Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics? Author(s): erif Mardin Source: Daedalus, Vol. 102, No.

1, Post-Traditional Societies (Winter, 1973), pp. 169-190 Published by: The MIT Press on behalf of American Academy of Arts & Sciences Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20024114 Accessed: 29/10/2009 08:25
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?ERIF

MARDIN Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?

Center-Periphery

just as certain societies have stronger centers centers are forged vary than others, the materials of which greatly between to con of attempts societies.1 The Middle East has had a long history even efforts struct the institutional of such centers, framework though resources were, more to marshall often than not, these "free floating"2 ex as an outstanding the Ottoman Here, emerges ephemeral. Empire a in There the Ottoman center was, ception. lasting supported Empire, a network of institutions. by sophisticated The methods the Ottomans and varied. By co used were ingenious an in the at elite recruited individuals opting largely early age from ruling into them the official class, by tightly religious minorities, by socializing not necessarily the system of taxation and controlling, though centralizing, "Society Yet land administration, and by dominating the religious the establishment, center in the of and and education, strong justice acquired leverage spheres in the dissemination of the symbols of legitimacy.8 These imperial achieve ments emerge even more in relation to the situation in clearly neighboring Iran. Iranian rulers were often jug merely "grand manipulators," gingerly over which were unable to establish con gling the many social forces they success in these matters a cannot fully be evaluated trol. But Ottoman by contrast with a the institutions its To of establish fuller simple neighbors.4 another comparison is in order, one that places the Ottoman perspective side side with Western the centralized and its state, Empire emerging, by
successor, the modern nation-state.

has

a center."

the form of government in the West which "Leviathan," emerged in the middle of the seventeenth and the later nation-state had century, a role to in the of Ottoman At institutions. first play development they were seen as rivals who were to excel in those areas beginning precisely where the Ottomans had traditionally for achievement. themselves prided the of the Ottomans however, modernization, process Eventually, during looked to these new forms of the state as models for reform in their own Both
government.

Leviathan

and

the nation-state

are also

important

for Turkish

history

169

170
because that

?ERIF MARDIN

contrasts to Ottoman institutions. The forces they present structural seem to vary state in the West from those the significantly shaped set in. Because state before modernization of its that shaped the Ottoman feudal antecedents, ern state included what of centralization the process a series of confrontations that created to the mod

with

compromises leading the feudal nobility, may be called the forces of the periphery: and later, industrial the cities, the burghers, labor. The consequence of was were nation-state these compromises that Leviathan and the relatively even a one-sided structures. Each time a compromise?or well articulated some of the peripheral force into the obtained, victory?was integration or the center was achieved. Thus the feudal estates, or the "privil?gi?s," at the same time, the into workers became while, integrated polity obtaining some status. These successive confrontations of their autonomous recognition had important consequences. The confrontations and co-optations had been state and church, between varied: nation builders conflicts between and owners non-owners means between of the and of localists, production. a introduced These identifica variety of political cross-cutting cleavages tions which for much of the flexibility of modern Western European provided center existed within a system of politics.5 Also, the linkages with peripheral in estates found a elements: medieval the lower classes parliaments; place were accorded the franchise.

In the Ottoman the nineteenth before these char century Empire seem to be acteristics and integration of multiple confrontation missing. was unidimensional, a clash be the major confrontation Rather, always tween the center and the In addition, the autonomy of periphery. peripheral de facto, an important social forces was more than anything difference estates from the institutional to for in accorded, recognition example, were or Prince"6 even Western the which from Lord "separate Europe, were when Until the confronta they "dependent recently, corporations."7 was the most center and tion between social important periphery cleavage to have Turkish and one that seemed survived more underlying politics in which than a century of modernization. This paper takes up the ways this cleavage was perpetuated modernization. during

The Traditional System

and periphery and economic life. One the outstanding became the always of urban dwellers with of these was the incompatibility large in Anatolia, the core of the Empire. The state's of nomads contingent on the was But in with nomads endemic. periphery difficulty dealing more nomads and urban dwellers than this, the clash between generated was a contest that civilization man's cultivated the Ottoman stereotype were and nomadism, urbanization and that all nomadic between things There many were reasons the opposition why issue of Ottoman political of center

CENTER-PERIPHERY

RELATIONS

171

A residue between of this basic of contempt. cleavage only deserving seen can in Eastern be still nomad and sedentary today population of social and issues basic the statistical structure, data, Turkey where so contrast those with settled agriculture thirteen provinces with sharply a in the four provinces and residues of with found economy pastoral
nomadism.8

was the Another of the center-periphery component cleavage suspicion traces of a of the center towards the remaining and pre-Ottoman nobility a number in the star risen of powerful whose families had provinces The provinces were also hotbeds of intractable with that of the Ottomans. mes Turbulent sects, syncretic cults, self-appointed religious heterodoxy. a siahs presented and the well-remembered When threat. long-lasting to Ottoman became for havens the throne, provinces occasionally pretenders the the added onus of having served as a launching gained periphery pad for rebellions. a of localism tolerated by the All of this occurred against background before social engineering insurmountable for Ottoman center, stopped As the Empire the Ottomans tasks. dealt with expanded, organizational encountered the seal of the new social institutions by giving they legitimacy a system of decentralized to local usages and by enforcing accommodation No attempt was made toward ethnic, religious, and regional particularisms. when ties loose One for a more complete integration proved workable.
may count among these semi-autonomous groups the non-Moslem com

in the more Thus, religious by were center the and two very the sense, ecological general, periphery This Ottoman social aspect of society, together with loosely related worlds. set one of the primary of the Ottoman establish fragmentation, problems ment: the confrontation the Sultan and his officials on the one between on the other. structure of Ottoman Anatolia hand, and the highly segmented munities controlled their leaders. is studies since it is the territorial important for modern particularly of modern Turkey. component set apart from the Those who opposed the officials, were segmentation, so to on the other side of the fence, not only periphery by being, speak, as well status characteristics, as but by virtue of certain distinctive by a one certain For differences. of the time, symbolic long distinguishing was re marks for a number of high?and low?officials that many were was cruited from non-Moslem to This establish practice groups.9 designed an ideal that of the bureaucrat the Sultan's slave (kul pattern, becoming in Turkish). In this ideal scheme, the official figured as a person with no ties and as to the goals of the ascriptive totally devoted implementing The establishment to accusations of was, therefore, open dynasty. having excluded free-born Moslems from these posts; obviously, this impediment to access rankled. Friction also existed between the kul and the members of the religious establishment who, barring certain exceptions, were closer Anatolia

own

172

?ERIF MARDIN The and institution was thus religious the periphery. During moder it was of the center, policies

to the life of the lower classes. daily on the border line between the center nization, and because of the identified with

secularizing the increasingly periphery.10 The bases of the distinction between the official elite and the periphery were to be found in economic as well. Officials were not variables subject was to taxation; when their income the Empire compared flourishing to This was partly attributable favorably with that of the richest merchants. costs for the administrator's certain and other office employing personnel the wielders of expenses, but it was also an aspect of Ottoman legitimacy: were the first citizens of the realm. power, not the merchants, political over the economy was a further The tight control established by the state in the Ottoman of the of Officials example primacy Empire.11 politics in extensive their wielded administrative be power capacity. Conversely, cause of their kul status, were to administrative subject they special, law and lacked the "civil rights" of the Moslem In a wider population.12 entire the the of official free-born and perspective, life-style patrimonial Moslem The contrasted. was the center and the periphery between confrontation not, a transmission of official status. On the contrary, due to hereditary however, was this was a feature of the way by merit; by and large, advancement Some the Empire was most official careers were made when vigorous. but families with a history of service to the state held privileged positions, its members of officials provided this second pool for the recruiting only to officialdom. It was with indirect privileges of access only after the or the of official patronage its nadir that the practice reached Empire influence exerted by court circles seem to have become more important. One aspect highlighting the difference between all types of officials the operation of the bureau both rural and urban, was and the masses, core of the state. Its arrogation of the major control of the economy commerce it its of of foodstuffs, the limitations control the society, on land it tried to and the strictness with which ownership, placed were enforce social stratification all de sumptuary regulations through over the nodal to maintain state's of the points society authority signed relations and to build a corresponding image of paramountcy.13 Property on arable were included in this system. The Sultan had full property rights land outside the cities. He could alienate land when he chose, but, in fact, little land was given out in freehold. Latifundia existed, but most relatively and could, when of them were usurped be confiscated necessary, by the state. Conversely, land be could fraud, peasant by only by expropriated the original under which the land had been circumventing understanding state was always alert to the that such fraud had granted. The suggestion but action was restricted by three major considerations. been perpetrated, as freehold, while In some regions land had been granted in others, per cratic and

CENTER-PERIPHERY

RELATIONS

173

was based on the feudal system in operation of property petuation rights state in many at the time of the Ottoman conquest. regions the Finally, seizure of the land not will?to the did have the power?or oppose by notables. A number of changes away from the original system of military run to favor notables in this respect. When in the "fiefs" worked long as it it did during the nineteenth the state could re-assert itself, century, statutes to peasant holdings by adopting hamper of land.14 its control was bolstered and economic The state's claim to political by to the heterogeneity Relative of the periphery, title to cultural preeminence. this was, above all, a cultural the ruling class was compact; singularly one one Two elements, negative, may be isolated positive, phenomenon. of the state was permeated here. On the one hand, the entire mechanism of the Sultan; on the other hand, there were by the myth of the majesty access on the common mortal's to the symbols of restrictions placed or or rural For of much the nomad official culture. settled, population, was most existence the urban, this cultural separation striking feature of its on the in the cities influenced Rulers and officials were heavily periphery. as the Iranian. of urban the cultures such culture earlier, successful, by in into Ottoman culture in particular was diffused Iranian bureaucratic and Arabic stitutions. For example, the rulers adopted languages?Persian were to the lower classes ?that and worked these into the foreign one of the educational benefited from official culture.15 The periphery only institutions that trained members of the establishment?the religious train own its institutions. the Not ing surprisingly, periphery developed extremely but it was well aware of its secondary cultural status, varied counter-culture, an awareness best illustrated by its clumsy imitation of the styles of elite was true of the lower classes, both rural and culture. This particularly as part the urban masses could also be counted urban, for in this matter at the Even of the periphery. height of the Ottoman power, when the image economic of the Sultan as a provident father had a tangible reality, the were the populace court, officials, and politics grim things from which kept in Turkish, and siyaseten kail means siyaset means apart. Today, politics to death for reasons of state, but in earlier official conderrmation parlance a synonym for a death sentence rea siyaset (politics ) was also imposed for sons of state. This one connotation is the which still retained grim siyaset in a study carried out in 1968 and 1969.16 for peasants These aspects of the style of state domination and of official status and culture together made up a cluster, an institutional code. In this code the set of to the which officials alert erosion of kept by the periphery principles an the achievements of the center occupied On the other important place. saw such as locally powerful hand, the forces of the periphery, families, as persons with whom the central officials had of many they points as to also who the and tried rivals the share of contact, get greatest possible tried to protect the consolidation individual

174

?ERIF MARDIN

meant for the center?which less agricultural surplus and other values for themselves. Because of the periphery, of the fragmentation of the dis its own code parate elements that entered into it, it was to begin to develop much later. In earlier times this code simply consisted of an awareness of center. the burdens the imposed by of those opposing the state's incursions into the economic if not a code that and social life of the periphery made up an attitude and heterodoxy. have been called What localism, particularism spelled an in the and identi role important "primordial groups"17 played periphery, fication with such a group was one of a variety of forms that this peripheral stance could take. In fact, however, forms of the pe the many different a negative stance were similar only in view of officialdom. ripheral sharing When local notables were used in an official capacity, and the state was to use them, this attitude often obliged the lack of any real but softened, of the for outside alive officialdom anyone legitimization kept potential The world-view
tension.

for violent confrontation the heyday of the Empire, this potential During between the center and the materialized both only sporadically, periphery of social forces and because of the because of the normal fragmentation this possibility. counterbalanced Among linkages with the periphery which of recruitment of free-born count the regular these one may system into some parts of officialdom, the judicial system penetrating Moslems to the of the and charitable tradition level, public works subprovincial net real hinge wide of the institution?the and the foundations, religious was a center of "fiefs" The between and periphery.18 system military at the the normal fief holder efficient integrative mechanism; particularly a cultivator with time of the rise of the Empire close ties to the being
peasant.19

the Empire that Ottoman officials between the relation and that society, plunderers with the peasant heavily burdened officials and the periphery?especially a of "Oriental despotism," the mark showed type of taxes?increasingly in earlier from the grimness of Sultanic rule different exploitation basically it to the earlier system only in the way times and comparable perpetrated elite and those excluded from it. Like the governing the cleavage between relied on local notables who emerged wise, the local population increasingly at this juncture to articulate the growth of their local interests. Despite status still had no autonomous influence and authority, these notables to that of the their While feudal nobility. European legitimacy comparable was in their role as agents for the center, increased autonomy acquired of state power or by outright could only be obtained rebel by defiance to stand rich in land and powerful lion.20 Thus, only those notables enough are some There up to the state could gain greater autonomy. signs that were no in the where local notables less interested this occurred, squeez only with the became of their decline own

It was

of

CENTER-PERIPHERY

RELATIONS

175

than was the state, but at least they saw it was in their ing the peasants services that interest to provide those minimum kept the system going. of form of a new of the Ottoman One urban type estrangement center in in in the 1730 from the form of the Istanbul periphery appeared their guilds, the artisans of Istanbul had so-called Patrona revolt. Through to a been asked to contribute that fizzled out military campaign heavily of the Palace. By then the lower because of the timidity and incompetence in Istanbul had for some time witnessed classes the Westernization of Ottoman to copy the statesmen and the Palace through various attempts France. When and the libertinism of eighteenth pomp of Versailles century to arms to prevent re called of traditional ways, the subversion they in Istanbul before, but rebellions that was thereafter often repeated:

sponded.21 There had been many first to show a syndrome Westernize and military section of the official elite,

this was the an effort to a administrative organization propounded by some of Western manners, accompanied by aping and used by another interest group to mobilize the masses against Western ization. Turkish modernists have concentrated upon the back exclusively of indeed, was an aspect intrigues by statesmen which, ground political for a complete picture we should also of this and similar revolts. However, on dwell the cultural alienation of the masses from the rulers, of the pe center. from the later of this aliena modernization, riphery During phases to be tion was compounded.

Ottoman Modernization During the Nineteenth Century

stood out as demanding in the solution problems were to the nineteenth the All related century. Empire during a state modeled to nation reformers' build after the attempt into of the center with the state, and all brought play the relations The first was the integration of non-Moslem within the groups periphery. same and the second of consisted the the for nation-state, accomplishing some order into the mosaic Moslem of the elements bring periphery?to structure of the Empire. these "discrete elements" in the "national Finally, to in the be had "into territory" brought meaningful participation political was not initiated until the middle of the system."22 This last development the first tangible co-optation twentieth of nota century; however, through a seen after 1908. bles into politics, of to be integration began beginning The national of the non-Moslem of the Otto integration components man was more than achieved Empire by losses of anything by default, the nineteenth and twentieth territory during century early century. With its of of the Turkish the situ made policy exchanges Republic population, ation even In the the the years following simpler. exchange, Republic to take a minorities, might have continued suspicious view of non-Moslem Three outstanding Ottoman Ottoman

176 but

?ERIF MARDIN

in rare cases did constitute the substance only minority problems issue. of an outstanding political it is usually of Moslem the national overlooked, integration Although was as a as of non-Moslem much that of the components just problem of the Turkish the Tanzimat reform policy, groups. The architects ( 1839 a set stone had here foundation their fiscal and 1876), already through reforms.23 By the third quarter of the nineteenth administrative century, state was an in the daily life of the the Ottoman increasing presence periph II (1876-1909) tried to continue the integration ery. Sultan Abdulhamid of the the remaining nomads to settle down. At the periphery by compelling same time, the Sultan to Ottoman bring to the Moslem attempted periphery a sense of its center. As is well underlined the unity with by Sir William a dream Pan Islamism was not so much Ramsay, Abdulhamid's policy of as an effort to establish some form of of uniting all Moslems proto an to unite his people around idea. As nationalism, Islamic-Imperial Ramsay notes: Until very recent times, the motley population of Asia Minor appears to have or been perfectly content with tribal and racial designations. The Turkmen Avshahr was satisfied to be Turkmen or Avshahr, and did not think so far as I know, of a national or imperial unity to which he belonged; and therefore there was no general name by which the Unity of the Empire could be ex
pressed.

Whether Abd ul-Hamid attached any importance to the adoption of one name or general designation for the Moslem subjects of the Empire, I am not aware. was the his interest . . . but at least it is in outside of it sphere Perhaps
evitable name to that a process such to as he was give expression is a marked feature the it, and of his reign, attempting wide adoption as I can assert to out find should carry name of an imperial from positive knowledge. a in

Anatolia

The name was government

process any, the in the tendency

an old historic title, and the diffusion of it was a fact of Ottoman long before Abd ul-Hamid, by his policy gave strength to a natural
Empire. to real and ... So far as I can of tribes learn there in the the existed country, unification feeling previously and all little, therefore if

unification
many

of name had

little vitality.
semi-nomad

The

tie to the Sultan

country,

sat very

lightly on
Christians,

nomad

in

while

had no desire and were not accorded the Jews and certain heretic Moslems a name appropriate to imperial Turks. There did, right to call themselves by
however, unity in exist a name which a Turkish-Moslem Empire. gradually This established name was itself the as name an expression Osmanli.24 of

success at national should not be exag But Abdulhamid's unification At the turn of the century, "Arab," "Laz," "Abaza," "Tcherkess," gerated. still words that referred to the social "Arnaut," "Kurd," and "Lezgi" were reality of the Empire. took over at a time when The Young Turks (1908-1918) only this of the Asia Minor of been unification had achieved. partial population a and educational unification tried to enforce of cultural They policy areas of the other where ethnic much clearer Empire cleavages throughout

CENTER-PERIPHERY

RELATIONS

177

and Their better ineptitude organized. to undermine what support they might incipient for decen for their regime. Lack of integration, demands have gathered con as well as to what were tralized administration, opposition provincial theme of their sidered the secular ideas of the Young Turks are a main as well as outside, Anatolia.25 years in power and appear within, existed and local to redeem limited his objectives Kemal Thus, Mustafa (Ataturk), who a not In with earliest clean slate. the for did ing Anatolia begin Turkey, movement the for national stages of organizing independence, following forces in Ankara the Ottoman withdrawal from World War I, his nationalist were surrounded for the govern by insurgent groups supposedly working ment of the Sultan Mustafa While these Kemal. groups pro opposed by of a rebel against the Sultan and claimed their aims to be the elimination seem to have to work for the greater glory of Islam, they also represented to be a the forces of the periphery what reacting against they considered of Young Turk rule and a policy of centralization. Between continuation 1920 and 1923, the fear that Anatolia would be split on primordial group lines ran as a strong undercurrent the architects of Kemalism among as a fundamental? their own center, and it remained trying to establish to often latent?issue of Kemalist the end of one party although Policy in rule 1950. The problem of politically structure this segmented integrating only with the of national and may thus be integration problem a separate heading.

groups were nationalism combined

partly overlaps taken up under

Social Cleavages
The tion

in the Nineteenth

Century

saw the end of the nineteenth of the penetra century beginning into certain more of market values regions of Anatolia. developed was the of local notables' earlier basis influence Thus, gradually an as interest and notables all took of transformed, types origin increasing in economic In tier this the of the upper pursuits. respect, provincial to acquire a not a it never began periphery uniformity?if unity?which one facet of this was new had had before. While the of focus uniformity new the notables' another facet the of involved the activities, ubiquity force: the greater penetration of the state into the opposing periphery. These to the the developments placed parties center-periphery cleavage in a new confrontation that embodied of the earlier clash, but elements also partly transformed the nature of that conflict. to the notables, With in the new this transformation centered regard area within which to and client rela patronage began operate. Patronage a structural transformation tions had Ottoman but politics, long permeated after the middle of the nineteenth instance, the determination the total picture. For century changed of the nineteenth of reform century architects

178 to make citizens

^ERIFMARDIN

out of the and to bring subjects of the Ottoman Empire, into the new periphery by imposing obligations?taxes, military well as by offering new benefits service, various registration procedures?as the of justice, land the individuals ?roads, regulation registration?placed in the in closer contact with the administrative and judicial periphery Before the into the of a system of process. gradual penetration periphery centralist in still served as a administration, 1864, notables inaugurated transmission belt of administration through locally elected councils work with time, con ing with provincial governors. This role, though modified tinued throughout the nineteenth more became notables thus century;26 the between the lower classes?the the clearly hinge peasantry?and officials. Largely because of the hold that the state still maintained over the economy, the new economic of the notables, where these pursuits a had become link second established between and notables important, In addition, while officials. the number in the Ottoman of positions ad ministrative increased after 1876,27 middle system had been considerably and lower-rank officials were in a The fashion. only paid desultory a notables thus established symbiotic relation with the officials, and bribing a new dimension. This was as much a for the advance acquired necessity ment own of the notables' as it was one for the interests of rendering services to their clients. new stratum of notables, one this Among may also the provincial men of a number of whom were place religion, property owners and also to the class of local "influentials." However, their belonged influence and leverage over the lower classes was also established through in involvement Faced with seculariza religion and education. increasing tion, these men became more clearly involved with the periphery. With the success of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, notables began to appear in the ranks of Ottoman and in political parties parliament. their influence can be traced, we see Where they stood for administrative and for a continuation decentralization of local control over culture, which, in fact, meant an attempt to the hold that men of keep religion had estab lished over the system of values and symbols. This was true for especially no other basis of status the poorer clerics, the men of who had religion than their standing as men of as the cru religion.28 But the view of Islam cial touchstone of the Ottoman was shared by patrimony non-religious notables. To this extent, an Islamic, dimension had again been unifying added to the peripheral a characteristic ideol code; what had thus become was an the not of Lum of ogy periphery idiosyncratic merely proposal One reason for this is clear: modern institutions had educational penulema. the cultural between center the and perpetuated pre-modern, cleavage the periphery. Modernization of Turkish educational institutions had be on the those of the officials. The provinces of the gun with lay margin world of elite education; the great majority of the provincials?even of in or fluential provincials?were unable to send their children to unwilling the state

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data we have today suggest that only the brightest modern schools. What ones were to be able to the capital with hopes that they would packed off a with official circles. In 1903 in the establish channel of communication were area that had had some of province Konya?an development?there as to sector of secondary education, 1,963 students in the modern opposed in 451 Medrese the tradi 12,000 students schools) providing (religious tional equivalent.29 sector of education was much easier for chil Entrance into the modern dren with fathers who were already part of the class of reformist officials, or even any In one of the key new educational part of the bureaucracy. the for more than school socialization counted schools, complexes, military its extension to education school and by of middle family socialization, by its recruitment of a large portion of students from less privileged families. as a backwater In this military milieu, the critical view of the provinces of civilization and of cultural of media sharply. The modernization emerged the gap between life in Turkey generally increased, rather than decreased, to Islam, to its cultural pa the "little" and the "great" culture. A clinging was to to the center's the it trimony, response inability integrate province's The provinces centers of into the new cultural framework. thus became was the fact that the "reaction." Most significant, however, provincial world as a whole, now was and lower both classes, upper including increasingly to secularism. No doubt the decentralist united by an Islamic opposition notables found this development The lower classes in the Otto heartening. man were also in this new sense of persons of the capital part periphery in joining the stream of modernization. who had difficulties In this new was a new and found unity, the periphery by challenged intellectually more type of bureaucrat. uncompromising Modernization as the Westernization although of the Bureaucrat

to compromise with obliged powerful see to real this them autonomy: acquire resigned was the core of the code of the traditional bureaucrat. However, bureauc in racy was also changing century. By the Turkey during the nineteenth that could be end of that century, the aspects of Ottoman bureaucracy a or "sultanic"30 were to bureauc called "patrimonial" "rational" giving way in the is formula The of Weberian this however, limited, racy. applicability as were sense that "bureaucratic" hierarchical such structure, elements, than "rational" claims, such as rewards based on per much more evident Ottoman statesmen, notables, were never
formance.

One

section

of the Ottoman

bureaucracy

had

been

attuned taken

to the re

quirements early relatively in reform century. This reformist during the nineteenth as the earliest nodal of reform the modernization point

of modernization

and had

the leadership selected bureaucracy of the educational

180

?ERIF

MARDIN

over institutions preparing the military and the civilian bureaucracy. Taking the French model of the "Grandes Ecoles," which was directed to aims very similar to those of Ottoman the nineteenth statesmen, century Ottoman a well-trained, in reformers succeeded bureau producing knowledgeable a view of the "interests of the state." In a way, cratic elite the guided by was was now earlier elite in molds then It formed that perpetuated. out a to in the earlier official. many ways brought product comparable a new dimension the penetration With of the state into the provinces, was added to the traditional concern with center. An at the shoring up was a to made state and the establish direct relation between the tempt citizen, man in a new form, of an ideal of Otto be no intermediate be statesmanship allegiances tween the Sultan and his the later of reform, the subjects. During stages creation of credit institutions and other facilities made a reality of the idea of the state as a provident father. When these re notables preempted invited the of statesmen.31 sources, they antipathy reforming But to this opposition officials to notables we must of reformist add still another source of opposition which began to appear toward the end of the nineteenth mod century. The new conflict resulted from administrative which was partly the revival, that there should

the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II. More it ernization during precisely, was a of the for Sultan's of while half-way modernization, product policy he also relied the Sultan worked hard to rationalize Ottoman bureaucracy, on individuals who countered It is as directives. his achievement-oriented access to were in how the unclear successful yet reaching higher positions to institution the Science?an the of School of Political moderni graduates zation of which the the Sultan had given his full support.32 Nevertheless, to the who bureaucrats and the Sultan younger oppose military, began that the highest century, did believe actively at the end of the nineteenth were staffed administrative and governmental character posts by persons ized more by their loyalty to the Sultan than by their ability. As for the the Sultan's modernist reforms did not fit in well with his prohi military, in maneuvers that large military units engage with live ammuni bition tion near the to The attitude eliminate these contradic seeking Capital. a "closure" of the tions and for be called "national" system might looking as to the earlier, Ottoman of "reason of bureaucratism, ideology opposed
state."

A further point at which the new, school-trained, national bureaucrats a modern to establish felt at odds with the Sultan was in their impatience state in allowed time for the much less elaboration of the Turkey. They as nation-state to the Sultan's more gradual?sometimes timid? compared the diffu impatience approach. The national bureaucrat's partly reflected into sion of nationalist the Ottoman These had ideas ideologies Empire. an affected part of the Ottoman intellectual establishment and created to be found among earlier reformers. No doubt the new not intransigence

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181

modernist

of truth, which had become in influential in well with this attitude.33 after fitted 1885, capital The old Ottoman motto of preservation of "religion and the state" thus in refurbished the Turk emerged Young slogan of "Union and Progress." After these new men took the Sultan out of the picture, the following to Turk the notables seemed them much Revolution, Young provincial more evil than or even for they had been for the traditional bureaucrats, In the reformers. Turk the notables' bills early Young parliament aiming at decentralization and less military control singled them out for suspicion at a time when currents were to be seen as a real separatist beginning circles of the
threat.34

view

of science

as the touchstone

War of this center (1920-1922), Independence once within the organ of the na again periphery duality appears directing tional resistance movement, the Grand National Here the Kemal Assembly. a diffuse ists were pitted was the party of against group which mainly notables led by alienated members of the official class. This group has been known as the "Second were aug Group." But in the Assembly they a mented more inchoate cluster of with Islamist by larger, representatives and decentralist cut across group lines.35 tendencies whose membership a series of These men formulated extremely interesting policies regard the and religious practice. instruction, ing representation, military, religious a five year residence to in an electoral They wanted requirement impose as a district as a prerequisite to for election candidacy they at deputy; to the control to and to the attach the tempted military began gendarmerie were on of the the that the Interior, stating Ministry gendarmes preying civilian population; education they strongly supported through religious the consumption of alcohol. Be schools; they passed a statute prohibiting cause we have no studies of the composition and uniformity of this precise we cannot about their cohesiveness, but the cluster cer group, say much as a tainly served rallying point against Kemalists.36 On the other hand, the more radical elements among the Kemalists pro tested that in the new law of "the people" were not repre municipalities sented on municipal councils. They the notables also accused of Bursa of having sold out to the Greek forces with whom the Kemalists were en a life or death for "the gaged in struggle. Both sides claimed to be working for but the Second Group this expression had clear connotations people," of decentralization and economic and for the liberalism, whereas political core it had undertones Kemalist of plebiscitar?an and the state's democracy to eliminate "intermediate" duty groups.37 The of the Kemalists' to the Second symbolic expression opposition to on and focused For the moment, Group provincials however, religion. Mustafa Kemal did not show his hand. With the end of the War of and the victory of the Kema Independence it a easier assume to over became hold lists, politics. Sophisticated political During

the Turkish

182

?ERIF

MARDIN

were as intimidation, The Repub used with persuasion. tactics, as well the of the established lican People's Kemalists, Party, successfully Party was an formed When its members. among party opposition discipline a Kurdish revolt in 1925, a Law for the activities with whose coincided for wide powers Maintenance of Order was passed giving the government was no link between the two years. the and there revolt, Party Although It was suppressed the new opposition did represent decentralist aspirations. the same year because said to be its links with "religious re of what were had been the central than "Kurdishness," action," and indeed this, more theme of the revolt.38 the primary aim in the suppression of this Party seems to have Although in which context it was made the been the elimination of political rivals, should be underlined. The nightmarish fissions seen before and during the War of Independence rebellion brought had traumatic effects; the Kurdish them to the surface. A second trauma, this time connecting political parties, in 1930. At that time an ex the provinces, and religious reaction, occurred from with multi-party received strong support periment politics which in a minor "Patrona" type the many groups opposing resulted Kemalism, the primary locus of the The province, revolt in the town of Menemen.39 was once more identified with treason aims the secularist periphery, against in the in this of the Republic. It is understandable, light, that beginning to his Mustafa Kemal should have devoted early 1930's, energies linguistic It is no coincidence that and historical myths. cultural matters, problems, he personally into the picture at this time to forge a new national stepped identity for the Turks. an In 1946 after Ataturk's death, when important political opposition was out from the the that went for the third formed time, party warning was "Do not go into the pro characteristic: Party Republican People's un our national to vincial towns or villages unity will be gather support: will be resurrected dermined,"40 meaning groups primordial "provincial as this argument was disingenuous, of whether political parties." Regardless 1923 and 1946 the the sense of the the fact is that between periphery?in an area was of potential it considered provinces?was suspect, and because it under close observation. the political center disaffection, kept is that a sizeable portion of Given is remarkable all this tension, what into the ranks of the the provincial, notable class was successfully co-opted not This did differ Party. compromise radically People's Republican at the time of the Young Turks, or even earlier. De from what prevailed as it was on the notables, the center had few means of realizing pendent the perennial Ottoman dream of working local through supine ideally In fact, the Kemalist revolu intermediaries for the benefit of the peasantry. in a number of ways: by an organizational tion could have been achieved the notable was actively opposed, in which revolution and/or by providing on the real services to the lower classes, and/or by an ideology focussing

CENTER-PERIPHERY

RELATIONS

183

In fact, the builders of the Turkish Republic placed even of the state first in their priorities, though it meant a very on notables. This the perpetuation of dependence might have been wise decision, one that allowed survive and to the economic Turkey despite new seems to Yet have been this the weakness of military option Republic. seem rational considerations, in retrospect, derived not so much from what, but from the bureaucratic code: the center had to be strengthened?partly else. It is this aspect of the bureau against the periphery?before everything cratic code that was profoundly unrevolutionary, despite the populist themes which the Republic developed. The Re the single party through which People's Party, Republican were channeled, was unable to establish contact with the publican policies so much rural masses. The movement the people," for which "toward was thin, clamor had gone up in the first years of the Ankara government, new links and the for establishing opened up by the Republic possibilities were not fulfilled. In fact, the meager between and government peasants sector financed much of of the reconstruction surplus of the agricultural on the notables as The for still social credit, Turkey. peasant depended The sistance, and, in some regions of Turkey, protection. symbol of the as came in the "fundamental the Kemalist Turk" peasant up very early were to but the of symbols Kemalist devoted movement, energies building of national to rather than the of the peas radically altering identity, place ant in the system. This is fairly understandable in view of the limited re sources of the in fact, went Republic. But the problem, deeper. of the bureaucratic The members class under the Republic had little an notion of identifying is with the peasantry. This themselves perhaps unfair judgment, given the large literature on the that ap village question in at time the the and of institutes. experiment peared given Turkey village I do not, however, of the recall any members ruling elite having constructed an or Chinese Russian operative theory of peasant mobilization, style. As are for attempts by officials to themselves with the these peasant, identify limited to a few radical teachers. Again, one has a feeling that the tradi tional Ottoman is relation with In the periphery being perpetuated. vestments in education, which a shorthand notation as be used to might of the this that show little what attitude, recapture multiple layers capital a genera there was came to be invested in institutions that would shape tion of true Kemalists at the center.41 One would highly
ture.

masses. peripheral the strengthening

ideational

of apprehending in these terms was the the consequence problem cast of the were "backward" and program: peasants Republican be the of the land, such as the laws only changed by transforming unrealistic law?what Marxists would call the superstruc village from the top down Ottoman had been the by imposing regulations social engineering. The characteristic

Integration general

approach

behind

184 features In

?ERIF

MARDIN

of Kemalism show that this view of society was still preeminent. re a theoretical the Kemalist to the peasant commitment program, an old Ottoman was to be advancement theme, while peasant peated achieved from the top down, an idea which also had an by integration vu. of element of d?j? had a fine understanding the Kemalists Altogether, in but missed the that, regulation, aspect revolutionary-mobilizational they certain contemporary masses schemes of modernization, for a re mobilized of society. To the extent that regulation had always been a structuring maxim of Ottoman had an unmis rule, their ideas about modernization organizational-mobilizational the publication Kadro activists which had a number of Marxist (1931-1934) in its ranks. Just as the Kemalists missed of mod the mobilizational aspects see not net too also did nature the the well of ernization, they integrative or were unable to work of modern it existence. into society, legislate to be seen in this The thinness of Kemalist has ideology light. Ataturk was to not do with he had what achieved trying ideology through political or a commitment to radical mobilization in social struc changes through ture. This was a hard burden to shift onto The Turkish country ideology. closer to the center by side, already suspect as separatist, was not brought a remarkable these policies. While showing ability for small but sustained see that it was the of the could growth, paying for the prosperity periphery was as it that but denied cities, consolation, being given speeches being the haven of its religious it is not culture. Thus, that local no surprising to and that the state was unable tables kept their hold over the peasantry, drive a wedge into the unity of the periphery. The Democrat founded Party, some erstwhile and prominent of the Republican members by People's was not so much a party of notables as it was a Party in 1946, party that a it speculated with political ideology which thought would be strongly sup masses was the old Ottoman the rural and their ported by by patrons. This idea of the state the interests of of its subjects: the protec being solicitous on the one hand, and abundance on the other. tive state justice distributing But this time it was the stance. this To show periphery who had preempted that the issues that were so central to the opposition had their roots in the from the center, we have only to look at the themes that won the alienation in the first multi Democrat Party 81 per cent of the seats in Parliament it would to the The new party promised services bring party elections. a concern as take his of de peasants, legitimate daily problems politics, liberalize bureaucratize and religious Finally, Turkey, practices. private controls and angered by its enterprise, by bureaucratic equally hampered on influence, was also promised greater freedom. dependence political at most a "means Until the 1946, Republican People's Party had been this date, when action." After it became "a for political parties emerged, was in medium for public participation but transformation this politics," takably traditional took note of the component. The only current within Kemalism side of modernization which was

CENTER-PERIPHERY

RELATIONS

185

to it.42 On the contrary, the electoral the periphery as seen in Democrat of the opposition, Party political platform especially in and in the media, the lines of a established newspapers, propaganda, debate between "real populists" and "bureaucrats." This symbolic and cul tural paraphernalia?the and religious of mosques conspicuous patronizing rituals by members of the Democrat the reluctant and Party follow-up by the Republican that secularism was with protests Party?laced People's the Democrat being lost, identified Party with the culture of the periphery. were its four official founders Ironically, just as much part of the bureau sufficient cratic "class" as other People's Party members. to Islam achieved by the Democrat The high resonance Party's appeal as the culture of the in the acquires greater significance light of periphery a an in the 1940's. Boran the Turkish Bor Behice discovery by sociologist came into found that as villages towns, the villager greater contact with see his as cam to The electoral inferior. began village ways increasingly at to the of intervened the time Democrat just paigns Party right provide rural areas with the belief that they were not inferior. The many transitional Islam and traditional rural values.43 Party relegitimized of the bureaucracy blows dealt to the power and the prestige be tween 1950-1957 to both the notables endeared the Democrat and Party the the peasants. The alliance was now continued under new conditions; laws of the Republic, the growth of the judicial apparatus, and the success in of the Republic the infrastructure of reforms had gradually building in the relation between master-servant patron and client, except changed as Southeastern the still Eastern such and regions, Turkey. undeveloped Economic set the relation be power, rather than domination, increasingly tween notables saw new and villagers. Smaller men notables surrounding success. Deals, economic and for trade-offs, opportunities bargains became than in the earlier situations, and client politics flour much more pervasive ished on a new level. This was not the form of mobilization that the Re a was it have but would People's undeniably publican Party approved, a form that a greater masses form of mobilization, of the portion brought into a relation with the center than had been possible under the meaningful The People's Party, Republican not have realized rural following might The Democrat that the very success of the stemmed from of the these bargains possibility Republican an economic in The workers, who at infrastructure. building People's Party not have the time usually voted for the Democrat Party, might thought that the Republican earlier, progressive People's Party's legislation had kept a rootless as some them from becoming but then, gratefulness, proletariat, of the Republican to members have continued is believe, People's Party not an element in was of the 1950's still early politics. Moreover, Turkey was not a land rich, and thus land redistribution major issue. Al relatively was a common the whose framework alliance, together, notable-peasant Democrat

not

to entice

186

?ERIF

MARDIN

to either side would bring greater benefits that collaboration understanding state control, worked than would rather well. In these straits, instead of future tasks in terms of organiza seeing its tion and mobilization, the Republican Party stood fast for the People's the selected it as the of Kemalist ideals. bureaucrats And, thus, preservation now one were There which best with could cooperate. party good they reasons to claim the that the Republican Party represented People's the Democrat "bureaucratic" the "demo center, whereas Party represented cratic" periphery. the cleavage be The Revolution of May 27, 1960 once more underlined of a static order, tween the center, now identified with the preservation The old polarization of the real "party of movement." and the periphery, a new form: the preservers of Pro the center against acquired periphery order against those who wanted crustean, change. The early Republican commented Celal Bayar, has recently the Republic, of deposed president of 1924 and the new the Turkish Constitution between that the difference of 1960 amounted to the consti after the revolution adopted as one of the bureaucracy and the intellectuals tutional legitimization source of to the "Turkish in addition earlier who had sovereignty people," as the source of sovereignty in the Kemalist only ideology.44 figured was All of the protests mounted by the Republican People's Party that it of democratic the real Party of change and the real supporter procedures were the latest appeal of a faction of the Party to "popu thus lost. Even to get down to the grass roots?dissipated, because the lism"?an attempt an to the grass roots as down issue was not so much getting providing means no confi alternative of fundamental change. The grass roots had constitution in the in the outlined and populist policies dence democratic, progressive, it of various because the electoral program Party, Republican People's no confidence in its methods of change. placed to identify the recent ( 1971 ) intervention It was easy for the periphery in Turkish with a desire for a return to the rigidity of the military politics of the intentions behind the move or the popu of the old order. Regardless of the of law and order, the elements lar support for the reestablishment their down-to-earth, believe that still observable direct, personal, periphery is its short-run gratifications, and integration, with of mobilization method more fewer risks than the Turkish and sys bureaucracy's presents tangible Insofar as the center's attitude tem of mobilization economy. by planned advice than by toward the periphery has been marked more by patronizing seem to have a lower identification with the plight of the classes, they would over seems to one's fate to the limbo of relegate all control point. Planning once its ugly head. Whether raises decision: bureaucratic again, regulation is irrelevant; of the implications of planning this is a correct assessment creates is that of officials that the perception of regulation the polarity versus all others.

CENTER-PERIPHERY RELATIONS

187

Once my thesis is stated this simply, I should add that the picture is, a the of is not completely in fact, more labor part complex. Organized of the of owners against non-owners The cross-cutting cleavages periphery. are an aspect of Turkish that could change means of production politics and has emerged, the Shi'ite minority the picture. A party representing at separate organization have been Kurdish attempts concerning rumblings is evidence and of dif heard for some time. There both of new cleavages of the bureaucracy Certain members the periphery. within ferentiation are now aware of the demands and integrated of a differentiated quite are to some them and of modern representing system, parties defecting and center But these are future aspects of Turkish politics, the periphery. is still one of its extremely structural compo important periphery polarity
nents.

code seem to have emerged two facets of the peripheral In retrospect, as made up of the periphery clearer outlines during modernization: as the center of a counter-official the and groups, periphery primordial culture. Both were b?tes noires of the Young Turks and of the Kemalists. as well as fortuitous But the policies of the modernizers, developments, Since this to the second facet of peripheral worked identity. highlight was able to it in all of almost submerge identity emerged provincial Turkey, code that ?if not to overcome aspect of the peripheral entirely?that as counter this identity harked back to primordial Later, allegiances. a for a party basis of allegiance nationwide also bureaucracy provided suc at the national Democrat level?the Party, and also for its operating one aspect of the cessors. Thus, stance?of which peripheral paradoxically, sense of pro a national the in the center was so suspicious?produced unity it was used by the Democrat around common vincial unification themes; is that this common code of the Party in its rise to power. The paradox a was productive national of which skein, unifying unexpectedly periphery not have emerged if the policies of the center toward the would probably had been more conciliatory. periphery with

References This a Fellow sity and article was written while of Near for the author was in residence The that were Shils, Free as University is grateful to the Univer to this end. made available at Princeton "Centre and in

in the Program the department initial formulation

Eastern

Studies. facilities from

author

the many is derived

1. My

Edward

The Logic of Personal Knowledge:

Seventieth here 2. For (New p. 117. resources Macmillan, see Birthday, 11 March 1961

Essays Presented
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to Michael
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Polanyi on His
pp. 117-130,

Periphery,"

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floating" York: Collier,

S. N. 1969),

Eisenstadt, passim.

The

Political

System

of Empires

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Empire," History 1970), Gibb Oxford 4. I owe

see Halil of these features "The Rise of the Ottoman survey Inalc?k, general Ann K. S. Lambton, in P. R. Holt, Bernard Lewis, eds., The Cambridge Islamic Lands Press, I, The Central of Islam, Vol. University (Cambridge: A. R. with assertive and compare the earlier more pp. 295-323, study of H. and Harold Bowen, Press, Islamic 1950-1967), Society pp. and 39-199. uses it in a forthcoming article in the West, Vol. I, part I (London:

University

to Prof. Y. Abrahamian this expression who East Studies. the International Journal of Middle relevant aspects of the development and Citizenship; of the state

5.

For

inWestern in our

Europe Changing

see Reinhard Social Order

Bendix, 1660

Nation-Building (New York:

Studies

(New York: Wiley,

Revolution, cially Party Party Press, 6. Friedrich, 7. Ibid., Vol. I

1966), pp. 1-142; C. J. Friedrich, The Age of the Baroque 1610

The Age 1952), p. 14ff.; R. R. Palmer, of Democratic Harper, Princeton and espe (Princeton: Press, 1959); University passim, here M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, Structures, important Seymour "Cleavage in An and Voter and Rokkan, Introduction," eds., Systems Alignment: Lipset and Voter Cross-National Free York: (New Systems Alignment: Perspectives 1967), The pp. Age 1-64. of the Baroque, p. 19.

p. 20. literature on in this Speros subject for the The time Decline of the formation of the Ottoman in Asia Empire Minor

8. The

is summarized

Vryonis,

of Medieval

Hellenism

and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh

(Berkeley: anthropologist, urban tradition direct University could which of of California still state Press, in 1966: of 1971), "There

through the Fifteenth Centuries

a French one of old a to

descendant

is the Turkey the Oghuz and

pp. 258-285. J. Cuisenier, are two truly Turkeys, the other of rural government, tribes belong here 219-242, pp. Diizeni (Ankara: to which

Turkmen

tradition, of 4/5th

Turks." Etudes No. 22-26 Rurales, (1966), day's see Ismail Besikci, Eastern Anadolunun Turkey Dogu 1969), p. 23. 9. See Gibb Islamic and Bowen, Society article "Devshirme" nuanced and Bowen, Islamic Society passim. and E.I., and

For p. 224. E. Yay?nlari,

the more 10. See Gibb University 11.

the West, pp. 2, No. 2, pp. the West, Vol.

39-199 210-213. I, part 2

and

compare

with

(London:

Oxford

Press,

1957-1969),

"The Ottoman See Halil Economic Mind and Aspects Econ of the Ottoman Inalc?k, in the Economic East in M. A. Cook, ed., Studies of the Middle from History omy," to the Present the Rise Oxford (London: Press, 1970), of Islam Day pp. University 206-218. See baasi, Ahmet 1963) Halil Mumcu, Ankara Osmanli Devletinde Hukuk Siyaseten Fakiiltesi Katl (Ankara: Ajans-Tiirk no. 180, Bilgiler Mat p. 71.

12.

Universitesi

Yayinlarindan Siyasal

13.

See

Dergisi, 14. See

"Osmali Inalc?k, Padi?ah?," 13 (December 1958), pp.

Ankara 68-79. in Turkish was who an

Universitesi

Fakiiltesi

Halil "Land Problems Inalc?k, Land ( 1955), pp. 221-228. ownership tween center Officials and periphery. the few who legal title to acquired they had gained control of these

History," important

element a

it?usually resources.

land acquired into shifted

45 World, in the be boundary as well surreptitiously?as peripheral stance once

The

Muslim

CENTER-PERIPHERY RELATIONS 189

15. F. p. B. Kramers, 959 ff. and "Ottoman M. C. first ed., Vol. IV, Turks, of Islam, History" Encyclopedia Mehmet Sahabeddin "Semsuddin Bey Devrinde Tekindag, 14 (March Tarih Dergisi, Fakiiltesi Universitesi Edebiyat

Karamanlilar," 1966), 16. For the Kultur 17. For Old 18. 19. See See zimat the pp.

Instanbul 81-98.

traditional in

situation (Ankara:

setting 1968-69, Sevin?

"Askeri," Encyclopedia Ozer Kbyde Ozankaya, Matbaasi, 1971). see Geertz, (Glencoe, Society Lutfi "The Free and

see

of

Islam

I,

(2), Yapi

p.

712. ve

For

Toplumsal

Siyasal

this concept, Societies and Gibb ibid., ve and

see Clifford New States Islamic ?mer

in Geertz, Revolution" Integrative Press, 1963), pp. 105-157. the West, Vol. I, part Hukuku Tanzimat: 1, passim. Tarihinde Y?z?nc?

ed.,

Bowen, and (1858)

p. 247 1274

tarihli

"Turk Toprak Barkan, in Arazi Kanunamesi,"

Tan Yil

d?n?m? M?nasebetiyle
20. For

(Istanbul: Maarif Matbaasi,

1940),

p. 325.

see Halil "The Nature of Traditional the earlier of notables Inalc?k, importance in Robert Mod E. Ward and Dankwart Rustow, eds., Political Society, Turkey," in ernization Princeton Press, 1964), (Princeton: pp. University Japan and Turkey 46-48. For later developments Old and New: The Ottoman Stanford Shaw, Between under pp. Selim III 1789-1807 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 212-217. Aktepe, Patrona No. 808, Isyani: 1958), 1730 passim. (Istanbul: Istanbul Universitesi Edebiyat

Empire

21.

See M. Munir Fakiiltesi

Yay?nlar? G.

22.

See on

Joseph Political

LaPalombara

Development,"

Political 23. See Halil

Development Inalc?k,

and Myron Weiner, "Conclusions: The of Parties Impact in LaPalombara Parties and Weiner, and eds., Political Princeton (Princeton: Press, 1966), p. 413. University Uygulanmas? ve Sosyal Tepkileri," Belleten, 28

"Tanzimat?n

(1964), pp. 623-690.

24. W. M. Ramsay, "The Intermixture of Races in Asia Minor: Some of Its Causes and

Effects," Proceedings of the British Academy

25. For 96th provincial and 97th April opposition sessions to of secularism the Ottoman at

( 1915-1916), p. 409.
the time of May the Young 24-25, Turks, 1910, see also the 71st

Parliament,

session, 26. For man 27. Enver 1907 Tarihi 28. See

3, 1911. Law of 1864, see Roderic Princeton H. Davison, Press, ve Reform 1963), in the Otto pp. Devirleri 136-171. 1876

the Administrative Empire 1856-1876

(Princeton:

University

Birinci Mesrutiyet Tarihi VIII: Ziya Karal, Osmanli tarih kurumu (Turk (Ankara, 1962), Yay?nlar?ndan, 5), p. 329. Bayar, Ben de Yazdim: Milli M?cadeleye Giris

Istibdat 13

ser., No.

16, Dunya

Celal

(Istanbul:

Baha

Matbaase,

1966), pp. 451, 475.

29. Server Bas?mevi, 30. I take Claus this Wittich, Iskit, Nesriyat Turkiyede p. 113. Hareketleri Tarihine bir Bakls (Istanbul: Devlet

1939),

from Max Weber, terminology eds., 3 vols. (New York:

Economy Bedminister

and

and Roth Guenther Society, Vol. Press, 1968), I, p. 229.

190
31. "Yeni 1971), 32. Andreas Allen Belgelerin pp. 60-117,

SERIF MARDIN
Siyasal durumu," Belleten, 35 (January

Pasan?n ?s?ginda K?mil here pp. 110-111.

in the Quest Education and (London: for Modernity Turkey to this information 12. I was alerted 1966), p. 90, note by Joseph in L. Szyliowicz, Recruitment World Role The "Elite of the Mulkiye," Turkey: concur that 10 cannot with his but 23 Politics, 1971), 386, interpretation (April is also at variance is "significant." This in higher data per cent of graduates posts P. Roos, Managers L. Roos, with that given of Moderniza by Leslie Jr., and Noralou in Harvard tion Organization Mass.: and Elites (1950-1969) (Cambridge, Turkey 20. Press, 1971), p. University Kazamias, and Unwin, See M. Orhan Okay, Ben Group, 1928), of p. Besir Fuad (Istanbul: Vol. Z. Hareket note Yay?nlar? 1. Siys? Partiler (Istanbul, 1969), passim.

33. 34. 35.

See Celal On the

Bayar, Second

de Yazdtm, see

II, p. 449, Tunaya,

Tar?k

Turkiyede

1952), pp. 538-539 and Halide Edib

Century 36. On Zabit 37. On Millet the Press, control 183.

[Ad?var], The Turkish Ordeal

see Vol.

(New York:
Meclisi

Ceridesi municipal Meclisi

the gendarmerie by the civilians Latin I, 29/6-7-1336. script edition boards Zabit

Turkiye II, pp.

Biiyuk Millet 182-183.

military protecting 38.

service, their

see not being of the people T?rkiye representative Biiyuk Vol. Ill, p. 85; on notables Ceridesi, I, 43/3-8-1336, evading in as persons interested ibid., Vol. II, p. 433; on notables primarily 260. Vol. Ibid., II, p. property, Siyast Lewis, Partiler, p. 617 The Emergence 1968), p. 266. p. 417. Birlik," in Demokrasi Yolunda (The Hague: 1964), on article of Modern 14 of On the party program. 2nd ed. (London:

See Tunaya, Turkiyede see Bernard the revolt Oxford University The Press,

Turkey,

39. 40.

See Lewis, F. K?pr?f?, p. 304.

Emergence,

"Partiler

ve Mill?

41.

M.

vestment

T. ?zelli, "The Estimates in the First Turkish

of Private Republic

Internal

Rates

of Return International

on Educational Journal

In

1923-1960,"

of Middle

East Studies, 1 (April 1970), pp. 156-176.

42. Osman Faruk Logoglu, Unpublished "Ismet Ph.D. In?n? and the Political Modernization University, Turk a tarih transitory 1970, Kurumu situation 1945-1965," 43. Behice Boran, Dissertation, Princeton (Ankara: this was of Turkey p. 135. basimevi, but

1945), pp. nevertheless 44. Celal Bayar,

Y api Arastirmalarl Toplumsal out that 218-219. Boran points served the Democrat Party well. "Ba?vekilim Adnan Menderes,"

it

Hurriyet,

June

29,

1969.