Confronting Relativism

William B. Irvine

Editor's Note: This essay by William B. Irvine and the subsequent article by Charles Landesman are loosely tied by subject matter. They both address academic dimensions of morality. The former charts from its author's experience in the classroom a landscape of the relativism that prevails among today's undergraduates. The latter explores the realm of the academic moralists, where we find scholars and philosophers projecting their political longings as unconditional imperatives for a just society. The two territories trade on each other's needs. The dreams of the moralists for diversity or multiculturalism provide alternatives to genuine ethical deliberation in a packaged philosophy that affords students the luxury of never having to formulate their own moral framework.
erica is awash in tolerance. Many of us simply refuse to b e j u d g m e n t a l o u t the actions o f others. I n d e e d , the only time s o m e o f us will pass j u d g m e n t on o u r fellow citizens is to chastise t h e m for b e i n g j u d g m e n t a l . In my own life I c o n f r o n t this e p i d e m i c o f t o l e r a n c e every time I discuss value t h e o r y in the college p h i l o s o p h y classes that I teach. Relativism runs r a m p a n t a m o n g the u n d e r g r a d u a t e s , a n d those u n d e r g r a d u a t e s w h o cling to absolutes often d o so surreptitiously, fearing the scorn o f the relativists a r o u n d them. This raises p r o b l e m s in the classroom, since m o s t o f the ethical theories we discuss in p h i l o s o p h y are unapologetically absolutist. Thus, I m m a n u e l Kant in the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals was an absolutist, as was J o h n Stuart Mill in Utilitarianism; a n d almost all o f those p h i l o s o p h e r s w h o criticize Kant a n d Mill find fault n o t with their absolutism b u t with the particular f o r m their absolutism took. T h e first task in any college ethics class, then, is to confront relativism. In saying this, I d o n o t m e a n to imply that ethical relativists are necessarily m i s g u i d e d souls w h o can easily be refuted. It is possible for an intelligent person to arrive at ethical relativism as the result o f long, h a r d thought: consider, for example, David B. Wong's sympathetic t r e a t m e n t o f relativism in Moral Relativity. T h e p o i n t is that m o s t u n d e r g r a d u a t e s d o n o t arrive at ethical relativism as the result o f long, h a r d thought. To the contrary, they e s p o u s e relativism as the result of a failure to think things t h r o u g h . M o r e precisely, William B. Irvine is an associate professor in the Department of Philosophy at Wright State University, Dayton, Ohio. Paragon House is to release his Doing Right by Children: Reflections on the Nature of Childhood and the Obligations of Parenthood in 2001. Please address correspondence to Academic Questions, 221 Witherspoon Street, Second Floor, Princeton, NJ 08542-3215; editor@aq.nas.org.

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they espouse relativism because they h a r b o r a n u m b e r o f misconceptions a b o u t the n a t u r e o f ethical absolutism. In the r e m a i n d e r o f this article, I will describe some o f these m i s c o n c e p t i o n s a n d explain how an absolutist can deal with them.

What Is Relativism?
To u n d e r s t a n d the difference b e t w e e n ethical absolutism a n d ethical relativism, it is useful to t h i n k a b o u t the difference b e t w e e n m a t h e m a t i c s a n d ice cream preferences. In m a t h e m a t i c s t h e r e are right a n d w r o n g answers. If s o m e o n e tells us 5+7=13, we d o n ' t say their m a t h is u n u s u a l , we say it is wrong. If an entire culture tells us 5+7=13, we say the culture is mistaken in its mathematics; w h e n it comes to math, we d o n ' t tolerate cultural differences. In m a t h e m a t i c s , the truths are universal, i.e., the same for all people, in all places, a n d at all times. In this sense m a t h e m a t i c s is absolute. W h e n it comes to ice c r e a m preferences, t h e r e are no right a n d w r o n g answers. A flavor that tastes g o o d to o n e p e r s o n m i g h t n o t taste g o o d to another. It would be silly for us to a t t e m p t to prove to s o m e o n e that vanilla ice cream is n o t good. If s o m e o n e thinks vanilla ice c r e a m is good, t h e n for him, it is good: De gustibus non est disputandum. For this reason, w h e n it comes to ice cream preferences, it is a p p r o p r i a t e for us to r e l a t i v i z e j u d g m e n t s to individuals or to groups. W h e n I say vanilla is good, I m e a n g o o d to me. W h e n I say m i n t chocolate is bad, I m e a n bad to me, but I allow the possibility that it m i g h t be g o o d to others. An ethical relativist is in the habit o f a d d i n g relativizing clauses to his ethical j u d g m e n t s . H e is disinclined to label a certain activity as b e i n g right or wrong, period. Rather, he tells us that the activity m i g h t be w r o n g for him b u t right for others; or that the activity m i g h t be w r o n g for one culture b u t right for another culture. In o t h e r words, he treats e t h i c a l j u d g r n e n t s in m u c h the same way as he treats j u d g m e n t s with respect to ice cream. An ethical absolutist, o n the o t h e r h a n d , treats ethics like m a t h . A c c o r d i n g to him, t h e r e are right a n d w r o n g answers to m o r a l questions. T h e answers are the same for all people, in all places, a n d at all times. Thus, an activity t h a t is wrong for me is w r o n g for everyone; a n d if others t h i n k the activity is right, they are simply w r o n g in their ethical viewpoint, the same way as s o m e o n e who thinks 5+7=13 is simply wrong.

Undergraduate Relativism
Why do u n d e r g r a d u a t e s favor ethical relativism? In large part because they h a r b o r various m i s c o n c e p t i o n s a b o u t ethical absolutism. H e r e are s o m e o f them.

Misconception #1. Only someone coming from a conservative religious background would favor ethical absolutism. It is true that m o s t religions are absolutist with

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r e s p e c t to ethics, b u t f r o m this it d o e s n o t follow that absolutist ethics invariably p r e s u p p o s e s either the existence o f G o d or certain religious views. It is entirely possible for an atheist to b e an ethical absolutist. Such an individual cannot, o f course, say that the reason we s h o u l d d o the right thing is to please G o d (or avoid p u n i s h m e n t f r o m G o d ) , b u t he can instead a r g u e - - a s Mill d i d - that we should do the right thing b e c a u s e we s h o u l d act to maximize the happiness o f h u m a n beings. It is worth n o t i n g that nearly all o f the (absolutist) ethical theories d e v e l o p e d by p h i l o s o p h e r s involve no religious presuppositions whatsoever. Misconception #2. Absolutists think they have all the answers, ethicall~ speaking. A l t h o u g h there may be absolutists w h o think they have all the answers, most will a d m i t that they d o n o t k n o w everything. For most absolutists, the situation in ethics is like that in mathematics: A l t h o u g h any m a t h e m a t i c a l absolutist will tell y o u that the truths o f m a t h e m a t i c s are the s a m e for us all, n o r i g h t - m i n d e d m a t h e m a t i c a l absolutist w o u l d claim to have all these truths. T h e best you can h o p e for in m a t h e m a t i c s is to c o m p r e h e n d a p o r t i o n o f the mathematical d o m a i n . Thus, m a t h e m a t i c a l absolutism d o e s n o t entail mathematical omniscience. T h e same is true o f ethical absolutism. An ethical absolutist might claim that there arecorrect answers to ethical questions, b u t quickly a d d that he himself lacks the answers to m a n y of these questions. Misconception #3. Ethical absolutists view the world in black and white terms: They regard every action as being either right or wrong and don't allow for cases that are simply outside the realm of ethics. In fact, a t h o u g h t f u l ethical absolutist will n o t regard every action as b e i n g either right or wrong. It is true that he will classify s o m e actions as b e i n g morally obligatory a n d s o m e actions as b e i n g morally impermissible, b u t he will also allow for a third possibility: that an action is n e i t h e r morally obligatory n o r morally impermissible, b u t is "morally neutral." Thus, s u p p o s e I pause in my writing to heave a sigh. It is n o t w r o n g for m e to heave the sigh, a n d it w o u l d n o t have b e e n w r o n g for m e not to heave the sigh; my sighing simply did n o t raise any moral issues. T h e same can be said o f most of my daily activities, including my decision on which clothes to wear, what b o o k to read, whether or not to play tennis, and whether or not to pet the cats. (These activities all could have m o r a l implications--if, for e x a m p l e , I h a d stolen the b o o k I was r e a d i n g or if by playing tennis I was b r e a k i n g a p r o m i s e to my wife to d o the t a x e s - - b u t in most cases do not have moral implications.) T h e r e is a n o t h e r sense in which ethical absolutists m i g h t b e c h a r g e d with e n g a g i n g in "black a n d white" thinking with respect to ethics: An ethical relativist might tell us that absolutists are unwilling to allow for e x c e p t i o n s to moral rules. Thus, an ethical absolutist w h o thinks a b o r t i o n is wrong, will think it is w r o n g in every case, with n o exceptions. An ethical relativist, o n the o t h e r hand, will be willing to relativize his views o n a b o r t i o n to various cases, arguing, for example, that a b o r t i o n is right for a w o m a n w h o is p r e g n a n t as the result o f rape.

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N o t only can an ethical absolutist "make exceptions" to moral rules, b u t a t h o u g h t f u l absolutist will m a k e plenty o f them. Thus, c o n s i d e r an ethical absolutist w h o agrees with the "abortion exception" j u s t cited. H e m i g h t tell us that a b o r t i o n is morally permissible if a w o m a n is p r e g n a n t as the result o f rape, b u t go on to argue that a b o r t i o n is morally impermissible if a w o m a n is in h e r eighth m o n t h o f pregnancy, if she voluntarily got p r e g n a n t , a n d if h e r life is n o t t h r e a t e n e d by c o n t i n u i n g the pregnancy. In m a k i n g such claims, is the absolutist giving in to relativism? N o t at all. T h e claims in q u e s t i o n are m o r e p r o p e r l y d e s c r i b e d as b e i n g conditional (i.e., "if-then") claims r a t h e r than relativistic (i.e., "for") claims. Ethics is a c o m p l e x subject, a n d we s h o u l d n o t e x p e c t ethical truths to be simple. Is it w r o n g to tell lies? Usually, b u t n o t always. Suppose, for example, that by telling a "white lie" you can save the life o f an i n n o c e n t person. Is it w r o n g to kill p e o p l e ? Usually, b u t n o t always: consider killing in self-defense. Thus, a t h o u g h t f u l absolutist p r o b a b l y w o n ' t w a n t to m a k e a blanket declaration that a b o r t i o n is always wrong, b u t will instead want to specify the conditions u n d e r which it is wrong; he will, in o t h e r words, conditionalize his ethical declarations with respect to abortion. But having declared, for instance, that a b o r t i o n is morally permissible if a w o m a n is p r e g n a n t as the result o f rape, the absolutist will go on to tell us that this c o n d i t i o n a l statement, if it is in fact true, is true for all p e o p l e , in all places, a n d at all times. His c o n d i t i o n a l ethical claims, in o t h e r words, are absolute conditional claims: H e will refuse to a d d a relativizing clause to his conditional declarations and say, for example, that for him a b o r t i o n is permissible if a w o m a n is p r e g n a n t as the result o f rape. Much the same thing h a p p e n s in mathematics. A m a t h e m a t i c i a n might m a k e a claim like the following: "If x=5, t h e n x+7=12." T h e claim itself is conditional, b u t we should n o t c o n c l u d e f r o m this that in m a k i n g the claim, the m a t h e m a t i c i a n has a b a n d o n e d his absolutism. To the contrary, he will h o l d that it is a conditional claim which, if true, is true for all p e o p l e , in all places, and at all times. Misconception #4. Absolutists are intolerant of others. This is only a partial misc o n c e p t i o n . Ethical absolutists will be intolerant in o n e sense o f the word. T h e y will n o t be universally accepting o f the b e h a v i o r o f o t h e r individuals, b u t will instead s o m e t i m e s label their actions as b e i n g morally wrong. S u p p o s e , for example, a father beats his children. An ethical absolutist will likely react with intolerance. H e will hold the father's actions to be morally c o n d e m n a b l e . H e m o s t certainly will n o t react to the i n c i d e n t by saying (as a truly tolerant a n d particularly shallow relativist might) that a l t h o u g h he w o u l d never b e a t his children, he is unwilling to force his personal ethics o n t o others. Having a d m i t t e d that ethical absolutists will b e intolerant in o n e sense o f the word, let m e d e f e n d t h e m from the charge o f i n t o l e r a n c e in a n o t h e r sense of the word. In this s e c o n d sense, an intolerant individual is o n e w h o is selfrighteous a n d is t h e r e f o r e continually expressing his disapproval o f the be-

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havior of others. What makes many students shun absolutism is their belief that ethical absolutists tend to be intolerant in this sense of the word. Students generally want to have lots of friends, and they know that if they go a r o u n d constantly criticizing the behavior of others, they will find themselves with few. As character traits go, self-righteousness is, in this day and age, distinctly uncool. Students are mistaken, though, if they think advocacy of ethical absolutism requires people to be publicly intolerant in the m a n n e r just described. Consider again the absolutist who determined that the behavior of the child-beating father was wrong. Although this absolutist holds the father's behavior to be morally condemnable, it does not follow from this that he will make his opinion known to the f a t h e r - - o r to anyone else, for that matter. He might instead report the father to the police in an anonymous fashion, but never confront the father himself. Indeed, he might even decide that morality requires him to keep absolutely silent about the father's behavior. Suppose, for example, he knows that the police refuse to intervene in such cases, and that if he expresses his outrage at the father's behavior, the father will react by beating his children more severely. To reinforce this point, consider the situation of mathematical absolutists. Even though they are absolutists, this in no way requires them to go a r o u n d telling everyone of their mathematical discoveries; and it is a good thing, too, since mathematicians who are unable to stop talking mathematics generally have few non-mathematical friends. In the same way, an ethical absolutist can be privately disapproving of certain behavior--i.e., be intolerant in the private sense of the w o r d - - b u t not publicly express his intolerance--i.e., not be intolerant in the public sense of the word. He can, in short, be an absolutist and have friends. A n o t h e r thing to realize about absolutist intolerance is that absolutists will generally be quite tolerant of behavior that is primarily self-affecting. What they will be intolerant of is behavior that negatively affects others. Suppose, then, that someone dyes his hair green. It would be difficult for an absolutist to develop a moral a r g u m e n t against this behavior, since it primarily affects the person doing the dyeing. Suppose, on the other hand, that the person doing the dyeing steals the dye from his neighbor. The absolutist would be quick to c o n d e m n this behavior (and might or might not choose to express his c o n d e m n a t i o n publicly), inasmuch as it is behavior that negatively affects someone else. "Outing" Closet Absolutism How can one persuade student relativists of the error of their ways? Here is a technique that I have employed with some success. During my classroom discussion of relativism, I pick one particularly outspoken relativist and ann o u n c e that I am considering giving him an F i n my course because he is

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wearing socks. T h e n I pick a s e c o n d relativist a n d a n n o u n c e that I am considering giving him an A in my course b e c a u s e he (like the first relativist) is wearing socks. After s o m e initial b e f u d d l e m e n t , students c o m p l a i n that it w o u l d b e w r o n g for m e to give grades in this manner. W h e n I ask t h e m why it w o u l d b e wrong, they generally raise issues o f fairness. Fairness requires that I grade t h e m n o t according to w h e t h e r they wear socks, b u t a c c o r d i n g to the quality o f their class work. Fairness also requires that I treat like cases alike. It is manifestly unfair for m e to give o n e s t u d e n t an F for wearing socks and t h e n turn a r o u n d and give a n o t h e r s t u d e n t an A for wearing socks. S o m e t i m e s students go o n to p o i n t o u t that I have a contractual obligation to g r a d e t h e m fairly; therefore, by giving a s t u d e n t an F for wearing socks, I a m n o t only guilty o f acting unfairly, b u t I am also guilty o f a b r e a c h o f my e m p l o y m e n t contract. I r e s p o n d by accusing these relativists o f intolerance. A c c o r d i n g to their ethical views, unfairness or b r e a c h o f c o n t r a c t m i g h t be wrong, b u t w h o are they to force their ethical views on me? Even t h o u g h unfairness m i g h t b e wrong for them, s h o u l d n ' t they, as ethical relativists, allow that it might b e right for me? A n d what are they, as relativists, d o i n g t h r o w i n g a r o u n d such absolutist concepts as fairness a n d contractual obligation? In the face o f such questions, they quickly a b a n d o n their relativism. T h e y realize that b e c a u s e this is a case in which s o m e o n e else's actions affect t h e m personally, they have every right to be j u d g m e n t a l . Cultural Relativism Earlier we have b e e n discussing individual ethical relativism. It is also possible for students to e n g a g e in cultural relativism. Cultural relativists a r g u e that different cultures have different ethical standards, that the ethical standards o f o t h e r cultures are j u s t as "valid" as o u r own, a n d that it is w r o n g for us to j u d g e o t h e r cultures by o u r own ethical standards. Students w h o have b e e n e x p o s e d to a n t h r o p o l o g y often c o m e away cultural relativists. T h e r e is less to cultural relativism than m e e t s the eye. W h a t is astonishing, when you view o t h e r cultures, is n o t h o w d i f f e r e n t their ethical beliefs are, b u t how similar they are to o u r own. W h a t differs are the circumstances u n d e r which these o t h e r cultures must apply their ethical beliefs. Because o f circumstantial differences, the same ethical standards can result in s e e m i n g differences in ethical practices. My favorite illustration of this is f o u n d in the writings o f G o n t r a n de Poncins. Poncins was a F r e n c h aristocrat w h o h a d an interest in "simpler" cultures. In 1938 this interest led him to live a m o n g the E s k i m o s - - o r , as they are n o w known, the I n u i t - - a n d travel with t h e m across the Canadian Arctic. In his b o o k Kabloona he describes his a d v e n t u r e s a n d provides w o n d e r f u l insight into h o w the Inuit lived b e f o r e b e i n g " m o d e r n i z e d , " At o n e p o i n t in his narrative, Poncins describes an Inuit w h o h a d killed an elderly relative:

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It was his own mother that he had driven out and set down at sea to freeze to death. He was fond of her, he explained. He had always been kind to her. But she was too old, she was no longer good for anything; so blind, she couldn't even find the porch to crawl into the igloo. So, on a day of blizzard, the whole family agreeing, he had taken her out, and they had struck camp and gone off, leaving her to die. A cultural relativist m i g h t r e s p o n d to this tale by c o m m e n t i n g on differences in cultural values. He m i g h t argue that we s h o u l d n o t j u d g e the I n u i t by the values o f o u r own culture. It would be w r o n g for us to leave o u r a g e d parents outside to freeze to d e a t h in a blizzard, b u t who are we to impose o u r ethical values on the Inuit? Intercultural tolerance, he m i g h t add, is as important as i n t e r p e r s o n a l tolerance. T h e t h i n g to realize a b o u t the case j u s t described is that the cultural relativist would be mistaken if he used this case to d e m o n s t r a t e intercultural differences in ethical values. For notice that w h e n we apply the ethical values o f m o d e r n America to the Inuit, we are likely to reach the same conclusion as they did a b o u t the p r o p e r t h i n g to do with one's elderly relatives. T h e I n u i t described by Poncins differ f r o m us n o t in their ethical values, but in their physical circumstances. T h e life o f the Inuit (before they were " m o d e r n i z e d " ) involved traveling across the ice in winter looking for f o o d - - p r i m a r i l y seals. A n y t h i n g that impaired the mobility o f the family u n i t t h e r e f o r e i m p a i r e d its chances o f surviving the winter. O n the Arctic ice in 1938, there were n o h o m e s for the a g e d where elderly relatives could be deposited. T h e I n u i t who f o u n d themselves traveling with an e n f e e b l e d elderly relative were t h e r e f o r e faced with the following choice: Either let the relative die, or m u c h o f the family u n i t (including the relative) dies. It is clear what the I n u i t s h o u l d do if they value h u m a n life: they s h o u l d let the relative die. It is also clear that if a m o d e r n A m e r i c a n family with s t a n d a r d ethical values f o u n d itself in similar c i r c u m s t a n c e s - - i f it was o u t on the ice with only primitive tools, was f o r c e d to travel miles each day to find food, a n d h a d no alternative to this way o f l i f e - - i t would m a k e m u c h the same choice. T h e conclusion: M o d e r n Americans share m a n y ethical values with the Inuit peoples o f sixty years ago; where we differ is in the physical circumstances u n d e r which we must apply these values. In discussing the Inuit practice o f leaving p e o p l e o u t on the ice to die, we s h o u l d keep in m i n d that the chosen means of death is a relatively gentle death. W h e n you die of hypothermia, you become progressively m o r e tired. T h o u g h t processes slow down until you are in a stupor. Ultimately you slip into u n c o n sciousness, never to awaken. It is a process that, r a t h e r t h a n b e i n g painful, is m a r k e d by an absence o f feeling, It is t h e r e f o r e p e r h a p s the kindest d e a t h t h a t the Inuit, who lacked m o d e r n drugs, c o u l d have inflicted on the elderly. In those cases in which there a r e g e n u i n e ethical differences between ourselves a n d some o t h e r culture, it hardly follows that we s h o u l d be t o l e r a n t o f

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those differences. Thus, if we discover a culture that c o n d o n e s slavery, m o r a l tolerance w o u l d be o u t o f place. T h e m e m b e r s o f this culture are simply w r o n g in their views on slavery--assuming, o f course, that we are right in o u r views. We s h o u l d do what we can to help t h e m "see the light" with regard to h u m a n rights, in m u c h the same way as we m i g h t try to h e l p t h e m see the light, mathematically speaking, if they believed 5+7=13.
Conclusion

After dealing with s t u d e n t relativism for decades, I have c o m e to the conclusion that it is a view students can fairly easily be talked o u t of. It is n o t at all difficult to reveal to students the e x t e n t to which they are closet absolutists. It is also n o t difficult to reveal to t h e m that their f o n d n e s s for relativism is in large part d u e to their m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g the n a t u r e of absolutism. A n u m b e r o f m i s c o n c e p t i o n s s u r r o u n d absolutism, a n d students fall victim to these misconceptions. It d o e s n ' t help matters that m a n y o f their college professors have fallen victim to these same m i s c o n c e p t i o n s a n d as a result e n c o u r a g e s t u d e n t relativism. In their minds, by e n c o u r a g i n g relativism, they are e n c o u r a g i n g tolerance in the classroom. As we have seen, though, absolutism is n o t s y n o n y m o u s with intolerance. Morality allows us to be tolerant in s o m e cases, b u t requires us to be i n t o l e r a n t in others. By c o n f r o n t i n g relativism in the c l a s s r o o m - - b y c o r r e c t i n g students' mistaken beliefs a b o u t a b s o l u t i s m - - c o l l e g e professors are taking an important step in fostering their students' d e v e l o p m e n t as moral beings.

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