The trifecta of civil resistance: unity, planning, discipline
Hardy Merriman [1]
Three attributes can make the difference between success and failure for nonviolent movements around the world: unity, planning, and nonviolent discipline. What makes nonvoent cv resstance movements effectve? If we accept the axom that n potcs power s never gven, t s aways taken, the concuson necessary s that hstorc nonvoent movements were successfu because, somehow, they weded power that was greater than that of ther opponents. Ths concuson confcts wth, and opens up a drect ne of questonng about, the wdey-hed assumpton that power utmatey orgnates from contro of matera resources and capacty for voence. If ths assumpton were entrey correct, nonvoent movements woud categorcay fa aganst better-armed and -resourced opponents. What hstory reveas, however, s a tmene of many successfu nonvoent strugges, extendng back for more than a century, wth protagonsts and causes as dverse as humanty tsef. To st some exampes: In the 1930s and 1940s, Indans won ther ndependence by engagng n massve noncooperaton (economc boycotts, schoo boycotts, strkes, tax refusa, cv dsobedence, resgnatons) that threatened to make Inda ungovernabe and eventuay convnced the Brtsh to eave; Durng the 1950s and 1960s, the US Cv Rghts Movement won equa rghts through nonvoent campagns such as the Montgomery bus boycotts and the Nashve unch-counter st- ns that expoted weaknesses n the nsttutonazed segregaton system and attracted supporters natonwde; From 1965-1970, the Unted Farm Workers unon grew from a sma, practcay unfunded oca organzaton to a natona presence through ther successfu use of strkes and boycotts aganst Caforna grape vneyards; In 1986 n the Phppnes, actvsts |oned wth mtary defectors to ray mons to demonstrate aganst the US-backed dctatorshp of Ferdnand Marcos. Wth hs optons qucky dmnshng n ght of ths nonvoent uprsng, Marcos fed the country; In 1988, Cheans overcame the fear nsted by the bruta dctatorshp of Augusto Pnochet and campagned and demonstrated aganst hm. These actons so undermned Pnochets support that even hs feow mtary |unta members were no onger oya to hm at the peak of the crss, and he was forced from power; From 1980-1989, Poes organzed an ndependent trade unon as part of the Sodarty movement and took back ther country from Sovet rue; In 1989, protests and strkes that became known as the Vevet Revouton ed to a peacefu transton from communsm n Czechosovaka. Smar actons ed to peacefu transtons n East Germany, and n Latva, Lthuana, and Estona n 1991; Strkes, boycotts, cv dsobedence and externa sanctons begnnng n the 1980s payed a ma|or roe n endng aparthed n South Afrca n the eary 1990s; In the foowng decade, Serbs (2000), Georgans (2003), and Ukranans (2004) ended autocratc rue by mobzng to prevent or resst frauduent eecton resuts; In 2005, Lebanese ended the occupaton of ther country by Syran troops through massve nonvoent demonstratons; In 2006, Nepas engaged n mass dsobedence and forced the restoraton of cvan rue; From 2007-2009, n the mdst of voent nsurgency and n the face of a mtary ruer, Pakstan awyers, cv socety groups, and ordnary ctzens successfuy pushed for the restoraton of an ndependent |udcary and a repea of state of emergency aws.
If people do not obey, rulers cannot rule These and other movements of cv resstance succeeded because they were based on a fundamenta nsght about power: that neary a nsttutons, organzatons, and systems n a socety depend on the ongong consent, cooperaton, and obedence of arge numbers of ordnary peope. Therefore, f peope choose to wthdraw ther consent and cooperaton n an organzed and strategc way, they can wed coercve power. When peope do not obey, then presdents, mayors, CEOs, generas, and other power hoders can no onger rue wth unchecked power. Nonvoent tactcs, such as strkes, boycotts, mass demonstratons, cv dsobedence, the estabshment of parae nsttutons, and teray hundreds of other creatve actons, were the nstruments used to do ths. They were not used necessary for mora reasons, but rather for pragmatc ones. Some who adopted cv resstance had seen smar strateges work n other countres or n ther own hstores, and recognzed that ths type of resstance had the best prospects of success of the optons avaabe to them. Skills and conditions Amdst these nsprng nonvoent movement vctores, however, hstory and the contemporary word aso offer exampes of faed or nconcusve movements. The word watched Poands and Czechosovakas nonvoent revoutons n the same year that t saw the Tananmen Square massacre. In the ast decade, arge numbers of peope used nonvoent tactcs n Burma, Zmbabwe, Egypt and Iran, but those movements' goas have not so far been acheved. In the successfu sef-determnaton strugge n East Tmor, cv resstance was ndspensabe, but whe t has heped prope cvan-based movements aganst occupers esewhere-n Paestne, West Papua, Western Sahara and Tbet-those strugges reman unresoved. What accounts for the dscrepances among these and other cases? The factors that made these and other movements succeed or fa s a sub|ect on whch reasonabe and we-nformed peope can dsagree.|1| Each stuaton s hghy compex and estabshng drect causaty s dffcut at best. The arguments I most often hear by schoars, |ournasts, and others are that the tra|ectores and outcomes of these and other predomnanty nonvoent movements were argey determned by structures, condtons and exceptona crcumstances n whch each movement operated. For exampe, arguments have been made that nonvoent movements are effectve ony n socetes n whch an oppressor s unwng to use etha force. Others may cam that certan economc crtera (.e. economc deoogy, ncome eves, weath dstrbuton, the presence of a mdde cass) and educatona eves are crtca for successfu movements. St others cam that the roe of superpowers and regona hegemons supersedes the mportance of other varabes n determnng a movements outcome. The number of addtona structures and condtons a person can cte-.e. ethnc dversty, potca and cutura hstory, popuaton sze, and area-are numerous, and to be sure, many of these condtons can nfuence the course of a gven movement. As a counterpont to structura and condtona factors are factors based on a movements sks n wagng confct, .e. what academcs ca agency. Sks and agency refer to those varabes over whch a movement has some contro: what strategy of acton the movement chooses; what anguage t uses to mobze peope and keep them nvoved; how t buds coatons; where and how t targets ts adversary; and a myrad of other decsons nvoved n engagng n cv resstance. In my vew, these sk-based factors are often sgnfcanty underemphaszed or overooked by those who come nto contact wth and anayze nonvoent movements. Why ths s so s beyond the scope of ths artce, but one reason may be that peope doubt or do not know the premse on whch nonvoent acton s based-that through shfts n coectve behavor, power can be re- aocated from entrenched and oppressve adversares to peopes movements. Instead, they assume that there must have been exogenous varabes or extraordnary crcumstances that made ths possbe n the cases n whch t has occurred. However, we can respect the roe of structures and condtons n nfuencng nonvoent movements' tra|ectores and outcomes wthout downpayng the mportance of agency and sks. Indeed, agency and sks make a dfference, and n some cases have enabed movements to overcome, crcumvent, or transform adverse condtons. The mportance, and sometmes prmacy, of sks and agency are consdered common knowedge n other dscpnes such as busness or mtary thnkng. Why shoud nonvoent strugge be any dfferent n ths regard? A mtary genera or corporate CEO woud augh f they were tod that strategy was of margna mportance to the outcome of ther endeavors. Sun Tzus cassc The Art of War woud not be so we known f peope thought the outcome of contests and contentous nteractons were aways foreordaned by matera condtons. To return then to the openng queston of ths artce-what makes nonvoent movements effectve?-we can start to fnd answers by ookng at strategc choces and best practces geaned from hstorc movements. There are a varety of agency-based factors and sks that can nfuence a movements outcome, but (for the sake of smpcty) f we dst those down to a few essentas, three attrbutes of successfu nonvoent movements emerge: unty, pannng, and nonvoent dscpne. Unity, planning and discipline At frst gance the mportance of such attrbutes may seem sef-evdent. Yet the profundty of these attrbutes and ther overarchng mpcatons sometmes are mssed when one vews movements at a predomnanty tactca and granuar eve. Each merts eaboraton. Unity s mportant because nonvoent movements draw ther strength from the partcpaton of peope n dverse sectors of socety. Put smpy: numbers matter. The more peope a movement has supportng t, the greater ts egtmacy, power, and tactca repertore. Successfu movements therefore contnuay reach out to new groups n ther socetes, e.g. men and women; youth, aduts, and eders; urban and rura popuatons; mnortes; members of regous nsttutons; farmers, aborers, busness peope, and professonas; weathy, mdde cass, and ower economc stratas; poce, soders, and members of the |udcary, as we as other groups. Successfu movements aso contnuay reach out to ther opponents supporters, understandng that one of the strengths of sustaned cv resstance n the servce of a unfyng vson s the abty to nduce oyaty shfts and defectons among ts opponents ranks. For exampe, the South Afrcan ant-aparthed movements ongong cvc dsrupton combned wth ts ca for natona reconcaton was abe to garner wdespread support and create unty for the cause of change, even among some whte supporters who had prevousy supported the aparthed state. Partcpants n nonvoent movements must aso make compex decsons about the course ther movements shoud take. Strategic planning s of centra mportance n dong ths. Regardess of the mert of ones cause or the moray ndefensbe acts of ones opponent, oppresson s usuay not overcome soey through spontaneous and mprovsed acts of resstance, even f such acts are we-executed. Instead, movements gan tracton when they pan how cv resstance can be systematcay organzed and adopted by peope n socety to acheve targeted and focused goas. Decdng what tactcs to use and how they shoud be sequenced; deveopng gavanzng propostons for change based on the aspratons and grevances of the peope who the movement ams to represent; pannng what ndvduas and groups to target wth tactcs and what short-, medum-, and ong-term ob|ectves to pursue; and budng nes of communcaton so that coatons can be negotated and but are |ust some of the ssues around whch nonvoent movements must creatvey strategze. Dong so requres a hostc anayss of the stuaton n whch the nonvoent strugge takes pace. As part of ther pannng process, effectve movements formay or nformay gather nformaton, sten to peope at the grassroots, and anayze themseves, ther adversares, and uncommtted thrd partes constanty through the course of a confct. Fnay, a strategy s ony effectve f t s executed n a dscpned way. The argest rsk for a faure of dscpne n a nonvoent movement s that some members may become voent. Therefore, nonviolent discipline-the abty of peope to reman nonvoent, even n the face of provocatons-s often contnuay nsted n partcpants. There are practca reasons for ths. Voent ncdents by members of a movement can dramatcay reduce ts egtmacy whe gvng the movements opponent an excuse to use represson. Furthermore, a movement that s consstenty nonvoent has a far greater chance of appeang to a broad range of potenta aes-ncudng even an adversarys supporters-through the course of ts strugge. A fu exporaton of these attrbutes coud f books, and the sub|ect of nonvoent resstance merts and s contnuay recevng further systematc study. Each movement that emerges adds a body of knowedge to the coectve understandng of ths phenomenon, yet there s st much about the art and scence of ths form of potca and soca acton that remans to be mapped and deveoped. But these three attrbutes-unty, pannng, and dscpne-are tmeess, and as such provde a genera framework through whch members and supporters of movements, as we as those who report and study them, can qucky assess a movements state. Is t unfed? Does t have a pan? Is t dscpned? The actons of those who embody these prncpes n nonvoent acton have aready bazed a path towards a more peacefu and |ust word. The future w be shaped by those who contnue to do so.
|1| For the purposes of ths artce, I am defnng successfu movements as those that acheve ther stated ob|ectves and faed movements as those that do not acheve ther stated ob|ectves. There s a tempora eement n ths defnton as we. A successfu movement may acheve ts stated ob|ectve (.e. the Orange movement n Ukrane n 2004) but chaenges n ensung years to that movements achevement may cause backsdng (for more nformaton on the Ukrane case, see the November 17, 2010 artce The strugge after peope power wns |16| by Oena Tregub and Oksana Shuyar on openDemocracy). Conversey, a movement that fas to acheve ts stated ob|ectve (.e. the Chnese pro-democracy movement n 1989) may create coatera effects n ensung years that constructvey advance the movements cause (for more nformaton on the Chna case, see the November 17, 2010 artce Repressons Paradox n Chna |17| by Lester Kurtz on openDemocracy). Whe not necessary changng the cassfcaton of a specfc movement as successfu or faed, these subsequent effects can be powerfu and therefore are noteworthy n ther own regard. [23] Civil resistance as deterrent to fracking: Part One, They shale not pass Philippe Duhamel [1] an we mobili!e and prepare the towns threatened by hydraulic fracturing with action plans so well"devised, so widely and transparently publici!ed, that unconventional energy developers wouldn#t dare enter$ See %art Two here &'().
It's win before you fight. Using an innovatively designed civil resistance campaign as a nonviolent deterrent, the people of Quebec have so far been successful in defending their land against hydraulic fracturing. Over the course of three years, plans to drill some 20,000 shale gas wells along the t. !awrence "iver, between #ontreal and Quebec $ity, have been thwarted to the point of being recogni%ed as a de facto moratorium on this form of e&treme energy e&traction. 's an organi%er who helped build this movement, I(m here to share some strategic insights and tactical ideas. The battle planned )hat level of preparedness does a resistance movement need to display before it can avoid the need to engage physically in nonviolent battle* )hat constitutes a cost high enough to deter the frac+ing industry and the government officials it seduces* )hat +ind of organi%ing does it ta+e to prevent countrysides from being turned into industrial wastelands drenched in frac+ing contaminants, dotted with methane,spewing drilling rigs and carcinogen,emitting holding ponds, criss,crossed by 2-./ truc+ing operations over pipelines running everywhere* $an we mobili%e and prepare the towns under threat with action plans so well,devised, so widely *mage: + ,arie"-eige .esner. and transparently publici%ed, that unconventional energy developers wouldn't dare enter* 0ow many organi%ed communities would be needed, each ready to sustain protracted action of the +ind the world has seen unfold in the )est usse& village of 1alcombe 2345* 6his idea of a citi%enry so fiercely indignant, so powerfully organi%ed it could actually shield its land from the fangs of a strong, wealthy and inherently polluting industry is what inspired an emergent, integrated civil resistance design. What the frack? ometime around 200/, stealthily, in typical blit%+rieg fashion as they do everywhere, unconventional energy developers moved into Quebec to test drill and frac+ for shale gas, appearing right in the middle of people's fields and bac+yards. In 2007, environmental organi%ations issued their first few statements. In 2030, alarmed and intensely worried citi%ens started calling 8ournalists, who found a compelling story9 articulate, undeserving victims, and a secretive, maladroit, and insatiable industry. 6he issue suddenly got front page in+ and prime time coverage. $iti%ens from rural areas soon found each other and started organi%ing. 'rtists and celebrities, some of whom owned properties in targeted areas, got involved. 6hey helped further alert and mobili%e public opinion through a viral video. 'n online petition gathered 340,000 names. :&perienced activists informed by civil resistance theory and practice ;including this author< felt compelled to 8oin, moved by the outrage they felt, and what they feared might happen. In =anuary 2030, the leadership of the main labour and environmental organi%ations called a meeting of activists to rally support for a >generic> moratorium on shale gas development, defined as an immediate suspension of no specific duration of all e&ploration and frac+ing operations. !abour and environmental leaders had reached a bac+room deal with the main opposition party, the ?arti Qu@b@cois. 6he ?arty would support the call for moratorium on shale gas in the t. !awrence valley. One of the main environmental spo+esmen was also being groomed for the position of future :nvironment minister. Aobody seemed to have a strategy to deal with what would happen once we got a short,term moratorium. )e were concerned that the anti,frac+ing movement may end up in disarray, or disband, once a short,term frac+ing moratorium was declared. 1y definition, a moratorium is temporary. It might be rescinded, potentially under a new government that would no longer have much use for a citi%en movement. !a $ampagne #oratoire d'une Beneration ;#CB<, the One,Beneration #oratorium $ampaign, was founded on a mission to prevent >dirty energy>, i.e. polluting fossil fuels , oil and gas, traditional and unconventional, whether found on the ground or offshore, including shale oil and gas , and nuclear energy, from being developed in Quebec. !uc+ily, because it lac+ed e&ploitable hydrocarbon resources and en8oyed an ample supply of hydroelectric power, the province never had developed meaningful fossil fuel resources. In Cecember 2030, a group of us , all volunteers who initially met at the Breenpeace local office in #ontreal , started circulating a call and proposal to leaders and groups who had +ic+started the fast,growing mobili%ation on the issue of frac+ing in Quebec9 /!et's get organi%ed. )e are not bluffing. $ome #ay of 2033, we will be ready to ta+e mass nonviolent action together.D )ith three preliminary ingredients , an ultimatum to the Quebec government to impose a 20,year moratorium on frac+ing, a proactive nonviolent direct action training program, and a long,distance wal+ from "imous+i to #ontreal , our hope was to lay the groundwor+ and build unity around a preventative struggle strategy to put on hold all current frac+ing operations and pre,testing wells in the province. Over the ne&t couple of months, our enthusiasm and the depth of our commitment would be put to the test. Resistance to resistance: the challenge of unity 1uilding unity around a preventative civil resistance strategy proved more difficult than we thought. It is Euite ironic. 6he first and hardest line of struggle is sometimes found with those who, at least in our mind, are our prime allies. Initially, the main visible activist leaders in opposition to shale gas did not respond to the proposal. 6hey ignored our repeated reEuests for a meeting to discuss strategy. 'part from Breenpeace, which has a history and ongoing practice of nonviolent resistance and direct action, the established environmental ABO's, the main spo+espeople and the issue,advocacy groups focused on media campaigns simply ignored the idea, hoping it would go away. 6hen, seeing that the campaign didn't wither and was going to be officially launched, three of the main environmental leaders summoned us to Euit the initiative, or be ostraci%ed. Our insistence on the need to go beyond a generic moratorium and to build a capacity for mass civil disobedience were the main stic+ing points. 1ecause the relationship was untested, and because an intentional civil resistance approach was relatively new to leaders who had become savvy in the game of traditional politics, the environmental leaders seemed to fear an uncontrollable fringe, as they eEuated civil disobedience in particular with violence. It got ugly. till we didn't stop. )e chose not to respond in +ind, and +ept our eyes on the pri%e, confident that one day, we would all congratulate each other on a 8oint victory. Walking the talk One of the highlights of the One,Beneration #oratorium $ampaign, and one for which it is most remembered, is the month,long wal+ it organi%ed in the spring of 2033 along an itinerary closely following the areas claimed for frac+ing by the industry. On #ay 3F, 2033, after the ultimatum and wee+s of organising, a group of about F0 people, aged from 3F to /F, started out from the mid,si%ed town of "imous+i. Grom day one, with thumbs up at our banner and sympathetic hon+ing at our signs, with the occasional gift of muffins and fresh water from front porches, it was confirmed we were wal+ing the right path9 ordinary people approved. 'cross the southern shore of the t. !awrence valley, up the "ichelieu river also under threat, down to #ontreal, some /00 +m ;over -40 miles< were wal+ed, in total for 44 days. Upon entering a town, we(d put together our singing parade, complete with giant puppets, industry giants on stilts, and a roaring pipeline dragon flan+ed by papier mHch@ props such as a sic+ cow, a wal+ing drilling rig, and a giant tap with poison signs. :ach night, local fol+s were invited to a special event with local singers, s+its, presentations and short movies, one of which was a participatory video made by local citi%ens. :ach step of the way, we tal+ed about frac+ing, the need for a 20,year moratorium, long,term solutions ;energy saving and green alternatives<, and the need to prepare preventative nonviolent struggle, including civil disobedience as a last resort. 6he press followed us closely, with national media at the start, middle and end points. 6he wal+ was the event of the day in rural towns. It would usually open the news, with the weather forecast sometimes closing with what the day would be li+e for the wal+ers. In cities li+e 6rois,"ivieres and Quebec $ity, the march through downtown would bring out hundreds, marching with the fanfare and swaying with the samba band. )hen we finally reached #ontreal, a crowd of some 30,000 to 3F,000 people awaited , the largest environmental demonstration in Quebec history at the time , our allies having finally come together to celebrate. 6hey held the banner in front of the march, with ?arti Qu@b@cois leader ?auline #arois at their side, with no representative from the wal+ invited to the photo op, howeverI In the month it too+ to reach #ontreal, two small victories were achieved. Girst, a bill was presented and adopted for a reduced F,year moratorium on shale gas development under the t. !awrence "iver proper and any of its islands west of 'nticosti. econd, on the eve of the wal+ entering the world(s second largest Grench,spea+ing city, the :nvironment minister declared for the first time that no more drilling and no more frac+ing would be allowed in the province at all, until further notice. #ore than two years later, the de facto moratorium is still standing. )e call it a citi%en moratorium, because it was clearly the result of grassroots organising and popular mobilisation. Other huge benefits of the wal+ were9 6rust and much closer relationships with rural groups all over the t. !awrence Jalley. )idespread support for the more >radical> position that shale gas should not be developed, or should remain in the ground for at least 20 years. 0undreds were now ready to attend Aonviolent Cirect 'ction training sessions. Other leaders could not malign civil resistance as much , rumours of #oratoire C(une Beneration being >violent hotheads> subsided ;or stopped wor+ing<. More than a village to raise a oveent )inning big usually reEuires a formidable synergy of efforts from wide and diverse civil society sectors. I would be remiss if I did not mention other +ey initiatives on which this success has rested. Over a hundred citi%en groups were formed over the last three years, that #oratoire C(une Beneration ;#CB< had little to no role in organising. #ost were formed after a core group of infuriated citi%ens e&changed contact information, following an evening educational, at a local community hall. 6his built the powerful and well mediati%ed "egroupement Interegional Ba% de chiste Jallee du t,!aurent ;"IBJ!<, with a membership primarily composed of middle,aged, e&perienced home owners across the area under threat, many with ties to political parties, chiefly the ?arti Quebecois. Using traditional community organising methods, the "egroupement canvassed rural communities, as+ing residents to sign a letter refusing access to the industry, and selling the highly visible red and yellow KAon au gas de schisteD signs that now dot villages and rural roads across Quebec. Over 40,000 property owners have signed the letter. )ith signature rates sometimes reaching as high as 70L, the organi%ers brought to city hall maps showing the supportive properties painsta+ingly coloured one by one. #any municipal governments were swayed. 1ylaws specifically designed to protect drin+ing water sources from the industry drilling were adopted in over M0 towns. #ore symbolic than legally binding, these bylaws and letters have certainly made visible the blatant failure of the energy industry to gain any social acceptance of frac+ing in the province. 6he 'Q!?', a government,funded environmental group, has also been +ey in providing initial e&pertise and direction to the movement. 's well, an independent committee of academic and scientific e&perts should be mentioned as a ma8or source of critical +nowledge, e&pertise and analyses to the grassroots and media. Civil resistance and the language of power Jack DuVall [1] *f you want to build a ship, don0t gather your people and ask them to provide wood, prepare tools, assign tasks. all them together and raise in their minds the longing for the endless sea.1 2 Antoine de Saint"34upery Who has po!er? One of the first people who understood how power could be produced by civil resistance was the great 'frican,'merican abolitionist, Grederic+ Couglass 23N5. In the years of his wor+ before the 'merican $ivil )ar, which was an age of universal, brutali%ing racism, even white abolitionists were dismissed as dreamers. 1ut Couglass was no dreamer. 0e operated with cold, furious logic. 6he power of oppressors Kconcedes nothing and it never will,D he said. Oou can find the Ke&act measureD of in8ustice that will be imposed on people, he e&plained, by measuring how much they will submit to. 'nd the in8ustice will go on until it is resisted. K6he limits of tyrants are prescribed by the endurance of those whom they oppress,D he declared. Couglass saw that if submission were replaced by civil resistance, the people could pierce the shroud of oppression, shifting power in a way that few in the world would have comprehended. ' half,century later, in the course of en8oining "ussians to resist military conscription, !eo 6olstoy came to the conclusion that Kpublic opinionD would, in the future, Kchange the whole structure of lifeD and ma+e violence Ksuperfluous.D In other words, what people believed and what they did to act on those beliefs could change the conditions they faced, and therefore violent intervention on behalf of change would be unnecessary. In the first decade of the twentieth century, #ohandas Bandhi read 6olstoy avidly, corresponded with him, and was galvani%ed by news reports of civil resistance against 1ritish rule in Ireland and against the 6sar(s rule in "ussia. :&perimenting, as he put it, with campaigns of nonviolent resistance against racist laws in outh 'frica and later against 1ritish rule in India, Bandhi e&panded the repertoire of tactics that people could use to challenge oppression9 tactics of protest such as petitions, marches and wal+,outsP tactics of noncooperation, such as boycotts, stri+es and civil disobedienceP and even tactics of disruption, such as bloc+ades and sei%ures of property. "o! are people roused? 6o enlist and unify the people involved in these campaigns, Bandhi summoned a durable, passionate commitment from millions of Indians to the cause of swaraj, or self,rule. 0e did this by listening to them to ensure that their beliefs and grievances were reflected in what his movement stood for, and by tal+ing with them about the importance of the cause and why their action was essential. In other words, he gave them an argument, a proposition for them to consider. 6he core of it, as reflected in many different themes and ideas, was this9 K6he 1ritish are ruling this country for their own benefit, so why should we help them*D :mbedded in that simple proposition were three central ideas about the rationale for the movement for Indian independence, ideas that foreshadowed the same basic rationale for change used by leaders of later, successful movements that rallied mass participation elsewhere in the world. Girst, Bandhi identified who was responsible for India(s problems9 the 1ritish, who had long tried to mollify Indians with the phony e&cuse that 1ritish control was benign. econd, Bandhi defined the reason for what was wrong with India9 the people were being governed unfairly, and they had no say in how they were governed. 6hird, he suggested that the people themselves, by tolerating the 1ritish as rulers, and by not resisting their rule, were facilitating the in8ustice that all Indians felt. =ust as Grederic+ Couglass had done /0 years before, he told his people that the power to liberate them was in their own hands. If the terms of your life are dictated by others, but if you have the power to revo+e those terms, then the Euestion of the moment is for no else but you to answer9 )ill you act* 6his is the e&istential moment facing every person living with oppression. 6hirty years after India gained its independence, Jaclav 0avel 2375, the $%ech theorist and leader of civil resistance, said that everyone who lives under tyranny but doesn(t resist is living a lie, the lie that life is normal Q and that everyone who resists instead lives Kwithin the truth.D :veryone who tells the truth denies in principle a system based on lies, 0avel argued, and therefore threatens that system Kin its entirety.D 'nd that is why totalitarian rulers have to arrest every dissident, as 0avel himself was arrested, twelve years before he became president of his country. Ceciding to resist after those you trust have summoned you to act has changed the lives of millions, but it may be less momentous than continuing to resist. trategic thin+ing about civil resistance can identify ways to minimi%e the ris+s of repression, yet people in many nonviolent movements have +nown that they were e&changing political dissent for personal 8eopardy if arrest was possible. ' few years ago, the 'merican civil rights leader =ames !awson 2205 told me why he thought that so many of his colleagues were relentless despite the ris+ of arrests and beatings. 0e cited Gannie !ou 0amer 2235, the leader of voter registration drives in #ississippi, who was pulled from her car by police one night, beaten almost to death, and after 40 days in the hospital, went immediately into another voter registration drive. K)hy did she do that*D, !awson as+ed me, and he answered9 K1ecause she believed that if she +ept wor+ing, the movement would succeed, and that if she didn(t, the movement would fail.D 0er sense of what would happen to herself had become ine&tricably tied to her sense of what would happen to the movement. $ertitude about the cause is the +ey to resilience. Where do oveents e#ist? In the late 37/0(s, the military 8unta that ruled 'rgentina fought leftists and dissidents with brutal tactics. Unmar+ed sedans would appear in the night in front of their houses, and they would be Rdisappeared(, never to be seen again. On 'pril 40, 37//, fourteen Rmothers of the disappeared 2225( 2245 went to the central sEuare of 1uenos 'ires, in front of the presidential palace, and began to protest. 6hey had one Euestion9 )here are our sons and daughters* 6he regime decided to let them march around the sEuare, because arresting mothers might have angered others. 1ut the mothers +ept coming bac+, until they were a movement Q which encouraged others opposed to the violence and incompetence of the regime to move into active resistance until eventually, under the stress of many events, 'rgentina(s dictatorship disintegrated. )here did this movement start* In a public sEuare in 1uenos 'ires* Ao, in the minds of the fourteen 'rgentine mothers who conceived a difficult Euestion to pose to the generals who ran the country. ome who en8oin nonviolence as a response to in8ustice suggest that the behavior of people in conflicts must be converted, from belligerence to acceptance of others( humanity, for nonviolent power to emerge. 1ut behavior is first of all a function of volition9 )hat I decide to do, in the precinct of my own thin+ing, is the impetus for my action. K'ny response that places man in the center of our current worries,D 0annah 'rendt 22-5 argued, Kand suggests he must be changed before any relief is to be found is profoundly unpolitical. Gor at the center of politics lies concern for the world.D 6o turn the people(s concern into action, 'braham !incoln 22F5 said that we must begin with Kreason Q cold, calculating, unimpassioned reason.D !incoln +new that the content of his cause, saving the union of 'merican states, had to be instilled in the motives and acts of the people. K)ith public sentiment, nothing can fail,D he said, Kwithout it, nothing can succeed.D 't a memorial service when !incoln was assassinated, the philosopher "alph )aldo :merson said of 'mericans that !incoln had Kthe thought of their minds articulated by his tongue.D In our time, the philosopher =ohn "awls insisted that every citi%en has Ka duty of civility to appeal to public reason.D 6his is what Bandhi, Jaclev 0avel, $ora%on 'Euino, Cesmond 6utu and other champions of civil resistance did Q and in the process, they made Indians, $%echs, Gilipinos, outh 'fricans and many other peoples into conscious, dedicated pursuers of rights and democracy. ?eople move their bodies once they move their minds. Po!er fro ends 6oday the leading democracies are home to political consultants who tell candidates running for public office that they should trigger voters( emotions rather than wasting time on ma+ing arguments about policies much less ideas. ome of these consultants begin with biological e&planations, insisting that language in politics should manipulate people(s refle&ive feelings in order to push them into certain choices at the polls. 1ut the history of civil resistance offers little support to these e&planations of how political convictions are shaped and translated into loyalty or support for a campaign. If we fail to reflect the real substance of a cause in the language used to recruit people to 8oin that cause, we reduce language to propaganda. 6hose who would instrumentali%e language and convert it into semaphores about transitory feelings do not recogni%e that it will enlist political fervor not if it blurs but if it crystalli%es ideas about purpose, identity, nationhood and other concepts that resonate with people(s most deeply held beliefs , and therefore act causally on their development of commitment and certitude, which are the fuel for the rise and resilience of movements. 'ctivate %eal for the ends of political action and you will draw power from those who are activated. I came to this conclusion not only after noticing how the language of supposedly mature democracies has deteriorated into manipulating voters( momentary li+es and disli+es ;so well represented by Gaceboo+(s ever,present option to Kli+eD every comment that appears on your KwallD<, but also because I noticed that scholars and practitioners of nonviolent struggle have different views about how to teach or train those who are new to the sub8ect. Is it possible to capture the essence of civil resistance in mechanical formulae about how to use tactics in particular circumstances* hould tactical action neglect to invo+e a campaign(s core ideas and values or fail to telegraph the campaign(s purpose through that action* $an a campaign be effectively planned if its leaders assume that people are ready to be mobili%ed, without first ascertaining what the people thin+ and how the content of the campaign(s goals can be e&pressed to represent that thin+ing* 6he unconscious tendency to downgrade the language of a movement , from an e&pression of its primordial purpose in changing the e&isting political order, to a KmessageD that e&ploits listeners( immediate discontent , is driven mainly by the assumption that a campaign or movement e&ists for the sole purpose of capturing political power as an end in itself, rather than as a means to the end of transforming society or the nation. If you capture power without first firing the minds and enlisting the wor+ of those who will be sta+eholders in the new order, you may have staged a coup de main ;nonviolent or otherwise<, but you will not have engaged the people in helping to e&ercise genuine democratic power. Instrumentali%ing language also tempts ma+ing a fatal strategic mista+e in the effort to accomplish political change, either through movements of civil resistance or campaigns of conventional political action, and that mista+e is brea+ing the lin+age between means and ends. Gor civil resistance to wor+, it has to shred the legitimacy of power,holders whom it opposes and model a higher legitimacy based on representing the real aspirations of the people. 1ut the fastest way to forsa+e that advantage is to resort to means that are not seen as legitimate. Ao participant in a movement can Kbecome the change you want to seeD unless he or she ta+es action that is consistent with the political values and social vision held by the movement. 6hat is not only an argument for nonviolent discipline ;since violent resistance usually does not produce nonviolent order<. It is also why the language of a campaign has to be based on rational propositions rather than deceptive or misleading allegations. If you lie your way to power, popular consent to your power is unli+ely to survive the discovery of your deceit, and to believe otherwise is to ma+e cynicism a 8ustification for e&pediency. Ao campaign can represent people it misleads, because then their participation is based on false beliefs instead of shared ideas. One common variation of the inconsistency between means and ends is found in how campaigns use language to channel the rage of those who are deprived of rights or live with ineEualities. 6he political psychologist "oy :idelson 22M5argues that shared outrage has lasting political force when Kit insists on e&planations for what(s wrong and it see+s accountability for the wrongdoing.D In other words, popular passion can be summoned, but only by using rational arguments to define the changes that are sought as well as the vices to be overturned. In doing that, a movement does what the writer 'dam Bopni+ 22/5 says that !incoln did9 it Kturns reason into a new +ind of passion.D If it would be heeded, the call for civil resistance must propose that a society or nation can be changed only as people 8oin and remain with a movement to ma+e it change. 6he power of the language that a movement employs, to call forth power from people who want their freedom, will come only as it invo+es the ideas and e&hibits the values at the root of their e&istence as a people. In his last letter to Bandhi, !eo 6olstoy said that he felt it was possible that the wor+ that Bandhi was doing, ab8uring violent force, could lead to similar action by all the peoples of the world. In the paintings and photographs of him near the end of his life, 6olstoy loo+ed li+e a prophet. In that letter to Bandhi, he became one. 6olstoy had no way to outline how he envisaged such power e&cept through the language of his boo+s and letters. Bandhi had no way to awa+en the Indian people to the power they already possessed, and no way to teach them how to use it, e&cept through the language he used to summon the people(s resolve to change their future. The Syrian resistance: a tale of two struggles Maciej Bartkowski [1] and Mohja Kah [!] *n Syria, mi4ing violent and nonviolent resistance 5eopardi!ed people power, particularly when violence became the main driver of resistance from early (6'( onward. See %art Two. &'7) It is a tragedy of history when so many people regardless of sect, ethnicity, religion, and gender 8oin in nonviolent resistance 23F5 to demand freedom for all, and achieve so much with so little during such a brief time, only to have their accomplishments go largely unrecogni%ed, and their struggle devolve into a fight with oppression on its own violent terms , as if these could be complementary to nonviolent resistance, an effective method to protect people, or a proven instrument to defeat a brutal regime. 6his happened in yria. 6he recent boo+ "ecovering Aonviolent 0istory 23M5 finds that a number of nonviolent campaigns in national liberation struggles were overta+en by violent resistance. One ma8or reason for abandonment of civil resistance in favor of armed struggle is not understanding what civil resistance can achieve, and with what benefits for a people(s liberation. 6he narrative void about civil resistance during ongoing conflict is often filled by armed insurrectionists with their own ideologi%ed discourse, which tries to discredit the effectiveness of nonviolent resistance and underestimates the costs of violence. 0ow this happened in yria is the story that follows. Part $: %onviolent and violent conflict $ivil resistance 6he impact of the nonviolent resistance in yria , before it was largely overshadowed by an armed uprising in early 2032 , was tremendous. It mobili%ed hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of until,then apathetic citi%ens, produced hundreds of KleadersD from people who were mostly un+nown e&cept locally, united diverse cross,sections of the yrian population, both rural and urban, as no other internal struggle since the anti,colonial period, and shoo+ and wea+ened 1aathist one,party rule. )idespread, organi%ed, yet non,hierarchical, nonviolent resistance succeeded in wea+ening the power of the regime to a degree that armed resistance ;notably in 0ama in 37N2<, a few valiant souls from an intellectual elite ;such as the signatories of the Camascus Ceclaration in 200F<, and one ethnic group isolated in their armed rebellion ;the Surds in 200-< had all failed to accomplish. 'll this was achieved while the ran+s of civil resisters were being decimated by massacre and detention, and when they had to undergo a mounting humanitarian crisis. ?rotesters hit the streets in mass numbers on #arch 3N, 2033, in Caraa, 1anyas, 0oms, and Camascus. 1anyas protesters reached out to the city(s large 'lawite population, singing K?eaceful, peaceful,neither unni nor 'lawite, we want national unity,D 23/5 In Camascus, protesters underscored multi,sectarian unity by holding up a sign with a cross and crescent and the words KAo to repression, Oes to freedom,D 23N5 while an earlier protest on #arch 3F in Camascus had featured a voice with a coastal 'lawite accent saying, K)e are 'lawites, unnis, people of every yrian sect, and we want to topple this regime.D 2375
Sillings of unarmed protesters bac+fired on the regime. In one video 2205uploaded on #arch 24, 2033 in Cara, a man shouts, in a desperate voice, to armed troops, ome of you have honor , don't shootT Oou have brothers U sisters, you have brothers , your daughters , your mothers U fathers in your town , they're 8ust li+e us, don't shootT I6his earth is big enough for all of usT Oou don't have the right anymore to ta+e all of it for yourselvesT cenes li+e this in the months of nonviolent resistance countered the regime narrative that Karmed gangsD were driving the resistance. ?rotests spread to alamiya, hub of yria(s Ismailia hia population. #isyaf, a town with large $hristian and 'lawite populations alongside unnis, was another early multi,sectarian protest locale. $hilling scenes of peaceful protesters suppressed by troops in Cara caused #untaha 'trash, daughter of a national hero from the anti,colonial struggle, to reprimand the president by name on Orient 6elevision ;owned by a secular, non,Islamist yrian in the Bulf< in her Euavering elderly voice 2235, declaring outright that the regime narrative was false and refuting its accusation of sectarianism. 6he civil resistance group Pulse ;Aabd<, begun by 'lawite activists, emerged in 0oms by summerP a Surdish nonviolent groupAva, formed around =une 2033P women were at the vanguard of a nonviolent protest series organi%ed in alamiya, called The Street Is Ours ;al,hare !ana<. Aon,sectarianism shone during yria(s most massive rally, of an estimated -00,000 in 0ama(s $loc+ 6ower Euare 2225in =uly 2033, full of scenes of cross,religious embrace, women(s participation, and nonviolent conduct. 6his broad,based appeal would have hardly been possible, had not the uprising been unarmed. )ith the regime insisting it was battling Karmed gangs,D protesters clapped and raised both hands while marching to show that they were not hiding weapons. In Caraya, Oahya hurba8i populari%ed the nonviolent concept of Kfraterni%ation,D whereby in order to ma+e human contact with regime soldiers and soften their hostility or perhaps even motivate their defection, protesters distributed water and flowers to soldiers at protests. Alawite symol of doule!pron"ed sword# cross# crescent# and star with national fla" colors# carried y protesters in Tal# $mostly Sunni town in %amascus countryside&# April 2'(() 1y 'pril, protesters in many towns had begun to self,organi%e, forming a non,hierarchical structure of local committees which sprang up all over yria to coordinate nonviolent resistance. 's regime detention swept and relentless violence too+ members, resistance groups dissolved and regrouped under new names. )ith similar adaptability, protesters innovated dodge,and,feint street tactics. )ael Surdi, an 'leppo University student, developed a Kflying protest9D protesters gathered on the agreed,upon street after announcing a fa+e location on government,monitored phone lines, marched and video,taped for eleven minutes, dispersed and hid or destroyed banners before security arrived, and went to safe,houses to upload the videos. Codge,and,feint tactics enabled protesters to protest another day, as did marching in narrow alleys rather than open sEuares on the :gyptian model, and holding protest signs bac+ward over their heads, so faces in videos could not be identified. treet protests, whose number rose to 720 different locations in one wee+ in the nonviolent phase and declined to fewer than 400 during the autumn 2033 when violent resistance began mounting, played an important role not only in publici%ing the movement(s message but in giving people a personal sense of empowerment, long absent under the police state. One young activist, K"ose,D e&pressed why protesters did not stop demonstrating, even +nowing they could be +illed9 K)e do other activism, but we will not stop demonstrating9 to taste freedom, if only for ten minutesTD Aarratives of defectors from the regime cite its targeting of lethal force on the unarmed and innocents as a +ey factor that bro+e the grip of loyalty to the regime. #assacres of unarmed protesters and the death in regime detention, under apparent torture, of 0am%a Shatib ;reportedly thirteen years old< were specifically recalled 2245by the first defecting 'lawite officer of record, 'faE 'hmad, who wor+ed in the Cara branch of 'ir Gorce ecurity. 'hmad defected days before 0am%a(s mutilated body was returned to his parents on #ay 2-, 2033. 6he regime responded to its defection problem by introducing snipers and tan+s, among other tactics, to reduce contact between soldiers and protesters. 6his, however, did not stop defections, which occurred in this phase mostly among conscripts although a handful of officers defected. ome at the army defectors( camp in 6ur+ey would form the Gree yrian 'rmy ;G'<. "eports of field e&ecution of attempted defectors proliferated. In response to defections, 'ssad began using only three of his army(s twelve divisions, the three manned by 'lawites, to force the sect to retrench around the regime. ' number of high,level military 22-5 defections occurred after violence spi+ed at the end of 2033 , though in some cases advanced preparation for defecting occurred during the nonviolent resistance phase , but these defections were increasingly by unnis. 6his set the stage for the violent polari%ation of yrian society. 6hat the government +ept responding to nonviolent protests with violent means was freEuently asserted by observers as an indication of the failure of nonviolent resistance in yria, with the concomitant assertion that nonviolent actions could succeed only when a regime behaved humanely. Oet evidence suggests that, while it lasted, nonviolent resistance was in fact a powerful weapon against the 'ssad regime, forcing it to be on the defensive, react to events, and commit mista+es that often bac+fired, leading to more resistance and solidarity across diverse groups. 'rmed rebellion 1esides formal regime forces, the government allowed armed loyalist militias to +idnap, loot, rape during home invasions, and traffic women to rape farms. 6he e&istence of these roving informal militias contributed to the belief that armed defense was necessary and could protect people against these violations. "eportedly the regime itself saturated certain areas with arms, to push protesters into becoming the Karmed gangsD which it claimed to be fighting from the outset. #any brigades at this stage were native to local communities, ma+ing them accountable. ?eaceful protests continued but with fewer participants9 many former protest locales were becoming unsafe. In some instances, the protests occurred, according to participants, only because armed rebels helped barricade areas against regime troops. 6his KprotectionD was short,term, as the presence of a brigade drew increasingly indiscriminate and more powerful regime fire , including later airstri+es , to such areas. 6his triggered calls for arming the rebels with more powerful weapons, rather than returning to nonviolent resistance. 6he tric+le of foreign fighters beginning in late 2033, who entered yria on their own or with support of foreign governments, further 8eopardi%ed unarmed resistance and reinforced the mutation of the overall conflict into civil war. 'ma%ingly, it was during this period of increasing violence on both sides that those who remained committed to nonviolent resistance achieved new levels of creativity and organi%ation. ome three do%en revolutionary newspapers, many of them distributed in hard copy on the ground ;some highlighted here 22F5<, emerged. In eptember 2033, Greedom Cays yria emerged as a coalition of do%ens of nonviolent resistance groups. #embers of groups in this coalition implemented new, highly creative nonviolent resistance methods. Gor e&le, several young underclasswomen at Camascus University released thousands of small papers from the highest dorm tower, containing messages of freedom and human rights, causing regime security agents to be assigned to using all their security training for the 8ob of pic+ing up the subversive litter from campus grounds for days, and pursuing the activists for three wee+s. 6his led, on Aovember 4, 2033, to the 24,day detention and torture of then eighteen,year,old Oaman Qadri, young mastermind of the scheme, which caused a ripple effect as her diverse classmates demonstrated for her, and were themselves detained, spurring more protests not only in Camascus but in their respective hometowns across yria. *ad, a nonviolent group in 0oms formed initially by 'lawite activists in spring 2033, redoubled its behind,the,scenes efforts at conflict resolution among 'lawite and unni villages and city neighborhoods. 6he yrian "evolutionary Oouth group, active in 0oms and Camascus, was launched in #ay 2032 and spearheaded both nonviolent direct actions and socio,economic organi%ing in direct rebuttal to the claims that Kthe revolution has become totally militari%ed and that there is no room for peaceful protest 22M5.D o, too, the top the Silling campaign 22/5 that lasted from 'pril to =uly 2032 and held at least 2M demonstrations in diverse geographic locations, drawing in many minority members, was an attempt to refocus energies toward nonviolent resistance after militari%ation had become the dominant resistance. #eanwhile, civilian structures on the ground in yria were wor+ing toward unified self,governance. Unity did not come to fruition on a national level, but reached the ne&t, community,centered, level9 "egional $ommand $ouncils ;in Camascus, 0oms, and so on< integrated many aspects of resistance wor+9 the underground clinic system, an alternate economy, schools, media, and transportationP in effect, they created alternative local governance. !ocal Gree yrian 'rmy units had liaison on each council, in an attempt to bring armed rebels under civilian leadership. $ouncils thus integrated both civilian and armed flan+s. :ventually, mi&ing violent and nonviolent resistance 8eopardi%ed people power, particularly when violence became the main driver of resistance from early 2032 onward. 'ssad redoubled his military efforts and could then show his supporters and neutral yrians that he was their only protector against violent e&tremists. 'rmed struggle also helped 'ssad to foster s+epticism about the revolution among $hristians, 'lawites, and other communities , something that he could not achieve during the first months of resistance. 6he populace now faced daunting conditions in many cities and towns. Aonviolent activists remained engaged in civic organi%ing 22N5 but, often, in the form of full,time relief wor+, operating field hospitals and distributing basic goods to displaced populations, and educating displaced children. )hen armed resistance fully overtoo+ civil resistance during 2032, it gained e&aggerated influence over the outside world(s view of the yrian conflict. Once the revolution embraced using violence, the only way it seemed possible to prevail over 'ssad was to acEuire more arms. 1ecause the fate of any armed resistance that is wea+er than its adversary is necessarily determined by e&ternal assistance in the form of weapons, army training or air stri+es, the door is opened to all the negative conseEuences that stem from outside military involvement. 1y contrast, nonviolent resistance does not historically need military intervention to prevail. It might welcome help from e&ternal civil society groups, but what it needs most of all is the force of its own mobili%ed citi%ens. uch struggle comes with fewer overall costs for the society and greater self,control over the internal tra8ectories of the resistance and its eventual outcomes. Resisting corruption: recent progress in Indonesia and Kenya "haa#ka Beyerle [1] %eople power may be well"suited to a systemic approach to curbing corruption. %olitical will can be thwarted, because too many office"holders have a stake in the crooked status 8uo. Those benefiting from graft are much less likely to stand against it than those suffering from it.
The CICAK campagn. |akarta Press |14| |14| Imagne you are an everyday ctzen, vng n a country wth a hstory of over three decades of state voence and authortaran rue, wth wdespread poverty st persstent. A nonvoent cvc coaton payed a sgnfcant roe n dspacng the od regme. The fedgng democracy nherted a thrty-year armed confct that resuted n thousands of deaths, dysfunctona state nsttutons, securty force mpunty and gross mafeasance. Yet amdst these chaenges, an ant- corrupton commsson has been created that has begun to expose ct behavor and reatonshps among the oca and natona governments, parament, admnstraton, poce and prvate sector. Not surprsngy, t has become a target of these corrupt forces, and commssoners have been |aed on trumped up charges. Aternatey, magne you ve n desttuton, n a sum, wth tte or no forma educaton. Ethnc voence has wracked your country, most recenty after natona eectons. You fee frustraton, hopeessness and anger at the ack of concern of oca offcas and your eected representatve, who receve funds to mprove your communty whe you see no benefca resuts. Yet, you aso have tte confdence you can change thngs, and beeve that n any case, ts utmatey out of your hands and s the responsbty of others. What coud you actuay do, n ether stuaton? One opton s to reman acquescent and suffer. A second opton s to resort to voence, perhaps by |onng a gang or extremst group, or ventng through rots or mob aggresson, though ths s hghy unkey to resut n postve change. But there s a thrd opton. You coud get together wth others sharng the same grevances, and take up cv resstance to make your coectve voce heard, artcuate grevances and demands, put pressure on authortes to force acton, and acheve resuts. Ths s exacty what happened n the above two stores. Indonesia: In the argest soca mobzaton snce the Reformas movement |15|, whch ended the bruta Suharto dctatorshp n Indonesa, the 2009 CICAK campagn |16| made hstory. CICAK has a dua meanng. Its an acronym for Love Indonesa, Love Ant-Corrupton. Its aso a gecko zard, referrng to a derogatory wretapped comment by the Chef of the Poces Crmna Department, who kened the Corrupton Eradcaton Commsson (KPK) to a gecko fghtng the crocode (poce). One hundred cvc organzatons soon |oned CICAK; a graduate student ndependenty created a Facebook group whch rapdy grew to 1.7 mon members; and oca groups formed n 20 of the countrys 33 provnces, wth we-known pubc fgures comng on board. CICAK organzed actons n |akarta, whe oca chapters and hgh schoo and unversty students spontaneousy ntated events throughout the country. A varety of creatve nonvoent tactcs were used, ncudng banners readng Say no to crocodes, ant-corrupton rngtones, stunts, street muras, wearng of symbos, sodarty vsts to the KPK, as we as demonstratons, concerts, st- ns, eafetng and hunger strkes. CICAK demanded an mmedate ndependent nvestgaton and caed on the Presdent to save the KPK. As cv resstance escaated, he agreed to the nvestgaton. The Commsson recommended the charges aganst the KPK offcas be dropped. Kenya: The second case s ongong n Kenya. Musms for Human Rghts (MUHURI |17|) s empowerng the poor n Mombasa to fght poverty by ganng access to nformaton about budgets, curbng msuse of consttuency deveopment funds, demandng pro|ects actuay wanted by communtes, and ganng accountabty of oca offcas and members of parament. Snce 2007, through a poneerng |18| coaboraton wth the Internatona Budget Partnershp |19| and veteran actvsts from the ,a!door 9isan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS |20|) movement for the Rght to Know n Inda, t has deveoped a defnng nonvoent method, the i$e%step social audit, desgned to pressure egsators to confront corrupton and msmanagement: The frst step conssts of nformaton gatherng - records from the oca Consttuency Deveopment Fund (CDF) offce. The second step s tranng oca men and women to become communty actvsts who decpher documents and budgets, montor expendtures and physcay nspect pubc works. The thrd step nvoves educatng and motvatng feow ctzens about the CDF and ther rght to nformaton and accountabty. Communty actvsts and MUHURI use nonvoent tactcs to attract attenton, drecty engage peope, and encourage them to attend a pubc hearng. Ths ncudes puppet pays, musca processons, street theatre, and eafetng. The fourth step s nspectng the CDF pro|ect ste. Fnay comes the pubc hearng wth CDF offcas, the meda, and n some cases, the member of parament. MUHURI frst eads a processon through the communty, repete wth chantng, a youth band, theatrcs and dancng chdren. Durng the forum the resuts of the nvestgatons are presented, CDF offcas are questoned and remeda measures are dentfed. Foow- up montorng tracks progress. In vrtuay every part of the word over the past 15 years, ctzens have been provng they are not passve onookers of ete-drven, ant-corrupton ntatves, but rather, drvers of accountabty, reform and change - a-the- whe expandng the appcaton of cv resstance tactcs orgnay honed through more vsbe ant-dctatorshp and ant-occupaton strugges. Peope power may be we-suted to a systemc approach to curbng corrupton. |21| Tradtona, top-down strateges are based on the assumpton that once ant-corrupton structures are put n pace, ct practces w change. Insttutons accused of corrupton are often made responsbe for enactng change. But those beneftng from graft are much ess key to stand aganst t than those sufferng from t. Its not surprsng that even when potca w exsts, t can be thwarted, because too many peope have a stake n the crooked status quo. In contrast, peope power has a strategc advantage: t conssts of extra- nsttutona pressure to push for change, when power-hoders are corrupt or unaccountabe, and nsttutona channes are bocked or neffectve. In ongong research, ths author has found that grass-roots campagns and movements targetng corrupton often compement and renforce ega and admnstratve mechansms, whch consttute the ant-corrupton nfrastructure needed for ong-term transformaton of systems of graft and abuse. They can dsrupt vertca and horzonta systems of corrupton. Ctzen mobzaton has aso bostered the efforts of honest ndvduas wthn the state and other nsttutons and sectors attemptng reforms and change, even to the extent of defendng them. Aruna Roy, one of the founders of the MKSS movement n Inda, characterzes corrupton as the externa manfestaton of the dena of a rght, an enttement, a wage, a medcne. In bottom-up approaches, corrupton snt consdered n a vacuum; t s nked to oppresson and other forms of n|ustce, from voence to poverty, human rghts abuses, substandard soca servces, authortaransm, unaccountabty, and envronmenta destructon. Consequenty, when peope deveop ther own channes of power, the prortes of fghtng corrupton often shft from grand corrupton, such as massve embezzement, to those forms of graft and abuse that are most drecty harmfu to the pubc, partcuary the poor. An actve ctzenry s at the heart of accountabty and |ustce. In the words of Hussen Khad of MUHURI, If peope are abe to be encouraged to go out, today ts CDF, tomorrow ts somethng ese, and another day ts another thng. So CDF s an entry pont to the reazaton of so many rghts that peope are not gettng. The achevements of the CICAK campagn, MUHURI and many others not ony set an exampe, but provde hope that peope can do more than st n quet sufferng or resort to voence. Often nsttutonazed, corrupton n democraces and non-democraces ake w reman gobay pervasve to the extent that we, the peope, have not yet become a nonvoent force for fghtng the n|ustce that t causes. Cv resstance s a means by whch ctzens can become that source of change. [2+] Civil resistance as deterrent to fracking: Part T!o, &hale '(( Philippe Duhamel [1] The on"the"ground citi!en victory against those who represented one of the most powerful industries in the world is the result of a multi"pronged, multiyear combination of tactics that has combined into an innovative, compelling strategy. See %art :ne here &'(). In ?art One, ?hilippe Cuhamel e&plains how !a $ampagne #oratoire d'une Beneration ;#CB<, the One,Beneration #oratorium $ampaign, deployed an ultimatum to the Quebec government to impose a 20,year moratorium on frac+ing, a proactive nonviolent direct action training program, and a long,distance wal+ from "imous+i to #ontreal, to build unity around a preventative struggle strategy to put on hold all current frac+ing operations and pre,testing wells in the province. )hat has happened since that success* 1y mid,summer 2033, as we were debriefing and evaluating the wal+ and its success, the organi%ing challenges and the lessons, #arie,Vve !educ, one of our creative members suggested that we set up an early warning system to watch and sound the alarm should frac+ing activity resume on Quebec territory. he suggested we call it Khale 733D. )e got wor+ing on the design. Girst, there would be the creation and maintenance of a monitoring website and a 3,N00 number to serve as hubs for active, citi%en,based surveillance. 6he web site that we built, $0I6:733.org [(3] in Grench, sports a big red button to signal suspicious frac+ing activity, and includes geo,mapping of all +nown potential sites, with a colour, coded level of alert with short descriptions. )e have secured the 3,NNN,$0I6: emergency number, allowing for low,tech and more immediate contact with the campaign. :yes and ears in the community, watching remotes sites, important intersections and bac+ roads, paying attention to rumours and tal+ing with strangers, can provide important, timely information. It is the first and vital step in the system. 6his +ind of surveillance networ+ doesn't always have to be built from scratch. In the $anadian province of Aew 1runswic+, $anada , Aeighbourhood )atch and 1loc+ ?arent homes were enlisted to signal to protesters the presence of thumper truc+s, used for seismic testing. 'ny information received is first validated through a basic protocol. =ournalism,style, we need at least two verified sources before an alert is made public. ?oint people in citi%en groups stand ready to go out and verify allegations. :ngineers and specialists are on call to validate. One priority: train, train, train If anything, the concept of preventative action rests on one paramount priority9 to train communities in Aonviolent Cirect 'ction ;AJC'< and $ivil Cisobedience ;$C<. 6o reinforce their intended effect as a deterrent for the industry, the trainings themselves are publici%ed and mediati%ed. Our trainings are full,day wor+shops, with advance registration, eEual part theory, history of civil resistance strategy, and tactical training, all based on an e&periential training design. 6o anchor the training, and move the real wor+ of organi%ing, we have started to facilitate tactical planning towards local emergency plans. )hat are the best locations to bloc+ade* )here will civil resisters be sheltered* 0ow will they be fed* )ho will provide transportation* 's another innovation, we are using a ?articipatory Jideo process, adapted from US, based Insi"htshare, teaching small groups in the use of video, the new literacy, to build a rapid deployment plan. )ith friendly faces from the community, this self,made video can show everyone , local fol+s, national authorities, and energy investors , the emergency mobilisation and direct action plans that are being prepared to resist shale gas development, should it ever dare come bac+ in the area. )irect action: costing the opponent 'lthough we +new intuitively, and politically, that preparing for mass participation in civil disobedience bloc+ades would constitute a threat to the industry, the $:O of a ma8or firm in the field of hydraulic fracturing provided a nice confirmation of the validity of one of our tactical assessments9 >' frac+ing operation costs about half a million dollars a day. 6hat's why I won't pay this +ind of money if the ris+ is too high that protesters will chain themselves to installations, or stop my teams from wor+ing.> - #ichael 1innion, $:O of Questerre. >6han+ you #r. 1innion, for sharing the recipe,> we'd Euip at every opportunity. >Aow let's gather the ingredientsT> 'lthough one would be well,advised to remember that one tactic alone is rarely enough, and that employing a vast repertoire of methods, with varying levels of ris+s, from none to mild to high, is +ey to mass participation, and thus victory, other sta+eholders and analysts seem to share his assessment that direct action and nonviolent bloc+ades represent a high ris+ and real costs for the industry. In early 2034, !ondon,based $ontrol "is+s, a global ris+ assessment consultancy for industries and governments, published an in,depth study of anti,frac+ing groups around the world entitled, 6he Blobal 'nti,Grac+ing #ovement9 )hat it )ants, 0ow it Operates and )hat(s Ae&t. 23-5 On page 30 of the report, $ontrol "is+s consultants provide this piece of analysis on direct action, weighing more specifically the relative cost.benefit of bloc+ades as a tactic to the anti,frac+ing movement, vs. unconventional hydrocarbon developers9 >Cirect action serves both strategic and tactical purposes. trategically, it attracts media attention, raising public awareness of hydraulic fracturing, and thereby increasing receptiveness to anti,frac+ing messaging and aiding activist recruitment. Cemonstrations, days of action and non,violent civil disobedience provide impetus and focus to the anti,frac+ing movement, helping to mobilise grassroots support, and generating solidarity both locally and globally. Cirect action can also confer political influence on the anti,frac+ing movement, as the imposition of moratoriums in Grance, 1ulgaria, outh 'frica, $%ech "epublic and elsewhere has demonstrated...>
>1loc+ades are a favoured non,violent direct action tactic across the environmental activist movement, particularly for rural gas drilling pro8ects, which often depend on single, purpose,built access roads. 1loc+ades generally do not reEuire site security to be breached and can occur at a distance from the pro8ect. Gurthermore, while the costs to activists of bloc+ades are e&tremely low Q both in terms of organisation and penalties Q the potential for disruption to the target can be significant in terms of lost productivity and e&tra operating costs.> ?roviding further confirmation of our choice of tactics, $ontrol "is+s also had this to say about one element of the One,Beneration #oratorium campaign, deemed a relatively sophisticated operation9 >In line with the generic evolution of social movements, online and social media are also instrumental in organising and mobilising the anti,frac+ing movement. !ocal and national anti,frac+ing demonstrations, for e&le, are promoted heavily via Gaceboo+ pages and 6witter feeds, with websites providing ready,made templates for posters, 6, shirts and banners. 't the more sophisticated end of the spectrum, for e&le, the anti, shale Quebecois ;$anada< campaign #oratoire d(une generation maintains a dedicated initiative , Schiste -(( , to alert activists y email to drillin" activity in the province). Making the ost of direct action 6he second +ey element of the preventative campaign design deals with training very much upstream of industry activity. )e put a lot of emphasis on non,arrest, support roles. Our goal is to get as many people to attend the training as possible. )e also want to recruit people who might not otherwise attend, because it is a fact that support roles around nonviolent direct action often involve greater time commitments, and even courage, than the getting arrested part. $ivil Cisobedience and Aonviolent Cirect 'ction ;AJC'< trainings can generate Euite a bit of media bu%%. :specially outside of urban areas, these wor+shops are not only a rare occurrence and a novelty, they generate enough controversy to provide prime newsworthiness. :specially when allowed to cover role,plays and other simulations, AJC' trainings provide this irresistible mi& of anticipation and drama about the upcoming conflict. 'llowing media to cover civil disobedience wor+shops allows training to become an action in itself. ince not only police and corporate surveillance outfits, but also 8ournalists have been +nown to covertly attend these trainings, it is better that the movement allow access to the media, and hence e&ert some control over the message, and plan how to derive the most benefit from the coverage. Pledging civil resistance 6he training sessions in civil resistance always end with the offer to sign a >?ledge of "esistance> made out to each participant's name, followed by a graduation ceremony with diplomas also printed individually , we register people in advance through an online form, and as+ for their personal information, to be compiled in a database. 1ecause it is formal and dignified, it strengthens people's resolve. It is a serious commitment, that not everyone, but most participants do ma+e. It prepares people for not 8ust short,term, but a longer, term vision of how they should contemplate being involved in this struggle. It provides a reassurance that this movement is serious, well,organi%ed and that it will see to it that nonviolent discipline doesn't brea+ down, and that high,ris+ roles aren't open to untrained participants. )e then ta+e a picture of each graduate holding their diploma, and add it to the database of trained participants. !ater, we send each one their laminated personal card, complete with photo IC, Q" code, and a newsletter with a fundraising appeal. )hen we reach F00 trained participants ;right now, our numbers hover 8ust above 400<, we hold a press conference to show how many people have committed to ta+e part in civil resistance actions, as direct participants and support, should the industry come bac+. *earning fro the e#perient Under a threat as immense as frac+ing, no town could succeed alone. =ust the same, no single organisation, much less a leader, can claim full credit for such a vast and successful movement. )ith a mi& of friction and collaboration, the combination of everyone(s diverse efforts and specific contributions generated the victory. =ust as in nature, it ta+es many speciali%ed roles to ma+e an effective and resilient movement ecosystem. ?ublic framing $hoose a frame that allows you to tal+ to almost everybody, ordinary people who do not +now about, share or even care about the premises of environmental activism, who +now nothing about movement 8argon such as Kclimate 8usticeD, K$O2 ??#D, or even alternative energy sources. 6o become a mass movement, we need to develop language devoid of inside code words or policy, spea+. If your framing allows the other side to win over the fence sitters, you will lose. )e chose to put forward the idea of a momentary stop , not a permanent ban outright , so that there could be a way to bring over those who are not yet convinced, or educated enough about the issue, to even >hear> a hard position such >no shale gas, ever>. 6he One,Beneration #oratorium idea was able to capture the idea of reaching into the future, to tal+ about life through caring about our children. Branted, >#oratorium> sounds technical, and soulless. It is itself a term that sounds li+e 8argon. It was so widely held in the movement, it was the main plan+9 we had to also cater to the activists. Ultimatum9 ta+e bac+ the timeline $iti%en,based initiatives trying to oppose unwanted development tend to be very reactive. 1y definition, the building of new installations is a process controlled by the opponent. 6herefore, the timing of events , when and how each of the steps will be carried out, cutting down trees, bulldo%ing the topsoil, bringing in the eEuipment , is controlled by the opponent. 'dd to this that citi%ens often lac+ in,depth +nowledge of the various steps involved in more comple& development processes, and you have a very uneEual power over the time and place for confrontation. )here do you draw the line* )hen do you launch an action* :&tensive research, other groups with on,the,ground e&perience, and sympathetic e&perts are all ways citi%en groups can acEuire better +nowledge of the upcoming process to define the important steps around which actions can be designed. 'nother great device is the ultimatum , a set date by which a demand must be met, or else a sanction, or a series of conseEuences, will ensue for the opponent. #ohandas S. Bandhi made good use of the ultimatum during his career, often in the form of a letter penned in concerned, amicable language. Issuing an ultimatum provides a number of advantages, the most important being that it allows a campaign to regain the initiative, by setting a deadline around which to plan, for a better handle on preparatory steps for mobili%ations and resource,intensive moments. 1ecause an ultimatum warns opponents ahead of time of the li+ely conseEuences if they opt for confrontation, it tends to ma+e the issuer loo+ more composed and reasonable. 't least, an attempt is made at persuasion, before coercion. 6he denouement One could argue that recent mar+et conditions , in the form of lower gas prices , helped temper Aorth 'merican enthusiasm and urgency towards the development of e&treme hydrocarbon deposits. 6rue enough. 1ut shale gas continues to be developed elsewhere, while it has been stopped in a province where the resource was found to be abundant, close to the surface, and cheap. ometimes, all it ta+es is some e&tra cost, some new unwanted ris+, or a small increase in political uncertainty. $ertainly, civil resistance can play a role in all three, for a winning combination to the benefit of people(s short,term Euality of life, long,term health, their environment, and the promise of a better life for their children(s children. Jictories against e&tractive industries and other destructive pro8ects sometimes come in the form of repeated delays and postponements imposed on promotersI until the conditions or the general climate, political and otherwise, change permanently. )inning time, especially if the time is used for more organi%ing, can mean winning, period. Initially, the opponent in Quebec was wise enough to use public forums to try and pull the public toward their point of view. It started in the spring of 2030, when the ?etroleum and Bas association toured the province to tal+ about the benefits of the industry. It was a disaster, helped along with the arrogance and mista+es of its spo+esmen. 6hen, the provincial government set up multiple environmental review boards. It designed their mandates so they would be constrained to loo+ only at the how, not the whether if, or when. o alongside civil resistance, the public authorities and the industry were also doing their advocacy and consultations, often winning government officials over. )hile activist groups were tempted to ignore the flawed process, they were nevertheless important as a potential means by which public decision,ma+ers would ta+e stoc+ of the deeper opposition that civil resistance had been stirring, as the included chronology shows. Chronology W pring 2030, the issue comes to the fore. W Gall 2030, ?rovincial government launches an environmental review process on how to mitigate hydraulic fracturing. $iti%en groups and most environmental organi%ations want proceedings to focus on whether frac+ing should be allowed and demand a moratorium. #oratoire C(une Beneration ;#CB< stages a dignified act of defiance9 one by one, everyone in the room stands up and as+s the board for a one,generation moratorium. W Cecember 2030 to Gebruary 2033, the #CB strategy proposal is circulated. W #arch 3, 2033, !aunch of the One Beneration #oratorium $ampaign, with ultimatum to government set for #ay 3. W #arch N, 2033, :nvironment minister announces a new study, this time a trategic :nvironmental 'ssesmment ;:'<, but ma+es no commitment that test wells and e&perimental frac+ing will be e&cluded. W #ay 2033, )al+ from "imous+i to #ontreal, with educational campaign on frac+ing and proposed long,range strategy of preventative nonviolent direct action. Girst moratorium law proposed, then adopted on frac+ing under the t. !awrence or any of its islands west of 'nticosti. W =une 2033, :nvironment minister announces full stop to drilling and frac+ing for shale gas. )al+ culminates on #ontreal. W Cecember 2033, the :' committee holds proceedings across the t. !awrence valley. :verywhere, it is met with hours of opposition testimonies and statements from citi%ens, others standing in silent protest, holding signs with a giant eyeball saying9 KSeeping an eye on you. 6he ne&t generations are watching.D W 'pril 2032, first of series of trainings for chiste733 ;hale733< begins. 'bout three hundred citi%ens have been trained so far. W eptember 2032, ?arti Qu@b@cois is elected as a minority government. In +eeping with election promises, it soon announces it will impose a moratorium on frac+ing for shale gas, through a bill to be presented. W #ay 2034, ' bill toward a F,year shale gas moratorium in the t. !awrence Jalley is presented, but has yet to be adopted. 6he ?arti Qu@b@cois also changes and e&tends the modalities of the :'. Gor the bill to be adopted, the minority government needs the votes of at least one of the largest opposition parties. W eptember 2034, the situation is unchanged. :mergency action plans are being drafted by citi%ens trained in AJC', using an innovative participatory video process. W 'nd ne&t, e&ploration for shale oil is slated for 203- on 'nticosti Island and the Basp@ peninsula, areas unfortunately e&cluded from the proposed moratorium. 6wo pipelines carrying 'lberta tar sands crude have also been announced to carry diluted bitumen across the province. Opposition to these initiatives is mounting. Jictories bring new challenges, and e&tra layers of comple&ity. !a lutte continueI On a practical level, intentional civil resistance planning, relentless community organi%ing, and a powerful seEuence of preventative nonviolent actions were able to prevent destructive development from being sold as a >done deal>. Brassroots civil resistance organi%ing acted as a real deterrent against seemingly undefeatable e&tractive industries. +ctivis and resistance 6his +ind of success does not come easily. 'nd many threats in Quebec still loom. 1ut the on,the, ground citi%en victory against those who represented one of the most powerful industries in the world is the result of a multi,pronged, multiyear seEuence of tactics that combined into an innovative, compelling strategy. $ivil resistance can change the politics of environmental threats, by mobili%ing the very same people who, in democracies, elect the politicians. 'ctivism and advocacy are with us all the time. 1ut sustained pressure by organi%ed groups of informed, determined people who will be affected by e&ploitative public or private action is still rare in open societies. )hen it is summoned by shrewd planning and the framing of a cause whose time has come, the result can be to pull the sword of the people(s power out of the roc+ of even the daunting combination of governmental torpor and relentless corporate action Q and finally put public interests ahead of private gain. The Syrian resistance: a tale of two struggles, art ! Maciej Bartkowski [1] and Mohja Kah [!] %robabilities are always shredded by violent conflict, e4cept the probability that freedom and 5ustice will be postponed. See %art :ne here. &';)
"ima Cali holding a banner that reads, K#y brother the policeman9 )here are our friends* and who has imprisoned them*D 's Cr. :rica $henoweth and Cr. #aria tephan reported in their groundbrea+ing Euantitative research ;reported in /hy 0ivil 1esistance /or2s, $olumbia University ?ress, 2033<, substituting armed struggle for civil resistance is li+ely to ma+e the success of resistance half as li+ely, even against the most brutal of regimes. Ao doubt, nonviolent civil resistance can fail. 1ut the same research showed that violent resistance failed in more than M0L of cases happening in a 30M,year period, 2.F times more than civil resistance. #oreover, as this research showed, it ta+es violent resistance against brutal regimes an average of nine years to run its course, but only three years for nonviolent resistance to succeed or fail. Part $$: +borting a revolution Aonviolent resistance dominated the yrian conflict only for less than one year , under one,third of the average duration needed to produce results. Biven the destructive force of violent conflict in yria now, any additional year of violent struggle means tens of thousands more lives lost and more of the nation(s infrastructure in ruins. :ven failed nonviolent resistance costs much less in lives and property destroyed, while the probability of democrati%ation is still much greater through people power than with even a victorious violent resistance. Ginally, no ma8or genocidal act is +nown to have happened during mass,based nonviolent struggles. 6he same cannot be said about violent conflicts, including civil wars. 0ad this information been +nown widely among revolutionary yrians in 2033, would the turn to civil war have been as ineluctable as it appears in hindsight* Instead, different beliefs and calculations were in the driver(s seat. Gour fatal beliefs )hat can be learned from a clear,eyed evaluation of the yrian nonviolent resistance* )e thin+ it is important to understand the movement,centered factors that victimi%ed and degraded civil resistance amid rising armed struggle9 6he belief that armed protection will help defend civil resistance Osama Aassar, a nonviolent advocate who helped to create Caraya(s !ocal $oordination committee said in October, 2033, that those who became convinced of the need to bear arms Kbelieve arming will protect people from getting +illed in demonstrations and shelling of towns, but it will multiply civilian casualties by tens of thousands,D collapsing the false logic that Karms protect.D hort,term and immediate protection against a home invasion or rape or neighborhood sniper could in fact be achieved by armed resistance but only for a limited time and with little overall protection e&tended over the whole community. $onseEuently, armed protection came at a collective price e&acted by the regime, resulting in more civilian losses in the long run as whole neighborhoods were demolished in pitched battles between armed combatants. In reality, civil resistance, while imposing significant costs on the regime and faced with brutal repression, saved many lives when it lasted, as the following figures illustrate. Curing the first five months of nonviolent civil resistance ;mid,#arch to mid,'ugust, 2033<, the death toll was 2,037 23-5 ;figures e&clude regime army casualties<. In the ne&t five months ;mid,'ugust 2033 to mid,=anuary 2033< mi&ed violent and nonviolent resistance saw the death toll climbed to 4,3--23F5, a FML increase. Ginally, during the first five months of armed resistance ;mid,=anuary 2032 to mid, =une 2032< the death toll was already N,37F 23M5, a staggering 3M3L increase in comparison with the casualties during nonviolent struggle. 6he regime also felt no longer constrained in the use of its deadly chemical weapons and freEuent use of air stri+es after the uprising became armed. 6here are no +nown cases of death by air stri+es, for e&le, when the resistance on the ground was driven by the widespread protest chants of Kilmiye, silmiyeD ;Kpeaceful, peacefulD<. 6he supremacy of nonviolent resistance over its armed counterpart in lowering the costs in human lives, and by e&tension in overall costs for the society when faced with a ruthless adversary, was ignored when, feeling immediate danger as well as high emotions and affinity with defecting soldiers, people turned to armed rebels to protect them. 6he belief that the regime would fall in wee+s, based on the 6unisian and :gyptian e&periences. 'ctivists interviewed say that many of them held high hopes based on the successes of nonviolent protests in 6unisia and :gypt, which resulted in the ouster of the heads of those regimes within wee+s of large street demonstrations, followed by the opting of soldiers not to use violence and ultimately the generals( decision to desist from it. 6he absence of planning for a protracted, even years,long, nonviolent resistance may have led to directing full energy initially to the primary tactic of street demonstrations , the regime(s repression of which often 8ustified the calls for armed protection of nonviolent protesters , to the detriment of less spectacular underground organi%ing of institutional networ+s of liberated communities, to which the civil resistance turned only after months of initial struggle. In hindsight, one of the wea+nesses of nonviolent resistance was a lac+ of anticipation, planning and preparation for gradual defections 23/5 that would not bring about the Euic+ collapse of the regime. 0ad that been anticipated, it might not have paved the way for the emergence of the KprotectiveD violent flan+ that eventually too+ over the resistance. ' freEuent argument during the transition to armed resistance was, K)here should defectors go, and where can they put down their arms* 6hey will be +illed, unless they form a rebel army.D 6his argument was flawed on its very premise9 that a resort to violence protected people, as if the probability of being +illed decreased with participation in violent resistance. 6his belief was proven wrong. It was the nonviolent community of organi%ers and activists that could have offered , both through their networ+s and nonviolent actions , much better chances of saving lives of the defecting soldiers. 6he belief that the yrian regime was uniEuely brutal, and the related lac+ of +nowledge of nonviolent struggles in other countries as well as in yria decades before) 6he yrian regime was not atypical in its proclivity to violence, yet youthful revolutionaries isolated from the facts about other countries( histories believed that yrians faced an e&ceptional brutality from the 'ssad regime. Gew if any +new that the hah of Iran +illed M00 nonviolent demonstrators in 6ehran on one day alone, eptember N, 37/N and that #ubara+(s police and other protectors hesitated little before gunning down 700 protesters during 3/ days of demonstrations in 2033 , more than twice the casualties in yria during the first two and a half wee+ of nonviolent protests. 6he Euestion is not the willingness to +ill , which every dictator possesses , but his capacity to sustain the +illing. 6he goal of civil resistance is to wea+en a regime(s capacity to such a degree that, as in Iran or :gypt, the regime is no longer able to rely on its bureaucracy, business sector, armed forces or other pillars of support. yrians who favored armed resistance claimed that the 'merican colonists had armed for their liberation, failing to notice that 'mericans engaged in 30 years of nonviolent resistance 23N5 against the 1ritish prior to armed struggle, and the "evolutionary )ar, triggered by the arrival of a massive 1ritish military force on 'merican shores, created desertions away from the rebel side and undermined colonial unity while earlier nonviolent resistance had broadened its social base. ome yrian nonviolent groups and activists, in stressing sectarian unity, didn(t see the double,edged sword of celebrating the multi,sectarian solidarity of an armed nationalist struggle. 6hey touted the yrian stand against the Grench in 372F , a violent struggle that failed , while ignoring an astounding episode of nonviolent struggle9 the Beneral tri+es of 374M ;one of the longest in the human history< that united sectarian communities and achieved significant concessions from the Grench. 6he belief that sectarian loyalties would inhibit unarmed resistance and necessitate violent conflict. One argument for armed struggle was the perception that the sectarian comple&ion of the regime inhibited a high level of defections from the security apparatus , that 'lawites would remain loyal due to strong internal ties. )hile the regime pursued pernicious sectarian tactics to ma+e 'lawite civilians into human shields, latent sectarian discourse surfaced on the revolutionary side, showing a failure to understand the pressures on the 'lawite 2375 community and to plan ways to ma+e their defections more feasible. In the history of revolutions, shooting at the other side has never increased chances for defections. ectarian discourse by e&tremists such as e&ile 'dnan 'roor was also allowed to develop in the name of unity against the regime, with the dangers it represented not adeEuately addressed early on. #any nonsectarian nonviolent activists believed that even mentioning religion was itself sectarian, and this hampered the effort to stem sectarianism. )hether or not the initial nonviolent resistance, despite its non,sectarianism, ultimately failed to win ma8orities of $hristians, 'lawites, and other components of yrian society, what is sure is that armed rebellion aggravated these divisions and inhibited the breadth and strength of the resistance coalition. Conclusion $ivil resistance in yria, while it dominated, was strategically effective against the 'ssad regime. )hen this method was used by hundreds of thousands of yrians, the regime became uncertain of the loyalties of its supporters. In contrast, armed struggle neither offered effective protection to the population, nor placed the resistance in a strategically more advantageous position vis,a,vis 'ssad than the nonviolent resistance had. 6he degeneration of the conflict from nonviolent to violent force was not inevitable and might not have been eventual, had the established benefits of civil resistance been better +nown. Instead, the real gains of civil resistance were never assessed, before being overcome by the myth of the power of the gun, and later by hope that e&ternal military intervention could resolve the conflict, even though such intervention has been freEuently shown to be incapable of assuring human rights 2205, safeguarding civilians 2235 and ending civil wars 2225. $ivil resistance still continues in yria today despite the prevalence of insensate violence. 6he armed resistance that led to the disproportionate escalation of violence by the regime, led to multiple humanitarian catastrophes and the use of chemical weapons. 1ut nonviolent activists are now focusing on building alternative services and institutions in communities. 6heir wor+ may help restore social bonds and citi%ens( networ+s even though the strategic effects of nonviolent resistance have been marginali%ed by civil war. 's we write this, the yrian regime has been constrained by U and "ussian diplomacy to agree to surrender its chemical weapons to the United Aations. )hile this may stall any decisive outcome in the civil war, it may also illuminate any ongoing brutality by the regime, leading perhaps to more assertive criticism by international parties, and perhaps offer space and time for civil resistance to regenerate. 1ut that is only a possibility. ?robabilities are always shredded by violent conflict, e&cept the probability that freedom and 8ustice will be postponed.