Abdul Shahin Topic #2

Philosophy 3000: Metaphysics Professor: Malowitz ( !2!20"2#

$n philosophy% the topic of &nowled'e and the philosophical branch of episte(olo'y can be a )ery confusin' and tric&y sub*ect+ $n the boo&% The Problems of Philosphy% by ,ertrand -ussell% we will focus our discussion on -ussell.s )iew of i((ediate &nowled'e and sense data and how it co(pares with ,ishop ,er&eley.s idealist ontolo'y (the idea that the (aterial world is (ind dependant+# /hapter one of The Problems of Philosophy be'ins by -ussell as&in' the 0uestion: 1$s there any &nowled'e in the world which is so certain no reasonable (an can doubt it23 (-ussel% p+4#+ Althou'h the 0uestion see(s si(ple at first% -ussell 0uic&ly assures readers of the actual co(ple5ity behind the 0uestion itself+ To the traditional non6philosopher% the 0uestion% 1what &nowled'e truly e5ists beyond reasonable doubt23 would nor(ally 'i)e rise to a 'reat (a'nitude of answers% such as: 1the s&y is blue73 and 1(y house is white73 8owe)er% -ussell uses his e5a(ple of a table to articulate the actual co(ple5ity of his 0uestion and we i((ediately realize why this 0uestion is so puzzlin' to (any Philosophers+ Accordin' to -ussell.s e5a(ple% he e5plains that the table before hi( is brown% shiny% s(ooth% cool and hard+ 8e also 'oes onto say that anyone else seein' this table would a'ree that the table had these 0ualities (-ussel% p+9#+ 8owe)er% as -ussell 'oes on to e5plain% an i((ediate proble( arises as one tries to co(e up with a (ore precise description of the table+ /ertain 0ualities% such as the color and te5ture of the table will be'in to )ary dependin' on the li'ht reflected on the table and the an'le and scope of the table obser)ed+ :sin' this e5a(ple% -ussell is able to draw the distinction between 1appearance3(what thin's see( to be# and 1reality3 (what they really are#+

Accordin' to -ussell% 1;no two <people= can see fro( e5actly the sa(e point of )iew3(p+9# Therefore% when 'oin' bac& to the e5a(ple of the table% we &now that dependin' on our point of )iew% the color% shape and other 0ualities of the table are sub*ect to chan'e fro( person to person+ >e also (ust ta&e into account% an indi)idual.s eyesi'ht% and their ability to distin'uish color (whether it be hindered or not#+ Thus% e)en the (ost self6e)ident and ob)ious assu(ptions in our e)eryday li)es (ust be ta&en under reconsideration+ ?ne be'ins to wonder% would it be correct to label the table as the color brown if there are (any other colors associated with it2 The answer is ob)iously no+ $t then beco(es apparent that ob*ects% such as the table( in -ussell.s e5a(ple# do not ha)e a fi5ed set of 0ualities such as hardness% shape and color that defines the( in reality% since all of these 0ualities are sub*ect to chan'e dependin' on one.s own interaction and )iew of the ob*ect+ ?n pa'e "" of The Problems of Philosophy% -ussell writes: 1the real table% if there is one% is not i((ediately &nown to us at all% but (ust be an inference fro( what is i((ediately &nown+3 This leads -ussell to 0uestion the &ind of ob*ect the table is and if a 1real table3 truly e5ists+ To help answer his 0uestions% -ussell co(es up with the ter( 1sense data+3 Accordin' to -ussell% what is 1i((ediately &nown3 is 'i)en the na(e of 1sense data3(p+"2# and rese(bles the thin's i((ediately &nown throu'h our senses (such as te5tures% s(ells% tastes and sounds#+ Thus% when one sees a 1red ob*ect3% the redness% or the red color of that ob*ect is considered the sense data (which is what we are i((ediately aware of#+ ,ein' aware of this color howe)er% is the sensation and it is distinct fro( the sense data itself+ Thus% if we want to &now anythin' about the ob*ect% such as its shape% color or te5ture% we (ust deri)e the( fro( the sense data that we associate fro( the ob*ect+

@ro( here% -ussell e5plains that the 1table3 he has used in his e5a(ple is considered a physical ob*ect since 1(atter3 is a collection of all physical ob*ects+ Therefore% his 0uestions about the table can be restated as: 1is there any such thin's as (atter <physical ob*ects=23 and 1what is its nature23(p+"2# This brin's -ussell.s attention to the Philosopher ,ishop ,er&eley who proposed an answer re'ardin' the e5istence of (atter+ Aurin' his lifeti(e ("B9C D "CC3# ,er&eley was considered an idealist who belie)ed there was no such thin' as (atter at all and that the world itself was dependant on nothin' but (inds and their ideas+ This belief 'oes hand in hand with the Eatin ter(: Fesse is percipi which (eans% 1To be is to be percei)ed3+ Accordin' to -ussell% ,er&eley denied (atter in a sense that it was so(ethin' that does not depend on the (ind but occupies space and is 1radically incapable of any sort of thou'ht or consciousness+3(p+"3#+ 8owe)er% at the sa(e ti(e% ,er&eley did not deny the e5istence of sense data% but instead% belie)ed that sense data was (ind6dependant+ $n chapter of The Problems of Philosophy, -ussell be'ins to discuss the topic of

$dealis( itself+ 8e defines $dealis( as Gthe doctrine that whate)er e5ists or at any rate whate)er can be &nown to e5ist% (ust be in so(e sense (ental+G(p+34#+ $n other words% $dealis( is a proposal which states that the physical world is so(ehow dependant to the (ind itself+ $t is i(portant to note that $dealis( does not contradict with the answer to -ussell.s 0uestion on the e5istence of physical ob*ects+ $t is a'reed that physical ob*ects do e5ist independently and they differ fro( sense data+ $t is also concluded that physical ob*ects correspond with sense data+ The proble( between -ussell and ,er&eley howe)er% lies on the 0uestion of the ob*ects nature+ Are physical ob*ects (ind6dependant or independent2

Accordin' to -ussell% ,ishop ,er&eley was able to ar'ue that sense data cannot be (ind6 independent and (ust be in so(e way% 1in3 the (ind (p+39#+ This is because one.s sense data would not e5ist if his or her ability to sense were so(ehow hindered+ @or e5a(ple% a blind person would not be able to sense color+ -ussell see(s 'enerally a'ree with this notion+ ,er&eley then went on to ar'ue that sense data is the only thin' one was sure to ha)e an e5istence fro( our own perceptions+ Since it was a'reed that sense data e5isted 1in3 our (inds% ,er&eley concluded that all thin's that could be &nown e5ist in a (ind+ Thus% ,er&eley belie)ed that the physical world was (ind6dependant and any ob*ect or thin' not in a (ind does not e5ist+ To pro)e his point% ,er&eley uses the e5a(ple of a tree and says there is nothin' that leads one to belie)e anythin' real about the tree e5cept fro( what we percei)e fro( our ideas+ Therefore% the tree.s bein' consists in bein' percei)ed (p+3H#+ 8e 'oes on to say that the tree will still e5ist e)en if we close our eyes because Iod continues to percei)e the tree e)en if we don.t+ Accordin' to ,er&eley% the tree stays as a per(anent idea in Iod.s (ind and therefore will continue to e5ist+ ,er&eley 'oes on to say that all our perceptions partially participate with the perceptions of Iod% which in turn% e5plains why different people ha)e so(ewhat different perceptions of the sa(e ob*ect+ Therefore% to su( up ,er&eley.s ar'u(ent% ,er&eley belie)ed that e5istence depended on the (ind of Iod (or a di)ine bein'#+ To refute ,er&eley.s ar'u(ent% -ussell discusses ,er&eley.s use of the ter( 1idea+3 As -ussell e5plains% the ter( 1idea3 is a na(e 'i)en to 1anythin' which is i((ediately &nown3(p+3H#+ Therefore% sense data% such sound% color and taste fall under this cate'ory+ The ter( 1idea3 accordin' to ,er&eley% also applies to thin's re(e(bered or i(a'ines+ @ro( here% -ussell atte(pts to refute ,er&eley.s ar'u(ent by statin' that it consisted of 1a 'ood (any fallacies3(p+ 0#+ The fallacy that -ussell clai(s to ha)e spotted in ,er&eley.s

ar'u(ent see(s to be his use of the word 1idea3+ -ussell clai(s that ,er&eley.s use of the word 1idea3 to e5plain the concept of a tree bein' 1in3 the (ind is a(bi'uous+ This is because an idea is in effect% thou'ht of as so(ethin' 1in3 so(eone.s (ind+ Therefore% if ,er&eley was so say that the tree is co(posed entirely of ideas% it would be lo'ical to say that the tree is entirely 1in3 (inds+ -ussell ta&es this clai( further by usin' the act of 1bearin' a person in (ind3 as an e5a(ple (p+ 0#+ ,earin' a person in (ind si(ply (eans that there is a thou'ht of the person 1in3 our (ind and is )ery different fro( a person actually bein' 1in3 our (inds+ Therefore% if ,er&eley was to ar'ue that the tree itself had to be in our (inds% it would be the sa(e as sayin' the person one bears in (ind (the person thou'ht of# is in our (ind+ The other fallacy found in ,er&eley.s ar'u(ent% -ussell clai(s% is the failure to ac&nowled'e the distinction between 1the thin' which we are aware of3 (such as the color% shape or size of the table# and the 1actual awareness itself% the (ental act of apprehendin' the thin'%3 when it co(es to the word 1idea3 (p+ "#+ -ussell ar'ues that althou'h the (ental act of apprehension is (ental% there is no reason to assu(e or deter(ine that the thin' apprehended is (ental+ 8e continues to ar'ue that color is not 1in3 the (ind because the color depends on the an'le and point of )iew of the recipient+ Therefore% ,er&eley.s )iew that color is in the (ind itself was a result of confusin' the thin' apprehended and the act of apprehension (since either of these two could be considered an idea#+ $n other words% the percei)in' act is not the sa(e as the ob*ect percei)ed and the failure to realize this concept lead to the fallacies in ,er&eley.s ar'u(ent+ Accordin' to -ussell% the percei)in' of the tree is (ind dependant but the tree itself is (ind dependant+ Thus% because of ,er&eley.s 1fallacy3% -ussell concludes: 1whate)er we can apprehend (ust be in our (inds+3

Aespite disa'reein' with (any of ,er&eley.s beliefs of (ind6dependence% -ussell was able to 'et so(e type of answer to his initial 0uestions+ $t is e)ident that both -ussell and ,er&eley a'ree on an answer to -ussell.s first 0uestion and conclude that the table and physical ob*ects in 'eneral do indeed e5ist+ 8owe)er% when it co(es to the actual nature of the table or a physical ob*ect itself% there see(s to be a si'nificant difference of opinion between both of their )iews+ Thus% when it co(es to the topic of &nowled'e and the nature of (atter itself% the 0uestions to be answered are indeed )ery challen'in' ones+