Jurisdiction of Labor Courts Explained

ChanRobles Internet Bar Review : ChanRobles Professional Review, Inc.
[These 8-part Notes discuss all topics/sub-topics in the Supreme Court-prescribed Syllabus for Labor Law]
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H. PROCEDURE AND JURISDICTION
LAST-MINUTE NOTES ON THE 2011 BAR EXAMINATION IN LABOR LAW BASED ON THE SUPREME COURT-PRESCRIBED SYLLABUS Prof. Joselito Guianan Chan
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TOPICS UNDER THE SYLLABUS
H. PROCEDURE AND JURISDICTION
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3. Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) Med Arbiters a. Jurisdiction (Original and Appellate)
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5. DOLE Regional Directors a. Small money claims
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1.PRELIMINARYCONSIDERATIONS.
a. Employmentrelationship,aprerequisiteforexerciseofjurisdiction.
LABOR LAW: H. PROCEDURE AND JURISDICTION Prof. Joselito Guianan Chan
www.chanroblesbar.com : www.chanroblesbar.com.ph
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Relevant Provisions: Articles 217 and 128 [b], Labor Code Section 10, R.A. No. 8042, as amended by R.A. No. 10022
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- =========================== TOPIC UNDER THE SYLLABUS: 1. Labor Arbiter a. Jurisdiction ===========================
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10. Prescription of Actions a. Money claims b. Illegal dismissal c. Unfair labor practice d. Offenses penalized by the Labor Code and IRR issued pursuant thereto
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9. Supreme Court a. Rule 45, Rules of Court
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8. Court of Appeals a. Rule 65, Rules of Court
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7. Voluntary Arbitrators a. Submission Agreement b. Rule 43, Rules of Court
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6. DOLE Secretary a. Visitorial and Enforcement Powers b. Power to suspend effects of termination
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4. National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a. Conciliation vs. Mediation b. Preventive Mediation
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2. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a. Jurisdiction b. Effect of NLRC reversal of Labor Arbiters order of reinstatement c. Requirements to perfect appeal to Court of Appeals
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1. Labor Arbiter a. Jurisdiction b. Effect of self-executing order of reinstatement on backwages c. Requirements to perfect appeal to NLRC
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f.ExceptionstotheoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionofLaborArbiters. Thefollowingaretheexceptions: 1. WhentheSecretaryofLaborandEmploymentorthePresidentexerciseshispowerunderArticle263[g]of theLaborCodetoassumejurisdictionovernationalinterestcasesanddecidethemhimself;or 2. WhentheNLRCexercisesitspowerofcompulsoryarbitrationovernationalinterestcasesthatarecertified to it by the Secretary of Labor and Employment pursuant to the exercise by the latter of his certification powerunderthesameArticle263[g];or 3. WhenthepartiesagreetosubmitthecasetovoluntaryarbitrationbeforeaVoluntaryArbitratororPanelof VoluntaryArbitratorswho,underArticles261and262oftheLaborCode,arealsopossessedoforiginaland exclusivejurisdictiontohearanddecidecasesmutuallysubmittedtothembythepartiesforarbitrationand adjudication. The LaborArbitersdonothave jurisdictionover thecasesmentioned above which are takencognizance ofby saidotherlaborofficialsortribunalsunderspecificprovisionsoftheLaborCode.
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e.NatureofjurisdictionofLaborArbitersisoriginalandexclusive. ThejurisdictionconferredbyArticle217totheLaborArbitersisbothoriginalandexclusive,meaning,noother officersortribunalscantakecognizanceof,orhearanddecide,anyofthecasesthereinenumerated.
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d.LaborArbitershavejurisdictionevenifthecaseisfiledbytheheirsoftheOFW. ThiswastherulinginMedlineManagement,Inc.v.Roslinda,[G.R.No.168715,September15,2010].Asheirs, thewifeandsonofJulianoRoslinda,thedeceasedOFW,havethepersonalitytofiletheclaimfordeathcompensation, reimbursementofmedicalexpenses,damagesandattorney'sfeesbeforetheLaborArbiteroftheNLRC.
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c.IncasesofmoneyclaimsofOFWs,LaborArbitersmayexercisejurisdictionevenabsenttheemployment relationship. In Santiago v. CF Sharp Crew Management, Inc., [G.R. No.162419, July 10, 2007], it was held that a seafarer whohasalreadysignedaPOEAapprovedemploymentcontractbutwasnotdeployedoverseasand,therefore,thereis no employeremployee relationship, may file his monetary claims case with the Labor Arbiter. This is because the jurisdictionofLaborArbitersisnotlimitedtoclaimsarisingfromemployeremployeerelationships.UnderSection10of R.A.No.8042(MigrantWorkersandOverseasFilipinosActof1995),asamendedbySection7ofR.A.No.10022(March 8, 2010), the Labor Arbiter may exercise the claims of OFWs arising out of an employeremployee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment, including claims for actual, moral, exemplaryandotherformsofdamage.
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Additionally, the MedArbiter may also exercise the power to determine existence of employeremployee relationship.
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b.TheLaborArbitersandtheNLRCarenotexclusivelyvestedwithauthoritytodeterminetheexistenceof employeremployeerelationship. In Republic of the Philippines v. Asiapro Cooperative, [G.R. No. 172101, November 23, 2007], involving the issueofcoverageofownersmembersofrespondentCooperativeundertheSocialSecuritySystem(SSS),itwasheldthat it is not only the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC who/which has the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the existence of the employeremployeerelationship.TheSocialSecurityCommission(SSC)hasalsothatpower.
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The existence of employeremployee relationship between the partieslitigants, or a reasonable causal connection to such relationship1 is a prerequisite for the exercise of jurisdiction over a labor dispute by the Labor Arbiters.
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Known as Reasonable Causal Connection Rule. Dai-ichi Electronics Manufacturing Corporation v. Villarama, Jr. G.R. No. 112940, Nov. 21, 1994, 238 SCRA 267, 271. San Miguel Corporation v. Etcuban, G. R. No. 127639, Dec. 3, 1999. 4 Montoya v. Escayo, G.R. Nos. 82211-12, March 21, 1989, 171 SCRA 442.
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i.LaborArbiterhasnoinjunctionpower;theNLRChas. While the NLRC is expressly granted the power to issue an injunction or a restraining order in labor disputes underArticle218[e],thereisnoexpress,orevenimplied,grantofsimilarpowertoLaborArbitersintheLaborCode.
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h.Labordisputes,notsubjecttobarangayconciliation. Labor cases are not subject to the conciliation proceedings prescribed under Presidential Decree No. 1508 requiringthesubmissionofdisputesbeforetheBarangayLupongTagapayapapriortotheirfilingwiththecourtorother government offices. Requiring conciliation of labor disputes before the barangay courts would defeat the very salutary purposes of the law. Instead of simplifying labor proceedings designed at expeditious settlement or referral to the propercourtsorofficestodecideitfinally,theconciliationoftheissuesbeforetheBarangayLupongTagapayapawould onlyduplicatetheconciliationproceedingsandundulydelaythedispositionoflaborcases.4
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g.Reasonablecausalconnectionruletheruleincaseofconflictofjurisdictionbetweenlaborcourtand regularcourt. Under this rule, if there is a reasonable causal connection between the claim asserted and the employer employeerelations,thenthecaseiswithinthejurisdictionoflaborcourts.2 Intheabsenceofsuchnexus,itistheregularcourtsthathavejurisdiction.3
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Thefollowing arecases fallingunder the original andexclusive jurisdictionof LaborArbiters underArticle 217 oftheLaborCode:
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2.1.CASESUNDERARTICLE217,
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2.JURISDICTIONOFLABORARBITERS. ThefollowingprovisionsoflawsgrantjurisdictiontotheLaborArbiters: 1. Article217oftheLaborCode; 2. Article128[b]oftheLaborCode;and 3. Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995) as amended in 2010 by R.A.No.10022[March8,2010].
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j.Powertoconductocularinspection. The Labor Arbiters or their duly authorized representatives, have the power to conduct ocular inspections, at any time during working hours, on any establishment, building, ship or vessel, place or premises, including any work, material, implement, machinery, appliance or any object therein, and ask any employee, laborer, or any person, as the casemaybe,foranyinformationordataconcerninganymatterorquestionrelativetotheobjectoftheinvestigation.5
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2.3.CASESOFOFWsUNDERARTICLESECTION10,R.A.NO.8042,ASAMENDEDBYR.A.NO.10022.
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3.UNFAIRLABORPRACTICECASES.
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Article 219 of the Labor Code. Formerly known as medicare. See paragraph [c] of Article 217, Labor Code. 8 labor employment and enforcement officer. 9 Under Article 248, Labor Code. 10 Under Article 249, Labor Code.
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b.Unfairlaborpracticeacts. UndertheLaborCode,thereareonlyfive(5)provisionsrelatedtounfairlaborpractices,towit: 1. Article 247 which describes the concept of unfair labor practices and prescribes the procedure for their prosecution; 2. Article248whichenumeratestheunfairlaborpracticesthatmaybecommittedbyemployers; 3. Article249whichenumeratestheunfairlaborpracticesthatmaybecommittedbylabororganizations;
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a.AllULPsthatmaybecommittedbyboththeemployersandlabororganizations. TheLaborArbiterhasoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionoverthecivilaspectofallULPsthatmaybecommitted by either the employers9 or the labor organizations.10 The criminal aspect thereof falls under the jurisdiction of the regularcourt.
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TheLaborArbiterhasoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionovermonetaryclaimsofOFWs,towit: 1. Thosearisingoutofanemployeremployeerelationship; 2. Thosearisingbyvirtueofanylaw; 3. ThosearisingfromacontractinvolvingFilipinoworkersforoverseasdeployment; 4. Claimsforactual,moral,exemplaryandotherformsofdamages.
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Article 128 [b] involves the exercise of the visitorial and enforcement powers by the DOLE Secretary. The jurisdictionovercasesarisingfromtheinspectionofestablishmentsisvestedwiththeDOLERegionalDirector,exceptin cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor inspectors8 and raises issues supported by documentary proofswhichwerenotconsideredinthecourseofinspection.Thesecontestedcasesfallingunderthisexceptionclause inparagraph[b]ofArticle128fallunderthejurisdictionoftheLaborArbiter.
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2.2.CASESUNDERARTICLE128[b],LABORCODE.
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Exceptions: 1. ClaimsforEmployees Compensation(EC), Social Security (SS), PhilHealth6 and maternitybenefits. Reason: Jurisdiction over EC, SS and maternity benefits is lodged with the Social Security Commission. Jurisdiction overPhilHealthisvestedwiththePhilippineHealthInsuranceCorporation(PHIC). 2. Cases involving interpretation or implementation of CBA and interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies. Reason: Jurisdiction over these cases is vested with the Grievance Machinery and Voluntary Arbitration. If erroneously filed with the Labor Arbiter, they shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiterbyreferringthesametothegrievancemachineryandvoluntaryarbitrationasmaybeprovidedin saidagreements.7
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1. Unfairlaborpractice(ULP)cases; 2. Terminationdisputes(Illegaldismissalcases); 3. MoneyclaimsinvolvinganamountexceedingP5,000.00; 4.Moneyclaimsraisedinillegaldismissalcases(regardlessofamount); 4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employeremployee relations; 5. CasesarisingfromanyviolationofArticle264oftheLaborCode,includingquestionsinvolvingthelegalityof strikesandlockouts;and
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4.JURISDICTIONOVERTERMINATIONDISPUTES(ILLEGALDISMISSALCASES).
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5.JURISDICTIONOVERMONEYCLAIMS.
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San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, 161 SCRA 719. Nation Broadcasting Corporation v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 116184, October 2, 1997, 280 SCRA 65, 68-69].
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b.Moneyclaimsmustariseoutofemployeremployeerelationship. As a general rule, money claims of workers that are not connected with or do not arise out of employer employee relationship fall within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The money claims of workers referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 217 of the Labor Code embrace those which arise out of or in connection with the employer employeerelationship,orsomeaspectorincidentofsuchrelationship.11 Clearly, the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter is not limited to money claims arising out of an illegal dismissal case,butallmoneyclaimsarisingoutofemployeremployeerelationships.12 Sonzav.ABSCBNBroadcastingCorporation,[G.R.No.138051,June10,2004] Since petitioner is not an employee but an independent contractor, his monetary claims for the recovery of unpaidtalentfees,13thmonthpay,separationpay,serviceincentiveleave,signingbonus,travelallowance,andamounts
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a.Moneyclaimsunderpar.(a),[3]and[6]ofArticle217;classification. MoneyclaimsfallingwithintheoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionoftheLaborArbitersarethosementionedin paragraph[a],Nos.3and6ofArticle217.Theymaybeclassifiedasfollows: 1. Anymoneyclaim,regardlessofamount,accompaniedwithaclaimforreinstatement;or 2. Any money claim, regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, exceeding the amountoffivethousandpesos(P5,000.00)perclaimant. The money claim in No. 1 above presupposes that it proceeds from a termination case, it being accompanied with a claim for reinstatement. Hence, it falls within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter since it is principally a terminationdispute. ThemoneyclaiminNo.2abovedoesnotnecessarilyarisefromorinvolveaterminationcasebutbecausethe amountexceedsP5,000.00,itfallswithinthejurisdictionoftheLaborArbiter.IftheamountdoesnotexceedP5,000.00, it is, under Article 129, the DOLE Regional Director or his duly authorized hearing officers who have jurisdiction to take cognizancethereof.
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b.Terminationcaseisnotagrievableissue. InNavarroIIIv.Damasco,[G.R.No.101875,July14,1995],theSupremeCourtheldthataterminationcaseis notagrievableissuethatmustbesubmittedtothegrievancemachinery. In another case, San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 108001, March 15, 1996, 255 SCRA 133, 140], it wassimilarlyheldthatdismissalsdonotcallfortheinterpretationorenforcementofcompanypersonnelpoliciesandso theymaynotbeconsideredgrievableorarbitrablebyvirtueofArticle217[c]. InManejav.NLRC,[G.R.No.124013,June5,1998,290SCRA603],itwasdeclaredthatterminationcasesfall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters, not of the Voluntary Arbitrators. The dismissal of petitioner does not fall within the phrase grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies, the jurisdiction of which pertains to the grievance machinery or thereafter, to a voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators. In Negros Metal Corp. v. Lamayo, [G.R. No. 186557, August 25, 2010]. It was held that termination disputes should be brought before a Labor Arbiter, except when the parties, under Article 262, unmistakably express that they agreetosubmitthesametovoluntaryarbitration.
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a.Laborofficialswhomaytakecognizanceofterminationdisputes. An examination of the Labor Code shows that the following officials have the power to take cognizance of terminationdisputesintheexerciseoftheiroriginalandexclusivejurisdiction: 1. LaborArbitersunderparagraph[a](2)ofArticle217; 2. VoluntaryArbitratorsorpanelsofVoluntaryArbitratorsunderArticles261and262; 3. The Secretary of Labor and Employment, in the exercise of his assumption power in national interest cases. Under paragraph [g] of Article 263, he may take cognizance of termination disputes that are includedorsubsumedinthecase/soverwhichhehasassumedjurisdiction. 4. TheNLRC,innationalinterestcasescertifiedtoitforcompulsoryarbitrationbytheSecretaryofLaborand Employment under the same Article 263 [g]. Such certified cases may include or subsume the issue of terminationofemploymentthelegalityofwhichtheNLRCmayvalidlydecideupon.
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4. Article 261 which considers violations of the CBA as no longer unfair labor practices unless the same are gross in character which means flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions thereof. 5. Article263[c]whichreferstounionbustinginvolvingthedismissalfromemploymentofunionofficersduly elected in accordance with the union constitution and bylaws, where the existence of the union is threatenedthereby.
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Food Traders House, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 120677, Dec. 21, 1998, 300 SCRA 360; See also Pondoc v. NLRC, G.R. No. 116347, Oct. 3, 1996, 262 SCRA 632. San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, 161 SCRA 719. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company v. Martinez, 112 SCRA 578. 16 Cagayan de Oro Coliseum, Inc. v. Minister of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 71589, Dec. 17, 1990. 17 Gregorio Araneta University Foundation v. Teodoro, G.R. No. 75583, Nov. 8, 1988, 167 SCRA 79. 18 Sara v. Agarrado, G.R. No. L-73199, Oct. 26, 1988, 166 SCRA 625. 19 Dacanay v. NLRC, G.R. No. 107277, Aug. 9, 1996, 260 SCRA 486.
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c.LaborArbitershavejurisdictionifemploymentrelationshipnolongerexistsatthetimeoftheinitiationof theactionunderArticle128. If at the time of the initiation of the action under Article 128 [b], the employeremployee relationship had alreadyceasedtoexist,itisnottheDOLERegionalDirectorbuttheLaborArbiterwhohasjurisdictionoverthesame,as emphasizedinthecaseofBatongBuhayGoldMines,Inc.v.Sec.DelaSerna,[G.R.No.86963,August6,1999,370Phil. 872].
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RizalSecurity&ProtectiveServices,Inc.v.Hon.Maraan,[G.R.No.124915,February18,2008] TheSupremeCourtruledherethatwhatismaterialtoconsideristhatatthetimeofthefilingofthecomplaints or claims for payment of monetary benefits with the DOLE Regional Office, the complainants were still employees of petitioner company. Thus, the Supreme Court said that considering that it is uncontroverted that there still existed an employeremployee relationship between petitioner Rizal Security and private respondents at the time of filing of the complainton19May1995,andthatthecaseisoneinvolvingviolationsoflaborstandardprovisionsoftheLaborCode,it istheDOLERegionalDirectorwhohasjurisdictionoverthecase.
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b.RequisitesforthevalidexerciseofthevisitorialandenforcementpowersunderArticle128. For the valid exercise of the visitorial and enforcement powers provided under Article 128 [b], the following requisitesshouldconcur: 1. Theemployeremployeerelationshipshouldstillexist; 2. The findings in question were made in the course of inspection by the labor employment and enforcementofficersorindustrialsafetyengineers;and 3.The employees have not yet initiated any claim or complaint with the DOLE Regional Director under Article129,ortheLaborArbiter,underArticle217. TheexistenceoftheemploymentrelationshipatthetimeoftheinitiationoftheactionunderArticle128[b]is essential.Basedonthisrequisite,theSupremeCourt,inthe2006caseofEJRCraftsCorp.v.Hon.CA,[G.R.No.154101, March10,2006],disagreedwiththecontentionofpetitionerthattheLaborArbiter,andnottheDOLERegionalDirector, hasjurisdictionoverthiscase.Itheldthatconsideringthattherestillexistsanemployeremployeerelationshipbetween petitioner and private respondents and that the case involves violations of the labor standard provisions of the Labor Code,theDOLERegionalDirectorhasjurisdictiontohearanddecidetheinstantcaseinconformitywithArticle128[b]of theLaborCode.
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a.VisitorialandenforcementpowersofDOLESecretaryunderArticle128. Article 128 enunciates the visitorial and enforcement powers of the DOLE Secretary or any of his duly authorizedrepresentatives.
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5.1.MONEYCLAIMSUNDERARTICLE128OFTHELABORCODE.
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Other illustrative cases where money claims were held not to have arisen from the employment relationship areasfollows: 1. Apersonalloanfromacompanypresidenttoanemployeeisnotwithintheambitofthejurisdictionofthe LaborArbiter.13 2. Claimofemployeeforacashprizeunderaprogramofthecompanywasheldbeyondthejurisdictionofthe LaborArbiter.14Butinanothercase,theclaimbyanemployeeforahouseandlotprizeastopsalesmanwas heldwithinthejurisdictionoftheLaborArbiter.15 3. Unpaid salaries, allowances and per diem of the President of a company are included in intracorporate dispute, hence, not cognizable by the Labor Arbiter.16 But a money claim of a corporate officer who is, at the same time, a regular employee is not an intracorporate dispute, hence, cognizable by the Labor Arbiter.17 4. Money claims of an independent contractor consisting of unpaid commissions and reimbursements fall beyondthejurisdictionoftheLaborArbiter.18 5. An action to enforce liability arising from a breach of trust, as well as to recover any amount allegedly misappropriated,mustbebroughtbeforetheregularcourts.19
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Consultav.CA,[G.R.No.145443,March18,2005] TheclaimforunpaidcommissionsfiledbytheManagingAssociateofanentityengagedinhealthcarebusiness, was declared beyond the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter because there was no employeremployee relationship betweentheparties.Herremedyistofileanordinarycivilactionintheregularcourttolitigateherclaim.
due under the Employee Stock Option Plan of the respondent company do not fall under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiterbutcognizablebytheregularcourt.
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ExBataan Veterans Security Agency, Inc. v. The Secretary of Labor Laguesma, [G.R. No. 152396, November 20,2007] ItwasheldinthiscasethattheRegionalDirectorvalidlyassumedjurisdictionoverthemoneyclaimsofprivate respondents even if the claims exceeded P5,000becausesuchjurisdiction was exercised inaccordance withArticle128 [b]oftheLaborCodeandthecasedoesnotfallundertheexceptionclause.20
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Allied Investigation Bureau, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, [G.R. No. 122006, November 24, 1999,377Phil.80], ItwasruledherethatwhileitistruethatunderArticles129and217oftheLaborCode,theLaborArbiterhas jurisdiction to hear and decide cases where the aggregate money claims of each employee exceeds P5,000.00, said provisions of law do not contemplate nor cover the visitorial and enforcement powers of the Secretary of Labor or his dulyauthorizedrepresentatives.
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d.LaborArbitershavenojurisdictioneveniftheamountofthemonetaryclaimexceedsP5,000.00. After the amendment of Article 128 [b] of the Labor Code by R. A. No. 7730, jurisprudence affirmed the rule that the visitorial and enforcement powers of the DOLE Secretary under Article 128 are no longer bound by the restrictiveeffectofArticles129and217insofarastheamountofmonetaryclaimsisconcerned.
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6.JURISDICTIONOVERCLAIMSFORDAMAGES.
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See also V.L. Enterprises v. Hon. CA, [G.R. No. 167512, March 12, 2007]. Ex-Bataan Veterans Security Agency, Inc. v. The Secretary of Labor Laguesma, [G.R. No. 152396, November 20, 2007]; See also See also Section 1 [b], Rule III of the Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the Regional Offices [September 16, 1987]. M. Ramirez Industries v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 89894, Jan. 3, 1997, 266 SCRA 111, 128; Ubay Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc. v. Trajano, G.R. No. 106813, Nov. 25, 1993, 228 SCRA 189. 23 Paragraph [a] 6, Article 217, Labor Code; South Motorists Enterprises v. Tosoc, G.R. No. 87449, Jan. 23, 1990, 181 SCRA 386. 24 Primero v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. L-72644, December 14, 1987, 156 SCRA 435], 25 Section 10, Republic Act No. 8042; Section 58, Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. 26 No. 26, Guidelines Governing Labor Relations.
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a.Jurisdictionoverstrikesorlockoutsnotaffectingnationalinterest. Ingeneral,theLaborArbiterhasthepowertodeterminequestionsinvolvingthelegalityorillegalityofastrike orlockout,uponthefilingofapropercomplaintandafterdueproceedings. Theemployer,incaseofastrike,ortheunion,incaseofalockout,mayfiletheproperpetitionwiththeLabor Arbitertoseekadeclarationoftheillegalitythereof.26
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7.JURISDICTIONOVERLEGALITYOFSTRIKESANDLOCKOUTS.
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b.ClaimsfordamagesofOFWs. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages that may be lodged by overseas Filipino workersarecognizablebytheLaborArbiters.25
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a.LaborArbitershavejurisdictionoverclaimsfordamages. It is now a wellsettled rule that claims for damages as well as attorneys fees in labor cases are cognizable by the Labor Arbiters, to the exclusion of all other courts. Rulings to the contrary are deemed abandoned or modified accordingly.24 No matter how designated, for as long as the action primarily involves an employeremployee relationship,thelaborcourthasjurisdictionoveranydamageclaims.
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Under Article 129 of the Labor Code, DOLE Regional Directors or his duly authorized hearing officers, are empowered,inasummaryproceeding,tohearanddecideclaimsforrecoveryofwagesandothermonetaryclaimsand benefits,includinglegalinterest,providedthefollowingrequisitesconcur: 1. Theclaimmustarisefromemployeremployeerelationship; 2. Theclaimantdoesnotseekreinstatement;and 3. TheaggregatemoneyclaimofeachemployeedoesnotexceedP5,000.00.22 Absent any of the requisites mentioned above will divest the Regional Directors of their authority to hear and decidesaidmoneyclaims.Consequently,thejurisdictionthereoverisvestedupontheLaborArbiters.23
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5.2.MONEYCLAIMSCOGNIZABLEBYDOLEREGIONALDIRECTORSUNDERARTICLE129.
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3elementstodivestDOLERegionalDirectorofjurisdictionandconferitwithLaborArbiter: (1) thattheemployerconteststhefindingsofthelaborregulationsofficerandraisesissuesthereon; (2) thatinordertoresolvesuchissues,thereisaneedtoexamineevidentiarymatters;and (3) thatsuchmattersarenotverifiableinthenormalcourseofinspection.21 Resultantly, if the said elements are present and, therefore, the labor standards case is covered by said exception clause, then the Regional Director will have to endorse the case to the appropriate Labor Arbiters of the ArbitrationBranchoftheNLRC.
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xxx. The Secretary or his duly authorized representatives shall issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their orders, except in cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor employment and enforcement officer and raises issues supported by documentary proofs which were not considered in the course of inspection.
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e.LaborArbitersmaystillhavejurisdictionovercontestedcasesundertheexceptionclauseinArticle128 [b]. TheexceptionclauseinArticle128[b],asamendedbyR.A.No.7730,states:
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8.OTHERISSUESAFFECTINGTHEEXERCISEOFJURISDICTIONBYLABORARBITERS.
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b.NewdoctrineisthatcorporateofficersreferonlytothosementionedintheCorporationCodeandthe ByLaws;allotherofficersnotsomentionedaredeemedemployees. MatlingIndustrialandCommercialCorp.v.Coros,[G.R.No.157802,October13,2010]. It is now the prevailing rule, as enunciated in this 2010 case of Matling, that only the following should be consideredcorporateofficers: 1. Those expressly mentioned in Section 25, specifically the three (3) officers which a corporation must have, namely:president,secretary,andtreasurer;and 2.ThoseexpresslymentionedandprovidedforintheByLaws. Thus, the creation of an office pursuant to or under a ByLaw enabling provision is not enough to make a positionacorporateoffice.Consequentlytheonlyofficersofacorporationwerethosegiventhatcharactereitherbythe
Article 263 [h], Labor Code. No. 019, Primer on Strike, Picketing and Lockout. Article 217[5], Labor Code). 30 Okol v. Slimmers World International, G.R. No. 160146, Dec. 11, 2009.
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a.LaborArbitershavenojurisdictionoverterminationofacorporateofficerwhichisinthenatureofan intracorporatedispute. Itisasettledrulethatjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterisconferredbylaw.Thedeterminationoftherights ofadirectorandcorporateofficerdismissedfromhisemploymentaswellasthecorrespondingliabilityofacorporation, ifany,isanintracorporatedisputesubjecttothejurisdictionoftheregularcourtsandnotofLaborArbiters.30
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8.1.JURISDICTIONOVERTERMINATIONOFCORPORATEOFFICERS(INTRACORPORATEDISPUTES).
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Jurisprudence enunciates a number of rulings on issues and controversies not expressly covered by any provisions of the Labor Code but which may or may not fall within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters. Some of them areasfollows: 1.Terminationofcorporateofficersandtheirmonetaryclaims; 2.Issuesinvolvingemployeesingovernmentownedand/orcontrolledcorporations; 3.Issuesinvolvinganalienparty; 4.Casesinvolvingentitiesimmunefromsuit; 5.Applicationofthedoctrineofforumnonconveniens; 6.Casesinvolvingpriestsandministers; 7.Effectofrehabilitationreceivershiponjurisdictioninlaborcases; 8.CasesinvolvingoverseasFilipinoworkers; 9.Wagedistortioncases; 10.Enforcementoflaborstandardslaws; 11.Claimsofdomesticorhousehelpers; 12.Enforcementofcompromiseagreement; 13.Issuescognizablebygrievancemachineryorvoluntaryarbitration; 14.Issuesinvolvingcooperatives; 15.Issuesinvolvinglocalwaterutilitiesdistricts; 16.Quasidelictortortcases; 17.CriminalandcivilliabilitiesarisingfromviolationsofArticle241; 18.Claimsorcounterclaimsofemployersagainstemployees; 19.ConstitutionalityofCBAprovisions; 20.Taxdeductionsasmoneyclaim; 21.IssuancebyRTCofWritofHabeasDatainrelationtoalaborcase;
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e.Jurisdictionovercriminalcasesarisingfromstrikesorlockouts. Jurisdictionovercriminalcaseswhichmayhavearisenasaconsequenceofthestrikeorlockoutfallsunderthe jurisdictionoftheregularcourts.
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d.Jurisdictionoverprohibitedactivitiescommittedduringstrikesorlockouts. Casesarisingfromany violationsofArticle264of the LaborCode regarding thecommissionof prohibitedacts inthecourseofastrikeorlockoutfallwithintheoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionoftheLaborArbiter.29
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c.Voluntaryarbitrationofstrikeorlockoutcasesmaybedoneatanystagethereof. BeforeoratanystageofthecompulsoryarbitrationprocessinastrikeorlockoutcasebeforeaLaborArbiteror the DOLE Secretary in assumed cases or the NLRC in certified cases, the parties may still opt to submit their dispute to voluntary arbitration.27 If the issue of legality or illegality of a strike or lockout is submitted by the parties to voluntary arbitration, the jurisdiction to resolve said issue belongs exclusively to the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators.28
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b.Jurisdictionoverstrikesorlockoutsaffectingnationalinterest. Jurisdiction over strikes or lockouts in industries affecting the national interest is vested with the DOLE SecretaryandnotwiththeLaborArbiter,underArticle263[g]oftheLaborCode.Thus,theDOLESecretarymayassume jurisdictionthereoveranddecideithimselforcertifyittotheNLRCforcompulsoryarbitration.
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d.Elementstodeterminewhetheradisputeisintracorporateornot. In view of the declaration in Matling that the Tabang pronouncement is not controlling because it is too sweeping and does not accord with reason, justice, and fair play, two (2) elements should be considered in order to determinewhetheradisputeconstitutesanintracorporatecontroversyornot,namely:
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Because the soundness of the dicta enunciated in Nacpil and Tabang therein is not unassailable, as it is too sweeping and does not accord with reason, justice, and fair play, the Supreme Court made a definitive holding in the 2010 case of Matling Industrial and Commercial Corp. v. Coros, [supra] that Nacpil and Tabang should no longer be controlling.Thus,itruled: The petitioners reliance on Tabang, supra, is misplaced. The statement in Tabang, to the effect that offices not expressly mentioned in the ByLaws but were created pursuant to a ByLaw enabling provision were also considered corporate offices, was plainly obiter dictum due to the positionsubjectofthecontroversybeingmentionedintheByLaws.Thus,theCourtheldthereinthat the position was a corporate office, and that the determination of the rights and liabilities arising fromtheousterfromthepositionwasanintracorporatecontroversywithintheSECsjurisdiction. InNacpilv.IntercontinentalBroadcastingCorporation,whichmaybethemoreappropriate ruling, the position subject of the controversy was not expressly mentioned in the ByLaws, but was created pursuant to a ByLaw enabling provision authorizing the Board of Directors to create other officesthattheBoardofDirectorsmightseefittocreate.TheCourtheldtherethatthepositionwasa corporateoffice,relyingontheobiterdictuminTabang. Consideringthattheobservationsearliermadehereinshowthatthesoundnessoftheir dicta is not unassailable, Tabang and Nacpil should no longer be controlling. [Underscoring supplied].
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c.RulingsinTabangandNacpil,nolongercontrolling. ThefollowingrulingshavebeenabandonedperMatling: 1. PurificacionG.Tabangv.NLRC,[G.R.No.121143,January21,1997,266SCRA462,468],whereitwasruled that (a) corporate officers dismissal is always a corporate act, or an intracorporate controversy, and the nature is not altered by the reason or wisdom with which the Board of Directors may have in taking such action.Also,anintracorporatecontroversyisonewhicharisesbetweenastockholderandthecorporation. There is no distinction, qualification, nor any exemption whatsoever. The provision is broad and covers all kindsofcontroversies between stockholdersandcorporations. In thiscase, the petitioners dualpositions at the time of her dismissal, that of Medical Director and Hospital Administrator of private respondent PamanaGoldenCareMedicalCenterinCalamba,Laguna,areexpresslyprovidedundertheByLaws. 2. Nacpilv.IntercontinentalBroadcastingCorporation,[G.R.No.144767,March21,2002],wherepetitioner arguedthatheisnotacorporateofficerofrespondentIBCbutanemployeethereofsincehehasnotbeen elected nor appointed as Comptroller and Assistant Manager by the IBCs Board of Directors. He pointed out that he has actually been appointed as such on January 11, 1995 by the IBCs General Manager. In support of his argument, petitioner underscored the fact that the IBCs ByLaws does not include the position ofcomptroller in its roster ofcorporateofficers. He,therefore,contendedthathisdismissalwas a controversyfallingwithinthejurisdictionofthelaborcourts.TheHighCourt,however,foundthisargument of petitioner untenable. It declared that even assuming that he was in fact appointed by the General Manager,suchappointmentwassubsequentlyapprovedbytheBoardofDirectorsofrespondentIBC.That the position of Comptroller is not expressly mentioned among the officers of IBC in its ByLaws is of no momentbecausetheIBCsBoardofDirectorsisempoweredunderSection25oftheCorporationCodeand under the corporations bylaws to appoint such other officers as it may deem necessary. Consequently, sincepetitionersappointmentascomptrollerrequiredtheapprovalandformalactionofrespondentIBCs Board of Directors to become valid, it is clear, therefore, that petitioner is a corporate officer whose dismissalmaybethesubjectofacontroversycognizablebytheSECunderSection5[c]ofP.D.902A(now bytheRegionalTrialCourtunderR.A.No.8799)whichincludesandcoverscontroversiesinvolvingboththe election and appointment of corporate directors, trustees, officers, and managers. Had petitioner been an ordinaryemployee,suchboardactionwouldnothavebeenrequired.
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Locsinv.NissanLeasePhils.,Inc.,[G.R.No.185567,October20,2010] Petitioner Locsin was undeniably Chairman of the Board and Executive Vice President and Treasurer, and was elected to these positions by respondent companys Board of Directors pursuant to its Bylaws. As such, he was a corporate officer, not an employee, based on the submitted facts in this case and on Presidential Decree 902A, and Section 25 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 69, or the Corporation Code. Even as Executive VicePresident/Treasurer, petitioner Locsin already acted as a corporate officer because such position is provided for in respondent companys By Laws.Consequently,itwasruledinthiscasethattheLaborArbiterhasnojurisdictionoverhisterminationcasesinceitis in the nature of an intracorporate dispute, an issue cognizable by the Regional Trial Court under Section 5 of Republic ActNo.8799(SecuritiesRegulationCode).
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Corporation Code or by the ByLaws; the rest of the corporate officers could be considered only as employees or subordinateofficials.31
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Okol v. Slimmers World International, G.R. No. 160146, Dec. 11, 2009; Lozon v. NLRC, G.R. No. 107660, Jan. 02, 1995, 240 SCRA 1; Espino v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 109642-43, Jan. 5, 1995.
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a.Generalprinciples. AccordingtoFelicianov.CommissiononAudit,[G.R.No.147402,January14,2004,419SCRA363],thereare two(2)classesofcorporations recognized under the1987 Constitution. The firstreferstoprivatecorporationscreated underagenerallaw;thesecondreferstogovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationscreatedbyspecialcharters.
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8.2.JURISDICTIONOVERCASESINVOLVINGEMPLOYEESOFGOVERNMENTOWNEDAND/ORCONTROLLED CORPORATIONS.
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i.Claimsforbenefitsanddamagesinintracorporatecasesarecognizablebytheregularcourts. Anymonetaryclaimsbeingassertedbyacorporateofficerwhoisnotamereemployeesuchasunpaidsalaries, commissions, separation pay and backwages, including claims for vacation and sick leaves, 13th month pay, Christmas bonus,medicalexpenses,carexpenses,andotherbenefits,arenotsimplelaborproblemsbutmattersthatcomewithin the area of corporate affairs and management, and are, in fact, corporate controversies in contemplation of the Corporation Code and, therefore, the jurisdiction thereover is lodged with the regular courts and not with the Labor Arbiter.32
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g.AcorporateofficermayalsobeanemployeewhosedismissalmayvestjurisdictionontheLaborArbiter. Acorporateofficermayalsobe,atthesametime,anemployee,asheldinRuralBankofCoron[Palawan],Inc. v. Cortes, [G.R. No.164888, December 6, 2006]. While, indeed, respondent was the Corporate Secretary of the Rural Bank of Coron, she was also its Financial Assistant and the Personnel Officer of the two other petitioner corporations. ThecaseofMainlandConstructionCo.,Inc.v.Movilla,[320Phil,353(1995)],instructsthatacorporationcanengageits corporateofficerstoperformservicesunderacircumstancewhichwouldmakethememployees.TheLaborArbiterhas thusjurisdictionoverrespondentscomplaint.
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f. Acaseofanemployeewhorosefromtherankstobecomeacorporateofficeratthetimeofhisdismissal stilltreatedasaregularemployee. In Prudential Bank and Trust Company v. Reyes, [G.R. No. 141093, February 20, 2001], it was held that respondentAssistantVicePresidentwhorosefromtherankswasaregularemployeeandisthusentitledtosecurityof tenure; that is, her services may be terminated only for a just or authorized cause. It was established by evidence that she started her employment with the bank when she was appointed Accounting Clerk on July 14, 1963. From that position, she rose to become supervisor. Then in 1982, she was appointedAssistant VicePresident which she occupied until her illegal dismissal on July 19, 1991. Petitioner banks contention that she merely holds an elective position and that,ineffect,sheisnotaregularemployeeisbeliedbythenatureofherworkandherlengthofservicetherewith.
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e.Thestatusofanemployee(whorosefromtheranks)asdirectorandstockholderdoesnot automaticallyconverthisdismissalintoanintracorporatedispute. AccordingtoMatling,thecriteriafordistinguishingbetweencorporateofficerswhomaybeoustedfromoffice atwill,ononehand,andordinarycorporateemployeeswhomayonlybeterminatedforjustcause,ontheotherhand, do not depend on the nature of the services performed, but on the manner of creation of the office. In the case of respondent in Matling, he was supposedly at once an employee, a stockholder, and a Director of Matling.The circumstances surrounding his appointment to office must be fully considered to determine whether the dismissal constitutedanintracorporatecontroversyoralaborterminationdispute.Anotherconsiderationiswhetherhisstatusas Director and stockholder had any relation at all to his appointment and subsequent dismissal as Vice President for FinanceandAdministration. Obviously enough, the respondent in Matling was not appointed as Vice President for Finance and Administration because of his being a stockholder or Director of Matling. He had started working for Matling on September8, 1966, and hadbeen employedcontinuously for 33yearsuntil his termination on April17,2000, first as a bookkeeper,andhisclimbin1987tohislastpositionasVicePresidentforFinanceandAdministrationhadbeengradual but steady, as the following sequence indicates: 1966Bookkeeper; 1968Senior Accountant; 1969Chief Accountant; 1972OfficeSupervisor;1973Assistant Treasurer;1978SpecialAssistant for Finance;1980AssistantComptroller;1983 Finance and Administrative Manager; 1985sst. Vice President for Finance and Administration; and 1987 to April 17, 2000Vice President for Finance and Administration. Even though he might have become a stockholder of Matling in 1992,hispromotiontothepositionofVicePresidentforFinanceandAdministrationin1987wasbyvirtueofthelength of quality service he had rendered as an employee of Matling. His subsequent acquisition of the status of Director/stockholderhadnorelationtohispromotion.Besides,hisstatusofDirector/stockholderwasunaffectedbyhis dismissalfromemploymentasVicePresidentforFinanceandAdministration.
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(a)Thestatusorrelationshipoftheparties;and (b)Thenatureofthequestionthatisthesubjectoftheircontroversy.
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c.Specificcases.
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It is now wellentrenched that the hiring and firing of employees of government owned and/or controlled corporations without original charters are covered by the Labor Code while those with original charters are basically governedbytheCivilServiceLaw,rulesandregulations.33 b.Jurisdictionoverdismissalofemployeeforoffensescommittedwhileemployedbyagovernmentowned corporationbutdiscoveredafteritwasprivatized. The2010caseofLuzvimindaAngv.PhilippineNationalBank,[G.R.No.178762,June16,2010],presentsthe unique issue of which agency has jurisdiction over petitioneremployees illegal dismissal case since she was dismissed based on offenses which she committed during her employment in respondent PNB while it was still a government ownedcorporationbutwhichwerediscoveredwhenshewasrehiredafterrespondentPNBwasprivatized.Atthetime she committed the offenses, the jurisdiction thereover was with the Civil Service Commission (CSC) since respondent bankwasagovernmentownedcorporation,butatthetimetheoffenseswerediscovered,respondentbankhasalready beenprivatizedand,therefore,thejurisdictionovertheissueoflegalityorillegalityofherdismissalbelongstotheLabor ArbiterundertheLaborCode.
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UniversityofLifeFoundationv.BureauofLaborRelations,[G.R.No.85050,April12,1989].TheUniversityof LifeFoundationisagovernmentownedandcontrolledcorporationwithoutanoriginalcharter,ithavingbeenorganized
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TradeUnionsofthePhilippinesandAlliedServicesv.NationalHousingCorporation,[G.R.No.49677,May4, 1989, 173 SCRA 33]. Employees of the National Housing Corporation (NHC) which was organized in 1959 under ExecutiveOrderNo.399,otherwiseknownastheUniformCharterofGovernmentCorporations(January1,1951),are coveredbytheLaborCode,NHCbeingagovernmentownedand/orcontrolledcorporationwithoutanoriginalcharter. Thereis,therefore,noimpedimenttotheholdingofacertificationelectionamongtheworkersofNHC.(SeealsoJucov. NLRC,G.R.No.98107,Aug.18,1997,277SCRA528).
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Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 80767, April 22, 1991]. Complaints for illegal dismissal and unfairlaborpracticelodgedbyemployeesagainsttheiremployer,BoyScoutsofthePhilippines(BSP)whichwascreated under Commonwealth Act No. 111 for the educational, civic and social development of the youth, fall outside of the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. BSP is both a governmentcontrolled corporation with an original charter and an instrumentality of the government, despite the fact that its funds are derived principally from membership dues and propertyrentals.
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BLISS Development Corporation Employees Union (BDCEU) FDTU Sentro ng Demokratikong Manggagawa (SDM)v.Hon.PuraFerrerCalleja,[G.R.No.80887,September30,1994].TheBlissDevelopmentCorporation(BDC)is a governmentowned or controlled corporation without an original charter. Hence, the unions or labor organizations therein existing are not covered by Executive Order No. 180 (Providing Guidelines for the Exercise of the Right to Organize of Government Employees, Creating a Public Sector LaborManagement Council, and for Other Purposes) which became effective on June 01, 2007. They are not required to register under Section 7 of said law as a pre conditionforfilingapetitionforcertificationelection.
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Camporedondo v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 129049, August 6, 1999]. The Supreme Court ruled that the Philippine NationalRedCross(PNRC)isagovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationwithitsowncharter.
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Duty Free Philippines v. Mojica, [G.R. No. 166365, September 30, 2005] Petitioner DFP was created under Executive Order No. 46 on September 4, 1986 primarily to augment the service facilities for tourists and to generate foreignexchangeandrevenue forthegovernment.In orderforthegovernmentto exercise directandeffectivecontrol and regulation over the tax and duty free shops, their establishment and operation were vested in the Ministry (now Department)ofTourism(DOT),throughitsimplementingarm,thePhilippineTourismAuthority(PTA).Allthenetprofits from the merchandising operations of the shops accrued to the DOT. Accordingly, since DFP is under the exclusive authority of the PTA, it follows that its officials and employees are likewise subject to the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.
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Postigo v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc.,[G.R. No. 155146, January 24, 2006]. The respondent was incorporated on March 11, 1960 as a nonprofit, benevolent and nonstock corporation under the Corporation Code. Having been created under the general corporation law instead of a special charter, it was held that respondent is a private and not a government corporation. This notwithstanding the fact that its employees are covered by the GSIS. Extant on the records is the respondents admission that although its employees are compulsory members of the GSIS, saidemployeesarenotgovernedbytheCivilServiceLawbutbytheLaborCode.
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CasinoLaborAssociationv.CA.[G.R.No.141020,June12,2008].Inresolvingtheissueofwhetherornotthe NLRC has jurisdiction over the employeremployee relationship in Philippine Amusement & Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), Philippine Casino Operators Corporation (PCOC) and Philippine Special Services Corporation (PSSC), the Supreme Court made the definitive ruling that the respondent corporations were created by an original charter. Consequently, they fall under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission and not the Department of Labor and Employment.
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Lumanta v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 82819, February 8, 1989]. Food Terminal, Inc. (FTI) is a governmentowned and controlledcorporationwithoutoriginalcharter,hence,itistheDepartmentofLaborandEmployment,andnottheCivil Service Commission, which has jurisdiction over the dispute arising from the employment of the petitioners and that, consequently,thetermsandconditionsofsuchemploymentaregovernedbytheLaborCodeandnotbytheCivilService Law,rulesandregulations.
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See Lasco, infra; International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, G.R. No. 85750, Sept. 28, 1990, 190 SCRA 130.
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DepartmentofForeignAffairsv.NLRC,[G.R.No.113191,September18,1996,262SCRA39,4344]. This case involves an illegal dismissal case filed against the Asian Development Bank (ADB), it was ruled that saidentityenjoysimmunityfromlegalprocessofeveryformand,therefore,thesuitagainstitcannotprosper.Andthis immunity extends to its officers who also enjoy immunity in respect of all acts performed by them in their official capacity. The Charter and the Headquarters Agreement granting these immunities and privileges to the ADB are treaty covenantsandcommitmentsvoluntarilyassumedbythePhilippinegovernmentwhichmustberespected.
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SoutheastAsianFisheriesDevelopmentCenterv.Acosta,[G.R.Nos.9746870,Sept.2,1993,226SCRA49]. Inthiscase,theSupremeCourt,inupholdingtheprincipleofimmunity,citedwithapprovaltheopinionofthe then Minister of Justice, thus: One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts wouldaffordaconvenientmediumthruwhichthehostgovernmentmayinterfereinitsoperationsoreveninfluenceor control the policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacityofsuchbodytodischargeitsresponsibilitiesimpartiallyonbehalfofitsmemberstates.
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To illustrate ruling case law on this subject, the case of Pakistan International Airlines Corporation v. Ople, [G.R. No. 61594, September 28, 1990], is in point. In this case, two contracts of employment were executed in Manila between Pakistan International Airlines Corporation and two Filipino flight attendants. Paragraph 10 of the contracts embodiesthestipulation,amongothers,thatthetermsthereofshallbeconstruedandgovernedbythelawsofPakistan and only the courts of Karachi, Pakistan shall have jurisdiction to consider any matter arising out of or under the agreement. Prior to the expiration of the contracts, the services of the two Filipino flight attendants were terminated. Theyjointlyfiledacomplaintforillegaldismissal.Oneoftheissuesraisediswhichlawshouldapplyandwhichcourthas jurisdictionoverthedispute. The Supreme Court, in holding that the Philippine law should apply and that the Philippine court has jurisdiction,declaredthatpetitionerPIAcannottakerefugeinparagraph10ofitsemploymentagreementwhich,firstly, specifiesthelawofPakistanastheapplicablelawoftheagreementand,secondly,laysthevenueforsettlementofany dispute arising out of or in connection with the agreement only [in] courts of Karachi, Pakistan. The first clause of paragraph10cannotbeinvokedtopreventtheapplicationofPhilippinelaborlawsandregulationstothesubjectmatter ofthiscase,i.e.,theemployeremployeerelationshipbetweenpetitionerPIAandprivaterespondents.Therelationship is much affected with public interest and that the otherwise applicable Philippine laws and regulations cannot be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing upon some other law to govern their relationship. Neither may petitioner invokethesecondclauseofparagraph10,specifyingtheKarachicourtsasthesolevenueforthesettlementofdisputes betweenthecontractingparties.Evenacursoryscrutinyoftherelevantcircumstancesofthiscasewillshowthemultiple andsubstantivecontactsbetweenlawandPhilippinecourts,ontheonehand,andtherelationshipbetweentheparties, upon the other. The contract was not only executed in the Philippines, it was also performed here, at least partially. PrivaterespondentsarePhilippinecitizensandresidents,whilepetitioner,althoughaforeigncorporation,islicensedto do business (and is actually doing business in the Philippines) and hence, is a resident in the Philippines. Lastly, private respondentswerebasedinthePhilippinesinbetweentheirassignedflightstotheMiddleEastandEurope.Alltheabove contracts point to the Philippine courts and administrative agencies as the proper forum for the resolution of the contractual disputes between the parties. Under these circumstances, paragraph 10 of the employment agreement cannot be given effect so as to oust Philippine agencies and courts of the jurisdiction vested upon them by Philippine law. Finally, and in any event, the petitioner PIA did not undertake to plead and prove the contents of Pakistan law on the matter. It must, therefore, be presumed that the applicable provisions of the law of Pakistan are the same as the applicableprovisionsofPhilippinelaw.
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under the Corporation Code. Thus, when the Bureau of Labor Relations assumed jurisdiction over the petition for certification election filed by the union, it acted in accordance with applicable law and latest jurisprudence on the matter.
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b.Exceptiontotherule. InUnited States v. Hon. Rodrigo,[G.R. No.79470,February 26,1990,182SCRA 644,660], where it washeld thatwhenthefunctionoftheforeignentityotherwiseimmunefromsuitpartakesofthenatureofaproprietaryactivity, such as the restaurant services offered at John Hay Air Station undertaken by the United States Government as a commercial activity for profit and not in its governmental capacity, the case for illegal dismissal filed by a Filipino cook working therein is well within the jurisdiction of Philippine courts. The reason is that by entering into the employment contract with the cook in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity fromsuit.
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Lasco v. United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration [UNRFNRE], [G.R. Nos. 109095 109107,February23,1995]. This involves an illegal dismissal case filed against the respondent which is a specialized agency of the United Nations, the said immunity rule was asserted and reiterated by the Supreme Court. In dismissing the case, the High CourtsaidthatbeingamemberoftheUnitedNationsandapartytotheConventiononthePrivilegesandImmunitiesof theSpecializedAgenciesoftheUnitedNations,thePhilippinegovernmentadherestothedoctrineofimmunitygranted totheUnitedNationsanditsspecializedagencies.Bothtreatieshavetheforceandeffectoflaw.
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Ebro III v. NLRC, G.R. No. 110187, Sept. 4, 1996, 261 SCRA 399. Bank of America, NT&SA, Bank of America International, Ltd. v. CA, [448 Phil. 181, 196 (2003)] and Communication Materials and Design, Inc. v. CA, [G.R. No. 102223, Aug. 22, 1996, 260 SCRA 673, 695],
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TheManilaHotelCorp.andManilaHotelInternationalLimitedv.NLRC,[G.R.No.120077,October13,2000]. Thisprinciplewasappliedinthiscase.PrivaterespondentMarceloSantoswasanoverseasworkeremployedas a printer in a printing press in the Sultanate of Oman when he was directly hired by the Palace Hotel, Beijing, Peoples Republic of China to work in its print shop. Later, he was terminated due to retrenchment occasioned by business reverses brought about by the political upheaval in China (referring to the Tiananmen Square incident) which severely affectedthehotelsoperations.Whenthecasewasfiledin1990,petitionerManilaHotelCorporation(MHC)wasstilla governmentowned and controlled corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines; while petitioner Manila HotelInternational Company, Limited(MHICL)was acorporationdulyorganized andexistingunder thelawsofHongKong.MHCisanincorporatorofMHICL,owning50%ofitscapitalstock.Byvirtueofamanagement agreementwiththePalaceHotel(WangFuCompanyLimited),MHICLtrainedthepersonnelandstaffofthesaidhotel inBeijing,China. In holding that the NLRC was a seriously inconvenient forum, the Supreme Court noted that the main aspects of the case transpired in two foreign jurisdictions and the case involves purely foreign elements. The only link that the Philippines has with the case is that the private respondent employee (Marcelo Santos) is a Filipino citizen. The Palace Hotel and MHICL are foreign corporations. Consequently, not all cases involving Filipino citizens can be tried here. Respondent employee washired directlybythe Beijing PalaceHotel, aforeign employer, throughcorrespondencesent to him while he was working at the Sultanate of Oman. He was hired without the intervention of the POEA or any authorizedrecruitmentagencyofthegovernment.Hence,theNLRCisaninconvenientforumgiventhatalltheincidents of the case from the time of recruitment, to employment to dismissal occurred outside the Philippines. The inconvenience is compoundedby thefact that the properdefendants, the Palace Hotel andMHICLarenotnationals of the Philippines. Neither are they doingbusiness in the Philippines.Likewise,the main witnesses,Mr. Shmidt(General ManagerofthePalaceHotel)andMr.Henk(PalaceHotelsManager)arenonresidentsofthePhilippines. Neither can an intelligent decision be made as to the law governing the employment contract as such was perfected in foreign soil. This calls to fore the application of the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract was made). It must be noted that the employment contract was not perfected in the Philippines. PrivaterespondentemployeesignifiedhisacceptancethereofbywritingaletterwhilehewasintheSultanateofOman. This letter was sent to the Palace Hotel in the Peoples Republic of China. Neither can the NLRC determine the facts
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PacificConsultantsInternationalAsia,Inc.v.Schonfeld,[G.R.No.166920,February19,2007]. Petitioners insisted on the application of this principle since the respondent is a Canadian citizen and was a repatriate. In rejecting petitioners contention, the Supreme Court cited the following reasons that do not warrant the applicationofthesaidprinciple: 1. TheLaborCodedoesnotincludeforumnonconveniensasagroundforthedismissalofthecomplaint. 2. Theproprietyofdismissingacasebasedonthisprinciplerequiresafactualdetermination;hence,itisproperly consideredasadefense.
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a.Rationalebehindthedoctrine. Under the international law principle of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court or agency may assume jurisdictionoverthecaseifitchoosestodosoprovidedthefollowingrequisitesconcur: (1) ThatthePhilippinecourtisonetowhichthepartiesmayconvenientlyresort; (2) ThatthePhilippinecourtisinapositiontomakeanintelligentdecisionastothelawandthefacts;and (3) ThatthePhilippinecourthasorislikelytohavepowertoenforceitsdecision.36
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Austria v. Hon. NLRC and Cebu City Central Philippines Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventist,[G.R.No.124382,August16,1999] the minister was not excommunicated or expelled from the membership of the church but was terminated from employment based on the grounds cited in Article 282 of the Labor Code. Indeed, the matter of terminating an employee which is purely secular in nature is different from the ecclesiastical act of expelling a member from the
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a.CasesoverwhichLaborArbitersandNLRChavejurisdiction. Thefactthatacaseinvolvesaspartiestheretothechurchanditsreligiousministerdoesnotipsofactogivethe caseareligioussignificance.Simplystated,whatisinvolvedinalaborcase,sayforillegaldismissal,istherelationshipof the church, as an employer, and the minister, as an employee a purely secular matter not related to the practice of faith,worshipordoctrinesofthechurch.Hence,LaborArbitersmayvalidlyexercisejurisdictionoversaidlaborcase.
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8.6. JURISDICTIONOVERLABORCASESINVOLVINGPRIESTSANDMINISTERS.
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Simv.NLRC,[G.R.No.157376,October2,2007] Citing the said ruling in PNB v. Cabansag, the High Court noted a palpable error in the Labor Arbiters disposition of the case, which was affirmed by the NLRC, with regard to the issue on jurisdiction. It held that it was wrongfortheLaborArbitertodismissthecaseforlackofjurisdictionunderitsholdingthatlaborrelationssysteminthe Philippineshasnoextraterritorialjurisdiction;thatitislimitedtotherelationshipbetweenlaborandcapitalwithinthe Philippines;andthatsincecomplainantwashiredandassignedinaforeignland,althoughbyaPhilippinecorporation, it follows that the law that governs their relationship is the law of the place where the employment was executed and herplaceofworkorassignment. The petitioner here is Corazon Sim who was initially employed byEquitable PCIBank (respondent) in 1990 as Italian Remittance Marketing Consultant to its Frankfurt Representative Office. Eventually, she was promoted to the position of Manager until September 1999, when she received a letter from Remegio David the Senior Officer, EuropeanHeadofPCIBank,andManagingDirectorofPCIBEuropeinformingherthatshewasbeingdismisseddueto lossoftrustandconfidencebasedonallegedmismanagementandmisappropriationoffunds.AccordingtotheSupreme Court, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction not only on the basis of Article 217 of the Labor Code but under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as well as Section 62 of the OmnibusRulesandRegulationsImplementingR.A.No.8042.Undertheseprovisions,itisclearthatLaborArbitershave original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising from employeremployee relations, including termination disputes involvingallworkers,amongwhomareoverseasFilipinoworkers.(Id.).
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PhilippineNationalBankv.Cabansag,[G.R.No.157010,June21,2005] RespondentwashiredbytheSingaporebranchofpetitionerbankwhileshewasatouristinSingaporein1998. PetitionerisaprivatebankingcorporationorganizedandexistingunderthelawsofthePhilippines,withprincipaloffices atthePNBFinancialCenter,RoxasBoulevard,Manila.Atthattime,theBranchOfficehastwo(2)typesofemployees:(a) expatriates or the regular employees hired in Manila and assigned abroad including Singapore; and (b) locally (directly) hired. She applied for and was hired as Branch Credit Officer. After her 3month probationary period, she was terminated. Subsequently, she fileda complaintbeforethe LaborArbiter. On appeal to theSupreme Court,one of the issuespresentedwaswhetherornottheLaborArbiterhasjurisdictionovertheinstantcontroversy.TheSupremeCourt, inansweringthisissueintheaffirmative,ruledthattheLaborArbiterhasjurisdictionbecausetheissuehereinvolvesthe termination of an overseas Filipino worker (OFW). While she may have been directly hired in Singapore by petitioner, however,respondentlikewiseappliedforandsecuredanOverseasEmploymentCertificatefromthePOEAthroughthe Philippine Embassy in Singapore. The Certificate declared her a bonafide contract worker in Singapore. Thus, even assumingarguendothatshewasconsideredatthestartofheremploymentasadirecthiregovernedbyandsubjectto the laws, common practices and customs prevailing in Singapore, she subsequently became a contract worker or an OFWwhowascoveredbyPhilippinelaborlawsandpoliciesuponcertificationbythePOEA.Atthetimeheremployment wasillegallyterminated,shealreadypossessedthePOEAEmploymentCertificate.Moreover,petitioneradmitsthatitis aPhilippinecorporationdoingbusinessthroughabranchofficeinSingapore.Significantly,respondentsemploymentby itsSingaporebranchofficehadtobeapprovedbythepresidentofthebankwhoseprincipalofficeswereinManila.This circumstancemilitatesagainstpetitionerscontentionthatrespondentwaslocallyhired;andtotallygovernedbyand subject to the laws, common practices and customs of Singapore, not of the Philippines. Instead, with more reason doesthisfactreinforcethepresumptionthatrespondentfallsunderthelegaldefinitionofmigrantworker,inthiscase, onedeployedinSingapore.Hence,petitionercannotescapetheapplicationofPhilippinelawsorthejurisdictionofthe NLRCandtheLaborArbiter.
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surrounding the alleged illegal dismissal as all acts complained of took place in Beijing, Peoples Republic of China. The NLRCwasnotinapositiontodeterminewhethertheTiananmenSquareincidenttrulyadverselyaffectedoperationsof thePalaceHotelastojustifyrespondentemployeesretrenchment. Even assuming that a proper decision could be reached by the NLRC, such would not have any binding effect against the employer, the Palace Hotel, which is a corporation incorporated under the laws of China and was not even served with summons. Jurisdiction over its person was not acquired. This is not to say that Philippine courts and agencies have no power to solve controversies involving foreign employers. Neither could it be said that the Supreme Court does not have power over an employment contract executed in a foreign country. If the respondent employee were an overseas contract worker, a Philippine forum, specifically the POEA, not the NLRC, would protect him. He is notanoverseascontractworkerafactwhichheadmitswithconviction.
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b.Ecclesiasticalaffair,meaning. Anecclesiasticalaffairinvolvestherelationshipbetweenthechurchanditsmembersandrelatestomattersof faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of the congregation. To be concrete, examples of these socalled ecclesiastical affairs to which the State cannot meddle, are proceedings for excommunication, ordination of religious ministers,administrationofsacramentsandotheractivitieswithattachedreligioussignificance.
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a.JurisdictionislodgedwithRTC. ThejurisdictionoverpetitionforsuspensionofpaymentislodgedwiththeRegionalTrialCourt.37 Although the jurisdiction of the SEC over rehabilitation and suspension of payments cases was transferred to theRegionalTrialCourtspursuantto
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religious congregation. As such, the State, through the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, has the right to take cognizance of thecasetodeterminewhetherthechurch,asemployer,rightfullyexerciseditsmanagementprerogativetodismissthe religiousministerasitsemployee.
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8.8.JURISDICTIONOVERCASESOFOVERSEASFILIPINOWORKERS(OFWs).
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Section 5.2, R.A. No. 8799, [August 8, 2000]; Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Philippine Airlines Employees Association [PALEA], G.R. No. 142399, June 19, 2007, Footnote 23. De Castro v. Liberty Broadcasting Network, Inc., G.R. No. 165153, Aug 25, 2010; Negros Navigation Co., Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 163156, Dec. 10, 2008, 573 SCRA 434, 455. Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Heirs of Zamora, G.R. No. 164267, Nov. 23, 2007. 40 Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 123238, July 11, 2005 [Resolution]. 41 Alemars Sibal & Sons, Inc. v. NLRC, [G. R. No. 114761, January 19, 2000]. 42 Lingkod Manggagawa sa Rubberworld, Adidas-Anglo v. Rubberworld [Phils.], Inc., [G.R. No. 153882, January 29, 2007] . 43 Section 11, in relation to Section 27, Rule 4 of the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation. 44 See also BF Homes, Inc. v. CA, 190 SCRA 262, 269, Oct. 3, 1990; Tiangco v. Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club, Inc. [G.R. No. 168697, December 14, 2009]. 45 Clarion Printing House, Inc. v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 148372, June 27, 2005].
37 38 39
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b. LaborArbitersmayexercisejurisdictionevenabsenttheemploymentrelationshipaswhentheOFWwas notdeployedabroad.
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a.ConfermentofjurisdictionovermoneyclaimsofmigrantworkersunderR.A.No.8042,asamendedby R.A.No.10022. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, as amended, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 (approved on June 7, 1995), conferred original and exclusive jurisdiction upon Labor Arbiters, to hear and decide all claims arising from employeremployee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipinoworkersforoverseasdeployment,includingclaimsforactual,moral,exemplaryandotherformsofdamages.
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f.RemedyistolodgethelaborclaimswiththeRehabilitationReceiver;exception. Becauseofthesuspensionofproceedings,theremedyshouldbefortheemployeewhoclaimedtohavebeen illegallydismissed,tolodgeherclaimbeforethedulyappointedreceiver.45
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Rubberworld(Phils.)Inc.v.NLRC,[G.R.No.126773,April14,1999,365Phil.273] Thesuspensionofallactionsforclaimsagainstpetitionerdoesnotexpireafterthree(3)months.Thelawdoes notprovideforthedurationoftheautomaticstay.Hence,thesuspensiveeffectthereofhasnotimelimitandremainsin forceaslongasreasonablynecessarytoaccomplishthepurposeoftheorder.44
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d.Executionoffinaldecisionsduringtheperiodofrehabilitationandsuspension,nullandvoid. The proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the order and writ subsequently issued by the NLRC during the periodofrehabilitationreceivershipareallnullandvoid.42
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c. Thesuspensionembracesallclaimsandallphasesofthesuit,includingexecution. Thesuspensionofallactionscovers: 1. all claims against the corporation which is undergoing rehabilitation receivership, whether for damages foundedonabreachofcontractofcarriage,laborcases,collectionsuitsoranyotherclaimsofapecuniary nature.Noexceptioninfavoroflaborclaimsismentionedinthelaw.39 2. all phases of the suit, be it before the trial court or any tribunal or before the Supreme Court. No other action may be taken, including the rendition of judgment during the state of suspension. It must be stressed that what are automatically stayed or suspended are the proceedings of a suit and not just the payment of claims during the execution stage after the case has become final and executory. Once the process of rehabilitation, however, is completed, the Court should proceed to complete the proceedings onthesuspendedactions.40 3. execution of decisions that are already final and executory may be stayed if the corporation has been placedunderrehabilitationreceivership.41
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b.Receivershiporliquidationofbusiness,effectonjurisdiction. A stay order issued consequent to the approval of a rehabilitation receivership simplysuspends all actions for claims against a corporation undergoing rehabilitation; it does not work to oust a court of its jurisdiction over a case properlyfiledbeforeit.ThependencyoftherehabilitationproceedingsdoesnotaffecttheCourtsjurisdictiontoresolve thecase,butmerelysuspendstheexecutionofitsdecision.38
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a.JurisdictionincasesunderArticle128oftheLaborCodeisvestedwithDOLERegionalDirectors. Irrespectiveoftheamountoftheviolationorclaimunearthedinthecourseofinspection,whethertheamount thereof isbelow or above P5,000.00,the exercise bytheDOLESecretary ofhis visitorialand enforcementpowerunder Article 128 [b] is not lost or affected thereby. Hence, the DOLE Regional Directors, being the duly authorized representativesoftheDOLESecretary,hasjurisdictionoverlaborstandardsviolations.
8.11.JURISDICTIONOVERCLAIMSOFDOMESTICORHOUSEHELPERS.
8.12.JURISDICTIONOVERENFORCEMENTOFCOMPROMISEAGREEMENTS.
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Section 1, NLRC en banc Resolution No. 1-95, Series of 1995. Philsa International Placement and Services Corporation v. Hon. Secretary of Labor and Employment, [G.R. No. 103144, April 4, 2001]. Article 124, Labor Code, as amended by Section 3, Republic Act No. 6727; Section 7, Chapter II, Implementing Rules of Republic Act No. 6727; Section 1, Rule VII, Rules of Procedure on Minimum Wage Fixing issued by the National Wages and Productivity Commission on 04 June 1990. 49 Id. 50 Section 6 [c], Rule V, NCMB Manual of Procedures for Conciliation and Preventive Mediation Cases.
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TheLaborArbiter retains jurisdiction overclaims that may be filedbydomesticorhousehelpersamounting to more than P5,000.00., despite the deletion of the phrase cases involving household services in paragraph 4 of Article 217effectedbyRepublicActNo.6715.
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b.Noforumshoppingifemployees,duringthependencyofthecaseunderArticle128,aredismissedand subsequentlyfiledanillegaldismissalcasewiththeLaborArbiter. InConsolidatedBroadcastingSystem,Inc.v.Oberio,[G.R.No.168424,June8,2007],therespondentsatfirst filed an inspection case before the DOLE Regional Director. While the case was pending, respondents were dismissed and consequently filed an illegal dismissal case with the Labor Arbiter. It was held that such filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal does not constitute forumshopping. In cases where the complaint for violation of labor standard laws precededtheterminationoftheemployeeandthefilingoftheillegaldismissalcase,itwouldnotbeinconsonancewith justice to charge the dismissed employees with engaging in forumshopping when the remedy available to them at the timetheircausesofactionarosewastofileseparatecasesbeforedifferentfora.
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c.Wagedistortiondisputesmadesubjectofnoticeofstrikeorlockout. Since wage distortion is not a proper ground to stage a strike or lockout, it should be referred to the Labor Arbiterforadjudication.50
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b.Inunorganizedestablishments. InestablishmentswheretherearenocertifiedcollectivebargainingunionsorexistingCBAs,theLaborArbiters havejurisdictionisvestedwithLaborArbiters.49
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c.Monetaryornonmonetaryclaims;jurisdiction. AllmonetaryclaimscasesthatmaybefiledbyanOFWfallsundertheoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionofthe Labor Arbiter. This includes claims for disability or death benefits. However, causes of action which do not refer to monetaryclaimsunderSection10ofR.A.No.8042arerequiredtobedismissedorreferredbytheLaborArbiterstothe appropriateagency.46 For example, violations of recruitment regulations certainly do not fall under the concept of monetary claims.ThejurisdictionthereoverbelongstothePOEA.47
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The case of Santiago v. CF Sharp Crew Management, Inc., [G.R. No.162419, July 10, 2007], enunciated that despite the absence of an employeremployee relationship between petitioner and respondent, the NLRC has jurisdiction over petitioners complaint. The petitioner here was not deployed overseas after signing the contract for overseas employment. The jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters is not limited to claims arising from employeremployee relationships.BasedonSection10ofR.A.No.8042,LaborArbitershavejurisdictionnotonlyovermoneyclaimsarising out of an employeremployee relationship but also by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseasdeploymentincludingclaimsforactual,moral,exemplaryandotherformsofdamagexxx. Considering that petitioner was not able to depart from the airport or seaport in the point of hire, the employment contract didnot commence to be effective and no employeremployee relationship was createdbetween the parties. However, a distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment contract and the commencement of the employeremployee relationship.The perfectionofthe contract, which in this case coincided with the date of execution thereof, occurred when petitioner and respondent agreed on the object and the cause, as well as the rest of the terms and conditions set forth therein.The commencement of the employeremployee relationshipwouldhavetakenplacehadpetitionerbeenactuallydeployedfromthepointofhire.Thus,evenbeforethe start of any employeremployee relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment contract was thebirthofcertainrightsandobligations,thebreachofwhichmaygiverisetoacauseofactionagainsttheerringparty. Thus,ifthereversehadhappened,thatis,theseafarerfailedorrefusedtobedeployedasagreedupon,hewouldhave beenheldliablefordamages.
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Section 1 (i) of Rule V of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC. Applicable to cooperatives organized under R.A. No. 6938, otherwise known as The Cooperative Code of the Philippines.
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PerpetualHelpCreditCooperative,Inc.v.Faburada,[G.R.No.121948,October8,2001] PetitionerinthiscasecontendsthattheLaborArbiterhasnojurisdictiontotakecognizanceofthecomplaintof private respondents (who are not members but employees of the cooperative) considering that they failed to submit their dispute to the grievance machinery. The Supreme Court, however, ruled that the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction. Thereisnoevidencethatprivaterespondentsaremembersofpetitionercooperativeandeveniftheyare,thedisputeis aboutpaymentofwages,overtimepay,restdayandterminationofemployment.UnderArticle217oftheLaborCode, thesedisputesarewithintheoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionoftheLaborArbiters. SanMiguelCorp.v.Semillano,[G.R.No.164257,July5,2010] Petitioner asserted that the present case is outside the jurisdiction of the labor tribunals because respondent Vicente Semillano is a member of the Alilgilan MultiPurpose Coop (AMPCO), not an employee of petitioner SMC.Petitionerisofthepositionthattheinstantdisputeisintracooperativeinnaturefallingwithinthejurisdictionof theArbitrationCommitteeoftheCooperativeDevelopmentAuthority.AMPCOwascontractedbypetitionertosupplyit with workers to perform the task of segregating bottles, removing dirt therefrom, filing them in designated places, loading and unloading the bottles to and from the delivery trucks, and to perform other tasks as may be ordered by SMCs officers. Semillano, together with the other respondents, filed the complaint for regularization with petitioner SMC,contendingthatAMPCOwasamerelaboronlycontractor.TheHighCourtdeclaredinthiscasethatAMPCOwasa laboronly contractor and consequently pronounced that all the respondents, including Semillano, were regular employeesofpetitioner.Onthisissueofjurisdiction,theHighCourtruledthattheLaborArbiterhasjurisdictionbecause precisely,SemillanohasjoinedtheothersinfilingthiscomplaintbecauseitishispositionthatpetitionerSMCishistrue employerandliableforallhisclaimsundertheLaborCode. 8.15.JURISDICTIONOVERCASESINVOLVINGLOCALWATERDISTRICTS.
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b.Failuretoobservegrievanceprocedure;effect. InCentralPangasinanElectricCooperative,Inc.v.Macaraeg,[G.R.No.145800,January22,2003],theparties voluntarily agree to submit the issue of illegal dismissal for voluntary arbitration without passing through the grievance machinery.However,beforetheSupremeCourt,thiswasraisedasanissue.TheSupremeCourtruled:Attheoutset, we hold that the first issue raised in the petition pertaining to the alleged violation of the CBA grievance procedure is mootandacademic.Thepartiesactiveparticipationinthevoluntaryarbitrationproceedings,andtheirfailuretoinsist that the case be remanded to the grievance machinery, shows a clear intention on their part to have the issue of respondentsillegaldismissaldirectlyresolvedbytheVoluntaryArbitrator.We,therefore,finditunnecessarytoruleon the matter in light of their preference to bring the illegal dismissal dispute to voluntary arbitration without passing throughthegrievancemachinery.
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a. OriginalandexclusivejurisdictionofGrievanceMachineryorVoluntaryArbitrators. AlthoughtheLaborArbitershaveoriginalandexclusivejurisdictiontohearanddecidetheenumeratedcasesin Article 217, one should not lose sight of the fact that under the amendatory provisions of R.A. No. 6715, the grievance machinery,underArticle260,hasoriginalandexclusivejurisdictiontoadjustandresolvethefollowinggrievances: 1. thosearisingfromtheinterpretationorimplementationoftheCBA;and 2. thosearisingfromtheinterpretationorenforcementofcompanypersonnelpolicies. If the same are not settled within seven (7) calendar days from the date of their submission, they shall automatically be referred to a Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators who, under Article 261, have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all such unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementationoftheCBAandthosearisingfromtheinterpretationorenforcementofcompanypersonnelpolicies. This explains the last paragraph of Article 217 which provides that (c)ases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of companypersonnelpolicies shallbe disposedofbytheLabor Arbiterby referring the sametothegrievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said agreements. By so providing, Article 217 acknowledges in no uncertain terms the jurisdiction of the grievance machinery under Article 260 and that of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panelofVoluntaryArbitratorsunderArticle261overtheseissues.
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Labor Arbiters have jurisdiction over the enforcement of compromise agreements when there is non compliancebyanyofthepartiestheretopursuanttoArticle227oftheLaborCode.51
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LaborArbitershavenojurisdictionoverquasidelictortortcases.
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Baezv.Valdevilla,[G.R.No.128024,May9,2000,331SCRA584] ThejurisdictionofLaborArbitersandtheNLRCunderArticle217iscomprehensiveenoughtoincludeclaimsfor allformsofdamagesarisingfromtheemployeremployeerelations.Bythisclause,Article217shouldapplywithequal forcetotheclaimofanemployerforactualdamagesagainstitsdismissedemployee,wherethebasisfortheclaimarises from or is necessarily connected with the fact of termination, and should be entered as a counterclaim in the illegal dismissalcase.Thisisinaccordwithparagraph6ofArticle217[a],whichcoversallotherclaims,arisingfromemployer employeerelations. Domondonv.NLRC,[G.R.No.154376,September30,2005,471SCRA559] The private respondentemployer was allowed to assert its counterclaim for damages against petitioner employee in the same case before the Labor Arbiter because it appears that the same arose out of the parties employeremployee relations. It was declared therein that the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to take cognizance of said counterclaim.
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ByexpressprovisionofArticle241oftheLaborCode,bothcriminalandcivilliabilitiesarisingfromviolationsof therightsandconditionsofmembershipinalabororganizationenumeratedinsaidArticleshallcontinuetobeunder thejurisdictionofordinarycourts.53 This provision should be distinguished from Article 247 of the Labor Code which vests jurisdiction upon the Labor Arbiters over the civil aspect of unfair labor practice cases, including damages, attorneys fees and other affirmativereliefs.54
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InHagonoyWaterDistrictv.NLRC,[G.R.No.81490,August31,1988],itwasdeclaredthatlocalwaterdistricts are quasipublic corporations and, therefore, the dismissal of their employees are governed by the civil service laws, rulesandregulations. However,althoughtheLaborArbiterhasnojurisdiction,theSupremeCourt,inZamboangaCityWaterDistrict v. Buat, [G.R. No. 104389, May 27, 1994], did not allow petitioner to belatedly raise the issue of jurisdiction before it, considering that it never raised said issue before the Executive Labor Arbiter, the NLRC or even before the Supreme Courtinanotherrelatedcase.Infact,itwaspetitioneritselfwhichfiledthecomplaintbeforetheExecutiveLaborArbiter and sought affirmative relief therefrom and participated actively in the proceedings therein. Although jurisdiction over strikes and dismissals of employees in local water districts is lodged not with the NLRC but with the Civil Service Commission,here,thepetitionerisalreadyestoppedfromassailingthejurisdictionoftheNLRCandis,therefore,bound torespectalltheproceedingstherein.
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8.19.JURISDICTIONOVERCONSTITUTIONALITYOFCBAPROVISIONS. Halagueav.PhilippineAirlines,Inc.,[G.R.No.172013,October2,2009] The Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction to decide the constitutionality of a CBA provision. It is the Regional Trial Courtwhichispossessedofthatjurisdiction. PetitionerswereemployedasfemaleflightattendantsofrespondentPhilippineAirlines(PAL)ondifferentdates prior to November 22, 1996. They are members of the Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines
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PhilippineRuralReconstructionMovement[PRRM]v.Pulgar,[G.R.No.169227,July5,2010] AmonetaryclaimoftheemployerwhichhasnotbeenassertedbeforetheLaborArbiter,cannotbebelatedly raised.Therecordsinthiscaseindicatesthatrespondentemployee(Pulgar),amanagerofpetitioner(PRRM),hasnotyet returnedthemoneyhetookfromthePRRMsbranchofficetheTayabasBayFieldOffice(TBFO)inQuezonProvince whichhedepositedinhisname.UnfortunatelyforPRRM,itneverraisedasanissuethemoneyallegedlystillinPulgars custodyintheproceedingsbeforetheLaborArbiter,orevenbeforetheNLRC.Theruleiswellsettledthatpointsoflaw, theories,issuesandargumentsnotadequatelybroughttotheattentionofthetrialcourtneednotbe,andordinarilywill not be considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal because this would be offensivetothebasicrulesoffairplay,justiceanddueprocess.
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InaletterdatedJuly22,2003,petitionersandseveralfemalecabincrewsmanifestedthattheaforementioned CBA provision on compulsory retirement is discriminatory, and demanded for an equal treatment with their male counterparts. This demand was reiterated in a letter by petitioners' counsel addressed to respondent demanding the removalofgenderdiscriminationprovisionsinthecomingrenegotiationsofthePALFASAPCBA. On July 29, 2004, petitioners filed a Special Civil Action for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 147, docketed as Civil Case No. 04886, against respondent for the invalidity of Section 144, Part A of the PAL FASAPCBA. In ruling that the RTC has jurisdiction, the Supreme Court observed that from the petitioners' allegations and relief prayed for in its petition, it is clear that the issue raised is whether Section 144, Part A of the PALFASAP CBA is unlawful and unconstitutional. Here, the petitioners' primary relief in Civil Case No. 04886 is the annulment of Section 144, Part A of the PALFASAP CBA, which allegedly discriminates against them for being female flight attendants.The subjectoflitigationisincapableofpecuniaryestimation,exclusivelycognizablebytheRTC,pursuanttoSection19(1)of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. Being an ordinary civil action, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of labor tribunals. The said issue cannot be resolved solely by applying the Labor Code. Rather, it requires the application of the Constitution, labor statutes, law on contracts and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the power to apply and interpret the constitution and CEDAW is within the jurisdiction of trial courts,acourtofgeneraljurisdiction. In Georg Grotjahn GMBH & Co. v. Isnani, [G.R. No. 109272, August 10, 1994, 235 SCRA 216, 221], the Court heldthatnoteverydisputebetweenanemployerandemployeeinvolvesmattersthatonlyLaborArbitersandtheNLRC canresolveintheexerciseoftheiradjudicatoryorquasijudicialpowers.ThejurisdictionofLaborArbitersandtheNLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to disputes arising from an employeremployee relationship which can onlyberesolvedbyreferencetotheLaborCode,otherlaborstatutes,ortheircollectivebargainingagreement. Not every controversy or money claim by an employee against the employer or viceversa is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. Actions between employees and employer where the employeremployee relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action precedes from a different source of obligation is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular court. Here, the employeremployee relationship between the parties is merely incidental and the cause of action ultimately arose from different sources of obligation, i.e., the Constitution and CEDAW. Thus, where the principal relief sought is to be resolved not by reference to the Labor Code or other labor relations statute or a collective bargaining agreement but by the general civil law, the jurisdiction over the dispute belongs to the regular courts of justice and not to the labor arbiter and the NLRC. In such situations, resolution of the disputerequiresexpertise,notinlabormanagementrelationsnorinwagestructuresandothertermsandconditionsof employment, but rather in the application of the general civil law. Clearly, such claims fall outside the area of competence or expertise ordinarily ascribed to labor arbiters and the NLRC and the rationale for granting jurisdiction oversuchclaimstotheseagenciesdisappears. Iftheregularcourtsaredivestedofjurisdictionoverthecase,thenwhichtribunalorforumshalldeterminethe constitutionalityorlegalityoftheassailedCBAprovision? The Court holds that the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitrators do not have the power to determine and settle the issues at hand. They have no jurisdiction and competence to decide constitutional issues relative to the questionedcompulsoryretirementage.Theirexerciseofjurisdictionisfutile,asitislikevestingpowertosomeonewho cannotwieldit. Although the CBA provides for a procedure for the adjustment of grievances, such referral to the grievance machineryandthereaftertovoluntaryarbitrationwouldbeinappropriatetothepetitioners,becausetheunionandthe managementhaveunanimouslyagreedtothetermsoftheCBAandtheirinterestisunified.
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(FASAP),alabororganizationcertifiedasthesoleandexclusivebargainingrepresentativeoftheflightattendants,flight stewardsandpursersofrespondent. On July 11, 2001, respondent and FASAP entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement incorporating the terms andconditionsoftheiragreementfortheyears2000to2005,hereinafterreferredtoasPALFASAPCBA. Section144,PartAofthePALFASAPCBA,providesthat: A. For the Cabin Attendants hired before 22 November 1996: xxx 3. Compulsory Retirement Subject to the grooming standards provisions of this Agreement, compulsory retirement shall be fifty-five (55) for females and sixty (60) for males. xxx.
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See also Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation [IBC[ v. Amarilla, [G.R. No. 162775, October 27, 2006, 505 SCRA 687].
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8.21.ISSUANCEBYRTCOFWRITOFHABEASDATAINRELATIONTOALABORCASE. ManilaElectricCompanyv.Lim,[G.R.No.184769,October5,2010] The poser in this case sought to be addressed by the ruling in this case is: May an employee invoke the remediesavailableundersuchwritwhereanemployerdecidestotransferherworkplaceonthebasisofcopiesofan anonymous letter posted therein imputing to her disloyalty to the company and calling for her to leave, which imputationitinvestigatedbutfailstoinformherofthedetailsthereof?ThiswasansweredintheNEGATIVE. Respondent Lim is an administrative clerk at petitioner Meralco. On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was postedatthedooroftheMeteringOfficeoftheAdministrationbuildingofMERALCOPlaridel,BulacanSector,atwhich respondentisassigned,denouncingrespondent.Theletterreads: CherryLim: MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHAMO,LUMAYASKARITO,WALANGUTANGNALOOB. Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen. Informed about it, respondent reportedthematteronJune5,2008tothePlaridelStationofthePhilippineNationalPolice. By reason of this anonymous letter, petitioner directed the transfer of respondent to its Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa. Respondent objected to the transfer, claiming that the punitive nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of due process. She cited as reason the grueling travel from her residence in Pampanga to Alabang and back entails,aswellastheviolationoftheprovisionsonjobsecurityoftheirCollectiveBargainingAgreement(CBA).Shethus requested for the deferment of the implementation of her transfer pending resolution of the issues she raised. Not receiving any response from petitioner, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan where she alleged that petitioners unlawful act and omission consisting of their continued failure and refusal to provide her with details or information about the alleged reportwhichMERALCOpurportedlyreceivedconcerningthreatstohersafetyandsecurityamounttoaviolationofher righttoprivacyinlife,libertyandsecurity,correctiblebyhabeasdata.Respondentthusprayedfortheissuanceofawrit commandingpetitionerstofileawrittenreturncontainingthefollowing: a)a full disclosure of the data or information about respondent in relation to the report purportedly received by petitioners on the alleged threat to her safety and security; the nature ofsuchdataandthepurposeforitscollection; b)themeasurestakenbypetitionerstoensuretheconfidentialityofsuchdataorinformation;and c)thecurrencyandaccuracyofsuchdataorinformationobtained. A TRO was issued by the RTC but petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition and recall of the TRO on thegroundsthat,interalia,resorttoapetitionforwritofhabeasdatawasnotinorder;andtheRTClackedjurisdiction overthecasewhichproperlybelongstotheNLRC. Afterdueproceedings,theRTCissuedadecisiongrantingtheprayersofrespondentincludingtheissuanceofa writ of preliminary injunction directing petitioners to desist from implementing respondents transfer until such time thatpetitionerscomplywiththedisclosuresrequired.Itjustifieditsrulingbydeclaringthat,interalia,recoursetoawrit ofhabeasdatashouldextendnotonlytovictimsofextralegalkillingsandpoliticalactivistsbutalsotoordinarycitizens, like respondent whose rights to life and securityare jeopardized by petitioners refusal toprovide her with information ordataonthereportedthreatstoherperson. Inrulinginfavorofthepetitioners,theSupremeCourtreasoned: Respondents plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCOs Memorandum directing her reassignmenttotheAlabang Sector,under theguiseofaquest for information or data allegedlyinpossessionofpetitioners,doesnotfallwithintheprovinceofawritofhabeasdata. Section1oftheRuleontheWritofHabeasDataprovides: Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatenedbyanunlawfulactoromissionofapublicofficialoremployeeorofa private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrievedparty.(emphasisandunderscoringsupplied) Thehabeasdatarule,ingeneral,isdesignedtoprotectbymeansofjudicialcomplaintthe image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a persons right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age ofinformationtechnology.
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Labor Arbiter and NLRCs conclusions, petitioners claim for illegal deduction falls within the tribunals jurisdiction. It is noteworthy that petitioner demanded the completion of her retirement benefits, including the amount withheld by respondentfortaxationpurposes.Theissueofdeductionfortaxpurposesisintertwinedwiththemainissueofwhether or not petitioners benefits have been fully given her. It is, therefore, a money claim arising from the employer employeerelationship,whichclearlyfallswithinthejurisdictionoftheLaborArbiterandtheNLRC.55
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Article 217 [6], Labor Code. Basaya, Jr. v. Militante, G.R. No. L-75837, Dec. 11, 1987, 156 SCRA 299. Singapore Airlines v. Hon. Ernani Cruz Pano, G.R. No. L-47739, June 22, 1983; 122 SCRA 671. 59 Singapore Airlines v. Hon. Ernani Cruz Pano, G.R. No. L-47739, June 22, 1983; 122 SCRA 671. 60 Asian Footwear & Rubber Corporation v. Soriano, G.R. Nos. 71695-703, May 20, 1986, 142 SCRA 49. 61 Tolentino v. Inciong, G.R. No. L-36385, July 25, 1979, 91 SCRA 563. 62 Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions [PAFLU] v. Salas, G.R. No. 39084, Feb. 23, 1988, 158 SCRA 53. 63 San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 80774, May 31, 1988, 161 SCRA 719. 64 Molave Motor Sales, Inc. v. Laron, G.R. No. 65377, May 28, 1984, 129 SCRA 485. 65 Sara v. Agarrado, G.R. No. L-73199, Oct. 26, 1988, 166 SCRA 625. 66 Section 10, Rule X, Book II, Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment 67 Article 264, Labor Code. 68 Bulletin Publishing Corporation v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 74425, Oct. 7, 1986, 144 SCRA 678. 69 Section 12, Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. 70 Section 1, Rule IV, Book VI, Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment.
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9.SUMMARYOFOTHERISSUESBEYONDJURISDICTIONOFTHELABORARBITERSORNLRC. In addition to the foregoing, other issues over which the Labor Arbiters or NLRC have no jurisdiction may be summedupasfollows: 1. ClaimsforEmployeesCompensation,SocialSecurity,Medicare(nowPhilHealth)andmaternitybenefits.56 2.Replevinintertwinedwithalabordispute.57 3.Violationoftrainingagreement.58 4. Claim for liquidated damages for breach of a contractual obligation, including the issue of liability in suretyship.59 5. Saleofpropertybeingleviedonexecutionhavingbeendoneinbadfaith.60 6. Contemptinvolvingajudgeoftheregularcourt.61 7. Injunction filed by a third party with the regular court against the sheriff enforcing a decision in a labor case.62 8. Claim of employee for cash prize offered under the Innovation Program of a company which, although arising from employeremployee relationship, requires the application of the general civil law on contracts.63 9. Action initiated by employer against an employee for sum of money and damages for cost of repair jobs madeonanemployeespersonalcaraswellasforthepurchasepriceofpartsandvehicles.64 10. Claimsforcommissionsandcertainreimbursementsmadebyanindependentcontractor.65 11. Violations of labor laws which are penal in nature. Examples are illegal recruitment cases,66 or criminal offensesorfeloniescommittedinthecourseofstrikesandlockouts.67 12. Insolvency proceedings in the enforcement of the workers preference ordained under Article 110 of the LaborCode. 13. Exerciseofequityjurisdictiontoenjoinactivitiesforpurposesofcompellinganemployertoignoreaclear mandateofthelaw.68 14. Administrative action against the licensee or holder of authority cognizable by the POEA which could proceedindependentlyfromthecriminalaction.69 15. ReviewofrecruitmentviolationsandotherrelatedcasesdecidedbythePOEA.TheSecretaryofLaborand Employmenthasexclusiveappellatejurisdictionoverthesecases.70
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Itbearsreiterationthatlikethewritofamparo,habeasdatawasconceivedasaresponse, giventhelackofeffectiveandavailableremedies,toaddresstheextraordinaryriseinthenumberof killings and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life,libertyorsecurityasaremedyindependentlyfromthoseprovidedunderprevailingRules. Castillo v. Cruz, [G.R. No. 182165, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 628, 635], underscores theemphasislaiddowninTapuzv.delRosario,[G.R.No.182484,June17,2008,554SCRA768,784], that the writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful.Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due process clause of the Constitution. It is evident that respondents reservations on the real reasons for her transfer a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of ones employment are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodgedbylawwiththeNLRCandtheLaborArbiters. In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed anyunjustifiableorunlawfulviolationofrespondentsrighttoprivacyvisavistherighttolife,liberty orsecurity.Toarguethatpetitionersrefusaltodisclosethecontentsofreportsallegedlyreceivedon the threats to respondents safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best speculative.Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from unknown individuals in her earlierquoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all. And she even suspects that her transfer to another place of work betray[s] the real intent of management] and could be a punitive move.Her posture unwittingly concedesthattheissueislaborrelated.
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Relevant Provision: Article 223, Labor Code 1. REINSTATEMENTASPECTOFLABORARBITERSDECISION,SELFEXECUTORYORIMMEDIATELYEXECUTORYEVEN PENDINGAPPEAL. a.OnlythereinstatementorderedbytheLaborArbiterisselfexecutory. It must be stressed at the outset that it is only the reinstatement ordered by the Labor Arbiter which is self executory (or immediately executory) incharacter. If the reinstatement is orderedby the NLRC on appeal, or the Court ofAppealsortheSupremeCourt,itisnotselfexecutoryandawritofexecutionisnecessarytoimplementandexecute it. Article223oftheLaborCodeisclearthatthedecisionoftheLaborArbiterreinstatingadismissedorseparated employee,insofarasthereinstatementaspectisconcerned,shallimmediatelybeexecutory,evenpendingappeal. b.2optionsoftheemployer. Theemployerhas2optionsbothofwhichspeaksofreinstatement: 1. Actual reinstatement (reinstatement to former position under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or if position is no longer available, to a substantially equivalent position);or 2. Payrollreinstatement. It must be noted that the employer has no way of preventing reinstatement.. The posting of a bond by the employershallnotstaytheexecutionforreinstatement. c.Effectifemployerdoesnotreinstate. Incasetheemployerfailedtoreinstate(actuallyorinthepayroll)theemployeeorderedreinstatedbythe LaborArbiter,theprevailingruleisenunciatedintheenbancdecisioninGarciav.PhilippineAirlines,Inc.,[G.R.No. 164856,January20,2009]. TestundertheGarciadoctrine. Under the said case of Garcia, the test to determine the liability of the employer (who did not reinstate the employee pending appeal) to pay the wages of the dismissed employee covering the period from the time he was ordered reinstated by the Labor Arbiter to the reversal of the Labor Arbiters decision either by the NLRC, the Court of AppealsortheHighCourt,istwofold,towit: (1) There must be actual delay or the fact that the order of reinstatement pending appeal was not executed priortoitsreversal;and (2) The delay must not be due to the employers unjustified act or omission. If the delay is due to the employers unjustified refusal, the employer may still be required to pay the salaries notwithstanding thereversaloftheLaborArbitersdecision. Inotherwords,aftertheLaborArbitersdecisionisreversedbyahighertribunal,theemployeemaybebarred from collecting the accrued wages, if it is shown that the delay in enforcing the reinstatement pending appeal was withoutfaultonthepartoftheemployer. In this Garcia case, while respondent Philippine Airlines (PAL) was undergoing rehabilitation receivership, an illegal dismissal case was filed by petitioners against respondent PAL which was decided by the Labor Arbiter in their favor.Onappeal,theNLRCreversedtherulingoftheLaborArbiterandheldthattheirdismissalwasvalid.Resolvingthe issue of whether petitioners may collect their wages during the period between the Labor Arbiters order of reinstatement pending appeal and the NLRC decision overturning that of the Labor Arbiter, now that respondent PAL hasterminatedandexitedfromrehabilitationproceedings,theSupremeCourtheldthatPALisnotobligatedtopaysuch wagesinthelightofthependencyoftherehabilitationproceedingswhicheffectivelypreventeditfromcomplyingwith thereinstatementorderedbytheLaborArbiter. d.TherulingsinRoqueroandGenuinohavebeenmodified. As a result of the Garcia doctrine, the rulings in Roquero v. Philippine Airlines, [G.R. No. 152329, April 22, 2003]andGenuinov.NLRC,[G.R.Nos.14273233,December4,2007]havebeenexpresslymodified. In Roquero, the dismissal of the employee was held valid by the Labor Arbiter. On appeal to the NLRC, the LaborArbitersdecisionwasreversedandconsequently,thedismissedemployeewasorderedreinstated.Theemployee did not appeal from that decision of the NLRC but filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of the order of
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============================== TOPIC UNDER THE SYLLABUS: 1. Labor Arbiter b. Effect of self-executing order of reinstatement on backwages ==============================
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Panuncillo v. CAP Philippines, Inc., [G.R. No. 161305, February 9, 2007]. Kimberly Clark (Phils), Inc. v. Facundo, [G.R. No. 144885, July 26, 2006 (Unsigned Resolution)]. Composite Enterprises, Inc. v. Caparoso, [G.R. No. 159919, August 8, 2007, 529 SCRA 470]. 74 Air Philippines Corp. v. Zamora, [G.R. No. 148247, August 7, 2006]. 7575 Citing College of the Immaculate Conception v. NLRC & Atty. Marius F. Carlos, Ph.D., G.R. No. 167563, March 22, 2010.
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e.TheprincipleofreinstatementpendingappealaswellastheRoquerodoctrine(nowGarcialdoctrine) applyonlyincasethereisafindingofillegalityofdismissalbytheLaborArbiter. In the 2009 case of Lansangan v. Amkor Technology Philippines, Inc., [G.R. No. 177026, January 30, 2009], it washeldthattheprincipleofreinstatementpendingappealaswellastheRoquerodoctrinalrulingfindapplicationonly
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Abocv.MetropolitanBankandTrustCompany,[G.R.Nos.17054243,December13,2010] This case answers the lingering question on the entitlement of an employee to reinstatement wages and benefitsduringthetimewhenhewasunderpayrollreinstatementasorderedbytheLaborArbiteruntilthereversalof theLaborArbitersrulingbytheNLRConappeal.Inthiscase,theemployeewasreinstatedinthepayrolluponorderof the Labor Arbiter who found his dismissal illegal. On appeal, the NLRC set aside and reversed the decision of the Labor ArbiterbutorderedrespondentMetrobanktopayAbocreinstatementwagesfromJuly12,1999(dateofdecisionofthe Labor Arbiter) to September 16, 1999; salary increase from January 2000 to June 2001; Christmas bonus for the year 2000;13thmonthpaydifferentialfortheyear2000;andsalarydifferentialforJulyandAugust2001.TheNLRCexplained that petitioner Aboc was entitled to receive these monetary awards because he was included in the payroll by respondent Metrobank as he was ordered reinstated by the Labor Arbiter. This ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In affirming the said ruling on the monetary awards, the Supreme Court ruled that they are warranted under Article 223 of the Labor Code and jurisprudence. It cannot be denied that respondent Metrobank opted to reinstate petitioner Aboc in its payroll. Since Metrobank chose payroll reinstatement for Aboc, he then became a reinstated regular employee. This means that he was restored to his previous position as a regular employee without loss of seniority rights and other privileges appurtenant thereto. His payroll reinstatement put him on equal footing with the otherregularMetrobankemployeesinsofarasentitlementtothebenefitsgivenundertheCBAisconcerned. ThefactthatthedecisionoftheLaborArbiterwasreversedonappealhasnocontrollingsignificance.Therule is that even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until final reversal by thehighercourt.75
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Consequent to the Garcia doctrine, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the prevailing principle that even if the orderofreinstatementoftheLaborArbiterisreversedonappeal,itisobligatoryonthepartoftheemployertoreinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court.It settles the view that the Labor Arbiter's order of reinstatement is immediately executory and the employer has to either re admitthemtoworkunderthesametermsandconditionsprevailingpriortotheirdismissal,ortoreinstatetheminthe payroll,andthatfailingtoexercisetheoptionsinthealternative,employermustpaytheemployeessalaries. ThespiritoftheruleonreinstatementpendingappealanimatestheproceedingsoncetheLaborArbiterissues the decision containing an order of reinstatement. The immediacy of its execution needs no further elaboration. Reinstatement pending appeal necessitates its immediate executionduring the pendency of the appeal, if the law is to serve its noble purpose. At the same time, any attempt on the part of the employer to evade or delay its execution,as observed in Panuncillo71 andaswhat actuallytranspired in KimberlyClark,72 CompositeEnterprises, Inc.,73 AirPhilippines74andRoquero[supra],shouldnotbecountenanced.
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The ruling in Roquero [supra] was qualified by the Supreme Court in its ruling in the 2007 case of Genuino v. NLRC, [G.R. Nos. 14273233, December 4, 2007], on the issue of whether the dismissed employee who is reinstated in the payroll and not actually to his former position has the obligation to refund what he has received as and by way of salaries during his payroll reinstatement if and when his dismissal is held valid and legal on appeal. In this case, the SupremeCourthadtakentheviewthat(i)fthedecisionoftheLaborArbiterislaterreversedonappealuponthefinding that the ground for dismissal is valid, then the employer has the right to require the dismissed employee on payroll reinstatementtorefundthesalarieshe/shereceivedwhilethecasewaspendingappeal,oritcanbedeductedfromthe accrued benefits that the dismissed employee was entitled to receive from his/her employer under existing laws, collective bargaining agreement provisions, and company practices. However, if the employee was reinstated to work during the pendency of the appeal, then the employee is entitled to the compensation received for actual services rendered without need of refund. Considering that Genuino was not reinstated to work or placed on payroll reinstatement, and her dismissal is based on a just cause, then she is not entitled to be paid the salaries stated in item no.3ofthefallooftheSeptember3,1994NLRCDecision.
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reinstatement. The Labor Arbiter granted the motion but the employer refused to comply with the said order on the ground that it has filed a Petition for Review before the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the dismissal of the employee was held valid by the Supreme Court. But it held that the unjustified refusal of the employer to reinstate the dismissed employee entitles the latter to the payment of his salaries effective from the time the employer failed to reinstate him despite the issuance of a writ of execution. Unless there is a restraining order issued, it is ministerial upon the Labor Arbiter to implement the order of reinstatement. In the case at bar, no restraining order was granted. Thus, it was mandatoryontheemployertoactuallyreinstatethedismissedemployeeorreinstatehiminthepayroll.Havingfailedto doso,theformermustpaythelatterthesalariesheisentitledto,asifhewasreinstated,fromthetimeofthedecision oftheNLRCuntilthefinalityofthedecisionoftheSupremeCourt.
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1.PRELIMINARYCONSIDERATIONS.
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MillenniumErectorsCorporationv.Magallanes,[G.R.No.184362,November15,2010] Petitioner here contends that the Labor Arbiters decision dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal had become final and executory following respondents failure to perfect his appeal to the NLRC, maintaining that the requirementsforperfectionofanappealandforproofofservicearenotmererulesoftechnicalitywhichmayeasilybe set aside. The Supreme Court, however, ruled that the NLRC did not err in treating respondents motion for reconsideration as an appeal, the presence of some procedural flaws including the lack of verification and proof of servicenotwithstanding.
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b.MotionforreconsiderationofaLaborArbitersdecision,notallowed. A motion for reconsideration is unavailing as a remedy against a decision of the Labor Arbiter. The Labor ArbitershouldtreatthesaidmotionasanappealtotheNLRC.79
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f.TheconceptofreinstatementpendingappealunderArticle223contemplatesallkindsofillegaldismissal cases. Inthe2010caseofC.Alcantara&Sons,Inc.v.CA,[G.R.No.155109,September29,2010],theCAdeniedthe reinstatement of the ordinary union members who participated in the illegal strike but whose dismissal was found to have been illegally effected since they did not commit any illegal acts in the course of the strike. The CA justified its denial by ruling that the reinstatement pending appeal provided under Article 223 contemplates illegal dismissal or termination cases and not cases under Article 264 (Prohibited Activities [in Strikes and Lockouts]).The Supreme Court, however, pronounced that this perceived distinction does not find support in the provisions of the Labor Code. The groundsforterminationunderArticle264arebasedonprohibitedactsthatemployeescouldcommitduringastrike.On the other hand, the grounds for termination under Articles 282 to 284 are based on the employees conduct in connection with his assigned work.Still, Article 217, which defines the powers of Labor Arbiters, vests in the latter jurisdiction over all termination cases, whatever be the grounds given for the termination of employment. Consequently, Article 223, which provides that the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed employee shall immediately be executory pending appeal, cannot but apply to all terminations irrespective of the groundsonwhichtheyarebased. ============================== TOPIC UNDER THE SYLLABUS: 1. Labor Arbiter c. Requirements to perfect appeal to NLRC ==============================
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in case there is a finding of illegality of dismissal by the Labor Arbiter.The petitioners in this case were found by the Labor Arbiter to have committed a dishonest act and, therefore, ruled that their dismissal was valid and legal but he orderedtheirreinstatementtotheirformerpositionswithoutbackwagesasameasureofequitableandcompassionate relief owing mainly topetitioners prior unblemished employment records, showof remorse, harshness of the penalty anddefectiveattendancemonitoringsystemofrespondent. Based ontheforegoingfacts,theSupreme Courtnotedthat Roquero,as well asArticle223oftheLaborCode on which the appellate court also relied, finds no application in the present case. Article 223 concerns itself with an interim relief, granted to a dismissed or separated employee while the case for illegal dismissal is pending appeal, as what happened in Roquero. It does not apply where there is no finding of illegal dismissal, as in the present case. Petitioners are not entitled to full backwages as their dismissal was not found to be illegal. Agabon v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 158693, Nov. 17, 2004], so states payment of backwages and other benefits is justified only if the employee was unjustlydismissed.
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3.PERFECTIONOFAPPEAL.
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Articles 129 and 223, Labor Code; Section 2[d], Rule VI, 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC. See also Metro Drug Distribution, Inc. v. Metro Drug Corporation Employees Association-FFW, [G.R. No. 142666, September 26, 2005]. As provided under Section 4[a], Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC. 83 Bristol Myers Squibb [Phils.], Inc. v. Viloria, G.R. No. 148156, Sept. 27, 2004. 84 Section 9, Rule VI Ibid.. 85 Delgado v. CA, G.R. No. 137881, Dec. 21, 2004; Corporate Inn Hotel v. Lizo, G.R. No. 148279, May 27, 2004; Sapitan v. JB Line Bicol Express, Inc., G.R. No. 163775, Oct. 19, 2007. 86 Gaudia v. NLRC, G.R. No. 109371, Nov. 18, 1999. 87 RJL Martinez Fishing Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. L-63550-51, Jan. 31, 1984.
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a.Reglementaryperiodisten(10)calendardays. Theshortenedperiodoften(10)daysfixedbyArticle223contemplatescalendardaysandnotworkingdays.87
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c.Perfectionofappeal,mandatoryandjurisdictional. Perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the reglementary period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional. It is not only a mere technicality. Noncompliance with such legal requirements is fatal. FailuretoperfectanappealasrequiredbytheRuleshastheeffectofrenderingthejudgmentfinalandexecutory,hence, unappealable.85 Consequently,theNLRChasnoauthoritytoentertainanappealwhichwasnotperfected,muchlesstoreverse thedecisionoftheLaborArbiter.86
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b.Effectofperfectionofappeal. Oncean appeal is filed, the LaborArbiter loses jurisdictionoverthecase.Allpleadingsand motions pertaining totheappealedcaseshouldthereafterbeaddressedtoandfiledwiththeCommission.84 TheonlyexceptionisonthereinstatementaspectoftheLaborArbitersdecision.Theperfectionoftheappeal shall not affect his continued exercise of jurisdiction over this particular aspect of his decision. Resultantly, he shall continuetohavejurisdictionovertheenforcementandexecutionofhisreinstatementorderevenatthetimewhenthe appealfromhisdecisionwastimelyfiledanddulyperfected.ThependencyoftheappealbeforetheCommission(NLRC) doesnotaffecthisjurisdictiontosoimplementhisreinstatementorder.
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a.Requisitesforperfectionofappeal. The following are the requisites for perfection of an appeal to the NLRC from the decision, order or award of theLaborArbiter:82 a.Theappealshouldbefiledwithinthereglementaryperiod; b.TheappealshouldbeverifiedbyappellanthimselfinaccordancewithSection4,Rule7oftheRulesofCourt; c. Thereshouldbeproofofpaymentoftherequiredappealfee; d.Acashorsuretybondshouldbepostedifjudgmentinvolvesmonetaryaward; e.The appeal should be accompanied by a memorandum of appeal in three (3) legibly typewritten copies which shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof, the relief prayed for, a statement of the date when the appellant received the appealed decision, resolution or order and a certificateofnonforumshopping;and f.Thereshouldbeproofofserviceoftheappealmemorandumontheotherparty.83
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b.NLRChascertioraripower. ThefirstgroundaboveregardingprimafacieevidenceofabuseofdiscretiononthepartoftheLaborArbiteris actually an exercise of certiorari power by the NLRC. The case of Triad Security & Allied Services, Inc. v. Ortega, [G.R. No.160871,February6,2006],expresslyrecognizesthiscertioraripoweroftheNLRC.81
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a.GroundsforappealunderArticle223. TheappealtotheNLRCmaybeentertainedonlyonanyofthefollowinggrounds: a.IfthereisaprimafacieevidenceofabuseofdiscretiononthepartoftheLaborArbiter; b.Ifthedecision,orderorawardwassecuredthroughfraudorcoercion,includinggraftandcorruption; c. Ifmadepurelyonquestionsoflaw;and/or d.If serious errors in the findings of fact are raised which, if not corrected, would cause grave or irreparable damageorinjurytotheappellant.80
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2.GROUNDSFORAPPEALTOTHECOMMISSION(NLRC).
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c.PetitionforRelieftreatedasappeal. Petitioner company in New Pacific Timber & Supply Co., Inc. v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 124224, March 17, 2000], contendsthattheappealinitiatedbyprivaterespondentsdenominatedasPetitionforReliefisnotthepropermodeof seekingareviewofthedecisionrenderedbytheLaborArbiter.Accordingtothepetitioner,nowhereintheLaborCode orintheNLRCRulesofProcedureistheresuchapleading.Rather,theremedyofapartyaggrievedbyanunfavorable ruling of the Labor Arbiter is to appeal said judgment to the NLRC. The Supreme Court disagreed with this contention and allowed the said pleading to be treated as a valid appeal in the interest of substantial justice. And this, notwithstanding the fact that the said Petition for Relief was filed way beyond the 10calendar day reglementary period.
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Section 6, Rule III, 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC; Flexo Mfg. Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. L-55971, Feb. 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 145; Lynx Industries Contractor, Inc. v. Tala, G.R. No. 164333, Aug. 24, 2007. Chronicle Securities Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 157907, Nov. 25, 2004. Henry Clyde Abbott v. NLRC, G.R. No. L-65173, Oct. 27, 1986, 145 SCRA 206. 91 Judy Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, G. R. No. 111934, April 29, 1998; SM Agri and General Machineries v. NLRC, G.R. No. 74806, Jan. 9, 1989. 92 GSIS v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 180045, November 17, 2010]. 93 Judy Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 111934, April 29, 1998] 94 Serrano v. CA, G.R. No. 139420, Aug. 15, 2001; See also Remington Industrial Sales Corp. v. Castaneda, G.R. Nos. 169295-96, Nov. 20, 2006. 95 New Pacific Timber & Supply Co., Inc. v. NLRC, G. R. No. 124224, March 17, 2000. 96 Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of the Philippines v. Lariosa, [G.R. No. L-70479, February 27, 1987]. 97 Section 2, Rule VI, NLRC Manual on Execution of Judgment. 98 Article 218 [d], as amended by Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989; Section 1, Rule IX, 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC. 99 Chronicle Securities Corporation v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 157907, November 25, 2004]; Manaban v. Sarphil Corporation, [G.R. No. 150915, April 11, 2005]. 100 ; Bristol Myers Squibb [Phils.], Inc. v. Viloria, G.R. No. 148156, Sept. 27, 2004. 101 Bunagan v. Sentinel Watchman & Protective Agency, Inc., [G.R. No. 144376, September 13, 2006]; Section 3, Rule VI, Old Rules of Procedure of the NLRC; Section 1, Rule VI, 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC 102 Lamzon v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 113600, May 28, 1999, 307 SCRA 665; 367 Phil. 169, 177]. 103 Globe General Services and Security Agency v. NLRC, G.R. No. 106477, Oct. 23, 1995. 104 Article 129, Labor Code; Section 1, Rule VI, 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC. 105 Section 1, Rule VI, Ibid.; Bristol Myers Squibb [Phils.], Inc. v. Viloria, G.R. No. 148156, Sept. 27, 2004. 106 Section 5, Rule VI, 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC.
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b.Whentoreckonstartofrunningofthe10calendardayreglementaryperiod. The ten (10) calendar day reglementary period to appeal should be counted from the date of receipt of the decision, award or order by the counsel or representative of record and not from the date of receipt thereof by the party.88 c.Effectoffailuretoappealwithinthe10calendardayreglementaryperiod. Failure to bring an appeal within the period prescribed by the rules renders the judgment appealed from final andexecutorybyoperationoflaw.89 Consequently, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right, to a writ of execution and the issuance thereofbecomesaministerialdutywhichmaybecompelledthroughtheremedyofmandamus.90 d.Someprinciplesonreglementaryperiod. Somenoteworthyprinciplesaffectingthe10calendardayreglementaryperiodareasfollows: 1. Saturdays,Sundaysandlegalholidaysincludedinreckoningthe10calendardayreglementaryperiod.91 2.Dateofmailingofappealmemorandumisthedateofitsfiling.92 3.Exceptionstothe10calendardayperiodrule. i.10thdayfallingonaSaturday.93 ii.10thdayfallingonaSundayorholiday.94 iii.NLRCspowertowaivedefectinsubstanceorformunderArticle218[c].95 iv.Relianceonerroneousnoticeofdecision.96 v.AppealfromdecisionsofLaborArbitersonthirdpartyclaimsten(10)workingdays.97 vi.AppealfromdecisionsofLaborArbitersindirectcontemptcasesfive(5)calendardays.98 vii.Allowingtheappealforsomecompellingreasonsandtosubservejustice.99 4.Motionforextensionoftimetoperfectanappeal,notallowed.100 5.Motionforextensionoftimetofilememorandumofappeal,notallowed.101 6.Motionforextensionoftimetofileappealbond,notallowed.102 e.Rationalebehindtheruleonnonextensionofperiodtoappeal. To extend the period of appeal is to prolong the resolution of the case, a circumstance which would give the employer the opportunity to wear out the energy and meager resources of the worker to the point that he would be constrainedtogiveupforlessthanwhathedeservesinlaw.103 f.ReglementaryperiodofappealfromdecisionsofDOLERegionalDirectorsunderArticle129oftheLabor Code. The reglementary period within which appeal to the NLRC may be instituted by any or both parties from the decisions, awards or orders of the DOLE Regional Directors or his duly authorized Hearing Officers is five (5) calendar daysfromreceiptthereof.104 If the 5th day falls on a Saturday, Sunday or a holiday, the last day to perfect the appeal shall be the next workingday.105 3.2.APPEALFEE. a.Appealfee,amountthereof. TheappellantisrequiredtopayanappealfeeofP150.00totheRegionalArbitrationBranchorRegionalOffice, andtheofficialreceiptofsuchpaymentshouldbeattachedtotherecordsofthecase.106 b.Latestrule:paymentofappealdocketfeeisbothmandatoryandjurisdictional. 1. The 2010 case of Saint Louis University, Inc. v. Cobarrubias, [G.R. No.187104, August 3, 2010], re asserted the rule that the payment of appeal docket fee is both mandatory and jurisdictional. This case involves an appeal from the decision of a Voluntary Arbitrator to the Court of Appeals (CA) under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. In the 2000 case of Workers of Antique Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 120062, June 8, 2000], it was ruled thatanappealisperfectedonlywhenthereisproofofpaymentoftheappealfee.Thishasbeentheconsistentrulingin aplethoraofcase.
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3.3.APPEALBOND;REQUIREDONLYINCASEOFMONETARYAWARD.
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Saint Louis University, Inc. v. Cobarrubias, G.R. No. 187104, Aug. 3, 2010, citing Lim v. Delos Santos, G.R. No. 172574, July 31, 2009, 594 SCRA 607, 616-617. Borja Estate v. Spouses R. Ballad, G.R. No. 152550, June 8, 2005, 498 Phil. 694. Forever Security & General Services v. Flores, G.R. No. 147961, Sept. 7, 2007. 110 Gaudia v. NLRC, G.R. No. 109371, Nov. 18, 1999; Lamzon v. NLRC, G.R. No. 113600, May 28, 1999, 307 SCRA 665; 367 Phil. 169, 177. 111 Santos v. Velarde, G.R. No. 140753, April 30, 2003; Borja Estate v. Spouses Ballad G.R. No. 152550, June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA 657, 667. 112 Quiambao v. NLRC, G.R. No. 91935, March 4, 1996, 324 Phil. 455; Aquino v. NLRC, G.R. No. 98108, Sept. 3, 1993, 226 SCRA 76. 113 Diaz v. Nora, G.R. No. 89324, Oct. 11, 1990. 114 Navarro v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 116464, March 1, 2000]. 115 Aba v. NLRC, G.R. No. 122627, July 28, 1999. 116 Section 14, Rule V, 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC. 117 Vergara v. NLRC, G.R. No. 117196, Dec. 5, 1997, 282 SCRA 486. 118 Mendoza, Jr. v. San Miguel Foods, Inc., [G.R. No. 158684, May 16, 2005]. 119 Cadalin v. Hon. CA, [G.R. No. 168923, November 28, 2008]. 120 Section 6, Rule VI, 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC. 121 Section 6, Rule VI of the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC; AFP General Insurance Corp. v. Molina, [G.R. No. 151133, June 30, 2008]. 122 UERM-Memorial Medical Center v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 110419, March 3, 1997, 269 SCRA 70]. 123 Cordova v. Keysas Boutique, [G.R. No. 156379, September 16, 2005]. 124 Mary Abigails Food Services, Inc. v. CA, [G.R. No. 140294, May 9, 2005]. 125 Ramirez v. Hon. CA, G.R. No. 182626, Dec. 4, 2009. 126 Section 6, Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC. 127 Coral Point Development Corporation v. NLRC, G. R. No. 129761, Feb. 28, 2000; Times Transportation Company, Inc. v. Sotelo, G.R. No. 163786, Feb. 16, 2005; Stolt-Nielsen Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 147623, Dec. 13, 2005. 128 Coral Point Development Corporation v. NLRC, supra; Stolt-Nielsen Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 147623, Dec. 13, 2005.
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d.SomeprinciplesonMotiontoReduceBond. 1.Themotiontoreducebondmustbefiledwithinthereglementaryperiod.127 2. Thefilingofamotiontoreducebondevenduringthereglementaryperioddoesnotstaythefinalityofthe decision.128
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b.Someprinciplesonbondrequirement. 1. Bondshouldbepostedwithinthe10calendardayreglementaryperiod.110 2. If a party failed to perfect his appeal by the nonpayment of the appeal bond within the 10calendar day periodprovidedbylaw,thedecisionoftheLaborArbiterbecomesfinalandexecutoryupontheexpiration ofthesaidreglementaryperiod.111 3. Thepostingofbondisbothmandatoryandjurisdictional;nonpostingthereofisfatal.112 4. Remedyofemployeeincaseemployerfailedtopostbondistofileamotiontodismissappeal.113 5. Awardofdamagesandattorneysfeesexcludedfromthecomputationofbond.114 6. Nomonetaryaward,noappealbondrequired.115 7. LaborArbitersdecisionsorordersshouldstatetheamountawarded.116 8. Iftheamountofthemonetaryawardisnotincludedinthejudgment,theappealbondisnotrequiredtobe posted.117 9. Incaseofconflictbetweenthebodyandthefalloofthedecision,thelattershouldprevail.118 10. Bondisnotrequiredtoentertainamotionforreconsideration.119 11. Suretybondmustbeissuedbyanaccreditedbondingcompany.120 12. Thebondpostedshouldbeineffectuntilfinaldispositionofthecase.121 13. Realpropertybondinlieuofcashorsuretybondallowed.122 14. Postingofabankcertificationorabankguarantee,notsufficientcompliancewiththebond requirement.123 15.LongChristmasholiday,notanexcuseforlatefilingofbond.124
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a.Perfectionofappealincaseofmonetaryjudgment. An appeal from a decision involving a monetary award may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or suretybond.108 The logical purpose of an appeal bond is to insure during the period of appeal against any occurrence that would defeat or diminish recovery under the judgment if it is subsequently affirmed. It also validates and justifies, at least on a prima facie basis, an interpretation that would limit the amount of the bond to the aggregate of the sums awarded other than in the concept of moral and exemplary damages. This is consistent with the States constitutional mandate to afford full protection to labor in order to forcefully and meaningfully underscore labor as a primary social andeconomicforce.109
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c.Exceptionstotheruleonpaymentofappellatecourtdocketfees. Thefollowingarerecognizedexceptionstothestrictobservanceoftheruleondocketfees:(1)mostpersuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without the appellant's fault; (10) peculiar, legal and equitablecircumstancesattendanttoeachcase;(11)inthenameofsubstantialjusticeandfairplay;(12)importanceof theissuesinvolved;and(13)exerciseofsounddiscretionbythejudge,guidedbyalltheattendantcircumstances.107
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a.Effectoffailuretoserveacopytoadverseparty. WhileSection4[a],RuleVIofthe2005RevisedRulesofProcedureoftheNLRCrequiresproofofserviceonthe otherpartyoftheappeal,noncompliancetherewith,however,willpresentnoobstacletotheperfectionoftheappeal; nordoesitamounttoajurisdictionaldefecttotheNLRCstakingcognizancethereof.152 Ithaslongbeensettledthatmerefailuretoserveacopyofamemorandumofappealupontheopposingparty doesnotbartheNLRCfromentertaininganappeal.153
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b.SomeprinciplesonMemorandumofAppeal. 1.Lackofverificationinanappeal,notfatalnorjurisdictional.146 2.Merenoticeofappeal,insufficient.147 3.OnlycomplainantswhosignedthememorandumofappealaredeemedtohaveappealedtheLaborArbiters decision.148 4.Failuretoallegematerialdateintheappealmemorandum,notfatal.149 5.Failuretoattachacertificateofnonforumshoppingintheappealmemorandum,fatal.150 6.Belatedfilingofthecertificateofnonforumshopping,fatal.151
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a.Memorandumofappeal,requisites. The appeal should be accompanied by a memorandum ofappeal inthree (3) legibly typewritten copieswhich shallstatethegroundsrelieduponandtheargumentsinsupportthereof,thereliefprayedfor,astatementofthedate when the appellant received the appealed decision, resolution or order and a certificate of nonforum shopping with proofofserviceontheotherpartyofsuchmemorandumofappeal.145
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3.Thefullamountofthemonetaryawardshouldstillbepostedeveniftheappellanthasfiledamotionto reducebond.129 4. Ifneitherbondnormotiontoreducebondisfiledwithinthereglementaryperiod,thedecisionbecomes finalandexecutory.130 5. Reductionofbond,notamatterofright.131 6. Liberalconstructionandrelaxationofruleonpostingofappealbond.132 (a) therewassubstantialcompliancewiththeRules; (b) surroundingfactsandcircumstancesconstitutemeritoriousgroundstoreducethebond; (c) a liberal interpretation of the requirement of an appeal bond would serve the desired objective of resolvingcontroversiesonthemerits;or (d) theappellants,attheveryleast,exhibitedtheirwillingnessand/orgoodfaithbypostingapartialbond duringthereglementaryperiod.133 6. Thefailuretopostthebondmustbecausedbyathirdparty,notbytheappellanthimself.134 7. AlternativeremedyistopaypartialappealbondwhilemotiontoreducebondispendingwiththeNLRC.135 8. Partialbondpostedmustnotbeinadequate.136 9. Thepartialbondmustbepostedduringthereglementaryperiod.137 10. PostingofbondtogetherwiththemotionforreconsiderationofNLRCdecisionheldvalid.138 11. NLRCmaygrantadditionaltimetopostbondafterdenialofmotiontoreducebond.139 12. Motionforextensionoftimetofilebondmustbefiledwithinthereglementaryperiod.140 13. Inaccuracyinthecomputationofmonetaryawardsmustbeproved.141 14. Financialdifficultiesorfinancialincapacity,notsufficientgroundstoreducethebond.142 15. Cooperativesarenotexemptedfrompostingbond.143 16. Monetary award in foreign currency necessarily requires that the peso equivalent be computed at the officialconversion rate onthedate of the renditionofthe decision.Hence,anything lesswould inevitably result in an inadequate or deficient bond and would necessarily result in the nonperfection of an appeal beforetheNLRC.144
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Section 1, Rule VII, 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC. Article 218 [e], Labor Code; Section 1, Rule XI, Ibid.. Section 2, Rule XI, Ibid.. 157 Article 263 [g], Labor Code; Rule IX, Ibid.. 158 Article 217 [b], Labor Code. 159 Section 1, Rule XXIII, Book V, Rules to Implement the Labor Code, as amended by Department Order No. 40-03, Series of 2003, Feb. 17, 2003; Section 1, Rule X, Ibid.. 160 Pondoc v. NLRC, G. R. No. 116347, Oct. 3, 1996, 262 SCRA 632.
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Garcia v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., [G.R. No. 164856, January 20, 2009 (En Banc)]. Section 4, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Confederation of Citizens Labor Unions v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. L-38955-56, Oct. 31, 1974; San Miguel Corporation v. Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. L-39195, May 16, 1975; Scott v. Inciong, G.R. No. L-38868, Dec. 29, 1975.
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======================================== TOPIC UNDER THE SYLLABUS: 2. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) c. Requirements to perfect appeal to Court of Appeals ======================================== Relevant Provision: Article 223, Labor Code Rule 65, Revised Rules of Court 1.NOAPPEALFROMNLRCDECISIONS. a.NostatutorygrantofrighttoappealfromNLRCdecisions. ThesyllabusforlaborlawprescribesasatopicRequirementstoPerfectAppealtoCourtofAppeals.However, itbearsnotingthatunderthepresentstateofthelaw,thereisnoprovisionforappealsfromthedecisionsoftheNLRC. While Article 223 bears the epigraph of appeal, it actually refers only to decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter which shall be final and executory unless appealed to the NLRC by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar daysfromreceiptthereof. Instead, the present Article 223, as last amended by Section 12 of R. A. No. 6715, merely provides that the NLRC shall decide all cases within twenty (20) days from receipt of the answer of the appellee, and that such decision shallbefinalandexecutoryafterten(10)calendardaysfromreceiptthereofbytheparties. When the issue was raised in St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998], on the argument that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to review the decisions of the NLR since there is no legal provision for appellate review thereof, the Supreme Court nevertheless rejected this thesis. It held that there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts of the NLRC on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the parties; and that it is that part of the checks and balances which restrictstheseparationofpowersandforestallsarbitraryandunjustadjudications. 2.MOTIONFORRECONSIDERATION,ANINDISPENSABLEREQUISITE. a.ThefilingofaMotionforReconsiderationoftheNLRCdecisionisanindispensableprerequisite. Pursuant to said St. Martin ruling, and as sanctioned by subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court, the remedyoftheaggrievedpartyistotimelyfileamotionforreconsiderationoftheNLRCsdecisionasapreconditionfor any further or subsequent remedy and then seasonably avail of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 for whichsaidRulehasnowfixedthereglementaryperiodofsixty(60)daysfromnoticeofthedecision.162 Technically,therefore,thedecisionsoftheNLRCarenotappealabletoanyhigherorsuperiorcourtortribunal. However, judicial review of the decisions of an administrative quasijudicial body like the NLRC may still be had on the groundsoflackofjurisdiction,graveabuseofdiscretion,seriouserroroflaw,fraudorcollusionbywayofaspecialcivil actionforcertiorariunderRule65oftheRevisedRulesofCourt.163 Thisprinciplewasfurtherunderscoredinthe2008caseofSolasv.Power&TelephoneSupplyPhils.,Inc.,[G.R. No. 162332, August 28, 2008]. Stating that respondents must be disabused of their belief that since no appeal may be taken from the NLRC decision, then the same can no longer be altered, the High Court cited Panuncillo v. CAP Philippines,Inc., [G.R.No.161305,February9, 2007,515 SCRA323], where itwas heldthat whileunderthe sixth (6th) paragraphofArticle223oftheLaborCode,thedecisionoftheNLRCbecomesfinalandexecutoryafterthelapseoften calendar days from receiptthereofbytheparties, the adverse party isnotprecluded from assailing it viaa petition for certiorariunderRule65beforetheCourtofAppealsandthentotheSupremeCourtviaapetitionforreviewunderRule 45.
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On backwages The employer, as a general rule, has to pay the socalled reinstatement wages of the employee from the time he was ordered reinstated by the Labor Arbiter until the reversal by the NLRC of such reinstatement order. The exception is when there exists justifiable reason for not effectingactualorpayrollreinstatementpendingappeal,asenunciatedundertheGarciadoctrine.161 (See discussion under SubTopic [b] (Effect of selfexecuting order of reinstatement on backwages), LaborArbiterabove). On reinstatement If the employee was, pending appeal, reinstated either to his former position/substantially equivalent position or in the payroll, the reversal of the reinstatement ordered by the LaborArbiter will not affect such reinstatement ifthe employee elevates his case to the Court of Appeals or subsequently, to the Supreme Court. However, if the employee no longer elevates the case to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court, the reversal shall mean the end of the litigation, hence, the reinstatement of the employee should cease as a matter of course upon the finalityofthereversaldecisionoftheNLRC.
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Section 15, Rule VII , 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC. Section 15, Rule VII thereof. Id. 167 Id. 168 Pilipino Telephone Corporation v. National Telecommunications Commission, G.R. No. 138295, Aug. 28, 2003, 410 SCRA 82, 88; Lopez de la Rosa Development Corporation v. CA, [G.R. No. 148470, April 29, 2005]. 169 (Seagull Shipmanagement and Transport, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 123619, June 8, 2000; See also Mandaue Dinghow Dimsum House Co., Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 161134, March 3, 2008; PLDT v. Buna, G.R. No. 143688, Aug. 17, 2007. 170 Metro Transit Organization, Inc. v. CA, [G.R. No. 142133, November 19, 2002]. 171 Remington Industrial Sales Corp. v. Castaneda, [G.R. Nos. 169295-96, November 20, 2006]. 172 Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad, [G.R. No. 154798, October 20, 2005]. 173 Arandilla, Jr. v. Mindanao Electric Cooperative, Inc. (MAGELCO), [G.R. No. 157329, July 28, 2005]. 174 Cocomangas Hotel Beach Resort v. Visca, [G.R. No. 167045, August 29, 2008]. 175 Peftok Integrated Services, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 124841, July 31, 1998; Jamer v. NLRC, G.R. No. 112630, Sept. 5, 1997. 176 See Laguna CATV Network, Inc. v. Maraan, [G.R. No. 139492, November 19, 2002], as cited in Social Security Commission v. Court of Appeals, [G.R. No. 152058, September 27, 2004]. 177 Mandaue Dinghow Dimsum House Co., Inc. v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 161134, March 3, 2008]. 178 Miguel v. JCT Group, Inc., supra; Kiamco v. NLRC, G.R. No. 129449, June 29, 1999. 179 PLDT v. Imperial, G.R. No. 149379, June 15, 2006; Midas Touch Food Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 111639, July 29, 1996, 259 SCRA 652. 180 Id.
165 166
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b.SomeprinciplesonMotionforReconsiderationoftheNLRCdecision. 1. MotionforReconsideration(MR)oftheNLRCdecision,notfoundinthelawbutintheNLRCRules.164 2. TheMRshouldbefiledwithinten(10)calendardaysfromreceiptofthedecision,resolutionororder.165 3.TheMRshouldbeunderoath.166 4.OnlyoneMRfromthesamepartyshallbeentertained.167 5.TheMRismandatoryandjurisdictional.168 6.TheMRistheplainandadequateremedyreferredtoinSection1,Rule65oftheRulesofCourt.169 7.PartiescannotarrogatetothemselvesthedeterminationofwhethertofileanMRornot.170 8. Latefilingofmotionforreconsiderationmaybeexcused.171 9.With the first MR which the NLRC granted, there is no need for the parties to file another MR before bringingupthemattertotheCA.172 10. Decisionmayhavebecomefinalandexecutoryforonepartybutnotfortheotherwhoseasonablyfiledan MR.173 11. Changingoftheoryonmotionforreconsideration,notallowed.174 12. Prematurity,propergroundforfailuretofileamotionforreconsideration.175 Prematurity is the proper nomenclature to describe the ground to be invoked for failure to exhaust administrativeremedies.Aprematureactionconstitutesafatalinfirmity. c.Exceptionstotheruleonexhaustionofadministrativeremedies. It bears to stress that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies under which the Motion for Reconsiderationfalls,isnotanironcladrule.thisprinciplemaybedisregardedunderthefollowingcircumstances:176 (1) Whenthereisaviolationofdueprocess; (2) Whentheissueinvolvedispurelyalegalquestion; (3) Whentheadministrativeactionispatentlyillegalamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdiction; (4) Whenthereisestoppelonthepartoftheadministrativeagencyconcerned; (5) Whenthereisirreparableinjury; (6) When the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear the impliedandassumedapprovalofthelatter; (7) Whentorequireexhaustionofadministrativeremedieswouldbeunreasonable; (8) Whenitwouldamounttoanullificationofaclaim; (9) Whenthesubjectmatterisaprivatelandinlandcaseproceedings; (10) Whentheruledoesnotprovideaplain,speedyandadequateremedy; (11) Whentherearecircumstancesindicatingtheurgencyofjudicialintervention; (12) Whennoadministrativereviewisprovidedbylaw; (13) Wheretheruleofqualifiedpoliticalagencyapplies; (14) Whentheissueofnonexhaustionofadministrativeremedieshasbeenrenderedmoot; (15) Wheretheorderisapatentnullity,aswherethecourtaquohasnojurisdiction;177 (16) Where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lowercourt,orarethesameasthoseraisedandpasseduponinthelowercourt;178 (17) Where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable. (18) Where,underthecircumstances,amotionforreconsiderationwouldbeuseless;179 (19) Wherepetitionerwasdeprivedofdueprocessandthereisextremeurgencyforrelief. (20) Where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trialcourtisimprobable. (21) Wheretheproceedingsinthelowercourtareanullityforlackofdueprocess. (22) Wheretheproceedingswasexparteorinwhichthepetitionerhadnoopportunitytoobject. (23) Wheretheissueraisedisonepurelyoflaworwherepublicinterestisinvolved.180 3.RULE65CERTIORARIPETITIONTOCAFROMNLRCDECISIONS. a.Certiorari,nature. IncaseswherethedecisionoftheNLRCisrenderedwithoutorinexcessofjurisdiction,orwithgraveabuseof discretionamounting to lackor excessof jurisdiction,the aggrievedparty mayelevate thecase to theCourt of Appeals
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Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 152568, Feb. 16, 2004. St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998, 295 SCRA 494 (En Banc)]. See Section 4, Rule 65, as amended by Circular No. 39-98 [effective Sept. 1, 1998] and further amended by A. M. No. 00-2-03-SC [effective Sept. 1, 2000]. 184 See Section 4, Rule 65, as amended by Circular No. 39-98 [effective Sept. 1, 1998] and further amended by A. M. No. 00-2-03-SC [effective Sept. 1, 2000]. 185 Section 6[a], Rule III of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC; Ginete v. Sunrise Manning Agency, [G.R. No. 142023, June 21, 2001]. 186 Article 226, Labor Code; Policy Instructions No. 6; Villaor v. Trajano, G.R. No. 69188, Sept. 23, 1986. 187 Section 1, Rule II, Rules of Procedure on Mediation-Arbitration. 188 Section 1, Rule II, Rules of Procedure on Mediation-Arbitration; La Tondea Workers Union v. The Hon. Secretary of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 96821, Dec. 09, 1994.
181 182 183
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Relevant Provision: Article 226, Labor Code 1. JURISDICTIONOFTHEBUREAUOFLABORRELATIONS(BLR)ANDLABORRELATIONSDIVISIONS(LRD)INTHEDOLE REGIONALOFFICES. a.ConcurrentjurisdictionoftheBLRandLRD. The Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) and the Labor Relations Divisions (LRD) in the Regional Offices have concurrentjurisdiction. Atty.Montaov.Atty.Verceles,[G.R.No.168583,July26,2010] The High Court pointed out that Article 226 of the Labor Code clearly provides that the BLR and the Regional Directors of DOLE have concurrent jurisdiction over interunion and intraunion disputes. Such disputes include the conduct or nullification of election of union and workers association officers.There is, thus, no doubt as to the BLRs jurisdiction over the instant dispute involving memberunions of a federation arising from disagreement over the provisionsofthefederationsconstitutionandbylaws. b.Originalandexclusivejurisdiction. The BLR and the Labor Relations Divisions in the DOLE regional offices have concurrent original and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative (motu proprio) or upon request of either or both parties, on the following controversies: a.Allinterunionconflicts; b.Allintraunionconflicts;and c. All disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting labormanagement relations in all workplaces, whether agricultural or nonagricultural, except those arising from the implementation or interpretation of collective bargaining agreements which shall be the subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary arbitration.186 Suchconcurrentjurisdictionappliesinthefollowingspecificactions: 1.Applicationforregistrationoflaborunions;and 2.Petitionforcancellationofunionregistration.187 As far as complaints for examination of unions books of accounts is concerned, the Rules of Procedure onMediationArbitrationpurposelyandexpresslyseparatedordistinguishedexaminationsofunionaccountsfrom the genus of intraunion conflicts and provided a different procedure for the resolution of the same. Original jurisdiction over complaints for examinations of union accounts is vested on the Regional Director and appellate jurisdictionoverdecisionsoftheformerislodgedwiththeBLR.188 c.Administrativefunctions. In addition to the aforementioned controversies over which they have concurrent original and exclusive jurisdiction, the BLR and the Labor Relations Divisions in the DOLE regional offices likewise have concurrent jurisdiction overthefollowingadministrativefunctions: 1. Registrationoflaborunions; 2. Keepingofregistryoflaborunions;
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notbywayofordinaryappealbutbyandthroughthespecialcivilactionforcertiorariprovidedunderRule65thereof,as amendedbythe1997RulesofCivilProcedure[effectiveJuly1,1997]. b.SomeprinciplesonRule65certioraripetition. 1.CertiorarimaybefiledeveniftheNLRCdecisionhasbecomefinalandexecutory.181 2.CertioraripetitionunderRule65iscognizablebytheCAandnotbytheSC182. 3.Periodwithinwhichtofilecertioraripetitions60days.183 4.The60dayperiodisinextendible.184 5.The60dayperiodisreckonedfromreceiptofthedecisionbycounsel,notbyparty.185 ========================================= TOPIC UNDER THE SYLLABUS: 3. Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) Med Arbiters a. Jurisdiction (Original and Appellate) =========================================
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2.APPELLATEJURISDICTION.
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3.INTERUNIONORINTRAUNIONDISPUTES.
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b.Intraunionorinternaluniondisputes. Anintrauniondisputeorinternaluniondisputereferstoanyconflictbetweenandamongunionmembers, includinggrievancesarisingfromanyviolationoftherightsandconditionsofmembership,violationofordisagreement overanyprovisionoftheunionsconstitutionandbylawsordisputesarisingfromcharteringoraffiliationofaunion.197
Article 231, Labor Code. Section 1 [1], Rule III, NCMB Manual of Procedures for Conciliation and Preventive Mediation Cases. See Article 259 of the Labor Code. 192 Section 2, Rule II, Rules of Procedure on Mediation-Arbitration. 193 Section 16, Rule XI, Book V, Rules to Implement the Labor Code, as amended by Department Order No. 40-03, Series of 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003]. 194 Section 16, Rule XI, Book V, Ibid.. 195 Section 21, Rule XI, Book V, Ibid.. 196 Section 1 [9], Rule III, NCMB Manual of Procedures for Conciliation and Preventive Mediation Cases; Diokno v. Hon. Cacdac, G.R. No. 168475, July 4, 2007; Bautista v. CA, G.R. 123375, Feb. 28, 2005, 452 SCRA 406, 420. 197 Section 1 [bb], Rule I, Book V, Ibid.; Diokno v. Hon. Cacdac, supra; Bautista v. CA, supra.
189 190 191
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c.Coverageofintrauniondisputes. Intrauniondisputesshallinclude: (1) Cancellationofregistrationofalabororganizationfiledbyitsmembersorbyanotherlabororganization; (2) Conduct of election of union and workers association officers or nullification of election of union and workersassociationofficers; (3) Audit/accountsexaminationofunionorworkersassociationfunds; (4) Deregistrationofcollectivebargainingagreements; (5) Validity/invalidityofunionaffiliationordisaffiliation; (6) Validity/invalidityofacceptance/nonacceptanceforunionmembership; (7) Validity/invalidityofimpeachment/expulsionofofficersormembersoftheunionorworkersassociation; (8) Validity/invalidityofvoluntaryrecognition; (9) OppositiontoapplicationforunionandCBAregistration; (10)Violations of or disagreements over any provision in the constitution and bylaws of a union or workers association; (11)Disagreementsovercharteringorregistrationoflabororganizationsandcollectivebargainingagreements;
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a.Interunionorrepresentationdisputes. An interunion dispute or representation dispute refers to a case involving a petition for certification election filed by a duly registered labor organization which is seeking to be recognized as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rankandfile employees or supervisory employees, as the case may be, in the appropriate bargainingunitofacompany,firmorestablishment.196
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c.FinalityofthedecisionoftheBLRorOfficeoftheDOLESecretary. The decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations or the Office of the DOLE Secretary shall become final and executory after ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the parties, unless a motion for its reconsideration is filed by any party therein within the same period. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Bureau of Labor RelationsortheOfficeoftheDOLESecretaryintheexerciseoftheirappellatejurisdictionshallbeallowed.195
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ThedecisionoftheMedArbiterandDOLERegionalDirectormaybeappealedtotheBLRbyanyoftheparties within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, copy furnished the opposing party. The decision of the BLR Director in the exercise of his original jurisdiction may be appealed to the Office of the DOLE Secretary by any party within the same period,copyfurnishedtheopposingparty.Theappealshallbeverifiedunderoathandshallconsistofamemorandumof appealspecificallystatingthegroundsrelieduponbytheappellant,withsupportingargumentsandevidence.194
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Asfarascancellationofunionregistrationisconcerned,incasethedecisionisrenderedbytheBLRDirectorin the exercise of his original jurisdiction, the same may be appealed to the Office of the DOLE Secretary by any party withinthesameperiodoften(10)days,copyfurnishedtheopposingparty.193
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a.Rulesonappeals. ThefollowingaretherulesonappealswithrespecttotheBLR: 1. IntrauniondisputesDecisionsofMedArbitersinintrauniondisputesareappealabletotheBLR.190 2. Interunion disputes Decisions of the MedArbiter in interunion disputes (certification elections) are not appealabletotheBLRbuttotheDOLESecretary.191 3. The BLR exercises appellate jurisdiction over all cases originating from the DOLE Regional Director involvingthefollowingissues: a.Unionregistration; b.Cancellationofcertificatesofunionregistration;and c.Complaintsforexaminationofunionsbooksofaccounts.192
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3. Maintenance and custody of the files of Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs) and other related agreements. 4. Recordsofsettlementoflabordisputes;and 5. CopiesofordersanddecisionsofVoluntaryArbitrators.189
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4.OTHERRELATEDLABORRELATIONSDISPUTES. a.Relatedlaborrelationsdispute,meaning. Related labor relations dispute refers to any conflict between a labor union and the employer or any individual,entityorgroupthatisnotalaborunionorworkersassociation.199 b.Coverageofotherrelatedlaborrelationsdisputes. Otherrelatedlaborrelationsdisputesinclude: (1)cancellationofregistrationofunionsandworkersassociations;and (2)apetitionforinterpleader.200
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(12)Violationsoftherightsandconditionsofmembershipinaunionorworkersassociation; (13)Violations of the rights of legitimate labor organizations, except interpretation of collective bargaining agreements; (14)Such otherdisputes orconflicts involving the rights to selforganization, union membership and collective bargaining (a) betweenandamonglegitimatelabororganizations; (b) betweenandamongmembersofaunionorworkersassociation.198
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5.MEDARBITER.
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Section 1, Rule XI, Book V, Rules to Implement the Labor Code, as amended by Department Order No. 40-03, Series of 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003]. Section 1 [rr], Rule I, Book V, Rules to Implement the Labor Code, as amended by Department Order No. 40-03, Series of 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003]. Section 2, Rule XI, Book V, Ibid.. 201 Section 1 [z], Rule I, Book V, Ibid.. 202 Section 1 [ii], Rule I, Book V, Rules to Implement the Labor Code, as amended by Department Order No. 40-03, Series of 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003]. 203 Id. 204 M. Y. San Biscuits, Inc. v. Laguesma, G.R. No. 95011, April 22, 1991. 205 Central Negros Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. 94045, Sept. 13, 1991. 206 FFW v. Noriel, G.R. Nos. L-47182-83, Oct. 30, 1978, 86 SCRA 132. 207 Dinio v. Laguesma, [G.R. No. 108475, June 9, 1997, 273 SCRA 109]. 208 Furusawa Rubber Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, G. R. No. 121241, Dec. 10, 1997, 282 SCRA 635. 209 Section 1, Rule XXIV, Book V, Rules to Implement the Labor Code, as amended by Department Order No. 40-03, Series of 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003]. 210 Section 4, Rule XI, Book V, Rules to Implement the Labor Code. 211 Verceles v. Bureau of Labor Relations-Department of Labor and Employment, [G.R. No. 152322, February 15, 2005]. 212 Rodriguez v. Director, Bureau of Labor Relations, [G.R. Nos. L-76579-82 and L-80504, August 31, 1988, 165 SCRA 239].
198 199 200
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a.Requirementof30%unionsupportincaseofcomplaintaffectingentiremembership. Wheretheissueinvolvestheentiremembershipofthelabororganization,thecomplaintorpetitionisrequired tobesupportedbyatleastthirtypercent(30%)ofitsmembers.210 However, this 30% support requirement needed to report violations of rights and conditions of union membership,asfoundinthelastparagraphofArticle241oftheLaborCode,neednotbestrictlyobserved.211 Itisthusnotmandatory.212
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6. RULEON30%SUPPORTREQUIREMENTTOFILEACOMPLAINTORPETITION.
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c.SomeprinciplesonthejurisdictionofMedArbiters. 1. The MedArbiter has authority to decide on the issue of whether an employeremployee relationship exists.204 2. Heisalsoempoweredtodecideotherissuesrelatedtotheeligibilityofemployeestovote.205 3. He cannot order the renegotiation of a CBA, his authority being confined to the determination of the exclusivebargainingagentinthebargainingunit.206 4. Heispossessedofthepowertoissuetemporaryrestrainingorderandthewritofinjunctioninappropriate cases.207 5. FactualfindingsofMedArbitersareaccordedgreatrespect.208 6. He may, upon his own initiative or on motion of any interested party, issue a writ of execution on a judgment withinfive (5)yearsfrom thedateitbecomes final and executory, requiringtheSheriff or aduly deputizedofficertoexecuteorenforcethesame.209
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b.MedArbiterhasnojurisdictionovercancellationofunionregistrationcases. Specifically excepted from the jurisdiction of MedArbiters are cases involving the cancellation of union registration.203ThesamedevolvesupontheDOLERegionalDirectorortheBLRDirector,intheexerciseoftheiroriginal jurisdiction.
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a.MedArbiter;jurisdiction. The MedArbiter refers to an officer in the DOLE Regional Office or in the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) authorizedtohearanddecidethefollowingcases: 1. representationcases; 2. interuniondisputes; 3. intrauniondisputes;and 4. otherrelatedlaborrelationsdisputes.202
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c.Interpleader,meaning. Interpleader refers to a proceeding brought by a party against two or more parties with conflicting claims, compelling the claimants to litigate between and among themselves their respective rights to the claim, thereby relievingthepartysofilingfromsuitstheymayotherwisebringagainstit.201
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1.NATIONALCONCILIATIONANDMEDIATIONBOARD(NCMB).
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b.ConciliatorMediator. AConciliatorMediatorreferstoanofficeroftheNCMBwhoseprincipalfunctionistoassistinthesettlement and disposition of labormanagement disputes through conciliation and preventive mediation, including the promotion andencouragementofvoluntaryapproachestolabordisputespreventionandsettlement.216
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2.CONCILIATIONANDMEDIATION.
See Section 1 of Rule XIV of the Implementing Rules of Book V ; See also Diokno v. Hon. Cacdac, [G.R. No. 168475, July 4, 2007]. Section 1 [e], Rule I, Book V, Rules to Implement the Labor Code, as amended by Department Order No. 40-03, Series of 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003]. Section 1[15], Rule III, NCMB Manual of Procedures for Conciliation and Preventive Mediation Cases. 216 Section 1 [k], Rule I, Book V, Rules to Implement the Labor Code, as amended by Department Order No. 40-03, Series of 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003]. 217 See Section 22 of Executive Order No. 126, [Reorganizing the Ministry of Labor and Employment and for Other Purposes] promulgated on January 30, 1987 by President Corazon C. Aquino, as amended by Section 4 of Executive Order No. 251 promulgated on July 25, 1987, creating the NCMB.
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c.Distinctionbetweenconciliationandmediation. Generally, there is no marked distinctions between conciliation and mediation. The reason is that In both cases, a neutral third party (called Conciliator or Mediator) is tasked to assist two or more opposing parties in findingappropriateresolutiontoadispute. Philippine law and jurisprudence do not embody any specific distinctions between these two as in fact, thereappearstobenouniversaldefinitionofthesewidelyacceptedalternativemodeofdisputeresolution. In other jurisdictions, however, the principal distinction between conciliation and mediation lies on the extentofthepowerandauthoritygrantedtotheneutralthirdparty. In mediation, the Mediator normally facilitates a deliberation or discussion of the issues between the parties. He may or may not offer any opinions on the strength and weaknesses of each party's position and arguments.Thus,mediationmaybeclassifiedintotwo,namely: 1. FacilitativeMediationwheretheMediatordoesnotmakeorofferanyopinion;or 2. EvaluativeMediationwheretheMediatoroffersanopinionwhichisnotbindingontheparties. It bears stressing, however, that regardless of which of the 2 methods above is chosen, the Mediator is notempoweredtoimposehiswillontheparties.
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b.Jurisdictionoverconciliation,mediationandvoluntaryarbitrationcases. Originally, conciliation, mediation and voluntary arbitration functions are vested with the Bureau of Labor Relations.Thesefunctions,however,wereallabsorbedbytheNCMBunderthelawwhichcreatedit.217
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a.Conciliationormediation,meaning. Both the terms conciliation and mediation refer to a process whereby a third person usually called Conciliator (in case of conciliation) or Mediator (in case of mediation), intervenes in a dispute involving two or more conflicting parties for the purpose of reconciling their differences or persuading them into adjusting or settling their dispute. The Conciliator or Mediator normally does not make or render any decision, his role being confined to the functionsaforedescribed.
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d.Notbeingaquasijudicialagency,NCMBsrulingsarenotcognizablebytheCourtofAppeals. This was the holding in the same case of Tabigue [supra]. Hence, NCMBs decisions cannot be elevated to the CourtofAppealsunderRule43oftheRulesofCourt.
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c.NCMBisnotaquasijudicialagency. Accordingtothe2009caseofTabiguev.InternationalCopraExportCorporation,[G.R.No.183335,December 23, 2009], based on the functions of the NCMB, as enumerated in Section 22 of Executive Order No. 126 (the ReorganizationActoftheMinistryofLaborandEmployment),itcannotbeconsideredaquasijudicialagency.
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a.TheBoardundertheLaborCode. The word Board as used in the Labor Code refers to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board 214 (NCMB). ItisanagencyattachedtotheDepartmentofLaborandEmploymentprincipallyinchargeofthesettlement of labor disputes through conciliation, mediation and of the promotion of voluntary approaches to labor dispute preventionandsettlement.215
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Relevant Provisions: 1. Executive Order No. 126, [Reorganizing the Ministry of Labor and Employment and for Other Purposes] (January 30, 1987) 2. Executive Order No. 251[Creating the NCMB] (July 25, 1987) Both issued by President Corazon C. Aquino
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============================================ TOPIC UNDER THE SYLLABUS: 4. National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a. Conciliation vs. Mediation b. Preventive Mediation ============================================
b.30%notrequiredifentireunionmembershipisnotinvolved. The30%requirementisnotnecessaryiftheissuedoesnotinvolvetheentiremembershipoftheunion.213
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Article 233, Labor Code; Section 2, Rule XXII, Book V, Rules to Implement the Labor Code, as amended by Department Order No. 40-03, Series of 2003, [February 17, 2003]. Section 22, Executive Order No. 126. Section 1 [20], Rule III, NCMB Manual of Procedures for Conciliation and Preventive Mediation Cases; See also Section 1 [mm], Rule I, Book V, Rules to Implement the Labor Code, as amended by Department Order No. 40-03, Series of 2003, [February 17, 2003]. 221 Insular Hotel Employees Union-NFL v. Waterfront Insular Hotel Davao, [G.R. Nos. 174040-41, September 22, 2010]. 222 Id.; Section 3, Rule IV of the NCMB Manual of Procedure. 223 NUWHRAIN v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 125561, March 6, 1998, 287 SCRA 192]; Philcom Employees Union v. Philippine Global Communications, [G.R. No. 144315, July 17, 2006].
218 219 220
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e.Strikeisillegalifstagedafterconversionofthenoticeofstrikeintoapreventivemediationcase. AcaseinpointisPhilippineAirlines,Inc.v.SecretaryofLaborandEmployment,[G.R.No.88210,January23, 1991, 193 SCRA 223], where the strike was declared illegal for lack of a valid notice of strike in view of the NCMBs conversionofsaidnoticeintoapreventivemediationcase. It is clear, according to San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 119293, June 10, 2003], that the moment the NCMB orders the preventive mediation in a strike case, the union thereupon loses the notice of strike it had filed. Consequently,ifitstilldefiantlyproceedswiththestrikewhilemediationisongoing,thestrikeisillegal.223
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d.Conversionofanoticeofstrike/lockoutintoapreventivemediationcaseresultsinitsdismissal. Once a notice of strike/lockout is converted into a preventive mediation case, it will be dropped from the docket of notices of strike/lockout. Once dropped therefrom, a strike/lockout can no longer be legally staged based on thesamenotice.Theconversionhastheeffectofdismissingthenotice.
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c.Authoritytoconvertanoticeofstrike/lockoutintoapreventivemediationcase. TheNCMBhastheauthoritytoconvertanoticeofstrike/lockoutfiledbytheunionintoapreventivemediation caseunderanyofthefollowingcircumstances: 1. Whentheissuesraisedinthenoticeofstrike/lockoutarenotstrikeableincharacter. 2. Whenthepartywhichfiledthenoticeofstrike/lockoutasksfortheconversion. 3. When both parties to a labor dispute mutually agree to have it subjected to preventive mediation proceeding.
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b.Someprinciplesonpreventivemediation. 1. Filing of notice of preventive mediation, first step to submit case for preventive mediation. It is only after thisstepthatasubmissionagreementmaybeenteredintobythepartiesconcerned.221 2. Only certified or duly recognized bargaining representatives may file a notice or request for preventive mediationincasesofbargainingdeadlocksandunfairlaborpractices.222 3. Noticeofpreventivemediationisdifferentfromthenoticetostrikeorlockout.
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a.NCMBsauthoritytoeffectconversionofanoticeofstrike/lockoutintoapreventivemediationcase. Preventive mediation, as a remedy, is not found in the Labor Code. But under the law which created the NCMB,oneofitsfunctionsistoprovidepreventivemediationtodisputingparties.219 Thisremedycoverspotentiallabordisputesthatarethesubjectofaformalorinformalrequestforconciliation andmediationassistancesoughtbyeitherorbothpartiesorupontheinitiativeoftheNCMBtoavoidtheoccurrenceof actuallabordisputes.220
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c.Privilegednatureoftheinformationinconciliationandmediationproceedings. Any information and statements made at conciliation proceedings should be treated as a privileged communication and thus may not be used as an evidence in any proceedings. They are inadmissible in evidence. Conciliators and similar officials are not allowed to testify in any court or body regarding any matters taken up at conciliationproceedingsconductedbythem.218 Theprivilegednatureofthecommunicationappliesnotonlyincasesofconciliationandmediationproceedings before the BLR, its MedArbiters or any of its hearing officers but also in similar proceedings conducted by other labor officials, such as the ConciliatorsMediators of the NCMB as well as the Labor Arbiters and the Commissioners of the NLRC. For instance, in modifying the award of annual salary increases given by the Secretary of Labor and Employment to the employees under the CBA, in thecase ofNissan Motors Philippines,Inc. v. Secretaryof Labor and Employment, [G.R. Nos. 15819091, June 21, 2006], the Supreme Court pointed out that it cannot sanction the award madebythepublicrespondentDOLESecretarybasedostensiblyontherevelationoftheNCMBAdministratorthatwas sourced from the confidential position given to him by petitioner company. The reason for this is simple. Article 233 of theLaborCodeprohibitstheuseinevidenceofanyconfidentialinformationgivenduringconciliationproceedings.The NCMBAdministratorclearlybreachedthisprovisionoflaw.
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Inconciliation,theConciliatorisgivenmorepowerandauthorityinthathemaynotonlyofferanopinion on the issues at hand but may actually make a binding opinion thereon provided the parties stipulate in advance thereon.Hisopinionisbasedonthefactsandthelawinvolvedinthecontroversybeforehim. It may thus be observed that conciliation is more formal than mediation in the sense that the formers opinion,unlikethelatters,maybebindingontheparties,althoughitmaybemerelytemporaryincharacter.
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1.SMALLMONEYCLAIMS(ORSIMPLEMONEYCLAIMS).
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g.AppealsfromdecisionsoftheDOLERegionalDirectorunderArticle129. 1. AppealistotheNLRCandnottotheDOLESecretary. 2. BasisoftheappealisArticle129andnotArticle223oftheLaborCode. 3. Reglementaryperiodofappealis5calendardays. 4. Motionforextensionofthereglementaryperiod,notallowed. 5. GroundsforappealandrequisitesforperfectionofappealtotheNLRCaresimilartothoseofappealsfrom decisionsoftheLaborArbitersunderArticle223oftheLaborCode.
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f.Employmentrelationshipshouldnolongerexistatthetimeoftheinitiationofthecomplaintformonetary claimunderArticle129. If the employment relationship still exists at the time of the filing of the complaint, the case necessarily falls under the coverage of Article 128 where it is a prerequisite that such relationship should still exist at the time of the initiationofthecomplaint. If the employment relationship no longer exists, the complaint falls under Article 129 for as long as the terminated employee does not raise the issue of legality of his dismissal or asserts any claim for reinstatement and merelyconfineshiscomplaintonlyonhismonetaryclaimswhichshouldnotexceedP5,000.00. Once the employeremployee relationship has already ceased and the legality of the dismissal is raised and reinstatement is sought, jurisdiction thereover necessarily falls under the Labor Arbiter by virtue of Article 217 of the LaborCode.Andsuchjurisdictioncoverstherecoveryofmonetaryandotherbenefitsconsequenttosuchdismissal.229
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d.WhenclaimdoesnotexceedP5,000.00butemployeepraysforreinstatement. Even if the individual claims of the employees do not exceed P5,000.00, if they include claims for reinstatement,thematterfallswithintheoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionoftheLaborArbiter.228Inotherwords,ifthe monetaryclaimisassertedaspartofanillegaldismissalcase,theamountofmonetaryclaimbecomesimmaterialsince theprincipalactionistheillegaldismissalwhichappropriatelyfallsunderthejurisdictionoftheLaborArbiter.
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c.JurisdictionwhentotalmonetaryclaimexceedsP5,000.00. Article 217 [a] (6) grants jurisdiction to the Labor Arbiters over all monetary claims arising from employer employeerelations,includingthoseofpersonsindomesticorhouseholdservice,ifthetotalamountthereofexceedsfive thousandpesos(P5,000.00),regardlessofwhetheraccompaniedwithaclaimforreinstatement.226 Incaseofnumerousclaimants,theindividualclaimshouldnotexceedP5,009.00.227
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b.RequisitesforthevalidexerciseofjurisdictionbyDOLERegionalDirectorsorHearingOfficersunderArticle 129. Thefollowingrequisitesmustconcur: (1) The claim is presented by an employee or person employed in domestic or household service or househelperunderthecode; (2) Theclaimantwhoseemploymenthasbeensevereddoesnotseekreinstatement;and (3) TheaggregatemoneyclaimoftheemployeeorhousehelperdoesnotexceedP5,000.00.224 In the absence of any of the aforesaid three (3) requisites, the Labor Arbiters have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all claims arising from employeremployee relations, other than claims for employees compensation, socialsecurity,PhilHealthandmaternitybenefits.225
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a.Claimsthatmayberecovered. Article 129 contemplates the recovery of wages and other monetary claims and benefits, including legal interest, owing to an employee or person employed in domestic or household service or househelper under the Labor Code,arisingfromemployeremployeerelations.
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=========================== TOPIC UNDER THE SYLLABUS: 5. DOLE Regional Directors a. Small money claims ===========================
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1.VISITORIALANDENFORCEMENTPOWERS.
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1.1.VISITORIALPOWERUNDERARTICLE128.
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d.DulyauthorizedrepresentativesbeingreferredtoinArticle128. The DOLE Regional Directors are the duly authorized representatives of the DOLE Secretary referred to in Article128oftheLaborCode.231
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MaternityChildrensHospitalv.SecretaryofLabor,[G.R.No.78909,June30,1989]. Accordingtothiscase,anyawardsgrantedarenotconfinedtoemployeeswhosignedthecomplaintinspection but are equally applicable to all those who were employed by the establishment concerned at the time the complaint was filed, even if they were not signatories thereto. The reason is that the visitorial and enforcement powers are relevantto,andmaybeexercisedover,establishments,notoverindividualemployeesthereof,todeterminecompliance bysuchestablishmentswithlaborstandardslaws.
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c.Subjectofthevisitorialandenforcementpowers. The subject of the visitorial and enforcement powers granted to the DOLE Secretary or his duly authorized representativesunderArticle128istheestablishmentwhichisunderinspectionandnottheemployeesthereof.
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b.Natureofthevisitorialandenforcementpowers. The visitorial and enforcement powers granted to the DOLE Secretary or his duly authorized representatives areinthenatureofaquasijudicialpower.230
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a.3separatepowerstreatedinArticle128. Thethree(3)kindsofpowertreatedinArticle128areasfollows: 1.Visitorialpowerwhichisembodiedinparagraph[a]thereof; 2.Enforcementpowerwhichistreatedinparagraphs[b]and[c]thereof;and 3.Appellatepowerorpowerofreviewwhichisfoundinthesubparagraphofparagraph[b]thereof.
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================================= TOPIC UNDER THE SYLLABUS: 6. DOLE Secretary a. Visitorial and Enforcement Powers =================================
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a.GrantofappellatepowertotheDOLESecretary,anewprovisioninArticle128[b].
Dole Philippines, Inc. v. Esteva, G.R. No. 161115, Nov. 30, 2006. San Miguel Corporation v. The Hon. CA, G.R. No. 146775, Jan. 30, 2002 Article 128 [a], Labor Code; Section 1, Rule X, Book III, Rules to Implement the Labor Code, as amended by Department Order No. 7-A, Series of 1995. 233 Article 128 [b], Labor Code. 234 Article 128 [c], Ibid.; Section 3 [a] and [b], Rule X, Book III, Rules to Implement the Labor Code. 235 Article 128 [f], Labor Code.
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Theenforcementpowerincludes: a.to issue compliance orders to give effect to the labor standards provisions of the Labor Code and other labor legislations based on the findings of labor employment and enforcement officers or industrial safety engineersmadeinthecourseofinspection. b.to issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their orders, except in cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor employment and enforcement officer and raisesissuessupportedbydocumentaryproofswhichwerenotconsideredinthecourseofinspection.233 c. to order stoppage of work or suspension of operations of any unit or department of an establishment when noncompliance with the law or implementing rules and regulations poses grave and imminent dangertothehealthandsafetyofworkersintheworkplace.Withintwentyfour(24)hours,ahearingshall beconductedtodeterminewhetheranorderforthestoppageofworkorsuspensionofoperationsshallbe lifted or not. In case the violation is attributable to the fault of the employer, he shall pay the employees concernedtheirsalariesorwagesduringtheperiodofsuchstoppageofworkorsuspensionofoperation.234 d. to require employers, by appropriate regulations, to keep and maintain such employment records as may benecessaryinaidofhisvisitorialandenforcementpowersundertheLaborCode.235
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Thevisitorialpowercoversandincludes: a.access to employers records and premises at any time of the day or night, whenever work is being undertakentherein;and b.theright: 1. tocopyfromsaidrecords; 2. to question any employee and investigate any fact, condition or matter which may be necessary to determineviolationsorwhichmayaidintheenforcementoftheLaborCodeandofanylaborlaw,wage order,orrulesandregulationsissuedpursuantthereto.232
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See Article 128 [b], Labor Code. Section 1, Rule IV of the Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the Regional Offices; See also University of Immaculate Concepcion, v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, [G.R. No. 143557, June 25, 2004]. Section 2, Rule IV, Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the Regional Offices. 239 See also Bay Haven, Inc. v. Abuan, [G.R. No. 160859, July 30, 2008].
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TheappealfromtheorderoftheDOLERegionalDirectorissuedunderArticle128shouldbemadetotheDOLE Secretary.236 b.Reglementaryperiod. Ten(10)calendardaysfromreceiptofacopyoftheorderoftheDOLERegionalDirector.237 c.Groundsforappeal. Theaggrievedparty may appealtotheSecretary of LaborandEmploymenttheorder oftheRegionalDirector onanyofthefollowinggrounds: 1.thereisaprimafacieevidenceofabuseofdiscretiononthepartoftheRegionalDirector; 2. theorderwassecuredthroughfraud,coercionorgraftandcorruption; 3. theappealismadepurelyonquestionsoflaw;or 4.serious errors in the findings of facts were committed which, if not corrected, would cause grave and irreparabledamageorinjurytotheappellant.238 2.REQUISITESFORTHEVALIDEXERCISEOFTHEVISITORIALANDENFORCEMENTPOWERSUNDERARTICLE128,AS AMENDED. Three(3)requisitesshouldconcur: a. Theemployeremployeerelationshipshouldstillexist; b. Thefindingsinquestionweremadeinthecourseofinspectionbythelaboremploymentandenforcement officersorindustrialsafetyengineers;and c. TheemployeeshavenotyetinitiatedanyclaimorcomplaintwiththeDOLERegionalDirectorunderArticle 129,ortheLaborArbiter,underArticle217. 2.1.FIRSTREQUISITE:EMPLOYMENTRELATIONSHIPSHOULDSTILLEXISTATTHETIMEOFTHEINITIATIONOFTHE ACTIONUNDERARTICLE128[B]. a.Existenceofemployeremployerrelationship,essential. EJRCraftsCorp.v.Hon.CA,[G.R.No.154101,March10,2006] It was held that considering that there still exists an employeremployee relationship between petitioner and private respondents and that the case involves violations of the labor standard provisions of the Labor Code, the DOLE Regional Director has jurisdiction to hear and decide the instant case in conformity with Article 128 [b] of the Labor Code.239 RizalSecurity&ProtectiveServices,Inc.v.Hon.Maraan,[G.R.No.124915,February18,2008]. TheSupremeCourtruledthatwhatismaterialtoconsideristhatatthetimeofthefilingofthecomplaintsor claims for payment of monetary benefits with the DOLE Regional Office, the complainants were still employees of petitionercompany. b.LaborArbiterhasjurisdictionintheabsenceofemploymentrelationship. BatongBuhayGoldMines,Inc.v.Sec.DelaSerna,[G.R.No.86963,August6,1999,370Phil.872]. If at the time of the initiation of the action under Article 128 [b], the employeremployee relationship had alreadyceasedtoexist,itisnottheDOLERegionalDirectorbuttheLaborArbiterwhohasjurisdictionoverthesame. 2.2.SECONDREQUISITE:THEFINDINGSSHOULDBEMADEINTHECOURSEOFINSPECTION. Under the second of the three (3) requisites for the valid exercise of the visitorial and enforcement power under Article 128 [b], it is essential that the findings in question were made in the course of inspection by the labor employmentandenforcementofficersorindustrialsafetyengineers. 2.3.THIRDREQUISITE:NOACTIONONTHESAMEVIOLATIONOFLABORSTANDARDLAWSHASYETBEENFILED UNDEREITHERARTICLES129OR217OFTHELABORCODE. Corollarytothesecondrequisiteaboveisthethird(3rd)requisitethattheaffectedemployeesshouldnothave initiated yet any claim or complaint on the violation of the labor standards provisions of the law with either the DOLE Regional Director under Article 129, or the Labor Arbiter, under Article 217 of the Labor Code. This is as it should be becauseoncethecomplainthasalreadybeentakencognizanceofbytheDOLERegionalDirectorunderArticle129.orby the LaborArbiter underArticle 217, jurisdiction attaches thereto and willnot be lostas a result of the findings made in thecourseofinspectionbythelaboremploymentandenforcementofficersorindustrialsafetyengineers.
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3.JURISDICTIONALDISTINCTIONSAMONGARTICLES128[B],129AND217. 1.Onthenatureoftheproceedingsandtheconcomitantpowersgranted. Article 128 [b] involves the exercise of visitorial and enforcement powers by the DOLE Secretary or his duly authorizedrepresentatives(referringtoDOLERegionalDirectors). Article129involvestheexerciseofadjudicatorypowerovermonetaryclaimsnotexceedingP5,000.00andnot accompanied by any claim for reinstatement by the DOLE Regional Directors or any of the duly authorized hearing officersofDOLE. Article 217 involves the exercise by the Labor Arbiters of their quasijudicial power to hear and decide monetaryclaimsexceedingP5,000.00regardlessofwhetheraccompaniedwithaclaimforreinstatement. 2.Onthepersonorofficergrantedthepowers. Article 128 [b] grants the power specifically to the DOLE Secretary or his duly authorized representatives (referringtoDOLERegionalDirectors). Article 129 grants the power specifically to the DOLE Regional Directors or any of the duly authorized hearing officersofDOLE. Article217grantsthepowerspecificallytotheLaborArbitersoftheNLRC. 3.Onthesubjectmatter. Article128[b]appliestoinspectioncasesinvolvinganyviolationsofthelaborstandardsprovisionsoftheLabor Code and other labor legislations regardless of the amount of monetary claims involved. Moreover, it is not only confinedtomonetaryclaimsbutalsoincludesviolationsofoccupationalsafetyandhealthstandards. Article129appliestomonetaryclaimswhosetotalamountdoesnotexceedP5,000.00. Article217appliestomonetaryclaimsexceedingP5,000.00. 4.Ontheaccompanyingclaimforreinstatement. Article128[b]appliesonlytoinspectioncaseswithoutanyaccompanyingclaimforreinstatement. Article129appliesonlywhenthemonetaryclaimisnotaccompaniedbyanyissueinvolvingreinstatement. Article 217 applies to monetary claims exceeding P5,000.00, irrespective of whether or not accompanied by a claimforreinstatement. 5.Onthepartyinitiatingtheaction. Article 128 [b] contemplates situations where the case for violation of labor standards laws and other labor legislationsarosefromtheroutineinspectionconductedbythelaboremploymentandenforcementofficerorindustrial safety engineers of the DOLE, with or without a complaint initiated by an interested party. Here, it is the DOLE which generallyinitiatestheactionmotuproprio. Article 129contemplates situations where there isa complaint initiatedbyan interestedpartyfor recovery of wages, simple money claims and other benefits. Here, it is the complainant (aggrieved employee) who initiates the action. Article 217 contemplates situations where a complaint is initiated by a worker or employee. Here, it is the complainantwhoinitiatestheaction. 6.Ontheexistenceofemployeremployeerelationship. Article128[b]isapplicableonlywhentheemployeremployeerelationshipstillexists.Incasetherelationship nolongerexists,monetaryclaimsmayfalleitherundertheexclusiveandoriginaljurisdictionoftheLaborArbiterswhen thetotalamountexceedsP5,000.00orundertheexclusiveandoriginaljurisdictionoftheDOLERegionalDirectorifthe totalamountthereofdoesnotexceedP5,000.00.Accordingly,ifonthefaceofthecomplaint,itcanbeascertainedthat the employeremployee relationship no longer exists, the case, whether or not accompanied by an allegation of illegal dismissal, should immediately be endorsed by the DOLE Regional Director to any of the Labor Arbiters of the NLRC. (Section3,RuleII,RulesontheDispositionofLaborStandardsCasesintheRegionalOffices,Sept.16,1987). Article129isapplicablewhentheemployeremployeerelationshipnolongerexistsandthemoneyclaimarose fromsaidrelationshipandthetotalamountthereofdoesnotexceedP5,000.00. Article 217 is applicable irrespective of whether or not the employeremployee relationship still exists for as longastheclaimarosefromthesaidrelationshipandthetotalamountofthemonetaryclaimsexceedsP5,000.00. 7.Ontheremedyofappeal,howtaken. Article128[b]grantsappealfromtheorderissuedbythedulyauthorizedrepresentativeoftheDOLESecretary tothelatter. Article 129 grants appeal from the decision of the Regional Director or any of the duly authorized hearing officersofDOLEtotheNLRC. Article217grantsappealfromthedecisionoftheLaborArbitertotheNLRC. 8.Onthereglementaryperiodofappeal. Article128[b]prescribesnospecificreglementaryperiodforappeal.Thelawissilentonthismatter.However, undertheRulesontheDispositionofLaborStandardsCasesintheRegionalOfficesissuedonSeptember16,1987bythe
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a.Powertosuspendeffectsoftermination. OneoftheextraordinarypowersgrantedtotheSecretaryofLaborandEmploymentishispowerunderArticle 277 [b] of the Labor Code to suspend the effects of termination effected by an employer which he may exercise even pendingresolutionofthelegalityorvaliditythereofinanappropriateproceeding.
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1.SUSPENSIONOFTHEEFFECTSOFTERMINATION.
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11.Ontheperiodtodecideappealandfinalityofdecision. Article 128 [b] does not prescribe the period within which to decide the appeal and when such decision will becomefinalandexecutory.However,itsimplementingrules,whilenotprovidingtheperiodwithinwhichthedecision should be rendered, mention that the decisions, orders or resolutions of the DOLE Secretary shall become final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof. (See Section 5, Rule V, Rules on the Disposition of Labor StandardsCasesintheRegionalOffices). Article129mentionsexpresslythattheNLRCshouldresolvetheappealwithinten(10)calendardaysfromthe submission of the last pleading required or allowed under its rules, which period is different from that provided under Article 223 which is within twenty (20)calendar days. With respect to the finality of the decision on the appealedcase, Article 223 provides that the same shall be final and executory after ten(10) calendardays from receipt thereof by the parties. Article217doesnotembodytheprovisionontheperiodwithinwhichtodecideappealedcasesortheperiod withinwhichsuchdecisionshallbecomefinalandexecutory.ThesemattersareprovidedunderArticle223oftheLabor Code. ===================================== TOPIC UNDER THE SYLLABUS: 6. DOLE Secretary b. Power to suspend effects of termination =====================================
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NOTE:ALTHOUGHNOTPRESCRIBEDINTHESYLLABUS,ADISCUSSIONONTHEJURISDICTIONOFTHEVOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR, VISVIS THE GRIEVANCE MACHINERY/PROCEDURE AND LABOR ARBITER IS NECESSARY, TOFULLYAPPRECIATETHISTOPICONVOLUNTARYARBITRATORS.
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UniversityofSto.Tomasv.NLRCandUSTFacultyUnion,[G.R.No.89920,October18,1990] In this case, all the sixteen (16) officers and directors of the faculty union were terminated on the grounds of grave misconduct, serious disrespect to a superior and conduct unbecoming a faculty member. As a result of said dismissal, some faculty members staged mass leaves of absence for several days, disrupting classes in all levels at the university. The faculty union filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice with the Labor Arbiter who, onaprimafacieshowingthattheterminationwascausingaseriouslabordispute,certifiedthemattertotheSecretary of Labor and Employment for a possible suspension of the effects of termination. On the basis of this, DOLE Secretary FranklinDrilonissuedanordersuspendingtheeffectsoftheterminationoftheunionofficersanddirectorsandordering the university to accept them back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to their dismissal. Later, on the basis of a petition for assumption or certification filed by the university, Secretary Drilon modified said order by certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration pursuant to Article 263 [g] of the Labor Code. He accordingly ordered the university to readmit all its faculty members, including the 16 union officers and directors,underthesametermsandconditionsprevailingpriortothedispute. Based on the foregoing, it may be said that suspension of the effects of termination has the same effect as assumptionorcertificationasfarasthereinstatementoftheaffectedemployeesisconcerned. =========================== TOPIC UNDER THE SYLLABUS: 7. Voluntary Arbitrators Jurisdiction ===========================
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f.CasewhereDOLESecretaryorderedboththesuspensionoftheeffectsofterminationandthereturnto workofemployeespursuanttoacertificationorderissuedunderArticle263[g].
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e.WhoaretheappropriateofficialsreferredtoinArticle277[b]? The particular portion of Article 277 [b] on suspension of the effects of termination empowers the appropriateofficialoftheDepartmentofLaborandEmploymentbeforewhomthedisputeispending,tomakethe prima facie finding that the termination may cause a serious labor dispute or is in implementation of a mass layoff which finding is a prerequisite to the issuance by the Secretary of Labor and Employment of the order suspending the effectsofthetermination. The said provision does not specify who this appropriate official is. A dissection of the Labor Code indicates thatthefollowingofficialshavethepowertotakecognizanceofterminationdisputesintheexerciseoftheiroriginaland exclusivejurisdiction: 1. LaborArbitersunderparagraph[a](2)ofArticle217; 2. VoluntaryArbitratorsorpanelsofVoluntaryArbitratorsunderArticles261and262; 3. TheSecretaryofLaborandEmployment,intheexerciseofhisassumptionpowerinnationalinterestcases. Underparagraph[g]ofArticle263,hemaytakecognizanceofterminationdisputesthatareincludedinthe case/soverwhichheassumesjurisdictionthereunder. 4. TheNLRC, in national interest cases certifiedto itforcompulsory arbitration by the Secretary of Laborand EmploymentunderthesameArticle263[g].
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d.Reinstatementpendingresolutionoftheterminationdispute. Suspension of the effects of termination will necessarily result in the immediate reinstatement of the terminatedemployees.AnorderofreinstatementpendingresolutionofthecasemaythusbeissuedbytheSecretaryof LaborandEmploymentpursuanttothispower.(No.12,BriefingPaperonR.A.6715).
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c.Rationaleforsuspendingtheeffectsoftermination. Theobviouspurposebehindthisruleistobringthepartiesbacktothestatusquoantelitem,thatis,theirstate of relationship prior to the termination. In this way, the workers will be litigating the issue of the validity or legality of their termination on more or less equal footing with the employer since they will not be deprived of their wages while thelitigationisongoing.
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b.Grounds. TheDOLESecretarymaysuspendtheeffectsofterminationpendingresolutionofthedisputeintheeventofa primafaciefindingbytheappropriateofficialoftheDOLEbeforewhomthedisputeispendingthat: 1.theterminationmaycauseaseriouslabordispute;or 2.theterminationisinimplementationofamasslayoff.240
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Article 260, Labor Code. See Articles 261 and 262, Labor Code. , See paragraph 2, Article 261, as amended by R.A. No. 6715 and implemented by Department Order No. 40-03; See 244 Par. 2, Article 261, Labor Code; Section 4, Rule XIX, Book V, Rules to Implement the Labor Code, as amended by Department Order No. 40-03, Series of 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003]. 245 Union of Nestle Workers Cagayan de Oro Factory v. Nestle Philippines, Inc., [G.R. No. 148303, October 17, 2002]. 246 Tabigue v. International Copra Export Corporation, [G.R. No. 183335, December 23, 2009]. 247 See Article 217 [c]; San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 108001, March 15, 1996, 255 SCRA 133, 140]. 248 Maneja v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 124013, June 5, 1998, 290 SCRA 603], Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 95940, July 24, 1996] and Atlas Farms, Inc. v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 142244, November 18, 2002]. 249 Vivero v. CA, [G.R. No. 138938, October 24, 2000, 344 SCRA 268, 281]. 250 Landtex Industries v. CA, [G.R. No. 150278, August 9, 2007]. 251 Vivero v. CA, [supra]. 252 Sanyo Philippines Workers Union-PSSLU v. Canizares, [G.R. No. 101619, July 8, 1992]. 253 Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 95940, July 24, 1996].
242 243
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Submissionofanissuetothegrievancemachinery,asageneralrule,isthefirststepbeforevoluntary arbitrationmayberesortedtobytheparties. Thegrievancemachineryhasjurisdictionoverthefollowinggrievances: 1. InterpretationandimplementationoftheCBA;and 2. Interpretationandenforcementofcompanypersonnelpolicies.241 Ifthesetwocasesareunresolvedwithin7daysfromtheirsubmissionforresolutionbytheGrievance Committee,theyshallbeforwardedtoaVoluntaryArbitratorforvoluntaryarbitration. 2.JURISDICTIONOFVOLUNTARYARBITRATORS. a.Originalandexclusivejurisdiction. TheVoluntaryArbitratororpanelofVoluntaryArbitratorsshallhaveexclusiveandoriginaljurisdictionoverthe followingcases: 1. Unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the collective bargaining agreement(CBA). 2. Unresolvedgrievancesarisingfromtheinterpretationorenforcementofcompanypersonnelpolicies. 3. ViolationsoftheCBAwhicharenotgrossincharacter. 4. Wagedistortionissuesarisingfromtheapplicationofanywageordersinorganizedestablishments. 5. Other labor disputes, including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks, upon agreement of the parties.242 6. Unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation and implementation of the Productivity Incentive ProgramsunderR.A.No.6971. b.SomeprinciplesonjurisdictionofVoluntaryArbitrators. 1. CasescognizablebyVoluntaryArbitratorsbutfiledwiththeLaborArbiters,DOLERegionalOfficesorNCMB should be referred to the Voluntary Arbitrators mutually chosen by the parties.243 They are required to immediately dispose and refer the same to the appropriate grievance machinery or voluntary arbitration providedintheCBA.244 2. CasescognizablebyVoluntaryArbitratorsbutfiledwiththeregularcourtsshouldbedismissed.245 3. WHENACASEDOESNOTINVOLVETHEPARTIESTOACBATHEEMPLOYERANDTHEBARGAININGUNION ITISNOTSUBJECTTOVOLUNTARYARBITRATION.Onlydisputesinvolvingtheunionandthecompanyshall bereferredtothegrievancemachineryorvoluntaryarbitrators.246 TERMINATIONDISPUTES. 4. A termination dispute is not a grievable issue; hence, grievance machinery and Voluntary Arbitrators have no jurisdiction over this issue. Termination cases do not call for the interpretation or enforcement of companypersonnelpoliciesandsotheymaynotbeconsideredgrievableorarbitrable.247 5. Interminationcases,ifthebargainingunionisnotnamedapartytotheillegaldismissalsuiteitherbecause itfailedtoobjecttothedismissaloftheemployeeorthesuitwasinitiatedbytheemployeealone,without theassistanceofhisunion,VoluntaryArbitratorhasnojurisdictionthereover.248 6. EvenifitisthepolicyoftheStatetopromotevoluntaryarbitrationasamodeofsettlingdisputes,thisdoes notforeclosethefilingofaterminationcasewiththeLaborArbiter.249 7. To confer jurisdiction with the Voluntary Arbitrator over termination disputes, there must be express agreement between employer and the bargaining agent to submit the termination case to voluntary arbitration.250 8. Even if the CBA provides that termination disputes are grievable, the same is merely discretionary on the partofthepartiesthereto.251 9. The Voluntary Arbitrator has no jurisdiction over cases involving the termination of employment effected pursuanttotheprovisionofaunionsecurityclause.252 10. Even on the issue of termination of employment due to retirement under the retirement plan provided under the CBA, it has been held that the Labor Arbiter and not the Voluntary Arbitrator who has jurisdictionthereover.253 MONEYCLAIMSCASES. 11. The Voluntary Arbitrators have original and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims arising from the interpretationorimplementationoftheCBAand,thosearisingfromtheinterpretationorenforcementof
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See Article 217 [c]; Del Monte Philippines, Inc. v. Saldivar, [G.R. No. 158620, October 11, 2006]. Pursuant to and on the strength of Article 262. Article 124, Labor Code, as amended by Section 3, R.A. No. 6727; Section 7, Chapter II, Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 6727; Section 7, Chapter II, Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 6727; Section 1, Rule VII, Rules of Procedure on Minimum Wage Fixing issued by the National Wages and Productivity Commission on 04 June 1990. 257 Section 8, Rule VII, NCMB Revised Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings [Oct. 15, 2004]; Luzon Development Bank v. Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees, G.R. No. 120319, Oct. 9, 1995. 258 Section 1, Rule VIII, NCMB Revised Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings [Oct. 15, 2004]; See also Article 262-A, Labor Code; Section 8, Rule XIX, Book V, Rules to Implement the Labor Code, as amended by Department Order No. 40-03, Series of 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003]. 259 Section 3, Rule V, NCMB Revised Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings [Oct. 15, 2004]. 260 No. 1, DOLE Circular No. 1, Series of 2006. 261 Id..
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3.LATESTRULE:DOLESECRETARYMAYACTASVOLUNTARYARBITRATOR. a.AdministrativeInterventionforDisputeAvoidance(AIDA). AnewformofdisputesettlementbytheDOLESecretarywasenunciatedinDOLECircularNo.1,Seriesof2006 issued on August 11, 2006. This recourse is separate from the established dispute resolution modes of mediation, conciliation and arbitration under the Labor Code, and is an alternative to other voluntary modes of dispute resolution such as the voluntary submission of a dispute to the Regional Director for mediation, to the NCMB for preventive mediation,ortotheinterventionofaregionalorlocaltripartitepeacecouncilforthesamepurpose.260 b.PartieswhomayrequestfortheDOLESecretarysintervention. Either or both the employer and the certified collective bargaining agent (or the representative of the employees where there is no certified bargaining agent) may voluntarily bring to the Office of the DOLE Secretary, throughaRequestforIntervention,anypotentialorongoingdisputedefinedbelow.261
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c.PowersanddutiesofVoluntaryArbitrators. TheVoluntaryArbitratorshallhavethefollowingpowers: 1. Torequireanypersontoattendhearing/s; 2. To subpoena witnesses and receive documents when the relevancy of the testimony and the materiality thereofhavebeendemonstratedtothearbitrator; 3. Totakewhateveractionisnecessarytoresolvetheissue/ssubjectofthedispute; 4. Toissueawritofexecutiontoenforcefinaldecisionsandinconnectiontherewith,itshallbehisdutyto: 4.1. seetoitthathisdecisionisfullysatisfied; 4.2.inquireintothecorrectnessoftheexecutionofhisfinaldecision; 4.3.considerwhateversuperveningeventthatmaytranspireduringsuchexecution; 4.4.determineeveryquestionoffactandlawwhichmaybeinvolvedintheexecution.259
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STRIKESANDLOCKOUTS. 12. The Voluntary Arbitrators may hear and decide issue of legality of strikes or lockouts for as long as the partiesmutuallyagreetosubmitittovoluntaryarbitration.255 VIOLATIONSOFACBA. 13. Ordinary violation of a CBA which involves noneconomic provisions thereof is not ULP and should be resolved as a grievance or grievable issue properly cognizable under the grievance machinery and voluntaryarbitrationprovisionsofaCBA.IftheviolationoftheCBAisgrossincharacter,i.e.,therefusalto complywiththeeconomicprovisionsthereofisflagrantand/ormalicious,itshouldbetreatedasanunfair labor practice and thus may be taken cognizance of by the Labor Arbiter under Article 217 or by the VoluntaryArbitratororpanelofVoluntaryArbitrators,uponagreementoftheparties,underArticle262of theLaborCode. WAGEDISTORTIONCASES. 14. Jurisdictional over wage distortion cases depends on whether the establishment is organized or unorganized. If organized, the Voluntary Arbitrator has jurisdiction. If unorganized, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction.256 ENFORCEMENTOFDECISIONSOFVOLUNTARYARBITRATORS. 15.Bothpartiestoavoluntaryarbitrationproceedingarerequiredtocomplyvoluntarilyandfaithfullywiththe decisionrenderedtherein.257 16. The Voluntary Arbitrator may issue a writ of execution requiring either the sheriff of the NLRC or the regularcourtsoranypublicofficialwhomthepartiesmayhavedesignatedintheirSubmissionAgreement, toexecutethefinaldecision. 17. IntheabsenceoftheVoluntaryArbitratoror,incaseofhisincapacity,themotionfortheissuanceofawrit of execution should be filed with the Labor Arbiter in the region having jurisdiction over the workplace. Thefilingofamotionfortheissuanceofawritofexecutioniswithoutprejudicetoanyotheractionwhich the aggrieved party may take against the noncomplying party such as a motion for contempt or impositionoffinesandpenalties.258
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companypersonnelpolicies,underArticle261.TheLaborArbitersjurisdictionovermoneyclaimscasesis limitedonlytothosearisingfromstatutesorcontractsotherthanaCBA.254
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Id.. No. 4, Ibid.. No. 54, NCMB Primer on Grievance Settlement and Voluntary Arbitration. 265 Section 1[i], Rule II, NCMB Revised Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings [Oct. 15, 2004].
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c.Potentialorongoingdispute. Apotentialorongoingdisputerefersto: 1. aliveandactivedispute; 2. thatmayleadtoastrikeorlockoutortomassivelaborunrest;and 3. is not the subject of any complaint or notice of strike or lockout at the time a Request for Intervention is made.262 d.PrerequisitetointerventionbytheDOLESecretary. The Office of the Secretary or the Regional Director, in the proper case, shall proceed to intervene after the partiesshallhavemanifestedthat: 1. they voluntarily submit their potential or ongoing dispute to intervention by the Office of the DOLE Secretary; 2. there is no pending notice of strike or lockout or any related complaint in relation to their potential or ongoingdispute; 3. they shall refrain from any strike or lockout or any form of work stoppage or from filing any related complaintwhiletheSecretary'sinterventionisineffect;and 4. they shall abide by the agreement reached, whose terms may be enforced through the appropriate writs issuedbytheDOLESecretary. All agreements settling the dispute should be in writing and signed by the parties as well as the official who mediatedthedispute.263 4. NEW RULE: DOLE REGIONAL DIRECTORS AND ASSISTANT REGIONAL DIRECTORS MAY ACT AS EXOFFICIO VOLUNTARYARBITRATORS. DepartmentOrderNo.8307,Seriesof2007[June8,2007]designatedallDOLERegionalDirectorsandAssistant RegionalDirectorsasExOfficioVoluntaryArbitrators(EVAs)tohavejurisdictionoverthefollowingissues: 1. GrievancesarisingfromtheinterpretationorimplementationoftheCBAs; 2. Grievancesfromtheinterpretationorenforcementofcompanypersonnelpolicies; 3. VoluntaryarbitrationcasesreferredbytheDOLESecretaryundertheDOLEsAdministrativeInterventionfor DisputeAvoidance(AIDA)initiative(providedunderDOLECircularNo.1,Seriesof2006,[supra]); 4. Uponagreementoftheparties,anyotherlabordisputeasmaybesubmittedbytheparties. 5.PHILIPPINEARBITRATIONLAW,NOTAPPLICABLETOLABORCASES. RepublicActNo.876,[TheArbitrationLaw]doesnotapplytovoluntaryarbitrationoflaborcases. 6.ALTERNATIVEDISPUTERESOLUTIONACTOF2004,NOTAPPLICABLETOLABORCASES. RepublicActNo.9285[AlternativeDisputeResolutionActof2004]approvedonApril2,2004,doesnotapply tolaborcases. =========================== TOPIC UNDER THE SYLLABUS: 7. Voluntary Arbitrators a. Submission Agreement =========================== 1.SUBMISSIONAGREEMENT. a.Initiationofarbitration. Anarbitrationmaybeinitiatedeitherbywayof: 1. ASubmissionAgreement;or 2. ADemandorNoticetoArbitrateinvokingthearbitrationclauseintheCBA;or 3. AnAppointmentfromtheNCMB. Sometimes,boththeSubmissionAgreementandtheNoticetoArbitrateareusedinterchangeably.264 b.SubmissionAgreement,defined. A Submission Agreement refers to a written agreement by the parties submitting their case for arbitration, containingastatementoftheissues,thenameoftheirchosenVoluntaryArbitratorandastipulationandanundertaking toabidebyandcomplywiththeresolutionthatmayberenderedtherein,includingthecostofarbitration.265 c.ContentsofaSubmissionAgreement. TheSubmissionAgreementshouldcontain,amongothers,thefollowingstipulations: 1. Anagreementtosubmitthecasetoarbitration;
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2.NOTICETOARBITRATE.
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1.JUDICIALREVIEWOFDECISIONSOFVOLUNTARYARBITRATORS.
Section 5, Rule IV, Ibid.. Section 1[j], Rule II, Ibid.. Section 6, Rule IV, Ibid.. 269 Section 7, Rule IV, Ibid.. 270 No. 55, NCMB Primer on Grievance Settlement and Voluntary Arbitration. 271 Temic Automotive Philippines, Inc. v. Temic Automotive Philippines, Inc. Employees Union FFW, [G.R. No. 186965, December 23, 2009]. 272 Article 262-A, Labor Code; No. 107, NCMB Primer on Grievance Settlement and Voluntary Arbitration.
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a.Decisionsarefinalandexecutory. As a general rule, decisions or awards of Voluntary Arbitrators are final, inappealable and executory after ten (10)calendardaysfromreceiptofacopythereofbytheparties.272
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=========================== TOPIC UNDER THE SYLLABUS: 7. Voluntary Arbitrators a. Rule 43, Rules of Court ===========================
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e.SomeprinciplesinconnectionwithSubmissionAgreement. 1. Partiestoacasemaystillchoosetoexecuteasubmissionagreementevenifthereisalreadyanarbitration clauseintheCBA. 2. PartiesnotimpleadedinthecasearenotboundbythedecisionrenderedbytheVoluntaryArbitrator.271
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d.Submissionagreementandnoticetoarbitrate,distinguished. Submission Agreement is sometimes called a stipulation or an agreement to arbitrate. It is used where thereisnopreviousagreementtoarbitrate.Thesubmissionagreementwhichmustbesignedbybothparties,describes an existing dispute. It often names the arbitrator, prescribes the procedure in the hearing and sometimes contains considerable details of the arbitrators authority and other matters which the parties wish to control. A submission agreement is more appropriate in interest disputes since collective bargaining agreements generally do not provide for the arbitration of such disputes that may arise in the future. Submission agreement is often entered into after the disputehasmaterializedandtheissuescanalreadybedefined. However, a Demand or aNoticeof Intent toArbitrate or simply aNotice to Arbitrate, is moreapplicable to rights disputes because collective bargaining agreements are required under Republic Act No. 6715, to provide for a grievance procedure and a voluntary arbitration clause with respect to disputes arising from the application or interpretationoftheCBAortheinterpretationorenforcementofcompanypersonnelpolicies.Thus,itisperfectlyvalid tostipulateintheCBAonanagreementtoarbitratefuturedisputesthatmayariseunderandduringthetermthereof. Ifadisputeiscoveredbysuchanarbitrationclause,arbitrationmaybeinitiatedunilaterallybyonepartybyservingupon theotherawrittendemandornoticeofintenttoarbitrate.270
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c.ContentsofaNoticetoArbitrate. TheNoticetoArbitrateshouldcontain,amongothers,thefollowing: 1. Thenames,addressesandcontactnumbersofthepartyuponwhomthenoticeismade; 2. ThearbitrationclauseoftheCBA; 3. Thespecificissue/sordispute/stobearbitrated; 4. Thereliefsought;and 5. Thename,addressandcontactnumbersofthepartyinitiatingorrequestingthearbitration.269
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b.SubmissiontoarbitrationthroughNoticetoArbitrate. Ifafterexhaustingthegrievanceprocedure,thegrievanceremainsunresolvedandonepartyrefusestosubmit thesametovoluntaryarbitration,thefollowingprocedureshouldbeobserved: 1. ANoticetoArbitrateshouldbeservedupontherefusingorunwillingparty,copyfurnishedthepermanent VoluntaryArbitrator,ifoneisnamedintheCBA,andtheNCMBRegionalBranchhavingjurisdictionoverthe workplace; 2. After the lapseofthe sevendayperiod within whichto respond totheNotice toArbitrate,thepermanent VoluntaryArbitratorshallimmediatelycommencethearbitrationproceedings; 3. IntheabsenceofapermanentVoluntaryArbitratornamedintheCBA,theNCMBshallappointaVoluntary Arbitrator who shall immediately commence the arbitration proceedings upon receipt of such appointment.268
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a.NoticetoArbitrate,defined. A Notice to Arbitrate refers to a formal demand made by one party to the other for the arbitration of a particulardisputeintheeventofrefusalbyonepartyinaCBAtosubmitthesametoarbitration.267
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Thespecificissue/stobearbitrated; Thename/softheVoluntaryArbitratororpanelofVoluntaryArbitrators; Thenames,addressesandcontactnumbersoftheparties; The agreement to perform or abide by the decision that may be rendered therein by the Voluntary ArbitratororpanelofVoluntaryArbitrators.266
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Continental Marble Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. L-43825, May 9, 1988. Unicraft Industries International Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 134903, March 26, 2001. Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc. v. Magsalin, G.R. No. 90426, Dec. 15, 1989; No. 107, NCMB Primer on Grievance Settlement and Voluntary Arbitration. 276 Honda Phils., Inc. v. Samahan ng Malayang Manggagawa sa Honda, G.R. No. 145561, June 15, 2005; National Steel Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 134468, Aug. 29, 2002; Colegio de San Juan de Letran - Calamba v. Villas, [G.R. No. 137795, March 26, 2003]. 277 Luzon Development Bank v. Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees, [G.R. No. 120319, October 6, 1995]; Oceanic Bic Division (FFW) v. Romero, No. L-43890, July 16, 1984, 130 SCRA 392, 400; See also Ludo & Luym Corporation v. Saornido, G.R. No. 140960, Jan. 20, 2003, 395 SCRA 451, 458. 278 Luzon Development Bank, [supra]; Alcantara, Jr. v. CA, [G.R. No. 143397, August 6, 2002]; See Leyte IV Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. LEYECO IV Employees Union-ALU, G.R. No. 157775, October 19, 2007; Centro Escolar University Faculty and Allied Workers-Independent Union v. Court of Appeals, [G.R. No. 165486, May 31, 2006, 490 SCRA 61, 69-70]. 279 Section 1, in relation to Section 4, of Rule 43, Rules of Court. 280 Saint Louis University, Inc. v. Cobarrubias, [G.R. No. 187104, August 3, 2010]; Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development Corporation v. Formaran III, G.R. No. 175914, Feb. 10, 2009, 578 SCRA 283, 297; Ruiz v. Delos Santos, G.R. No. 166386, Jan. 27, 2009, 577 SCRA 29, 43. 281 Manila Midtown Hotel v. VA Borromeo, [G.R. No. 138305, September 22, 2004], 282 Odango v. NLRC, G.R. No. 147420, June 10, 2004. 283 German Machineries Corporation v. Endaya, G.R. No. 156810, Nov. 25, 2004; Nunal v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 78648, Jan. 24, 1989, 169 SCRA 356, 363. 284 Sea Power Shipping Enterprises, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 138270, June 28, 2001, 412 Phil. 603; Permex, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 125031, Jan. 24, 2000; Aquino v. CA, G.R. No. 149404, Sept. 15, 2006. 285 Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 152568, Feb. 16, 2004. 286 St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998, 295 SCRA 494 (En Banc)]. 287 See Section 4, Rule 65, as amended by Circular No. 39-98 [effective Sept. 1, 1998] and further amended by A. M. No. 00-2-03-SC [effective Sept. 1, 2000]; Labao v. Flores, G.R. No. 187984, Nov. 15, 2010; Laguna Metts Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 185220, July 27, 2009, 594 SCRA 139, 143, citing De Los Santos v. CA, G.R. No. 147912, April 26, 2006, 488 SCRA 351; Yutingco v. CA, 435 Phil. 83, 91 [2002]. 288 Tirazona v. CA, G.R. No. 169712, March 13, 2008.
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b.Judicialreview. It is wellsettled a rule, however, that the findings of fact and law made by the Voluntary Arbitrator may be reviewedbythecourt.273 Judicialreviewisjustifiedincertaincases,274towit: TheVoluntaryArbitratorsdecisionsorawardsmaybecontestedonthefollowinggrounds: 1.Lackorwantofjurisdiction; 2.Graveabuseofdiscretion; 3.Violationofdueprocess; 4.Denialofsubstantivejustice; 5.Erroneousinterpretationofthelaw.275 c.SomeprinciplesinthejudicialreviewofdecisionsoftheVoluntaryArbitrators. 1.FactualfindingsofVoluntaryArbitratorsaccordednotonlyrespectbutfinality.276 2. Voluntary Arbitrator acts in a quasijudicial capacity, although he is not a part of a government unit or a personneloftheDepartmentofLaborandEmployment.277 3. ThemodeisordinaryappealunderRule43ofthe1997RulesofCivilProcedure.278 4.Periodofappealis15days.279 5.Paymentofappealdocketfeewithinprescribedperiod,bothmandatoryandjurisdictional.280 6.AppealwillbedismissediferroneouslyfiledunderRule65insteadofRule43.ItmustbenotedthatRule65 petitionforcertiorariisnotasubstituteforalapsedappeal.281 =========================== TOPIC UNDER THE SYLLABUS: 8. Court of Appeals a. Rule 65, Rules of Court =========================== 1.RULE65CERTIORARIPETITIONTOCAFROMNLRCDECISIONS. a.Certiorari,nature. A decision of the NLRC may be elevated to the Court of Appeals by way of Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari in caseswheresuchdecisionisrendered: 1. withoutjurisdiction;or 2. inexcessofjurisdiction;or 3. withgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdiction. b.SomeprinciplesonRule65certioraripetition. 1. The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the commissionofgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdiction.282 2. Therighttofileaspecialcivilactionofcertiorariisneitheranaturalrightnorapartofdueprocess.Awritof certiorariisaprerogativewrit,neverdemandableasamatterofright,neverissuedexceptintheexerciseof judicialdiscretion.283 3. The jurisdiction of the CA to review a decision of the NLRC in a petition for certiorari does not include the correctnessofitsevaluationoftheevidenceorofitsfactualfindingswhicharegenerallyaccordednotonly respect but also finality, but is confined to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The judicial reviewdoesnotgo as faras to examineand assessthe evidenceof thepartiesand to weightheprobative valuethereof.284 4. CertiorarimaybefiledeveniftheNLRCdecisionhasbecomefinalandexecutory.285 5. CertioraripetitionunderRule65iscognizablebytheCAandnotbytheSC.286 7. Periodwithinwhichtofilecertioraripetitions60dayswhichisinextindible.287 8. 60day period computed from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsiderationornewtrialistimelyfiled,whethersuchmotionisrequiredornot,the60dayperiodshall becountedfromnoticeofthedenialofsaidmotion.288 9.The60dayperiodisreckonedfromreceiptofthedecisionbycounsel,notbyparty.289
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1. APPEALFROMTHECOURTOFAPPEALSTOTHESUPREMECOURTBYPETITIONFORREVIEWONCERTIORARI UNDERRULE45.
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2.PRESCRIPTIVEPERIODOFILLEGALDISMISSALCASES.
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Ginete v. Sunrise Manning Agency, [G.R. No. 142023, June 21, 2001]. Asian Transmission Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 144664, March 15, 2004; See also Tirazona v. CA, G.R. No. 169712, March 13, 2008; San Miguel Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 146775, Jan. 30, 2002, 375 SCRA 311, 315. Malayang Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Associated Anglo American Tobacco Corp. [MAKAMANGGAGAWA] v. Associated Anglo American Tobacco Corp., G.R. No. 156613, Feb. 18, 2008; New Ever Marketing, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 140555, July 14, 2005, 463 SCRA 284, 293-294. 292 Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Picop Resources, Inc.-Southern Philippines Federation of Labor [NAMAPRI-SPFL] v. The Hon. CA, G.R. Nos. 148839-40, Nov. 2, 2006; See also Panganiban v. Tara Trading Shipmanagement, Inc., [G.R. No. 187032, October 18, 2010]. 293 Section 1, Rule II, Book VII, Rules to Implement the Labor Code; E. Ganzon, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 123769, Dec. 22, 1999; Surima v. NLRC, G.R. No. 121147, June 26, 1998. 294 Cadalin v. POEA, [G.R. Nos. 104776, 104911-14 and 105029-32, December 05, 1994]. 295 Degamo v. Avantgarde Shipping Corp., [G.R. No. 154460, November 22, 2005]; Southeastern Shipping v. Navarra, Jr., [G.R. No. 167678, June 22, 2010]; Medline Management, Inc. v. Roslinda, [G.R. No. 168715, September 15, 2010]. 296 University of Pangasinan v. Confesor, G. R. No. 109977, Sept. 5, 1997; Cebu Institute of Technology v. Ople, G.R. No. L-58870, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 503. 297 Callanta v. Carnation Philippines, [G.R. No. 70615, February 29, 1986]; See also PLDT v. Pingol, [G.R. No. 182622, September 8, 2010]; Azcor Manufacturing, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 117963, Feb. 11, 1999; Premiere Development Bank v. NLRC, G.R. No. 114695, July 23, 1998; Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 122075, Jan. 28, 1998, 285 SCRA 297. 298 Paragraph 2, Article 290, Labor Code; Section 2, Rule II, Book VII, Rules to Implement the Labor Code. 299 As provided under Article 247 of the Labor Code.
289 290 291
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b.Prerequisiteforprosecutionofcriminalcases. BeforeacriminalactionforULPmaybefiled,itisaconditionsinequanonthatafinaljudgmentfindingthatan unfair labor practice act was committed by the respondent should first be secured or obtained in the labor or administrativecaseinitiatedbeforetheLaborArbiterortheVoluntaryArbitrator,asthecasemaybe.299Finaljudgment isonethatfinallydisposesoftheactionorproceeding.Forinstance,iftheremedyofappealisavailablebutnoappealis
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a.PrescriptiveperiodofULPcasesis1year(Article290,LaborCode). Theprescriptiveperiodforallcomplaintsinvolvingunfairlaborpracticesisone(1)yearfromthetimetheacts complainedofwerecommitted;otherwise,theyshallbeforeverbarred.298
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3.PRESCRIPTIVEPERIODOFUNFAIRLABORPRACTICE(ULP)CASES.
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a.LegalbasisisnotArticle291oftheLaborCodebutArticle1146oftheCivilCode. The 3year prescriptive period in Article 291 solely applies to money claims but not to illegal dismissal cases which are not in the nature of money claims. The prescriptive period of illegal dismissal cases is 4 years under Article 1146oftheCivilCode.297
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b.Allmoneyclaimsofworkersprescribein3years. Article291contemplatesallmoneyclaimsarisingfromemployeremployeerelationship,including: 1.MoneyclaimsarisingfromtheCBA.294 2.MoneyclaimsofOverseasFilipinoWorkers(OFWs).295 3.Incrementalproceedsfromtuitionincreases.296
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a.Prescriptiveperiodisthree(3)yearsunderArticle291oftheLaborCode. The prescriptive period of all money claims and benefits arising from employeremployee relations is 3 years fromthetimethecauseofactionaccrued;otherwise,theyshallbeforeverbarred.293
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1.PRESCRIPTIVEPERIODOFMONEYCLAIMSCASES.
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b.SomeprinciplesonRule45,RulesofCourt. 1. Reglementary period to appeal is 15 days from notice of judgment or denial of the motion for reconsideration.290 2. ApetitionforcertiorariunderRule65cannotbeasubstituteforalostappealunderRule45;hence,itshould bedismissed.291 3.ApartycannotfileapetitionbothunderRules45and65.292 ============================ TOPIC UNDER THE SYLLABUS: 10. Prescription of Actions a. Money claims b. Illegal dismissal c. Unfair labor practice d. Offenses penalized by the Labor Code and IRR issued pursuant thereto ============================
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a.Rule45petitions,themodeofelevatingacasefromtheCourtofAppealstotheSupremeCourt. Since the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 that may be filed before it from the decisions of the NLRC, any alleged errors committed by it in the exercise of its jurisdiction would be errors of judgment which are reviewable by means of a timely appeal to the Supreme Court and not by a special civil action of certiorari. Such appeal from a final disposition of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review on certiorari underRule45andnotaspecialcivilactionofcertiorariunderRule65oftheRulesofCourt.
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=========================== TOPIC UNDER THE SYLLABUS: 9. Supreme Court a. Rule 45, Rules of Court ===========================
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4. PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD OF OFFENSES PENALIZED UNDER THE LABOR CODE AND ITS IMPREMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS(IRR).
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5.ACCRUALOFCAUSEOFACTION.
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Id. Id. Callanta v. Carnation Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 70615, Feb. 29, 1986. 303 J Marketing Corporation v. Taran, G.R. No. 163924, June 18, 2009, 589 SCRA 428, 440, citing Auto Bus Transport System, Inc. v. Bautista, G.R. No. 156367, May 16, 2005; Mendoza v. NLRC, G.R. No. 122481, March 5, 1998, 287 SCRA 51. 304 Far East Agricultural Supply, Inc. v. Lebatique, G.R. No. 162813, Feb. 12, 2007. 305 Article 291, Labor Code; Degamo v. Avantgarde Shipping Corp., [G.R. No. 154460, November 22, 2005].
300 301 302
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Serranov.CA,[G.R.No.139420,August15,2001,363SCRA223]. Itwasdeclaredherethatthecauseofactionofpetitionerhasnotyetprescribed.Theantecedentfactsindicate that from 1974 to 1991, respondent MaerskFilipinas Crewing, Inc., the local agent of respondent foreign corporation, A.P.Moller,deployedpetitionerSerranoasaseamantoLiberian,BritishandDanishships.Aspetitionerwasonboarda
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b.Exception. Acauseof action for moneyclaimsaccrues uponthe categoricaldenial ofa claim.In other words,to properly construe Article 291, it is essential to ascertain the time when the third (3rd) element of a cause of action transpired.Stateddifferently,inthecomputationofthe3yearprescriptiveperiod,adeterminationmustbemadeasto theperiodwhentheactconstitutingaviolationoftheworkersrighttothebenefitsbeingclaimedwascommitted.Forif the cause of action accrued more than three (3) years before the filing of the money claim, such cause of action has alreadyprescribedinaccordancewithArticle291.305
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a.MeaningofaccruedcauseofactioninmoneyclaimscasesunderArticle291;generalrule. The general rule is that all money claims arising from an employeremployee relationship shall be filed within three(3)yearsfromthetimethecauseofactionaccrued;otherwise,theyshallbeforeverbarred.Thismeansthatifitis established that the benefits being claimed have been withheld from the employee for a period longer than three (3) years, the amount pertaining to the period beyond the threeyear prescriptive period is barred by prescription. The amountthatcanonlybedemandedbytheaggrievedemployeeshallbelimitedtotheamountofthebenefitswithheld withinthree(3)yearsbeforethefilingofthecomplaint.304
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b.Whenacauseofactionaccrues. An action doesnot accrueuntil theparty obligated to do orperform an act, refuses, expressly or impliedly, to complywiththeduty.Generally,withoutademandforcomplianceandtheconsequentrefusalbythepartyobligatedto complytherewith,thecauseofactioncannotbedeemedtohaveaccrued.
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a.Causeofaction,elements. The prescriptive period provided under the law commences to run only upon the accrual of the cause of action.Thethree(3)elementsofacauseofactionareasfollows: 1. Arightinfavoroftheplaintiffbywhatevermeansandunderwhateverlawitarisesoriscreated; 2. Anobligationonthepartofthenameddefendanttorespectornottoviolatesuchright;and 3. An act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breachoftheobligationofthedefendanttotheplaintiff.303
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c.IllegaldismissalisnotanoffenseunderArticle290. The act of the employer in dismissing an employee without cause, although a violation of the Labor Code and its implementing rules, does not amount to an offense as this term is understood and contemplated under Article 290.302
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b.ConsequenceofnoncompliancewithprescriptiveperiodunderArticle290. Failure to initiate or file the criminal action or complaint within the prescriptive period shall forever bar such
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a.Prescriptiveperiodis3years(Article290,LaborCode). TheprescriptiveperiodofallcriminaloffensespenalizedundertheLaborCodeandtheRulestoImplementthe LaborCodeisthree(3)yearsfromthetimeofcommissionthereof.
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d.Evidentiaryvalueofthefinaljudgmentinthelaborcase. InULPcases,thefinaljudgmentintheadministrativecasecannotbepresentedasevidenceofthefactsproven therein or as evidence of the guilt of the respondent therein. Its evidentiary or probative value is confined merely in proving the fact of compliance with the condition sine qua non prescribed by law, i.e., that a final judgment has been secured in the administrative proceeding finding that an unfair labor practice act was in fact committed by the respondent.301
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c.Interruptionofprescriptiveperiodofoffenses. AsfarasULPcasesareconcerned,therunningoftheone(1)yearprescriptiveperiodisinterruptedduringthe pendencyoftheadministrativeproceeding.300
made,then,thejudgmentisdeemedfinalandexecutory.Ifanappealismade,thenthefinaljudgmentrenderedbythe lasttribunal,saytheSupremeCourt,towhichthecasewaselevatedshouldbethereckoningfactor.
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c.Differentprescriptiveruleforserviceincentiveleave. TheSupremeCourtclarifiedinAutoBusTransportSystem,Inc.v.Bautista,[G.R.No.156367,May16,2005], thecorrectreckoningoftheprescriptiveperiodforserviceincentiveleave,consideringthattheserviceincentiveleave is a curious animal in relation to other benefits granted by the law to every employee because in the case of service incentiveleave,theemployeemaychoosetoeitherusehisleavecreditsorcommutethemtotheirmonetaryequivalent ifnotexhaustedattheendoftheyear.Furthermore,iftheemployeeentitledtoserviceincentiveleavedoesnotuseor commute the same, he is entitled upon his resignation or separation from work to the commutation of his accrued serviceincentiveleave. Applying Article 291 of the Labor Code as well as the three (3) elements of a cause of action [supra], the SupremeCourtruled:
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Degamov.AvantgardeShippingCorp.,[G.R.No.154460,November22,2005]. Petitioner OFW was repatriated to the Philippines on March 4, 1995 due to an accident requiring surgery and hospitalization. Immediately upon his arrival, petitioner reported to respondent Avantgardes office, but since it was a Saturday and there was no one to assist him, he went to his relatives in Cebu and was operated at Metro Cebu Community Hospital. Later, on December 24, 1997, petitioner asked Avantgarde to pay his sickness benefits. On January 6, 1998, Avantgarde replied that it could no longer act on petitioners claim as he had deviated from the legal procedure and, should he wish, he could personally followup with its foreign principal, Johnson Management, Pte., Ltd. On March 4, 1998 and May 5, 1998, petitioner wrote a letter to Sembawang regarding his claim. Sembawang did notreply. On March 2, 2001, petitioner lodged a complaint for payment of disability benefits and other money claims against the respondents with the Labor Arbiter who dismissed the case on the ground of prescription. On appeal, the NLRC likewise ruled that petitioners cause of action had prescribed as a mere letter of demand would not toll the prescriptiveperiodforfilingthecomplaint.Petitionersmotionforreconsiderationwasdenied. Inaffirmingthesaidruling,theSupremeCourtruledthatacauseofactionaccruesuponthecategoricaldenial of the claim. Consequently, petitioners cause of action accrued only on January 6, 1998, when Avantgarde denied his claimandsobreacheditsobligationtopetitioner.Petitionercouldnothaveacauseofactionpriortothisdatebecause his earlier requests were warded off by indefinite promises.Unfortunately, the complaint filed in this case on March 2, 2001wasalreadybeyondthethreeyearprescriptiveperiodmandatedbytheLaborCode.
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PhilippineNationalConstructionCorporation[PNCC]v.NLRC,[G.R.No.100353,October22,1999]. ThecomplainantwasnotdismissedbutmerelyaskedtogoonvacationinMay,1985.ItwasonlyonAugust16, 1989thathewasinformedoftheterminationofhisservices.Hence,itwasheldthatwhenhebroughthiscomplaintin 1989, his cause of action was not yet barred by prescription. It was within the threeyear prescriptive period under Article291oftheLaborCode.
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shipmostofthetime,respondentMaerskofferedtosendportionsofpetitionerssalarytohisfamilyinthePhilippines. The amounts would be sent by money order. Petitioner agreed to such arrangement and from 1977 to 1978, he instructedrespondentMaersktosendmoneyorderstohisfamily.RespondentMaerskdeductedtheamountsofthese money orders totaling HK$4,600.00 and 1,050.00 Sterling Pounds from petitioners salary. Respondent Maersk also deducted various amounts from his salary for Danish Social Security System (SSS), welfare contributions, ship club, and SSSMedicare. It appears that petitioners family failed to receive the money orders petitioner sent through respondent Maersk. Upon learning this in 1978, petitioner demanded that respondent Maersk pay him the amounts the latter deducted from his salary. Respondent Maersk assured him that they would look into the matter, then assigned him again to board one of its vessels. Whenever he returned to the Philippines, petitioner would go to the office of respondent Maersk to follow up his money claims but he would be told to return after several weeks as respondent Maerskneededtimetoverifyitsrecordsandtobringupthematterwithitsprincipalemployer,respondentA.P.Moller. Meantime, respondent Maersk would hire him again to board another one of its vessels for about a year. Finally, in October1993,petitionerwrotetorespondentMaerskdemandingimmediatepaymenttohimofthetotalamountofthe money orders deducted from his salary from 1977 to 1978. On November 11, 1993, respondent A.P. Moller replied to petitioner that it keeps accounting documents only for a certain number of years, thus data on his money claims from 1977 to 1978 were no longer available. Likewise, it claimed that it had no outstanding money orders. A.P. Moller declinedpetitionersdemandforpayment.Inrulingthatthecauseofactionhasnotyetprescribed,theSupremeCourt declared: ThefactsinthecaseatbararesimilartotheBaliwagcase(BaliwagTransit,Inc.v.Ople,[G. R. No. 57642, March 16, 1989]). Petitioner repeatedly demanded payment from respondent Maersk butsimilartotheactuationsofBaliwagTransitintheabovecitedcase,respondentMaerskwardedoff these demands by saying that it would look into the matter until years passed by. In October 1993, Serrano finally demanded in writing payment of the unsent money orders. Then and only then was the claim categorically denied by respondent A.P. Moller in its letter dated November 22, 1993. Following the Baliwag Transit ruling, petitioners cause of action accrued only upon respondent A.P. Mollers definite denial of his claim in November 1993. Having filed his action five (5) months thereafter or in April 1994, it was held that it was filed within the threeyear (3) prescriptive period providedinArticle291oftheLaborCode.
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Central Negros Electric Cooperative, Inc. [CENECO] v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 106246, September 1, 1994]. Ramos v. Our Lady of Peace School, G.R. No. L-55950 Dec. 26, 1984, 218 Phil. 708, 712; Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Ople, infra. It was the Regional Director who has jurisdiction over illegal dismissal cases at that time.
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BaliwagTransit,Inc.v.Ople,[G.R.No.57642,March16,1989]. A bus of petitioner Baliwag Transit driven by the respondent driver figured in an accident with a train of the Philippine National Railways (PNR) on August 10, 1974. This resulted to the death of eighteen (18) passengers and caused serious injuries to fiftysix (56) other passengers. The bus itself also sustained extensive damage. The bus companyinstitutedacomplaintagainstthePNR.Thelatterwasheldliableforitsnegligenceinthedecisionrenderedon April 6, 1977. The respondent driver was absolved of any contributory negligence. However, the driver was also prosecuted for multiple homicide and multiple serious physical injuries, but the case was provisionally dismissed in March1980forfailureoftheprosecutionwitnesstoappearatthescheduledhearing.SoonafterthePNRdecisionwas rendered,thedriverrenewedhislicenseandsoughtreinstatementwithBaliwagTransit.Hewasadvisedtowaituntilhis criminal case was terminated. He repeatedly requested for reinstatement thereafter, but to no avail, even after termination of the criminal case against him. Finally, on May 2, 1980, he demanded reinstatement in a letter signed by his counsel. On May 10, 1980, petitioner Baliwag Transit replied that he could not be reinstated as his drivers license had already been revoked and his driving was extremely dangerous to the riding public. This prompted respondent drivertofileonJuly29,1980,aformalcomplaintwiththeMinistryofLaborandEmploymentforillegaldismissalagainst Baliwag Transit praying for reinstatement with backwages and emergency costofliving allowance. The complaint was dismissed by the Regional Director308 on the ground of prescription under Article 291 of the Labor Code. This was reversed by then Labor and Employment Minister Blas F. Ople. On appeal to the Supreme Court, it was ruled that the actionhasnotyetprescribedatthetimeofthefilingofthecomplaint,viz.: We hold that the private respondents right of action could not have accrued from the mere fact of the occurrence of the mishap on August 10, 1974, as he was not considered
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It is settled that in illegal dismissal cases, the cause of action accrues from the time the employment of the worker was unjustly terminated. Thus, as a general rule, the 4year prescriptive period shall be counted and computed from the date of the employees dismissal up to the date of the filing of complaint for unlawful termination of employment.307
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d. Filingofacasewithgrievancemachinerytollstherunningoftheprescriptiveperiod. Amonetaryclaimcannotbeconsideredtohaveprescribedifwithinthe3yearperiod,itwassubmittedtothe grievancecommitteeasprovidedundertheCBA.306
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FollowingtherulinginAutoBus[supra],itwasheldinFarEastAgriculturalSupply,Inc.v.Lebatique,[G.R.No. 162813,February12,2007],thatLebatiquetimelyfiledhisclaimforserviceincentiveleavepay,consideringthatinthis situation, the prescriptive period commences at the time he was terminated. On the other hand, his claim regarding nonpayment of overtime pay since he was hired in March 1996 is a different matter. In the case of overtime pay, he canonlydemandfortheovertimepaywithheldfortheperiodwithinthree(3)yearsprecedingthefilingofthecomplaint onMarch20,2000.
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In the case at bar, respondent had not made use of his service incentive leave nor demanded for its commutation until his employment was terminated by petitioner. Neither did petitionercompensatehisaccumulatedserviceincentiveleavepayatthetimeofhisdismissal.Itwas onlyuponhisfilingofacomplaintforillegaldismissal,onemonthfromthetimeofhisdismissal,that respondent demanded from his former employer commutation of his accumulated leave credits. His causeofactiontoclaimthepaymentofhisaccumulatedserviceincentiveleavethusaccruedfromthe timewhenhisemployerdismissedhimandfailedtopayhisaccumulatedleavecredits. Therefore, the prescriptive period with respect to his claim for service incentive leave pay onlycommencedfromthetimetheemployerfailedtocompensatehisaccumulatedserviceincentive leave pay at the time of his dismissal. Since respondent had filed his money claim after only one month from the time of his dismissal, necessarily, his money claim was filed within the prescriptive periodprovidedforbyArticle291oftheLaborCode. [Underscoring supplied]
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Correspondingly, it can be conscientiously deduced that the cause of action of an entitled employee to claim his service incentive leave pay accrues from the moment the employer refuses to remunerate its monetary equivalent if the employee did not make use of said leave credits but instead chose to avail of its commutation. Accordingly, if the employee wishes to accumulate his leave credits and opts for its commutation upon his resignation or separation from employment, his causeofactiontoclaimthewholeamountofhisaccumulatedserviceincentiveleaveshallarisewhen theemployerfailstopaysuchamountatthetimeofhisresignationorseparationfromemployment. Applying Article 291 of the Labor Code in light of this peculiarity of the service incentive leave, we can conclude that the three (3)year prescriptive period commences, not at the end of the year when the employee becomes entitled to the commutation of his service incentive leave, but from the time when the employer refuses to pay its monetary equivalent after demand of commutationoruponterminationoftheemployeesservices,asthecasemaybe.
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automatically dismissed on that date. At best, he was deemed suspended from his work, and not evenbypositiveactofthepetitionerbutasaresultofthesuspensionofhisdriverslicensebecause oftheaccident.Therewasnoapparentdisagreementthenbetween(respondentdriver)Hughesand his employer. As the private respondent was the petitioners principal witness in its complaint for damages against the Philippine National Railways, we may assume that Baliwag Transit and Hughes were on the best of terms when the case was being tried. Hence, there existed no justification at that time for the private respondent to demand reinstatement and no opportunity warrant (sic) eitherforthepetitionertorejectthatdemand. WeagreewithprivaterespondentthatMay10,1980isthedatewhenhiscauseofaction accrued,for itwasthen thatthepetitionerdenied hisdemand for reinstatementandsocommitted that act or omission constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff. The earlierrequestsbyhimhavingbeenwardedoffwithindefinitepromises,andtheprivaterespondent notyethavingdecided to asserthis right,hiscauseofaction couldnotbe said tohavethenalready accrued. The issues had not yet been joined, so to speak. This happened only when the private respondent finally demanded reinstatement on May 2, 1980, and his demand was categorically rejectedbythepetitioneronMay10,1980.
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PLDTv.Pingol,[G.R.No.182622,September8,2010]. Respondent was dismissed by petitioner on January 1, 2000. Respondent Pingol cited the same date of dismissal in his complaint before the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter dismissed his complaint on the ground of prescriptionbecauseatthetimehefileditonMarch29,2004,four(4)yearsandthree(3)monthshadalreadyelapsed. Respondent,however,claimedthatbetween2001and2003,hemadefollowupswithPLDTmanagementregardinghis benefits. This, to his mind, tolled the running of the prescriptive period. Citing the same Article 1155 and following the ruling in Intercontinental Broadcasting [supra], the Supreme Court held that respondents cause of action had already prescribed because he never made any written extrajudicial demand. Neither did petitioner make any written acknowledgment of its alleged obligation. Thus, respondents claimed followups could not have validly tolled the
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IntercontinentalBroadcastingCorp.v.Panganiban,[G.R.No.151407,February6,2007]. In this case, while the filing earlier by respondent of a civil case for nonpayment of his unpaid commissions could have interrupted the running of the 3year prescriptive period, its consequent dismissal by the Court of Appeals duetolackofjurisdictioneffectivelycanceledthetollingoftheprescriptiveperiodwithinwhichtofilehismoneyclaim, leaving respondent in exactly the same position as though no civil case had been filed at all. The running of the 3year prescriptive period not having been interrupted by the filing of the civil case, respondents cause of action had already prescribed on September 2, 1991, three (3) years after his cessation of employment on September 2, 1988. Consequently, when respondent filed his complaint for illegal dismissal, separation pay, retirement benefits and damagesinJuly24,1996,hisclaimclearlyhadalreadybeenbarredbyprescription.
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Like other causes of action, the prescriptive period for money claims is subject to interruption, and in the absenceofanequivalentLaborCodeprovisionfordeterminingwhetherthesaidperiodmaybeinterrupted,Article1155 Article 291 Money Claims oftheCivilCodemaybeapplied.309 Thesaidprovisionstates: Article1155.TheprescriptionofactionsisinterruptedwhentheyarefiledbeforetheCourt, when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgmentofthedebtbythedebtor. Thus,theprescriptionofanactionisinterruptedby: (a) thefilingofanaction; (b) awrittenextrajudicialdemandbythecreditor;and (c) awrittenacknowledgmentofthedebtbythedebtor.
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VictoryLiner,Inc.v.Race,[G.R.No.164820,March28,2007]. Therulewasreiteratedherethatthe4yearprescriptiveperiodshallcommencetorunonlyupontheaccrualof thecauseofactionoftheworker.Inthiscase,therespondentemployeewasabusdriverwhofiguredinanaccidenton the night of August 24, 1994. As a consequence thereof, respondent suffered a fractured left leg and was rushed to a hospitalwherehewasoperatedonandconfinedfromAugust24,1994uptoOctober10,1994.One(1)monthafterhis release from the said hospital, the respondent was confined again for further treatment of his fractured left leg at anotherhospital.Hisconfinementthereinlastedamonth.InJanuary1998,therespondent,stilllimpingheavily,wentto thepetitionersofficetoreportforwork.Hewas,however,informedbythepetitionerthathewasconsideredresigned fromhisjob.Inholdingthatthecauseofactionofrespondenthasnotyetprescribed,theSupremeCourtstatedthatThe respondent must be considered as unjustly terminated from work in January 1998 since this was the first time he was informed by the petitioner that he was deemed resigned from his work. Thus, it was only at this time that the respondents cause of action accrued. Consequently, the respondents filing of complaint for illegal dismissal on 1 September1999waswellwithinthefouryearprescriptiveperiod.
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Accessories Specialist, Inc. v. Alabanza, G.R. No. 168985, July 23, 2008. Ramos v. Central Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-29352, Oct. 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 565. Mendoza v. CA, G.R. No. 116710, June 25, 2001, 412 Phil. 14, 29. 313 Gandara Mill Supply v. NLRC, G.R. No. 126703, Dec. 29, 1998; Premiere Development Bank v. NLRC, G.R. No. 114695, July 23, 1998. 314 Placewell International Services Corp. v. Camote, G.R. No. 169973, June 26, 2006; Juco v. Heirs of Tomas Siy Chung Fu, G.R. No. 150233, Feb. 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 464, 471-472; Premiere Development Bank v. NLRC, supra. 315 Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 122075, Jan. 28, 1998, 285 SCRA 297.
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b.Lachesandprescription,distinguished. Laches is a doctrine in equity while prescription is based on law. Our courts are basically courts of law, not courtsofequity.Thus,lachescannotbeinvokedtoresisttheenforcementofanexistinglegalright.Itisalongstanding principle that equity follows the law. Courts exercising equity jurisdiction are bound by rules of law and have no arbitrarydiscretiontodisregardthem. Laches cannot be invoked to bar a cause of action which was filed within the prescriptive period allowed by law. Thus, where the claim was filed within the 3year statutory period, recovery therefor cannot be barred by laches.
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a.Concept. Laches is the failure for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, in exercising due diligence,couldorshouldhavebeendoneearlier.Itisnegligenceoromissiontoassertarightwithinareasonabletime, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or has declined to assert it. The doctrineoflachesorstaledemandsisbaseduponthegroundofpublicpolicywhichrequires,forthepeaceofsociety, discouragementofstaleclaims.Andunlikethestatuteoflimitations,itisnotamerequestionoftimebutisprincipallya questionofinequityorunfairnessofpermittingarightorclaimtobeenforcedorasserted.313 Thus, the doctrine of laches presumes that the party guilty of negligence had the opportunity to do what should have been done but failed to do so.Conversely, if the said party did not have the occasion to assert the right, thenhecannotbeadjudgedguiltyoflaches.Lachesisnotconcernedwiththemerelapseoftime;ratherthepartymust havebeenaffordedanopportunitytopursuehisclaiminorderthatthedelaymaysufficientlyconstitutelaches.314 In labor cases, laches may be applied only upon the most convincing evidence of deliberate inaction, for the rightsoflaborersareprotectedunderthesocialjusticeprovisionsoftheConstitutionandundertheCivilCode.315
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8.DOCTRINEOFLACHESASAPPLIEDTOLABORCASES.
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AccessoriesSpecialist,Inc.v.Alabanza,[G.R.No.168985,July23,2008]. All the foregoing requisites of promissory estoppel are present in this case. Respondent is the wife of Jones Alabanza,formerVicePresident,ManagerandDirectorofpetitioner(ASI),whodiedwithoutreceivinghismoneyclaims consistinginunpaidsalaries,separationpayand13thmonthpay.Jonesrenderedoutstandingservicesforthepetitioners from1975toOctober1997.OnOctober17,1997,JoneswascompelledbytheownerofASI,hereinpetitionerTadahiko Hashimoto,tofilehisinvoluntaryresignationonthegroundthatASIallegedlysufferedlossesduetolackofmarketand incurred several debts caused by a slam in the market. At the time of his resignation, Jones had unpaid salaries for eighteen (18) months from May 1995 to October 1997 equivalent to P396,000.00 and US$38,880.00. He was likewise not paid his separation pay commensurate to his 21 years of service in the amount of P462,000.00 and US$45,360.00 and13thmonthpayamountingtoP33,000.00.JonesdemandedpaymentofhismoneyclaimsuponresignationbutASI informedhimthatitwouldjustsettlefirstthemoneyclaimsoftherankandfileemployees,andhisclaimswillbepaid thereafter.Knowingthepredicamentofthecompany, Jones patiently waitedforhisturntobepaid.Severaldemands weremadebyJonesbutASIjustkeptonassuringhimthathewillbepaidhismonetaryclaims.JonesdiedonAugust5, 2002andfailedtoreceivethesame. In holding that the principle of promissory estoppel applies to this case, the Supreme Court noted that Jones relied on the promise of ASI that he would be paid as soon as the claims of all the rankandfile employees had been paid. If not for this promise that he had held on to until the time of his death, there is no reason why he would delay filing the complaint before the Labor Arbiter. Thus, there is ample justification not to follow the prescriptive period imposed under Article 291 of the Labor Code. Great injustice will be committed if the employees claims would be brushed aside on a mere technicality, especially when it was petitioners own action that prevented respondent from interposingtheclaimswithintherequiredperiod.
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b.Elementsofpromissoryestoppel. In order to make out a claim of promissory estoppel, a party bears the burden of establishing the following elements: (1)apromisewasreasonablyexpectedtoinduceactionorforbearance; (2)suchpromisedid,infact,inducesuchactionorforbearance;and (3)thepartysuffereddetrimentasaresult.312
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a.Principleofpromissoryestoppel,anexceptiontoArticle291. Theprincipleofpromissoryestoppelisarecognizedexceptiontothethreeyearprescriptiveperiodenunciated inArticle291oftheLaborCode.310 Promissory estoppel may arise from the making of a promise, even though without consideration, if it was intendedthatthepromiseshouldbereliedupon,asinfactitwasreliedupon,andifarefusaltoenforceitwouldvirtually sanctiontheperpetrationoffraudorwouldresultinotherinjustice.311
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runningoftheprescriptiveperiod.Moresowhenrespondentneverpresentedanyprooftosubstantiatehisallegation offollowups.
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Courts should never apply the doctrine of laches earlier than the expiration of time limited for the commencement of actionsatlaw.316 Chuav.CA,[G.R.No.125837,October6,2004]. It was held here that there isno laches where there isnoproofthat private respondentemployeeshadfailed orneglectedtoasserttheirright,consideringthattheyfiledtheirclaimwithintheperiodprescribedbylaw. PlacewellInternationalServicesCorp.v.Camote,[G.R.No.169973,June26,2006]. Thedoctrineoflacheswasnotappliedsincerespondentfiledhisclaimwithinthe3yearprescriptiveperiodfor thefilingofmoneyclaimssetforthinArticle291oftheLaborCode. END OF DISCUSSION ON TOPIC H. PROCEDURE AND JURISDICTION
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Mendoza v. NLRC, G. R. No. 122481, March 5, 1998.
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Jurisdiction of Labor Courts Explained

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ChanRobles Internet Bar Review : ChanRobles Professional Review, Inc.

H. PROCEDURE AND JURISDICTION

TOPICS UNDER THE SYLLABUS

H. PROCEDURE AND JURISDICTION

5. DOLE Regional Directors a. Small money claims

LABOR LAW: H. PROCEDURE AND JURISDICTION Prof. Joselito Guianan Chan

9. Supreme Court a. Rule 45, Rules of Court

8. Court of Appeals a. Rule 65, Rules of Court

7. Voluntary Arbitrators a. Submission Agreement b. Rule 43, Rules of Court

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LABOR LAW: H. PROCEDURE AND JURISDICTION Prof. Joselito Guianan Chan

e.NatureofjurisdictionofLaborArbitersisoriginalandexclusive. ThejurisdictionconferredbyArticle217totheLaborArbitersisbothoriginalandexclusive,meaning,noother officersortribunalscantakecognizanceof,orhearanddecide,anyofthecasesthereinenumerated.

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TheLaborArbiterhasoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionovermonetaryclaimsofOFWs,towit: 1. Thosearisingoutofanemployeremployeerelationship; 2. Thosearisingbyvirtueofanylaw; 3. ThosearisingfromacontractinvolvingFilipinoworkersforoverseasdeployment; 4. Claimsforactual,moral,exemplaryandotherformsofdamages.

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e.LaborArbitersmaystillhavejurisdictionovercontestedcasesundertheexceptionclauseinArticle128 [b]. TheexceptionclauseinArticle128[b],asamendedbyR.A.No.7730,states:

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e.Jurisdictionovercriminalcasesarisingfromstrikesorlockouts. Jurisdictionovercriminalcaseswhichmayhavearisenasaconsequenceofthestrikeorlockoutfallsunderthe jurisdictionoftheregularcourts.

d.Jurisdictionoverprohibitedactivitiescommittedduringstrikesorlockouts. Casesarisingfromany violationsofArticle264of the LaborCode regarding thecommissionof prohibitedacts inthecourseofastrikeorlockoutfallwithintheoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionoftheLaborArbiter.29

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f.RemedyistolodgethelaborclaimswiththeRehabilitationReceiver;exception. Becauseofthesuspensionofproceedings,theremedyshouldbefortheemployeewhoclaimedtohavebeen illegallydismissed,tolodgeherclaimbeforethedulyappointedreceiver.45

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LABOR LAW: H. PROCEDURE AND JURISDICTION Prof. Joselito Guianan Chan

b.Inunorganizedestablishments. InestablishmentswheretherearenocertifiedcollectivebargainingunionsorexistingCBAs,theLaborArbiters havejurisdictionisvestedwithLaborArbiters.49

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b. LaborArbitershavejurisdictionoverillegaldismissalcasesofemployeesofcooperatives. Theruleisdifferentwithrespecttotheterminationofemploymentoftheemployeesofthecooperative.The LaborArbitershavejurisdictionthereover.

a.Membersofcooperativesarenotemployees. Membersofacooperativesareitsowners.Issuesontheterminationoftheirmembershipwiththecooperative donotfallwithinthejurisdictionoftheLaborArbiters.52

8.13. JURISDICTIONOVERCASESPROPERLYCOGNIZABLEBYTHEGRIEVANCEMACHINERYORVOLUNTARY ARBITRATORS.

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