Kant On Intentionality

Kant on Intentionality Author(s): Derk Pereboom Source: Synthese, Vol. 77, No. 3 (Dec., 1988), pp.
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KANT
ON
INTENTIONALITY
as a theory If we construe Kant's theory of mental representations a striking contrast between Kant's we will discover of intentionality, Whereas there is an important views and those of his predecessors. sense in which Hume of the tradition and much him preceding on not. extensionalizes intentional Kant does Reflection how relations, to avoid extensionalism, Kant manages and on his theory of in tentionality perspective us with an unusual and illuminating in general, provides on Kant's metaphysical and epistemological project.
1. A SUMMARY OF KANT'S VIEWS ON
INTENTIONALITY
some fairly familiar concepts in the theory of review in which will be useful Kant's position. intentionality understanding to is the of intentionality, The hallmark authors, many according in the its object of a mind towards directedness 'object' (taking broadest sense).1 Thinking, seeing, desiring, experiencing, sensing, are all, or at least all can be, intentional and grasping, loving, to focus, however, are the I want relations. The ones on which an awareness of such as relations of the mind's object, paradigmatic an to is of Kant's One and provide projects perceiving. thinking to an object whose exis account of our having relations intentional I will first to tence is apparently of its representations (as opposed independent mere subjective that lack intentionality). In this states, mental episodes in the next section, the notion of account, which we will examine cause plays a central role, as it does in Kant's development of the view of intentionality. anti-extensionalist if they capture the first person perspec Most intentional relations, two characteristics which non-intentional tive, can be distinguished by relations that an intentional lack. In specifying relation capture the first person perspective, star being the evening morning star when Adam's I mean to rule out Adam same relation as Adam thought employs thinking about the the thinking about the concept 'the evening
Synthese 11 (1988) 321-352.

? 1988 by Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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star and the morning star star' and he doesn't know that the evening are identical. The first person perspective captures what the subject and knows. The two distinguishing of characteristics thinks, believes, are are intentional relations these: facie first, they prima typical - that to which a mind is intentionally related existence-independent an oasis in a hallucination even need not exist. One can experience can one not oasis does the and think of the non-existent exist, though present intentional relations are prima facie Second, king of France. - one can to an object be related concept-dependent intentionally one or to it under which and not under concept description applies or as the another think of Venus One may concept description. as one as an star just star and not the morning may experience evening on on as as not the outside red and white the inside. What apple accounts for the concept-dependent character of intentional relations of a thing of which one that there are characteristics is the possibility or knowledge. From other perspectives has no cognition intentional not to From a relations might have these two characteristics. appear
the intentional relation Eve different perspective, thinking about the not from river may differ Eve thinking about the Euphrates, supposing is the Euphrates. Eve doesn't know that the river in question But if are the first person intentional relations they capture perspective, and existence-independent. typically concept-dependent seems to follow What from this is that sentences which report are typically the first person perspective intentional relations capturing are not extensional, which is to say that they are intensional.2 There some difficulties involved in moving from discourse about intentional to the semantic about sentences relations level, the level of discourse move I Yet this is worth intentional relations. think that reporting it allows one to link Kant's views about the concept while because to of intentional relations and existence-independence dependence a more in Two conditions that familiar tradition philosophy. perhaps are that in them co-referential sentences extensional one can for be another salva veritate and that substituted expressions are sentences to Intensional existential subject generalization. they in which Sentences lack one or both of these conditions. report the first don't relations tentional person perspective capturing usually sentences intentional relations reporting satisfy either of them. As 'Adam is about the the first person perspective, thinking capturing not about the 'Adam is does star' thinking morning evening imply characterize
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INTENTIONALITY
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star exists'. The sentence 'Adam is thinking star', nor 'The evening star' can be assigned an extensional about the evening reading, but on sense in which sentences this reading there remains an obvious logic from this one do not express what the subject believes ally derivable let us call the parts of sentences the tradition, and knows. Following of co-referential salva veritate and for which substitution expressions contexts. existential fails intensional generalization What is it to explain or give a theory of intentional relations? Part of the answer for many of the great philosophers is that such an explana in analyzing intentional relations the first capturing as con the intensional extensional, person perspective redescribing texts in them in such a way that the resulting sentence is extensional. strate three general The pre-Kantian presents history of philosophy is the this. The first Aristotelian for strategy, propounded doing gies to which an intentional relation to a and others, according by Aquinas tion consists or as two relations, the subject's is redescribed apprehension for the thing intended. On of a form, and the form's standing Aquinas's theory, a sensory form is received by a sense organ and is thing grasp form is abstracted from in sensation. Then the intelligible apprehended in cognition. The the sensible form by the intellect and is apprehended the subject and the object, form is in effect the intermediary between to the object. to it and it is related that is, the subject is related of both these relations which Sentences capture describing accurately will thus be extensional. There is no such the first person perspective form to which the subject can be related, so the thing as a non-existent never to a non-existent relation of is related object. The subject a to in that form be it is relation of ap intentional may subject an a or a to sentence of mind but which prehension object, proposition reports (1) it, like Adam apprehends the form of the evening star.
no intensional contains Sentences the relation context.3 describing it between a form and an ordinary object are also extensional; whether or exemplification, none of these relations be resemblance, sameness, have the two distinguishing features that typical intentional relations
have.4
of this type emerged from Aristo theory of intentionality In in the views of Ockham Locke. this kind of view and theory a a not the intermediary is form but idea in sensible the mind.5 entity Another telian
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On Locke's version of this theory sentences accurately describing the first person perspective) mind's relation (the relation capturing Lockean idea are extensional, such as6 (2) The Adam apprehends the idea of the evening star.
the to a
issue about ideas themselves tion as concepts
dependent. idea and

resemblance.7
of the ideas does not arise and the the non-existence are the objects of immediate awareness. Ideas func awareness of and the mind's them is not concept an sentences the relation between Furthermore, describing are extensional: the relation is that of its object typical
and third and quite different theory was developed by Berkeley In this theory, held by Hume. it is true that sentences again, to what it is related the mind's relation to, ideas or describing are The extensional.8 part of Hume's theory of in perceptions, are not intentional that relations immediate concerning tentionality awarenesses in that it is a resemblance is like Locke's theory. Ideas for are faded copies of original Hume and they represent impressions them (Treatise p. Iff). One those original by resembling impressions on ideas or cannot make mistakes about or have cognitive perspective one if has these it is indeed on any perceptions. Moreover, perceptions not possible sentences that they don't exist. Finally, the describing are extensional. relations between ideas and impressions resemblance A from Locke's for intensional that relations one is having in those cases in which don't stand for or resemble ordinary original Impressions impressions. or outside them; rather, ordinary they constitute objects beyond a facie relation between the mind and what is So objects. prima into that is describable is resolved only intensionally ordinary objects relations relations between the mind and which many perceptions, features of typical intentional relations. don't have the distinguishing aware of an object, having original is immediately So when someone sentences the intentional relation accurately describing impressions, as the first such which relation (the person perspective), captures (3) Adam this perception and this perception etc. the (where together perceptions perception, of the evening Adam's star). perception has and this constitute But Hume's theory differs awarenesses are immediate
are
extensional.
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INTENTIONALITY
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some of are several problems for these sorts of theories, an are to of Kant's view. which relevant understanding particularly as good explanations of intentional count do such theories Why accounts for the rather relations? What that such pervasive feeling are good that it is not immediately theories explanations, given the relevant relation of a mind to an idea or form obvious why positing or understandable? makes the intentional relations more perspicuous I'm not calling into question the positing of an entity to be or to concerns the cognitive the Rather, my worry explain perspective. we are aware. of An that which immediately posited entity becoming There is to explain what it is to important role of the theory of intentionality aware of that of which we seem to be immediately be immediately seem that substituting for instance. It would aware, ordinary objects, as the objects of immediate unusual entities for the ordinary objects
awareness gives up ground.
is something unsatisfactory about the fact that in theories the relation to the ordinary object turns out to or exemplification. Prima facie the like resemblance be something an intentional or aware of in the mind is ordinary object subject is no relation. But on these theories the relation to the ordinary object seem we awareness. to It that that wanted would something longer - has - the awareness of the been lost. ordinary object explain Furthermore, some of these there To these charges Locke, for instance, might give the partial reply aware an to of that immediate awareness be is just to be aside, object aware of an idea which resembles to it. But there is an implausibility awareness an an awareness to that all there is of is of object thinking of the idea of it. At least it should be required that there be knowledge seems to this idea being an idea of the relevant But rein object. aware of an object troduce the notion of awareness of independent ness of an idea of it, so it would seem as if the account is in trouble as can be constructed it stands. This same problem for an Aristotelian
theory.
to eli in his resistance is manifested anti-extensionalism and both minating existence-independence concept-dependence, a in detail I present in Section which we will examine 3. Here on we are view. For the what Kant, gloss preliminary immediately aware of in typical intentional relations are the contents of intuitions, some of which are real or, we might say, exist, and others of which are Kant's not real, or do not exist. One might thus expect Kant to eliminate
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for in the way that Hume does roughly existence-independence, awarenesses. But Kant makes the distinction immediate between real and unreal contents of intuitions, using the notion of causal coherence. to eliminate He Kant also does not attempt concept-dependence. none of the three main for extensionalizing it. advances strategies no use of Aristotelian of in That he makes forms in his account the first kind of that he fails to endorse a kind of form for Kant, he never are concepts theory. Although subjects are aware of or apprehend. speaks of them as entities which that Kant rejects any theory Two things about Kant's indicate theory or for him the immediate Hume's. like Aquinas's, Locke's, First, awareness is the of always ordinary object and not some special object tentional relations indicates of Idealism. in the Refutation object. This view appears, for instance, an in for which and there is Locke, Second, Aquinas, important way are or Hume, ap merely conceptual perspectives cognitive varying aware of are forms, all that we are immediately ideas, or parent: them at all, which are such that if we apprehend atomistic perceptions we necessarily For charac them the Kant, completely. apprehend are of the teristics of the object immediately independent apprehended or what in transcend the that subject ap they go beyond subject in Section for instance, That this is Kant's view is evident, prehends. in B. 19 of the Transcendental Deduction there is a clear sense in One must be precise at this point, because of from the first intentional relations viewed which Kant's theory as be extensionalist. On Kant's may person perspective interpreted can star the be described Adam's evening theory, perceiving by the
sentence
(4)
Adam
evening
perceives
star.
the evening
star under
the concept
of the
or
of akin to it. Sentence Substitution (4) is extensional. something are and both co-referential existential pos generalization expressions sible. But what I want to focus on are, for the simple cases like the one a mind two-term and the object relations between of its above, sentences the these relations. One with awareness, describing along can trivially transform relations into three-term rela these two-term or mode of awareness the third term, tions by making the concept them extensional, ceteris the sentences rendering describing are between the theories we are considering The divergences
thereby paribus.
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ON
INTENTIONALITY
327
what are, for the simple cases, in the sentences manifested describing two-term these sentences is so, I think, because de relations. This relation to objects as it appears from the original scribe the awareness it appears of the subject and not in the way from the perspective a structure of of the of intentional the relations; theory perspective former is what we are focusing on here. Sentence (4) does not meet to a concept and to the evening reference this condition since itmakes star in which the subject originally, of the way pre independently them. The read as sentence, apprehends following theoretically, the first person perspective, does fulfill reporting a relation capturing this condition: (5) Adam perceives the evening star.
one cannot co because Sentence substitute (5) is not extensional one for 'the star' referential salva and veritate, evening expressions on the referring cannot existentially generalize validly expression the direct object of (5). constituting allows us to exhibit the contrast This condition inten regarding and the various theorists. among Aquinas's extensionality sionality version of (5), (1)
Locke's
Adam
version,
apprehends
the form of the evening
star.
(2)
Adam
apprehends
the idea of the evening awareness),
star,
and Hume's, (3)
(for a case of immediate
Adam
has this perception and this perception etc. (where the perceptions together perception, Adam's of the evening star). perception
and this constitute
are extensional, In (1), (2), and (3) whereas (5) is not extensional. are co-referential substitutable salva veritate, and existen expressions on the referring in the direct object tial generalization expression holds. position with a tradition associated One might with think, in accordance sentence that is extensional because the Quine, (5) 'perceives evening star' should be regarded as a semantically But such simple expression. a move on his view is not in the spirit of Kant's theory because a are structure relations have apprehension complex they apprehen
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sion relations of the mind to objects. Regarding the evening 'perceives star' as a semantically obscures this. simple expression awareness If Kant thinks that we have immediate of ordinary the question arises as to what role Kantian concepts objects, play in are characterized as mediate since these concepts cognition, especially For Locke, ideas might be said to be mediate representations.9 because aware, and these they are that of which we are immediately in virtue of similarity. But for Kant it is not ideas themselves represent the case that there are two such stages in conceptual representation. an in a single act in which consists the mind apprehends Judgment is contained within object by means of a concept. All the intentionality as this act of mind. There is no description of what it is for a concept, an entity, to have the capability of representing things mediately by not of concepts itself. For Kant these are capabilities but of the in acts of judgment. exercised Kantian understanding, capabilities are as not best viewed entities which represent on their own, concepts but as abstractions from these cognitive exercised in capabilities judgment: they are the rule-like modes by which acts of judgment can
be made.
2.
AN
ACCOUNT
OF
BASIC
FEATURE
OF
INTENTIONALITY
The Second Analogy account is Kant's of causation. An important fact about this account that is usually neglected is that it proceeds by of a basic feature of intentionality which is way of an explanation an in the form of from this basic feature of argument presented to its explanation. The centerpiece of this explanation is intentionality the concept of cause. Kant indicates exactly what he wants to explain in this way:
We have representations in us, and can become consciousness and however careful may extend, mere that is, inner determinations representations, or, time. How, then, does to their in addition of which I don't it come subjective yet know about conscious of them. But however far this and accurate itmay be, they still remain of our mind in this or that relation of
reality
that we posit an object for these representations, to them an objective ascribe reality, as modifications, the nature? (A 197, B 242)
In this passage Kant inner determinations objects posited for
draws the distinction of our mind and them. The
as representations which have representations to is a distinction Kant is pointing between
KANT
ON
INTENTIONALITY
329
an experience between theoretical distinction consisting of nothing but matter the fundamental non-intentional of atomistic representations, we of that have. The and the objects experience actually experience, in the Second Analogy is how itmight that Kant is addressing problem be that the latter arises from the former. that Kant wants to explain, which The basic feature of intentionality a premise for his argument, is that experience thus provides is of no in isolation have Atomistic they representations objects. objects "inner determinations of our mind". the closest Perhaps our to in such atomistic conscious things experiences representations are tickles and twinges; at all, they if they have any intentionality some to must Kant there fact about do. be percep barely According or both, which the rise of in the mind, tions, or about explains are mere from these atomistic representations. tentionality In the Second Analogy Kant uses this basic feature of to argue for the applicability of experience of the tentionality and the kinds of objects of cause and effect to events, that concern are events. when he describes However, primary as is clear in the above passage, he of experience, tentionality the in
concept are his the in doesn't to events. It is likely that Kant's account of the restrict his comments to apply to of experience basic feature of the intentionality is meant to most to and other other objective concepts, phenomena notably the of But and substance. for the purposes concept persisting objects of this exposition it seems best to stick to Kant's own examples. from the basic Kant the argument feature of the in repeats course in of the of the Second five times tentionality experience I to In won't restrict my exposition any one state Analogy. myself some in since some are more in ment, respects and others complete The with Kant's of the identification argument begins content of with the of objects representations, (Inbegriff) experience obvious for objects of that things in themselves, candidates given are to not accessible cognition: experience, others.
Now realize as soon that as the I unfold house the is not transcendental a thing in of my concepts of an object, I meaning an appearance, that is, a itself, but only of which is unknown. What, then, am I to
the transcendental representation, object how in the appearance understand the manifold be connected may by the question: in itself? That which lies in the successive is itself, which yet is nothing apprehension as representation, the appearance to me, while which here viewed is given notwith as their of these representations, that it is nothing but the content is viewed standing object.... (A 190-91, B236)10
330
At this point
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the question of arises as to how the content as gets experienced something distinguishable representations themselves. Kant's answer is as follows: the representations
If we enquire dignity what
these from
what
representations manner: and certain order,
new character to an object confers relation upon our representations, we find that it results in subjecting the thereby acquire, only they us to connect to a rule, and so in necessitating them in some one specific are necessitated in a that only in so far as our representations conversely, as regards their time-relations do they acquire objective meaning.
(A 197,B 242-43) Kant's for our experience for the rise of being of objects, of the intentionality of experience, is that atomistic are synthesized of rules, in particular the by means representations I of that what Kant has in mind is that cause.11 concept suspect leads us to experience the content among representations organization as objects over of these representations phenomenologically against us. There is a particular point, I think, to Kant's taking up this issue in to make us of cause. What is supposed connection with the concept as objects over of representations the content able to experience on an us own. content The life of its is that the takes apparent against can a own content of its is in which such life way acquire through related in a and succeeding parts of the content being preceding are to in be other lawlike way, that is, causally. sure, (There reality, factors relevant to the account, like the forms of intuition, as Richard as well as factors of which Kant did not have Aquila emphasizes,12 as the Gestalt such rules of good continuation and common knowledge, are contents of intuitions it is when is that Kant's thought fate.)13 own own as their their causal pattern, experienced having dynamic, can be of objects. Possibly it is Kant's position that our experience that cause means most of is the of the concept important part synthesis by explanation this basic feature of this basic feature of intentionality, that other the explanation a as role in the But our don't concepts significant explanation. play the issue in for this conjecture is only that he considers best evidence Kant never explicitly makes the Second Analogy and not elsewhere. of the point. successive of Kant illustrates the account by contrasting perceptions a a of boat down of with house successive parts moving perceptions an stream. Even though the perceptions of the house do not constitute no states this is neverthe of with example example object, subjective it supplies a case of a feature of a series of less appropriate because
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INTENTIONALITY
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is not a feature of an object representations, namely their order, which or objective event independent of its representation. The perceptions are cases in which of the boat moving the downstream, by contrast, order of the perceptions is a feature of the object or objective event to show what accounts Kant wants for the difference represented. a successive in between which succession is not in the apprehension one of in Kant the and which it is. introduces the object apprehension, of the in this house way: example
... I have in spite also of the fact that their representation to show what sort of connection in themselves. of a house which of For the instance, stands before me is also in apprehension time to The This, belongs of apprehension is successive. successive. is always successive, the manifold in the in the then ap
appearances pearance whether one will
the manifold question however,
the manifold grant.
the house
in itself
arises, is what no
(A 190, B 326)
The
is apprehended First, say, the house, in the example, successively. floor is then the second then the third, and story, ground apprehended, Is the the roof. this in the house succession gable adorning finally itself? No, it is not an aspect of the house, of my ap the object a case or It in is the of otherwise such as event, happening prehension. a boat moving downstream:
a happening in an appearance which contains But, as I also note, (the preceding we may entitle A, and the succeeding the perception B) B can be apprehended A cannot follow upon B but only precede the perception upon A: following I see a ship move of its lower position downstream. instance, My perception state of only as it. For follows
of its position that in upon the perception higher up in the stream, and it is impossible of this appearance in the the apprehension the ship should first be perceived lower down stream and afterwards higher up. (A 192, B 237)
In the case of the perception of an event, the succession is indeed an What of of the the this, accord aspect apprehension. explains object one see not to to is that could have chosen the boat Kant, ing later: the order forces itself upon us; it first and upstream downstream accounts is in a sense necessary. This causal necessity for the fact that as an aspect of the object as objective, the succession is apprehended or objective What in turn explains this phenomenon apprehended. a a with associated the is that rule rule, namely concept of objectivity case case not in in has been this and the of the cause, applied apprehension
...
of the house;
of an event the apprehension there of is always a rule that makes this appearance) follow the order upon one in which another the a
in the perception (in
perceptions
332
necessary manifold of can order.... The
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objective
succession
will
therefore
consist
in that order
of
the
of appearance that which happens
I be justified that a succession
to which, in conformity with a rule, the apprehension according of that which Thus only follows upon the apprehension precedes. not merely but of appearance of my apprehension, in asserting, itself, with it. (A 193, B 238-9)
is to be met
to spell out what Kant means of attempt by his notion a means of In rule. the Second Analogy Kant uses organizing by one another like 'setting' representations and alongside metaphors in certain places. Perhaps the best way of 'putting' representations is in terms of the notion of thinking or cashing out these metaphors as In F. the case of the experience of causal experiencing something atomistic the explanation successions, begins with representations I suspect and recurring in similar patterns. that the occurring means of the of the boat by of a rule must organization experience of an ability consist in the exercise the mind has to think and as such patterns patterns, and hence to have rule-governed experience To organize and of causal successions. atomistic experiences thoughts a means of associated with rule the of concept by representations cause is to think and experience them as causally ordered. to other views on the same How does Kant's account here compare Let us issue? Naive realists would surely reject the very project of attempt an our experience can be phenomenolo to account of how ing give to be explained of that there is would say gically objects. They nothing would be that that of here. Kant's consists reply given experience our we fact in the that have mental representations, experience immediate awareness of objects definitely The requires an explanation. we it have that is obvious that naive realists would immediate say just awareness to us. of things in themselves, external things completely Kant would primary phy" (Enquiry S 104). Locke's explanation of objects that here, agree with Hume soon men of all is opinion destroyed the "this universal and the by slightest philoso
can be phenomenolo of how our experience it in saying that we is because consists gically unsatisfactory are immediately aware of ideas which are caused by and resemble, in some cases, the objects which cause them. This doesn't the explain aware of objects. As we have said, intuition that we are immediately the awareness relation on Locke's picture is not to the ordinary object, idea. That which Kant wants of the object, gets left behind. to explain, the im
but rather to the awareness mediate
KANT
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account may have been inspired by Hume's of explanation in terms of constancy features of objectivity and coherence, a causal notion.14 Kant's view differs given that the latter is explicitly from Hume's, since Kant wants to show how the objects we however, are apprehended as distinct from subjective immediately experience seems to be saying that all we experience are atomistic states. Hume certain for him beliefs accounted for by association and the like perceptions: the form and organization do not constitute of the objects of Kant the of in basic feature Furthermore, experience. explains in terms of mental abilities, which contrasts with Hume's tentionality to which official line according cannot have the entire explanation recourse to anything beyond the perceptions themselves.15
Kant's
3.
THE
DISTINGUISHING INTENTIONAL
FEATURES RELATIONS
OF
TYPICAL
consider the claim that in Kant's Let us now more thoroughly theory to of intentional in general there is no complete reduction relations as we describable relations. have in the seen, First, extensionally Kant develops his idea by proposing that objects of Second Analogy are the contents of intuitions. That Kant identifies objects experience of experiences with the contents of intuitions could readily make one relations extensional that he renders intentional after all. But suspect accounts which both Kant the existence-in preserve provides of We and the intentional relations. dependence concept-dependence have already caught a glimpse of these accounts: now we will examine them in detail. one hal let us consider When First, existence-independence. oasis in a desert, one is intentionally related to lucinates a non-existent which merely exist as contents of the contents of this representation, a representation. seem not this relation does relevantly Initially to the contents of my as contents which also exists present non-hallucinatory representation, a notion of that But at this point Kant provides of a representation. or of the existent, we might which is real (wirklich), say, which accounts for our belief that contents of hallucinations aren't real or the contents of ordinary don't real, whereas represent something or an are the do. He which preserves experiences provides explanation different in kind from my intentional relation
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of intentional relations. The pas prima facie existence-independence can to account in relevant this be found in the the sages Critique The Refutation of Idealism in B, and Postulates of Empirical Thought, The Second Postulate in A in the Fourth Paralogism. reads its cognate as follows: (2) That which is bound that is, with the material conditions of up with is real (wirklich). sensation, (A 218,
experience,
B 266)16
as stated here is somewhat but it becomes The Postulate vague, to say that the real is that that he means in the discussion evident to the system of empirical conforms causal laws (A 225, which to dreams is related B 272ff). How the Second Postulate and hal to the Refutation out in the third note is spelled of lucinations Idealism:
Note tation 3. From of outer be the fact that the existence of of outer for the possibility of things is required follow that every intuitive represen can those things, for their representation not
a determinate very well
consciousness
representation are possible shown,
things involves of the product merely is merely the product only be
the self, it does the existence of the
supposed experience and determinations, (wirklichen Erfahrung).
through not purely must be ascertained from its special imaginary, its congruence with the criteria of all real experience through cf. A 376, cf. A 492, B 520-1) (B 278-79
and delusions). Such (as in dreams imagination as has been outer perceptions, of previous which, the reality of outer objects... Whether this or that
Dreams
the criteria of all real don't meet hallucinations that the real is what fits the Second Postulate, namely in the system right way.17 is real in might be noted about this account of what account of this involves the notion First, concep again phenomena. in a certain tual synthesis. The real is that which has been synthesized have also been synthesized since they and hallucinations way. Dreams are conscious. to the Refutation of Idealism and the But according of dreams can be regarded as unreal the contents Second Postulate, and of experience into the causal Three things because they they don't causally cohere with the rest of experience, don't fit into the rich causal net of empirical reality. This must mean of the that their contents haven't been fully synthesized by means sense not in in the that their does result of cause, concept synthesis objects and events of which all of the ordinary causal laws hold. are not Second, by saying that objects of dreams and hallucinations
KANT
ON
INTENTIONALITY
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connected saying that are outside states, are previous contents
with real objects to causal is not laws, Kant according as the dreams and hallucinations mental states, themselves, of the causal system. Dreams as mental and hallucinations, real events; thus by the Second Analogy they follow from real events by causal laws. It is just that their objects, the are not real because of dreams and hallucinations, don't they
causal system of intentional objects of experience. A be made between contents and of representations as Dreams have been representations. representation fully synthesized of the categories. The which constitute by means representations dreams causally cohere with each other and with other empirically real to form an aspect of an object features of the world in the empirical the empirical self. But the contents of representations which world, constitute since don't cohere with each other and dreams, they real features of the couldn't be world, empirically by fully synthesized means of the categories, in particular of the concept of by means cause. (Yet the contents of dreams are synthesized to the categories by some degree because, for instance, we are typically aware of objects in
dreams.)
fit into a general must distinction
is fairly powerful. this account Kant does not Third, Although a defense of it against certain kinds of realist objec himself provide tions, Berkeley does, and I think he says what needs to be repeated. About dreams and hallucinations Philonous, Berkeley's spokesman, the materialist, says to Hylas,
And so lively and natural, yet by their not to be never being the preceding and subsequent of our lives, transactions from realities. In short, by whatever method they might easily be distinguished you on your own scheme, the same, it is evident, will hold distinguish things from chimeras also upon mine. For it must be, I presume, and I am not difference, by some perceived for depriving you of any one thing that you perceive. pp. 68-69) (Dialogues, though connected, they should happen and of a piece, with
Lockean and even naive realists must Certainly representationalists some criteria as to what is real and what is not: material employ don't come with labels that read "This is real". Berkeley's objects a theorist is that whether point may be taken to have the consequence an idealist or not, the criterion that he and Kant employ for dis the real from the in unreal be the tinguishing experience may only one available and a good one nonetheless. Thus Kant explains the prima facie existence-independence of in tentional relations without eliminating it. For Kant we have immediate
336
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of both existent and non-existent experience things, not just to existent It may seem that on Kant's view we only forms, ideas, or perceptions. states. But this have immediate awareness of our own (existent) mental is not true from the empirical have immediate point of view. We are intuitively awareness of genuinely non-existent objects. What are on Kant's to non-existent account relations intentional objects contents of intuitions, intentional relations to objects, that don't caus ally cohere with the rest of experience. to eliminate Kant also does not attempt from concept-dependence intentional for which he might have the following relations, type of are reason. On the Lockean different objects picture of intentionality even for experiences under different when the posited conceptions, I is prima facie the same object. So when object experienced am as a I to related Venus the Evening Star different idea experience as a it merely from the one you are related to when you experience ideas, at least bright heavenly body. On Locke's theory these various but mediately: the primary quality ideas, resemble ordinary objects, the ordinary object is behind the scenes. The immediate intentional is not the same as yours when we are both object of my experience an object I experience Venus. This is unintuitive. When experiencing as the Evening am im I of I believe that the object which Star aware one same is the that you might experience merely as a mediately that we and others could have varying same aware of the immediate very cognitive object ness. It is traditional to think that what explains and intuitive the on of this the of objects possibility varying cognitive perspective of is the character these experience objects, recognition-transcendent are the way they are independently that these objects of what we think or know of them. Kant claims that the objects of im might are recognition awareness wants to try mediate and he transcendent, to explain this. Part of the explanation of recognition-transcendence, or at least certain conditions for it, are given in the Second Analogy, as we saw in the last section. If we are to have immediate awareness of believe on perspectives that are recognition-transcendent it must be the case that this objects as we have seen in the awareness is of objects, and Kant's account, terms is in of the and applicability section, previous given application we must of the concept of cause. For further explanation look to in B. On the one hand, Section 19 of the Transcendental Deduction bright We object. commonly
KANT
ON
INTENTIONALITY
337
19 is the continuation of the argument of Section Section 18, in that in terms of judgment here Kant interprets the notion of synthesis (?20, else going on. In Section 19 Kant B143). But there is also something makes that the objects of experience the intuitive observation have nature their characteristic of what the states of the independently be. He has a unique way of making this experiencing subject might we assert this about the objects of point: he thinks that implicitly we make sort about of a certain whenever experience judgments them:
to say 'The body is heavy' to state that the two representations is not merely have in my perception, however often that perception be repeated: always been conjoined what we are asserting is that they are combined in the object, no matter what the state of the subject may be. (B 142, cf. Proleg., IV 298ff) ?19: Ak Thus
in judgments we make about objects that embedded is a are that these objects He recognition-transcendent. presupposition makes his point by having us contrast such judgments with judgments states such as 'If I support a body, I feel an about our subjective (B 142) and 'The room is warm, sugar sweet, impression of weight' Kant thinks to and wormwood ?19, AK 299). We're (Proleg., nasty' supposed sense the difference such subjective and such between judgments as 'The body to say that these is heavy'. Kant wants judgments of anything beyond subjective judgments don't point to the existence the states of the subject, whereas the judgment implicit in our making 'The body is heavy' is the presupposition that the body is the way it is the subject might of what be experiencing. That we independently make like 'The is of and not just judgments body heavy' experience, a an 'If I I of weight' like feel support body, impression judgments are ones which are shows that the relevant objects of our experience can be and on which recognition-transcendent cognitive perspective it is presupposed had. In the former type of judgment that the objects are a certain way whereas in the latter type this is not so. that these objects which are presupposed to So far it is still possible are not objects be recognition-transcendent of which we are im aware and that they are behind the scenes, as they are for mediately But the fact that Kant doesn't think that judgments like 'The are are is not about which ap body heavy' objects immediately is strongly suggested prehended by the fact that he calls such judg ments in the Prolegomena (Ak IV 297ff). I 'judgments of experience' Locke.
338
think that this is evident Kant writes
... the consciousness of other of my things
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of Idealism.
from the Second in the Refutation

existence ouside is at the same me_Idealism
Postulate and the Refutation of Idealism:

time an immediate assumed that consciousness of
the existence experience moreover, given outer
shown that of it is inner experience is really immediate, and that only by means experience not indeed the consciousness of it in time of my own existence, but the determination cf. B xl-xli n.) (B 276-77, possible.
and that from it we can only is inner experience, as in all cases where we are manner, only in an untrustworthy causes... to determinate in the above it has been But effects proof
the only infer outer things
immediate and this, from inferring
In these passages he also makes that we have it clear that he believes of objects which persist and that are permanent, immediate cognitions them and which causal change even when we don't perceive undergo we not A characteristics 225, B272ff). (B 275ff, may possess perceive an intuition as a represen It is also significant that Kant characterizes to the object..." tation which "... relates immediately (A 320, B 377, are one the represen cf. B xl-xli n., A 19, B 33). Intuitions, (in sense) to it Kant's notion of and is central tations of ordinary objects, awarenesses of these ordinary that they are immediate intuition in judgment that is presupposed recognition-transcendence an to explain account. is invoked requires Again synthesis conceptual a characteristic seems to that experience have: the notion intuitively an to Kant create allows of conceptual gap epistemological synthesis between the states of the subject and the real nature of the objects of aware. This idea is also developed in which we are immediately 19 it 19 of the B Deduction. When Section should be Section reading to refer only to that Kant there uses the term 'judgment' understood like 'The body is heavy', about recognition judgments judgments are not not distinct from and which transcendent about objects objects of them. In Section 19 Kant writes as follows: the representations
are in which of knowledge is nothing but the manner that a judgment given modes to the of This is is what intended by the brought objective unity apperception. to distinguish the objective 'is'. It is employed representations unity of given copula to original and its necessary It indicates from the subjective. their relation apperception, I find ...
objects. The
itself is empirical, and therefore It holds good even if the judgment unity. contingent, are heavy'. I do not here assert in the judgment that the 'Bodies as, for example, to one another in the empirical intuition, but that they necessarily belong representations in the synthesis of to one another in virtue of the necessary unity of apperception belong intuitions, that is, according to principles of the objective determination of all represen
KANT
ON
INTENTIONALITY
339
of
tations,
in so which
principles of apperception. a relation
can be acquired far as knowledge are derived from the fundamental
by means
in this way does there arise Only is objectively and so can be adequately from a valid, distinguished - as that would relation of the same representations when have only subjective validity to laws of association. In the latter case, all that I could according they are connected a body, I feel an impression I could not say, 'It, of weight': be, 'If I support say would which the body, is heavy'. (B 141-42)
these representations the transcendental principle unity a judgment, from this relation that is, of
to set himself off from a position on which is clearly concerned about don't differ in kind from judgments about judgments objects states. An to associationist like he is doomed Hume, thinks, subjective hold such a view because for him experience consists of perceptual are just modifications no in of the mind, atoms, which possessing Kant It is important to note that Hume could come up with a tentionality. notion of a recognition-transcendent notion The could be object. out of the varying experiences constructed of people at certain places and times, and/or counterfactuals at about an individual's experience certain places and times. But it is not clear that on Hume's view this would be a notion of a recognition-transcendent object of immediate awareness. The problem is that this construction is not the commonly held notion of an object of experience. Hume thinks that we are only aware of atomistic immediately on association or some other these only original perceptions
tise, pp. 1-7).
we can form beliefs based perceptions: relation among these perceptions, yet are contained in the experience (Trea
But why should it be that a priori conceptual for synthesis accounts a Kant in What is that says recognition-transcendence? recognition to one ano transcendent the relevant representations object "belong ther in virtue of the necessary unity of apperception in the synthesis of to the principles that is, according of the objective deter intuitions, mination of representations ...", but this doesn't seem to give much of an explanation as to why a priori conceptual synthesis can "objectively 19 is somewhat disappointing Section in representations". this respect. But we can extrapolate from other sources. An of recognition-transcendence of objects is that they aspect to exist when we don't experience continue them. Kant's criterion for the reality of unexperienced and the reality of their charac objects teristics concerns to exist the notion of causality: continue objects we can when we are not experiencing and know that them, they do determine
340
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and what they are like by means of causal reasoning. On the view of we know that they exist and have the charac the Second Postulate nexus we in virtue of the extension of causal teristics do they we can Kant would also that know that say experience. objects which no one has ever experienced, like certain planets, do in fact exist as ask, where long as they are part of this causal nexus. Yet, one might are our not In do objects exist when being experienced? they spatio answer. But here a tension would be Kant's framework, temporal manifests itself. Kant gives sense to the idea of an object through the of the content of an intuition: we want to know what sense it to say that an object exists if and when it is not the content of makes an intuition. If Kant elects to say that such objects exist just the same itwould seem that he has compromised his notion as to what an object of experience is. the central There is a way out, however. Kant thinks that although notion of an object of experience is that of the content of an intuition, the notion acquires broader scope by means of the causal criterion of so as to include objects which play a role in an the Second Postulate notion ideal story about
That must
experience.
Kant writes:
no one has ever perceived in the moon, there may be inhabitants them, although of that in the possible advance be admitted. This, however, only means certainly we may encounter is real which in connection them. For everything stands experience with the laws of empirical advance. with a perception in accordance (A 493, B 521)
for partially On Kant's view this broader notion would be accounted means because of especially causality figures by conceptual synthesis, so prominently in it. to add to his account of our notion allows Kant The broader of the immediate ordinary beliefs about the recognition-transcendence for example, he can use it to account for the fact objects of awareness: of unintuited facts about that we suppose we can make discoveries objects, concepts explain no one new empirical in which we employ discoveries concepts, are not used in a priori synthesis. He can also use it to facts about objects which the intuition that there are empirical facts are discovered, if has ever or may ever discover. These which
of causal reasoning and, in virtue of the causal they are, by means criterion of the real, they are genuine facts about the objects. Kant
says: For the existence of the thing being thus bound up with our perceptions in a possible
KANT
ON
INTENTIONALITY
341
we are able in the series of possible the guidance of and under perceptions experience, to the thing in question. to make from our actual perception the transition the analogies of attracted iron filings we know of the existence of a magnetic from the existence Thus us off from our cuts matter of all the constitution bodies, organs pervading although immediate perception of this medium. (A 225-26, B 273)
is that of the content of an the central notion of an object we can regard such facts as characterizing the objects we a It I is fact about the immediately perceive immediately perceive. matter This iron filings that magnetic them. embellishes pervades relations can be irreducibly Kant's account of how it is that intentional Because intuition,
concept-dependent.
to preserve the ordinary beliefs concerning of of the immediate awareness, objects recognition-transcendence a theory according to which the concept-dependence Kant propounds It may seem that it would be of intentional relations is not eliminated. to immediate objects of difficult to impute recognition-transcendence on awareness notion of an object Kant's view central is that the given to do so by that of the content of an intuition. Yet Kant attempts In summary, in order means of his notion of conceptual synthesis. By virtue of synthesis an account to of for our he provides the cause, concept according that there are objects and features of objects we have never beliefs intuited. What results on Kant's view is a notion of object of which we are immediately aware and on which we can have genuine cognitive an essential of This attempt is, furthermore, component perspective.
to the extent that transcendental Kant's transcendental idealism, of is the doctrine that the nature of the ordinary objects idealism on our cognitive is dependent processes. experience
4.
WHAT
MOTIVATIONS
IS KANT
RESISTING?
I have suggested that the reason Kant's theory turns out the way it awareness does is that he thinks that we have immediate of objects that are recognition-transcendent, and that this motivation is bound to our with our his of beliefs about up preserve project trying ordinary of the external world. But certainly the other philoso apprehension we are aware have been also of these phers discussing ordinary beliefs about the world. What has led them to propound theories which do not preserve them? What motivations is Kant in leaving resisting sentences describing intentional relations from the first person per
342
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Kant is certainly unextensionalized? the common spective resisting are in space belief that objects and time mind-in completely He believes that this doctrine leads to the idea that what dependent. we can be immediately aware of is a just representation caused by an to such that is, it leads to the empirical idealism he wants object; avoid The relation between the mind and the represen (A367ff). as extensionally describ tation, in turn, is perhaps readily construed
able.
runs Kant may also be resisting the lure of foundationalism, which The relation of through the entire history of theories of intensionality. a mind to an idea in the Lockean is held to be theory, for example, one accounts and for this, in particular the lack extensional, thing that to be a possibility of concept-dependence, is that there is not supposed of an epistemological the mind and a form, while there is gap between a an such the mind and gap between ordinary object. On the Lockean on an idea if theory one cannot have varying cognitive perspectives one apprehends no at it all. There is also about the idea not question of ideas if it is indeed apprehended. Thus this apprehension existing meets for being in the foundations for some the criteria included foundationalist theories of knowledge. But there are other reasons why such an extensionalizing theory is or seems to be explanatory, reasons more closely bound up precisely to be only what appears the theory redescribing with extensionally comes One motivation from describable. such intensionally logic. On one fairly prominent on the that conception logic depends principle or a proposition is determined the truth value of a sentence by the or sentence truth of the of the references values and/or pro parts this way: he defined the notion of position. Frege put the requirement as to the truth value of a sentence, that which contributes Bedeutung of a sentence is a which is also a Bedeutung, such that the Bedeutung controver of its parts.18 Matters become function of the Bedeutungen at least like this is applied to intensional sial when a principle contexts, concern contexts intentional relations. where the intensional (Modal is a problem because logic seems to be on a better footing.) This contexts don't have the same logical properties that exten intensional ones do. Restricting to intensional contexts that the discussion contexts have such intensional have to do with intentional relations, ones lack, features to two features that extensional that correspond sional concept-dependence and existence-independence. Because intentional
KANT
ON
INTENTIONALITY
343
necessarily substitute
relations
are
concept-dependent,
one
cannot
in the that-clauses of sentences with the same reference expressions that report such a relation while preserving their truth value. So the do not seem to be a function of the truth values of such sentences values references of their parts. If one can't substitute truth and/or one for co-referential another while maintaining the truth expressions to establish it will be complicated value of a sentence, and difficult for such sentences, inference and it may be patterns interesting come on to with inference the up any interesting patterns impossible alone without basis of the sentences what looking into the context the speaker knows and believes, and so on. Also, because intentional one cannot existentially relations are existence-independent, general ize from what is inside a that-clause. The invalidity of existential is a problem for the logic of intensional contexts generalization is such a fundamental because existential generalization logical rule. some philosophers are willing to say In the face of such problems, contexts have no logical structure at all, but this is to that intensional an intensional give up the project of developing logic. One possible route to take is Frege's.19 He had the and prima facie appealing contexts in of elements intensional be the usual Sinne Bedeutungen or on of these elements. So (senses meanings) Frege's theory the a a sentence of is function of the usual of the Bedeutung Bedeutungen extensional elements and the usual Sinne of the elements in intensional contexts. But in order for this to work, the strange features of typical cannot be present intentional relations these Sinne, or the among over new all will arise Thus the of problems again. Bedeutungen sentences must work in a purely extensional intensional On way. Frege's (1) theory, the Bedeutungen of the parts of star [in front of him] is not the morning Adam/believes/that star. identical to the evening
are
(2)
(or some relation like the grasping himself/believing associated with believing) the sense of '(that) that not to star is identical the evening star' (which is a morning function of the senses of all of the expressions in the 'that' Adam relation clause taken individually). can have no intensional context in it. as reconstrued,
The
sentence,
344
But for some
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to take this extensional this might be a motivation the intentional from the perspective relation of sentence, reporting as describing a relation which the subject, is neither genuinely nor existence-independent. I am not saying that concept-dependent this extra move, but someone might to hold that on the level of considerations senses are apprehended, like Fregean and something transcendent Venus itself is not a sense. Since logical issues were very much alive in Kant's makes be motivated by only psychology the recognition
Frege these
day, it is possible that Kant is resisting these motivations that derive from logic. If this is our intuitions about indeed the case, then Kant's desire to preserve awareness to of objects immediate the outweighs logical motivation extensionalize. But perhaps Kant is also resisting a deeper motivation, one that perhaps to extensionalize also underlies the motivation in logic. one might Here is a suggestion: think of typical intentional relations as strange because we think of some background or contrast as being normal. That is the external, natural world and the background relations among the things in it. Sentences describing typical relations in the external world are extensional.20 Extensional of redescription intensional relations has explanatory value all by itself because of a more general predilection to take such natural, extensionally describ as paradigmatically able relations understandable. This is because to think that for anything to be explained there is a general tendency it must be part of or at least continuous in kind with the external, natural world. This is explicitly the aim of naturalist philosophers of mind such as physicalists not to mention Hume. Perhaps and many functionalists, a desire as continuous to see the intentional with the external and natural is the explanation for Aquinas's and Locke's extensionalizing as well, albeit for them the desire isn't as explicit as of the intentional it is for philosophers who are more resolutely naturalistic. The under we an a cognitive that here be have may lying feeling understanding, hold on the external, natural world of a sort that we don't so obviously have on the mind, and that if we could construe the mind as conform we to to nature be able understand it. ing might eventually In a way Kant agrees with all of this. He thinks that thorough of anything, to the is only possible the mind, explanation including are things in the physical world or extent that what is to be explained are sufficiently similar to these things. The aspect of the mind which is
KAN!
ON
INTENTIONALITY
345
similar to the rest of nature to allow the empirical self is sufficiently in The empirical self falls thorough explanations empirical psychology. under deterministic causal laws, as does the rest of nature. But on Kant's view the mind is not exhausted self; by the empirical as subject of intentional in particular the mind is not an relations in nature. Consequently, the extent empirical thing, it is not something to which we can explain the mind and intentional relations is limited:
Through recesses, never observation and no one and we penetrate of appearances into nature's inner analysis in time extend. But with all may say how far this knowledge to us, we should even of nature were if the whole revealed still and can
nature. The which those transcendental go beyond questions our own mind with any other to us to observe than it is not given intuition source of our in the mind that the secret that of inner sense: and that it is precisely to an object and what the transcendental is located. The relation of sensibility sensibility are so deeply matters concealed of this be, undoubtedly ground unity may [objective] as inner sense and therefore that we, who after all know even ourselves only through reason is that appearance, can never be justified for discovering investigation to explore their nonsensible as being a suitable in treating sensibility save still other appearances eager anything cause. B 278, 334) (A instrument as we of yet are
this knowledge, be able
to answer
We
about nature, and we are able to give questions for But our knowledge of the mind is natural explanations phenomena. we cannot to an in of the relation limited; explain particular sensibility we can reason nature understand the The includes (which object. we of is that have intuitions its but the relation self) empirical objects, to an object is deeply concealed. It is not even possible of sensibility are for us to investigate it. All we can discover through investigation but the mind as subject of intentional relations is a other appearances, we can to It of isn't that do kind different very thing. nothing explain intentional relations: Kant their structure. says a great deal about for what it is for Rather, we have no access to any explanatory model the mind to be the subject of them. that to provide for the Thus Kant believes thorough explanations to nature. But he does not believe it must conform that our mind in nature; Kant resists the idea that things completely to typical relations in the natural world. relations conform own our we cannot As subjects of minds. fully explain Consequently our are intentional relations and as moral minds the agents, beyond own our natural world, and thus, in certain important ways, beyond cognitive grasp.
are able
to answer
are minds intentional
346
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NOTES
Hahn,
to thank Robert David Adams, Christensen, Philip Clark, Martin Tyler B?rge, of William E. Mann, Nicholas Wolterstorff and the editors Kornblith, Hilary on comments of for and this drafts very paper. enlightening helpful Synthese 1 to David for this characterization of intentionality I am indebted W. and Smith and Intentionality, D. Reidel, Ronald Mclntyre: 1982, Husserl Dordrecht, pp. 1-85 and 1. John Searle's: 1983, Intentionality, Press, Cambridge, Cambridge University Chapter I wish intentional Brentano, Meinong, R. and Knowledge, (viz. Frege Translations are existence-independent concern to is what was of particular in Bertrand and Russell Russell: 1956, Logic (viz. 'On Denoting' C. Marsh and Unwin, whereas (ed.), Allen London, pp. 39-56), in Peter Geach and Reference', 'On Sense and Max Black 1970, (eds.): relations
That
the Philosophical Blackwell, Oxford, pp. Writings of Gottlob Frege, from was more in concept-dependence. interested 'The Thought' in See also Frege's 56-78) P. F. Strawson Oxford 1967, Philosophical Press, Oxford, (ed.): pp. Logic, University 17-38. 2 are used in this way by Rudolf terms 'extensional' and 'intensional' The 1947, Carnap: pp. 23ff. is a semantically simple
of Chicago and Necessity, Press, Chicago, Meaning University 3 star' in this sentence The expression 'the form of the evening
expression. 4 See Aristotle, De Anima, Bks. 2 and 3: Aquinas, Summa la, 84-86. Theologiae, 5 of Notre Dame and also Marilyn Ockham Adams, Press) (1987, University Marilyn Nominalism and Unreal Adams: 'Ockham's Review 1977, 86, Entities', Philosophical 144-76. Locke, II, esp. 1 and 8. Essay 6 star' in this sentence is a semantically The expression 'the idea of the evening simple expression. 7 It should relations in redescribing be noted that Locke doesn't succeed all intentional probably so that the resulting is extensional. is due to his empiricism: if This description were all concepts indeed Lockean would but succeed, ideas, then the extensionalism cannot like 'the third idea of red I've had today' which there are concepts clearly be cast as Lockean ideas. As concept-dependent: that it is the third that all concepts to extensionalize regard qualities, manner determine. Ockham a result, relations between the mind and Lockean ideas seem to be for me to have a Lockean it is possible idea of red and not realize idea of red I've had today. Yet this is not Locke's intention: he thinks ideas. This intentional relations
point about the failure of the Lockean theory was to me by Richard suggested Foley. With to the next point, for Locke, ideas of primary resemble qualities primary ideas of secondary don't resemble but The qualities qualities. secondary to in which ideas relate to secondary is more difficult quality secondary qualities Alexius in certain Meinong's See respects. also David Smith: theory Smith of intentionality and Maclntyre, resembles Husserl and that of Locke and esp. Intentionality, in Grazer Philosophische
are Lockean
and 1975, pp. 54-57 'Meinongian Objects' Studien 1, 43-71. 8 1, 8-23. Treatise, 15-16, Hume, pp. esp. Principles, Dialogues, passim. Berkeley, as saying that the distinctness of objects and continuous existence 187ff. I read Hume are external to the atomistic into which all of our perceptions of objects perceptions can be resolved. in the One might that for Hume the beliefs be tempted by the view
KANT ON
distinctness of
INTENTIONALITY
347
are features the Treatise and in the for Hume
of objects from our perceptions and their continuous existence we experience, the objects but this isn't right. In the first chapter of can be resolved Hume into simple ones, says that all of our perceptions to the Senses' entitled 'Of Skepticism with Regard it is a mystery chapter
where the beliefs in distinctness come and continuous existence from. It wouldn't be a if he thinks that they are a feature of the objects we experience. mystery 9 It might be thought that certain in the schematism indicate that Kant's passages is closer in kind to Locke's than I am presenting it, that for him theory of representation to concept He says, for instance: images are in some way or other essential application. can exist nowhere of a triangle schema but in thought. It is a rule of (A) The of the imagination, in respect of pure figures in space. Still less is an object synthesis or its image ever of experience to the empirical for this latter adequate concept, to the schema of imagination, relation as a rule for the always stands in immediate determination The concept in accordance with some specific universal intuition, concept. a rule according to which my indicates (bedeutet) imagination the figure of a four-footed in a general manner, animal (verzeichnen) 'dog' to any single determinate that I can represent in concreto passage (A) and a universal the schema figure actually such as presents. experience, (A 141, B or 180) any of our
can signify without limitation possible Bennett takes image
the above
the sentence of procedure of a concept. imagination (A 140, B in providing 179-80) an
of (B) This representation I entitle image for a concept to indicate not that schemata with
are rules for constructing images. Thus even though concepts with associated them. On Bennett's images, they are closely account of Kant's an appropriate theory we apply concepts through producing image and comparing it with the object: Kant wants his schematism theory, I think, to explain how we are able to recognize, For example: classify, describe. are identical I have links call no doubt this with this a dog this thing here in front of me is a dog: but what, for me now, a I am have called in to such that I entitled way things 'dogs', answer too? Kant's is that I can link this dog with other dogs by that picture Bennett: 1966, of a dog, and checking Kant's Analytic, it against Cambridge the object University which Press, I
other
conjuring now see. Cambridge, Bennett
up a mental (Jonathan p. 143.)
proceeds that Bennett's however, of two theses: (1) (2) A To this could
to advance
telling
interpretation
objections of Kant
against is mistaken.
this This
theory.
It seems
to me, consists
interpretation
schema apply not
is a rule a concept
for constructing is to check the
an image. image against an object. he with says that there are no of the pure concepts
But
be Kant's
theory
can be constructed images which the understanding: ... any the schema image of a pure
by means
for all concepts because of rules associated
whatsoever.
of the understanding concept It is simply a pure synthesis,
can
never
determined
be brought by a rule of
into that
348
unity, in accordance with
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PEREBOOM
to which the category (A 142,
concepts,
gives
expression.
B181)
a schema In general, an image. One is not a rule for constructing therefore, yet might as R. C. S. Walker take the position, that Kant that images are required does, thought for the application of empirical but not for non-empirical ones concepts (R. C. S. Walker: and Kegan But this attributes 1978, Kant, Paul, London, pp. 88-9). Routledge to Kant that is somewhat On the one hand, his theory of concept strange. no longer be unitary: would and non-empirical would application empirical concepts in very different ways. On the other hand, Kant's reasons for saying that apply to objects cannot be identified with the usefulness of images for concepts images seem to obviate the concept If concepts aren't of the process application altogether. images because of general an image be the role of a rule for producing impossibility images, what would or even different that fall into a general if Kant already has an class, especially images a view account Further discusses The of how the mediation of images? concepts apply without view is suggested against Walker's by the passage the rule which is identified with the concept 'dog': evidence some in which Kant
a rule according to which my imagination can signify the concept dog indicates in a general manner, to any single without limitation figure of a four footed animal or any possible determinate can that I in figure such as experience, image represent concrete (A 141, B 180) presents. actually Kant as says that concepts signify that something by which Kant mentions explicitly things which which a fall under them while mentioning is not constrained. signifies know how schemata to apply
Here images
Furthermore, appearances: This
concept that he does not
mere
of our understanding, in its application to appearances and their in the depths of the human of form, is an art concealed soul, whose modes nature is hardly and to have open to our activity likely ever to allow us to discover, (A 141, B 180-81) gaze. schematism thinks that we can't know a view how schemata it would apply to objects, or concepts to which schemata seem apply to be via
If Kant wrong
to attribute
to him
according
images. One piece of evidence in which schemata above, But which
that stands indeed
the other assertions given he has been arguing that schemata to think that (B) is not intended plausible
in the way of this interpretation is the passage (B) to be identified with rules for producing images. that Kant makes, and given the context in (a paragraph seem shouldn't can the be identified of with as a definition 'schemata'. it seems images), What Kant means for constructing schemata and mean to
to say here, I think, is that at most schemata that the only fact about images: interesting can be used to produce is that schemata images say that images play 10 That this is Kant's an intrinsic role
function
as rules between
relationship I think images.
that he doesn't
in concept application. favored notion of object of experience is evident from a passage in the letter to J. S. Beck are exactly of 20 January 1792: You right (Sie haben es ganz wohl getroffen) when of a representation is itself the you say "The content (Inbegrijf) and the of a representation mind content the of is presented is object: activity whereby
KANT
ON
INTENTIONALITY
349
what
it to the object". is meant (Z 183, and in J?rgen Zehbe (ed.): by relating & Ruprecht, Kant, Briefe, Vandenhoeck p. 191, Ak XI, 313-6.) G?ttingen, 1! reason to think that Kant with rules. Kant's is good identifies There concepts at A with is found 106 where he writes: of rules identification concepts explicit But
1970, most
rule.
as regards serves as a a concept which is always, its form, something universal as the unity of the manifold of body, for instance, which The is concept of outer appearances. it, serves as a rule in our knowledge thought through to
University element
of Richard in his: 1983, Representational the emphasis Mind, Aquila a dispensable Indiana is by no means Press, Bloomington, synthesis of Kant's account of intuitions of ordinary of how it is that particulars, of objects arise. Aquila thinks that in interpreting Kant there is no need representations Contrary of to think that Kant believes that there is any sense in which a whole is generated out of by means of synthesis: that Kant maintains that supposed arise out of an act whereby the apprehension the mind puts of anything a manifold of
12
parts
It is sometimes manifold discrete such must items and
always
into a whole. of any Since we are not conscious (sensations?) together are to be in ordinary with spatial wholes experience already presented to suppose in various it is also tempting that the acts in ways, conceptualized level_There is (noumenal?) question must occur on some deeper, pre-empirical no need to adopt we need to remember this line. What is that Kant is undertaking act, an explanation whatever kind only to intuitions. He of the application of concepts that is, is concerned, are involved in recognition conditions of the spatial (and temporal) In that context, when Kant claims that a certain forms with which we are presented. be of "synthesis" is involved talking about conditions There at most (pp. in the representation of anything in the conceptualization involved is no need we are dealing 122-23) he can manifold, or recognition of
with
as a manifold. something out of parts: is generated recognized as having
an activity whereby a whole to suppose a whole with an activity whereby is
parts,
For Aquila of something is just the recognition synthesis an entire unified out of a manifold. But this cognition himself Aquila not experienced to be central acknowledges to be external to intuitive to Kant,
not the generation manifold, is in tension with something
of that
structure that conceptual is namely and their objects, but is part of cognitions of particulars them. In other words, and their objects ordinary representations always an interpretation content. have at least an implicit conceptual About of the passage in are empty Kant content that thoughts which without and intuitions without says concepts are blind (A 51, B 75) Aquila says:
If a concept is at best something intrinsic identity of the latter would approach references certain seems to involve
with an intuition, combined then the externally of the former. Furthermore, be independent the a doctrine of "bare particulars". our Intuitions provide as they are classified or Merkmale that refer to something Kant's claim and temporal
to particulars: the means concepts provide by which sorts of particulars, in terms of the various characteristics It seems Not to follow that by themselves only does this appear nonsensical, form of intuition itself by which intuitions but concrete
they exhibit. characterless. that it is the
it contradicts spatial
350
characteristics are presented
DERK
PEREBOOM
in the first
for possible
conceptualization
place,
(p.
119)
are the contents of intuitions, the way objects precisely is through his doctrine of synthesis. Pre-conscious type of view are not "bare assures of which we are aware in intuition that the particulars or "something for the conceptual characterless". is what provides Synthesis Since for Kant this avoids our intuitions intuitions is that and their objects; it is what for Kant content. their objects have a conceptual in which the unity of an intuition consists. and in which he synthesis particulars" structure of
the fact that all of our explains in turn, The conceptual content,
to this objection answer him is implicit in the last sentence of the against Aquila's are not "bare He thinks that the explanation intuitions above quotation. why Kant's is that they are characterized the forms of Indeed, particulars" by the forms of intuition. intuition intuitions instance, The do he characterize also says: are but it is evident intuitions, of synthesis, the products and from synthesis the text that Kant thinks that For is always conceptual.
in a judgment function which representations gives unity to the various in an intuition: of various and this gives unity to the synthesis representations we entitle of the understand in its most general the pure concept expression, unity, cf., e.g., B 143, B 144) ing. (A 79, B 104-5, same also on Aquila's to do a of Kant the forms of intuition are supposed interpretation are supposed to provide for the intentionality of work. They the account of the fact that they are of or about something. While the forms of intuition states,
In general, great deal mental could clear of 13
a role here, Kant does not emphasize this role in the text. I think that it is the text of the Second Analogy that a more role in the explanation important means of is concepts. intentionality by played by synthesis play from
to Perception, Macmillan 1975, An Introduction Co., New Irving Rock: Publishing continuation and common fate are Gestalt rules for grouping Good York, pp. 253-62. as part in perceiving in perception, rules we employ whether certain units are perceived as a principle of organization, of a single group. Rock continuation, says "Good implies to perceive that there is a "preference" of lines that in some sense are smooth segments as one line or form" (p. 254). According to the principle of one another, continuations as a single group of common units that move fate, we perceive together (pp. 257-8). 14 of this feature of the intentionality close to an explanation Hume attempts something to explain are is our belief that objects of experience of experience. What he attempts distinct and and perception, which is like our basic feature of intentionality, from the mind on which Hume thinks distinctness that objects the prior principle, is dependent, is undertaken in existence have a continuous (Treatise, pp. 188, 199). The explanation to the Senses', where with Regard he the chapter of the Treatise entitled 'Of Skepticism
one involving two accounts, which he rejects as the causal notion of coherence, suggests too weak, of constancy, which he thinks is more the notion and the other involving to account not turns Kant's of the it is dissimilar The coherence out, account, powerful. existence that perceptions have a continuous basic feature of intentionality. We believe an organic, in their changes: the changes because there is a coherence possess causally I notice I return to a fire after an hour's absence that the new ordered character. When state of the fire is like the one which results when I actually watch a similar fire for an
KANT
ON
INTENTIONALITY
351
hour
consideration of simplicity, Hume (Treatise, p. 195). Invoking says that the of the continuous I am not perceiving existence of the fire when it "gives us supposition a notion of a much than what among objects greater regularity they have when we look no farther than our senses" in the distinctness of the fire (Treatise, p. 198). The belief from the mind been Hume. It has enough against Humean with and perception a subject of us Recent to arises naturally from the belief in its continuous existence. whether Kant knew Hume's well controversy philosophy a much as directed of what he says in the Critique interpret that Kant was indicate with findings quite well acquainted has found reports recent having research a copy of Hume's Treatise discussed the material shows that of Kant's inWolfenb?ttel of the Treatise
to allow
in which
theory. Richard Popkin of a preface the writer to Popkin, Kant. According in the German figures
philosophy
of knowledge context today. 15 For Hume, atomistic, self does
world philosophical like Frege and Russell
the knowledge of Hume's to the is comparable day philosophical
in the Anglo-American
so there could be no source of content in a self which lies perceptions, them. No cause beyond the perceptions is involved in associating beyond perceptions. one another The associate with all by themselves. This is indicated perceptions by Hume's about association: the first sentence of Hume's "Of the way of speaking chapter Association connexion in the Enquiry It is evident reads: that there is a principle of or ideas of the mind, the different and that, in their thoughts or imagination, to the memory a certain each other with appearance they introduce of method and regularity (S 14). And he says in the Treatise: degree of Ideas" between ... when course This the set into any train of thinking, when is apt to continue, imagination, its object fails it and like a galley put into motion by the oars, carries without (Treatise, p. 198) any new impulse. even on its
atomistic, tion of these
no mind or a self which in any instance of association, from is distinct or perceptions received is a causal factor and such a passively representations not contribute to experience. Association is a relation any content among a self is just a collec received for Hume thermselves: passively perceptions
on these differences between Kant and Hume points out, I think, one of the deepest our experiences issues. Kant thinks of necessary are connections that, for instance, to be explained factor outside of the atomistic, received by a causal percep passively to the content tions and that this factor contributes of such experiences. official Hume's on the other is that the genesis of our idea of necessary connection account, hand,
can be explained received and relations just in terms of atomistic, passively perceptions them. among 16 from Kemp-Smith due to inconsistent of 'wirklich'. translation 'Actual' may Changed be a better translation of 'wirklich' that Kant also uses the terms 'real' and given of 'wirklich' the meaning 'realit?t'. Nevertheless, is closer than that of Kant's word 'real' to the meaning are related of our word to the Latin 'real'. Kant's 'real' and 'Realit?t' can come in degrees, as when has to do with amount of being. 'Realit?t' 'realitas', which is called God 'ens realissimum', A B i.e., 'most real being' 578, 606). (e.g., 17 Here Kant says: From can be generated of objects either by mere perceptions knowledge play of or by way of experience: and in the process there may, no doubt, arise
imagination
352
illusory representations attributable sometimes to an error illusion, perception 18 19 Gottlob Ibid. we
DERK
which don't
PEREBOOM
to the objects, the deception correspond being of the imagination and sometimes (in dreams) of judgment To avoid such deceptive (in so-called sense-deception). to proceed to the rule: Whatever have is connected with a according to a delusion to empirical Sense Kant laws, is real (wirklich).
according On
Frege, It should
be noted
and Reference, that Frege differs maintains
(cf. fn. 1). from Kant of
in his
treatment de
of
these Frege
issues not. 20 be
in that whereas
the notion
irreducibly relations
re belief,
logical does
Sentences intensional
describing
causal
and counterfactual 'Qualification
(see Dagfinn
F0llesdal's
external among into Causal Contexts',
can objects in Leonard
Linsky 52-62.) objects,
and Modality, Oxford 1971, Reference (ed.): Press, Oxford, pp. University All that my contention is that paradigmatic relations external among requires the ones one would think of, are extensionally describable. ordinarily
REFERENCES Kant's Kant's Works: is cited edition. in the The traditional 'A' indicates way: is a list of abbreviations the first for texts
Critique of Pure Reason 'B' indicates the second edition, used in this paper: Ak Kants gesammelte der Wissenschaften
following
Schriften, and
its
ed. by the Koenigliche successors (Berlin:
Preussische Georg
Akademie sub Carus
Reimer, The Paul
Proleg.
1902-.) sequently W. de Gruyter, to any Future Metaphysics, Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena revised translation, extensively by James W. Ellington Hackett Co., 1977) Publishing Arnulf Kant, 1759-99, Philosophical Correspondence, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967)
(Indianapolis: Zweig, editor,
Other Ad
Works: Three Dialogues George Berkeley, with an introduction by Robert M. Hackett Co., 1979) Publishing David between Adams, Hylas and edited Philonous, and Cambridge:
(Indianapolis
S ST Treatise
Human edited by Eric Hume, Enquiry Concerning Understanding, Hackett Co., 1977) Steinberg, (Indianapolis: Publishing Thomas Summa Blackfriars, (London: 1963) Aquinas, Theologiae, A Treatise David Hume, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, Nature, of Human at the Clarendon (Oxford: Oxford Press, 1978)
Department University Burlington, U.S.A.
of Philosophy of Vermont VT 05401

Kant On Intentionality

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Kant On Intentionality

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Kant on Intentionality Author(s): Derk Pereboom Source: Synthese, Vol. 77, No. 3 (Dec., 1988), pp.

Synthese 11 (1988) 321-352.

issue about ideas themselves tion as concepts

dependent. idea and

the form of the evening

the idea of the evening awareness),

and Hume's, (3)

(for a case of immediate

and this constitute

In this passage Kant inner determinations objects posited for

draws the distinction of our mind and them. The

as representations which have representations to is a distinction Kant is pointing between

representations manner: and certain order,

appearances pearance whether one will

the manifold question however,

the manifold grant.

in the perception (in

of appearance that which happens

I be justified that a succession

but rather to the awareness mediate

a determinate very well

representation are possible shown,

things involves of the product merely is merely the product only be

the self, it does the existence of the

supposed experience and determinations, (wirklichen Erfahrung).

connected saying that are outside states, are previous contents

fit into a general must distinction

from the Second in the Refutation

Postulate and the Refutation of Idealism:

the existence experience moreover, given outer

the only infer outer things

immediate and this, from inferring

principles of apperception. a relation

can be acquired far as knowledge are derived from the fundamental

this knowledge, be able

are minds intentional

can signify without limitation possible Bennett takes image

the sentence of procedure of a concept. imagination (A 140, B in providing 179-80) an

conjuring now see. Cambridge, Bennett

up a mental (Jonathan p. 143.)

schema apply not

for constructing is to check the

for all concepts because of rules associated

of the understanding concept It is simply a pure synthesis,

Furthermore, appearances: This

concept that he does not

images. One piece of evidence in which schemata above, But which

that stands indeed

relationship I think images.

It is sometimes manifold discrete such must items and

as a manifold. something out of parts: is generated recognized as having

an activity whereby a whole to suppose a whole with an activity whereby is

not the generation manifold, is in tension with something

they exhibit. characterless. that it is the

In general, great deal mental could clear of 13

of knowledge context today. 15 For Hume, atomistic, self does

world philosophical like Frege and Russell

the knowledge of Hume's to the is comparable day philosophical

atomistic, tion of these

and Reference, that Frege differs maintains

(cf. fn. 1). from Kant of

and counterfactual 'Qualification