Abstract -- In the night of November 4, 2006, at around 22:10,

the UCTE (Union for the Coordination of the Transmission of

Electricity) power grid was affected by a serious incident. The
paper provides a short description of the events that triggered
the blackout and introduces the restoration of the power system.
It analyses the root causes and other critical factors that resulted
in the blackout. Furthermore, by considering the experiences and
lessons, the security defense system in bulk power grid is
constructed to prevent large scale blackout in the future.

Index 1erms -- Blackout, Interconnected Power Systems, Load
Shedding, Power System Dynamic Stability, Power System
Restoration, Security Defense System
I. INTRODUCTION
ECENT cascading Iailures in several power systems in
the world require urgent attention. The US/Canada
blackout, the Scandinavian blackout and the Italian
blackout have shown that the technical issues related to the
power system security can not be completely overcome Ior
any country |1|-|3|. It is necessary to investigate the accident
processes, analyze the causes leading to the blackouts, identiIy
potential blackouts, and develop preventive measures to
ensure power system security. The Europe blackout on
November 4th 2006 constitutes the most severe disturbance in
the history oI UCTE, as Iar as the number oI involved TSOs
and the amplitude oI the registered Irequency deviation are
concerned. It aIIected approximately 15 million people in
Europe. Roughly 14.5 GW oI load was interrupted, and the
load was not supplied Ior a time interval ranging Irom0.5
to1.5 hours.
In this paper, section II presents a brieI summary oI the
sequence oI events. Section III introduces the restoration oI
the blackout. Section IV analyses the root causes and other
critical Iactors leading to the blackout. Based on the
experience and lessons section V presents a brieI description
oI security deIense system in bulk power grid in China to
prevent similar blackout in the Iuture. Section VI presents
overall conclusions and recommendations.

The work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation oI China
(50477018)
Xiangyi Chen is with the School oI Electrical Engineering, Wuhan
University ,Wuhan,430072,China.(e-mail: morodossina.com.cn)
Changhong Deng is with the School oI Electrical Engineering, Wuhan
University ,Wuhan,430072,China. (email: dengch-whu163.com)
Yunping Chen is with the School oI Electrical Engineering, Wuhan
University ,Wuhan,430072,China. (email: yunpchenwhu.edu.cn)

II. SEQUENCE OF THE EVENTS
Based on the report submitted by UCTE Investigation
Committee |4|-|5|, it shows that the system incident
originated Irom the disconnection oI the 380-kV-line
ConneIorde-Diele over the Ems River in the control area oI
E.ON Netz. The sequence oI events which occurred prior to
and aIter the system incident on the evening oI November 4
and which are relevant to the incident as things currently stand
will be described in the Iollowing sections.
A. The Grid Situation before the Disconnection
On the evening oI November 4 at 21:29 hours, the GCC
(Grid Control Centre) oI E.ON Netz perIormed based on
data oI the current grid state a simulation calculation Ior the
scheduled disconnection oI the line over the Ems River. The
control system did not indicate any violation oI limit values in
this case. At this time approximately 13700 MW oI electricity
were consumed in E.ON Netz`s area, the power plant Ieed-in
amounted to a total oI approximately 14100 MW, 3 200 MW
oI which Irom wind Ieed-in. The transit loads, i.e. Ireely
traded electricity conducted over E.ON Netz`s grid, were
approximately 7300 MW. The load Iorecast Ior the E.ON
Netz control area showed a continuously Ialling trend
Irom18:00 hours on. According to the Iorecast, the wind
power Ieed-in was expected to increase continuously Irom
3,000 MW at 19:00 to 4500 MW at 3:00 hours.
B. The Events between 21.29 Hours and 22.10 Hours
1) At 21:38 hours, E.ON Netz switched oII the 380-kV-line
Diele-ConneIorde Ior the transport oI the 'Norwegian Pearl
on the Ems River to the North Sea. The actual load oI the grid
in the region was essentially in accordance with the
expectations on the basis oI the simulation calculation.
2) At 21:39 hours, E.ON Netz received several warning
messages Irom the lines Elsen-Twistetal and Elsen-
Bechterdissen which inIormed the staII that currency limit
values are reached. Due to thermal reserves which allow a
temporary overload oI the equipment by up to 25, E.ON
Netz assumed that there was no immediate need Ior action.
This is covered by an internal regulation oI E.ON Netz.
3) At 21:41 hours, E.ON Netz had a conversation with
RWE and RWE pointed out the saIety limit value oI 1800 A
on the line Landesbergen-WehrendorI which is the
interconnector between E.ON (Landesbergen) and RWE
(WehrendorI). RWE inIormed about its protective limit value
oI 1990A at the WehrendorI substation. At that time, the load
Blackout Prevention: Anatomy oI the Blackout in
Europe
Xiangyi Chen, Changhong Deng, Yunping Chen and Chunyan Li
R
928
978-981-05-9423-7 c 2007 RPS

oI the line Landesbergen-WehrendorI was approx 1780 A
4) At 22:00 hours, changes oI the commercial schedules
were set as on every Iull hour. At the same time, the
consumption in the control area oI E.ON Netz was about
13500 MW, the injected wind power amounted to 3300 MW.
Due to transits, the lines towards West were already loaded.
But this situation was in itselI normal.
5) At 22:05 hours i.e. aIter the end oI the schedule
adjustments, the load Ilow situation changed unexpectedly and
within a Iew minutes, it resulted in a Iast increase oI the load
on the 380-kV-line between Landesbergen and WehrendorI
by 100 MW (equivalent to approx. 160 A).
6) At 22:06 hours, the current on the line Landesbergen-
WehrendorI increased to approx. 1900A within 2 to 3
minutes.Thus, the saIety limit value oI the RWE protection
device oI 1800A as speciIied by RWE was exceeded on this
line.
C. The Events after Occurrence of the Incident at 22.10
Hours
1) At 22:10:11 hours, E.ON Netz perIormed the coupling,
without any Iurther coordination with RWE due to the
necessary rush. The switching measure was intended to reduce
the load Ilow on the line Landesbergen-WehrendorI. E.ON
Netz assumed that the measure would result in a reduction oI
the load by about 50 MW (equivalent to 80 A).
2) At 22:10:13, the line Landesbergen-WehrendorI was
tripped by the automatic protective device due to overload.
3) At 22:10:15 hours, the 220-kV-line BieleIeld/Ost-
Gtersloh oI RWE was also tripped automatically.

Fig. 1 Frequency recordings aIter the split
4) At 22:10:19 hours, the 380-kV-line Bechterdissen-Elsen
was tripped by automatic protective devices. As a domino
eIIect, the cascading eIIect continued towards the south and
Iinally resulted in a separation oI the entire UCTE grid into
three partial sub-grids with diIIerent Irequencies (see Iig. 1).
The area 1 and 3 remained asynchronously connected through
the DC link between Italy and Greece during the whole event.
In order to re-establish the balance between generation and
consumption, load-shedding (cut oI power supply to industry
and household customers) was perIormed as Iollows:

TABLE I
LOAD-SHEDDING OF SOME TSO
Country/TSO
Load shed
(GW)
Country/TSO
Load shed
(GW)
Austria/APG 1.5 Italy/TERNA 1.5
Austria/Tiwag 0.04 Netherlands /TenneT 0.4
Belgium/Elia 0.8 Portugal/REN 0.5
France/RTE 5.2 Apanish/REE 2.1
Germany/E.ON 0.4 Slovenia/ELES 0.1
Germany/RWE 2
III. THE RESTORATION
This Section presents some details about the restoration oI
the three islands. As a Iirst step oI a resynchronization process,
the area 1 was synchronised with area 2 in Germany and
Austria and as a second step, the area 3 was synchronised with
already interconnected areas 1 and 2. Those two steps were
perIormed within the overlapped timeIrames i.e. the second
one started beIore completing the Iirst one. The actions which
Iinally allowed the resynchronization can be grouped into the
Iollowing phases:
A. Preparatorv Actions
The preparations to reconnect tripped lines started
immediately aIter 22:10 but due to the huge diIIerences oI
Irequencies, successIul switching on the lines required
extraordinary measures. These were several attempts oI
unsuccessIul actions to re-close the open lines. The areas
where the trial switchings were perIormed are not Iully
identiIied.
B. Resvnchroni:ation Trials which did not Result in Real
Interconnection
22:34:59.5-22:38:57.1, two trials switching-on oI the 220
kV line Ternitz-Hessenberg in Austria were Iailed and the line
tripped immediately. 22:40:06, trial switching-on oI the 380
kV Landesbergen-WehrendorIline was also Iailed and the line
tripped due to low voltage and high current. 22:40:27 trial
The 8
th
International Power Engineering Conference (IPEC 2007) 929

switching-on oI the 380 kV ConneIorde-Diele line was Iailed
and the line also tripped due to oscillations.
C. Resvnchroni:ation Attempts which Resulted in Real
Interconnection but Failed after a few Seconds
22:46:23-22:46:27.3 switching-on oI the 380 kV
ConneIorde-Diele line, which again caused oscillations, ended
up aIter 4 seconds with trippings oI both 380/220 kV
transIormers in the ConneIorde substation, the 380 kV line
Unterweser-ConneIorde and opening oI the 220 kV busbar
coupling in the ConneIorde substation (moving the border line
eastwards).
22:46:57.3 - 22:47:00.6 switching-on oI the 380 kV
Landesbergen-WehrendorI line which tripped due to
oscillations aIter 3 seconds.
D. Successful Resvnchroni:ation Process
Finally, at 22:47:23, successIul resynchronization took
place Iirst on the 380 kV line Bechterdissen-Elsen. It is
remarkable that this line is much shorter than lines in the north
oI Germany which Iailed beIore, and is located closer to the
generation area in the western part. Following that successIul
trial, Iurther lines were switched-on very quickly and aIter 6
minutes (at 22:53) already nine 380 kV and Iour 220 kV lines
on the border between area 1 and area 2 were in operation in
Germany and in Austria. The restoration sequence was Iinally
Iinished in Germany at 23:24:39 with 17 transmission
elements reclosed(in Austria re-closure oI all six lines was
completed already by 22:51).
The resynchronization process started immediately aIter
successIul reconnection oI areas 1 and 2 with switching-on oI
the 400 kV line Mukachevo-Rosiori at 22:49:35. At that time,
area 1 and area 2 were synchronously connected by Iour lines
in Germany and three lines in Austria. Prior to connection, the
diIIerence oI Irequencies between area 1-2 and area 3 was in
the range oI 40 mHz. Within the next 13 minutes, Iour lines
connecting area 3 to the rest oI UCTE were switched on (two
internal lines in Croatia, one circuit oI the Croatian-Hungarian
tie-line). The resynchronization sequence was Iinished at
23:57 when the last 400 kV line between Croatia and Hungary
was switched on.
IV. WHAT CAUSED THE BLACKOUTS?
Based on the interim reportsubmitted by the investigation
committee |6|, the root causes are non IulIillment oI the N-1
criterion and inappropriate regional inter-TSO co-ordination
during this event. This Section presents some details about the
root causes and other critical Iacts.
A. Preliminarv Root Causes Analvses
1) Non IulIillment oI the N-1 Criterion
Considering the Iirst event oI the sequence, switching oII
the 380 kV Diele-ConneIorde line resulted in non N-1 secure
conditions in the E.ON Netz grid and on some oI its tie-lines
to the neighboring TSOs. The evaluation oI N-1 secure
conditions aIter the switching action was not based on results
oI numerical analyses. It was also not based on the analysis
Ior the Iollowing hours oI possible changes oI the system
conditions. Only an empirical evaluation oI the situation was
perIormed. Concerning the high load on the 380 kV line
Landesbergen-WehrendorI which appeared at 22:08, RWE
TSO drew the attention on this urgent situation but E.ON Netz
did not take eIIicient remedial actions. InIluence oI the
topology change in the substation Landesbergen on the power
Ilow on the line was not checked by numerical analysis due to
the necessary rush. In Iact the results oI the switching were
opposite to the expectations oI operators and led to the
tripping oI the line WehrendorI Landesbergen. This tripping
initiated the cascading tripping oI many lines which resulted
in the splitting oI UCTE in 3 areas.
2) Inappropriate regional inter-TSO co-ordination during
this event
The initial planning Ior switching-oII the 380 kV Diele-
ConneIorde line Ioreseen on 5 November Irom 01:00 to 5:00
was duly prepared by the directly involved TSOs (E.ON Netz,
RWE TSO and TenneT). However, the change oI the time oI
this switching maneuver was communicated by EON Netz to
the other directly involved TSOs very late and was not
prepared and checked in order to ensure the secure operation
oI the system in this area.
In spite oI the Iact that the network was highly loaded at
that time, no eIIicient remedial action was prepared by E.ON
Netz in order to keep a minimum saIety margin and to prevent
a possible increase oI the Ilow due to changes in generation
(especially wind power), in consumption and in cross border
exchanges Ior the Iollowing hours. Just beIore the triggering
event at the Landesbergen substation due to the necessary rush
neither coordination nor consultation was perIormed by E.ON
Netz towards directly involved TSOs.
No speciIic attention was given by E.ON Netz to the Iact
that the protection devices have diIIerent settings on both
sides oI the Landesbergen-WehrendorI line although this
inIormation was critical due to the very high Ilow on this line
(close to the tripping limit in the RWE TSO WehrendorI
substation).
B. Other Critical Factors
The Iollowing sections summarize the preliminary Iindings
on the critical Iacts that occurred during the disturbance:
generation related issues, range oI the possible actions Ior the
dispatchers to handle grid congestions, deIense and restoration
plans, resynchronization process and training oI dispatchers.
1) Generators related issues
During the disturbance, a signiIicant amount oI generation
units tripped due to the Irequency drop in the system which
resulted in the increased imbalance. Most oI this generation is
connected to the distribution grid (especially wind and
combined-heat-and-power). In a similar way, the uncontrolled
reconnection oI generation units was causing Iurther
imbalance in the area with a power surplus. This situation
certainly had an inIluence on the Irequency behavior during
the Iirst seconds and minutes aIter the splitting oI the UCTE
system and it contributed to the deterioration oI system
930 The 8
th
International Power Engineering Conference (IPEC 2007)

conditions.
Additionally, most oI the TSOs do not have the real time
data oI the power units connected to the distribution grid. The
restoration oI the Irequency aIter activation oI the deIense
plans requires suIIicient means Ior rescheduling generation in
individual control areas (resources, procedures). However the
automatic restarting oI a considerable amount oI wind
generation in the North part oI Germany was not immediately
compensated by a corresponding amount oI decreased
generation in thermal or hydro power plants. During the
incident, the growing surplus oI generation in Germany
balanced by the decrease oI generation in other countries in
the North - East area (mainly in Poland and the Czech
Republic) induced signiIicant additional problems in the
transmission grid (overloading oI some lines). The insuIIicient
rescheduling oI generation output was a main reason Ior long
lasting Irequency deviations in the East-North area and Ior re-
synchronisation Iailures.
2) Limited range oI action available to dispatchers Ior
handling grid congestions
To remove a constraint and restore a secure operation oI
the grid and the N-1 criterion, German TSOs have to manage
a number oI actions deIined in the German Energy Law and
internal procedures: grid related measures, market related
measures and other 'adjustments Ior the management oI
emergency situations. The adequacy oI such measures that
have to be duly prepared will need to be Iurther investigated
taking into account the remaining saIety margin in the grid,
variable Iactors such as changes oI exchange programs,
generation changes and Iinally the time needed Ior dispatchers
to implement a given measure.
3) TSO/DSO co-ordination in the context oI deIense and
restoration plans
In some control areas, re-energizing customers started
without proper knowledge oI the situation oI the overall
UCTE system. Some Distribution System Operators (DSOs)
started to reconnect customers without co-ordination with
their TSOs. This worsened the conditions Ior TSOs action in
order to restore normal system conditions.
4) Inappropriate co-ordination oI resynchronization
procedures during this event
Actions taken by TSOs during the resynchronization
process were not coordinated in all cases There have been
several unsuccessIul attempts to put lines back into operation
and to resynchronize the 3 diIIerent system areas with only a
partial view oI the status oI the whole grid. The protection
devices perIormed correctly and prevented Iurther negative
consequences.
5) Training oI dispatchers to be improved
Further investigation is necessary to determine the
accuracy and completeness oI dispatchers training. Two
aspects have to be examined: procedures and tools and inter-
TSO co-ordination and consultation under normal and
emergency conditions.
V. CONSTRUCTING DEFENSE SYSTEM OF LARGE POWER GRID
With the development oI the 'East-West power
transmission, South-North power transaction, nationwide
electricity interconnection project, power grid and power
exchange are expanding the scale in China, extent and impact
oI events such as blackouts trends to increase in bulk power
grid. In recent years, various oI electrical accidents have
happened in China, Ior example, blackout oI September 9,
2003 in the center oI Tibet power grid, blackout oI September
26, 2005 in Hainan |7|, blackout oI July 1, 2006 in Henan, et
al. These accidents reveal hidden trouble in the security
deIensive system oI power grid in China. The security oI
power system has been included in the national security
system. The blackout oI August 14, 2003 in U.S.-Canada
blackout and the blackout oI November 4 in European and
other blackouts have implied that we should clearly realize the
emergent situation currently and construct the security deIense
system in bulk power grid |8|-|9|, and then ensure the saIe,
stable and economical operation in power grid.
A. The Theorv Svstem of Securitv, Planning and Operation in
Bulk Power Grid
The developing structure oI power source and power grid
will present large sized hydropower, large sized stream
turbine, large sized nuclear power and extra high voltage in
China Ior the Iuture (three large and one extra). With the
development oI the large scale use oI the regenerative energy,
the long distance transmission oI super scale power energy,
the technique oI power grid planning, the Iacility oI analysis
and research, and operation control technology as so on have
to Iace new challenges. New research subjects on the
technique oI power grid planning will be proposed in order to
coordinate the relation between EHV and other voltage levels
power grid and the contradiction between security and
economy requirements under the condition oI electricity
market. Since the large impact and the wide incidence oI the
Iaults caused by the large scale power source and EHV
transmission, power grid security operation and control
technology Iace the challenges. So it is urgent and important
to accelerate the basic research oI security deIense system in
bulk power grid.
B. The Research of Off-line Securitv Assessment in Bulk
Power Grid
AIter the nationwide electricity interconnection, the
security assessment on power grid will Iace new challenge
under the super scale power system. Because oI the large
number oI elements which will have more or less eIIect on the
security and perIormance oI power grid, the deep research oI
the model and parameter oI dynamic elements in power
system must be done to guarantee the credibility oI power
system simulation results. In order to provide research tools
and basic data Ior security operation oI power system, we
must develop rapid and accurate analytical calculations Ior
bulk power system simulation, establish a uniIorm data center
Ior analysis and calculation, develop hybrid simulation which
is composed oI electromagnetic transient and
The 8
th
International Power Engineering Conference (IPEC 2007) 931

electromechanical transient in power system, increase the
studies on techniques oI power system entire dynamic process
simulation which means electromechanical transient and
middle-long term dynamic state; Strengthen the basis
theoretical research to improve power grid security.
C. The Research of On-line Securitv Defense Svstem in Bulk
Power Grid
With the development oI nationwide electricity
interconnection and EHV AC and DC transmission, power
grid oI China will be the largest scale , the highest voltage
grade and the most complex voltage levels in the world. It
can`t satisIy the development oI nationwide electricity
interconnection and the requirements oI security operation oI
EHV transmission power grid, which is the existing security
deIense strategy and static security analysis and control
platIorm mainly RTU/SCADA/EMS. Based on the
experiences and lessons oI blackout oI nationalities, it`s
necessary to construct on-line security deIense system in order
to satisIy the high reliability requirements in bulk power grid,
which can convert the passive deIense system to active
deIense and strategic system, which can also convert existing
static security analysis to on-line dynamic security analysis.
The researches on the power grid dispatching automation
system which contains dynamic security analysis and early-
warning and decision-making Iunction and the dynamic
security stability system which is adaptive and harmonious
will improve the dynamic security deIense level to a new high
one.
D. The Emergencv Mechanism in Bulk Power Grid
The emergency technology is now a priority research area
in power grid security. Power grid security not only
concentrates on blackout prevention but also emphasizes the
research on emergency technology in power grid. The risk
leading to blackout still exits because oI power grid operation
may be deadly damaged by accidents and natural disasters and
unexpected incidents. It is import to improve the capacity oI
preventing damage and reduce accident loss that we should
strengthen the studies on black start and serious disaster
analysis and emergency technology, build up the emergency
commanding center in bulk power grid.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The paper gives a description, based on the documents
published until now on the subject, oI the main events that
lead to the blackout in UCTE interconnected grid on
November 4th,2006. It also describes the restoration oI the
blackout.
As a result, the analysis oI the incident suggests some
conclusions on the practices oI the system operators in the
operation oI interconnected systems. A higher level oI
coordination should be ensured due to the higher and higher
level oI exploitation oI the transmission resources and oI
uncertainties consequent to the electricity market. Besides,
based on the lessons learned Irom the blackout and the
Chinese practical situation, the Iramework oI security
deIensive system is constructed in the interconnected power
system in china to prevent similar blackout in the Iuture.
VII. REFERENCES
|1| G. Andersson, P. Donalek, R. Farmer, N. Hatziargyriou, I. Kamwa, P.
Kundur, N. Martins, J. Paserba, P. Pourbeik, J. Sanchez-Gasca, R.
Schulz, A. Stankovic, C. Taylor, and V. Vittal, "Causes oI the 2003
major grid blackouts in North America and Europe, and recommended
means to improve system dynamic perIormance," IEEE Trans. Power
Systems, vol. 20, pp. 1922-1928, Nov. 2005.
|2| S. Corsi1 and C. Sabelli, "General blackout in Italy Sunday September
28, 2003, h. 03:28:00," IEEE Trans. Power Systems, vol. 20, pp. 1-14,
Nov. 2005.
|3| S. T. Fu, "Summary on power system security problems on 2004 IEEE
PES meeting and recommendation Ior developing deIense measures,"
Automation oI Electric Power Systems, vol.29, pp. 1-4, Apr. 2005
|4| Union Ior the Coordination oI Electricity Transmission (UCTE), "First
Iacts about the system disturbance on 4 November", http:// www.
ucte.org/, 2006-11-05
|5| Union Ior the Coordination oI Electricity Transmission (UCTE), "Further
Iacts about the system disturbance on 4.11.06",http://www. ucte.org/,
2006-11-06
|6| Union Ior the Coordination oI Electricity Transmission (UCTE), "UCTE
releases detailed Interim Report on the disturbances oI 4 November",
http:// www.ucte.org/, 2006-11-30
|7| S. Q. Tang, M. Zhang, J. S. Li, X. C. Wu, K. Jiang and S. Y. Shu,
"Review oI Blackout in Hainan on September 26thCauses and
Recommendations ," Automation oI Electric Power Systems, vol.30, pp.
1-7, 16, Jan. 2006
|8| Y. S. Xue, "Space-time cooperative Iramework Ior deIending blackouts
Part I From isolated deIense lines to coordinated deIending ,"
Automation oI Electric Power Systems, vol.30, pp. 8-16, Jan. 2006
|9| Y. S. Xue, "The way Irom a simple contingency to system-wide disaster-
Lessons Irom the Eastern interconnection blackout in 2003," Automation
oI Electric Power Systemsvol.27, pp. 1-5, 7, Sep. 2003
VIII. BIOGRAPHIES
Xiangyi Chen was born in Hubei, China in 1976. He
received the B.S. degree Irom Wuhan University oI
Hydro and Electrical Engineering, China, in 1997. He is
now studying at Wuhan University Ior his Ph.D. degree
in power system and its automation. His main research
interests are in the areas oI power system stability and
control, automation and power system simulation.

Changhong Deng was born in Hubei, China in 1963.
She received the M.S. degree Irom Wuhan University
oI Hydro and Electrical Engineering and the Ph.D. in
Whuhan University, China. She is a proIessor with
Whuhan University. Her research interests are power
system stability and control.

Yunping Chen was born in Hunan, China, in 1945. He
graduated Irom Huazhong University oI Science &
Technology in 1968, and received his M.S. and the
Ph.D. in power system and its automation Irom Wuhan
University oI Hydraulic & Electric Engineering in 1982
and 1986 respectively, Iinished his post-doctoral
research in 1988 at Tsinghua University. He is a
proIessor with Wuhan University. His research interests
are power systems, FACTS, relay protection

932 The 8
th
International Power Engineering Conference (IPEC 2007)