatGodbeingessentially omniscient,isincompatiblewithfreewill.

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ThisexamplecanalsobeusedtoshowwhyGodsknowledgedoesimply causation,whenanonomniscientbeingsknowledgedoesnot.Simplyreplace GodintheaboveexamplewithChris(arguablyanonomniscientbeing).Itisnota contradictioninreasoning,tosaythatJoneshadtheabilitytorefrainfrommowing thelawnbecauseChrisknewhewasgoingto,becauseitisnotacontradictionto saythatChriscouldhaveheldafalsebelief.Jonescouldhavedecidednottomow thelawn,thereforemakingChrissbeliefafalsebelief.Itseemstomethatthis provesthatDivineknowledge/Godsomniscience,doesinfactimplycausation. Molinaarguesthattherearethreetypesofknowledge(ClassNotes),natural knowledge(thewaythingsare),freeknowledge(whatcouldbethecase),and middleknowledge(whatwouldbethecase).Insupportofthecompatibilistview, MolinaattributesthesethreetypesofknowledgetoGodinanattempttoshowthat freewillandGodsOmnisciencearecompatible.Molinaargues,thatbecauseof thesethreetypesofknowledge,Godknowswhatis,whatcouldbe,andwhatwould be.Toclarify,MolinaexplainsGodasknowingeverypossiblesituationwithinwhich wemaybeplaced,heknowsthenwhatwillhappenifweareplacedinanyoneof thosesituations.OnMolinasview,Godknowsallpotentialities,butitisuptothe individualtoactualizethem.Molinabelievesthatthisallowsforthecompatibilityof GodsOmniscienceandfreewill. IfoneunderstandsdistinctlytheideaoftheclassicalGodlyattributethatis omniscience,thenMolinasviewseemstocollapse,offeringnoactualsolutionto theproblemoffreewill.MolinaarguesthatbecauseGodknowsallpotentialities,

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andthatwemustactualizethem,thatGodsknowledgedoesnotimplycausation. MolinaarguesthatthisisevidenceoffreewillandGodsomnisciencebeing compatible.BecauseMolinastillclaimsthatGodisomniscient,thisleadstothe conclusion,thatwhileGoddoesknowallpotentialities,hemustalsoknowwhichof thepotentialitieswillbeactualized,ifhedidnot,hewouldnottrulybeomniscient.If heknowswhichofthesepotentialitieswillbeactualized,thenthisargumentseems toprovidenosolutionatall(excellentuseofsemantictrickery/bullshithowever). Thethirdstanceonthefreewillproblem,isthatofDeterminism.The StanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophydefinesDeterminismasfollows: Determinism:Theworldisgovernedby(orisundertheswayof)determinism ifandonlyif,givenaspecifiedwaythingsareatatimet,thewaythingsgo thereafterisfixedasamatterofnaturallaw.(Hoefer) Determinismisessentiallytheideathatfreewillisabsolutelynonexistent. Deterministsbelievethateveryeffectoraction,isthenecessaryconsequentofprior causes.WhenthisisappliedtoGod,becauseGodistheprimemover,alleffects aretracedbacktohim,paintinghimastheinitialcause.Ifthisistrue,thenitimplies thatbecauseonepersonsactionisthenecessaryconsequentofapriorcause,it couldnothavehappenedanyotherway.Ifitcouldnothavehappenedanyother way,thentherewasnoactualabilityforthepersontochoosetorefrainfromfrom performingsaidactionwhichwouldimplythatthereisnofreewill.

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Oneflawinthisargumentistheideathatsomeeventsareentirely unpredictablefromthosepriortothem.TakethisquotefromtheStanford EncyclopediaofPhilosophywhichdescribesthisproblemofsufficientreason: Moreover,thinkingabouthowsuchdeterminationrelatesto freeaction,afurtherproblemarises.Iftheceterisparibusclauseis openended,whoistosaythatitshouldnotincludethenegationofa potentialdisruptorcorrespondingtomyfreelydecidingnottogogetthe beer?Ifitdoes,thenweareleftsayingWhenA,B,C,Tedwillthengoto thefridgeforabeer,unlessDorEorFororTeddecidesnottodoso. Themarionettestringsofasufficientcausebegintolookrathertenuous. (Hoefer) Theceterisparibusclausetalkedaboutabove,istheexerciseofintentionally ignoringallvariables,bothknownandunknownexceptforthoseinimmediate relationtothegivenexample.Hoefer,issayinginthisquotethatbecausethereare somanypotentialdisruptorsorthingsthatcaninterferewithTedsdecisiontoget abeerthatitcanneverbedeterminedwhethertheywillhappenornotbasedonthe priorevents,thattheonlywaytoallowforthistypeofcausaldeterminismwouldbe toexcludethesepotentialdisruptors,whichisseeminglyimplausible. IfGodistrulyandessentiallyOmniscient,itisabsurdtosuggestthathecan holdafalsebelief,which(thoughcompatibilistswillrejectit)iswhatyouessentially mustdotoacceptcompatibilism.Determinismontheotherhand,issimplynot compellingenoughofanargumenttojustifyitsacceptance,whichleadstomy

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conclusion.IfanessentiallyOmniscientGodexists,thenfreewillcannot,and conversely,iffreewillexists,thenanessentiallyOmniscientGodcannot.Though terrifyingtoacceptthatunderanallknowingGod,ourlivesaredecided,withno optiontochangeourcourse,itseemstobetheonlyplausibleanswertotheageold problemoffreewill.

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WorksCited 1.Pike,Nelson."God'sForeknowledgeandHumanFreeWillAreIncompatible." 2012.PhilosophyofReligion:AnAntholgy.6thed.N.p.:n.p.,n.d.96106.Print. (Pike) 2.Atkinson,Shannon."Handout1Lecture1."Philosophy2350.SaltLake CommunityCollege.2014.Lecture.(ClassNotes) 3.Hoefer,Carl."CausalDeterminism."StanfordUniversity.StanfordUniversity,23 Jan.2003.Web.26Mar.2014.(Hoefer) .