LAND TITLES AND DEEDS I.

PRELIMINARY IMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECT DEFINITION OF TERMS LAND TITLE - is the evidence of the owners right or extent of interest, by which he can maintain controland as a rule assert right to exclusive possession and enjoyment of property. DEED - is the instrument in writing by which any real estate or interest therein is created, alienated,mortgaged, or assigned, or by which title to any real estate may be affected in law or equity. TORRENS SYSTEM - is a system for registration of land under which, upon the landowners application, the court may, after appropriate proceedings, direct the issuance of a certificate of title. TORRENS TITLE is a certificate of ownership issued under the Torrens System, through the Register of Deeds, naming and declaring the owner of the real property described therein, free from all liens and encumbrances except such as may be expressly noted there or otherwise reserved by law.

TORRENS SYSTEM OF REGISTRATION Cases October 2, 1915 LegardavsSaleeby FACTS: Legarda and Saleeby are owners of adjoining lots in Ermita, Manila Between their lots is a stone wall which is located on the lot of plaintiff Legarda. On March 2, 1906, Legarda filed a petition in the Court of Land Registration to register their lot. The registration was allowed on October 25, 1906. They were then issued an original certificate of title. The title wasregistered including the wall. On March 25, 1912, the predecessor of Saleeby presented a petition for registration in the Court of Land Registration. The court decreed the registration of his land, and also included the wall. Hence, plaintiff presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for adjustment and correction of the error where the wall was indicated in both registrations. However, the lower court denied their petition, contending that, they failed to make any objection during the pendency of Saleebys registration. ISSUE: WON the defendant is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it? RULING: NO. The lower courts decision would call for the plaintiffs to be always alert and see to it that no other parties will register the wall and its land. Such would defeat the real purpose of the Torrens system of land registration. The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. The purpose of the law, would seem that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court to avoid the possibility of losing his land. So who owns the land? Based on the Torrens system, plaintiff Legarda owns the land. Under our law, once a party registers the land, final and in good faith, no third parties may claim interest on the same land. The rights of the world are foreclosed by the decree of registration. The registration, under the Torrens system, does not give the owner any better title than he had. The registration of a particular parcel of land is a bar to future litigation over the same. It is a notice to the world and no one can plead ignorance of the registration.

Adopting the rule which we believe to be more in consonance with the purposes and the real intent of the torrens system, we are of the opinion and so decree that in case land has been registered under the Land Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date shall prevail. DECISION: Judgment of the lower court was revoked. The wall and the land where it sits is awarded to the plaintiffs. TRADERS ROYAL BANK vs.COURT OF APPEALS RULING: The pertinent question then is, was the transfer of the CBCI from Filriters to Philfinance and subsequently from Philfinance to TRB, in accord with existing law, so as to entitle TRB to have the CBCI registered in its name with the Central Bank? Obviously, the assignment of the certificate from Filriters to Philfinance was fictitious, having made without consideration, and did not conform to Central Bank Circular No. 769, series of 1980, better known as the "Rules and Regulations Governing Central Bank Certificates of Indebtedness", which provided that any "assignment of registered certificates shall not be valid unless made . . . by the registered owner thereof in person or by his representative duly authorized in writing." Petitioner's claimed interest has no basis, since it was derived from Philfinance whose interest was inexistent, having acquired the certificate through simulation. What happened was Philfinance merely borrowed CBCI No. D891 from Filriters, a sister corporation, to guarantee its financing operations. Admittedly, the subject CBCI is not a negotiable instrument in the absence of words of negotiability within the meaning of the negotiable instruments law (Act 2031). A reading of the subject CBCI indicates that the same is payable to FILRITERS GUARANTY ASSURANCE CORPORATION, and to no one else, thus, discounting the petitioner's submission that the same is a negotiable instrument, and that it is a holder in due course of the certificate. Thus, the transfer of the instrument from Philfinance to TRB was merely an assignment, and is not governed by the negotiable instruments law. The pertinent question then is, was the transfer of the CBCI from Filriters to Philfinance and subsequently from Philfinance to TRB, in accord with existing law, so as to entitle TRB to have the CBCI registered in its name with the Central Bank? The terms of the CBCI No. D891 contain a provision on its TRANSFER. Thus: TRANSFER. This Certificate shall pass by delivery unless it is registered in the owner's name at any office of the Bank or any agency duly authorized by the Bank, and such registration is noted hereon. After such registration no transfer thereof shall be valid unless made at said office (where the Certificates has been registered) by the registered owner hereof, in person, or by his attorney, duly authorized in writing and similarly noted hereon and upon payment of a nominal transfer fee which may be required, a new Certificate shall be issued to the transferee of the registered owner thereof. The bank or any agency duly authorized by the Bank may deem and treat the bearer of this Certificate, or if this Certificate is registered as herein authorized, the person in whose name the same is registered as the absolute owner of this Certificate, for the purpose of receiving payment hereof, or on account hereof, and for all other purpose whether or not this Certificate shall be overdue. Petitioner knew that Philfinance is not registered owner of the CBCI No. D891. The fact that a non-owner was disposing of the registered CBCI owned by another entity was a good reason for petitioner to verify of inquire as to the title Philfinance to dispose to the CBCI.It cannot, therefore, be taken out of the said funds, without violating the requirements of the law. Thus, the anauthorized use or distribution of the same by a corporate officer of Filriters cannot bind the said corporation, not without the approval of its Board of Directors, and the maintenance of the required reserve fund.Consequently, the title of Filriters over the subject certificate of indebtedness must be upheld over the claimed interest of Traders Royal Bank. ABELARDO CRUZ vs. LEODEGARIA CABANA (JUNE 22, 1984)

FACTS:There is no dispute that the land in question was sold with right of repurchase on June 1, 1965 to defendants- spouses TeofiloLegaspi and Iluminada Cabana. Said land was not repurchased and in the meantime, however, said defendants-spouses took possession of the land. Upon request of Leodegaria Cabana, the title of the land was lent to her in order to mortgage the property to the Philippine National Bank. Said title was, forthwith, deposited with the PNB. On October 21, 1968, defendant Leodegaria Cabana sold the land by way of absolute sale to the defendants- spouses. The said defendants-spouses attempted to register the deed of sale but said registration was not accomplished because they could not present the owner's duplicate of title which was at that time in the possession of the PNB as mortgage. However, on November 29, 1968 defendant Leodegaria Cabana sold the same property to herein plaintiff, Abellardo Cruz and the latter was able to register it in his name. ISSUE: Whether or not Plaintiff Abellardo Cruz, as the second buyer, and who knows about the prior sale to spouses Cabana has a better right because of the fact that he registered the land first in his name? RULING: The transaction in question is governed by Article 1544 of the Civil Code. True it is that the plaintiff was able to register the sale in his name but was he in good faith in doing so? While the title was registered in plaintiff- appellant's name on February 9, 1971 (Exh. A), it appears that he knew of the sale of the land to defendants-spouses Legaspi as he was informed in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon. It appears that the defendants-spouses registered their document of sale on May 13, 1965 under Primary Entry No. 210113 of the Register of Deeds (Exh. 2). Under the foregoing circumstances, the right of ownership and title to the land must be resolved in favor of the defendants- spouses Legaspi on three counts. First, the plaintiffappellant was not in good faith in registering the title in his name. Consistent is the jurisprudence in this jurisdiction that in order that the provisions of Article 1544 of the new Civil Code may be invoked, it is necessary that the conveyance must have been made by a party who has an existing right in the thing and the power to dispose of it (10 Manresa 170, 171). It cannot be set up by a second purchaser who comes into possession of the property that has already been acquired by the first purchaser in full dominion (Bautista vs. Sison, 39 Phil. 615), this not withstanding that the second purchaser records his title in the public registry, if the registration be done in bad faith, the philosophy underlying this rule being that the public records cannot be covered into instruments of fraud and oppression by one who secures an inscription therein in bad faith (Chupinghong vs. Borreros, 7 CA Rep. 699). A purchaser who has knowledge of fact which would put him upon inquiry and investigation as to possible defects of the title of the vendor and fails to make such inquiry and investigation, cannot claim that he is a purchaser in good faith. Knowledge of a prior transfer of a registered property by a subsequent purchaser makes him a purchaser in bad faith and his knowledge of such transfer vitiates his title acquired by virtue of the latter instrument of conveyance which creates no right as against the first purchaser (Reylago vs. Jarabe, L-20046, March 27, 1968, 22 SCRA 1247). In the second place, the defendants-spouses registered the deed of absolute sale ahead of plaintiff- appellant. Said spouses were not only able to obtain the title because at that time, the owner's duplicate certificate was still with the Philippine National Bank. In the third place, defendants-spouses have been in possession all along of the land in question. If immovable property is sold to different vendees, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the registry of property; and should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the possession (Soriano, et al. vs. The Heirs of Domingo Magali et al., L-15133 , July 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 489). Priority of possession stands good in favor of herein defendants-spouses (Evangelista vs. Abad, [CA] 36 O.G. 2913; Sanchez vs. Ramos, 40 Phil. 614, Quimsonvs, Rosete, 87 Phil. 159).

The Court finds that in this case of double sale of real property, respondent appellate court, on the basis of the undisputed facts, correctly applied the provisions of Article 1544 of the Civil Code that Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property. Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property. Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith. ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of respondent appellate court, upholding respondentsspouses TeofiloLegaspi and Iluminada Cabana as the true and rightful owners of the property in litigation and ordering the issuance of a new title with the cancellation as null and void of Title No. T- 99140 obtained by petitioner Abelardo C. Cruz, is hereby affirmed in toto. In accordance with the partial grant of petitioner's prayer for alternative relief as stated in the preceding paragraph hereof, the Court hereby orders and sentences respondent Leodegaria Cabana to reimburse and pay to petitioner's heirs the total sum of P5,750.00. TYPES OF TORRENS CERTIFICATE OF TITLE Original Certificate of Title the first titleissued in the name of the registered owner bythe Register of Deeds (ROD) covering a parcelof land which had been registered by virtue of ajudicial or administrative proceeding. Transfer Certificate of Title the title issuedby the ROD in favor of the transferee to whomthe ownership of the already registered landhad been transferred by virtue of a sale orother modes of conveyance.

REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES MEANING OF LAND REGISTRATION is a judicial or administrative proceeding whereby a persons claim over aparticular land is determined and confirmed or recognized so that such land and the ownership thereof may be recorded in a public registry. FUNCTIONS OF REGISTRATION Three functions of registration: 1. Publicity- Tells the whole world 2. Priority- First in time, first in law 3. Security- Prevents unlawful registration of others Legarda v. Saleeby, 31 Phil 590 (1915) PURPOSES OF THE TORRENS SYSTEM: 1. To quiet title to the land and to stop forever any question as to the legality of said title 2. To relieve the land of unknown claims 3. To guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized 4. To give every registered owner complete peace of mind 5. To issue a certificate of title to the owner which shall be the best evidence of his ownership of the land 6. To avoid conflicts of title in and to real estate and to facilitate transactions. Subdivision, Inc. v. Province of Negros Occidental, 7 SCRA 60 (1963) The registration of property is to:

1. avoid possible conflicts of title in and to real property, and 2. facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, EXCEPT when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry. PROBATIVE VALUE OF THE TORRENS TITLE Torrens Title may be received in evidence in all courts in the Philippines, and shall be conclusive as to all matters contained therein, principally as to the identity of the land owner except so far as provided in the Land Registration Act. METHODS OF REGISTRATION Transcription Entering in the administration book. May be judicial or administrative. Judicial when subscribed to the jurisdiction of the court, and administrative when procedure is done with the DENR. Inscription When mortgage is annotated in the title.

KINDS OF REGISTRATION Judicial/Voluntary/Ordinary by filing withthe proper court; application by the privateindividual himself Administrative/Involuntary/Cadastral compulsory registration initiated by the government II.THE GOVERNING LAWS PD 1529 (PROPERTY REGISTRATION ACT) Incorporated the following Laws: Act 496 Land Registration Act CA 141 Public Land Act Act 2259 The Cadastral Act Act 3344 System of Registration for Unregistered Lands Act 1508 The Chattel Mortgage Law, as amended RA 26 Reconstitution of Original Certificate of title PD 27 Emancipation, Patents, Land Reform Law PD 957 Subdivision and Condominium Protective Buyers Decree RA 4726 Condominium Act III.LEGAL BASIS AND NATURE CONCEPT OF JURA REGALIA Cruz vs. DENR Secretary FACTS: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of RA 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part. The Commission on Human Rights asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parenspatriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous people. It prays that the petition be dismissed. HELD: After due deliberation, 7 voted to dismiss the petition, while 7 other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. As the votes were equally divided and the necessary majority

was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED. LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION AND ITS REGISTRY OF DEEDS THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY(LRA) Agency charged with the efficient execution of the laws relative to the registration of lands, under the executive supervision of the DOJ Consists of an Administrator assisted by 2 Deputy Administrators FUNCTIONS AND AUTHORITY OF LRA Extend speedy and effective assistance to the Dept. of Agrarian Reform, the Land Bank, and other agencies in the implementation of the land reform program of the government Extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings Be the central repository of records relative to original registration of lands titled underthe Torrens system, including the subdivision and plans of titled lands

EO NO. 649 (REORGANIZING THE LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION INTO THE NATIONAL LAND TEXTILES AND DEEDS REGISTRATION ADMINISTRATION AND REGIONALIZING THE OFFICES OF THE REGISTRARS THEREIN) Creation of the Offices of the Administrator and Deputy Administrator. The Land Registration Commission is hereby reorganized into an office to be known as the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration. It shall have the following functions: 1. Issue decrees of registration pursuant to final judgments of the courts in land registration proceedings and cause the issuance by the Registrars of Land Titles and Deeds of the corresponding certificates of title; 2. Be the central repository of records relative to original registration of lands titled under the Torrens system, including subdivision and consolidation plans of titled lands; and 3. Extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings and to the other agencies of the government in the implementation of the land reform program. 4. There are hereby created in the Administration the Offices of the Administrator and the Deputy Administrator. OFFICE OF THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS (ROD) Constitutes a public repository of records ofinstruments affecting registered orunregistered lands and chattel mortgagesin the province or city wherein such officeis situated . Headed by the
Register of Deeds, assistedby a Deputy FUNCTIONS OF THE ROD: Immediately register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with the requisites for registration Shall see to it that said instrument bears the proper documentary and science stamps and that the same are properly cancelled If the instrument is not registerable, he shall deny the registration thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in writing, stating the ground or reason therefore, and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Sec. 117 of PD 1529 Prepare and keep an index system which contains the names of all registered owners and lands registered

Baranda v, Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757 (1988) - The function of the ROD with reference to registration of deeds, encumbrances, instruments, and the like is ministerial in nature.

This petition is impressed with merit. Under these circumstances, it is crystal clear that the Providos, private respondents herein, in filing Civil Case No. 15871 were trying to delay the full implementation of the final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 as well as G.R. No. 64432 wherein this Court ordered immediate implementation of the writs of possession and demolition in the reconstitution proceedings involving Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre. The purpose of a notice of lis pendens is defined in the following manner: Lis pendens has been conceived to protect the real rights of the party causing the registration thereof With the lis pendens duly recorded, he could rest secure that he would not lose the property or any part of it. For, notice of lis pendens serves as a warning to a prospective purchaser or incumbrancer that the particular property is in litigation; and that he should keep his hands off the same, unless of course he intends to gamble on the results of the litigation. The private respondents are not entitled to this protection. The facts obtaining in this case necessitate the application of the rule enunciated in the cases of Victoriano v. Rovila (55 Phil. 1000), Municipal Council of Paranaque v. Court of First Instance of Rizal (70 Phil., 363) and Sarmiento v. Ortiz (10 SCRA 158), to the effect that: We have once held that while ordinarily a notice of pendency which has been filed in a proper case, cannot be cancelled while the action is pending and undetermined, the proper court has the discretionary power to cancel it under peculiar circumstances, as for instance, where the evidence so far presented by the plaintiff does not bear out the main allegations of his complaint, and where the continuances of the trial, for which the plaintiff is responsible, are unnecessarily delaying the determination of the case to the prejudice of the defendant. (Victoriano v. Rovira, supra; The Municipal Council of Paranaque v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, supra) The facts of this case in relation to the earlier cases brought all the way to the Supreme Court illustrate how the private respondents tried to block but unsuccessfuly the already final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432. Parenthetically, respondent Judge Tito Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the respondent Acting Register of Deeds' stand that, the notice of lis pendens in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over Lot No. 4571, Barbara Cadastre cannot be cancelled on the ground of pendency of Civil Case No. 15871 with the Court of Appeals. In upholding the position of the Acting Register of Deeds based on Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, he conveniently forgot the first paragraph thereof which provides: Cancellation of lis pendens. Before final judgment, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled upon Order of the Court after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be registered. It may also be cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the party who caused the registration thereof. This Court cannot understand how respondent Judge Gustilo could have been misled by the respondent Acting Register of Deeds on this matter when in fact he was the same Judge who issued the order dismissing Civil Case No. 15871 prompting the private respondents to appeal said order dated October 10, 1984 to the Court of Appeals. The records of the main case are still with the court below but based on the order, it can be safely assumed that the various pleadings filed by the parties subsequent to the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners (the defendants therein) touched on the issue of the validity of TCT No. 25772 in the name of the Providos over Lot Number 4571, Sta. Barbara Cadastre in the light of the final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432. The next question to be determined is on the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds to annotate and/or cancel the notice of lis pendens in a torrens certificate of title.

Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration. ... . If the instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in writing, stating the ground or reasons therefore, and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this Decree." Section 117 provides that "When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other instrument presented to him for registration or where any party in interest does not agree with the action taken by the Register of Deeds with reference to any such instrument, the question shall be submitted to the Commission of Land Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest thru the Register of Deeds. ... ." The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. (Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231; Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union [IBAAEU] v. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663) The statute concerning the function of the Register of Deeds to register instruments in a torrens certificate of title is clear and leaves no room for construction. Hence, the function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds encumbrances, instruments and the like is ministerial in nature. The respondent Acting Register of Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of the respondent Judge's Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over the subject parcel of land. In case of doubt as to the proper step to be taken in pursuance of any deed ... or other instrument presented to him, he should have asked the opinion of the Commissioner of Land Registration now, the Administrator of the National Land Title and Deeds Registration Administration in accordance with Section 117 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. In the ultimate analysis, however, the responsibility for the delays in the full implementation of this Court's already final resolutions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 which includes the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre falls on the respondent Judge. He should never have allowed himself to become part of dilatory tactics, giving as excuse the wrong impression that Civil Case No. 15871 filed by the private respondents involves another set of parties claiming Lot No. 4517 under their own Torrens Certificate of Title. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. SO ORDERED.

Balbin v. ROD, 28 SCRA 12 (1969) Instances when the ROD may validly deny registration of a voluntary instrument: 1. Where there are more than 1 copy of the ownersduplicate certificate of title and not all such copiesare presented to the ROD 2. Where the voluntary instrument bears on its faceinfirmity 3. Where the validity of the instrument sought to beregistered is in issue in a pending court suit. Notice of pending suit must be given to parties. Registration may be suspended.

We find no merit in petitioners' contention. Section 55, supra, obviously assumes that there is only one duplicate copy of the title in question, namely, that of the registered owner himself, such that its production whenever a voluntary instrument is presented constitutes sufficient authority from him for the register of deeds to make the corresponding memorandum of registration. In the case at bar, the three other copies of the title were in existence, presumably issued under section 43 * of Act 496. As correctly observed by the Land Registration Commissioner, petitioners' claim that the issuance of those copies was unauthorized or illegal is beside the point, its legality being presumed until otherwise declared by a court of competent jurisdiction. There being several copies of the same title in existence, it is easy to see how their integrity may be adversely affected if an encumbrance, or an outright conveyance, is annotated on one copy and not on the others. The law itself refers to every copy authorized to be issued as a duplicate of the original, which means that both must contain identical entries of the transactions, particularly voluntary ones, affecting the land covered by the title. If this were not so, if different copies were permitted to carry differing annotations, the whole system of Torrens registration would cease to be reliable.

One other ground relied upon by the Land Registration Commissioner in upholding the action taken by the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur is that since the property subject of the donation is presumed conjugal, that is, property of the marriage of the donor, Cornelio Balbin, and his deceased wife, Nemesia Mina, "there should first be a liquidation of the partnership before the surviving spouse may make such a conveyance." This legal conclusion may appear too general and sweeping in its implications, for without a previous settlement of the partnership a surviving spouse may dispose of his aliquot share or interest therein subject of course to the result of future liquidation. Nevertheless, it is not to be denied that, if the conjugal character of the property is assumed, the deed of donation executed by the husband, Cornelio Balbin, bears on its face an infirmity which justified the denial of its registration, namely, the fact that the two-thirds portion of said property which he donated was more than his one-half share, not to say more than what remained of such share after he had sold portions of the same land to three other parties. It appears that there is a case pending in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur (CC No. 2221), wherein the civil status of the donor Cornelio Balbin and the character of the land in question are in issue, as well as the validity of the different conveyances executed by him. The matter of registration of the deed of donation may well await the outcome of that case, and in the meantime the rights of the interested parties could be protected by filing the proper notices of lis pendens. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decisions of the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur and that of the Commissioner of Land Registration are affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.
NOBLEJAS VS. TEEHANKEE Facts: Noblejas was the commissioner of land registration. Under RA 1151, he is entitled to the same compensation, emoluments, and privileges as those of a Judge of CFI. He approved a subdivision plan covering certain areas that are in excess of those covered by the title. The Secretary of Justice, Teehankee, sent a letter to Noblejas, requiring him to explain. Noblejas answered, arguing that since he has a rank equivalent to that of a Judge, he could only be suspended and investigated in the same manner as an ordinary Judge, under the Judiciary Act. He claims that he may be investigated only by the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, he was suspended by the Executive Secretary (ES). Noblejas filed this case claiming the lack of jurisdiction of the ES and his abuse of discretion. ISSUE:(1) Whether the Commissioner of Land Registratoin may only be investigated by the Supreme Court (in view of his having a rank equivalent to a judge)? (2) Whether or not the resolution of the consulta of the ROD a judicial function? RULING: (1)NO. If the law had really intended to include the general grant of rank and privileges equivalent to Judges, the right to be investigated and be suspended or removed only by the Supreme Court, then such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the doctrine of separation of powers because it would charge the Supreme Court with an administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials,simultaneously reducing pro tanto, the control of the Chief Executive over such officials. As such, RA 1151 while conferring the same privileges as those of a judge, did not include and was not intended to include, the right to demand investigation by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon the Courts recommendation. Said rights would be violative of the Constitution. The suspension of Noblejas by the ES valid. (2)Also, the resolution of the consulta by a Register of Deeds is NOT a judicial function, but an administrative process. It is conclusive and binding only upon the Register of Deeds, NOT the parties themselves. Even if the resolution is appealable, it does not automatically mean that they are judicial in character. Still, the resolution of the consultas are but a minimal portion of the administrative or executive functions. Ledesma v. Villaseor, 13 SCRA 494 (1965) - It is enough that in the RODs opinion an instrument is registrable for him to register it. The act being an administrative act does not contemplate notice to and hearing of interested parties. Almirol v. ROD of Agusan, G.R. No. L-22486, Mar.20, 1968 - The determination of whether a document is valid or not is a function that belongs to a court of competenjurisdiction, and not to the ROD. Gallardo v. IAC, 155 SCRA 248 (1987) - The ROD may also refuse to register a privatedocument since Section 112 of PD 152 provides that deeds of conveyances affecting lands should be verified and acknowledges before a notary public orother public officer authorized by law to take.

III.ORIGINAL REGISTRATION (SEC. 14 TO 38) APPLICATION SEC. 14 (PD 1529)

Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. (2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws. (3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws. (4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law. Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the application jointly. Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro may file an application for the original registration of the land, provided, however, that should the period for redemption expire during the pendency of the registration proceedings and ownership to the property consolidated in the vendee a retro, the latter shall be substituted for the applicant and may continue the proceedings. A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original registration of any land held in trust by him, unless prohibited by the instrument creating the trust. ONG VS REPUBLIC (MARCH 21, 2008)

The petition lacks merit. Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529 (Property Registration Decree), as amended, provides
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Thus, pursuant to the aforequoted provision of law, applicants for registration of title must prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain, and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.[8] These requisites involve

questions of fact which are not proper in a petition for review oncertiorari. Factual findings of the court a quo are generally binding on this Court except for certain recognized exceptions, as is the case here, where the trial court and the Court of Appeals arrived at conflicting findings. There is no dispute that the subject lot is classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. However, petitioner failed to prove that he or his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The records show that petitioner and his brothers bought the subject lot from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil on August 24, 1998,[14] who in turn purchased the same from spouses Teofilo Abellera and Abella Sarmen on January 16, 1997.[15] The latter bought the subject lot from Cynthia, Agustin Jr., Jasmin, Omir and Lauro, all surnamed Cacho, on July 10, 1979.[16] The earliest tax declaration which was submitted in evidence was Tax Declaration No. 25606[17] issued in 1971 in the names of spouses Agustin Cacho and Eufrosinia Baustista. While tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership, they constitute good indicia of possession in the concept of owner and a claim of title over the subject property. Further, as correctly pointed by the Court of Appeals, possession alone is not sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain because the law requires possession and occupation. Petitioner admitted that after he and his brothers bought the subject lot from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil in 1998, neither he nor his brothers actually occupied the subject lot.[21] No improvements were made thereon and the most that they did was to visit the lot on several occasions. [22] Petitioners predecessor-in-interest, Tony Bautista testified that he and his wife never actually occupied the subject lot from the time they bought the same from spouses Teofilo Abellera and Abella Sarmen in 1997 The burden of proof in land registration cases rests on the applicant who must show by clear, positive and convincing evidence that his alleged possession and occupation of the land is of the nature and duration required by law.[24] Unfortunately, petitioners evidence do not constitute the well -nigh incontrovertible evidence necessary in cases of this nature.[25] Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the Decision of the trial court and in denying his application for registration of title over the subject lot. SO ORDERED.
CANETE VS GENUINO ICE COMPANY , JAN. 22 2008

We deny the petition. The subject lots are part of the Piedad Estate, Quezon City, a Friar Land acquired on December 23, 1903 by the Philippine Government from the Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company, Ltd., La Sociedad Agricola de Ultramar, the British-Manila Estate Company, Ltd., and the Recoleto Order of the Philippine Islands, as indicated in Public Act No. 1120 (Friar Lands Act) enacted on April 26, 1904.18 After the Piedad Estate was registered in OCT No. 614 in the name of the Philippine Government in 1910 under the provisions of Act 496, the area was subdivided originally into 874 lots. As a result of subsequent surveys executed in the course of disposition, the number of lots increased to 1,305. Disposition of these lots was made by the Bureau of Lands thru sales, under the Friar Lands Act, as early as 1910 and records show that even before the Second World War, all lots in the Piedad Estate have been disposed of. 19 The Piedad Estate has long been segregated from the mass of the public domain and has become private land duly registered under the Torrens system following the procedure for the confirmation of private lands prescribed in Act 496. Thus the lands inside the Piedad Estate are no longer lands of the public domain.20 One who acquires land under the Friar Lands Act, as well as his successors-in-interest, may not claim successional rights to purchase by reason of occupation from time immemorial, as this contravenes the historical fact that friar lands were bought by the Government of the Philippine Islands, pursuant to an Act of Congress of the United States, approved on July 1, 1902, not from individual persons but from certain companies, a society and a religious order. Under the Friar Lands Act, only "actual settlers and occupants at the time said lands are acquired by the Government" were given preference to lease, purchase, or acquire their holdings, in disregard of the settlement and occupation of persons before the government acquired the lands. 21 As to the second issue raised, petitioners claim that they are bona fide occupants of the subject property within the contemplation of the Friar Lands Act, having allegedly been in actual, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession of the property, although it is not stated for how long and since when. In their second amended complaint, they seek judgment (4) Declaring the plaintiffs as bona fide occupants of the property in litigation pursuant to the provisions of the Friar Lands Act and other existing laws. (Emphasis supplied) They do not pray to be declared owners of the subject property despite their alleged adverse possession but only to be adjudged as the "bona fide occupants" thereof. In other words, petitioners concede the States ownership of the property. Being so, petitioners may not be considered the real parties in interest for the purpose of maintaining the suit for cancellation of the subject titles. The Court of Appeals is correct in declaring that only the State, through the Solicitor General, may institute such suit. Jurisprudence on the matter has been settled and the issue need not be belabored. Thus The Court also holds that private respondents are not the proper parties to initiate the present suit. The complaint, praying as it did for the cancellation of the transfer certificates of title of petitioners on the ground that they were derived from a "spurious" OCT No. 4216, assailed in effect the validity of said title. While private respondents did not pray for the reversion of the land to the government, we agree with the petitioners that the prayer in the complaint will have the same result of reverting the land to the government under the Regalian doctrine. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED.

2.JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT OR INCOMPLETE TITLE (SEC. 28 (B) OF THE PUBLIC LAND ACT, CA 141)

SECTION 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act , to wit: (a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the prior United States have applied for the purchase, composition or other form of grant of lands of the public domain under the laws and royal decrees then in force and have instituted and prosecuted the proceedings in connection therewith, but have with or without default upon their part, or for any other cause, not received title therefor, if such applicants or grantees and their heirs have occupied and cultivated said lands continuously since the filing of their applications. (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in sub-section (b) hereof.
SUSI VS RAZON (DEC. 9, 1925)

With these facts in view, we shall proceed to consider the questions raised by the appellant in his assignments of error.
lawphi1.net

It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of the land in question openly, continuously, adversely, and publicly, personally and through his predecessors, since the year 1880, that is, for about forty-five years. While the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Angela Razon in the forcible entry case does not affect the Director of Lands, yet it is controlling as to Angela Razon and rebuts her claim that she had been in possession thereof. When on August 15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the purchase of said land, Valentin Susi had already been in possession thereof personally and through his predecessors for thirty-four years. And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac had already made said land a fish pond when he sold it on December 18, 1880, it can hardly be estimated when he began to possess and occupy it, the period of time being so long that it is beyond the reach of memory. These being the facts, the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Cario vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (212 U. S., 4491), is applicable here. In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently,

in selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public domain, the plaintiffappellee cannot maintain an action to recover possession thereof.
lawphi1.net

If, as above stated, the land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already become, by operation of law, private property of the plaintiff, there lacking only the judicial sanction of his title, Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to recover possession thereof and hold it. For the foregoing, and no error having been found in the judgment appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed in all its parts, without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered
REP VS IAC AND ACME PLYWOOD AND VENEER CO. (DEC. 29, 1986)

REP VS CA AND NAGUIT (JAN. 17, 2005) REP VS HERBIETO (MAY 26, 2005) HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN VS REPUBLIC (APRIL 24, 2009) REPUBLIC VS CA (AUG. 6, 2008) DE CASTRO VS. MAYOR YAP (OCT. 8, 2008) DIAZ VS REPUBLIC (FEB. 2, 2010) 1. REGISTRATION UNDER THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT CONSTITUTION (IPRAS QUOTE ON THE CONSTITUTION)

CHAPTER l GENERAL PROVISIONS Section 1. Short Title.- This Act shall be known as "The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997." Sec. 2. Declaration of State Policies.- The State shall recognize and promote all the rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) hereunder enumerated within the framework of the Constitution: a) The State shall recognize and promote the rights of ICCs/IPs within the framework of national unity and development; b)The State shall protect the rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains to ensure their economic, social and cultural well being and shall recognize the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain; c) The State shall recognize, respect and protect the rights of ICCs/IPs to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the formulation of national laws and policies; d) The State shall guarantee that members of the ICCs/IPs regardless of sex, shall equally enjoy the full measure of human rights and freedoms without distinctions or discriminations; e) The State shall take measures, with the participation of the ICCs/IPs concerned, to protect their rights and guarantee respect for their cultural integrity, and to ensure that members of the ICCs/IPs benefit on an equal footing from the rights and opportunities which national laws and regulations grant to other members of the population and f) The State recognizes its obligations to respond to the strong expression of the ICCs/IPs for cultural integrity by assuring maximum ICC/IP participation in the direction of education, health, as well as other services of ICCs/IPs, in order to render such services more responsive to the needs and desires of these communities. Towards these ends, the State shall institute and establish the necessary mechanisms to enforce and guarantee the realization of these rights, taking into consideration their customs, traditions, values, beliefs, their rights to their ancestral domains. Sec. 14. Support for Autonomous Regions.- The State shall continue to strengthen and support the autonomous regions created under the Constitution as they may require or need. The State shall likewise encourage other ICCs/IPs not included or outside Muslim Mindanao and the Cordillera to use the form and content of their ways of life as may be compatible with the fundamental rights defined in the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and other internationally recognized human rights.

CHAPTER V SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS Sec. 21. Equal Protection and Non-discrimination of ICCs/IPs.- Consistent with the equal protection clause of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights including the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and International Human Rights Law, the State shall, with due recognition of their distinct characteristics and identity, accord to the members of the ICCs/IPs the rights, protections and privileges enjoyed by the rest of the citizenry. It shall extend to them the same employment rights, opportunities, basic services, educational and other rights and privileges available to every member of the society. Accordingly, the State shall likewise ensure that the employment of any form of force of coersion against ICCs/IPs shall be dealt with by law. The State shall ensure that the fundamental human rights and freedoms as enshrined in the Constitution and relevant international instruments are guaranteed also to indigenous women. Towards this end, no provision in this Act shall be interpreted so as to result in the diminution of rights and privileges already recognized and accorded to women under existing laws of general application. Sec. 82. Separability Clause.- In case any provision of this Act or any portion thereof is declared unconstitutional by a competent court, other provisions shall not be affected thereby.

ANCESTRAL DOMAINS AND ANCESTRAL LANDS