adorno esteika pomirenja

Therefore, the character of all great art is that of darkness, joylessness, and dissonance. These istinska individualnost spasenje subjekta same. The categories are concepts of an object in general (B 129); they are a priori conditions of the possibility of experience (A 94, B 126). We are able to experience objects, that is, only because we have the concept of an object. We do not derive this concept from experience, for we could not experience anything as an object without already having the general concept of an object. These concepts do not arise from experience; they underlie the possibility of experience. Kant is driving toward the conclusion that appearances have a necessary relation to the understanding (A 119). Appearances, he says, are data for a possible experience; they therefore have to relate to the understanding. The transcendental unity of apperception is responsible for what Kant calls the affinity of our representationthat is, their being our representations, their constituting a single empirical consciousnessand also the rule-governed character of the synthesis of the manifold of intuition. If that synthesis were not rule-governed, the combination of the data of sense would not yield knowledge but random and accidental collocations (A 121) such as the products of imagination in the usual sense. We may freely combine concepts, to form the notion of a threeheaded dragon or a golden mountain, but we gain no knowledge of what is actual from exercising that freedom. We attain knowledge of objects because the construction of objects actually presented in experience is rulegoverned. rules. The objective deduction, Kant maintains, shows that we can know objects because we construct them: Thus the order and regu larity in the appearances, which we entitle nature, we ourselves introduce. We could never find them in appearances, had not we ourselves, or the nature of our mind, originally set them there (A 125). The understanding, consequently, is nothing less than the lawgiver of nature (A 126). This follows from Kants argument, for it has shown that the transcendental unity is an objective condition of all knowledge. It is not merely a condition that I myself require in knowing an object, but is a condition under which every intuition must stand in order to become an object for me (B 138). Certainly, he means to show that the hope of extending knowledge beyond the realm of sense experience is illusory. But he uses the term illusion in a more specific sense: an illusion may be said to consist in treating the subjective condition of thinking as being knowledge of the object (A 396; see A 297, B 3534). The key to the Analytic is the Copernican revolution, the idea that the faculty of thinking constitutes objects. This should not tempt us to conclude, however, that subjectivity and objectivitythinking and knowingmatch effortlessly. Clearly we may think of things that are not objectively real through imagination. We may also make mistakes. Most seriously, our thinking extends easily beyond the realm of sense experience. We may engage in metaphysical contemplation, arguing about the freedom of the will, the existence of God, and the mortality or immortality of the soul. But Kant denies that we can attain any real

knowledge of these matters.

As with the self, so with things-in-themselves. The second consequence of Kants distinction is thus that knowledge of things -in-them-selves is impossible; knowledge is limited to the sphere of experience. The limits of knowledge become clear in thinking about the role of the categories. The pure concepts of the understanding are conditions of the possibility of experience. They have a priori validity, against the claims of the skeptic, because all empirical knowledge of objects would necessarily conform to such concepts, because only as thus presupposing them is anything possible as an object of experience (A 93, B 126). Objects of experience must conform to the categories. Objects beyond the realm of experience, however, face no such constraint. In fact, we have no reason to believe that the categories apply to them at all. The categories conform to objects of possible experience because we synthesize those objects from the data of sensibility. What lies beyond sensibility lies beyond the categories, for we have no reason to believe that it results from such a process of synthesis. svo mogue znanje je subjektivno znanje

U korenu Benjaminove filozofije lei kritika i nadogradnja Kantovog koncepta transcendentalnog iskustva izvedena kroz koncept spekulativnog iskustva. Subjekt je kod Kanta stavljen u centar filozofskog sistema, kao posednik univerzalnih a priornih formi saznanja, kategorija, koji konstituiu logikim zakonima sinteze objekte kao pojave. Kant razdvaja domen subjektivno mogueg iskustva, fenomenalnu sferu, od domena stvari po sebi kao noumenalne sfere metafizike i apsoluta. Opseg subjektivnog iskustva je tako sveden na odnos aktivnog subjekta i pasivnog objekta, gde je percepcija objekta uslovljena univerzalnim, fiksnim kognitivnim kategorijama razuma, koji organizuju prostornovremenskim formu opaanja objekata. Iskustvo je tako redukovano ovim univerzalnim kategorijama logike, koje postoje nezavisno od objekata u sferi transcendatalnosti koja kao podloga odreuje okvir mogueg iskustva. Sfera stvari po sebi i apsoluta je prema Kantu van kognitivnih mogunosti subjekta i ne postoji mogunost njenog saznanja.1 Benjaminov koncept spekulativnog iskustva ima za cilj da premosti jaz izmeu ova dva domena i da pokua da definie nain na koji je apsolutno sadrano u fenomenalnom.

Imanuel Kant, Kritika istog uma, BIGZ, Beograd, 1976.