Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs, vol. 39, no. 1 (2005), pp. 87–128.
88 Ahmad Fauzi
detention, renewable indefinitely on a two-yearly basis, subject to
recommendations from the Special Branch and an appointed Advisory
Board (Lent 1984: 443–4). Upon release, detainees may have a further
restriction order imposed upon them, effectively confining their
movements to a designated locality and circumscribing their public
role (Barraclough 1985: 808). In Ustaz Ashaari’s case, his movement
was confined to the Gombak district in Selangor from the end of
October 1994 until February 2002, when he was forcibly transported
to Labuan, off the coast of Sabah, where he remained until October
2004. Throughout the period, he had to report to the nearest police
station once a week and was not allowed to be outside his residence at
night. The identity of his visitors and the subject of conversations he
had with them were closely monitored.
Having established Darul Arqam, a seemingly innocent
religious study group in the lower middle class Dato’ Keramat suburb
in Kuala Lumpur in 1968, Ustaz Ashaari rapidly developed the
movement by means of intense self-purification and soul-searching
activities. Early recruits were generally young, first generation rural-
urban migrants who formed the upcoming Malay middle class. Such
urban spiritualism laid the foundation for a powerful sense of
solidarity and commitment among adherents, who were prepared to
sacrifice material comfort in order to create model Islamic villages
which sprouted around the country after the founding of Darul
Arqam’s pioneering Sungai Penchala settlement in the outskirts of
Kuala Lumpur in 1973. The settlements became bases where courses
on the essentials of Islam were organised, missionary activities were
planned, economic enterprises were set up, schools were built, medical
facilities were offered and publications were produced. In the 1980s,
Darul Arqam expanded internationally, as shown by Ustaz Ashaari’s
decision in 1988 to travel abroad more or less continuously. By the
early 1990s, Darul Arqam had burgeoned into a self-styled business
empire with an extensive global network whose influence penetrated
mainstream socio-political circles. The clampdown on Darul Arqam in
1994 involved persistent vilification in the mainstream media, raids
into Darul Arqam communal villages by the security forces, wanton
confiscation of property, job and scholarship suspension, state-incited
The banning of Darul Arqam in Malaysia 89
social boycott, a ban on overseas travel, detentions of Darul Arqam
leaders under the Internal Security Act and mass arrests of followers
for minor criminal offences such as failing to register marriages and
distributing illegal publications. The wholesale proscription of Darul
Arqam, by necessitating the closure of its economic activities and
institutions, led to its 8,000 strong workforce almost instantly
becoming unemployed. The former Darul Arqam members had to
undergo special classes of the state Islamic Centre (Pusat Islam), later
renamed the Islamic Advancement Department of Malaysia (JAKIM:
Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia).4
Having had their livelihood disrupted if not destroyed, Darul
Arqam’s former followers paid a heavy price for its dissolution. These
Malay-Muslims, despite the anti-establishment tag put on them, had in
fact contributed to Malay economic development, thus realising a
major target of the New Economic Policy (Nagata 1984: 107, 113;
1997: 138). But in the true manner of neo-feudal Malay patronage
politics, these achievements were not acknowledged by the state
because they took place outside the network of state institutions and
parties dominated by ruling elites. Independent Malays were
considered dangerous because their power base and loyalty would be
necessarily independent of official corridors of political, economic
and social influence (cf. Nidzam Sulaiman 2002). The demise of Darul
Arqam abruptly stopped a bold attempt to create Malay-Muslims who
could develop independently from the state, though the state’s
crackdown on Darul Arqam was undertaken in the name of guarding
the sanctity of Islam.
Throughout the ‘Darul Arqam versus the state’ saga, the
government consistently stressed that the stern measures against
Darul Arqam were based on religious rather than political grounds
(Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid 2000: 36). As we proceed to examine this
claim in the following sections, it will become clear to readers that the
government’s strategy of demonising Darul Arqam relied significantly
upon a compliant mainstream media, whose freedom had experienced
considerable erosion throughout Dr. Mahathir Mohamad’s
tempestuous Premiership (1981–2003). Steady restructuring of media
ownership since the 1970s meant that by the late 1980s, major
90 Ahmad Fauzi
Malaysian newspapers and television stations had been either directly
controlled by the government or indirectly via share acquisitions by
investment subsidiaries of the ruling elites. To make matters worse,
Dr. Mahathir’s era had been notoriously marked by unabashed
expression of and hold on to antipathetic views on press freedom
(Lent 1984: 451-2, Means 1991: 137–41). From the moment of the
authorities’ declaration in 1986 of Darul Arqam being suspected of
practising deviant teachings, the media played a crucial role in building
a negative public image of Darul Arqam through a vicious onslaught
of libellous and biased coverage, the intensity of which fluctuated but
occasionally reached high points in 1986, 1988, 1991 and ultimately
1994.
The transformation of the relationship between Darul
Arqam and the Malaysian state
Darul Arqam had earned the ‘deviant’ tag in the mid-1970s, when its
attempt to revive elementary Islamic practices, as manifested in its
manners of eating, dressing and communicating, was widely viewed as
antithetical to the modern values advocated by the socio-political
establishment. Allegedly displaying anti-progressive attitudes, Darul
Arqam pioneers fostered in many minds the image of religious fanatics
aspiring to recreate the ‘age of the camel’ within their retreats
(Muhammad Syukri Salleh 1995: 228–9). The earliest newspaper article
on Darul Arqam accused it of basically inventing a ‘new religion’
which demanded total abandonment of worldly comfort (Utusan
Melayu 26 May 1976). Public misinterpretation of Darul Arqam’s
endeavour was predictable in view of the widespread ignorance of
Islam beyond the paradigm set by the dominant post-Independence
liberal-capitalist thinking and refurbished by post-1969 leaders of
national reconstruction. Despite contemptuous responses to Darul
Arqam growing in society and the pro-establishment media, the
political authorities took hardly any notice (Muhammad Syukri Salleh
1992: 102–7). A handful of recluses who seemingly shunned worldly
pursuits and were in turn shunned by society was hardly an irritation
to the state. Probably convinced that Darul Arqam’s influence would
remain marginal, the political elites were content to maintain minimal
The banning of Darul Arqam in Malaysia 91
surveillance of Darul Arqam at a time when the political potential of
Islamic resurgence was beginning to cause apprehension in official
circles. The officially-sanctioned Islamic Centre did react to public
pressure by dispatching an investigation team to Darul Arqam’s main
settlement in Sungai Penchala, but despite reservations about Darul
Arqam’s alien world-view and lifestyle, this team came out with largely
positive findings (Mingguan Islam 21 Oct. 1988).
As Darul Arqam’s socio-economic and dakwah (missionary)
activities began to create a significant impression among the Malay-
Muslims, especially the urban youth who flocked in large numbers to
self-contained Darul Arqam villages to join their Islamic activities,
Darul Arqam’s exclusive ‘anti-development’ image was tacitly accepted
as inaccurate. This change of perception was reflected in the official
cooperation extended to Darul Arqam’s economic projects, and the
reception of influential government figures at Darul Arqam functions
(Nagata 1984: 112, Hussin Mutalib 1990: 89). The cordial visit to
Darul Arqam’s principal headquarters by the Federal Territory mufti,
Syeikh Mohsin Salleh, in 1978 did much to dispel the notion that the
Islamic practices enjoined by Darul Arqam differed substantially from
those of the Muslim masses (Al Islam June 1978). A minor outcry
against Darul Arqam surfaced in 1979 amidst the expulsion of six
leading members for allegedly questioning Ustaz Ashaari Muhammad’s
unorthodox teachings, but this issue was quickly resolved by an
amicable discussion between Darul Arqam leaders and Islamic Centre
officials, and the consequent agreement of Ustaz Ashaari to clarify his
mystical beliefs in the following December issue of the Al-Arqam
newspaper (Kedah Religious Affairs Department 1994: 3–4,
Meuleman 1996: 52). The first official recognition of Darul Arqam by
the political establishment came in the same year when Ustaz Ashaari
was summoned to the office of the Deputy Prime Minister, Dr
Mahathir Mohamad, to explain the nature of Darul Arqam’s activities.
Having apparently been convinced that Darul Arqam’s struggle did
not forsake the world and was therefore not antithetical to the aims of
the New Economic Policy, Dr Mahathir was reported to have
expressed admiration for the ambitions of Darul Arqam (Ashaari
Muhammad 1993b: x–xii).5 Paradoxically, it was during Dr Mahathir’s
92 Ahmad Fauzi
term as prime minister that the relationship between Darul Arqam and
the Malaysian state deteriorated to the point at which reconciliation
became impossible.
In 1986, in the wake of the resignation of and revelations by
the erstwhile Deputy Sheikh Al-Arqam, Ustaz Mokhtar Yaakub, the
government began to unearth allegedly deviant (sesat) practices of
Darul Arqam. Propaganda against Darul Arqam’s peculiar lifestyle was
superseded by allegations of theological ‘deviationism’, which came
officially from the Islamic Affairs Division of the Prime Minister’s
Department (BAHEIS: Bahagian Hal Ehwal Islam Jabatan Perdana
Menteri) and were sanctioned by its political masters.6 There were
relentless media attacks on supposedly Darul Arqam doctrines.7 At the
centre of the dispute were the theological status of the Aurad
Muhammadiah8 and certain practices associated with it, and Darul
Arqam’s position with respect to the Imam al-Mahdi.9 Darul Arqam’s
response to the allegations came not in the form of replies through the
government-controlled media or outbursts of unruly behaviour, but
rather through the intensification of dakwah, social services and
explanations to the public. Theologically, Ustaz Ashaari defended his
teachings in his book Aurad Muhammadiah Pegangan Darul Arqam
(Aurad Muhammadiah: The Conviction of Darul Arqam) (1986), to
which the Islamic Centre replied with an anonymously written
discourse, Penjelasan Terhadap Buku Aurad Muhammadiah Pegangan Darul
Arqam (An Explanation of the book ‘Aurad Muhammadiah: The
Conviction of Darul Arqam’) (1986).
The intellectual exchange of arguments between the
authorities and Darul Arqam, however, was short-lived. In 1988,
unambiguous declarations of Darul Arqam’s deviationism were made
by the Islamic Centre (Utusan Malaysia 22 Sept., 12 Oct. 1988; Berita
Harian 14 Oct. 1988), and followed by state religious councils.10 The
book Aurad Muhammadiah Pegangan Darul Arqam was banned, and the
publishing permits of seven Darul Arqam’s newspapers and
magazines were revoked by the Home Affairs Ministry for fear they
would lead the public astray by disseminating the Aurad
Muhammadiah.11 Denied of nearly all means of communication with
the public, Ustaz Ashaari questioned the banning and the unilateral
The banning of Darul Arqam in Malaysia 93
declarations of Darul Arqam’s deviationism and replied to the book
Penjelasan with another book, Berhati-Hati Membuat Tuduhan (Be Careful
in Making Allegations) (1989). Nevertheless, response from the
authorities came in the form of intensified allegations and repressive
regulations.
Throughout the 1990s, the Malaysian public witnessed a
systematic campaign against Darul Arqam launched through the mass
media and the distribution of pamphlets, Friday sermons and public
lectures in mosques, offices, universities and places of public interest
(cf. Abdul Khaliq 1993: 8–16, Haswan 1993: 12–23). With the
intervention of senior Malaysian political figures, allegations against
Darul Arqam mixed theological and non-theological, primarily
security, issues. Following a firm declaration by the Chief Director of
the Islamic Centre banning all Darul Arqam activities and products in
government departments, agencies and ministries — a ban which
would also in due course cover statutory bodies, local authorities,
political organisations and the private sector (Utusan Malaysia 12 Sept.
1991)12 — the Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir, stated that the activities of
the Sheikh Al-Arqam would be investigated to ascertain whether or
not they were dangerous and threatened national security (Berita
Minggu 15 Sept. 1991). Pronouncing that the decision to ban Darul
Arqam was made by Islamic experts, Dr Mahathir unconditionally
declared that Darul Arqam had deviated from Islam (Utusan Malaysia
14 Sept. 1991, Berita Harian 14 Sept. 1991). A similar allegation was
later reiterated by his deputy, Ghafar Baba (Utusan Malaysia 28 Sept.
1991). These were followed by the commitment given by the Deputy
Home Affairs Minister, Megat Junid Megat Ayub, that Darul Arqam
leaders would be arrested under the Internal Security Act if their
actions were found to create tension and jeopardise national harmony
(Utusan Malaysia 27 Sept. 1991). On the sluggishness of the
government to enforce the ban, Deputy Minister at the Prime
Minister’s Department, Dr. Abdul Hamid Othman, replied that
aggressive action against Darul Arqam would turn its supporters
towards militancy (Berita Harian 12 Oct. 1991, New Straits Times 18 Oct.
1992). Allegations surfaced of Ustaz Ashaari’s extravagant lifestyle
abroad and of Darul Arqam illegally operating its own radio station
94 Ahmad Fauzi
(Berita Harian 7 Dec. 1991, Utusan Malaysia 6 Oct. 1991). Permits for
newly published Darul Arqam magazines were revoked without any
justification being given.13
In 1993, following Dr. Abdul Hamid’s accusation that Darul
Arqam was manipulating Islam to highlight the image of its leader as
a political hero (Berita Harian 24 Feb. 1993), the Chief Director of the
Islamic Centre claimed that militancy had crept into Darul Arqam,
which allegedly harboured designs to overthrow the government by
revolutionary means (Berita Harian 4 May, 6 May 1993). After the
Prime Minister stressed yet again that Darul Arqam activities would be
clamped down on (Utusan Malaysia 8 May 1993), a prominent United
Malays National Organisation (UMNO)14 senator urged the
government to confiscate Ustaz Ashaari’s passport. He claimed that
Darul Arqam was more dangerous than the communists, that Ustaz
Ashaari had ambitions to become Prime Minister, that Darul Arqam
members believed their leader was the Imam al-Mahdi, and that the
Darul Arqam lifestyle so promoted promiscuity that syphilis was rife
among its members (Berita Harian 26 May 1993).15
While state religious officials and politicians in charge of
Islamic affairs tried to justify government actions from a theological
point of view, other politicians and bureaucrats from the ruling elite,
in their occasional outbursts, failed to portray the ‘Darul Arqam versus
government’ controversy as a strictly non-political affair. For example,
the clampdown of 1994 was triggered by the Islamic Centre’s charge
that Darul Arqam had formed a 313-men ‘suicide army’ based in
Bangkok in a plan to take over power in Malaysia through militant
means (Utusan Malaysia 13 June 1994, 14 June 1994). The Information
Minister, Mohamed Rahmat, simultaneously accused Darul Arqam of
harbouring extreme political ambitions (Utusan Malaysia 14 June 1994).
Immediately following the fatwa (legal ruling) banning Darul Arqam,
Deputy Minister at the Prime Minister’s Department, Dr Abdul Hamid
Othman insisted that Darul Arqam’s concept of Imam al-Mahdi was a
political concept which had been associated with a religious struggle
(Utusan Malaysia 6 Aug. 1994). Following the Internal Security Act
arrests, the Malaysian Police Chief claimed to have extracted
information from Ustaz Ashaari, under interrogation, proving that
The banning of Darul Arqam in Malaysia 95
Darul Arqam had plans to capture political power ‘through magic and
violence’ (The Nation 17 Sept. 1994).
Clearly, as Darul Arqam expanded in size and influence, the
state had, on its own volition, transformed the nature of its
relationship with Darul Arqam from one of provisional toleration to
one of overt hostility. While concerns about Darul Arqam’s lifestyle
and religious beliefs and practices had ostensibly determined the
government’s actions until the late 1980s, statements by ruling elites in
the 1990s suggested that antagonism between both parties had
assumed political proportions, despite official disclaimers to the
contrary. But insofar as it needed a religious justification to act against
Darul Arqam, which was not legally registered, the government had to
continue using Islam to conceal more directly political motives. Since
the ‘Darul Arqam episode’ had always been presented by the
government as a purely religious affair devoid of political motives,16 it
is pertinent to examine the contending arguments from just such a
perspective.
All Quranic references are from The Holy Qur’an: Translation and
commentary by A. Yusuf Ali, Durban: Islamic Propagation Centre
International, n.d. (first edition 1934).