Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus by Ludwig Wittgenstein Published (1922) (Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung (1921)) Perhaps this book will be understood only

by someone who has himself already had the thoughts that are e pressed in it--or at least similar thoughts!--"o it is not a te tbook!--#ts purpose would be achie$ed if it ga$e pleasure to one person who read and understood it! %he book deals with the problems of philosophy& and shows& # belie$e& that the reason why these problems are posed is that the logic of our language is misunderstood! %he whole sense of the book might be summed up the following words' what can be said at all can be said clearly& and what we cannot talk about we must pass o$er in silence! %hus the aim of the book is to draw a limit to thought& or rather--not to thought& but to the e pression of thoughts' for in order to be able to draw a limit to thought& we should ha$e to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i!e! we should ha$e to be able to think what cannot be thought)! #t will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn& and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense! # do not wish to (udge how far my efforts coincide with those of other philosophers! #ndeed& what # ha$e written here makes no claim to no$elty in detail& and the reason why # gi$e no sources is that it is a matter of indifference to me whether the thoughts that # ha$e had ha$e been anticipated by someone else! # will only mention that # am indebted to )rege*s great works and of the writings of my friend +r ,ertrand -ussell for much of the stimulation of my thoughts! #f this work has any $alue& it consists in two things' the first is that thoughts are e pressed in it& and on this score the better the thoughts are e pressed--the more the nail has been hit on the head--the greater will be its $alue!--.ere # am conscious of ha$ing fallen a long way short of what is possible! "imply because my powers are too slight for the accomplishment of the task!--+ay others come and do it better! /n the other hand the truth of the thoughts that are here communicated seems to me unassailable and definiti$e! # therefore belie$e myself to ha$e found& on all essential points& the final solution of the problems! And if # am not mistaken in this belief& then the second thing in which the of this work consists is that it shows how little is achie$ed when these problem are sol$ed! L!0! 1ienna& 1912

1 %he world is all that is the case! 1!1 %he world is the totality of facts& not of things! 1!11 %he world is determined by the facts& and by their being all the facts! 1!12 )or the totality of facts determines what is the case& and also whate$er is not the case! 1!13 %he facts in logical space are the world! 1!2 %he world di$ides into facts! 1!21 4ach item can be the case or not the case while e$erything else remains the same! 2 0hat is the case--a fact--is the e istence of states of affairs! 2!51 A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of ob(ects (things)! 2!511 #t is essential to things that they should be possible constituents of states of affairs! 2!512 #n logic nothing is accidental' if a thing can occur in a state of affairs& the possibility of the state of affairs must be written into the thing itself! 2!5121 #t would seem to be a sort of accident& if it turned out that a situation would fit a thing that could already e ist entirely on its own! #f things can occur in states of affairs& this possibility must be in them from the beginning! (6othing in the pro$ince of logic can be merely possible! Logic deals with e$ery possibility and all possibilities are its facts!) 7ust as we are 8uite unable to imagine spatial ob(ects outside space or temporal ob(ects outside time& so too there is no ob(ect that we can imagine e cluded from the possibility of combining with others! #f # can imagine ob(ects combined in states of affairs& # cannot imagine them e cluded from the possibility of such combinations! 2!5122 %hings are independent in so far as they can occur in all possible situations& but this form of independence is a form of conne ion with states of affairs& a form of dependence! (#t is impossible for words to appear in two different roles' by themsel$es& and in propositions!) 2!5123 #f # know an ob(ect # also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs! (4$ery one of these possibilities must be part of the nature of the ob(ect!) A new possibility cannot be disco$ered later! 2!51231 #f # am to know an ob(ect& thought # need not know its e ternal properties& # must know all its internal properties! 2!5129 #f all ob(ects are gi$en& then at the same time all possible states of affairs are also gi$en! 2!513 4ach thing is& as it were& in a space of possible states of affairs! %his space # can imagine empty& but # cannot imagine the thing without the space!

2!5131 A spatial ob(ect must be situated in infinite space! (A spatial point is an argument-place!) A speck in the $isual field thought it need not be red& must ha$e some color' it is& so to speak& surrounded by color-space! 6otes must ha$e some pitch: ob(ects of the sense of touch some degree of hardness& and so on! 2!519 /b(ects contain the possibility of all situations! 2!5191 %he possibility of its occurring in states of affairs is the form of an ob(ect! 2!52 /b(ects are simple! 2!5251 4$ery statement about comple es can be resol$ed into a statement about their constituents and into the propositions that describe the comple es completely! 2!521 /b(ects make up the substance of the world! %hat is why they cannot be composite! 2!5211 #f they world had no substance& then whether a proposition had sense would depend on whether another proposition was true! 2!5212 #n that case we could not sketch any picture of the world (true or false)! 2!522 #t is ob$ious that an imagined world& howe$er difference it may be from the real one& must ha$e something-- a form--in common with it! 2!523 /b(ects are (ust what constitute this unalterable form! 2!5231 %he substance of the world can only determine a form& and not any material properties! )or it is only by means of propositions that material properties are represented--only by the configuration of ob(ects that they are produced! 2!5232 #n a manner of speaking& ob(ects are colorless! 2!5233 #f two ob(ects ha$e the same logical form& the only distinction between them& apart from their e ternal properties& is that they are different! 2!52331 4ither a thing has properties that nothing else has& in which case we can immediately use a description to distinguish it from the others and refer to it: or& on the other hand& there are se$eral things that ha$e the whole set of their properties in common& in which case it is 8uite impossible to indicate one of them! )or it there is nothing to distinguish a thing& # cannot distinguish it& since otherwise it would be distinguished after all! 2!529 %he substance is what subsists independently of what is the case! 2!52; #t is form and content! 2!52;1 "pace& time& color (being colored) are forms of ob(ects! 2!52< %here must be ob(ects& if the world is to ha$e unalterable form! 2!52= /b(ects& the unalterable& and the subsistent are one and the same!

2!52=1 /b(ects are what is unalterable and subsistent: their configuration is what is changing and unstable! 2!52=2 %he configuration of ob(ects produces states of affairs! 2!53 #n a state of affairs ob(ects fit into one another like the links of a chain! 2!531 #n a state of affairs ob(ects stand in a determinate relation to one another! 2!532 %he determinate way in which ob(ects are connected in a state of affairs is the structure of the state of affairs! 2!533 )orm is the possibility of structure! 2!539 %he structure of a fact consists of the structures of states of affairs! 2!59 %he totality of e isting states of affairs is the world! 2!5; %he totality of e isting states of affairs also determines which states of affairs do not e ist! 2!5< %he e istence and non-e istence of states of affairs is reality! (0e call the e istence of states of affairs a positi$e fact& and their non-e istence a negati$e fact!) 2!5<1 "tates of affairs are independent of one another! 2!5<2 )rom the e istence or non-e istence of one state of affairs it is impossible to infer the e istence or non-e istence of another! 2!5<3 %he sum-total of reality is the world! 2!1 0e picture facts to oursel$es! 2!11 A picture presents a situation in logical space& the e istence and none istence of states of affairs! 2!12 A picture is a model of reality! 2!13 #n a picture ob(ects ha$e the elements of the picture corresponding to them! 2!131 #n a picture the elements of the picture are the representati$es of ob(ects! 2!19 0hat constitutes a picture is that its elements are related to one another in a determinate way! 2!191 A picture is a fact! 2!1; %he fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a determinate way represents that things are related to one another in the same way! Let us call this conne ion of its elements the structure of the picture& and let us call the possibility of this structure the pictorial form of the picture! 2!1;1 Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related to one another in the same way as the elements of the picture! 2!1;11 %hat is how a picture is attached to reality: it reaches right out to it! 2!1;12 #t is laid against reality like a measure!

2!1;121 /nly the end-points of the graduating lines actually touch the ob(ect that is to be measured! 2!1;19 "o a picture& concei$ed in this way& also includes the pictorial relationship& which makes it into a picture! 2!1;1; %hese correlations are& as it were& the feelers of the picture*s elements& with which the picture touches reality! 2!1< #f a fact is to be a picture& it must ha$e something in common with what it depicts! 2!1<1 %here must be something identical in a picture and what it depicts& to enable the one to be a picture of the other at all! 2!1= 0hat a picture must ha$e in common with reality& in order to be able to depict it--correctly or incorrectly--in the way that it does& is its pictorial form! 2!1=1 A picture can depict any reality whose form it has! A spatial picture can depict anything spatial& a colored one anything colored& etc! 2!1=2 A picture cannot& howe$er& depict its pictorial form' it displays it! 2!1=3 A picture represents its sub(ect from a position outside it! (#ts standpoint is its representational form!) %hat is why a picture represents its sub(ect correctly or incorrectly! 2!1=9 A picture cannot& howe$er& place itself outside its representational form! 2!12 0hat any picture& of whate$er form& must ha$e in common with reality& in order to be able to depict it--correctly or incorrectly--in any way at all& is logical form& i!e! the form of reality! 2!121 A picture whose pictorial form is logical form is called a logical picture! 2!122 4$ery picture is at the same time a logical one! (/n the other hand& not e$ery picture is& for e ample& a spatial one!) 2!19 Logical pictures can depict the world! 2!2 A picture has logico-pictorial form in common with what it depicts! 2!251 A picture depicts reality by representing a possibility of e istence and non-e istence of states of affairs! 2!252 A picture contains the possibility of the situation that it represents! 2!253 A picture agrees with reality or fails to agree: it is correct or incorrect& true or false! 2!22 0hat a picture represents it represents independently of its truth or falsity& by means of its pictorial form! 2!221 0hat a picture represents is its sense! 2!222 %he agreement or disagreement or its sense with reality constitutes its truth or falsity!

2!223 #n order to tell whether a picture is true or false we must compare it with reality! 2!229 #t is impossible to tell from the picture alone whether it is true or false! 2!22; %here are no pictures that are true a priori! 3 A logical picture of facts is a thought! 3!551 *A state of affairs is thinkable*' what this means is that we can picture it to oursel$es! 3!51 %he totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world! 3!52 A thought contains the possibility of the situation of which it is the thought! 0hat is thinkable is possible too! 3!53 %hought can ne$er be of anything illogical& since& if it were& we should ha$e to think illogically! 3!531 #t used to be said that >od could create anything e cept what would be contrary to the laws of logic!%he truth is that we could not say what an *illogical* world would look like! 3!532 #t is as impossible to represent in language anything that *contradicts logic* as it is in geometry to represent by its coordinates a figure that contradicts the laws of space& or to gi$e the coordinates of a point that does not e ist! 3!5321 %hough a state of affairs that would contra$ene the laws of physics can be represented by us spatially& one that would contra$ene the laws of geometry cannot! 3!59 #t a thought were correct a priori& it would be a thought whose possibility ensured its truth! 3!5; A priori knowledge that a thought was true would be possible only it its truth were recogni?able from the thought itself (without anything a to compare it with)! 3!1 #n a proposition a thought finds an e pression that can be percei$ed by the senses! 3!11 0e use the perceptible sign of a proposition (spoken or written& etc!) as a pro(ection of a possible situation! %he method of pro(ection is to think of the sense of the proposition! 3!12 # call the sign with which we e press a thought a propositional sign!And a proposition is a propositional sign in its pro(ecti$e relation to the world! 3!13 A proposition& therefore& does not actually contain its sense& but does contain the possibility of e pressing it! (*%he content of a proposition* means the content of a proposition that has sense!) A proposition contains the form& but not the content& of its sense!

3!19 0hat constitutes a propositional sign is that in its elements (the words) stand in a determinate relation to one another! A propositional sign is a fact! 3!191 A proposition is not a blend of words!(7ust as a theme in music is not a blend of notes!) A proposition is articulate! 3!192 /nly facts can e press a sense& a set of names cannot! 3!193 Although a propositional sign is a fact& this is obscured by the usual form of e pression in writing or print! )or in a printed proposition& for e ample& no essential difference is apparent between a propositional sign and a word! (%hat is what made it possible for )rege to call a proposition a composite name!) 3!1931 %he essence of a propositional sign is $ery clearly seen if we imagine one composed of spatial ob(ects (such as tables& chairs& and books) instead of written signs! 3!1932 #nstead of& *%he comple sign @a-b@ says that a stands to b in the relation -* we ought to put& *%hat @a@ stands to @b@ in a certain relation says that a-b!* 3!199 "ituations can be described but not gi$en names! 3!2 #n a proposition a thought can be e pressed in such a way that elements of the propositional sign correspond to the ob(ects of the thought! 3!251 # call such elements *simple signs*& and such a proposition *complete analysed*! 3!252 %he simple signs employed in propositions are called names! 3!253 A name means an ob(ect! %he ob(ect is its meaning! (*A* is the same sign as *A*!) 3!21 %he configuration of ob(ects in a situation corresponds to the configuration of simple signs in the propositional sign! 3!221 /b(ects can only be named! "igns are their representati$es! # can only speak about them' # cannot put them into words! Propositions can only say how things are& not what they are! 3!23 %he re8uirement that simple signs be possible is the re8uirement that sense be determinate! 3!29 A proposition about a comple stands in an internal relation to a proposition about a constituent of the comple ! A comple can be gi$en only by its description& which will be right or wrong! A proposition that mentions a comple will not be nonsensical& if the comple does not e its& but simply false! 0hen a propositional element signifies a comple & this can be seen from an indeterminateness in the propositions in which it occurs! #n such cases we know that the proposition lea$es something undetermined! (#n fact the notation for generality contains a prototype!) %he contraction of a symbol for a comple into a simple symbol can be e pressed in a definition!

3!2; A proposition cannot be dissected any further by means of a definition' it is a primiti$e sign! 3!2<1 4$ery sign that has a definition signifies $ia the signs that ser$e to define it: and the definitions point the way! %wo signs cannot signify in the same manner if one is primiti$e and the other is defined by means of primiti$e signs! 6ames cannot be anatomi?ed by means of definitions! (6or can any sign that has a meaning independently and on its own!) 3!2<2 0hat signs fail to e press& their application shows! 0hat signs slur o$er& their application says clearly! 3!2<3 %he meanings of primiti$e signs can be e plained by means of elucidations! 4lucidations are propositions that stood if the meanings of those signs are already known! 3!3 /nly propositions ha$e sense: only in the ne us of a proposition does a name ha$e meaning! 3!31 # call any part of a proposition that characteri?es its sense an e pression (or a symbol)! (A proposition is itself an e pression!) 4$erything essential to their sense that propositions can ha$e in common with one another is an e pression! An e pression is the mark of a form and a content! 3!311 An e pression presupposes the forms of all the propositions in which it can occur! #t is the common characteristic mark of a class of propositions! 3!312 #t is therefore presented by means of the general form of the propositions that it characteri?es! #n fact& in this form the e pression will be constant and e$erything else $ariable! 3!313 %hus an e pression is presented by means of a $ariable whose $alues are the propositions that contain the e pression! (#n the limiting case the $ariable becomes a constant& the e pression becomes a proposition!) # call such a $ariable a *propositional $ariable*! 3!319 An e pression has meaning only in a proposition! All $ariables can be construed as propositional $ariables! (4$en $ariable names!) 3!31; #f we turn a constituent of a proposition into a $ariable& there is a class of propositions all of which are $alues of the resulting $ariable proposition! #n general& this class too will be dependent on the meaning that our arbitrary con$entions ha$e gi$en to parts of the original proposition! ,ut if all the signs in it that ha$e arbitrarily determined meanings are turned into $ariables& we shall still get a class of this kind! %his one& howe$er& is not dependent on any con$ention& but solely on the nature of the pro position! #t corresponds to a logical form--a logical prototype! 3!31< 0hat $alues a propositional $ariable may take is something that is stipulated! %he stipulation of $alues is the $ariable!

3!31= %o stipulate $alues for a propositional $ariable is to gi$e the propositions whose common characteristic the $ariable is! %he stipulation is a description of those propositions! %he stipulation will therefore be concerned only with symbols& not with their meaning! And the only thing essential to the stipulation is that it is merely a description of symbols and states nothing about what is signified! .ow the description of the propositions is produced is not essential! 3!312 Like )rege and -ussell # construe a proposition as a function of the e pressions contained in it! 3!32 A sign is what can be percei$ed of a symbol! 3!321 "o one and the same sign (written or spoken& etc!) can be common to two different symbols--in which case they will signify in different ways! 3!322 /ur use of the same sign to signify two different ob(ects can ne$er indicate a common characteristic of the two& if we use it with two different modes of signification! )or the sign& of course& is arbitrary! "o we could choose two different signs instead& and then what would be left in common on the signifying sideA 3!323 #n e$eryday language it $ery fre8uently happens that the same word has different modes of signification--and so belongs to different symbols--or that two words that ha$e different modes of signification are employed in propositions in what is superficially the same way! %hus the word *is* figures as the copula& as a sign for identity& and as an e pression for e istence: *e ist* figures as an intransiti$e $erb like *go*& and *identical* as an ad(ecti$e: we speak of something& but also of something*s happening! (#n the proposition& *>reen is green*--where the first word is the proper name of a person and the last an ad(ecti$e--these words do not merely ha$e different meanings' they are different symbols!) 3!329 #n this way the most fundamental confusions are easily produced (the whole of philosophy is full of them)! 3!32; #n order to a$oid such errors we must make use of a sign-language that e cludes them by not using the same sign for different symbols and by not using in a superficially similar way signs that ha$e different modes of signification' that is to say& a sign-language that is go$erned by logical grammar--by logical synta ! (%he conceptual notation of )rege and -ussell is such a language& though& it is true& it fails to e clude all mistakes!) 3!32< #n order to recogni?e a symbol by its sign we must obser$e how it is used with a sense! 3!32= A sign does not determine a logical form unless it is taken together with its logico-syntactical employment!

3!322 #f a sign is useless& it is meaningless! %hat is the point of /ccam*s ma im! (#f e$erything beha$es as if a sign had meaning& then it does ha$e meaning!) 3!33 #n logical synta the meaning of a sign should ne$er play a role! #t must be possible to establish logical synta without mentioning the meaning of a sign' only the description of e pressions may be presupposed! 3!331 )rom this obser$ation we turn to -ussell*s *theory of types*! #t can be seen that -ussell must be wrong& because he had to mention the meaning of signs when establishing the rules for them! 3!332 6o proposition can make a statement about itself& because a propositional sign cannot be contained in itself (that is the whole of the *theory of types*)! 3!333 %he reason why a function cannot be its own argument is that the sign for a function already contains the prototype of its argument& and it cannot contain itself! )or let us suppose that the function )(f ) could be its own argument' in that case there would be a proposition *)()(f ))*& in which the outer function ) and the inner function ) must ha$e different meanings& since the inner one has the form /(f( )) and the outer one has the form B(/(f ))! /nly the letter *)* is common to the two functions& but the letter by itself signifies nothing! %his immediately becomes clear if instead of *)()u)* we write *(do) ' )(/u) ! /u C )u*! %hat disposes of -ussell*s parado ! 3!339 %he rules of logical synta must go without saying& once we know how each indi$idual sign signifies! 3!39 A proposition possesses essential and accidental features! Accidental features are those that result from the particular way in which the propositional sign is produced! 4ssential features are those without which the proposition could not e press its sense! 3!391 "o what is essential in a proposition is what all propositions that can e press the same sense ha$e in common! And similarly& in general& what is essential in a symbol is what all symbols that can ser$e the same purpose ha$e in common! 3!3911 "o one could say that the real name of an ob(ect was what all symbols that signified it had in common! %hus& one by one& all kinds of composition would pro$e to be unessential to a name! 3!392 Although there is something arbitrary in our notations& this much is not arbitrary--that when we ha$e determined one thing arbitrarily& something else is necessarily the case! (%his deri$es from the essence of notation!) 3!3921 A particular mode of signifying may be unimportant but it is always important that it is a possible mode of signifying! And that is generally so in philosophy' again and again the indi$idual case turns out to be unimportant&

but the possibility of each indi$idual case discloses something about the essence of the world! 3!393 Definitions are rules for translating from one language into another! Any correct sign-language must be translatable into any other in accordance with such rules' it is this that they all ha$e in common! 3!399 0hat signifies in a symbol is what is common to all the symbols that the rules of logical synta allow us to substitute for it! 3!3991 )or instance& we can e press what is common to all notations for truth-functions in the following way' they ha$e in common that& for e ample& the notation that uses *Pp* (*not p*) and *p E g* (*p or g*) can be substituted for any of them! (%his ser$es to characteri?e the way in which something general can be disclosed by the possibility of a specific notation!) 3!3992 6or does analysis resol$e the sign for a comple in an arbitrary way& so that it would ha$e a different resolution e$ery time that it was incorporated in a different proposition! 3!9 A proposition determines a place in logical space! %he e istence of this logical place is guaranteed by the mere e istence of the constituents--by the e istence of the proposition with a sense! 3!91 %he propositional sign with logical co-ordinates--that is the logical place! 3!911 #n geometry and logic alike a place is a possibility' something can e ist in it! 3!92 A proposition can determine only one place in logical space' ne$ertheless the whole of logical space must already be gi$en by it! (/therwise negation& logical sum& logical product& etc!& would introduce more and more new elements in co-ordination!) (%he logical scaffolding surrounding a picture determines logical space! %he force of a proposition reaches through the whole of logical space!) 3!; A propositional sign& applied and thought out& is a thought! 9 A thought is a proposition with a sense! 9!551 %he totality of propositions is language! 9!522 +an possesses the ability to construct languages capable of e pressing e$ery sense& without ha$ing any idea how each word has meaning or what its meaning is--(ust as people speak without knowing how the indi$idual sounds are produced! 4$eryday language is a part of the human organism and is no less complicated than it! #t is not humanly possible to gather immediately from it what the logic of language is! Language disguises thought! "o much so& that from the outward form of the clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it& because the outward form of the clothing is not designed to re$eal the form of the body& but for

entirely different purposes! %he tacit con$entions on which the understanding of e$eryday language depends are enormously complicated! 9!553 +ost of the propositions and 8uestions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical! Eonse8uently we cannot gi$e any answer to 8uestions of this kind& but can only point out that they are nonsensical! +ost of the propositions and 8uestions of philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our language! (%hey belong to the same class as the 8uestion whether the good is more or less identical than the beautiful!) And it is not surprising that the deepest problems are in fact not problems at all! 9!5531 All philosophy is a *criti8ue of language* (though not in +authner*s sense)! #t was -ussell who performed the ser$ice of showing that the apparent logical form of a proposition need not be its real one! 9!51 A proposition is a picture of reality! A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it! 9!511 At first sight a proposition--one set out on the printed page& for e ample--does not seem to be a picture of the reality with which it is concerned! ,ut neither do written notes seem at first sight to be a picture of a piece of music& nor our phonetic notation (the alphabet) to be a picture of our speech! And yet these sign-languages pro$e to be pictures& e$en in the ordinary sense& of what they represent! 9!512 #t is ob$ious that a proposition of the form *a-b* strikes us as a picture! #n this case the sign is ob$iously a likeness of what is signified! 9!513 And if we penetrate to the essence of this pictorial character& we see that it is not impaired by apparent irregularities (such as the use FsharpG of and FflatG in musical notation)! )or e$en these irregularities depict what they are intended to e press: only they do it in a different way! 9!519 A gramophone record& the musical idea& the written notes& and the sound-wa$es& all stand to one another in the same internal relation of depicting that holds between language and the world! %hey are all constructed according to a common logical pattern! (Like the two youths in the fairy-tale& their two horses& and their lilies! %hey are all in a certain sense one!) 9!5191 %here is a general rule by means of which the musician can obtain the symphony from the score& and which makes it possible to deri$e the symphony from the groo$e on the gramophone record& and& using the first rule& to deri$e the score again! %hat is what constitutes the inner similarity between these things which seem to be constructed in such entirely different ways! And that rule is the law of pro(ection which pro(ects the symphony

into the language of musical notation! #t is the rule for translating this language into the language of gramophone records! 9!51; %he possibility of all imagery& of all our pictorial modes of e pression& is contained in the logic of depiction! 9!51< #n order to understand the essential nature of a proposition& we should consider hieroglyphic script& which depicts the facts that it describes! And alphabetic script de$eloped out of it without losing what was essential to depiction! 9!52 0e can see this from the fact that we understand the sense of a propositional sign without its ha$ing been e plained to us! 9!521 A proposition is a picture of reality' for if # understand a proposition& # know the situation that it represents! And # understand the proposition without ha$ing had its sense e plained to me! 9!522 A proposition shows its sense! A proposition shows how things stand if it is true! And it says that they do so stand! 9!523 A proposition must restrict reality to two alternati$es' yes or no! #n order to do that& it must describe reality completely! A proposition is a description of a state of affairs! 7ust as a description of an ob(ect describes it by gi$ing its e ternal properties& so a proposition describes reality by its internal properties! A proposition constructs a world with the help of a logical scaffolding& so that one can actually see from the proposition how e$erything stands logically if it is true! /ne can draw inferences from a false proposition! 9!529 %o understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true! (/ne can understand it& therefore& without knowing whether it is true!) #t is understood by anyone who understands its constituents! 9!52; 0hen translating one language into another& we do not proceed by translating each proposition of the one into a proposition of the other& but merely by translating the constituents of propositions! (And the dictionary translates not only substanti$es& but also $erbs& ad(ecti$es& and con(unctions& etc!: and it treats them all in the same way!) 9!52< %he meanings of simple signs (words) must be e plained to us if we are to understand them! 0ith propositions& howe$er& we make oursel$es understood! 9!52= #t belongs to the essence of a proposition that it should be able to communicate a new sense to us! 9!53 A proposition must use old e pressions to communicate a new sense! A proposition communicates a situation to us& and so it must be essentially connected with the situation! And the conne ion is precisely that it is its

logical picture! A proposition states something only in so far as it is a picture! 9!531 #n a proposition a situation is& as it were& constructed by way of e periment! #nstead of& *%his proposition has such and such a sense& we can simply say& *%his proposition represents such and such a situation*! 9!5311 /ne name stands for one thing& another for another thing& and they are combined with one another! #n this way the whole group--like a tableau $i$ant--presents a state of affairs! 9!5312 %he possibility of propositions is based on the principle that ob(ects ha$e signs as their representati$es! +y fundamental idea is that the *logical constants* are not representati$es: that there can be no representati$es of the logic of facts! 9!532 #t is only in so far as a proposition is logically articulated that it is a picture of a situation! (4$en the proposition& *Ambulo*& is composite' for its stem with a different ending yields a different sense& and so does its ending with a different stem!) 9!59 #n a proposition there must be e actly as many distinguishable parts as in the situation that it represents! %he two must possess the same logical (mathematical) multiplicity! (Eompare .ert?*s +echanics on dynamical models!) 9!591 %his mathematical multiplicity& of course& cannot itself be the sub(ect of depiction! /ne cannot get away from it when depicting! 9!5911 #f& for e ample& we wanted to e press what we now write as *( ) ! f * by putting an affi in front of *f *--for instance by writing *>en! f *--it would not be ade8uate' we should not know what was being generali?ed! #f we wanted to signali?e it with an affi *g*--for instance by writing *f( g)*--that would not be ade8uate either' we should not know the scope of the generality-sign! #f we were to try to do it by introducing a mark into the argument-places--for instance by writing *(>&>) ! )(>&>)* --it would not be ade8uate' we should not be able to establish the identity of the $ariables! And so on! All these modes of signifying are inade8uate because they lack the necessary mathematical multiplicity! 9!5912 )or the same reason the idealist*s appeal to *spatial spectacles* is inade8uate to e plain the seeing of spatial relations& because it cannot e plain the multiplicity of these relations! 9!5; -eality is compared with propositions! 9!5< A proposition can be true or false only in $irtue of being a picture of reality! 9!5<1 #t must not be o$erlooked that a proposition has a sense that is independent of the facts' otherwise one can easily suppose that true and false

are relations of e8ual status between signs and what they signify! #n that case one could say& for e ample& that *p* signified in the true way what *Pp* signified in the false way& etc! 9!5<2 Ean we not make oursel$es understood with false propositions (ust as we ha$e done up till now with true onesA--"o long as it is known that they are meant to be false!--6oH )or a proposition is true if we use it to say that things stand in a certain way& and they do: and if by *p* we mean Pp and things stand as we mean that they do& then& construed in the new way& *p* is true and not false! 9!5<21 ,ut it is important that the signs *p* and *Pp* can say the same thing! )or it shows that nothing in reality corresponds to the sign *P*! %he occurrence of negation in a proposition is not enough to characteri?e its sense (PPp C p)! %he propositions *p* and *Pp* ha$e opposite sense& but there corresponds to them one and the same reality! 9!5<3 An analogy to illustrate the concept of truth' imagine a black spot on white paper' you can describe the shape of the spot by saying& for each point on the sheet& whether it is black or white! %o the fact that a point is black there corresponds a positi$e fact& and to the fact that a point is white (not black)& a negati$e fact! #f # designate a point on the sheet (a truth-$alue according to )rege)& then this corresponds to the supposition that is put forward for (udgement& etc! etc! ,ut in order to be able to say that a point is black or white& # must first know when a point is called black& and when white' in order to be able to say&*@p@ is true (or false)*& # must ha$e determined in what circumstances # call *p* true& and in so doing # determine the sense of the proposition! 6ow the point where the simile breaks down is this' we can indicate a point on the paper e$en if we do not know what black and white are& but if a proposition has no sense& nothing corresponds to it& since it does not designate a thing (a truth-$alue) which might ha$e properties called *false* or *true*! %he $erb of a proposition is not *is true* or *is false*& as )rege thought' rather& that which *is true* must already contain the $erb! 9!5<9 4$ery proposition must already ha$e a sense' it cannot be gi$en a sense by affirmation! #ndeed its sense is (ust what is affirmed! And the same applies to negation& etc! 9!5<91 /ne could say that negation must be related to the logical place determined by the negated proposition! %he negating proposition determines a logical place different from that of the negated proposition! %he negating proposition determines a logical place with the help of the logical place of the negated proposition! )or it describes it as lying outside the latter*s logical place! %he negated proposition can be negated again& and this in itself shows

that what is negated is already a proposition& and not merely something that is prelimary to a proposition! 9!1 Propositions represent the e istence and non-e istence of states of affairs! 9!11 %he totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science (or the whole corpus of the natural sciences)! 9!111 Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences! (%he word *philosophy* must mean something whose place is abo$e or below the natural sciences& not beside them!) 9!112 Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts! Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an acti$ity! A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations! Philosophy does not result in *philosophical propositions*& but rather in the clarification of propositions! 0ithout philosophy thoughts are& as it were& cloudy and indistinct' its task is to make them clear and to gi$e them sharp boundaries! 9!1121 Psychology is no more closely related to philosophy than any other natural science! %heory of knowledge is the philosophy of psychology! Does not my study of sign-language correspond to the study of thought-processes& which philosophers used to consider so essential to the philosophy of logicA /nly in most cases they got entangled in unessential psychological in$estigations& and with my method too there is an analogous risk! 9!1122 Darwin*s theory has no more to do with philosophy than any other hypothesis in natural science! 9!113 Philosophy sets limits to the much disputed sphere of natural science! 9!119 #t must set limits to what can be thought: and& in doing so& to what cannot be thought! #t must set limits to what cannot be thought by working outwards through what can be thought! 9!11; #t will signify what cannot be said& by presenting clearly what can be said! 9!11< 4$erything that can be thought at all can be thought clearly! 4$erything that can be put into words can be put clearly! 9!12 Propositions can represent the whole of reality& but they cannot represent what they must ha$e in common with reality in order to be able to represent it--logical form! #n order to be able to represent logical form& we should ha$e to be able to station oursel$es with propositions somewhere outside logic that is to say outside the world! 9!121 Propositions cannot represent logical form' it is mirrored in them! 0hat finds its reflection in language& language cannot represent! 0hat e presses itself in language& we cannot e press by means of language! Propositions show the logical form of reality! %hey display it!

9!1211 %hus one proposition *fa* shows that the ob(ect a occurs in its sense& two propositions *fa* and *ga* show that the same ob(ect is mentioned in both of them! #f two propositions contradict one another& then their structure shows it: the same is true if one of them follows from the other! And so on! 9!1212 0hat can be shown& cannot be said! 9!1213 6ow& too& we understand our feeling that once we ha$e a signlanguage in which e$erything is all right& we already ha$e a correct logical point of $iew! 9!122 #n a certain sense we can talk about formal properties of ob(ects and states of affairs& or& in the case of facts& about structural properties' and in the same sense about formal relations and structural relations! (#nstead of *structural property* # also say *internal property*: instead of *structural relation*& *internal relation*! # introduce these e pressions in order to indicate the source of the confusion between internal relations and relations proper (e ternal relations)& which is $ery widespread among philosophers!) #t is impossible& howe$er& to assert by means of propositions that such internal properties and relations obtain' rather& this makes itself manifest in the propositions that represent the rele$ant states of affairs and are concerned with the rele$ant ob(ects! 9!1221 An internal property of a fact can also be bed a feature of that fact (in the sense in which we speak of facial features& for e ample)! 9!123 A property is internal if it is unthinkable that its ob(ect should not possess it! (%his shade of blue and that one stand& eo ipso& in the internal relation of lighter to darker! #t is unthinkable that these two ob(ects should not stand in this relation!) (.ere the shifting use of the word *ob(ect* corresponds to the shifting use of the words *property* and *relation*!) 9!129 %he e istence of an internal property of a possible situation is not e pressed by means of a proposition' rather& it e presses itself in the proposition representing the situation& by means of an internal property of that proposition! #t would be (ust as nonsensical to assert that a proposition had a formal property as to deny it! 9!1291 #t is impossible to distinguish forms from one another by saying that one has this property and another that property' for this presupposes that it makes sense to ascribe either property to either form! 9!12; %he e istence of an internal relation between possible situations e presses itself in language by means of an internal relation between the propositions representing them! 9!12;1 .ere we ha$e the answer to the $e ed 8uestion *whether all relations are internal or e ternal*!

9!12;2 # call a series that is ordered by an internal relation a series of forms! %he order of the number-series is not go$erned by an e ternal relation but by an internal relation! %he same is true of the series of propositions *a-b*& *(d ' c) ' a- ! -b*& *(d &y) ' a- ! -y ! y-b*& and so forth! (#f b stands in one of these relations to a& # call b a successor of a!) 9!12< 0e can now talk about formal concepts& in the same sense that we speak of formal properties! (# introduce this e pression in order to e hibit the source of the confusion between formal concepts and concepts proper& which per$ades the whole of traditional logic!) 0hen something falls under a formal concept as one of its ob(ects& this cannot be e pressed by means of a proposition! #nstead it is shown in the $ery sign for this ob(ect! (A name shows that it signifies an ob(ect& a sign for a number that it signifies a number& etc!) )ormal concepts cannot& in fact& be represented by means of a function& as concepts proper can! )or their characteristics& formal properties& are not e pressed by means of functions! %he e pression for a formal property is a feature of certain symbols! "o the sign for the characteristics of a formal concept is a distincti$e feature of all symbols whose meanings fall under the concept! "o the e pression for a formal concept is a propositional $ariable in which this distincti$e feature alone is constant! 9!12= %he propositional $ariable signifies the formal concept& and its $alues signify the ob(ects that fall under the concept! 9!12=1 4$ery $ariable is the sign for a formal concept! )or e$ery $ariable represents a constant form that all its $alues possess& and this can be regarded as a formal property of those $alues! 9!12=2 %hus the $ariable name * * is the proper sign for the pseudo-concept ob(ect! 0here$er the word *ob(ect* (*thing*& etc!) is correctly used& it is e pressed in conceptual notation by a $ariable name! )or e ample& in the proposition& *%here are 2 ob(ects which! ! !*& it is e pressed by * (d &y) !!! *! 0here$er it is used in a different way& that is as a proper concept-word& nonsensical pseudo-propositions are the result! "o one cannot say& for e ample& *%here are ob(ects*& as one might say& *%here are books*! And it is (ust as impossible to say& *%here are 155 ob(ects*& or& *%here are H5 ob(ects*! And it is nonsensical to speak of the total number of ob(ects! %he same applies to the words *comple *& *fact*& *function*& *number*& etc! %hey all signify formal concepts& and are represented in conceptual notation by $ariables& not by functions or classes (as )rege and -ussell belie$ed)! *1 is a number*& *%here is only one ?ero*& and all similar e pressions are nonsensical! (#t is (ust as nonsensical to say& *%here is only one 1*& as it would be to say& *2 I 2 at 3 o*clock e8uals 9*!)

9!12=21 A formal concept is gi$en immediately any ob(ect falling under it is gi$en! #t is not possible& therefore& to introduce as primiti$e ideas ob(ects belonging to a formal concept and the formal concept itself! "o it is impossible& for e ample& to introduce as primiti$e ideas both the concept of a function and specific functions& as -ussell does: or the concept of a number and particular numbers! 9!12=3 #f we want to e press in conceptual notation the general proposition& *b is a successor of a*& then we re8uire an e pression for the general term of the series of forms *a-b*& *(d ' c) ' a- ! -b*& *(d &y) ' a- ! -y ! y-b*& !!! & #n order to e press the general term of a series of forms& we must use a $ariable& because the concept *term of that series of forms* is a formal concept! (%his is what )rege and -ussell o$erlooked' conse8uently the way in which they want to e press general propositions like the one abo$e is incorrect: it contains a $icious circle!) 0e can determine the general term of a series of forms by gi$ing its first term and the general form of the operation that produces the ne t term out of the proposition that precedes it! 9!12=9 %o ask whether a formal concept e ists is nonsensical! )or no proposition can be the answer to such a 8uestion! ("o& for e ample& the 8uestion& *Are there unanalysable sub(ect-predicate propositionsA* cannot be asked!) 9!122 Logical forms are without number! .ence there are no preeminent numbers in logic& and hence there is no possibility of philosophical monism or dualism& etc! 9!2 %he sense of a proposition is its agreement and disagreement with possibilities of e istence and non-e istence of states of affairs! 9!21 %he simplest kind of proposition& an elementary proposition& asserts the e istence of a state of affairs! 9!211 #t is a sign of a proposition*s being elementary that there can be no elementary proposition contradicting it! 9!22 An elementary proposition consists of names! #t is a ne us& a concatenation& of names! 9!221 #t is ob$ious that the analysis of propositions must bring us to elementary propositions which consist of names in immediate combination! %his raises the 8uestion how such combination into propositions comes about! 9!2211 4$en if the world is infinitely comple & so that e$ery fact consists of infinitely many states of affairs and e$ery state of affairs is composed of infinitely many ob(ects& there would still ha$e to be ob(ects and states of affairs!

9!23 #t is only in the ne us of an elementary proposition that a name occurs in a proposition! 9!29 6ames are the simple symbols' # indicate them by single letters (* *& *y*& *?*)! # write elementary propositions as functions of names& so that they ha$e the form *f *& */ ( &y)*& etc! /r # indicate them by the letters *p*& *8*& *r*! 9!291 0hen # use two signs with one and the same meaning& # e press this by putting the sign *C* between them! "o *a C b* means that the sign *b* can be substituted for the sign *a*! (#f # use an e8uation to introduce a new sign *b*& laying down that it shall ser$e as a substitute for a sign a that is already known& then& like -ussell& # write the e8uation-- definition--in the form *a C b Def!* A definition is a rule dealing with signs!) 9!292 4 pressions of the form *a C b* are& therefore& mere representational de$ices! %hey state nothing about the meaning of the signs *a* and *b*! 9!293 Ean we understand two names without knowing whether they signify the same thing or two different thingsA--Ean we understand a proposition in which two names occur without knowing whether their meaning is the same or differentA "uppose # know the meaning of an 4nglish word and of a >erman word that means the same' then it is impossible for me to be unaware that they do mean the same: # must be capable of translating each into the other! 4 pressions like *a C a*& and those deri$ed from them& are neither elementary propositions nor is there any other way in which they ha$e sense! (%his will become e$ident later!) 9!2; #f an elementary proposition is true& the state of affairs e ists' if an elementary proposition is false& the state of affairs does not e ist! 9!2< #f all true elementary propositions are gi$en& the result is a complete description of the world! %he world is completely described by gi$ing all elementary propositions& and adding which of them are true and which false! )or n states of affairs& there are possibilities of e istence and non-e istence! /f these states of affairs any combination can e ist and the remainder not e ist! 9!22 %here correspond to these combinations the same number of possibilities of truth--and falsity--for n elementary propositions! 9!3 %ruth-possibilities of elementary propositions mean Possibilities of e istence and non-e istence of states of affairs! 9!31 0e can represent truth-possibilities by schemata of the following kind (*%* means *true*& *)* means *false*: the rows of *%*s* and *)*s* under the row of elementary propositions symboli?e their truth-possibilities in a way that can easily be understood)' 9!9 A proposition is an e pression of agreement and disagreement with truth-possibilities of elementary propositions!

9!91 %ruth-possibilities of elementary propositions are the conditions of the truth and falsity of propositions! 9!911 #t immediately strikes one as probable that the introduction of elementary propositions pro$ides the basis for understanding all other kinds of proposition! #ndeed the understanding of general propositions palpably depends on the understanding of elementary propositions! 9!92 )or n elementary propositions there are ways in which a proposition can agree and disagree with their truth possibilities! 9!93 0e can e press agreement with truth-possibilities by correlating the mark *%* (true) with them in the schema! %he absence of this mark means disagreement! 9!931 %he e pression of agreement and disagreement with the truth possibilities of elementary propositions e presses the truth-conditions of a proposition! A proposition is the e pression of its truth-conditions! (%hus )rege was 8uite right to use them as a starting point when he e plained the signs of his conceptual notation! ,ut the e planation of the concept of truth that )rege gi$es is mistaken' if *the true* and *the false* were really ob(ects& and were the arguments in Pp etc!& then )rege*s method of determining the sense of *Pp* would lea$e it absolutely undetermined!) 9!99 %he sign that results from correlating the mark *#@ with truthpossibilities is a propositional sign! 9!991 #t is clear that a comple of the signs *)* and *%* has no ob(ect (or comple of ob(ects) corresponding to it& (ust as there is none corresponding to the hori?ontal and $ertical lines or to the brackets!--%here are no *logical ob(ects*! /f course the same applies to all signs that e press what the schemata of *%*s* and *)*s* e press! 9!992 )or e ample& the following is a propositional sign' ()rege*s *(udgement stroke* *J-* is logically 8uite meaningless' in the works of )rege (and -ussell) it simply indicates that these authors hold the propositions marked with this sign to be true! %hus *J-* is no more a component part of a proposition than is& for instance& the proposition*s number! #t is 8uite impossible for a proposition to state that it itself is true!) #f the order or the truth-possibilities in a scheme is fi ed once and for all by a combinatory rule& then the last column by itself will be an e pression of the truth-conditions! #f we now write this column as a row& the propositional sign will become *(%%-%) (p&8)* or more e plicitly *(%%)%) (p&8)* (%he number of places in the left-hand pair of brackets is determined by the number of terms in the right-hand pair!) 9!9; )or n elementary propositions there are Ln possible groups of truthconditions! %he groups of truth-conditions that are obtainable from the truth-

possibilities of a gi$en number of elementary propositions can be arranged in a series! 9!9< Among the possible groups of truth-conditions there are two e treme cases! #n one of these cases the proposition is true for all the truthpossibilities of the elementary propositions! 0e say that the truth-conditions are tautological! #n the second case the proposition is false for all the truthpossibilities' the truth-conditions are contradictory ! #n the first case we call the proposition a tautology: in the second& a contradiction! 9!9<1 Propositions show what they say: tautologies and contradictions show that they say nothing! A tautology has no truth-conditions& since it is unconditionally true' and a contradiction is true on no condition! %autologies and contradictions lack sense! (Like a point from which two arrows go out in opposite directions to one another!) ()or e ample& # know nothing about the weather when # know that it is either raining or not raining!) 9!9<211 %autologies and contradictions are not& howe$er& nonsensical! %hey are part of the symbolism& much as *5* is part of the symbolism of arithmetic! 9!9<2 %autologies and contradictions are not pictures of reality! %hey do not represent any possible situations! )or the former admit all possible situations& and latter none ! #n a tautology the conditions of agreement with the world--the representational relations--cancel one another& so that it does not stand in any representational relation to reality! 9!9<3 %he truth-conditions of a proposition determine the range that it lea$es open to the facts! (A proposition& a picture& or a model is& in the negati$e sense& like a solid body that restricts the freedom of mo$ement of others& and in the positi$e sense& like a space bounded by solid substance in which there is room for a body!) A tautology lea$es open to reality the whole--the infinite whole--of logical space' a contradiction fills the whole of logical space lea$ing no point of it for reality! %hus neither of them can determine reality in any way! 9!9<9 A tautology*s truth is certain& a proposition*s possible& a contradiction*s impossible! (Eertain& possible& impossible' here we ha$e the first indication of the scale that we need in the theory of probability!) 9!9<; %he logical product of a tautology and a proposition says the same thing as the proposition! %his product& therefore& is identical with the proposition! )or it is impossible to alter what is essential to a symbol without altering its sense! 9!9<< 0hat corresponds to a determinate logical combination of signs is a determinate logical combination of their meanings! #t is only to the uncombined signs that absolutely any combination corresponds! #n other

words& propositions that are true for e$ery situation cannot be combinations of signs at all& since& if they were& only determinate combinations of ob(ects could correspond to them! (And what is not a logical combination has no combination of ob(ects corresponding to it!) %autology and contradiction are the limiting cases--indeed the disintegration--of the combination of signs! 9!9<<1 Admittedly the signs are still combined with one another e$en in tautologies and contradictions--i!e! they stand in certain relations to one another' but these relations ha$e no meaning& they are not essential to the symbol ! 9!; #t now seems possible to gi$e the most general propositional form' that is& to gi$e a description of the propositions of any sign-language whatsoe$er in such a way that e$ery possible sense can be e pressed by a symbol satisfying the description& and e$ery symbol satisfying the description can e press a sense& pro$ided that the meanings of the names are suitably chosen! #t is clear that only what is essential to the most general propositional form may be included in its description--for otherwise it would not be the most general form! %he e istence of a general propositional form is pro$ed by the fact that there cannot be a proposition whose form could not ha$e been foreseen (i!e! constructed)! %he general form of a proposition is' %his is how things stand! 9!;1 "uppose that # am gi$en all elementary propositions' then # can simply ask what propositions # can construct out of them! And there # ha$e all propositions& and that fi es their limits! 9!;2 Propositions comprise all that follows from the totality of all elementary propositions (and& of course& from its being the totality of them all )! (%hus& in a certain sense& it could be said that all propositions were generali?ations of elementary propositions!) 9!;3 %he general propositional form is a $ariable! ; A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions! (An elementary proposition is a truth-function of itself!) ;!51 4lementary propositions are the truth-arguments of propositions! ;!52 %he arguments of functions are readily confused with the affi es of names! )or both arguments and affi es enable me to recogni?e the meaning of the signs containing them! )or e ample& when -ussell writes *Ic*& the *c* is an affi which indicates that the sign as a whole is the addition-sign for cardinal numbers! ,ut the use of this sign is the result of arbitrary con$ention and it would be 8uite possible to choose a simple sign instead of *Ic*: in *Pp* howe$er& *p* is not an affi but an argument' the sense of *Pp* cannot be understood unless the sense of *p* has been understood already! (#n the name 7ulius Eaesar *7ulius* is an affi ! An affi is always part of a

description of the ob(ect to whose name we attach it' e!g! the Eaesar of the 7ulian gens!) #f # am not mistaken& )rege*s theory about the meaning of propositions and functions is based on the confusion between an argument and an affi ! )rege regarded the propositions of logic as names& and their arguments as the affi es of those names! ;!1 %ruth-functions can be arranged in series! %hat is the foundation of the theory of probability! ;!151 %he truth-functions of a gi$en number of elementary propositions can always be set out in a schema of the following kind' (%%%%) (p& 8) %autology (#f p then p& and if 8 then 8!) (p ? p ! 8 ? 8) ()%%%) (p& 8) #n words ' 6ot both p and 8! (P(p ! 8)) (%)%%) (p& 8) @ ' #f 8 then p! (8 ? p) (%%)%) (p& 8) @ ' #f p then 8! (p ? 8) (%%%)) (p& 8) @ ' p or 8! (p E 8) ())%%) (p& 8) @ ' 6ot g! (P8) ()%)%) (p& 8) @ ' 6ot p! (Pp) ()%%)) (p& 8) @ ' p or 8& but not both! (p ! P8 ' E ' 8 ! Pp) (%))%) (p& 8) @ ' #f p then p& and if 8 then p! (p I 8) (%)%)) (p& 8) @ ' p (%%))) (p& 8) @ ' 8 ()))%) (p& 8) @ ' 6either p nor 8! (Pp ! P8 or p J 8) ())%)) (p& 8) @ ' p and not 8! (p ! P8) ()%))) (p& 8) @ ' 8 and not p! (8 ! Pp) (%)))) (p&8) @ ' 8 and p! (8 ! p) ())))) (p& 8) Eontradiction (p and not p& and 8 and not 8!) (p ! Pp ! 8 ! P8) # will gi$e the name truth-grounds of a proposition to those truth-possibilities of its truth-arguments that make it true! ;!11 #f all the truth-grounds that are common to a number of propositions are at the same time truth-grounds of a certain proposition& then we say that the truth of that proposition follows from the truth of the others! ;!12 #n particular& the truth of a proposition *p* follows from the truth of another proposition *8* is all the truth-grounds of the latter are truth-grounds of the former! ;!121 %he truth-grounds of the one are contained in those of the other' p follows from 8! ;!122 #f p follows from 8& the sense of *p* is contained in the sense of *8*! ;!123 #f a god creates a world in which certain propositions are true& then by that $ery act he also creates a world in which all the propositions that follow from them come true! And similarly he could not create a world in which the proposition *p* was true without creating all its ob(ects! ;!129 A proposition affirms e$ery proposition that follows from it! ;!1291 *p ! 8* is one of the propositions that affirm *p* and at the same time one of the propositions that affirm *8*! %wo propositions are opposed to one another if there is no proposition with a sense& that affirms them both! 4$ery proposition that contradicts another negate it! ;!13 0hen the truth of one proposition follows from the truth of others& we can see this from the structure of the proposition!

;!131 #f the truth of one proposition follows from the truth of others& this finds e pression in relations in which the forms of the propositions stand to one another' nor is it necessary for us to set up these relations between them& by combining them with one another in a single proposition: on the contrary& the relations are internal& and their e istence is an immediate result of the e istence of the propositions! ;!1311 0hen we infer 8 from p E 8 and Pp& the relation between the propositional forms of *p E 8* and *Pp* is masked& in this case& by our mode of signifying! ,ut if instead of *p E 8* we write& for e ample& *pJ8 ! J ! pJ8*& and instead of *Pp*& *pJp* (pJ8 C neither p nor 8)& then the inner conne ion becomes ob$ious! (%he possibility of inference from ( ) ! f to fa shows that the symbol ( ) ! f itself has generality in it!) ;!132 #f p follows from 8& # can make an inference from 8 to p& deduce p from 8! %he nature of the inference can be gathered only from the two propositions! %hey themsel$es are the only possible (ustification of the inference! *Laws of inference*& which are supposed to (ustify inferences& as in the works of )rege and -ussell& ha$e no sense& and would be superfluous! ;!133 All deductions are made a priori! ;!139 /ne elementary proposition cannot be deduced form another! ;!13; %here is no possible way of making an inference form the e istence of one situation to the e istence of another& entirely different situation! ;!13< %here is no causal ne us to (ustify such an inference! ;!13<1 0e cannot infer the e$ents of the future from those of the present! %.#" PA-A>-AP. E/KLD 6/% ,4 -4AD #6 )-/+ D#"L ;!13<2 %he freedom of the will consists in the impossibility of knowing actions that still lie in the future! 0e could know them only if causality were an inner necessity like that of logical inference!--%he conne ion between knowledge and what is known is that of logical necessity! (*A knows that p is the case*& has no sense if p is a tautology!) ;!13<3 #f the truth of a proposition does not follow from the fact that it is self-e$ident to us& then its self-e$idence in no way (ustifies our belief in its truth! ;!19 #f one proposition follows from another& then the latter says more than the former& and the former less than the latter! ;!191 #f p follows from 8 and 8 from p& then they are one and same proposition! ;!192 A tautology follows from all propositions' it says nothing! ;!193 Eontradiction is that common factor of propositions which no proposition has in common with another! %autology is the common factor of all propositions that ha$e nothing in common with one another!

Eontradiction& one might say& $anishes outside all propositions' tautology $anishes inside them! Eontradiction is the outer limit of propositions' tautology is the unsubstantial point at their centre! ;!1; #f %r is the number of the truth-grounds of a proposition *r*& and if %rs is the number of the truth-grounds of a proposition *s* that are at the same time truth-grounds of *r*& then we call the ratio %rs ' %r the degree of probability that the proposition *r* gi$es to the proposition *s*! ;!1;1 #n a schema like the one abo$e in ;!151& let %r be the number of *%*s* in the proposition r& and let %rs& be the number of *%*s* in the proposition s that stand in columns in which the proposition r has *%*s*! %hen the proposition r gi$es to the proposition s the probability %rs ' %r! ;!1;11 %here is no special ob(ect peculiar to probability propositions! ;!1;2 0hen propositions ha$e no truth-arguments in common with one another& we call them independent of one another! %wo elementary propositions gi$e one another the probability 1M2! #f p follows from 8& then the proposition *8* gi$es to the proposition *p* the probability 1! %he certainty of logical inference is a limiting case of probability! (Application of this to tautology and contradiction!) ;!1;3 #n itself& a proposition is neither probable nor improbable! 4ither an e$ent occurs or it does not' there is no middle way! ;!1;9 "uppose that an urn contains black and white balls in e8ual numbers (and none of any other kind)! # draw one ball after another& putting them back into the urn! ,y this e periment # can establish that the number of black balls drawn and the number of white balls drawn appro imate to one another as the draw continues! "o this is not a mathematical truth! 6ow& if # say& *%he probability of my drawing a white ball is e8ual to the probability of my drawing a black one*& this means that all the circumstances that # know of (including the laws of nature assumed as hypotheses) gi$e no more probability to the occurrence of the one e$ent than to that of the other! %hat is to say& they gi$e each the probability 1M2 as can easily be gathered from the abo$e definitions! 0hat # confirm by the e periment is that the occurrence of the two e$ents is independent of the circumstances of which # ha$e no more detailed knowledge! ;!1;; %he minimal unit for a probability proposition is this' %he circumstances--of which # ha$e no further knowledge--gi$e such and such a degree of probability to the occurrence of a particular e$ent! ;!1;< #t is in this way that probability is a generali?ation! #t in$ol$es a general description of a propositional form! 0e use probability only in default of certainty--if our knowledge of a fact is not indeed complete& but

we do know something about its form! (A proposition may well be an incomplete picture of a certain situation& but it is always a complete picture of something !) A probability proposition is a sort of e cerpt from other propositions! ;!2 %he structures of propositions stand in internal relations to one another! ;!21 #n order to gi$e prominence to these internal relations we can adopt the following mode of e pression' we can represent a proposition as the result of an operation that produces it out of other propositions (which are the bases of the operation)! ;!22 An operation is the e pression of a relation between the structures of its result and of its bases! ;!23 %he operation is what has to be done to the one proposition in order to make the other out of it! ;!231 And that will& of course& depend on their formal properties& on the internal similarity of their forms! ;!232 %he internal relation by which a series is ordered is e8ui$alent to the operation that produces one term from another! ;!233 /perations cannot make their appearance before the point at which one proposition is generated out of another in a logically meaningful way: i!e! the point at which the logical construction of propositions begins! ;!239 %ruth-functions of elementary propositions are results of operations with elementary propositions as bases! (%hese operations # call truthoperations!) ;!2391 %he sense of a truth-function of p is a function of the sense of p! 6egation& logical addition& logical multiplication& etc! etc! are operations! (6egation re$erses the sense of a proposition!) ;!29 An operation manifests itself in a $ariable: it shows how we can get from one form of proposition to another! #t gi$es e pression to the difference between the forms! (And what the bases of an operation and its result ha$e in common is (ust the bases themsel$es!) ;!291 An operation is not the mark of a form& but only of a difference between forms! ;!292 %he operation that produces *8* from *p* also produces *r* from *8*& and so on! %here is only one way of e pressing this' *p*& *8*& *r*& etc! ha$e to be $ariables that gi$e e pression in a general way to certain formal relations! ;!2; %he occurrence of an operation does not characteri?e the sense of a proposition! #ndeed& no statement is made by an operation& but only by its result& and this depends on the bases of the operation! (/perations and functions must not be confused with each other!)

;!2;1 A function cannot be its own argument& whereas an operation can take one of its own results as its base! ;!2;2 #t is only in this way that the step from one term of a series of forms to another is possible (from one type to another in the hierarchies of -ussell and 0hitehead)! (-ussell and 0hitehead did not admit the possibility of such steps& but repeatedly a$ailed themsel$es of it!) ;!2;21 #f an operation is applied repeatedly to its own results& # speak of successi$e applications of it! (*/*/*/*a* is the result of three successi$e applications of the operation */*4* to *a*!) #n a similar sense # speak of successi$e applications of more than one operation to a number of propositions! ;!2;22 Accordingly # use the sign *Fa& & /* G* for the general term of the series of forms a& /*a& /*/*a& !!! ! %his bracketed e pression is a $ariable' the first term of the bracketed e pression is the beginning of the series of forms& the second is the form of a term arbitrarily selected from the series& and the third is the form of the term that immediately follows in the series! ;!2;23 %he concept of successi$e applications of an operation is e8ui$alent to the concept *and so on*! ;!2;3 /ne operation can counteract the effect of another! /perations can cancel one another! ;!2;9 An operation can $anish (e!g! negation in *PPp* ' PPp C p)! ;!3 All propositions are results of truth-operations on elementary propositions! A truth-operation is the way in which a truth-function is produced out of elementary propositions! #t is of the essence of truthoperations that& (ust as elementary propositions yield a truth-function of themsel$es& so too in the same way truth-functions yield a further truthfunction! 0hen a truth-operation is applied to truth-functions of elementary propositions& it always generates another truth-function of elementary propositions& another proposition! 0hen a truth-operation is applied to the results of truth-operations on elementary propositions& there is always a single operation on elementary propositions that has the same result! 4$ery proposition is the result of truth-operations on elementary propositions! ;!31 %he schemata in 9!31 ha$e a meaning e$en when *p*& *8*& *r*& etc! are not elementary propositions! And it is easy to see that the propositional sign in 9!992 e presses a single truth-function of elementary propositions e$en when *p* and *8* are truth-functions of elementary propositions! ;!32 All truth-functions are results of successi$e applications to elementary propositions of a finite number of truth-operations! ;!9 At this point it becomes manifest that there are no *logical ob(ects* or *logical constants* (in )rege*s and -ussell*s sense)!

;!91 %he reason is that the results of truth-operations on truth-functions are always identical whene$er they are one and the same truth-function of elementary propositions! ;!92 #t is self-e$ident that E& ?& etc! are not relations in the sense in which right and left etc! are relations! %he interdefinability of )rege*s and -ussell*s *primiti$e signs* of logic is enough to show that they are not primiti$e signs& still less signs for relations! And it is ob$ious that the *?* defined by means of *P* and *E* is identical with the one that figures with *P* in the definition of *E*: and that the second *E* is identical with the first one: and so on! ;!93 4$en at first sight it seems scarcely credible that there should follow from one fact p infinitely many others & namely PPp& PPPPp& etc! And it is no less remarkable that the infinite number of propositions of logic (mathematics) follow from half a do?en *primiti$e propositions*! ,ut in fact all the propositions of logic say the same thing& to wit nothing! ;!99 %ruth-functions are not material functions! )or e ample& an affirmation can be produced by double negation' in such a case does it follow that in some sense negation is contained in affirmationA Does *PPp* negate Pp& or does it affirm p--or bothA %he proposition *PPp* is not about negation& as if negation were an ob(ect' on the other hand& the possibility of negation is already written into affirmation! And if there were an ob(ect called *P*& it would follow that *PPp* said something different from what *p* said& (ust because the one proposition would then be about P and the other would not! ;!991 %his $anishing of the apparent logical constants also occurs in the case of *P(d ) ! Pf *& which says the same as *( ) ! f *& and in the case of *(d ) ! f ! C a*& which says the same as *fa*! ;!992 #f we are gi$en a proposition& then with it we are also gi$en the results of all truth-operations that ha$e it as their base! ;!9; #f there are primiti$e logical signs& then any logic that fails to show clearly how they are placed relati$ely to one another and to (ustify their e istence will be incorrect! %he construction of logic out of its primiti$e signs must be made clear! ;!9;1 #f logic has primiti$e ideas& they must be independent of one another! #f a primiti$e idea has been introduced& it must ha$e been introduced in all the combinations in which it e$er occurs! #t cannot& therefore& be introduced first for one combination and later reintroduced for another! )or e ample& once negation has been introduced& we must understand it both in propositions of the form *Pp* and in propositions like *P(p E 8)*& *(d ) ! Pf *& etc! 0e must not introduce it first for the one class of cases and then for the other& since it would then be left in doubt whether its meaning were the same in both cases& and no reason would ha$e been gi$en for combining the signs

in the same way in both cases! (#n short& )rege*s remarks about introducing signs by means of definitions (in %he )undamental Laws of Arithmetic ) also apply& mutatis mutandis& to the introduction of primiti$e signs!) ;!9;2 %he introduction of any new de$ice into the symbolism of logic is necessarily a momentous e$ent! #n logic a new de$ice should not be introduced in brackets or in a footnote with what one might call a completely innocent air! (%hus in -ussell and 0hitehead*s Principia +athematica there occur definitions and primiti$e propositions e pressed in words! 0hy this sudden appearance of wordsA #t would re8uire a (ustification& but none is gi$en& or could be gi$en& since the procedure is in fact illicit!) ,ut if the introduction of a new de$ice has pro$ed necessary at a certain point& we must immediately ask oursel$es& *At what points is the employment of this de$ice now una$oidable A* and its place in logic must be made clear! ;!9;3 All numbers in logic stand in need of (ustification! /r rather& it must become e$ident that there are no numbers in logic! %here are no pre-eminent numbers! ;!9;9 #n logic there is no co-ordinate status& and there can be no classification! #n logic there can be no distinction between the general and the specific! ;!9;91 %he solutions of the problems of logic must be simple& since they set the standard of simplicity! +en ha$e always had a presentiment that there must be a realm in which the answers to 8uestions are symmetrically combined--a priori--to form a self-contained system! A realm sub(ect to the law' "imple sigillum $eri! ;!9< #f we introduced logical signs properly& then we should also ha$e introduced at the same time the sense of all combinations of them: i!e! not only *p E 8* but *P(p E 8)* as well& etc! etc! 0e should also ha$e introduced at the same time the effect of all possible combinations of brackets! And thus it would ha$e been made clear that the real general primiti$e signs are not * p E 8*& *(d ) ! f *& etc! but the most general form of their combinations! ;!9<1 %hough it seems unimportant& it is in fact significant that the pseudorelations of logic& such as E and ?& need brackets--unlike real relations! #ndeed& the use of brackets with these apparently primiti$e signs is itself an indication that they are not primiti$e signs! And surely no one is going to belie$e brackets ha$e an independent meaning! ;!9<11 "igns for logical operations are punctuation-marks& ;!9= #t is clear that whate$er we can say in ad$ance about the form of all propositions& we must be able to say all at once ! An elementary proposition really contains all logical operations in itself! )or *fa* says the same thing as

*(d ) ! f ! C a* 0here$er there is compositeness& argument and function are present& and where these are present& we already ha$e all the logical constants! /ne could say that the sole logical constant was what all propositions& by their $ery nature& had in common with one another! ,ut that is the general propositional form! ;!9=1 %he general propositional form is the essence of a proposition! ;!9=11 %o gi$e the essence of a proposition means to gi$e the essence of all description& and thus the essence of the world! ;!9=2 %he description of the most general propositional form is the description of the one and only general primiti$e sign in logic! ;!9=3 Logic must look after itself! #f a sign is possible & then it is also capable of signifying! 0hate$er is possible in logic is also permitted! (%he reason why *"ocrates is identical* means nothing is that there is no property called *identical*! %he proposition is nonsensical because we ha$e failed to make an arbitrary determination& and not because the symbol& in itself& would be illegitimate!) #n a certain sense& we cannot make mistakes in logic! ;!9=31 "elf-e$idence& which -ussell talked about so much& can become dispensable in logic& only because language itself pre$ents e$ery logical mistake!--0hat makes logic a priori is the impossibility of illogical thought! ;!9=32 0e cannot gi$e a sign the wrong sense! ;&9=321 /ccam*s ma im is& of course& not an arbitrary rule& nor one that is (ustified by its success in practice' its point is that unnecessary units in a sign-language mean nothing! "igns that ser$e one purpose are logically e8ui$alent& and signs that ser$e none are logically meaningless! ;!9=33 )rege says that any legitimately constructed proposition must ha$e a sense! And # say that any possible proposition is legitimately constructed& and& if it has no sense& that can only be because we ha$e failed to gi$e a meaning to some of its constituents! (4$en if we think that we ha$e done so!) %hus the reason why *"ocrates is identical* says nothing is that we ha$e not gi$en any ad(ecti$al meaning to the word *identical*! )or when it appears as a sign for identity& it symboli?es in an entirely different way--the signifying relation is a different one--therefore the symbols also are entirely different in the two cases' the two symbols ha$e only the sign in common& and that is an accident! ;!9=9 %he number of fundamental operations that are necessary depends solely on our notation! ;!9=; All that is re8uired is that we should construct a system of signs with a particular number of dimensions--with a particular mathematical multiplicity

;!9=< #t is clear that this is not a 8uestion of a number of primiti$e ideas that ha$e to be signified& but rather of the e pression of a rule! ;!; 4$ery truth-function is a result of successi$e applications to elementary propositions of the operation *(-----%)(4& !!!!)*! %his operation negates all the propositions in the right-hand pair of brackets& and # call it the negation of those propositions! ;!;51 0hen a bracketed e pression has propositions as its terms--and the order of the terms inside the brackets is indifferent--then # indicate it by a sign of the form *(4)*! *(4)* is a $ariable whose $alues are terms of the bracketed e pression and the bar o$er the $ariable indicates that it is the representati$e of ali its $alues in the brackets! (4!g! if 4 has the three $alues P&N& -& then (4) C (P& N& -)! ) 0hat the $alues of the $ariable are is something that is stipulated! %he stipulation is a description of the propositions that ha$e the $ariable as their representati$e! .ow the description of the terms of the bracketed e pression is produced is not essential! 0e can distinguish three kinds of description' 1!Direct enumeration& in which case we can simply substitute for the $ariable the constants that are its $alues: 2! gi$ing a function f whose $alues for all $alues of are the propositions to be described: 3! gi$ing a formal law that go$erns the construction of the propositions& in which case the bracketed e pression has as its members all the terms of a series of forms! ;!;52 "o instead of *(-----%)(4& !!!!)*& # write *6(4)*! 6(4) is the negation of all the $alues of the propositional $ariable 4! ;!;53 #t is ob$ious that we can easily e press how propositions may be constructed with this operation& and how they may not be constructed with it: so it must be possible to find an e act e pression for this! ;!;1 #f 4 has only one $alue& then 6(4) C Pp (not p): if it has two $alues& then 6(4) C Pp ! P8! (neither p nor g)! ;!;11 .ow can logic--all-embracing logic& which mirrors the world--use such peculiar crotchets and contri$ancesA /nly because they are all connected with one another in an infinitely fine network& the great mirror! ;!;12 *Pp* is true if *p* is false! %herefore& in the proposition *Pp*& when it is true& *p* is a false proposition! .ow then can the stroke *P* make it agree with realityA ,ut in *Pp* it is not *P* that negates& it is rather what is common to all the signs of this notation that negate p! %hat is to say the common rule that go$erns the construction of *Pp*& *PPPp*& *Pp E Pp*& *Pp ! Pp*& etc! etc! (ad inf!)! And this common factor mirrors negation! ;!;13 0e might say that what is common to all symbols that affirm both p and 8 is the proposition *p ! 8*: and that what is common to all symbols that affirm either p or 8 is the proposition *p E 8*! And similarly we can say that

two propositions are opposed to one another if they ha$e nothing in common with one another& and that e$ery proposition has only one negati$e& since there is only one proposition that lies completely outside it! %hus in -ussell*s notation too it is manifest that *8 ' p E Pp* says the same thing as *8*& that *p E P8* says nothing! ;!;19 /nce a notation has been established& there will be in it a rule go$erning the construction of all propositions that negate p& a rule go$erning the construction of all propositions that affirm p& and a rule go$erning the construction of all propositions that affirm p or 8: and so on! %hese rules are e8ui$alent to the symbols: and in them their sense is mirrored! ;!;1; #t must be manifest in our symbols that it can only be propositions that are combined with one another by *E*& *!*& etc! And this is indeed the case& since the symbol in *p* and *8* itself presupposes *E*& *P*& etc! #f the sign *p* in *p E 8* does not stand for a comple sign& then it cannot ha$e sense by itself' but in that case the signs *p E p*& *p ! p*& etc!& which ha$e the same sense as p& must also lack sense! ,ut if *p E p* has no sense& then *p E 8* cannot ha$e a sense either! ;!;1;1 +ust the sign of a negati$e proposition be constructed with that of the positi$e propositionA 0hy should it not be possible to e press a negati$e proposition by means of a negati$e factA (4!g! suppose that @a* does not stand in a certain relation to *b*: then this might be used to say that a-b was not the case!) ,ut really e$en in this case the negati$e proposition is constructed by an indirect use of the positi$e! %he positi$e proposition necessarily presupposes the e istence of the negati$e proposition and $ice $ersa! ;!;2 #f 4 has as its $alues all the $alues of a function f for all $alues of & then 6(4) C P(d ) ! f ! ;!;21 # dissociate the concept all from truth-functions! )rege and -ussell introduced generality in association with logical productor logical sum! %his made it difficult to understand the propositions *(d ) ! f * and *( ) ! f *& in which both ideas are embedded! ;!;22 0hat is peculiar to the generality-sign is first& that it indicates a logical prototype& and secondly& that it gi$es prominence to constants! ;!;23 %he generality-sign occurs as an argument! ;!;29 #f ob(ects are gi$en& then at the same time we are gi$en all ob(ects! #f elementary propositions are gi$en& then at the same time all elementary propositions are gi$en! ;!;2; #t is incorrect to render the proposition *(d ) ! f * in the words& *f is possible * as -ussell does! %he certainty& possibility& or impossibility of a situation is not e pressed by a proposition& but by an e pression*s being a

tautology& a proposition with a sense& or a contradiction! %he precedent to which we are constantly inclined to appeal must reside in the symbol itself! ;!;2< 0e can describe the world completely by means of fully generali?ed propositions& i!e! without first correlating any name with a particular ob(ect! ;!;2<1 A fully generali?ed proposition& like e$ery other proposition& is composite! (%his is shown by the fact that in *(d & /) ! / * we ha$e to mention */* and *s* separately! %hey both& independently& stand in signifying relations to the world& (ust as is the case in ungenerali?ed propositions!) #t is a mark of a composite symbol that it has something in common with other symbols! ;!;2<2 %he truth or falsity of e$ery proposition does make some alteration in the general construction of the world! And the range that the totality of elementary propositions lea$es open for its construction is e actly the same as that which is delimited by entirely general propositions! (#f an elementary proposition is true& that means& at any rate& one more true elementary proposition!) ;!;3 #dentity of ob(ect # e press by identity of sign& and not by using a sign for identity! Difference of ob(ects # e press by difference of signs! ;!;351 #t is self-e$ident that identity is not a relation between ob(ects! %his becomes $ery clear if one considers& for e ample& the proposition *( ) ' f ! ? ! C a*! 0hat this proposition says is simply that only a satisfies the function f& and not that only things that ha$e a certain relation to a satisfy the function& /f course& it might then be said that only a did ha$e this relation to a: but in order to e press that& we should need the identity-sign itself! ;!;352 -ussell*s definition of *C* is inade8uate& because according to it we cannot say that two ob(ects ha$e all their properties in common! (4$en if this proposition is ne$er correct& it still has sense !) ;!;353 -oughly speaking& to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense& and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing at all! ;!;31 %hus # do not write *f(a& b) ! a C b*& but *f(a& a)* (or *f(b& b)): and not *f(a&b) ! Pa C b*& but *f(a& b)*! ;!;32 And analogously # do not write *(d & y) ! f( & y) ! C y*& but *(d ) ! f( & )*: and not *(d & y) ! f( & y) ! P C y*& but *(d & y) ! f( & y)*! ;!;321 %hus& for e ample& instead of *( ) ' f ? C a* we write *(d ) ! f ! ? ' (d & y) ! f ! fy*! And the proposition& */nly one satisfies f( )*& will read *(d ) ! f ' P(d & y) ! f ! fy*! ;!;33 %he identity-sign& therefore& is not an essential constituent of conceptual notation!

;!;39 And now we see that in a correct conceptual notation pseudopropositions like *a C a*& *a C b ! b C c ! ? a C c*& *( ) ! C *& *(d ) ! C a*& etc! cannot e$en be written down! ;!;3; %his also disposes of all the problems that were connected with such pseudo-propositions! All the problems that -ussell*s *a iom of infinity* brings with it can be sol$ed at this point! 0hat the a iom of infinity is intended to say would e press itself in language through the e istence of infinitely many names with different meanings! ;!;3;1 %here are certain cases in which one is tempted to use e pressions of the form *a C a* or *p ? p* and the like! #n fact& this happens when one wants to talk about prototypes& e!g! about proposition& thing& etc! %hus in -ussell*s Principles of +athematics *p is a proposition*--which is nonsense--was gi$en the symbolic rendering *p ? p* and placed as an hypothesis in front of certain propositions in order to e clude from their argument-places e$erything but propositions! (#t is nonsense to place the hypothesis *p ? p* in front of a proposition& in order to ensure that its arguments shall ha$e the right form& if only because with a non-proposition as argument the hypothesis becomes not false but nonsensical& and because arguments of the wrong kind make the proposition itself nonsensical& so that it preser$es itself from wrong arguments (ust as well& or as badly& as the hypothesis without sense that was appended for that purpose!) ;!;3;2 #n the same way people ha$e wanted to e press& *%here are no things *& by writing *P(d ) ! C *! ,ut e$en if this were a proposition& would it not be e8ually true if in fact *there were things* but they were not identical with themsel$esA ;!;9 #n the general propositional form propositions occur in other propositions only as bases of truth-operations! ;!;91 At first sight it looks as if it were also possible for one proposition to occur in another in a different way! Particularly with certain forms of proposition in psychology& such as *A belie$es that p is the case* and A has the thought p*& etc! )or if these are considered superficially& it looks as if the proposition p stood in some kind of relation to an ob(ect A! (And in modern theory of knowledge (-ussell& +oore& etc!) these propositions ha$e actually been construed in this way!) ;!;92 #t is clear& howe$er& that *A belie$es that p*& *A has the thought p*& and *A says p* are of the form *@p@ says p*' and this does not in$ol$e a correlation of a fact with an ob(ect& but rather the correlation of facts by means of the correlation of their ob(ects!

;!;921 %his shows too that there is no such thing as the soul--the sub(ect& etc!--as it is concei$ed in the superficial psychology of the present day! #ndeed a composite soul would no longer be a soul! ;!;922 %he correct e planation of the form of the proposition& *A makes the (udgement p*& must show that it is impossible for a (udgement to be a piece of nonsense! (-ussell*s theory does not satisfy this re8uirement!) ;!;923 %o percei$e a comple means to percei$e that its constituents are related to one another in such and such a way! %his no doubt also e plains why there are two possible ways of seeing the figure as a cube: and all similar phenomena! )or we really see two different facts! (#f # look in the first place at the corners marked a and only glance at the b*s& then the a*s appear to be in front& and $ice $ersa)! ;!;; 0e now ha$e to answer a priori the 8uestion about all the possible forms of elementary propositions! 4lementary propositions consist of names! "ince& howe$er& we are unable to gi$e the number of names with different meanings& we are also unable to gi$e the composition of elementary propositions! ;!;;1 /ur fundamental principle is that whene$er a 8uestion can be decided by logic at all it must be possible to decide it without more ado! (And if we get into a position where we ha$e to look at the world for an answer to such a problem& that shows that we are on a completely wrong track!) ;!;;2 %he *e perience* that we need in order to understand logic is not that something or other is the state of things& but that something is ' that& howe$er& is not an e perience! Logic is prior to e$ery e perience--that something is so ! #t is prior to the 8uestion *.owA* not prior to the 8uestion *0hatA* ;!;;21 And if this were not so& how could we apply logicA 0e might put it in this way' if there would be a logic e$en if there were no world& how then could there be a logic gi$en that there is a worldA ;!;;3 -ussell said that there were simple relations between different numbers of things (indi$iduals)! ,ut between what numbersA And how is this supposed to be decidedA--,y e perienceA (%here is no pre-eminent number!) ;!;;9 #t would be completely arbitrary to gi$e any specific form! ;!;;91 #t is supposed to be possible to answer a priori the 8uestion whether # can get into a position in which # need the sign for a 2=-termed relation in order to signify something! ;!;;92 ,ut is it really legitimate e$en to ask such a 8uestionA Ean we set up a form of sign without knowing whether anything can correspond to itA Does

it make sense to ask what there must be in order that something can be the caseA ;!;;; Elearly we ha$e some concept of elementary propositions 8uite apart from their particular logical forms! ,ut when there is a system by which we can create symbols& the system is what is important for logic and not the indi$idual symbols! And anyway& is it really possible that in logic # should ha$e to deal with forms that # can in$entA 0hat # ha$e to deal with must be that which makes it possible for me to in$ent them! ;!;;< %here cannot be a hierarchy of the forms of elementary propositions! 0e can foresee only what we oursel$es construct! ;!;;<1 4mpirical reality is limited by the totality of ob(ects! %he limit also makes itself manifest in the totality of elementary propositions! .ierarchies are and must be independent of reality! ;!;;<2 #f we know on purely logical grounds that there must be elementary propositions& then e$eryone who understands propositions in their E form must know #t! ;!;;<3 #n fact& all the propositions of our e$eryday language& (ust as they stand& are in perfect logical order!--%hat utterly simple thing& which we ha$e to formulate here& is not a likeness of the truth& but the truth itself in its entirety! (/ur problems are not abstract& but perhaps the most concrete that there are!) ;!;;= %he application of logic decides what elementary propositions there are! 0hat belongs to its application& logic cannot anticipate! #t is clear that logic must not clash with its application! ,ut logic has to be in contact with its application! %herefore logic and its application must not o$erlap! ;!;;=1 #f # cannot say a priori what elementary propositions there are& then the attempt to do so must lead to ob$ious nonsense! ;!< %he limits of my language mean the limits of my world! ;!<1 Logic per$ades the world' the limits of the world are also its limits! "o we cannot say in logic& *%he world has this in it& and this& but not that!* )or that would appear to presuppose that we were e cluding certain possibilities& and this cannot be the case& since it would re8uire that logic should go beyond the limits of the world: for only in that way could it $iew those limits from the other side as well! 0e cannot think what we cannot think: so what we cannot think we cannot say either! ;!<2 %his remark pro$ides the key to the problem& how much truth there is in solipsism! )or what the solipsist means is 8uite correct: only it cannot be said & but makes itself manifest! %he world is my world' this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which alone # understand) mean the limits of my world!

;!<21 %he world and life are one! ;!<3 # am my world! (%he microcosm!) ;!<31 %here is no such thing as the sub(ect that thinks or entertains ideas! #f # wrote a book called %he 0orld as l found it & # should ha$e to include a report on my body& and should ha$e to say which parts were subordinate to my will& and which were not& etc!& this being a method of isolating the sub(ect& or rather of showing that in an important sense there is no sub(ect: for it alone could not be mentioned in that book!-;!<32 %he sub(ect does not belong to the world' rather& it is a limit of the world! ;!<33 0here in the world is a metaphysical sub(ect to be foundA Bou will say that this is e actly like the case of the eye and the $isual field! ,ut really you do not see the eye! And nothing in the $isual field allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye! ;!<331 )or the form of the $isual field is surely not like this ;!<39 %his is connected with the fact that no part of our e perience is at the same time a priori! 0hate$er we see could be other than it is! 0hate$er we can describe at all could be other than it is! %here is no a priori order of things! ;!<9 .ere it can be seen that solipsism& when its implications are followed out strictly& coincides with pure realism! %he self of solipsism shrinks to a point without e tension& and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it! ;!<91 %hus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a non-psychological way! 0hat brings the self into philosophy is the fact that *the world is my world*! %he philosophical self is not the human being& not the human body& or the human soul& with which psychology deals& but rather the metaphysical sub(ect& the limit of the world--not a part of it! < %he general form of a truth-function is Fp& 4& 6(4)G! %his is the general form of a proposition! <!551 0hat this says is (ust that e$ery proposition is a result of successi$e applications to elementary propositions of the operation 6(4) <!552 #f we are gi$en the general form according to which propositions are constructed& then with it we are also gi$en the general form according to which one proposition can be generated out of another by means of an operation! <!51 %herefore the general form of an operation M*(n) is F4& 6(4)G * (n) ( C Fn& 4& 6(4)G)! %his is the most general form of transition from one proposition to another! <!52 And this is how we arri$e at numbers! # gi$e the following definitions C M5 Def!& M*M$* C M$I1* Def! "o& in accordance with these rules& which deal

with signs& we write the series & M* & M*M* & M*M*M* & !!! & in the following way M5* & M5I1* & M5I1I1* & M5I1I1I1* & !!! ! %herefore& instead of *F & 4& M*4G*& # write *FM5* & M$* & M$I1* G*! And # gi$e the following definitions 5 I 1 C 1 Def!& 5 I 1 I 1 C 2 Def!& 5 I 1 I 1 I1 C 3 Def!& (and so on)! <!521 A number is the e ponent of an operation! <!522 %he concept of number is simply what is common to all numbers& the general form of a number! %he concept of number is the $ariable number! And the concept of numerical e8uality is the general form of all particular cases of numerical e8uality! <!53 %he general form of an integer is F5& 4& 4 I1G! <!531 %he theory of classes is completely superfluous in mathematics! %his is connected with the fact that the generality re8uired in mathematics is not accidental generality! <!1 %he propositions of logic are tautologies! <!11 %herefore the propositions of logic say nothing! (%hey are the analytic propositions!) <!111 All theories that make a proposition of logic appear to ha$e content are false! /ne might think& for e ample& that the words *true* and *false* signified two properties among other properties& and then it would seem to be a remarkable fact that e$ery proposition possessed one of these properties! /n this theory it seems to be anything but ob$ious& (ust as& for instance& the proposition& *All roses are either yellow or red*& would not sound ob$ious e$en if it were true! #ndeed& the logical proposition ac8uires all the characteristics of a proposition of natural science and this is the sure sign that it has been construed wrongly! <!112 %he correct e planation of the propositions of logic must assign to them a uni8ue status among all propositions! <!113 #t is the peculiar mark of logical propositions that one can recogni?e that they are true from the symbol alone& and this fact contains in itself the whole philosophy of logic! And so too it is a $ery important fact that the truth or falsity of non-logical propositions cannot be recogni?ed from the propositions alone! <!12 %he fact that the propositions of logic are tautologies shows the formal--logical--properties of language and the world! %he fact that a tautology is yielded by this particular way of connecting its constituents characteri?es the logic of its constituents! #f propositions are to yield a tautology when they are connected in a certain way& they must ha$e certain structural properties! "o their yielding a tautology when combined in this shows that they possess these structural properties!

<!1251 )or e ample& the fact that the propositions *p* and *Pp* in the combination *(p ! Pp)* yield a tautology shows that they contradict one another! %he fact that the propositions *p ? 8*& *p*& and *8*& combined with one another in the form *(p ? 8) ! (p) '?' (8)*& yield a tautology shows that 8 follows from p and p ? 8! %he fact that *( ) ! f '?' fa* is a tautology shows that fa follows from ( ) ! f ! 4tc! etc! <!1252 #t is clear that one could achie$e the same purpose by using contradictions instead of tautologies! <!1253 #n order to recogni?e an e pression as a tautology& in cases where no generality-sign occurs in it& one can employ the following intuiti$e method' instead of *p*& *8*& *r*& etc! # write *%p)*& *%8)*& *%r)*& etc! %ruth-combinations # e press by means of brackets& e!g! and # use lines to e press the correlation of the truth or falsity of the whole proposition with the truth-combinations of its truth-arguments& in the following way "o this sign& for instance& would represent the proposition p ? 8! 6ow& by way of e ample& # wish to e amine the proposition P(p !Pp) (the law of contradiction) in order to determine whether it is a tautology! #n our notation the form *P4* is written as and the form *4 ! n* as .ence the proposition P(p ! Pp)! reads as follows #f we here substitute *p* for *8* and e amine how the outermost % and ) are connected with the innermost ones& the result will be that the truth of the whole proposition is correlated with all the truth-combinations of its argument& and its falsity with none of the truth-combinations! <!121 %he propositions of logic demonstrate the logical properties of propositions by combining them so as to form propositions that say nothing! %his method could also be called a ?ero-method! #n a logical proposition& propositions are brought into e8uilibrium with one another& and the state of e8uilibrium then indicates what the logical constitution of these propositions must be! <!122 #t follows from this that we can actually do without logical propositions: for in a suitable notation we can in fact recogni?e the formal properties of propositions by mere inspection of the propositions themsel$es! <!1221 #f& for e ample& two propositions *p* and *8* in the combination *p ? 8* yield a tautology& then it is clear that 8 follows from p! )or e ample& we see from the two propositions themsel$es that *8* follows from *p ? 8 ! p*& but it is also possible to show it in this way' we combine them to form *p ? 8 ! p '?' 8*& and then show that this is a tautology! <!1222 %his throws some light on the 8uestion why logical propositions cannot be confirmed by e perience any more than they can be refuted by it!

6ot only must a proposition of logic be irrefutable by any possible e perience& but it must also be unconfirmable by any possible e perience! <!1223 6ow it becomes clear why people ha$e often felt as if it were for us to *postulate * the *truths of logic*! %he reason is that we can postulate them in so far as we can postulate an ade8uate notation! <!1229 #t also becomes clear now why logic was called the theory of forms and of inference! <!123 Elearly the laws of logic cannot in their turn be sub(ect to laws of logic! (%here is not& as -ussell thought& a special law of contradiction for each *type*: one law is enough& since it is not applied to itself!) <!1231 %he mark of a logical proposition is not general $alidity! %o be general means no more than to be accidentally $alid for all things! An ungenerali?ed proposition can be tautological (ust as well as a generali?ed one! <!1232 %he general $alidity of logic might be called essential& in contrast with the accidental general $alidity of such propositions as *All men are mortal*! Propositions like -ussell*s *a iom of reducibility* are not logical propositions& and this e plains our feeling that& e$en if they were true& their truth could only be the result of a fortunate accident! <!1233 #t is possible to imagine a world in which the a iom of reducibility is not $alid! #t is clear& howe$er& that logic has nothing to do with the 8uestion whether our world really is like that or not! <!129 %he propositions of logic describe the scaffolding of the world& or rather they represent it! %hey ha$e no *sub(ect-matter*! %hey presuppose that names ha$e meaning and elementary propositions sense: and that is their conne ion with the world! #t is clear that something about the world must be indicated by the fact that certain combinations of symbols--whose essence in$ol$es the possession of a determinate character--are tautologies! %his contains the decisi$e point! 0e ha$e said that some things are arbitrary in the symbols that we use and that some things are not! #n logic it is only the latter that e press' but that means that logic is not a field in which we e press what we wish with the help of signs& but rather one in which the nature of the absolutely necessary signs speaks for itself! #f we know the logical synta of any sign-language& then we ha$e already been gi$en all the propositions of logic! <!12; #t is possible--indeed possible e$en according to the old conception of logic--to gi$e in ad$ance a description of all *true* logical propositions! <!12;1 .ence there can ne$er be surprises in logic! <!12< /ne can calculate whether a proposition belongs to logic& by calculating the logical properties of the symbol! And this is what we do

when we *pro$e* a logical proposition! )or& without bothering about sense or meaning& we construct the logical proposition out of others using only rules that deal with signs ! %he proof of logical propositions consists in the following process' we produce them out of other logical propositions by successi$ely applying certain operations that always generate further tautologies out of the initial ones! (And in fact only tautologies follow from a tautology!) /f course this way of showing that the propositions of logic are tautologies is not at all essential to logic& if only because the propositions from which the proof starts must show without any proof that they are tautologies! <!12<1 #n logic process and result are e8ui$alent! (.ence the absence of surprise!) <!12<2 Proof in logic is merely a mechanical e pedient to facilitate the recognition of tautologies in complicated cases! <!12<3 #ndeed& it would be altogether too remarkable if a proposition that had sense could be pro$ed logically from others& and so too could a logical proposition! #t is clear from the start that a logical proof of a proposition that has sense and a proof in logic must be two entirely different things! <!12<9 A proposition that has sense states something& which is shown by its proof to be so! #n logic e$ery proposition is the form of a proof! 4$ery proposition of logic is a modus ponens represented in signs! (And one cannot e press the modus ponens by means of a proposition!) <!12<; #t is always possible to construe logic in such a way that e$ery proposition is its own proof! <!12= All the propositions of logic are of e8ual status' it is not the case that some of them are essentially deri$ed propositions! 4$ery tautology itself shows that it is a tautology! <!12=1 #t is clear that the number of the *primiti$e propositions of logic* is arbitrary& since one could deri$e logic from a single primiti$e proposition& e!g! by simply constructing the logical product of )rege*s primiti$e propositions! ()rege would perhaps say that we should then no longer ha$e an immediately self-e$ident primiti$e proposition! ,ut it is remarkable that a thinker as rigorous as )rege appealed to the degree of self-e$idence as the criterion of a logical proposition!) <!13 Logic is not a body of doctrine& but a mirror-image of the world! Logic is transcendental! <!2 +athematics is a logical method! %he propositions of mathematics are e8uations& and therefore pseudo-propositions! <!21 A proposition of mathematics does not e press a thought!

<!211 #ndeed in real life a mathematical proposition is ne$er what we want! -ather& we make use of mathematical propositions only in inferences from propositions that do not belong to mathematics to others that likewise do not belong to mathematics! (#n philosophy the 8uestion& *0hat do we actually use this word or this proposition forA* repeatedly leads to $aluable insights!) <!22 %he logic of the world& which is shown in tautologies by the propositions of logic& is shown in e8uations by mathematics! <!23 #f two e pressions are combined by means of the sign of e8uality& that means that they can be substituted for one another! ,ut it must be manifest in the two e pressions themsel$es whether this is the case or not! 0hen two e pressions can be substituted for one another& that characteri?es their logical form! <!231 #t is a property of affirmation that it can be construed as double negation! #t is a property of *1 I 1 I 1 I 1* that it can be construed as *(1 I 1) I (1 I 1)*! <!232 )rege says that the two e pressions ha$e the same meaning but different senses! ,ut the essential point about an e8uation is that it is not necessary in order to show that the two e pressions connected by the sign of e8uality ha$e the same meaning& since this can be seen from the two e pressions themsel$es! <!2321 And the possibility of pro$ing the propositions of mathematics means simply that their correctness can be percei$ed without its being necessary that what they e press should itself be compared with the facts in order to determine its correctness! <!2322 #t is impossible to assert the identity of meaning of two e pressions! )or in order to be able to assert anything about their meaning& # must know their meaning& and # cannot know their meaning without knowing whether what they mean is the same or different! <!2323 An e8uation merely marks the point of $iew from which # consider the two e pressions' it marks their e8ui$alence in meaning! <!233 %he 8uestion whether intuition is needed for the solution of mathematical problems must be gi$en the answer that in this case language itself pro$ides the necessary intuition! <!2331 %he process of calculating ser$es to bring about that intuition! Ealculation is not an e periment! <!239 +athematics is a method of logic! <!2391 #t is the essential characteristic of mathematical method that it employs e8uations! )or it is because of this method that e$ery proposition of mathematics must go without saying!

<!29 %he method by which mathematics arri$es at its e8uations is the method of substitution! )or e8uations e press the substitutability of two e pressions and& starting from a number of e8uations& we ad$ance to new e8uations by substituting different e pressions in accordance with the e8uations! <!291 %hus the proof of the proposition 2 t 2 C 9 runs as follows' (M$)n* C M$ u* Def!& M2 2* C (M2)2* C (M2)1 I 1* C M2* M2* C M1 I 1*M1 I 1* C (M*M)*(M*M)* CM*M*M*M* C M1 I 1 I 1 I 1* C M9* ! <!3 %he e ploration of logic means the e ploration of e$erything that is sub(ect to law ! And outside logic e$erything is accidental! <!31 %he so-called law of induction cannot possibly be a law of logic& since it is ob$iously a proposition with sense!---6or& therefore& can it be an a priori law! <!32 %he law of causality is not a law but the form of a law! <!321 *Law of causality*--that is a general name! And (ust as in mechanics& for e ample& there are *minimum-principles*& such as the law of least action& so too in physics there are causal laws& laws of the causal form! <!3211 #ndeed people e$en surmised that there must be a *law of least action* before they knew e actly how it went! (.ere& as always& what is certain a priori pro$es to be something purely logical!) <!33 0e do not ha$e an a priori belief in a law of conser$ation& but rather a priori knowledge of the possibility of a logical form! <!39 All such propositions& including the principle of sufficient reason& tile laws of continuity in nature and of least effort in nature& etc! etc!--all these are a priori insights about the forms in which the propositions of science can be cast! <!391 6ewtonian mechanics& for e ample& imposes a unified form on the description of the world! Let us imagine a white surface with irregular black spots on it! 0e then say that whate$er kind of picture these make& # can always appro imate as closely as # wish to the description of it by co$ering the surface with a sufficiently fine s8uare mesh& and then saying of e$ery s8uare whether it is black or white! #n this way # shall ha$e imposed a unified form on the description of the surface! %he form is optional& since # could ha$e achie$ed the same result by using a net with a triangular or he agonal mesh! Possibly the use of a triangular mesh would ha$e made the description simpler' that is to say& it might be that we could describe the surface more accurately with a coarse triangular mesh than with a fine s8uare mesh (or con$ersely)& and so on! %he different nets correspond to different systems for describing the world! +echanics determines one form of description of the world by saying that all propositions used in the

description of the world must be obtained in a gi$en way from a gi$en set of propositions--the a ioms of mechanics! #t thus supplies the bricks for building the edifice of science& and it says& *Any building that you want to erect& whate$er it may be& must somehow be constructed with these bricks& and with these alone!* (7ust as with the number-system we must be able to write down any number we wish& so with the system of mechanics we must be able to write down any proposition of physics that we wish!) <!392 And now we can see the relati$e position of logic and mechanics! (%he net might also consist of more than one kind of mesh' e!g! we could use both triangles and he agons!) %he possibility of describing a picture like the one mentioned abo$e with a net of a gi$en form tells us nothing about the picture! ()or that is true of all such pictures!) ,ut what does characteri?e the picture is that it can be described completely by a particular net with a particular si?e of mesh! "imilarly the possibility of describing the world by means of 6ewtonian mechanics tells us nothing about the world' but what does tell us something about it is the precise way in which it is possible to describe it by these means! 0e are also told something about the world by the fact that it can be described more simply with one system of mechanics than with another! <!393 +echanics is an attempt to construct according to a single plan all the true propositions that we need for the description of the world! <!3931 %he laws of physics& with all their logical apparatus& still speak& howe$er indirectly& about the ob(ects of the world! <!3932 0e ought not to forget that any description of the world by means of mechanics will be of the completely general kind! )or e ample& it will ne$er mention particular point-masses' it will only talk about any point-masses whatsoe$er! <!3; Although the spots in our picture are geometrical figures& ne$ertheless geometry can ob$iously say nothing at all about their actual form and position! %he network& howe$er& is purely geometrical: all its properties can be gi$en a priori! Laws like the principle of sufficient reason& etc! are about the net and not about what the net describes! <!3< #f there were a law of causality& it might be put in the following way' %here are laws of nature! ,ut of course that cannot be said' it makes itself manifest! <!3<1 /ne might say& using .ertt'*s terminology& that only conne ions that are sub(ect to law are thinkable! <!3<11 0e cannot compare a process with *the passage of time*--there is no such thing--but only with another process (such as the working of a chronometer)! .ence we can describe the lapse of time only by relying on

some other process! "omething e actly analogous applies to space' e!g! when people say that neither of two e$ents (which e clude one another) can occur& because there is nothing to cause the one to occur rather than the other& it is really a matter of our being unable to describe one of the two e$ents unless there is some sort of asymmetry to be found! And if such an asymmetry is to be found& we can regard it as the cause of the occurrence of the one and the non-occurrence of the other! <!3<111 Lant*s problem about the right hand and the left hand& which cannot be made to coincide& e ists e$en in two dimensions! #ndeed& it e ists in onedimensional space in which the two congruent figures& a and b& cannot be made to coincide unless they are mo$ed out of this space! %he right hand and the left hand are in fact completely congruent! #t is 8uite irrele$ant that they cannot be made to coincide! A right-hand glo$e could be put on the left hand& if it could be turned round in four-dimensional space! <!3<2 0hat can be described can happen too' and what the law of causality is meant to e clude cannot e$en be described! <!3<3 %he procedure of induction consists in accepting as true the simplest law that can be reconciled with our e periences! <!3<31 %his procedure& howe$er& has no logical (ustification but only a psychological one! #t is clear that there are no grounds for belie$ing that the simplest e$entuality will in fact be reali?ed! <!3<311 #t is an hypothesis that the sun will rise tomorrow' and this means that we do not know whether it will rise! <!3= %here is no compulsion making one thing happen because another has happened! %he only necessity that e ists is logical necessity! <!3=1 %he whole modern conception of the world is founded on the illusion that the so-called laws of nature are the e planations of natural phenomena! <!3=2 %hus people today stop at the laws of nature& treating them as something in$iolable& (ust as >od and )ate were treated in past ages! And in fact both are right and both wrong' though the $iew of the ancients is clearer in so far as they ha$e a clear and acknowledged terminus& while the modern system tries to make it look as if e$erything were e plained! <!3=3 %he world is independent of my will! <!3=9 4$en if all that we wish for were to happen& still this would only be a fa$our granted by fate& so to speak' for there is no logical conne ion between the will and the world& which would guarantee it& and the supposed physical conne ion itself is surely not something that we could will! <!3=; 7ust as the only necessity that e ists is logical necessity& so too the only impossibility that e ists is logical impossibility!

<!3=;1 )or e ample& the simultaneous presence of two colours at the same place in the $isual field is impossible& in fact logically impossible& since it is ruled out by the logical structure of colour! Let us think how this contradiction appears in physics' more or less as follows--a particle cannot ha$e two $elocities at the same time: that is to say& it cannot be in two places at the same time: that is to say& particles that are in different places at the same time cannot be identical! (#t is clear that the logical product of two elementary propositions can neither be a tautology nor a contradiction! %he statement that a point in the $isual field has two different colours at the same time is a contradiction!) <!9 All propositions are of e8ual $alue! <!91 %he sense of the world must lie outside the world! #n the world e$erything is as it is& and e$erything happens as it does happen' in it no $alue e ists--and if it did e ist& it would ha$e no $alue! #f there is any $alue that does ha$e $alue& it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case! )or all that happens and is the case is accidental! 0hat makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world& since if it did it would itself be accidental! #t must lie outside the world! <!92 "o too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics! Propositions can e press nothing that is higher! <!921 #t is clear that ethics cannot be put into words! 4thics is transcendental! (4thics and aesthetics are one and the same!) <!922 0hen an ethical law of the form& *%hou shalt !!!* is laid down& one*s first thought is& *And what if # do& not do itA* #t is clear& howe$er& that ethics has nothing to do with punishment and reward in the usual sense of the terms! "o our 8uestion about the conse8uences of an action must be unimportant!--At least those conse8uences should not be e$ents! )or there must be something right about the 8uestion we posed! %here must indeed be some kind of ethical reward and ethical punishment& but they must reside in the action itself! (And it is also clear that the reward must be something pleasant and the punishment something unpleasant!) <!923 #t is impossible to speak about the will in so far as it is the sub(ect of ethical attributes! And the will as a phenomenon is of interest only to psychology! <!93 #f the good or bad e ercise of the will does alter the world& it can alter only the limits of the world& not the facts--not what can be e pressed by means of language! #n short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world! #t must& so to speak& wa and wane as a whole! %he world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man! <!931 "o too at death the world does not alter& but comes to an end!

<!9311 Death is not an e$ent in life' we do not li$e to e perience death! #f we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration but timelessness& then eternal life belongs to those who li$e in the present! /ur life has no end in (ust the way in which our $isual field has no limits! <!9312 6ot only is there no guarantee of the temporal immortality of the human soul& that is to say of its eternal sur$i$al after death: but& in any case& this assumption completely fails to accomplish the purpose for which it has always been intended! /r is some riddle sol$ed by my sur$i$ing for e$erA #s not this eternal life itself as much of a riddle as our present lifeA %he solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time! (#t is certainly not the solution of any problems of natural science that is re8uired!) <!932 .ow things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is higher! >od does not re$eal himself in the world! <!9321 %he facts all contribute only to setting the problem& not to its solution! <!99 #t is not how things are in the world that is mystical& but that it e ists! <!9; %o $iew the world sub specie aeterni is to $iew it as a whole--a limited whole! )eeling the world as a limited whole--it is this that is mystical! <!; 0hen the answer cannot be put into words& neither can the 8uestion be put into words! %he riddle does not e ist! #f a 8uestion can be framed at all& it is also possible to answer it! <!;1 "cepticism is not irrefutable& but ob$iously nonsensical& when it tries to raise doubts where no 8uestions can be asked! )or doubt can e ist only where a 8uestion e ists& a 8uestion only where an answer e ists& and an answer only where something can be said! <!;2 0e feel that e$en when all possible scientific 8uestions ha$e been answered& the problems of life remain completely untouched! /f course there are then no 8uestions left& and this itself is the answer! <!;21 %he solution of the problem of life is seen in the $anishing of the problem! (#s not this the reason why those who ha$e found after a long period of doubt that the sense of life became clear to them ha$e then been unable to say what constituted that senseA) <!;22 %here are& indeed& things that cannot be put into words! %hey make themsel$es manifest! %hey are what is mystical! <!;3 %he correct method in philosophy would really be the following' to say nothing e cept what can be said& i!e! propositions of natural science--i!e! something that has nothing to do with philosophy -- and then& whene$er someone else wanted to say something metaphysical& to demonstrate to him that he had failed to gi$e a meaning to certain signs in his propositions!

Although it would not be satisfying to the other person--he would not ha$e the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy--this method would be the only strictly correct one! <!;9 +y propositions are elucidatory in this way' he who understands me finally recogni?es them as senseless& when he has climbed out through them& on them& o$er them! (.e must so to speak throw away the ladder& after he has climbed up on it!) = 0hat we cannot speak about we must pass o$er in silence!