Descartes 2

International Phenomenological Society
Descartes on the Dubitability of the Existence of Self Author(s): David Cunning Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 74, No. 1 (Jan., 2007), pp. 111-131 Published by: International Phenomenological Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40041029 . Accessed: 25/03/2014 22:03
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Research and Phenomenological Philosophy 2007 Vol. LXXIV No. 1, January 2007 International Phenomenological Society
Descartes on theDubitability of Self of theExistence

DAVID CUNNING
The University of Iowa
In a number a passages Descartesappears to insistthat"I am, I exist"and its variants are wholly indubitable.These passages presentan intractable problem of in the face of passages in whichDescartesallows that any resultis interpretation a numberof elements of dubitable,"I am, I exist" included.Here I pull together Descartes' system to show how all of thesepassages hang together. If my analysis is correct, it tellsus something about the perspective thatDescarteshimself thinks we should take in readingthe Meditations.
There are a number in which of passages Descartes "I to treat appears in a way thatotherresults are not. For am, I exist"as indubitable he saysin theSecondMeditation that example,
afterconsidering I mustfinally conclude that this everything verythoroughly, I am, I exist,is necessarily truewhenever it is put forward proposition, by me or conceivedin mymind.1
In theFirst Meditation he had argued thatwe can doubtthetruths of if we cannotruleout theprospect arithmetic and geometry thatour minds are not reliable he (AT 7:20-1),but in the SecondMeditation finds that"I am, I exist"is indubitable evenin thefaceof thatprosis a "firm and immoveable pect.The latter point"(AT 7:24),and "one is certain that and unshakeable" are somepassages, thing (ibid.).There in which Descartes allowsthat"I am,I exist" and itsvariants however,
AT 7:25. A similarpassage is in Second Replies,AT 7:145-6.Unless otherwise indiin John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald cated, I use the translations Murdoch, The PhilosophicalWritings of Descartes, VolumeI, Cambridge: CamPress (1985); Cottingham, and Murdoch, The PhiloStoothoff, bridge University Press sophical Writings of Descartes, VolumeII, Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Stoothoff, Murdoch,and AnthonyKenny, The Philosoph(1984); and Cottingham, ical Writings Press of Descartes, VolumeIII, Cambridge: Cambridge University to the paginationin Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, (1991). I use "AT" to refer Oeuvres de Descartes,VolumesI-XII, Paris: Vrin(1996).
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are dubitable.2 Here I pull together a numberof elements of Descartes' In sectionone to show how all of thesepassages hang together. system I argue thatDescartesholds thatmostof us have a confusedmaterially falseidea of selfand thatas a resultwe can thinkour existence confusedly and hencedoubt it. In sectiontwo I considera passage in Second thatit Repliesin whichDescartesappears to statewithout qualification is impossible In sectionthreeI conforus to doubt our own existence. sidertheclear and distinct of selfthatis achievedin the Secperception ond Meditation.I conclude withsome remarks of on the implications Descartes' notionof materialfalsity forthe projectof conceptualanalysis. I The mostfundamental of Descartes'metaphysics includethat principles "what is done cannot be undone," that "he who thinkscannot but existwhile he thinks,"and that "nothingcomes fromnothing."3 Descartes refers to these alternately as "common notions" and "primary notions."4Althoughthereis a sense in which these notions are the mostevidentof all,5theyare stillquite dubitable.Descarteswrites, In thecase of these there is no doubtthatthey are capable common notions, of being not and for otherwise would clearly distinctly they properly perceived; be calledcommon notions. Butsomeofthem do notreally havean equalclaim wellperto be called'common' sincethey are notequally amongall people, ceivedby everyone. This is not,I think, becauseone man'sfaculty of knownotions are extends more than butbecause thecommon another's, widely ledge caninconflict with ofsomepeople thepreconceived who,as a result, opinions noteasily notions are perceived with theutmost Buttheselfsame graspthem. from suchpreconceived clarity byother opinions.6 peoplewhoarefree
2 1:49AT 7:35-6,and Principles See forexamplethe ThirdMeditation, of Philosophy have arguedthatin the lightof thesepassages 50, AT 8A:23-4. Some commentators is no coherent of Descartes'viewson thedubitabilthere accountto be reconstructed 's Method of Descartes ity of "I am, I exist." See for example Janet Broughton, Press (2002), 185. See also AnthonyKenny, Princeton Doubt, Princeton: University Bristol: ThoemmesPress(1968), 185; Margaret Descartes,A Studyof His Philosophy, Wilson(1978), Descartes;New York: Routledge(1978), 37 and 133-5;and Genevieve III and V: From the'General of Meditations "On theComplementarity Rodis-Lewis, Rule' of Evidenceto 'CertainScience'," in AmelieOksenbergRorty(ed.), Essays on Press(1984), 280. Descartes'Meditations, of California Berkeley: University 1:49, AT 8A:23-4; Second Replies,AT 7:145-6; and Second Replies,AT Principles 7:135-6. 1:50,AT 8A:24; and Second Replies,AT 7:135-6. Principles "are by notionsof metaphysics In Second Replies,Descartes says that the primary notionswhichthe theirnatureas evidentas, or even moreevidentthan,the primary study"(AT 7:157). geometers 1:50,AT 8A:24. Principles
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Here (in Principles 1:50) Descartessays thatcommonnotionsare dubi1:49 he includedas a commonnotion that "he table, and in Principles who thinkscannot but existwhile he thinks."On Descartes' view,we a clear and distinct while we cannot refrain fromaffirming perception are havingit, but the commonnotions"are not equally well perceived If a perceptionis even the slightest bit obscure, it is by everyone."7 it: to doubt possible
So long as we attend to a truthwhich we perceiveveryclearly,we cannot in this doubt it. But when,as often to any truth happens,we are not attending that we have previously way,theneven thoughwe remember perceivedmany therewill be nothing whichwe may not justly thingsveryclearly,nonetheless doubt so long as we do not know thatwhatever we clearlyperceive is true.8
"I am, I exist"is dubitablein thesense thatwe can conLike anything, ceive thatit is falseif we thinkit confusedly.9 We can be suspiciousof its truth if we barelygrasp it and if it is "in conflict with[one of our] for that what we know best we know preconceived opinions," example
7
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For Descartes' view thatwe cannot refrain fromaffirming a clear and distinct perAT 7:69; Appendix to Fifth ceptionwhilehavingit, see the FifthMeditation, Objectionsand Replies,AT 9A:205; Second Replies,AT 7:144; "To [Mesland], 2 May 1644," AT 4:115-6; Principles 1:43,AT 8A: 21; AnthonyKenny,"Descartes on the Press(1998), Will," in JohnCottingham (ed.), Descartes,Oxford:OxfordUniversity 149-52;Charles Larmore,"Descartes' Psychologistic Theoryof Assent,"Historyof Philosophy Quarterly1 (1984), 61-74; and Alan Nelson, "Descartes's Ontologyof Thought,"Topoi 16 (1997), 163-4. Seventh and Replies,AT 7:460, emphasisadded. See also FourthReplies, Objections AT 7:245-6. Descartesnowhereoffers a definition of dubitability, and so his account of dubitamustbe reconstructed fromthe passages in whichhe speaks of things as dubibility table. Here I am appealingto the Seventh and Repliespassage as partial Objections evidencefor the view that Descartes holds that a proposition p is dubitableiffwe can think and conceivethat~/?. Similarpassages are in Fourth p confusedly Replies, AT 7:245-6;the Third Meditation, AT 7:36; and Principles 1:50,AT 8A:24. We can rule out in advance an alternative account accordingto whichDescartesholds that a proposition p is dubitableiffit is possible for someone to clearlyand distinctly that~p: Descartesnowhere perceive speaks of clearlyand distinctly perceiving negahis view on the will-compellingness of clear and distions,but more importantly, tinctperceptions entails that a clear and distinct that ~p would be an perception indubitable that~/?,and presumably Descartesdoes not hold thatwhat perception it is to doubt something is to affirm withcertainty that it is false.To doubt someof it mustbe at least somewhatconfused;and of thingthat is true,our perception course the same has to apply in cases in whichwe doubt something thatis false.In to FifthObjections and RepliesDescartessays that "beforewe can decide Appendix to doubt, we need some reason fordoubting"(AT 9A:204). Accordingly, we doubt a thingin circumstances in whichwe perceiveit confusedly and affirm something else thatconflicts withit.
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the senses.10 We can conceivethatit is falseif we barelygrasp through it and if we are among "those who like to contradict just forthe sake of it."11 We can conceivethatit is false if we barelygrasp it and if we take seriously thepossibility thatour mindsare not reliable. is thatin One scenarioin whichwe perceiveour existence confusedly a whichwe have a confusedidea of self.Descartesidentifies
if,as well as beingclear,it is so sharply [as] 'distinct' separatedfrom perception all otherperceptions thatit containswithin itself onlywhatis clear.12
If our idea of self is confused,our perception of the existenceof our can be selfis constituted in part by a confusedidea.13 This perception made more distinct if we clarify our idea of self,but untilwe do it is dubitable:
in cases where It is clear that we do not have this kind of [absolute]certainty our perception is even the slightest bit obscureor confused;forsuch obscurity, whatever its degree,is quite sufficient to make us have doubtsin such cases.14
Descartesholds thatmostof us have an idea of selfthatis confused:

All our ideas of what belong to the mind have up till now been veryconfused and mixedup withthe ideas of things thatcan be perceived by the senses.15
He adds that
with to understand reason forour inability This is thefirst and most important about the soul and God.16 sufficient thecustomary assertions clarity
understand One of the reasons that we do not clearlyand distinctly some of the(presumably about mindis thatour idea of true)assertions conditionforhavinga confusedpercepmindis confused.A sufficient tionthatX is A is havingan idea of X thatis confused.
10 11 12 13
The Second Meditation, AT 7:29-30. Second Replies,AT 7:157. 1:45,AT 8A:22, emphasisadded. Principles Here I am referring to Descartes' view that a judgmentis the affirmation by the will of an idea thatis had by the intellect. See forexamplethe FourthMeditation, AT 7:56-8;and Principles AT 8A:18-9. 1:34-38, Second Replies,AT 7: 145. Second Replies,AT 7: 130-1.
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a detailedaccountof how we come to have ideas of Descartesoffers mindand God thatare "mixed up" withideas of sensiblethings. First, he says that as a resultof paying so much attentionto the sensible we ignorethingsthatwe canbodies on whichwe depend forsurvival, not sense and assume that theyare nothingat all.17We assume that whateveris real is sensible,and our ideas of mind and God pay a heavy price. If we regardmind or God as real, we conceive themas sensible: ofsubstance is still limited to that which is imagimany people's understanding nableandcorporeal, or evento that which is capableof being perceived bythe senses. thatnothing can subsist it is a body, unless and that ...[TJhey suppose itcan be perceived no bodycan subsist unless bythesenses.18 Anotherreason thatwe come to conceiveof mindand God as sensible is thatour standardway of thinking of any object is to thinkof it as a A childhood focus on our bodily needs is a focus on sensiblething.19 the sensiblebodies that meet them,and as a resultwe do not become at thinking of otherkindsof thing: proficient ourmind is unable to keepitsattention on things without somedegree ofdiffiand fatigue; and it is hardest ofall forit to attend to whatis notpresent culty to thesenses or evento theimagination.20 If it is extremely difficult for us to conceive of thingsthat cannot be that we do conceive we will conceive as sensed, almost everything
17
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See forexamplePrinciples 1:71. Descarteswrites that"since the mindjudged everyto the body in whichit was immersed, it assessed the thingin termsof its utility amountof reality in each object by the extentto whichit was affected by it. As a in rocks and result,it supposed that therewas more substanceor corporeality metals than in water or air, since it feltmore hardnessand heavinessin them. the air as a merenothing, so long as it feltno wind or cold or Indeed,it regarded heat in it" (AT 8A:36). See also The World, chapterfour,AT 11:21; and Principles AT 8A:45-52. 11:10-22, 1:73; AT 8A:37. Principles See also E.M. Curley,"Analysisin the Meditations: The Quest forClear and DistinctIdeas," in Rorty 1984, 156-62;Gary Hatfield, "The Senses and the Fleshless as CognitiveExercises,"in Rorty 1984, 70-1; and Stephen Eye: The Meditations Press (1998), Menn, Descartes and Augustine, Cambridge:Cambridge University chapter6. Principles1:73, AT 8A:37. Descartes goes on to say that most of us are very attachedto our sensesand that"since... thereis nothing whose truenaturewe perceive by the sensesalone, it turnsout thatmost people have nothing but confused their entire lives" (AT 8A:37). perceptions throughout
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sensible.In particular, we will conceive of mind and God as sensible, even thoughtheyare not.21 Descartesdoes not thinkthatwe are thinking of mindor God if we have an idea of a sensible He to just thing. says Gassendi,
This is a thought whichis worthy of you alone, O Flesh. For if anyone thus or the to himself he is attempting to imaginesomething God, mind, represents whichis not imaginable, and all he will succeed in forming is a corporealidea to which he falselyassigns the name 'God' or 'the mind'. A true idea of the mindcontainsonlythought and its attributes, none of whichis corporeal.22
Descartespresumably shouldsay thatan idea is not of God or mindif it is an idea of a sensiblething.It is insteadan idea of a sensiblething. A "true idea of mind," as Descartes puts it, is not an idea of a thing thatis sensible.In betweena trueidea of mindand an idea thatis falsely assigned the name 'mind' is an idea that is of mind,but that is confused.Descartes says that our ideas of mind and God "have been thatcan be perceived veryconfusedand mixedup withideas of things the senses." A true clear and idea of minddoes not repby (or distinct) resentmind as material,but as resultof our embodiment this idea is runtogether, and tightly associated,withideas of sensiblethings. idea of mind is very Accordingto Descartes,our pre-philosophical confused.It in facthas muchin commonwithwhat Descartestreatsas the paradigmaticcase of a materially false idea - the sensoryidea. Descartesdefines materialfalsity in Fourth Replies:
this The firstpoint is that certain ideas are materially false. As I interpret forerror. claim, it means that the ideas are such as to providesubject-matter (AT 7:231)
forerroris not exactly What it is foran idea to providesubject-matter to be "is the falsity clear,however.Descartes says thatmaterialfalsity foundin an idea" (AT 7:233). He elaborates:
thereis stillsubjectoutsidemyself, Even if I do not refer myideas to anything forerror, since I can make a mistakewithregardto theactual natureof matter the ideas. For example,I may considerthe idea of colour, and say thatit is a whichis represented I may say thatthe colour itself, thingor quality;or rather is a of the kind. For example,I may say whiteness by this idea, is something - even outsidemyself thisidea to anything quality;and even if I do not refer if I do not say or suppose that thereis any whitething- I may stillmake a
21 See also FifthReplies,AT 7:365; Second Replies,AT 7:130-1; "To Mersenne, July 1641," AT 3:393-4; "To Hyperaspistes, August 1641," AT 3:430; and "To Clerselier,February1645," AT 4:187-8. Fifth Replies,AT 7:385.
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with to whiteness itself anditsnature or theidea in theabstract, mistake regard I haveofit...23 If an examination of our idea of cold revealsthatcoldnessis a thingor quality,when coldnessis not a thingor quality,thenour idea of cold mischaracterizes coldness. Descartes thinksthat most of us have an in thisway. This idea of cold idea of cold thatis misrepresentative of cold represents leadsmeto judgethattheidea of thesensation someobject is located outside ofme....24 called'cold'which Our sensoryideas, Descartes says, "represent as things."25 non-things They lead us to judge that (for example)coldnessis "something positive whichexistsoutsidemy sensation."26 itemsthat do They represent not existmind-independently as itemsthatdo.27 Descartes thinksthat strictly speaking a sensation is a mode of mind.A trueidea of a sensationrepresents it as such: and distinctly whenthey are pain and colourand so on are clearly perceived as sensations or thoughts.28 regarded merely
23
24 25 26
Conservation with AT 5:152. Note thatDescartesindicates thattheexpresBurman, sion 'even if I do not refer thisidea to anything outsidemyselfis to be understood as 'even if I do not say or suppose thatthereis any whitething'.In the largerpasout thatthe materialfalsity of an idea (of X) is independent of sage he is pointing whether or not X actuallyexists. Fourth Replies,AT 7:234-5. The ThirdMeditation, AT 7:43. Fourth a definition of material in Replies,AT 7:234. Descartesis not offering falsity the Third Meditationwhen he says thatmaterially falseideas represent non-things as things. one of theways in whichsensory ideas provide Instead,he is expounding the subject-matter for error:theyrepresent as thingsin the sense that non-things as thingsthat do exist theyrepresent thingsthat do not existmind-independently Ideas - even sensory ideas - can providesubject-matter for mind-independently. errorin otherways, as Descartes revealswhen he says that ideas of appetite(for are materially false in that theylead us to pursueor avoid items example,thirst) thatwe should not (Fourth of material falReplies,AT 7:234). Descartes'definition false" (emphasis sity- what he "means[in sayingthat]certainideas are materially forerror." added) - is that"the ideas are such as to providesubject-matter See also Principles AT 8A:32-6;and The World, AT 11:3. 1:66-71, 1:68; AT 8A:33. Similarpassages are in Principles 1:66, AT 8A:32; and Principles 1:70, AT 8A:34-5. See also Alan Nelson, "The Falsityin SensoryIdeas: Principles Descartes and Arnauld," in E. Kremer(ed.), Interpreting Toronto: UniArnauld, of Toronto Press (1996), 19, 23-6; Nelson 1997, 166; Samuel C. Rickless, versity "The CartesianFallacy Fallacy," Notts39 (2005), 315-7; and KatherineJ. Morris, and Confusion," International Journalof PhilosophicalStudies 3 "Intermingling (1995), 290-7.
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idea of cold - is materially Our idea of cold - our pre-philosophical of that false.It providessubject-matter forerrorin thatan examination idea deliversthe resultthat the sensationof cold existsextra-mentally, in thissensory idea whenin factit does not. Descartestracesthe falsity to our unreflective childhood suppositionthat objects are just as we them: perceive all of us have,from of our our earlychildhood, judgedthatall theobjects are things outside and closely our minds sense-perception existing resembling oursensations, i.e. theperceptions that we had of them. a colThus,on seeing a thing outside us which we supposed we were located our,forexample, seeing resembled theideaofcolour that weexperienced within us at thetime.29 closely As children, we judge correctly that the extensivequalities of bodies have a mind-independent but in additionwe make the hasty existence, thatall of the otherqualitiesthatwe perceiveto be in bodies judgment existmind-independently as well.30 The falsity in a sensoryidea is the resultof something that we do. Descartes' account of materialfalsity thus parallels the account of errorthat he offers in the Fourth Meditation: if we frequently have ideas containing some falsity, thiscan happenonly in them, forin thatrespect becausethere is something confused and obscure state in nothingness, that arein us in this confused is,they only they participate itis no lesscontradictbecause we arenotwholly Anditis evident that perfect. from God thanthat or imperfection as suchshouldproceed orythatfalsity truth or perfection should from proceed nothingness.31
29 30 1:66. AT 8A:32. Principles AT 8A:35-6.Descarteswrites that"In our earlychildhoodthemind 1:71, Principles was so closelytied to the body thatit had no leisureforany thoughts exceptthose by means of which it had sensory awareness of what was happening to the areas to the different body....[T]he mind had various sensationscorresponding and ways in which,the body was beingstimulated, where, namelywhatwe call the sensationsof tastes,smells,sounds, heat, cold, light,colours and so on - sensaAt the same located outsideof our thought. tionswhichdo not represent anything to timethe mindperceived sizes, shapes,motionsand so on, whichwerepresented or modes of things, it not as sensationsbut as things, (or at least capable existing of existing)outside of thought, althoughit was not yet aware of the difference of the betweenthingsand sensations.The next stage arose when the mechanism body, whichis so constructed by naturethat it has the abilityto move in various in its random ways by its own power, twistedaround aimlesslyin all directions at thispointthemindthat and avoid the harmful; to pursuethe beneficial attempts or avoidwas attachedto the body began to noticethatthe objectsof thispursuit to them not only sizes, ance had an existenceoutside itself.And it attributed but as thingsor modes of things, shapes, motionsand the like,whichit perceived also tastes,smells,and so on, the sensationsof whichwere,it realized,produced by the objectsin question." Discourseon theMethod,Part Four, AT 6:38-9.
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in a humanmindis falseintrinsicNone of theideas thatGod implants color as mindally.32A clear and distinctidea of color represents but as a result of our habitual suppositionthat color is dependent, that idea has run been and tightly associmind-independent, together, existence.33 Like an idea of ated, with the idea of mind-independent mind that is mixed up withideas of sensiblethings, a materially false idea of a sensationis mixedup withotherideas, and it would not be an ifit werejust an idea of a mind-independent idea of thatsensation thing. It has "something positiveas its underlying subject,namelythe actual It is in some sense a compositeof a trueidea of sensationinvolved."34 thesensation and predicates thatdo not pertain to thesensation. It is an idea that"is referred to something otherthan thatof whichit is in fact the idea."35It is a trueidea of a sensationthat is so tightly associated withpredicates thatdo not pertainto thesensationthatan examination of our idea of thesensation willyielda result thatis false. Descartescertainly the idea as theparadigm ofmaterprivileges sensory ial falsity, buthe takesother ideas to be materially falseas well.He writes, theconfused ideasofgodsconcocted I see no reason [A]sfor byidolaters, why too cannot be called in so far as thesubjectfalse, they materially they provide matter for false judgements.36 He adds that materialfalsityadmits of degrees and that an idea is moreor less materially falseas a function of theextent to whichit providessubject-matter forerror: ideaswhich little or no scopefor error do notseem as much givethe judgement entitled to be calledmaterially false as those which error.37 givegreat scopefor
32 See also Nelson 1996,23-6, and Dan Kaufman,"Descartes on the ObjectiveReal81 (2000), 402. As a ityof MateriallyFalse Ideas," PacificPhilosophical Quarterly resultof our hastyjudgments and also our embodiment, some of our ideas become of these - for example confused,but we can restoreeven the most recalcitrant ideas of sensationsthatinclineus to pursueor avoid what we should not. (See for AT 7:89-90). Some commentators have arguedthat exampleThe SixthMeditation, Descartesholds that sensoryideas are confusedintrinsically. See forexampleWilson 1978, 105-16;and JillBuroker,"Descartes on Sensible Qualities," Journalof theHistory 29 (1991), 585-611. of Philosophy See also Principles 1:71,AT 8A:35; and Nelson 1997, 168-9. Fourth AT 7:234. Note thatDescartesholds thateveryone has innateideas Replies, of God and mindthatserveas the "underlying of our confusedideas components" of mindand God. See forexample ThirdReplies,AT 7:183-9; Second Replies,AT 7:136-7;and FifthReplies,AT 7:375. Fourth Replies,AT 7:233.
Ibid. Ibid.
33 34
35
36 37
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Confusedideas thatare made up at will do not provideas muchscope for erroras ideas of color and cold, whichwe do not notice that we have assembled,and "the greatestscope for erroris providedby the One possible ideas which arise from the sensations of appetite."38 of sensory explanationfor Descartes' emphasison the materialfalsity ideas over thatof our pre-philosophical ideas of mindand God is that, as a resultof our embodiment to self-preservation, and our attention wed our clear and distinct ideas of sensationshave been more tightly materiof to predicates thatdo not apply to them.The task correcting in that theseideas ally false sensoryideas also has a kind of urgency, lead us to errin a way thatthreatens our verysurvival.For example,a patient with dropsy mightdie if he accepts the deliverancesof his the researchthat will false idea of thirst.39 More generally, materially the workings of the human body, and to learn help us to understand how to treatit, will not be completedif we do not abandon the bad of Aristotelian science.40 predicates II is In thissectionI wantto consider an objection.In SecondRepliesthere a passage in whichDescartesappears to statethat"I am, I exist"and its variants are notdubitablein anycircumstances. He writes, Now someof these are so transparently clearand at thesametime perceptions them to be true. so simple that we cannot everthink of them without believing be The factthatI exist so longas I am thinking; or thatwhatis donecannot this in respect we manifestly are examples of truths of which undone, possess we think of them; butwe kindof certainty. For we cannot doubtthem unless are true, as was think at thesametime cannot of them without believing they at thesametime Hencewecannot doubt them without believing they supposed. aretrue; that doubtthem. is,wecan never (AT 7:145-6) thatwe cannot think"I Here Descartesappears to state unequivocally thatit is trueand so withoutbelieving existso long as I am thinking" can neverdoubt it. The first thingto note about thispassage is thatDescartesdoes not and othersimple in factsay in it that"I existso long as I am thinking"
38 39 40 Fourth Replies,AT 7:234. Ibid. sciencewith One of Descartes' aims is to replace the bad conceptsof Aristotelian of of the confusion the conceptsof the new mechanistic science,and a recognition our current ideas of sensiblequalitiesis crucialto thisend. See Principles of Philosophy,prefaceto the Frenchedition,AT 9B:5-9; "To PrincessElizabeth,21 May 1643," AT 3:665-8; "To Regius, January1642," AT 3:491-2; and "To Princess Elizabeth,28 June1643," AT 3:690-1.
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of truths are indubitable. Instead,he says that some of our perceptions thesetruths are so transparently clear that we cannot have themwithout believingtheirtruth.At the end of the precedingparagraph,he the perceptions that he has in mind- "the clear perceptions specifies as opposed to perceptions of the intellect" that involvethe senses (AT In Principles 1:49-50(cited at the beginning of sectionone) he 7.145).41 included"what is done cannot be undone" and "I exist so long as I as examplesof common notionsthat can be doubted if am thinking" we perceivethemconfusedly. Here he says of thesesame notionsthat some of our perceptions of themare indubitable.42 He is not talking about the indubitability of particular but about the indubitabiltruths, of thesetruths. ityof some of our perceptions Descartes does indeed singleout "I existso long as I am thinking" and "what is done cannot be undone" as unique in the passage. Howthemout as whollyindubitable.He is instead ever,he is not singling them from truthsthat cannot be clearlyand distinctly distinguishing own. on their As he says, perceived
There are othertruths whichare perceived so long veryclearlyby our intellect as we attend to the arguments on which our knowledgeof themdepends.... (AT 7:146)
Descartesis certainly to thinkthatthereare truths whose truth is right not fully evidentif we are not also aware of our reasons foraccepting
41
42
Descartes adds here that "if thereis any certainty to be had, the only remaining alternative is that it occurs in the clear perceptions of the intellect and nowhere else" (AT 7:145). Thereare threepassages in Descartes'corpuswhichmight appear to reflect the viewthatsome non-intellectual are clear and distinct. One perceptions is in Second Replies,in whichDescartessays thata personwithjaundice perceives snow "just as clearlyand distinctly as we do whenwe see it as white"(ibid.). This or not perceptions of snow passage is at best neutralon the question of whether are actuallyclear and distinct; beforeDesindeed,the passage comes immediately cartes'claim thatif thereis any certainty to be had it occurs in the clear and distinctperceptions of the intellect and nowhereelse. The second passage is in First Replies,in whichDescartes says thatjust as we can clearlyand distinctly perceive we can clearlyand distinctly part of a chiliagonif we focusour attention, perceive a portionof the sea (AT 7:113). This passage can be read as reflecting the Second Meditationview that we can clearlyand distinctly perceivea body so long as we focusour attention on those aspectsof the body thatare perceived by the intellect alone (AT 7:30-1). Given the weightof the Second Repliespassage, this is how it should be read. The same readingapplies to the passage in Conversation withBurviewsee Rickless2005, 315-7. man,AT 5:160. For a contrary Descartes does say (in the Second Replies passage) that the two common notions are "truthsof whichwe manifestly Given that he possess this kind of certainty." takesthe truths to be dubitable, he is not sayingthatwe alwayshave such certainty about them, but thatsuch certainty is within our capability.
them.In the AT 7:145-6 passage, he is not makingthe point that the "simple" truthsare absolutelyindubitable.Instead, he is makingthe consistsin the fact that,unlike the point that part of theirsimplicity conclusionsof arguments, it is within our capabilityto clearlyand disanything tinctly perceivethemwithout clearlyand distinctly perceiving else - for example,premisesfromwhichtheyare inferred. Still,it is and thendoubt them. possibleforus to thinkthemconfusedly in whichwe can Descartesthinks thatthereare manycircumstances as a doubt "I am, I exist." We can doubt it if we thinkit confusedly resultof having a confusedmaterially false idea of self. We can also doubt "I am, I exist" if we thinkit by attending to linguistic symbols thatstandin forit. Descarteswrites,
it is veryseldom thatour conceptof a thingis so distinct thatwe can separate of almost all it totallyfromour concept of the words involved.The thoughts withwordsthanwiththings....43 people are moreconcerned
difficult forus to As we have seen,Descartesthinks thatit is extremely sustainthekind of attention thatis requiredforhavinga clear and disof thinktinctperception. It is mucheasier forus to take the short-cut In attempting to thinkof infinitude, forexample,we ing imagistically. of symbolsthat stands in for our idea mightinsteadthinkof a string "whatof infinitude.44 Or, we might confusedly perceivetheproposition everthinks exists"when
it is put forwardwithoutattentionand believed to be true only because we remember thatwe judged it to be truepreviously.45
Accordingto Descartes,much of human behaviortakes place without beingguidedby thought:

a verylarge numberof the motionsoccurring inside us do not depend in any respiration way on the mind. These include heartbeat,digestion,nutrition, and the whenwe are asleep, and also such wakingactionsas walking,singing, themindattending to them.46 like,whentheseoccur without
The habitual use of language is no exception.The reason whyan aniits mal can speak is that,withoutany accompanying mentalactivity, animal spirits can cause its body to make the relevantnoises,but our
43 44 45 46 1:74,AT 8A:37. Principles See forexampleSecond Replies,AT 7:141-2. to Fifth and Replies,AT 9A:205. Objections Appendix Fourth Replies,AT 7:229-30.
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as well.47 If "the thoughts animal spiritscan cause bodily movements withwordsthan withthings," of almostall people are moreconcerned and if we can use languagewithout the ideas to whichthat confronting we the is can entertain of a lot of things language tied, possible falsity even if theirfalsity is strictly speakingincoherent.48 in whichwe can doubt "I am, I exist" is that Anothercircumstance in which we take seriouslythe possibilitythat our minds mightbe thatare mostevidentto us. In the ThirdMedideceivedabout matters the view that we cannot doubt a clear and tation Descartes reiterates distinct whilehavingit: perception
whenI turnto the things themselves whichI thinkI perceive I am veryclearly, so convincedby them that I spontaneously declare: let whoevercan do so deceiveme, he will neverbringit about that I am nothing, so long as I continueto thinkI am something; or make it trueat some future timethatI have neverexisted,since it is now truethat I exist;or bringit about that two and threeadded together are more or less than five,or anything of this kind in whichI see a manifest contradiction. (AT 7:36)
However,when we turnour attention away froma clear and distinct idea and considerinsteadtheprospectthatwe might be deceivedabout matters thatare most evidentto us, we can doubt any of our beliefs.49 In the FirstMeditation,Descartes had argued that the truths of arith47 See also "To the Marquess of Newcastle,23 November 1646," AT 4:573-5; and The Passionsof theSoul 1:50,AT 11:368-9.Such a viewis not unusualamongearly moderns. See forexampleJohnLocke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P.H. Nidditch,Oxford,ClarendonPress (1975), II.ix.10, 147; and Ralph CudCannstatt:F. worth,The True Intellectual Systemof the Universe, Stuttgart-Bad FromannVerlag (1964), 157-9. See also David Cunning,"Systematic Divergences in Malebrancheand Cudworth,"Journalof the Historyof Philosophy 41 (2003), 351-2; and David Cunning, "Agency and Consciousness," Synthese120 (1999), 271-94. See also Bertrand of Logical Atomism," Russell,"The Philosophy Logic and Know"In very ledge,ed. R.C. Marsh, London: Allen & Unwin (1956), 185. He writes, abstract studies suchas philosophical thatyouare supposed logic,... thesubject-matter to be thinking of is so exceedingly difficult and elusivethatany personwho has ever triedto thinkabout it knowsyou do not thinkabout it exceptperhapsonce in six months forhalfa minute. The restof thetimeyou think about thesymbols, because are tangible, forthething about is fearfully diffithey you are supposedto be thinking cultand one does not often about it. The really is manageto think good philosopher the one who does once in six monthsthink about it fora minute.Bad philosophers never do." See also David Cunning, "Semelin Vita:Descartes'StoicViewon thePlace ofPhilosophy in HumanLife,"FaithandPhilosophy (forthcoming). AT 7:36. Descarteswrites, "And whenever beliefin the supreme my preconceived powerof God comes to mind,I cannot but admitthatit would be easy forhim,if he so desired, to bringit about thatI go wrongeven in thosematters whichI think I see utterly clearlywithmy mind'seye." For a discussionof thiskind of "metaCartesian cognitive"doubt, see Lex Newman and Alan Nelson, "Circumventing Circles,"Nous 33 (1999), 370-404.
48
49
meticand geometry are dubitablein the face of the prospectthat we that are most evidentto us.50In the mightbe deceivedabout matters Third Meditationhe says that untilwe know that God has createdus with reliablecognitivefacultieswe "can never be quite certainabout else" (AT 7:36). As in othercircumstances, in theThirdMedianything tationwe are able to doubt our own existence.51 Ill has a clear and Early in the Second MeditationDescartes' meditator distinct to of his existence. thereafter he reverts perception Immediately of his selfas a thingthat is sensibleand material.This is not thinking
50 meditaThereis a debatein theliterature about whether or not theFirstMeditation tor clearlyand distinctly the truths of mathematics and geometry. Some perceives are commentators have argued that the beliefsof the First Meditationmeditator "fromthesensesor through thesenses"(AT 7:18) and thusthathe does nothave any clearand distinct Demons,Dreamers, (See forexampleHarryFrankfurt, perceptions. and Madmen, Company,Inc. (1970), Indianapolisand New York: The Bobbs-Merrill 62-4; Charles Larmore,"Scepticism,"in Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers(eds.), The Cambridge Volume II, Cambridge: Historyof Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, Press(1998), 1166-8;and Rickless2005, 323-4.An important CambridgeUniversity texthereis the Second Repliespassage (AT 7:145) in whichDescartessays thatcerin thestrict theintellect.) Other senseis nothad through thesensesbutthrough tainty of mathematics commentators have argued that in the FirstMeditationthe truths and disand geometry are "transparent" and "evident"and thusthatthey are clearly and DisNote on Clarity (See forexampleGeorgesMoyal, "A Brief tinctly perceived. tinctness in Descartes' First Meditation,"Studia Leibnitiana31 (1999), 91-8; and NormanKemp Smith, New Studiesin thePhilosophy ofDescartes,London: MacMillan & Co. (1963), 272.) The correct view is thatit is a mistaketo take sides on the the Meditations fora variety of minds issue. Descartesis explicitthathe is writing {Seventh pointReplies,AT 7:482; FirstReplies,AT 7:120). We take thefirst-person of-view in an attempt to Fifth to come to see thetruth forourselves Objec{Appendix tionsand Replies,AT 9A:208), but not all meditators begin at the same epistemic is an atheistgeometer, or ifhe has "form[ed] verydistinct position.If themeditator notionsof body" as a result of his "studyof mathematics" ("To PrincessElizabeth, of thetruths 28 June1643," AT 3:692), he might have clear and distinct perceptions hisattention instead of mathematics and geometry and thendoubtthemafter turning to theprospect to him.Such a thathe is deceivedabout matters thatare mostevident in meditator indeedbe committed to theempiricist viewthatthereis nothing might reflect theintellect thatwas notfirst in thesenses, and hisfirst-person reasoning might thiscommitment, but thatof course does not mean or even suggestthatall of his realization thesenses.The Second Meditation beliefs are either from or through (AT of bodies have always involvedan act of purelymental 7:31) thatour perceptions is bears out thatthe commitment is false.The FirstMeditationmeditator scrutiny notyeta Cartesian, and he reasonsaccordingly. our existThere stillremainsthe questionof whywe cannot refrain fromaffirming ence in the face of the prospectof hyperbolic doubt at the startof the Second considerthe Meditation.Below I argue that Descartes holds that if we carefully thatare most evidentto us, we prospectthatwe mightbe deceivedabout matters of idea of selfand have a clear and distinct forma clear and distinct perception theexistence of self.
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Descartesholds thatthe habitsthat stemfromour embodisurprising. forus to have a clear and distinct mentare such thatit is verydifficult that if we do we almost revert to thinking and immediately perception, thatis confused: In lateryearsthemindis no longer a totalslaveto thebody,and does not to it. it intothetruth of things considered in refer Indeed, everything inquires ofitsprevious to be false. But and discovers themselves, very many judgements to erasethese false it is noteasyforthemind from its this, judgements despite stick can causea variety oferrors. For and as longas they there, they memory; in our earlychildhood we imagined starsas beingvery small;and example, nowclearly showus thatthey astronomical are very arguments although large our preconceived is stillstrong to makeit very hard indeed, enough opinion them from thewaywedidbefore.52 for us to imagine differently to habitualways of thinking Descartesthinksthatwe revert even after we have done a lot of philosophicalwork and appreciatethat those are to be abandoned. At the start of the Second ways of thinking to revert to a preMeditationwe are practically Meditations guaranteed Descartes thus works to make sure that we do not way of thinking. conclude on the basis of our materially false idea of self erroneously we have just establishedis sensibleand that the thingwhose existence material.If we do, we will "be makinga mistakein the veryitem of knowledgethat I maintainis the most certainand evidentof all" (AT 7:25). If we concludethatwe exist,but appeal to our pre-philosophical idea of self to unpack what it is that thereby exists,we will conclude that the thingthat exists is materialand sensible.We are therefore instructed to restore our confusedperception of our existence to a perceptionthatis clear and distinct: I willtherefore on whatI originally believed to go back and meditate myself I embarked on this train ofthought. I willthen subtract be,before present anyevenminimally, nowintroweakened, thing capableof being bythearguments so thatwhatis left at theendmaybe exactly and onlywhatis certain duced, and unshakeable. (AT 7:25) What remains at theend of thisprocessis "exactlyand onlywhatis certainand unshakeable," and so theperception thatwe had at thestartof theprocessis somewhat confused. We target theFirstMeditation skeptical arguments on our preMeditations idea of selfuntilwe are no longer theexistence of something sensible and material whenwe affirm affirming our existence.53 We stripour pre-Meditations idea of selfof the ideas of
52 53 1:72,AT 8A:36-7. See also The World, Principles chaptersix, AT 11:35; prefaceto AT 7:9; Fourth AT 7:231; and Second Replies,AT 7:164. the Meditations, Replies, See also Broughton 2002, 120-1;Menn 1998,245-7;and Frankfurt 1970, 119-20.
sensiblethings thatare tightly associatedwithit, and we are leftwitha of our clearand distinct idea of mind,and a clearand distinct perception AT of the existence We are the same at the start (at 7:27). doing thing Second Meditation, the and distinct clear although resulting perception is moremomentary. in the We suppose that"thereis absolutely nothing world,no sky,no earth,no minds,no bodies" (AT 7:25), and we are left witha clearand distinct of our existence.54 thereby perception after at a clear and distinct idea of mind,DesImmediately arriving cartesappears to claim thathe thereby knows thathe is an immaterial He says, thing. At present I am notadmitting true. I am, whatis necessarily anything except in thestrict sense a thing that thinks. then, (AT 7:27) only A bitlaterin theMeditation he makesclearthathe is beingmorecareful: I am supAndyetmayit notperhaps be thecase thatthese which very things to be nothing, because are unknown to me,are in reality identical posing they with theT of which I am aware? I do notknow, I shall and forthemoment notarguethepoint, which are sinceI can make about only things judgements known to me.(Ibid.) One of the reasons that Descartes does not prove that mind is immaterialin the Second Meditationis thathe is not a positionto compare a clear and distinct idea of body idea of mindwitha clear and distinct to see what mindand body have in common.55 If he had addressedthe or not thinking is material,his meditator would question of whether have comparedhis clear and distinct idea of mindto the confusedidea the of body thathe brought to the Meditations, and we do not subtract excesselements fromthisidea untiltheend of the Second Meditation.56 Descartes makes explicitin the Second Meditationthat he does not establishtherein thatmind is immaterial, and he is clear in othertexts as well:
54 55 See also Principles 1:7,AT 8A:7. In "To Mersenne,21 January1641," Descarteswritesthat "To say that thoughts are merely movements of the body is as perspicuousas sayingthat fireis ice, or thatwhiteis black; forno two ideas we have are moredifferent thanthoseof black and white,or those of movement and thought. whether Our only way of knowing two thingsare different we have different ideas or identicalis to considerwhether of them,or one and the same idea..." (AT 3:285). See also "To [De Launay], 22 July1641," AT 3:421. One of thereasonsthatDescartesdoes notcomparea clearand distinct idea of mind to a clearand distinct idea of bodyat theendot theSecond Meditation is presumably thathe has othertasksthathe sees as morepressing. For example, in theThirdMedithere is tationhe saysthat"as soon as theopportunity arisesI mustexaminewhether a God, and ifthere He can be a deceiver" is,whether (AT 7:36).
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I deny that I in any way presupposedthat the mind is incorporeal [in the SecI did in factdemonond Meditation]; thoughlateron, in the SixthMeditation, strateas much.57 He does not conclude in the Second Meditation that he is an immaterial thing.58 He does however say therethat he is in the strictsense only a thingthat thinks.Outside of the Meditations he explains what he means by this: I said in one place that while the soul is in doubt about the existenceof all - 'in the strict material it knowsitself sense only'- as praecisetantum things, an immaterial down I showed that substance;and seven or eightlines further sense only' I do not at all mean an entireexclusion by the words 4inthe strict or negation,but only an abstractionfrommaterialthings;for I said that in spite of this we are not sure that thereis nothing corporealin the soul, even thoughwe do not recognize anything corporealin it. Here mycriticis so unfair to me as to tryto persuadethe readerthatwhenI used thephrase'in the strict sense only' I meant to exclude the body, and that I thus contradicted myself afterwards whenI said thatI did not mean to excludeit.59 Here Descartes uses some technical terminology; he says that Gassendi has understood him as excluding body from mind in the Second Meditation. Descartes reports that in fact he does not do this in the Second Meditation, for excluding body from mind is tantamount to showing that mind is immaterial. In the Second Meditation he intends
57 Seventh and Replies,AT 7:492, emphasisadded. See also Second Replies, Objections AT 7:129; ThirdReplies,AT 7:175; Fifth 24 Replies,AT 7:355, 357; "To Mersenne, December 1640," AT 3:266; and the FourthMeditation, AT 7:59. In "Synopsisof the following six Meditations,"Descartes says that in the Second Meditationhe forms"a conceptof the soul that is as clear as possible and is also quite distinct fromeveryconcept of body" (AT 7:13). Given the weightof the otherpassages, Descartesis not sayingherethatin the Second Meditationwe noticethatour confrom our conceptof body,just thatit is distinct fromit. cept of soul is distinct A number of commentators take Descartesto be concluding thathe is an immaterial thingin the Second Meditation.See Norman Malcolm, "Descartes' ProofThat His Essence is Thinking,"The Philosophical Review74 (1965), 326; Dugald Murin Descartes' Metaphysics," doch, "Exclusion and Abstraction Philosophical Quar43 (1993), 51-2; and Wilson 1978, 197. One of the reasonswhycommentators terly defendthisviewis thatin the partof the Discoursethatparallelsthe Second MeditationDescartesdoes pretty muchthe same thingthathe does in the Second Meditation,and in that part of the Discoursehe concludes that mind is incorporeal. There is no question about whether or not Descartes concludes that minds are immaterial in the parallel sectionof the Discourse.He draws the conclusionexplion the passage he citlyin the Discourseitself(AT 6:32-3), and in a commentary thatthatis whathe is doing ("Prefaceto the Reader," AT 7:8). One reason reports in the more autobiographical Discourseis why Descartes proceeds so differently thatin the Meditations he is assumingthatat the startof inquiry his readershave ideas of mindand body. veryconfused to Fifth and Replies,AT 9A:215. Appendix Objections
58
59
frommaterialthings."This is a processin which "only an abstraction a compositeidea is sifted forone of its parts:
This intellectual abstraction consistsin my turning away fromone my thought part of the contentsof this richeridea the betterto apply it to the otherpart of the withgreater attention. Thus, whenI considerthe shape without thinking substanceor theextension whose shape it is, I make a mentalabstraction.60
If an idea has different we might isolate one of these partsor contents, contentsand thinkof it separatelyfromwhat remainsof the larger idea. Descartes has the meditatordoing exactly this in the Second Meditation.His preMeditations idea of selfis a compositeof an idea of mindand ideas of sensiblethingsthatare tightly associated withit; he considersthis idea and "subtracts] everything that is capable of he his thought to things whose existence beingweakened." He restricts cannot doubt, and all that he is leftthinking of is mind. He abstracts He does not yet an idea of mindfromhis preMeditations idea of self.61 have a clear and distinct idea of body withwhichto compareit, so he does not concludethatthinking is immaterial.62 to resolvethe Funnythoughit may sound, when we are attempting need to bring of the Cartesian we largerinterpretive corpus problems confusionto the debate, or at least to give confusiona place at the table. Whetherwe are worriedabout the Cartesian position on the of "I am, I exist,"or about anotherproblem- forexamdubitability that we be sensitive ple that of the CartesianCircle - it is imperative to the datumthatDescartesholds thatmanynotionsare confusedthat to solve are not recognizably so at the startof inquiry.In attempting the problemof the CartesianCircle,forexample,we can note that in
60 "To Gibieuf,19 January1642," AT 3:475. See also Rulesfor the Direction of the in Rules to anotherkindof abstraction Mind,AT 10:413,441. Descartesalso refers for the Directionof the Mind - a process of movingfromthe particularto the in this sense in the abstraction more general(AT 10:458). He is not performing confusedidea of Second Meditation.He is not generalizing fromthe meditator's selfto a moregeneralversionof thatidea. is just CartesianexcluSome commentators have arguedthatCartesianabstraction sion without the guarantee of divine veracity.See Malcolm 1965, 326; and Murdoch 1993,52. thatif the mediSee also 'To [Mesland],2 May 1644," AT 4:120. We might worry thereis no tatorhas a confusedidea of body at the startof the Second Meditation, thatwhenhe deniestheexistence of all bodies he will be leftwitha clear guarantee takesto be theexistence of what he confusedly and distinct idea of self.By denying ideas of Meditations Meditations idea of selfof his prebody,he might striphis preidea of body,and so not be leftwitha body,but not stripit of a clear and distinct clear and distinct idea of mind.However,at theend of the Second MeditationDesMeditations idea of body includesa clear and cartesargues thatour confusedpredistinct idea of body.
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thinksa lot of thingsthat are false the First Meditationthe meditator thatall of our beliefs are either fromor through the senor incoherent: that that it is God is a and that an evil demon ses, deceiver, possible if be us God is not. Like the meditaany philosopher, might deceiving tor mightthinkall kindsof things at the startof inquiry, but that he will later abandon after he has carefully examined his pre-reflective and commitments. He arrivesat the consideredresultthat conceptions S is not P; he does not thencount it as an objectionto thisresultthat it seemedthatS might beforehe gave it any thought be P. The meditator of the Meditations arrivesat a new standardof distinctness in the Second Meditation,and premisesthat meet this standardentail that God exists. The confusions that the meditator brought to the and the materially false ideas that are among them,do Meditations, not compete.63
63
See Principles1:75-76. Descartes writes,"In order to philosophizeseriouslyand searchout the truth about all the things thatare capable of beingknown,we must first of all lay aside all our preconceived opinions,or at least we must take the care not to put our trust in any of the opinionsacceptedby us in the past greatest untilwe have first scrutinized themafresh and confirmed their truth. Next,we must in an orderly us, and we give our attention way to the notionsthatwe have within mustjudge to be true all and only those whose truthwe clearlyand distinctly recognizewhen we attendto themin thisway. When we do this we shall realize, first of all, thatwe existin so faras our natureconsistsin thinking; and we shall realize both that thereis a God, and that we depend on him,and simultaneously also that a consideration of his attributes enables us to investigate the truthof otherthings, since he is their cause. Finally,we will see thatbesidesthe notionsof God and of our mind,we have withinus knowledge of many propositions which are eternally When we contrastall true,such as 'Nothingcomes fromnothing'.... thisknowledge withtheconfusedthoughts we had before, we willacquire the habit of forming clear and distinct thatcan be known.... conceptsof all the things [I]t is of a philosopher to accept anything as trueif he has neverestabquite unworthy lishedits truth and he should neverrelyon the senses,that by thorough scrutiny; of his childhood,in preference to his mature is, on the ill-considered judgements powers of reason" (AT 8A:38-9). Some commentators (for example Nelson and Newman 1999) are committed to theviewthatDescartesholds thatwe cannotonce and for all dismisshyperbolic doubt as a confusionuntilwe have a (FifthMediintuition of God's existence and veracity. This is not Descartes' tation)self-evident view. (See also First Replies, AT 7:120, Second Replies, AT 7:163-4, and First for Replies,AT 7:136, whereDescartes is clear that he offers multiplearguments the existenceof God because meditators who do not follow one such argument followone of theothers;and also "To Regius,24 May 1640," AT 3:64-5.)A might completediscussionof the problemof the CartesianCircleis of course beyondthe scope of this paper. However,the solutionproposed here has Descartesengaging the good-sensephilosophicalpracticeof analyzingpre-reflective conceptionsand commitments and abandoningthe provisionaland less clear in favorof the more clear. Descartesis supposingthatonce we are intellectually we continueto mature, does not do this,or if he forgets all that he has rejectthe unclear.If a meditator learnedand reverts to takingseriously FirstMeditationhypotheses, thatis a problem forhim,but not forDescartes.
IV to the In The Search AfterTruth, Nicholas Malebranchecalls attention difficulties that the (dualist-minded)metaphysicianencounters in a personwho has an inaccurateidea of soul. For example, instructing ifthepersonasks themetaphysician or not souls are immortal, whether thecorrect answerto thequestionis 'no' ifthepersonconceivesof soul as a sensible thing. Malebranche concludes that the metaphysician should refrain fromanswering the questionat all:
If in questioning themwe recognizethat theirideas do not agree withours, it is uselessto answerthem.For what do we replyto a man who imaginesthata is of spirits;that a thought desire,for example,is nothingbut the movement in the brain;and that but a traceor image of objectswherespirits have formed all reasoningsof men consist only in the different placementof certaintiny bodies diversely arrangedin the head? To answerhim that the soul, taken in the sense thathe understands, is immortal, is to deceivehim,or to make yourselfridiculous in his mind. But to answerhim thatit is mortalis in a sense to not confirm him in an errorof very great consequence. We must therefore answer him, but only tryto make him retreatinto himself, in order that he may receivethe same ideas as we....64
Descartes faces a (somewhat) similar problem in the Second Meditation.We enterthe Meditationwitha confusedidea of self,an idea that providessubject-matter for error.Our prospectsfor engagingin productive philosophical inquiry hingeon our abilityto prunethisidea of ideas that have become attached to it. We revertto our confused ideas withease, and Descartesis thereto help us at everyturn. else. None For Descartes,our existence isjust as dubitableas anything identhat we would that Descartes thinks of thisis to suggest, however, dubitain whichit is our existence as dubitablein all circumstances tify ble. In the same way thatwe have bad pre-philosophical ideas, sensory ideas of mindand God, we are not alwaysin and bad pre-philosophical For example,in theFirst possessionof thebeststandardof distinctness. are so distinct our that Meditationwe might sensory perceptions report are notveridical thatthey thatit is impossible (AT 7:18-9),and we would be wrong.Or, we might proceedlike thosewho "have nevertakensuffithebody" themindfrom cientcare to distinguish
64 Thomas M. Lennon and Paul J. Nicholas Malebranche,The Search AfterTruth, Press (1997), VI.ii.7, and University ed.), Cambridge (trans, Cambridge: Oscamp rare forthose "it is extremely 492. See also II.ii.8, 157. There Malebranchewrites, to be able to explainwell the things who meditate upon whichtheyhave seriously to speak of these things, meditated.Ordinarilythey hesitatewhen undertaking thatraise a falseidea in others.Being about usingterms because theyhave scruples in ashamed to speak simplyfor the sake of speaking,...they have greatdifficulty well." wordsto expressunusualthoughts finding
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of their ownexistence that before of they mayhaveputthecertainty Although to realize in failed thatthey should havetaken 'themselves' else,they anything thiscontext to meantheir mindsalone. Theywereinclined instead to take 'themselves' to meanonly their bodies....65 We mighteven have the thought that if an evil demon is deceivingus we must exist, but have it cold and out of context,withouthaving "philosophize[d]in an orderlyway" and withouthaving a clear and distinct Like many of our epistemic deficiencies our poor perception.66 standardof distinctness is traceableto our embodiment. Speaking of our pre-philosophical idea of color, Descarteswrites, this that colorexists was something because that, [namely, mind-independently] of our habitof making suchjudgements, we thought we saw clearly and dis- so much so that we tookitfor certain and indubitable.67 tinctly something In childhood,our embodiment is so pronouncedthatwe neverstop to evaluate the false judgmentsthat we make about bodies. We later assume thatthereasonwhythesejudgments have stood the testof time is thattheyare unimpeachable: from ourmind was swamped with a thousand suchpreconceived Right infancy and in later that were without sufchildhood, opinions; forgetting they adopted ficient it regarded them as known or implanted examination, by thesenses by andaccepted them as utterly true andevident.68 nature, As we workthrough the Meditations, we are impressed by a newstand- a standardto whichour pvQ-Meditations ard of distinctness standard of distinctness to Descartes,it is imperpales in comparison. According ative thatwe make thisepistemic If we do not,we will not be progress. in a position to see our pre-philosophical ideas and the propositions thatincludethemforthe confusions thattheyare. We will continueto their analyzeconceptsthatmisrepresent objects,and we will mistakenly as sound.69 regardour results
65 66 67 68 69 1:12,AT 8A:9, emphasisadded. Principles The quotationis fromPrinciples 1:7,AT 8A:7. AT 8A:32. See also 1:66, 1:70,AT 8A:34-5. Principles Principles AT 8A:36. 1:71; Principles I am grateful to three referees of thisjournal forcomments on an earlier anonymous version of thispaper. I am also grateful forcomments from at the2005 participants CentralDivisionMeeting of theAmerican whereI presenAssociation, Philosophical ted a version of thepaper.The paper also benefited from discussions thatI had with JohnCarriero, Daniel Garber,Diane Jeske, Landini,Michael Mulnix,Alan Gregory Nelson,and Tad Schmaltz.Finally,I would liketo acknowledge generous fellowship forthe Humanities supportfromthe National Endowment (2004-5) and the UCLA Clark Library/Center for17thand 18th-Century Studies(Fall 2004).

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Descartes on theDubitability of Self of theExistence

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DESCARTES ON THE DUBITABILITY OF THE EXISTENCE OF SELF

Descartesholds thatmostof us have an idea of selfthatis confused:

DESCARTES ON THE DUBITABILITY OF THE EXISTENCE OF SELF

Accordingto Descartes,much of human behaviortakes place without beingguidedby thought:

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