Organized Labor and Democracy in Latin America Author(s): Steven Levitsky and Scott Mainwaring Source: Comparative Politics,

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Organized Labor andDemocracy inLatin America

Steven Levitsky and ScottMainwaring

Although the relationship between organized laborand democracy inLatinAmerica

has long been considered to be important, it remains the subject of substantial dis

pute. Several influential scholars, most notably Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and

Stephens, have argued that organized labor is a consistent champion of democracy and that, consequently, strong labor movements make democratic outcomes more

However, evidence fromLatin America calls this argument into question. likely.1
Although Latin American labor movements their record with have often played a leading role in strug respect to democracy has been mixed. In several countries, including Argentina, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Peru, labor move ments actively backed nondemocratic regimes during the latter half of the twentieth gles against dictatorships,

century. In other cases, unions either supportedcoups against elected governments

(Argentina, Bolivia) or engaged inmaximalist strategies that put democratic regimes at risk (Chile, Bolivia, Peru). This article seeks to explain variation in labor support for democracy in Latin America since 1945. Based on a comparative analysis of the seven most populous countries in Latin America (Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Argentina, Peru, Venezuela, and Chile), as well as two smaller countries in which labor movements have had a major impact on regimes (Bolivia and Nicaragua), it argues that labor movements' regime orientation hinged on two factors: the nature of their partisan alliances and the perceived regime alternatives. Although a few Latin American labor movements aligned themselves with solidly democratic parties after 1945, most were aligned with Marxist or populist parties that held instrumental views toward democracy. These labor movements fought for democracy when no better alternative existed or when that democracy would further their material and organi interests. However, where inclusionary nondemocratic regime alternatives existed or were perceived to be viable alternatives, they often failed to fight for democracy and sometimes fought against it. In other words, Latin American labor zational their leaders believed

movementswere contingentdemocrats.2
These findings not only challenge arguments that organized labor is a consistent champion of democracy, but they also call into question the essentialist assumption underlying those claims: that labor's political behavior can be reduced to the defense 21

ComparativePolitics
of the material approaches more broadly

October 2006
classes. This analysis as organizations organizational, thus lends support to labor's interests lead

interests of the working to include the political,

that treat labor movements

and define

and career goals of union

ers. The issueof organized labor's orientation towarddemocracy is important. During

much of the twentieth century, labor movements countries, Where and their political labor is strong, alliances its behavior were powerful actors inmany Latin impact on regime to the survival American outcomes.3 democratic had a substantial can be critical

of regimes. Yet the question of why and when labor movements push for, oppose, or remain indifferent to democracy has received little attention.4 Under a stringent procedural definition of democracy, a regime is democratic if four conditions are met. There must be free and fair competitive elections for the

legislatureand, inpresidentialsystems, the executive. Virtually the entire adultpopu

lation must have the right to vote. There must be broad protection of civil and politi cal liberties, including the rights of free speech, press, and association. And elected officials must have the power to govern; if the military exercises veto power, the regime is not a full democracy.

Organized A prominent as consistent Europe

Labor, Working line of work

Class

Interests, science

and Democracy and sociology views labor movements

in political

champions of democracy. Goran Therborn, for example, argued that in "the labor movements sought almost everywhere not only for higher wages

and betterworking conditions, but also for political democracy."5 Rueschemeyer,

Stephens, and Stephens' relative class power model of democratization hinges on the claim that, of the major social classes, the working class is "the most consistently

Carles Boix's recentwork on democracy and redistribution pro-democratic force."6

similarly treats the working class as a uniformly prodemocratic actor.7 These arguments rest on three key assumptions: that working classes can be treat ed as politically homogeneous actors; that labor movements' regime preferences are driven exclusively by the material concerns of the working classes; and that democ racy is almost always in the material interest of the working class, because its more

inclusionarynature affords greater possibilities of redistributionthan other regime types.Thus, according toRueschemeyer,Stephens, and Stephens,because thework
ing class consistently gains from democracy, and because "those who gain from democracy will be itsmost reliable promoters and defenders," have only to the working

classwill be consistentlyprodemocratic.8
This article breaks with these essentialist assumptions. Organized labor's interests can not be reduced to the material well-being of workers. Although the initial raison d'tre of labor organizations is to protect and advance the material interests of work

22

Mainwaring StevenLevitskyand Scott

ers, the reasons for their support for political to this realm. For example, union members appeals that are only loosely or temporarily parties and regimes are rarely limited may respond to social and cultural tied to material payoffs. Political move

ments such asArgentine Peronism thatchallenged traditional class hierarchies in the social and cultural realms and incorporated working classes into politics created
union loyalties that can not be explained by material exchange alone. In some cases,

with thepoor,was as leaders'political style, especially their symbolic identification importantas their economic program inwinning and retaining working class sup port.Although these symbolic and socioculturalappealswere frequentlycombined with material appeals, they often helped cement allegiances thatendured long after parties or governmentshad abandoned prolaborpolicies.9 The disjuncturebetweenworkers'material interestsand labor'spolitical orienta by union leadershipautonomy. As a long tradition tions iswidened further of schol
arship dating back to Michels has shown, most labor leaders enjoy considerable

autonomy from rank-and-filedemands.10 Although the degree of union democracy

varies across cases, many tion and rank-and-file tions have historically participation. labor organizations exhibit low levels of internal competi They are particularly low where state-labor rela been structured along corporatist lines, as in much of Latin

America. Inmany LatinAmerican countries institutional arrangementsthatprotect ed union leadershipsfrom competitive challenges, heightened theirdependence on
state resources, and created mechanisms that were more of state intervention responsive duced union leaderships into union affairs pro to state leaders than to rank-and

file workers." Although union leaders in corporatist systems can not afford to neglect rank-and-file demands entirely, theygenerally enjoy substantial discretion in
terms of which demands they take up and how quickly and strenuously they push

thosedemands.
Autonomy from the rank and file allows union leaders to pursue a diversity of goals, some of which are individual rather than collective, and many of which extend well beyond the material welfare of workers. Frequently, these goals are organiza

tional. Labor organizationsbenefit from governmentpolicies that facilitateunion or provide unions ization,extend or protectmonopolies overworker representation,
with new sources of revenue. Although these organizational resources may benefit workers in the long run by strengthening unions, their pursuit is rarely driven by rank-and-file demands. In some cases, unions have pursued or defended them at the expense of those demands.12 Union leaderships also pursue political goals-such as placing their members or are only loosely related to workers' material partisan allies in public office-that to public office and other positions of power may benefit orga demands. Access

nized laborcollectively by allowing unions to influenceand even implementpublic

policy. However, itmay also serve as a selective incentive for individual union lead ers seeking to advance their careers in ways that have little to do with rank-and-file

23

ComparativePolitics

October 2006

interests.13 In addition, labor leaders may pursue ideological commitments that are not necessarily or fully sharedby rank-and-file workers. For example, Marxist union leadershave at times supported political forces that, for a variety reasons (including
deference to strategies dictated by the Soviet Union), treated workers' material demands as secondary, at best.

In short,whereas Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens and others assume that labor movements focus almost exclusively on maximizing workers'material gains, labor interestscan be definedmore broadly to includeorganizational, political, ideo logical, and careerbenefits. Two implicationsfollow from thisdiscussion. First, ide
ological commitments and political, organizational, and sociocultural payoffs may

induce labor movements to supportparties or governments thatdo not deliver sub

stantial material movements' to the working class. Notable examples include labor PRI support for theMexican after 1982 and the Sandinista government benefits labor movements may pursue their inter they are and

during the latter half of the 1980s. Second, political regimes that guarantee voting union

ests successfullywithin variouspolitical regimes. Although democraciesare the only

rights and civil liberties for workers, power may be weakened, of political not the only ones under which tions strengthened, oligarchic union organiza

leaders given positions

power, and wages

otherworker benefits increased. Historically, a variety of inclusionaryauthoritarian regimes have offered union leadersavenues for achieving their collective and indi
vidual benefits goals. In twentieth century Latin America, for example, revolutionary and

populist governmentsoffered unprecedented material, organizational,and symbolic

labor and unions. Many of these governments strengthened movements, expanded worker rights and benefits, created new channels of union access to the state, and placed union leaders in important positions of power. Some of the region's most important labor movements-including those in Argentina, to workers

Bolivia, Brazil, andMexico

by nondemocratic satisfying union regimes as exceptional. Where

were incorporated politically and granted legal status

There is no reason to treat labor support for such authoritarian regimes do a better job of ideological, or career political, inclusionary

governments.

leaders' material,

organizational,

interests, labor's indifference (and even opposition) to democracymay be entirely rational.

Explaining

Labor's

Orientation

toward Democracy:

Partisan

Alliances

and

Regime Alternatives
If labor movements logical goals, nondemocratic and ideo pursue a variety of material, political, organizational, and if many of those goals may be met under both democratic and is likely to regimes, then organized labor's support for democracy

24

StevenLevitskyand ScottMainwaring vary according to thehistorical andpolitical context. Inotherwords, labor,likeother organized interests, is a contingent democratic actor.Under what conditionswill labor movements supportor oppose democracy?Two factors are of critical impor tance: labor's dominantpartisan linkageand availableregimealternatives. Partisan Linkages In part, labororientations towarddemocracy hinge on their partisan alliances.Most peak-level labor leaders in LatinAmerica have historically For unions, theparty-union with one political party or another.14 aligned themselves
"exchange" often brought new channels of access to the state, key organizational

resources, and a variety of prolabor socioeconomic policies. For parties, they Many party-laboralliances brought critical electoral andmobilizational support.15 became institutionalizedover time. Political careers, overlapping leaderships,and deeply rootedpolitical identitiescreatedvested interestsinmaintaining the alliance,
such thatmany union leaders came to value the party for its own sake.16 Thus, despite important changes in the party's program or strategy.17 insti

tutionalized alliances became "sticky," in that unions remained committed to it Labor's political alliances vary considerably. Unions have historically supported governments,parties, and candidateswhose programs includedhigher wages, the extensionof worker benefits, and otherpolicies aimed at incomeorwealth redistrib
ution. Yet such policies have come in a variety of ideological variants, and distinct packages, including social democracy, Marxism in its many forms of populism.

These political projects differ considerably in their orientation towarddemocracy.

Some labor-based political movements, such as the British Labour Party and postwar European social democracy, are fully committed to liberal democracy. They are the only ones that unequivocally match Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens' analysis of the impact of organized labor on democracy. Other party-labor alliances maintain an instrumental orientation toward democra cy. They support democratic regimes to the extent that such regimes are seen as the best means of advancing their material, organizational, and political interests. Two types of instrumentalist party-labor alliance were common in Latin America after

1945: Marxist and populist parties. Marxist partieswere committed to the long-term overthrow of capitalism. Although they frequently fought for democracy when
exclusionary authoritarian viewed regimes were democracy in power, and although as a means of achieving they often worked broader socioeco to

within democratic regimes for decades (for example, inmid-centuryChile),Marxist

parties nevertheless obstacle

nomic or ideological goals.When democratic institutions were perceived to be an

to those goals, Marxist parties often proved indifferent and even hostile

democracy. Populist partiesmobilized labor from above, often from positions in the state. Although they generally espoused prolabor policies and often sought to open up 25

ComparativePolitics
exclusionary political

October 2006
regimes, many populist parties in Latin America have histori

cally displayed aweak commitment to liberaldemocracy.Populistmovements tend ed to be weakly institutionalized, personalistic, and highlymajoritarian,often to the point of disregardingthe rightsof politicalminorities and other institutionalfeatures
of liberal democracy. Populist governments in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and other

countries demonstrated little tolerance for opposition parties or respect for basic civil liberties,and thepopulistAmerican PopularRevolutionary Alliance (APRA) in Peru routinelyengaged inviolence against elected governments. Available Regime Alternatives
bility of alternative alternatives

Labor strategies with respect to democracy also

its stability, and the perceived via

hinge on the regime context. The type of regime,

regime types play crucial roles in shaping the strategies of instru labor movements can be expected

movements. In consolidated democracies, inwhich nondemocratic mentalist labor

are off the table, even instrumentalist authoritarian however,

to supportdemocracy.Likewise, under exclusionary authoritarian regimes, such as

the right-wing bureaucratic In other regime contexts, Marxist regimes of the 1960s and 1970s, unions are labor movements with dominant linkages to

likely to supporteven conservative transitionsto democracy.

and populist parties may be indifferent to democracy and/or support nonde

mocratic alternatives. They may do so in a context of unstable or highly polarized in which revolutionary outcomes are perceived as possible. In such a democracies context, Marxist labor movements may pursue maximalist strategies that put democ ratic regimes at risk. Labor may also be indifferent to (and even oppose) democracy when inclusionary authoritarian regimes are in power. In Latin America in the twen tieth century, a variety of nondemocratic revolutionary and populist governments offered labor movements substantial material, democratic organizational, alternatives and symbolic benefits.

Labormovements were particularlylikely to support such governments in countries

with no history of labor-friendly (such as postrevolutionary

Bolivia,Mexico, andNicaragua). This discussion highlights theneed to distinguishbetween opposition to authori

tarianism and support for democracy. opposing (1979-90), authoritarian being regimes es) without democratic Labor movements may play a central role in process (and even pushing forward democratization actors. In Argentina and Nicaragua (1945-55) helped to bring successors. down authoritarian and Peru In Bolivia

for example, to undermine

labor movements

regimes but then supported

their semiauthoritarian

together to produce four possible outcomes with respect to labor's orientation toward democracy. Democratic party-labor alliances can be expected to support democracy in all regime contexts. In the case of instru

labor helped tomobilize in ways Table 1 brings the two variables

authoritarian regimes in the late 1970s but then continued that weakened the fragile democracies that replaced them.

26

Steven Levitsky and Scott Mainwaring toward Democracy in Latin

Table

1 Determinants

of Labor Movement

Orientations

America
Perceived Viability of Pro-Labor __ondemocratic Alternative Low High

Regime Orlentation of
Partisan Allyv

Liberal Democratic

Labor Supports Democracy

Lsbor Supports Democracy

Instrumental

Labor Works Against Democracy

Labor Supports Democracy

....... ....... ,..... .................... . ~~~~~~~~~~~~~........................

mentalist

(Marxist or populist) party-labor alliances, labor support for democracy depends on the regime context. To the extent that inclusionary nondemocratic alter natives are perceived to be feasible (for example, when such regimes were in power or revolutionary are taken seriously), instrumentalist party-labor alternatives alliances may be expected to be indifferent, ambivalent, or even opposed to democ racy. If the party-labor alliance is democratic or if there is no viable inclusionary If the party-labor alliance is authoritarian alternative, labor will be prodemocratic. instrumentalist and attractive nondemocratic alternatives are perceived to exist, then Stephens, and labor may well work against democracy. Whereas Rueschemeyer, in this framework they are Stephens treat cases in the lower left box as exceptional, just as theoretically plausible as any other outcome. In fact, cases that fell in the in Latin America between 1945 and 1989. lower left box were widespread

Latin American

Party-Labor

Linkages

after 1945

Why did some Latin American labor movements consistently favor democracy, while others did not? Four major patterns of party-labor linkage existed in Latin America

27

ComparativePolitics

October 2006

after 1945: democratic,Marxist, populist, and no dominant linkage.Most Latin American labor movements contain competing ideologies and orientations toward The focus in classifying cases here is on the dominantpolitical force democracy.18
within labor movements. In a few cases, particularly Brazil and Peru, majority con cases, trol of labor movements shifted over time from one party to another. Inmost

however, thedominantpartisan linkagesremainedstable.

Dominant Linkage to Populist Parties InArgentina, Mexico, and Peru, labor move

ments aligned themselveswith populist parties. InArgentina theGeneralWorkers Peronistfrom 1945 to 2000.Union support Confederation(CGT) was overwhelmingly
for populist leader Juan Peron was rooted in a vast array of material, that he provided first as labor secretary (1943-45) organizational, and symbolic benefits and later as presi turn of Peronist demonstrated an

dent (1946-55).19 The alliance survived Peron's conservative

turn in the early 1950s, his

overthrow in 1955, and his death in 1974, as well as themarket-oriented movement. InMexico Revolutionary Confederation For most of its history, Peron and his top supporters aligned itself with

PresidentCarlosMenem during the 1990s. Peronism was a near-prototypical populist attitudetoward ambiguousandhighly instrumental democracy.20
the bulk of the labor movement the Institutional Party (PRI) and its precursor from 1945 to 2000.21 Although Mexican

laborwas always fragmentedinto competing confederations, theMexican Workers

(CTM) was usually predominant. The state-labor alliance was consoli dated during the presidency of Lazaro Catrdenas (1934-40). C'ardenas mobilized the

labor movement fromabove,offering itunprecedented material,political, andorganiza

tional benefits.22 incorporated In 1938 this corporatist alliance was Revolution formalized through the creation of the Party of the Mexican as an organized (later renamed the PRI), in which labor was "sector." Given its central role inMexico's hegemonic

party authoritarian regime, the PRI's weak commitment to democracy is clear. In Peru organized labor was initially mobilized by APRA, a populist party created by Rauil Haya de la Torre. The Peruvian Labor Congress APRA APRA's in 1944, was Peru's largest labor confederation (CTP), which was until created by the late 1960s, when the labor movement. APRA it never installed an and insurrectionary

demonstrated

shift to the right eroded the CTP's position within an ambiguous commitment to democracy. Although

authoritarian regime, in the 1930s and 1940s tactics in pursuit of power.

it employed violence

In Bolivia, Chile, Nicaragua, and post-1968 Dominant Linkage toMarxist Parties Peru, the dominant wing of labor movements aligned itself with Marxist parties. The Bolivian labor movement, which was among the most militant in Latin America, was led by Marxists Central for most (COB) was of the post-1945 period.23 Although the Bolivian Workers' initially forged out of an alliance with the populist Nationalist

28

StevenLevitskyand Scott Mainwaring Revolutionary Movement (MNR) in the aftermath of the 1952 revolution,these ties
eroded over the course of the 1950s. In 1963 the COB broke with the MNR govern ment. After the 1964 coup Marxists gained the dominant position in the labor move

ment, includingthepowerful miners' confederation.24 They retainedthispositionuntil

the late 1980s, when the weakened fragmented labor movement ceased to have any

dominant party linkage. The Chilean labormovement, which was organized into theUnified Workers Confederation(CUT)beginning in 1953,was pluralist, in that it containedcompeting Socialist,Communist,Christian Democratic,andRadical groups.However, the confed eration was usuallydominated by theSocialist (PSCh)andCommunist (PCCh) parties. Although theCommunistsandSocialistsworkedwithin Chile's democraticinstitutions, they remainedcommitted to the goal of socialist revolution,andmuch of the PSCh acceptedthe legitimacy of armedstruggle.25 InNicaragua the labormovement aligned itself with the SandinistaNational Liberation Front (FSLN) from the late 1970s through 2000. Organized laborsupported
the FSLN in the insurrection against dictator Anastasio Somoza, and the dominant

theSandinista Workers'Central (CST),remained laborconfederation, postrevolutionary

a faithful ally of the FSLN party inspired by the Cuban throughout its rule. The FSLN was a revolutionary leftist revolution. Most Sandinista leaders were Marxist and labor movement aligned itself with Marxist parties

aweak and instrumental demonstrated commitmentto liberal democracy.

Finally, the bulk of the Peruvian beginning in the early 1970s. APRA's shift to the right during the 1950s and 1960s led many unions to abandon the CTP, and by the early 1970s the Peruvian General Labor

Confederation(CGTP)had become Peru'sdominant laborconfederation. The CGTP

leadership was dominated by the Peruvian Communist extent, other Marxist parties. Few of these parties democracy.26 Dominant Party (PCP) and, to a lesser were committed to liberal

In Brazil, Venezuela, and post-1989 Linkage to Democratic Parties Chile, dominant labor organizations were affiliated with democratic parties. In Brazil labor's partisan linkages have always been fragmented and have changed over time, but

they have generally been democratic. During Brazil's first period of democracy
(1946-64), the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) and the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB)

movement.Although thePTB was divided within the labor competed for dominance most party leaders were commit between liberal democratsand instrumental populists,
ted democrats. The PCB (which was banned in 1947 but functioned in a semiclandes tine manner) was an instrumental Marxist party. In the context of a fragmented labor

movement,moderate PTB leadersheld a dominantposition through1960. Between

1960 and 1964, and particularly after the formation of the General Workers Command (CGT) in 1962, radical leftists from the PCB and PTB gained ascendance within the

labor movement.27 Labor's ideologicalorientationduring this periodwas mixed. The 29

ComparativePolitics
labor movement

October 2006
rule in the 1970s. It remained divided, but the United Workers' Central Party (PT). Although the PT's lead

reorganized under military

the largest confederation

to emerge during the 1980s was

(CUT), which was aligned with the leftistWorkers'

ership was dividedbetween Marxist instrumentalists and committeddemocrats,the lat tergenerallyheld theupperhand.28
Venezuela is perhaps the clearest case of a stable democratic party-labor linkage. From the time of its creation in 1947 until 1998 theVenezuelan Workers Confederation (CTV) was the only major labor confederation inVenezuela. Various parties competed leadership during the postwar period, but the confederation was almost always dominated by unionists with ties to Democratic Action (AD).29 AD played a major role in establishing Venezuela's first democratic regime and was a consistently democratic actor in the decades after 1948.30 Finally, the post-1989 Chilean labor movement was democratic. Although the labor movement remained aligned with the Socialists and Communists after the 1973 coup, for the CTV

theSocialists' regimeorientation changedconsiderably duringthe subsequent periodof

authoritarian rule. During the 1980s the PSCh abandoned Marxism and fully embraced

liberal democracy.31
A Case of No Dominant Party-Labor Linkage Colombia is the only case of no dominant partisan affiliation among labor organizations. During the 1930s and 1940s the dominant Confederation of Colombian Workers (CTC) maintained close ties to the Liberal Party.32 During the 1950s, however, theUnion of Colombian Workers (UTC), which declared itself apolitical, emerged as the country's largest labor confeder ation. According to Urrutia, the UTC "did not commit itself to any political party," which made the "Colombian experience.. .radically different from that of other Latin American nations."33 Beginning in the 1970s, the labor movement fragmented, as sever al labor confederations competed alongside many unaffiliated unions. In this context, Colombia: existing partisan linkages eroded, and no new dominant party-labor alliance emerged.34 Table 2 summarizes the linkages between labor and parties that prevailed in these nine cases between 1945 and 2000. In most cases dominant labor organizations were affiliated to either Marxist (Bolivia, Nicaragua, pre-1973 Chile, post-1968 Peru) or pop ulist (Argentina, Mexico, pre-1968 Peru) parties. Hence the vast majority of party-labor alliances were characterized by instrumental attitudes toward democracy. Consistently prodemocratic labor movements were the exception, not the rule.

Labor

Support

for Democratic

and Nondemocratic

Regimes

Labor support for democracy depended on both the dominant party-labor linkage and on the regime context. This framework, can be used to examine organized labor's sup in these nine Latin American lack of support for democracy countries port-or

30

Steven Levitsky and Scott Mainwaring Table 2 Dominant Linkages Countries Years 1945-2000 1946-52 1952-63 1963-1985 1945-62 1962-64 1979-2000 1945-73 1.989-2000 1947-2000 1945-2000 1979-2000 1945-68 1968-92 1945-98 Dominant Partisan Linkage Populist (Peronism) Marxist Mixed MaistPopulist Marxist Deniocratic (PTB) Mixed MarxistDemocratic (PCB-PT3) Democratic (PT) Marxist (Socialist/Communist parties) Democratic (Socialist .Communist) No dominant partisan linkages OnrginallyPopulist (PRI) Marxist (FSLN) Populist (APRA) Marxist (Comlmunist Party Democratic (AD) (MNR)

between

Labor Movements

and Political

Parties

in

Nine Latin American Country Argentina Bolivia

Brazil

Chile

Colombia Mexico Nicaragua Peru

Venezuela

between 1945 and 2000. The case analysis suggests a clear relationship among partisan linkage, regime context, and labor practice. In cases of democratic partisan linkage, labormovements did not support authoritarian regimes, back coups against elected gov ernments, or engage in regime-threatening mobilization under democracy. In cases of Marxist and populist partisan linkages, labor behavior hinged on the regime context. Where democracy was the predominant regime or the only feasible alternative to right wing dictatorship, Marxist and populist-led labor movements supported democracy. But where inclusionary nondemocratic regimes were either in power or perceived to be viable alternatives, they routinely worked against democracy. Organized labor may work against democracy in three ways. First, itmay support the extraconstitutional removal of an elected government. Second, it may actively support a nondemocratic regime, which may entail opposing efforts to democratize the regime. Third, politically polarizing union mobilization in pursuit of revolution ary goals may-perhaps inadvertantly destabilize democratic regimes.

31

ComparativePolitics

October 2006

Marxist or populist labor movements' supportfordemocra Twophenomena limited

cy during the post-1945 Cuban Revolution. period. The first was the political polarization created by the increased both During the 1960s and 1970s, the Cuban Revolution

This development the attractiveness and theperceivedviability of socialist revolution. movements to pursuemaximalist strategiesthat, though encouraged Marxist-led labor not directly antiregime,threatened economic andmilitary elites and therebyincreased
the likelihood that those elites would to the test. A prioritization support amilitary coup. The emergence of a revo stability in such a

democracy lutionary optionputMarxist labor movements' commitmentto "bourgeois"

of revolutionary goals over democratic context indicates an instrumental orientation toward democracy.

labor movements towork against Another phenomenonthatinducedinstrumentalist

democracy was the spread of inclusionary authoritarian regimes that sought tomobilize the support of organized labor, peasants, and other nonelite groups. Three types of

inclusionary authoritarian regimes existed in LatinAmerica after 1945: revolutionary

regimes such as those founded inMexico military after 1917 and Nicaragua after 1979; populist and populist of regimes such as those in Peru (1968-75) and Panama (1968-81);

electoral authoritarian regimes such as the one created by Per6n inArgentina. Most bolic benefits, as well as unprecedented access to political power. Governments

and sym movements substantial material, organizational, these regimesoffered labor

such as those of Peron, the PRI, and the FSLN incorporated the working class into the political system, created new channels of union access to the state, encouraged the spread of unionization, provided unions with substantial organizational resources, and expanded worker rights and benefits. These policies often won deep union loyalties. Hence it is

movements supportedthem. not surprising thatlabor

The Argentine labor movement's record with respect to support for democ Argentina racy ismixed. Argentine unions backed Peronism throughout the 1945-2000 period, but on behalf of labor mobilization Peronism was not always democratic. Whereas Peronism had a democratizing Labor mobilization cratic elections sive wage impact in some instances, in other instances it did not. helped create the political opening delivered material that enabled Peron towin demo inclusionary authoritarian, not benefits to labor, including mas

in 1946, but the resulting regime was

democratic.35 Peron's government

increases and an expansion

of health and social security benefits. Union

were routinely However, civil liberties during thisperiod.36 membershipnearly tripled

violated, and Peron's reelection in 1951 was marred by repression and fraud. The overthrow of Peron in 1955 ushered in nearly three decades of unstable civilian and military rule, during which labor's behavior remained ambiguously democratic. In 1964 and 1965 Peronist unions engaged inmassive mobilizations that placed the elected government of Arturo Illia at risk, and key labor leaders supported the coup that toppled Illia in 1966.37 Labor protest played an important role in bringing down the post-1966

32

Steven Levitsky and Scott Mainwaring

between dictatorship, and theCGT stronglysupportedthe electedPeronistgovernment 1973 and 1976. However, unionmobilization and violence helped trigger the 1976
coup.38

Labor and Peronismwere more solidly prodemocratic after 1976, in partbecause regimeoptionsnarrowed. Peronistunionsplayed amajor role inmobilizing opposition authoritarian After 1983, as democracybecame to the 1976-83 bureaucratic regime.39 nondemocraticalternativeslost viability,Peronist and consolidatedand inclusionary labor leadersconsistentlydefendeddemocracy. For example, theCGT unambiguously opposed military uprisingsin 1987 and 1990. Bolivia
democracy

The Bolivian labor movementmaintained an instrumental attitude toward

from the 1940s theMNR through the mid 1980s. The COB initially supported the

inclusionary semiauthoritarianregime that emerged from the 1952 revolution.40

However, when moved government moderated over the course of the 1950s, the COB celebrated when amili into opposition. The radical wing of the labor movement

Victor PazEstenssoro in 1964.41 tarycoupdeposedelectedpresident The labor movement actively opposedmost of themilitary dictatorshipsthatgov
erned Bolivia mental between 1964 and 1982. However, as was union leaders maintained an instru attitude toward democracy, seen in their support for the leftist military

This instrumental of General JuanJoseTorres (1970-71).42 orientation per government

nant view sisted after the 1982 transition to democracy. During the mid 1980s, the COB's "domi toward representative democracy was reductionist and instrumental," and leaders viewed democracy as an "instrument for establishing a dictatorship

most COB

of the proletariat."43 Unions mobilized against the democratic government of Hernan Siles Suazo (1982-85) almost as vigorously as they had against earlier dictatorships. Even as Bolivia's fledgling democracy crumbled in the face of hyperinflation, the COB played amaximalist been amuch Brazil game. Devastated by the closing of the tinmines less powerful actor in the subsequent two decades. in 1985, labor has

Between 1946 and the early 1960s the Brazilian labor movement consistently backed the democratic regime, notwithstanding the significant Communist influence in its leadership. In part, it did so because there was no viable alternative to democracy

that offered labor better benefits and greater access to power. In the polarized context of the early 1960s, however, themovement became radicalized. Although the CGT contin ued to back Goulart's government from 1962 to 1964, itsmobilization and maximalist demands were factors in triggering the 1964 coup.4 The bulk of the Brazilian labor movement opposed and the "new unionism" presence played a leading role in pushing the 1964-85 military regime, the

that rose to the forefront of the movement tendencies,

in the late 1970s

for a transition to democracy.45 Notwithstanding

of instrumentalist Marxist

the CUT and its PT allies remained

solidly prodemocraticthroughoutthepost-1985 democraticperiod. 33

ComparativePolitics

October 2006

Chile AlthoughChile's Marxist-dominatedlabor movementworkedwithin the liberal democraticregime throughout the 1945-1973 period, it adoptedan increasingly maxi malist position as Chilean politics polarizedduring the 1960s and 1970s.Despite their commitmentto constitutional rule, the Marxist parties thatcontrolledtheCUT during thisperiod soughta socialist transformation of society.The SocialistPartywas divided
over the "electoral game." The party's radical wing, which gained ascendance during the

1960s, disavowed the electoralroad to socialism and openly espoused armed struggle. Socialist leadersdeclaredthattheirparticipationindemocraticinstitutions was "merely
a prelude to an eventual institutional rupture."46 The left's revolutionary push accelerat ed with the election of Socialist President Salvador Allende in 1970. Leftist and labor

mobilizationunder Allende,which includedanunprecedented levelof strikesand facto ry occupations, heightened the perceived threat to the economic andmilitary elite,
which countermobilized played with a brutal coup in 1973.47

Organized laborstronglyopposed Pinochet's dictatorshipfrom 1973 to 1989 and

a leading role in antiregime protests during the 1980s.48 Due in part to the Socialist Party's transformation into a social democratic force, the CUT emerged as a actor after the 1989 democratic solidly prodemocratic transition. Under Christian and Socialist leadership through 1996 and Socialist and Communist leader ship thereafter, the CUT maintained amoderate posture. It engaged in limited mobiliza

Democratic

tion and generally cooperated with the center-leftDemocratic Concertation govern ments.49
Colombia The Colombian labor movement has been characterized by a weak pres ence in national politics, organizational fragmentation, and a lack of a dominant parti san orientation. Within this context, the bulk of the labor movement has backed democ racy since 1945. Most labor leaders opposed the dictatorship of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla (1953-57) and maintained a consistently prodemocratic orientation after the 1958 tran

sition. Although unions frequently opposed theLiberal andConservativegovernments

in power during movement the 1958-74 National Front, the dominant sectors within the labor supported the existing democratic regime.50 They continued to do so during the 1980s and 1990s, despite the growth of more radicalized left-wing unions and the

of leftistguerrilla movements. resurgence

Mexico labor movement backed authoritarian regime that emerged out of the 1910 revolution.51 The labor support and offered extensive material and postrevolutionary regime mobilized organizational benefits, particularly during the presidency of Cardenas (1934-40). At no time, however, was it a democracy. The regime allowed regular elections, but the the inclusionary From the 1920s until 2000 the bulk of theMexican

electoral playing field was tremendously uneven, and the regime resorted to violence, fraud, and vote buying where necessary. The CTM and other major labor confederations were unwavering in their support for the PRI, even during the 1980s and 1990s, when

34

StevenLevitskyand Scott Mainwaring economic austeritybroughta steepdecline inworkers' incomes. When thedemocracy
movement took hold beginning in the late 1980s, the CTM became notoriously fied as one of the pillars of the PRI's authoritarian, antireform wing.52 Mexico one of the few cases discussed here in which transition. dominant party-labor linkage was forged in the the dominant ment actively opposed a democratic Nicaragua As inMexico, identi is thus

faction of the labor move

Nicaragua's

contextof a revolutionary hegemonicparty regime. Organized labor active participated

ly in the overthrow of dictator Anastasio Sandinista government with unprecedented that emerged access sionary and prolabor. The Sandinistas Somoza, and the CST strongly supported the in 1979. The postrevolutionary regime was inclu strengthened the labormovement and provided it fell short of democracy.

to the state.53 Yet the regime

were held in 1984, civil andpolitical liberties Although elections were frequently violat
ed. Strike activity was restricted; government opponents were subject to harassment and arrest, and the leading opposition newspaper, La Prensa, was closed for substantial peri ods of time. The CST remained a pillar of the Sandinista od, despite the steep decline economic collapse. Between by 30 percent, movement in workers' regime throughout the 1979-90 peri living standards triggered by the post-1984

and real wages

1985 and 1990, real per capita income inNicaragua fell fell by more than 75 percent.54 Nevertheless, CST They did so because they enjoyed the lead

leadersremainedsolidly pro-Sandinista,and they staunchlyopposed the democracy

that emerged access in the late 1980s. unprecedented ing opponents to political and organizational resources and because alternative.

of the regime were not viewed

as a labor-friendly

Peru Under its populist (1944-68) andMarxist (post-1968) leaderships, the Peruvian labor movementmaintained an instrumental attitude towarddemocracy. In
1948 the CTP backed APRA against helped the elected as it engaged in conspiracies and violent mobilizations Its actions ultimately trigger a coup.55 During the 1970s the CGTP backed the populist military regime led by General Juan Velasco (1968-75). Velasco's government undertook a government reforms and actively to the military supported non-Aprista government existed" labor organizations, that no viable the Communist-led alternative CGTP. CGTP leaders "concluded of Jose Luis Bustamente.

variety of prolabor particularly more-leftist

and that their interests

were best served by cooperating with the government.56 Thus, after initially oppos ing the 1968 coup, the CGTP embraced the military government beginning in 1969, backing it even after Velasco's successor, General Francisco Morales Bermuidez, shifted to the right in 1975. Not until the massive wave of popular tion of 1977 did the CGTP join antigovernment protests.57 Although labor mobilization during 1977-78 sector mobiliza

played an important role in pushing

35

ComparativePolitics

October 2006

forwardPeru's democratic transition, the CGTP retained an instrumentalattitude

toward the democratic regime that emerged after 1979.58 Many of the leftist parties

United Left rejected liberaldemocracy in favorof thatconstituted theCGTP-backed and revolutionarystruggle.59 Polarizationand guerrillaviolence popular insurrection helped justify Alberto Fujimori's autogolpe in 1992.
Venezuela After The CTV was a consistently democratic actor between 1948 and 1998.

the 1948 coup the CTV played a central role in the struggle against the Perez the first four decades of the new democratic aggressive regime, CTV leaders exer for

the 1958 democratictran duringthe 1950s and stronglysupported Jimenezdictatorship

sition. During democratic cised amoderating role in politics and labor relations, pushing policies that protected the

regime and their party over more

efforts to secure benefits

of a significantleftistguerril rank-and-file They did so despite theemergence workers.60

in the radicalized political climate of the early 1960s. Indeed, the CTV's la movement cooperation with AD governments during the 1960s helped to avoid the regime-threaten ing polarization that hit many other Latin American in 1998. Chavez's countries during this period.61 revolutionary rhetoric and autocrat

to democracybecamemore ambiguousafter the electionof The CTV's relationship

former coup leader Hugo Chavez

ic governing style-which

included efforts to engineer a government-sponsored

many Venezuelan elites that he sought to install an takeover of the CTV-convinced in an effort to remove authoritarian regime. In this context, the CTV actively mobilized Chavez by extraconstitutional means, and in April 2002 it supported a failed coup against Chavez. Table 3 provides (1979-90), democracy was widespread ported nondemocratic a summary of the nine cases. As it shows, labor action against in the post-1945 period. InMexico (1945-2000), Nicaragua

labor movements actively sup and Argentina (1946-55) regimes. In Chile during the early 1970s and in Bolivia and Peru during the 1980s they pursued revolutionary goals inways that undermined democratic Peru (1968-75),

regimes.Nondemocratic behaviorwas particularly frequentduring the 1960s and

1970s, when ments inclusionary authoritarian alternatives appeared most viable. Labor move consistently prodemocratic during the 1980s and 1990s, but this became more

change was largely due to the disappearance of inclusionary alternatives.

Conclusion
Contrary to Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, labor is not a consistent champion of democracy, at least not in Latin America after 1945. Rather, it is a contingent democ ratic actor, and it is necessary do or do not support democratic to explore the conditions under which regimes. labor movements

36

Steven Levitsky and Scott Mainwaring

Table 3 Partisan Linkage, Regime Alternatives, Case Type of Party-Labor Linkag Populist Perceived Viable Alternative to Democracy? 1945-1976:Yes 1976-No Yes Yes
- - - - --------------1963-4:

and Labor Behavior,

1945-2000

Labor Behavior

Argentina

Bolivia
1946-52

Marxist
_

1946-55: Backed authoritaran regime 1955-76:Regime-threatening behavior : 1976- Democratic Opposed dictatorship
_

Bolivia 1952-64 Bolivia 1964-85 Brazil

1945-62

Mixed Marxis
-i

1952-63: Supported revolutionary semi-democratic regime

Backed 1964 coup

Marxist

Democratic
_

1964-70, 1971-80: Anti-authoritarian 1970-7 : Backed leftistmilitary rule __________ ___________1982-85:ReJime threateningbehavior Democratic No Generally yes Ambipous
. . . ........... .. .

Brazil
1962-64

Mixed
.

behavior Regiime threatening

. . ........................

Brazil 1979-2000 Chile 1945-85 Ch}ile

1986-2000

Democratic Marxist

No 1945-64:No 1964-1973: Yes 1973-85: No No

. . __

Democratic 1945-69:Democratic 1970-73: Regime-threatening behavior 1973-85: Opposed dictatorship Democratic

.... ...................... _

Democratic
. . ......... . .

Colombia Mexico Nicaragua

No dominant
affiliation

Ambiguous inearly Democratic

1960s

Populist Marxist

Yes 1979-90:Yes 1990-: Ambiguous Yes Yes

Backed authoritarianregime 1979-90: Backed revolutionaryregime 1990-20%: Regime-threatening violence 1 947-48: Regime threatening 1 1948-68: Generally pro-democratic 1969-77: Backed military regime
1980-92: Regime threatenng beavior

behavior ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~........................... ........,,,. .

Peru 1945-68 Peru

1968-92 _

Populist Marxist Democratic

Venezuela 1,945-1998

Yes in 1945-48 and Democratic 1962-65; none after

Organized labor's support for democracy hinged on two political factors: partisan labor movements alliances and the regime context. Although a few Latin American period, most were affiliated with liberal democratic parties during the 1945-2000 aligned themselves with Marxist and populist parties with instrumental attitudes toward supported democracy when it was predominant democracy. These labor movements

37

ComparativePolitics

October 2006

and/or when inclusionary were deemed nonviable,butwhen authoritarian alternatives inclusionary authoritarian regimesexisted orwere perceivedas viable alternatives,they oftenworked againstdemocracy. This analysiscalls intoquestion an important elementof Rueschemeyer,Stephens, andStephens' theoryabout the relationship between capitalist developmentanddemoc
ments' racy. Their balance of class power argument rests on the assumption that labor move regime orientations hinge on thematerial interests of the working class. Such an

assumption ignores the relative autonomy of most labor leaders, the multiple and diverse nature of those leaders' interests, and the fact thatmany of those interests may be satisfied inways that bring few material benefits for workers. The fact that Latin American labor movements have not consistently championed

democracy also challenges Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens' argument that

strong labor movements has generally much capacity, have historically played a critical role in achieving democra

tization.62InLatinAmerica the relationshipbetween labor strengthand democracy

of the region and during some periods it may have been negative. In labor movements peaked in terms of their size, mobilizational and political influence in the 1960s and 1970s. During that period labor did not often result in stable democracy but more frequently con been weak,

mobilization

tributedto polarization and democratic breakdown. In the highly polarized context

of the cold war, heightened working class mobilization and/or electoral victories by labor-based parties were often perceived as a threat to the vital interests of economic and state elites, who inmany cases led or supported military coups.63 Organized labor weakened throughout most of Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s. Due to the economic crisis of the 1980s, the neoliberal economic reforms that followed it (including, in some cases, the dismantling of corporatist labor laws), and the rapid growth of the urban informal sector, most Latin American labor move ments were smaller and weaker in the 1990s than they had been in the 1970s.64 At the same time, Latin America underwent an unprecedented wave of democratization. Although an important role in some of these transitions, given labor's decline inmost of the region, it is difficult to argue that labor strength was an important cause of Latin America's democratic turn. If anything, democratic played stability during the 1980s and 1990s was elimination of any serious working class facilitated by labor's weakness, for the "threat" almost certainly enhanced the labor movements

Right's commitment to democratic rules.65 As Kenneth Roberts argues, the surpris

ing durability of contemporary Latin American democracies may, in part, be "an artifact of the diminished capacity of popular sectors to challenge elite interests."66 Labor's weakness was not necessary for (or even a major cause of) the recent in Latin America. wave of democratization of labor move Indeed, the weakening ments may well have important for the quality negative of implications numerous democracy.67As studies, particularly of western Europe, have shown, and labor-based parties have often played a central role in strong labor movements

38

Steven Levitsky and Scott Mainwaring

creatingmore egalitarian societies and inclusionarypolities.68 As LatinAmerican labormovements weakened during the 1980s and 1990s, many of the region's democracies were characterized by increasing socioeconomic inequality.
Nevertheless, the contrast between the 1960s and 1970s, when strong and often radi

calized labor movements were oftenmet with right-wingcoups, and the contempo raryperiod of unprecedented democratic stability amid growing laborweakness makes it clear that there is little relationship between laborstrengthand regime out comes inLatinAmerica.
At a broader theoretical level, organized labor's interests are not always best satis

fied under democratic regimes.This argument is consistentwith theoriesof democ ratization that emphasize actors' contingent and interactivepreferences.69 It chal lenges theoriesthatsee laboras immutably and consistentlyprodemocratic.

NOTES
We are grateful toMauricio Archila, Claudia Baez Camargo, Frances Hagopian, Ren? Antonio Mayorga, comments. James McGuire, for helpful Guillermo and Ken Roberts O'Donnell, Armesto, Alejandra Claudia Baez Camargo, and Annabella Espa?a provided research assistance. 1. Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and John D. Stephens, Capitalist Development Evelyne Huber Stephens,

see Goran and Democracy of Chicago Press, University 1992). For similar arguments, (Chicago: New Left Review, "The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy," 103 (May-June Therborn, 1977); "The Travail of Latin American Goran Therborn, New Left Review, 113 (January-April Democracy," Transition Theory: The Labor Movement, 1979), 71-109; Glenn Adler and Eddie Webster, "Challenging to Democracy in South Africa," Politics and Society, 23 (March 1995), Radical Reform, and Transition inNamibia 75-106; Gretchen Bauer, Labor and Democracy Press, 1998); Ellen (Athens: Ohio University Meiksins Wood, Democracy Press, 1995). against Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University this phrase from Eva Bellin, 2. We borrow Democrats: Industrialists, Labor, and "Contingent Democratization in Late Developing 52 (January 2000), World Politics, 175-205. Several Countries," as uniformally other analyses have cautioned against treating Latin American labor movements prodemo see Ruth Berins Collier, in labor movements' cratic actors. On variation roles in democratic transitions, toward Democracy: The Working Press, (Cambridge: Cambridge University to Democracy: A Framework for Analysis," State, in Western Europe Class and Elites and South America in Transitions "Labor Movements 1999); J. Samuel Valenzuela, 21 (July 1989), 445-72. On labor sup Politics, Comparative The Paradox of Revolution: Kevin J.Middlebrook, Labor, the

Paths

The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Claudia "From Silent Acquiescence to Active Resistance: to Market Labor Leaders' Responses Camargo, inMexico" of Notre Dame, 2002). Oriented Economic Reform (Ph.D. diss., University Baez 3. Ruth Berins Press, Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena (Princeton: under Princeton authoritarian University 4. One 1991). is Bellin, although her analysis is limited to labor movements

port for authoritarian regimes, see Bellin; inMexico and Authoritarianism (Baltimore:

exception

"The Rule of Capital and Rise of Democracy," p. 34. classes may support Stephens, and Stephens, p. 8, recognize that organized working Rueschemeyer, nondemocratic regimes when they are "initially mobilized by a charismatic but authoritarian leader or a hege monic party linked to the state apparatus." However, they explicitly treat such instances as exceptions. 6.

regimes. 5. Therborn,

39

ComparativePolitics

October 2006
Press, 2003), p. (Cambridge: Cambridge University and James Robinson, "A Theory of Political Acemoglu For a classic alternative view, Review, 91 (September 2001), 938-63. class authoritarianism, Political Man: The Social Bases analysis of working see Daron Books, 1960), pp. 87-179. and Stephens, p. 57. by James P. Brennan, The Labor Wars and Redistribution

7. Carles Boix, Democracy 13. For a similar assumption, Transitions," American Economic see Seymour Martin Lipset's (Garden City: Anchor of Politics 8. Rueschemeyer, Stephens, 9. This theme Work and Labor

in C?rdoba, 1955-1976: is developed Ideology, in an Argentina Industrial City (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Politics Press, Peronism and Integration: and the Argentine James, Resistance Working Class, 1994); and Daniel 1945-1976 Press, 1988), 14-40. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 10. 11. Roberto Michels, See Ruth Berins Political Collier

Parties (New York: The Free Press, 1962). versus Constraints: and David Collier, "Inducements Disaggregating 73 (December and Collier, Political Science Review, Collier American 1979), 967-86; Corporatism," S. Mericle, Control Class: the Political of the Working Arena; Kenneth "Corporatist Shaping Authoritarian America and Corporatism in Latin 1964," in James M. Malloy, ed., Authoritarianism Nature de "The of Press, 303-38; Souza, pp. 1977), Pittsburgh Amaury (Pittsburgh: of Organized Leaders and Members Labor in Brazil" of Corporatist Representation: (Ph.D. diss., Cornell Brazil since University in Latin America: and Labor Competition Partisan Coalitions Trade Murillo, Press, 2001); Katrina Burgess, Parties and Reforms (New York: Cambridge University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004). Global Economy (Pittsburgh: University

1978). University, 12. Maria Victoria Unions Unions 13. 14. and Market in the New

BaezCamargo. Robert J. Alexander,

13-23; Collier 15. Collier Political Sage, 16.

Labor in Latin America 1965), pp. (New York: The Free Press, Organized the Political Arena. and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena; J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Labor Movements and and Collier, Shaping in Marino Regini, Some Variations," ed., The Future of Labor Movements (London: Systems:

1992), pp. 53-101. in Argentina Peronism without Per?n: and Democracy James W McGuire, Unions, Parties, Press, 1997). (Stanford: Stanford University and Lucan A.Way, "Between a Shock and a Hard Place: The Dynamics 17. Burgess; Steven Levitsky inArgentina and Poland," Comparative 30 (January 1998), 171-92; of Labor-Backed Politics, Adjustment and Political Systems." "Labor Movements Valenzuela, to Democracy," "Labor Movements in Transitions 18. Valenzuela, p. 446. 19. Juan Carlos Torre, La Vieja Guardia Sindical y Per?n: Sobre los or?genes Aires: 20. 21. 22. Editorial McGuire. Baez Sudamericana, 1990).

del peronismo

(Buenos

pp. 255-87. Camargo; Middlebrook, and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, pp. 232-50; Middlebrook. al orden Democr?tico? estado y 23. Rene Antonio Mayorga, Democracia, ?De la anomia pol?tica movimiento sindical en Bolivia de Estudios Multidisciplinarios, (La Paz: Centro Boliviano 1991); Steven Collier S. Volk, "Class, Union, Party: The Development Science and Society, 39 (1975), 26-43, (1905-1952)," The Uncompleted 24. Bolivia: See James Malloy, 1970). Paul Drake, Socialism and Populism Socialismo of a Revolutionary 180-98. Revolution 1932-52 Union Movement in Bolivia

(Pittsburgh: (Urbana:

University of

of Pittsburgh Illinois Press,

Press, 25.

in Chile,

University

1978), pp. 309-10; Ignacio Walker, (Santiago, Chile: Cieplan-Hachette, 26. DESCO, See Carmen Rosa Balbi, 1989); Nigel Haworth,

Chile y Europa en Perspectiva y Democracia: Comparada 1990), pp. 136-71. Identidad clasista en el sindicalismo: Su impacto en las f?bricas (Lima: The Peruvian Working in "Conflict or Incorporation: Class, 1968-79,"

40

StevenLevitskyand Scott Mainwaring

David Modern Booth and Bernardo and Social Classes: The Peruvian Experience, Reformism The Press, 1983), p. 97; Kenneth M. Roberts, Deepening Democracy? in Chile and Peru (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998). the Political Arena, pp. 549-55; Lucilia de Almeida Neves Delgado, Shaping Sorj, eds., Military

1968-80

(New York: St. Martin's Left and Social Movements

27. Collier and Collier, PTB: Do GetulismoAo (1945-1964) (S?o Paulo: Editora Marco Zero, 1989), pp. 217-90. Reformismo E. Keck, The Workers' Party and Democratization in Brazil 28. See Margaret (New Haven: Yale a "The of William R. The Workers' Press, 1992); Nylen, Party and University Making Loyal Opposition: the Consolidation Brazil: Actors, David in Brazil," in Peter R. Kingstone and Timothy J. Power, eds., Democratic of Democracy and Processes Institutions of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), pp. 126-43; (Pittsburgh: University to Social Democracy? J. Samuels, "From Socialism The Evolution of theWorker's Party in Brazil," 37 (November 2004), 999-1024. Labor in Venezuela, 1958-1991: Behavior and Concerns in a Democratic

Political Studies, Comparative 29. Steve Ellner, Organized

1993). Setting (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, in Venezuela 30. Daniel H. Levine, Conflict and Political (Princeton: Princeton University Change Evolution Political Press, 1973); John D. Martz, Acci?n Democr?tica: of a Modern Party in Venezuela "Labor and the State in a Party-Mediated Press, 1966); Jennifer McCoy, (Princeton: Princeton University inVenezuela," Institutional Change Democracy: 31. Roberts, pp. 118-40. Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political 32. 33. Miguel Urrutia, Press, The Development 1969), pp. 207, 213, 224. Cambridge Latin American Research Review, 24 (1989), 35-67.

University Colombia 34.

Arena, pp. 299-308. Labor Movement of the Colombian See also Jonathan Hartlyn, The Politics

(New Haven: Yale of Coalition Rule in

Press, 1988). University "Problemas del sindicalismo," in Francisco laborales y reestructuraci?n Botero, Leal Buitagro and and Le?n Zamosc, de los a?os 80 eds., Al filo del caos: Crisis pol?tica en la Colombia Universidad Nacional de Colombia Internacionales, (Bogot?: Instituto de Estudios Pol?ticos y Relaciones Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, pp. 467-68, and Tercer Mundo, 1991), pp. 275-305; (Cambridge: Roci? Londo?o 673-81 35. 36. 37. ; Hartlyn, Torre. Collier Brennan, William pp. 183-87. p. 53.

and Collier,

the Crisis of the Argentine Political 38. (Stanford: Economy Stanford University Press, 1989), pp. 228-31. and Workers 39. Gerardo Munck, Authoritarianism and Democratization: in Argentina, Soldiers 1976-1983 40. 41. (University pp. Malloy, 185-86, Park: Pennsylvania 223-35. State University Press, 1998).

the Political Shaping p. 105; McGuire, pp. 114-20, and Smith, Authoritarianism

Arena, 145-50.

p. 341; McGuire,

Alexander,

(Cambridge: Socialization: 42. 361-66. 43. 44. 45.

Labour Movement 1848-1971 p. 62; Guillermo Lora, A History of the Bolivian Labor Unions and Political Press, 1977), p. 301; John H. Magill, Cambridge University A Case Study of Bolivian Workers (New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 32. "The Labor Movement Alexander, pp. 65-67; Lora, pp. during and since the 1952 Revolution,"

ed., Stepan, Brazil (New York: Oxford University Press, Democratizing 46. Roberts, p. 92. See also Walker, pp. 136-71. 47. The Breakdown Arturo Valenzuela, of Democratic Regimes: Chile (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins the Political Arena, pp. 560-65. Press, 61-80; Collier and Collier, Shaping pp. University 1978), Transition," 1989), pp. 252-96. 48. C. Epstein, Jaime Ruiz Tagle, "Trade Unionism and the State under the Chilean Military Regime," in Edward ed., Labor Autonomy and the State in Latin America (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989).

pp. 161, 181. Mayorga, Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, pp. 552-55; in the Brazilian E. Keck, "The New Unionism Margaret

Delgado,

pp. 260-89. in Alfred

41

ComparativePolitics
49. 50. 51. 52. Roberts, Urrutia. pp. 149-53.

October 2006

Middlebrook; Ruth Berins Century: One-Party

Twentieth Embrace: Academic

Collier, The Case

Baez Camargo. "The Transformation of Mexico," in Herman

of Labor-Based Giliomee

One-Partyism and Charles Simkins, Countries

at the End

of

the

Domination

and Democracy

in Industrializing

eds., The Awkward Harwood (Amsterdam:

in Nicaragua, and the Popular Classes 53. "Stabilization, Destabilization, Latin American Research Review, 26 (1990), 55-88; Richard Stahler-Sholk, "The Dog That 1979-1988," and Economic Adjustment in Nicaragua Didn't Bark: Labor Autonomy under the Sandinista and UNO 28 (1995), 77-102. Governments," Politics, Comparative inNicaragua," and the Popular Classes Destabilization, "Stabilization, Stahler-Sholk, p. 83. Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, pp. 328-30. Huber See also Balbi, pp. 59-67; Haworth, 56. pp. 106-13; Cynthia p. 70. Stephens, Evelyne of Populism in Peru: 1975-1990" "The Democratic Left and the Persistence Sanborn, (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1991), pp. 105-10. 54. 55. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. Sanborn, Roberts, pp. 104-28. pp. 213-14. Ibid., pp. 250-53. pp. 39-40. McCoy, the Political Arena. Ellner; Collier and Collier, Shaping to Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, p. 46: "It is the growth of a counter-hegemo the working class... that is critical for the promotion classes and especially of democra O'Donnell, (Berkeley: Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South

Publishers, 1999). Richard Stahler-Sholk,

According ny of subordinate cy." 63. Guillermo Politics

American

"Reflections O'Donnell, Studies, 1973); Guillermo on the Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian 12 State," Latin American Research Review, in Latin America ed., The New Authoritarianism 1978), 3-38; David Collier, (Princeton: (Winter Princeton University Press, 1979).

Institute of International

in Argentina, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, 64. Labor movements Chile, Colombia, lost between 25 and 70 percent of their memberships between 1985 and and Venezuela Peru, Uruguay, ILO World Labor Report: Industrial Relations, 1995. See International Labor Organization, Democracy "Economic in Latin America: and Stability ILO, 1998); John Weeks, (Geneva: Impact on Integration and Training Paper No. Labor" (Geneva: International Labor Office Employment 18, 1998). Brazil was an and Peru in the early and mid 1980s. and John D. Stephens, "The Paradoxes of Contemporary Rueschemeyer, and Social Dimensions," 29 (April 1997), 332; Formal, Participatory, Politics, Democracy: Comparative and the Chilean and Mexican and Marcus Kurtz, Free Market Democracy Countryside (New York: make similar Press, arguments. 2004), Cambridge University 67. and Stephens; Roberts; Kurtz. Huber, Rueschemeyer, 66. Evelyne Huber, Dietrich 68. Routledge Huber, Rueschemeyer, and Kegan Paul, 1983); and Stephens; Walter Korpi, The Democratic John D. Stephens, The Transition from 1979). of Democratic Class Capitalism (London: Struggle to Socialism to this trend. exception include Bolivia 65. Exceptions

and Re-Equilibration Crisis, Breakdown, Regimes: O'Donnell and Philippe C Schmitter, Press, 1978); Guillermo (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Democracies Transitions from Authoritarian about Uncertain Rule: Tentative Conclusions (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986)

of Illinois Press, (Urbana: University 69. Juan J. Linz, The Breakdown

42