Public Disclosure Authorized

Report

No:

12971

GLB

RESETTLEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

Public Disclosure Authorized

Public Disclosure Authorized

THE BANKWIDEREVIEW OF PROJECTS INVOLVINGINVOLUNTARYRESErLEMENT 1986-1993

MICROGRAPHICS
Public Disclosure Authorized

Report No: Type SEC

12971

GLB

The World Bank EnvironmentDepartment April 8, 1994

RESETTLEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

THE BANKWIDEREVIEW OF PROJECTS INVOLVINGINVOLUNTARYRESETTLEMENT

1986-1993

The World Bank EnvironmentDepartment Apnrl8, 1994

g~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

ABBREVIATIONS
AFR .........

AficaReglionalOfflce

AGR ASTEN.

Agriculture and NaturalResour% )epartment Environment and NaturalResource Development Division of AsiaTechnical Department CAM.Country Assistance Management CASEC.Interagency WorkingGroup (Colombia) CD .Country Department DKI .Department of WaterWorks(Turkey) EAP .East Asiaand the PacificRegionalOffice ECA .Europe and CentralAsiaRegionalOffice Institute EDI .Economic Development Department ENV .Environment ESD . . Environment and Sustainable Development Vice-Presidency GNP. GrossNationalProduct GOI . Governmentof India ICLARM.International Center for AquaticResourceManagement IDA .International Development Association N.. IndustryandEnergyDepartment AuditConmmttee JAC.Joint lICA .Japan Institutefor InternationalCooperationAgency lAC .Latin Americaand the CaribbeanRegionalOffice EG. Legal Vice-Presidency MINA .Middle East andNorth Afica RegionalOffice MPS Management and PersonnelServices M&E.Monitoring and Evaluation NGO .Non-Governental Organizations ThermalPowerCorporation(India) N'TPC.National OD 430 . OperationalDirective 430 Involuntary Resettlement" OED .Operations Evaluation Department ONMS OperationalManualStatement OPN .Operations PolicyNote ODA .Overseas Development Administration (England) OEC.D Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Completion Report PCR .Project PPAR .Project Performance AuditReport R&R .Resettlement and Rehabilitation SA2.South AsiaCountryDepartmentII SAR .Staff AppraisalReport AsiaRegionalOffice SAS.South TD .Technical Department TM .Task Managers TWU.Transport, Water and Urban Development Department WDR .World Development Report
.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abbnekdons Ewecuuadve Summarcy
Inu rGi uacbn azlnd Backg

.......................... i

nrid .......................................... A1l

Chapter 1: THE NATUREOF INVOLUNTARYRESETLEN[ENT

ANDTMEBANK'SPOLICY
The Natue and Feaibilityof Resettlement ....... ResetdementPolicyas CodifedGCodPracdce ....... ................ ..............

1/1
i7

Chpter 2: RESETTLEMENTINBANKOPERATIONS: 1986-1993

Magnitudeof Resettement .............. ...................... Compoition by Regionsand Secors ......... .................... Socio-Economic Characteistics................................. Future Tends ................. ............................ he Ban's Progam in Contet ...............................

2/1
2 29 210 2V10

Chopter 3: PERFORMANCE: INFLUENCING POLICY AND

REDUCINGDISPLACENENT
MainFndins .................. ............................ The Banks Impacton Resettlement Policies....................... Diffcultiesia Policy Reform ............ ....................... Reducing Displacements in Projects ............................ 3/1
3n2

3/8 3/10

Chapter4: 4PERFORMANCE:

RESTORINGINCOMES AND LIVELIHOODS

Main Fndings .............................................. Assessing IncomeRestoration.................................. Impoverishment Risksand Trends............................... Land and Jobs for Recovering Livelioods ....... ................

4 43
4/7 4/15

Captaer S: PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL OF PROJECTS

WITH RESETTLEMENT
Main FFninngs ....................... ResettlementPlanning ......................... Preparationof Plansto RestoreLost Income ............. . Progressin ResettlementAppraisal........ ..................... ResettlementCostsand ProjectBudgets....... .................. EnsuringAdequateFmance ......... ......................... The EconomicCostsof Resettlement Programs ................. .5 CommonFactorsin Preparationand AppraisalDifficulties.........
__X
..

511
513 /5 5/10 5/15 5/16 /20 .. S22
b/n

Caspter 6: PROJECTSUP

IONAND IMPLEMTATION PERFORMANCE

Supervion in Practice ....................................... 64

Main Fiding .............................................. 611 Acoounting for Vaiabilityin Supervising Reset ............... tlement Improing the Effecisveness of ResStement Supervision.I 6/6
Reent hnprovements .......... .................. ......... 618 SupervisionFindings .................................... . 6/10

I 6/12

ahapter 7: RECENT DMOVEMENTSIN PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT AND QUALUTY

Technical Assistance for PortfolioQuality.......... ............... 7/4 orrectiveActions.............. 7/8 i%staining the Trend ............ 7/13 Trainingfor Borrowers andBankStaff .......................... 7/14 Other Productsofthe BankwideReview........ ................. 7/15 b ThereaChange m BankCulte? ........ .................... 7116

Chapter8: ACIONS TO IPROVE PEFOR Annex1: Annex2s

Task Force and seing
ResettleumentRevle

NM CE .................. 8/1
B/i C/i

Committ for the aBiwde

ib"iNw ...............................................

Generk Termsof Refr Resetement Reew Suprvl sloni....ss.o............................................

LISTOF BOXES
ExcSuin: Box1: IheBank'sresettlementpolicy................................. v
Chapr 1: Boxa .1: Key steps inthe evolution of the Banks resettlement policy .........

Box 1.2 Ihe Bank'sretement

policy..............................

1 1/10

Capter 3: Bcx 3.1: Creatingand affirming policyownership: Colombia..... .......... 3/5 Box32: Bank Impacton non-Bank financedworks:floodcontrolin a rver basin 3/6 Box3.3: Does Bankinvolvement makea difference to displaced people? ...... 3/9 Box3.4: Avoiding displacement.................................... 3/11 Chapter4: Bx 4.1: Learningabout income restoration ....... ..................... Box4.2: Reservoirfisheriesas new incomesources ...................... Box4.3: Evidenceof successfid urban resettlement ..................... Bao4.4: From violentexpulsion to reduceddisplacement .................. Box4.5: Socialintegrationand political instability ................... ... Box4.6: Infomudsociad networks and resettlereconomics ........... ./ Box4.7: Ihe reasons of success: whydoes resettlement in China work? ..... Box4.8 Innovative waysto identify land for resetders: land conslidaton ....
1_
z _O0~Ii

4/4 415 416 412 04 W15

4/16

4/19
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ChapterS Box S.1: HowmuchbaselinesuvUyworkis enough? ..................... Box52. 2 participation in resetdementpossible?........................ Bax53: Good and bad practice-two resettlementtimetabls . ............ BoxS.4: 'Me importanceof easuringgovenment ownenhip . ............. BoxS.S:bDeveloping institutionalcapacities . .......................... Box5.6: Lessonsleaned the hard way ............................... BoxS.7: Absenceof timely planning makes the task morediffEcult.......... Box S& Innovative approaches to resAdement in sectorloans ............. Box .9: A summay presentation of resettlement costs ............ ....... Chapter 6: Box6.1: Doesresetdementsupervisionmatter?......................... Box6.2: Effective portfoliomanagement - resettlement in Upper KrishnaH project ........ Box6.3: Contrasting examples of Banksupervnision and follow-up ..... ...... Bax 6.4: IThepriceof ignorance ............... .................... Box6.5: Projectsuperiisioncannotsubstitutefor countrystrategies......... Bax 6.6: Effective resettlement an examplefromAfrica .... ... Box6.7: Monitoringpanels and mid-termreviews ...... ................. Chapter 7: Box7.1: Technical resettlementassistance:BraziL....................... Box72 Staffing inadequacy andremedies ............................ Box73: Corrective actionsin Madagascar Tana Plainproject ..... Box7.4: Yacyreta one year of reviewand supervision work .....

512 5/S 5.9 5/11 5/13 5/14 5/15 5/16 5/17 6/6 6/10 6/12 6/13 6/14

r...I...... 7

6115

7/5 7/8 ........ 7/10 ......... 7/11

LIST OF FIGURES Chapter 2: Figure2.1: A year by year imageof the ResettlementPortfolio Projectsclosed,approvedand activeduringeach FY. ............ Figure2.2: A yearby year imageof the Resettlement Portfolio People displaced by projectsclosed,approvedand actve dunng each FY .................................... Figure2.3: People displaced by region- projectsactiveduringFY '93 ....... . . Figure2.4: People displaced by sector - projectsactiveduringFY '93 .. ....... Chapter 5: Fgure S.1: Resourceallocationforresettlement ........................ Chapter 6: Figure6.1: Resettlement superision in percentage....................... 2)2 2 V4 V
5120

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LIST OF TABI ES
Chapter 2: Table 2.1: Table2.2: Table2.3: Table2.4: Table 2.5: Table 2.6: Entryof projectsinto the resettlementportfolio ..... ........... 211 Regionaldistrbutionofprojectsactivein FY93................. 2/4 Sectoral istnbutionof projectsactivein FY93 ..... ............ 216 Distribution of projectsbycauseof displacement ..... ........... 27 Iage Bank-assisted resettlementprojects ..................... 2/8 Distribution of the resettlementportfolioby size of displacement ........... .............................. 2/8 Table 2.7: Projectedentryof projectsinto the resettlementportfolio .... V10 /....

Clwpter 5: Table 5.1: Activeprojectswithbaselinesurveys by appraisalFY86-FY93 ...... 513 Table 5.2: Projectimnactsof inaccuratebaselinesurveys ..... ............. 5/4 Table 5.3: Appraisalof resettlementplansin Bank-assisted projects, FY1986-1993 .......................................... 5/11 Table 5.4: Activeprojectswith appraisalresettlementplansby region, FY86-FY93 ............ ............................... 5/12 Table 5.5: Sensitivity of the internaleconomicrate of return to resettlement . . S23 Chapter 6: Table 6.1: Resettlementsupervision by region 1986-1993. Table 6.2: Resettlementsupevison by sector, 1986-1993. Table 6.3: Resettlement supervision, 1993. Chapter 7: Table 7.1: Reviewfieldworkon resettlementduring1993.7/
64

6/5 6/9

__

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b/4

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.

to ve~~~~~~~~~~~~~s
escle and boas Invoye~lyuntary pet

tion op etm

Ba entondevp

histsON onkdnuer

countries. and has been indeliblywritten into the evolutionof industrialas well as developing dams, irigation and drinlkngwater systems,or extendinghighway Istallng maior hydropower and deprivation. The dramaof forced fraughtwith hardships networkshas entaileddisplacements literature.The beautifulI an entire sociological has spawned West End in Boston's urban displacement in the daysof BaronHIaussmann of today'sPariswasmadepsble bypainfulrelocation master-plan ofwhichsome neighborhoods, throughmanly slashed CrossBronxExpressway NewYork'simpressive in Canadahave complexes have been saved. Huge hydroelectric - at least in hindsight-could displacements continueto occurin groups. Involuntary requiredthe uprootingof manyindigenous infrastructure, environmental a countriesfor reasonsrelated to the bettermentof livig conditions, displacement and types of involuntary withvarious of publicservices.The experience or eWansion and andfor protecting the entitlements knowledge for planning has generatedincreased resettlement vn7elihoods of those affBcted. has opulationdisplacement countries, thescaleofdevelopanent-related In develoPing m r and growing provision of infrastructure due to the accelerated in tie past fewdecades, grownrapidly toll of the 300 large dams that, on average,enter into pouation densities. The displacement constructioneveryyear is estimatedto be above 4 millionpeople. The urban developmentand countriesare estimatedto displace transportationprogramsbeig started each year in developing estimated that about 80 to 90 million decade, it is 6 millionpeople. Over the past some additional andurbanand for dam construction, peoplehavebeen resettledas a resultof infrastrcture programs in other sectorshave increasedthis number&rther. transportationdevelopment.Investments share of thistotal. butsignificant, accountfor a small, programs 3. WorldBanl-financed of 2 million the resettlement are experted to involve Bankc's active Fortfolio in the Projectscurrently for some3 percent conservatively, projecs account, period. Bank-funded peopleover an eight-year of the resettlement caused by dam constructionworldwideand for about 1 percent of the world. projectsin the developing causedby urban and transportation displacements in resettlementisnonetheless in relativeterms,the Bank'sinvolvement Whilelimited 4. projects,the Bank has a of great importance. For those people resettled under Bank-financed impre, ensurethat everyeffortis madeto restore,and if possible responsibility to help Borrowers the size that far exceeds alsohas a broadersignificance their lielihoods But the Bank'sinvolvement the Bank past fourteen years since indeed, over the of resettlementunder Banfinanda projects. to wo n th rk establishedits path-breakingresettlementguidelines, itvhsvncreasinglysoughot

govermments to promotebetter policiesand legal frameworks for resettlement,at and beyondthe projectlevel,and withproject-executing agencies to promotebetter proceduresfor implementation. S. Improving resettlementis difficultfor deielopingcountrygovernments, particularly in low incomecountrieswith land scarcity, whichface competing needs,resourcelmitations,and constraintson institutional capacity. Progresshas been substantial over recent years and, in some countries, has been remarkable. However, majorproblems anddifficulties associated withinvoluntary resettlementoperationscontinueto occur,and often implementation perfomance is lower than expected. 6. The costsof inadequateresettlement can be veryhigh,resultingin increased povert for largenumbersof people. Thisis especially serioussincemanyof those affectedare alreadyvery poor. Theytend to livein disadvantaged areaswhereinfrastructure is lacking andsocialservices are veer limited. The remote locationsof manydam sites are often inhabitedby indigenouspeople, ethnicminorities or pastoralgroups. Thisheightens the moralimperative of ensunngsoundpolicies and effectiveimplementation. 7. Done nrght, resettlement programs can be an elementof a nation'sstrategyto reduce poverty.Ibis requiresnot onlysoundpolicies and adequateresources, but alsoa changein mind-set - towards recognizing resettlers'entitlementsto share in the benefitsof the projectswhichcause their dplacement & Improvingresettlementis thus an urgent priority. Achievingsound resettlement requiresimproving our understanding of the social,cultural,economicand ecological complexities ivolved, and in franklyfacingup to the lessonsfromsuccess and failure. Tis currentreviewis part of this process.

THE BANKWIE RESETTLEMENTREIEW

9. The Bankwide Resettlement Reviewwasinitiatedin 1992to encompass all projects with resettlementin the Bank'sportfoliobetween1986and 1993and to assessconsistency between policyand operations. The Bankwide reviewwas assigned to the Environment Departmentin the Environmentally Sustainable Development Vice Presidency(ESD);the Environment Department establisheda Task Force to coordinate the review and carry it out jointly with the regional departments. Each of the Bank's operationalregionsand the BanlksLegal Departmentformed resettlement reviewworkinggroups.Allregionspreparedcomprehensive analytical reportson their resettlementportfolios, and these formedLhe basisof this report. Contnbutions were alsoreceived fromthe other centralVice Presidencies. 10. The three objectives of the resettlementreviewwere: * * To ascertainthe scaleof involuntary resettlement in the Bank-'s portfolio, and determineregionaland sectoraltrendsand composition. To analyze ongoing resettlementprograms for their quality,consistency with policy, and outcomes.

GOOMM.&no

ii

To identify recurrent problemsaffectingperformance,initiate midstrem remedialactions, andpreparea follow-up strategyfor addressing tesettiement more effectively.

11. Rather than beingcarriedout as a desk-bound and staticstock-taldng exercise, this reviewwasdeliberatewly designedas a broad processof resettlementanalysis in thefield, carriedout bythe Bank'srelevantregional and centralunitsjointlywiththe Borrowers.7hemainproductof Xhs comprehensive review is not sinply itsfinal repoiz but theprocessthat the revew triggredthroughout 1993across theBankand on theground.The reviewprocess consisted of intensified fieldsuperviion, analysis of projectpreparation, appraisal, supervision, and implementation, on-siteconsultations with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), sectoralresettlement studies,development ofnewtechnical tools for resettlementplanning, and a considerable numberof joint remedialactionsinitiatedbythe Bank and the Borrowers for projectsfafling to meet set objectives.

CONCEPTUAL ISSUES
12. The need for investment in lxfrastruCtum Developing countries invest around $200 bilion per year in newinfrastructure. The socialandeconomic returnsfromthese inestments have been high.' I the past 15years,the share of households withaccessto cleanwater has risenby5O percent,bringing dramatic improvements in healthandthe quality of life. Per capitaaccessto electric power and telephoneshas doubledin the sameperod, enablingincreasedproducivityand human welfare. Foodproductionhas risensharply- doublingin the pastquarter century- with overhalf thisgai coming frominvestments in irrigation.Andinvestments in transportation havereducedcosts and improved farm gate and producerprices. 13. Suchdevelopments ofteninvolve changes in land andwateruse patterms, andin some instancesthisrequiresthat peoplebe displaced.Tne numbersof peoplerequirmg resettlementcan be reducedand, as shownin this report, progressin this areas has been substantiaLBut the need for resettlement cannotbe eliminated.Nor shouldit be assumed that the volume of resettlement Wi be muchlowerin the future. More than 2 billionpeoplestilllackaccessto electricity and are forced to use sticksand dung for their energyneeds; 1.7 billionlackseweragesystemsand 1 billon lack accessto clean pipedwater, resultingin the unnecessa death of 2.3 millioninfantsand children each year. Food productionwillneed to double againin the 40 years - an impossibility without additionalinvestmentin irigation. And the world'spopulationwillgrowby almost1 billioneach decadeover the sameperod. Substantial furtherinvestment in inf uct wiUl thusbe absolutely essentialif povertyis to be reducedand population grow rates broughtdow 14. lhe natue of the resetflementproblem.Involuntary resettlementconsistsof two closely related yet distinctprocesses:displacing peopleand rebuilding their lvelihood- processes amongthe mostdifficult in development worL The complexity of involuntary resetdment and the enormous diversityof project situationsmake achievinggood resettlment a formidabletasL Recognizing the intinsic difficulty of resettleme et is the primestep for addressing thistaskseriously. 15. Whenpeopleare displaced, production systems maybe dismantled, kIdnship groupsare scattered,and long-established residential settlementsare disorganized. People'slivesare affected in verypainfulways.Manyjobsand assetsare lost. Healthcaretendsto deteriorate.Linksbetween producersand their customers often are severed,and local labormarketsare disrupted. Informal
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awlPRepon, 1994(_tghcomlng) fDra detaited disusn.

INW: SA i

socialnetworks that are part of dailysustenance systems - providing mutualhelp in childcare, food security, revenue transfers, short-term credit, labor exchanges, and other basic sources of socio-economic support- are dissolved.Localorganizations and formaland informalassociations disappearbecauseof the dispersion of their members.Traditional community and authority systems can lose their leaders. Symbolic markers,such as ancestralshrinesand graves,are abandoned, breakinglinkswith the past and withpeoples'culturalidentity. 16. The cumulative effect can tear apart the socialfabric and local economy,and is profoundly disruptiveto large numbersof people. The main risk is impoverishment - through landlessness, joblessness, food insecurity, deterioratinghealth, or the loss of accessto community assets. Thatiswhycarrying out resettlement adequately isan impoverishment prevention andpoverty reductiontask - centralto the Bank'smainmission.In worling to reducepoverty,the Bank and its membercountriesmustadopt mitigation measuresto ensure that project-induced displacement and resettlementdo not make additional peopleworseoff. 17. Movingpeople involuntarily also raises legal issues. The potential for violating people'sindividual and group rightsmakescompulsory relocationunlikeanyother projectactivity. The factthat projectsfrequently are delayedbycourts,andthat compensation levelsare oftenraised significantly on appeal, reflectsthe recognition in legal systemsthat people cannotbe arbitrarily displaced withoutjust compensation, regardless of nationalneed. Whenresettlementprocesses are carriedout in a lawfulmannerthat fullyrespectspeople'srights,opposition to projectsby adversely affectedpeopleis reduced(althoughnot eliminated) andoverallprojectimplementation is likelyto unfoldmoreeffectively.Resettlement that reflectsthe needs ant rightsof affectedpersonsis not just compliance with the law,but alsoconstitutes sound development practice. I&* The Internationaldebate on resettlement Becauseof its complexity and adverse effects,involuntary resettlementhas becomethe focusof a wideinternational debate,engaging and polarWing governments andnongovernmental organizations, publicopinion groups,parliaaentarians, developmentagencies,and the media. Criticismof involuntary resettlementoften evohes into rejectionof the goals and legitimacy of the project causingthe resettlement,and sometimes of development itself. Twoarguments are advanced.Onedenies,in principle, the acceptability of any involuntary resettlement. The second criticizesthe qualityof specificresettlement operations. Considerable criticism of both kindsis directedat Bank-supporte:d projects. 19. The rejection of all resettlementis unrealistic. In many situationsinvoluntaty resettlementis unavoidable; the questionis how to mininize its magnitudeand how to respond effectively to the needs of the peoplebeing resettled. Thus, the Bank shares the viewsof those criticswho deplorebad resettlementoperations. Their concernfor the welfareof the displaced populations is fullyjustified- and germaneto the Bank'sown mandateand policies. In practice, criticism of resettlementfailuresbyNGOsor other interestedgroupsfrequentlyhas helpedimprove the Bank'spoficiesand operations. Throughits very decisionto adopt a formalpolicybased on equitableprinciplesarid sound approaches, the Bank has deliveredthe sharpest criticismof bad displacement practicestha4t causethe impoverishment of those displaced. 2C. Bank resettlementpollcy. The Bankwasthe firstinternational development agency to respondto the complexity and difficulty of displacement by adopting, in 1980,a formalpolicyand institutional proceduresto addressdisplacement processesand resettlers'needs (see bar 1). This policyis based on actualexperiences with resettlementin both developedand developing countries and on social science research. By adopting this policy,the Bank rejected the argumentthat impoverishing resettlerswasan unavoidable, if lamentable, facetof development.The fundamental
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goalof the Bankes policyis to restorethe living standards and earningcapacities of displaced persons - and when possibleto improe them. Its provisin protect and enlarge the entitlementsof displacedpeople and promote a safetynet approachfor restoringtheir Ivelihoods. Whenever possible, the Bank'spolicy callsfortransforng people'sinvoluntaty resettlement into an opportunity for development and for enhancing their prior living standardsby enabling resettlersto share in the benefitsof the development projectthat causestheir displacement. 21. Restoringpreviousstandards of livig is a formidable task in practice. By pursuing a development-oriented outcome,the Bank'sresettlementpolicyraisesa majorchallengefor both Borrowersand the Bankl, but a challengefullyconsistentwith the povertyalleviationpoliciesof bofrowinggovenments. However,the nature and the dimensionsof the tasks at hand in implementing this policymust be well understood. The absencein manydeveloping countriesof effectivelyfunctioningland and labor markets,the subswantive and procedural inadequacies of compensation systemsfor propertyappropriated by the state, and the absenceof adequatesocial safetynets are three central reasonswhy the simplecash compensation of propertylosse under eminentdomainlawscannotrealistically be expected at thistimeto provide satisfactory outcomes for project-affected people in developing countries. This makesthe need for the Bank'sapproachto resettlment compelling, in orderto preventimpoverishment underBank-financed projects Attaining thisgoaloftenrequireschangesin the policies, legalframeworks, institutional capacities, andcurent practicesof manyBorrowers Ihis chalenge is facedanew in everysingledevelopment projectthat entailsdisplacement.Meetingit successfy demandsthat a systematic effort is made each time, includingimprovingpolicy,allocatingappropriate resources, and fosteringthe participationof resettlen and hosts. 22. For nations as for the Bankl policy goals must be translated into systematic implementation. Whileimplementation in Bank-financed projectshas not consistently been at the level requiredby the policy, it has been improving.It alsois undeniable that treatmentof affected populations under projectsthat applyBankpolicyis,in general considerably better than undernonBank financedprojects,whichaccountfor up to 97-98percent of total mvoluntary resettlementin the developing world. Bank-supported projects, however, shouldnot be isolatedfrombroadnatioal policycontextsand frameworksOne of the mostimportantfindings of thisreviewis that addressing the plightof these manymillions throughgoverment commitment to better pocies on resetemnt (whichwouldapplyto both Bank-financed and non-Bankfimanced projects)is also the keywayof improving the performance m that portionof the Ban's portfolio whereresetment issuesremain problematic.Hence in countrieswherethe Bank is financing, or is considering financing projects whichinvolveresettlement, the Bank alsoassistsgovements in establishing or improving national polices,buldig on project-level experienceL

KEY FIDINGS OF THE REVIEW

23. The single mostimportant message ofthe review isthat goodresettlement canprevent impoverishmetand evenreducepovert by rebuflding susainablelivelihoods. If raettment is not done adequately, resettlersend up worseoff than before. Socialyresponsible resettlementis also economically beneficial becausethe heavycostsof poorlyhandleddisplacement extendwel beyond the immediately affectedpopulation- to the regionaleconomy,and to the host populationin reocatin are Iadequate resettlement induces localresistance, increases political tensios, cntais extensive projectdelays,and postponesprojectbenefitsfor al concerned; the benefitslostbecause of such avoidableproject delayssometimes far exceedthe marginalcost of a good resettlement packge. Ensuringthat involuntary resettlementis mimized - and whenunavoidable, is carried
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the peopledisplaced- is fullyjustifiedon both economicand ethical out withoutimpoverishing grounds. mote difficult, The renew has shown,once again,that resettlementis nearlyalways 24. than generallyrealized. 'Me largest resettlement more expensive,and more time-consuming operationsmovetens of thousandsof people - often vety poor people - longdistancesin a vey their standard of lving is a hard task The inhert diffcultyin short time, and reestablis;hng and by the limitedtechnical seancesis compounded standardsof lving andcommunity reestablishing fromsomee3ecuting of mostBowmes, andbyweakcommitment resettlementcapacity institutional agencies. 25. andsectoraland legalstudiesconfim that: Fieldresearch,projectevaluations, (a) (b) in Box1,while described resettlement, The Bank'spolicytowardimyoluntazy is sound and its goalsreasonable. ambitious, better resettlement Projects that follow Bank policy have demonstrably Reettlt outcomes than projects that bypass these reqements. guided by the Bank-spolicyoccur at operationsunder projectseffectively projects standardsusuallysuperiorto those outsideBank-assisted associated withthe presenceor absence isdirectly performance Resettlement on resettlement frameworks and organizational of a domestic policy states, or sectorswith an adequateresettlementpolicygenerally Countries, achieve better outcomes in preventing impovershment and restoing lvelihoodsthan do countnesor sectorswhichlacksuchpolicies. operationsism muchbetter healththan The Bank'sportfolioof resettlement in 198h the year the previousresettlementreviewwas completed- and rdically diferent from the state of the portfolio at the time when the resettlementpolicywas issued. However,in a number of projectsactual with the standards resettlementoperationsand outcomesare not consistent policy. definedand demandedby the Bank's throughthe Bank'spolicyhave andcrteria established The planing processes other govemments, improvedthe practicesof some borrowing significantly largeprojects,and the implementing donors,tchnical agencies international itself However,progress in this respect has been isfficient and Bankc of planng, uneven. Much more needs to be done to ensure consistency Policygoals. With and impactmonitoring outconmes,

(c)

(d)

(e)

hasgeneratedimportantbkowdge The in-depthteviewof resettlementexperiences 26. for both the Bank and Borrwers about waysto carryout more effectiveresettlement,and has that are descrbedin this performance unsatisfactory of correcting andways goodpractices identified projectsrequiremuchgreaterattentionby report Tle socialdimensonsof civilworksconstruction as wel as by the Bank?2 membercountrygovenments,as the recent QED reviewalso concluded, itselfwillcontinueto be doggedby some public Unless these aspectsare masted, development
JiR1aase EV&y.m WA hwaka&Wy See Opmtoas Baluatia Dfhtnau&wtBe*
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June 30,1993. 12142, Repoa Now

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criticism, ratherthan obtainthe full,and increasing, supportthat it needs andrichly deserves.Hence, beyond project-by-project activities, institutional development foraddressing resettlement issues needs to be pursuedas a valuabledevelopment objective in its own right. 27. Importantlearninghas taken placeoverthe last 10-14 year, building up towardsthe positivechangesnow underway. Despite the vast differencesamongcounties and populatios involved, muchmore is now understoodabout the majorcommonfactorsthat exain - by their presenceor absence- whyresettlementworkedin some casesand failedelsewher These are: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) Politicalcommitment by the Borrower, expressed in law,officialpolcies,and resourceallocations; Systematic implementation by the Borrowerand the Bank of established guidelines and procedures; Sound social analysis,reliable demographicassessments,and technical expertisein planningfor development-oriented resettlement; Accuratecost assessments and commensurate financin6 with resettlement timetables tied to civilworls construction; Effectiveexecutingorganizations that respondto local development need, opportunities and constraints; and Public participation in setting resettlement objectives, identitfyg reestablishment solutions, and implementing them. THE BANK'S RESETTLEMNT PORTFOLIO

During 1986to 1993involuntary resettlementwas a part of 192projects,displacing a total of 2.5 millionpeople over the life of those projects. Forty-ix projectshad dosed by 1993, havingresettled over half a millionpeople. Under the current portfolioof 146 projectsactivein 1993, nearlytwomillionpeopleare in variousstagesof resettlement.Theseprojectsrepraent eight percentof the Bank'scurrently ongoing 1,900projects,andaccountfor US$23bilion or 15percent of Bank lending. The largemajority of the Bank-funded projects(60 percent) are locatedin East Asia and South Asia, due to the rapid development of these countriesand their high population densities.Nearly100projects, witha prelimiaty estimateof about600,000peopleto be relocated, have been proposedby the Borrowers for the 1994to 1997pipelineof projects. 29. Within the 146 active projects with resetlement in the portfolio,the scale of resettlementper projectvariesfromlessthan 500 to morethan 200,000 people. However, the bulk of resettlementisconcentrated in a handfulof projectsin India,China,Indonesia, andBrazil: ekven largeprojectssituatedin thesecountries accountfor overhalf- 1.1milion - of allthe peoplebeing resetded. Projectsin the SouthAsiaandEast Asiaregionsaccountfor 80 percentof the population to be resettled. Latin America's share in the resettlementprojectportfoliois 9 percent andAfric's is 23percent. Ihe numberof countries withmultipleresettlement operationsis expanding growing economies inPakistan, Bangladesh, Vietnam, andIndonesia expect significant increas in the number of Bank-supported projectswith resettlement.

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portfolioisthe rapidrise secoral shiftin the Bank'sresettlement The mostsignificant 30. projects. This is now the largest sector in termsof of transport,water and urban infrastructure resettlement.However, projectsinvolving for 75 of the 146ongoing numberof projects,accounting or agricultureprojects. these resettlementoperationsare smallerthan the averagein hydropower and drining water are the singl largestcauseof displacement hydropower Dams for irrigation, (63 percent of displacedpeople), and transportation corridors are the second largest cause projectscontinueto accountfor the largestsegmentof (23 percent).In sectoralterms,agricultural resettlers(52 percent).

PERFORMANCE IN RESETTLEMENT
31. progressduring1986to 1993in three majorareas: The Bank madesignificant * *
*

countries. the resettlementpoliciesof borrowing Influencing AssistingBorrowersin avoidingunnecessaryresettlement operations or displacements. reducingthe scrle of unavoidable of resettlersand their the circumstances AssistingBorrowersin improving income. their restore to ability

guidelines, whenprojectswere not coasistentwithpolicyand processing At the sametime,however, a numberof resettlersended up worseoffE
32. Influendae nolicxes.Having been the first internationaldevelopment agencyever to

whoseprojects the Bank has promotedthis policywith the Borrowers adopt a resettlementpolicy, impactduring catalytic One mainresultof the Bankes displacement. population includeinvoluntary policiesand legalframeworks domestic enactedor improved 1986to 1993is that severalBorrowers for resettement wantit to work. The mainwaygovernments workswhengovernments Resettlement 33. defined capacity, to goodresettlementisbycreatingadequateinstitutional expresstheircommitment do not genuinely and resources. Where Borrowers as the synergybetweenpolicy,organizations, not from the outset,resettlementis generally concurwiththe Bank'sresettlementpolicyobjectives the or missions, supervision follow-up covenants, of number of the carred out well,regardless not itself does the Bank when SimiarWly, disbursements. frequencyof Bank threats to suspend is weakened. projectperformance or procedures, adhere to its policyprinciples consistently
34. The 1986 to 1993 period has been marked by some notable policy successes

Stimulatedby a Bank sector project in 1990,based on the Bank's poicy, Brazil'sElectrobras for the countrys power sector. Colombiaadopted resettlementguidelines developedsatisfactory in its policyguidelines in 1992. China,with Bankinvolement,improved similarsectoralguidelines adopteda sectoral ThermalPowerCorporation sector. in 1993,India'sNational the waterresources with the Bank as part of detailednegotiations policyfor all its operations,following rehabflitation - and immediate overall effective more been far Bank has The loan. preparationsfor a sector operations have benefited more - when it succeededin reachingagreement with borrowing operatwins, to Bank-assisted relevant framework or sectoralpolicy on the broaddomestic governments projects In turn, the than when its effortswere only confinedto legal agreementsfor individual and the agreedupon 'project polic have loan legalagreements laid down individual obligations
CzVwt S. MOM MAm ix

sometimes formedthe basis for discussing and improving more general domesticpolicyand legal frameworks. 35. Major multilateraland bilateral donors also have recently issued resettlement guidelines similarto the Bans - for instance,the Inter-American Development Bank in 1990and the AsianDevelopment Bank is now considering formaly adoptingsimilarguidelines At the OECDs request,the Bankprovided supportin preparing resettlement guideflines, congruent withthe Bank'sguidelines, and in 1991the development ministers of all OECD countriessanctioned simlar unifiedguidelines for their countries'aid agencies. 36. Avoldrg or reducin disnia ent The Bankhas becomemoreeffective in assiting Borrowers in implementing the first principleof the resettlementpolicy: to avoidresettement or reduce its size whenevertechnicallyand economically feasible. The potential for reducingor eliminatingresettlement exsts in manyprojectproposals submitted for Bankfinancing.Ihe redesign of the Saguling highdamin Indonesia, for instance, lowered dam heightby fivemeters,thusavoiding the displacement of 35,000 people. In the Cote d'Ivoireforestryproject,the Bankproposedrevisions that reducedthe Borrower's proposal to displace up to 200,000 peopleby80 percent,to 40,000, and set substantially higherstandardsfor those to be relocated. In Thailand resitingthe Pak Mun dam and lowering its heighthas reduceddisplacement from20,000 to 5,000people. In Ecuadors Guayas flood-control project,the redesign of canallayouts completely eliminated the needto displace anyone. 37. Restorhy Incomes.The ultimate test of consistency betweenresettlement operations and policyis income restoration and improvent Bank-financed projects that resettle people productively on land and in jobs tend to restore incomemore effectely than projectsthat deiver compensation withoutinstitutional assistance.Incomeswer successfuly restoredparticularly when resettlerswereenabledto share in the immediate benefitscreatedby the veryprojectthat displaced them. Examples includehelpingresettlersdevelopaquaculture and fisheriesin the new reservoirs (Indonesia), moving theminto the newly irrgated commd areas(China,andsomeprojects in India) or favoring them to cashin on the commercial opportunities createdaround the newlycostructed infrastructure (Argentina,China,Turkey). In manyprojects,lving standardsfor urban resettlers
improved through more durable housing more floor space per capita, and better access to sartay

services - even thoughthis cameat the costof a longercommute. 38 AlthoughBank policydefinesa measurable goal for all resettlementoperatios restoringpre-move incomelevels- vey fewprojectshaveincluded sufficient measuresor methods to assess whetherincome restoration isbeingachieved.Regional resettlement reportsandmostOED audits could not documentwhether incomeswere improvedor restored. Availableevidence documents numerous cases of impoverishmentof displaced people through unsatisfatory resettlement.Better monitoring systems have recentlybeen initiatedand willbe expanded. 39. Comparedto the findings of the Operations Evaluation Departmentin assessngthe earlyexperiences withresettlement" (1993), whichmostly referredto projects startedin the earlyand mid-l980s,the review found better performancein recently completed or ongoing projects, particularly in countrieswith robust resetflementpoliciesand implementation capacitiessuch as
China. However, the reviewcomes to the same conclusionas the OED studies - that, although the

dataare weak,projectsappearoftennot to havesucceededin reestablishigresetters at a better or equal livingstandard and that unsatisfactory performance still persts on a wide scale. Though fragmentary, the weight of availableevidencepoints to unsatisfactory income restoration more frequentlythan to satisfactory outcomes.Performance in incomerestorationis of partcular concem in some countryportfolios,such as India and Indonesia,vwichhave numerousprojectsentailing
_S.1U700 a. x

displacement but do not have a country-wide policyor legalframework for resettlement withincome restoration. The keyexplanatory variablefor successin restoringlivelihoods on a productive basis is the presenceof a nationalcommitment to help resettlers,reflectedin sectoralor nationalpolicy postureson the issue. 40. Declines in postrelocation incomes aresometimes significant, in certaincasesreaching as much as 40 percent for people who were poor even befose their displacement.Iosses often includeimportantincome-generating assetsthat are not replaced,as well as lossof shelter. Field findings showthat for farm families, loss of their land has generallyfar more severeconsequences than displacement from their homes;this is true even when partial lossof farmingland leaves an economically nonviable unit. For urbanfamilies, hardestto replaceisthe lossof smallbusinesses and workshops, or of accessto gainfulemployment Retrofitting actionshave been starteddung the reviewin somerecentlyidentified cases,and other corrective actons willfollowup on this review. 41. The risksof declining standards of living occuralongseverallines- economic, social, health,nutrition,and culturalalienation- and the risk-model identified by the reviewprovidesa warng modelthat helpsplannersand policymakers to preventimpoverishment. Not allrisksaffect variousresettlergroups equally,and some vulnerablegroupsand people (such as indigenous and tribalgroups, or womenheadedhouseholds) havemoreexposure to the riks of economic andhabitat displacement. Understandingthe risks specificto different social groups helps explain how impoverishment occursand what mustbe done to effectively avoidtheserisks in futureoperations. 42. The singlemost importantfactor for countering such risks in rural resettlementis makingavailable adequateland with clear title to the membersof displacedcommunities.In most situations,the 'land for land! strategy leads to results far superior than cash compensation. Difficulties occurparticularly where land is scarceand land marketsare thin. 'Land for land!also implies land of approximately equal capability and,whensuchsolutionsare not available, trade-offs must be providedto open up off-farmincomesources In urban areas, resetdementdifficulties revolveprimarily around entitlementsof owners,tenants,or transientgroups,accessto alternative jobsand business opportunities, and affordable housing. Participatory approaches and involvement of local urban NGOs have been very effectivein findingalternattvefill-inlocationsfor urban resettlersand in mobilizing resettlers'energiesfor reconstructing their habitat at higherstandards, withbetter environmental services. 43. The questionthisreviewhasposedfor analysis iswhetherit is possible to identify the causesfor the gapbetweenBankpolicyobjectives - primarily recovering incomelevels- andactual projectoutcomes, whichleavemanypeopleworseoff. Whitethere are casesof evidentneglectand departuresfrominstitutional norms,morefundamental reasonsaccountfor problems in resettlement performance (see alsoparas.21and60). Other lessons learnedthroughthisreviewconcernquestions of institutional capacities of both Borrwers and the Bank the costsof successful resettlement, and the need for long-termdevelopment strategies. 44. Despitethe enormousvariability betweenprojectsand countries,a relatively small numberof factorsaccountfor the unevenperformance of resettlementoperations: * Compensation provisions and propertyacquisition practicesdo not provide enoughresources to allowresettlers to purchasereplacement landsandother assets. While no law prevents governmentsfrom providingadequate assistanceto resetders, in practice compensationprocedures frequently excludeor underpaysignificant numbersof affectedpeople. Borrowers use
tAC,~ S. 1oo...

CA%WMflKW0M=

Xi

institutionalmeans to displace people but do not use enough of their on the ground. abilities to facilitate'land for land' alternatives institutional * The overallfinancialresourcesearmarkedfor resettlementoften fall short, often by large amounts. Cost overrunsfor resettlementoperationsexceed becauseof initial ovemmsfor civilworksbyan averageof 50percent,mainly procedureslimit allocation and inflexible Budgetconstraints underestimates. resourcesstill further. The institutionschargedwith managingresettlementoften lack the legal framework, mandateandskillneededto helpresettlersandtheir hosts. Rigid procedures and lack of experiencewith resettlement exacerbatesweak commitment and poor performance. in the The affectedand host communities are not adequatelyparticipating resettlement process. Local knowledge is rarely used in designing resettlement programs or finding viable solutions, and effective legal mechanisms for resolving grievances are often lacking. Top-down planning beneficiaries in do not mobilize project institutional field presence and weak for resettlementsuccessby accommodating host areasto act as stakeholders resettlersamongstthem.

45. Certain preconditions exist for creatingthe enablingenvironment neded to help displaced families rebuildtheir lost livelihoods and productionsystems.Knowledge is available for creating such an enabling envronment, despite the enormousvariabilityin each resettlement sufficientfinancing,able institutions, and local situation. Favorablepolicyand legal frameworks, involvement in programdesignand management are the foundationfor successful resettlement. resettlementpracticewithinBank operationsand 46. Borrowercapacities. Improving discussions between issues into the broaderdevelopment resettlement beyondrequiresincorporating the Bank and its Borrowers, and withinthe agendaof povertyalleviation policiesand strategies. haveemergedfromsectoraldialogues, resettlementexperiences Someof the Bank'smostsuccessful principles andplanning resettlement objectives on overall andthe Bankconcentrate whereBorrowers resettlementprojects. that willguideindividual 47. Important differences existbetweencountries' abiltiestoimplement resettlement, and, such sectoralagencies Strongandprofitable countries, betweensectoralcapabilities. withinindividual as utilitiesand some parastatalscan allocatethe resourcesto carryout resettlementsuccesfully, business standards becomenormal andsoundrelocation it ispart of their legalresponsibility, provided departments typicallylack the resources, budgetaryflexibility,and practices. Administrative withoutmajorimprovements in their internal managerial skillsto carryout resettlementprograms smaller-scale operationssuchas the ones found in including structure. All resettlementprograms, byinvolving local many urbanor environmental protection programs, canbe handledmoreeffectively and hosts. of both resettlers organizations NGOsor community

OF RESETTLEENT PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL

improvements in the preparationand appraisalof projectsinvolving 48. Considerable abovethe levels qualitymarkedly between1986and 1993,bringing resettlementwere implemented
cAWf e . uoaiDo m.m.V

foundby the 1986resetdementreview. But some workprocess and procedureswere found not to havebeen carriedout futlyeither byBorowers or the Bank. The prqect proceing and portfolio management issuesidentified by this revieware partySimilar to those foundby the recent portlio management task forcefor the Bankat large,thoughoften moreacute in the case of resettlement; theyexplainsomeof the unevenperfonnance on the ground. Specific problemsthat were foundto recur,particularly in the earlypart of the review period,are: (i) failureby manyboroing agencies to prepare satisfactoy resettlement plans (quality at entry); (ii) lness in filing in-house responsibilities for reviewand clearancein earlyprojectstages;(iu)irreguar or insufficient project supervion; and (iv) insufficient follow-up actionsby Borwers andthe Bankwhenimplementation problemsare identified. 49. For soundprojectpreparation andexecution, fourelementsare definedas mandatory for Bank financing of projectsentailingdisplacemenet population and incomesurveys; resettement plans and development packages; resettlementtimetables synchronized with civilworks;and distinct resettlement budgets for financingcompensationand resettlement-related investmen With significant regularity, the failuresin implementation and in restoringincomecan be traced to poor work proceses pardcularlyin early project stagesduring project identificaton,preparation,and appraisaL 50. Baseine sum s. Infomation about the populationaffectedand its resourcebase is essentialfor assing and planningresettlement The use of baseline surves has increased substantially - from21 percentin FY-FY8S to 43 percentinFY86-FY93, to 72 percentin projects approvedin FY92-FY93, and 100percent in the first ten monthsof FY94. The majorityof these Borrwer socio-economic surveys for ongoingprojectsstil do not includeincomedata. Assessing pre-move incomelevelsis not easy,but is feasibleand necesary, sincelackof incomedata at start deprves the designand executionof projectsof definedimplementation targets and monitorable benchmarks for incomerecovery. S1. The greatestinitid difficulty in manyinstances is that borrowmg agencies undercount the affected populationin project preparationand provideinaccurateinformationto appraisal missions.The Turkey 1mir Water and Sewerageproject(FY87)startedwith an estimateof 3,700 affectedpeople and now has a revsed aessment of 13,000 people. The Madagascar Tana Plain project (FY90),for whichthe Borroweespreparationestimatewas3,500people,now has a revised estimate of 11,000people. Incorrectly assesed displacement sizes result in project undadesign, inadequate costestimates, resource shortfals,institutional inability to prepareadequatesolions, and the impoverishment of resettlers Specal independentstudies sponsoredby the Bank appear sometimesnecessary, and wil be done in the future, to clarifypercived discrepanci in survey information receivedfromBorrowers'feasiflity aesments. 52. Reselent p - Requirements for Borwers to prepare and the Bank to appraiseresettlementplans have been at the heart of Wodd Bank poliy since 1980. Appraial missions shouldnot proceedto the fieldunlessthe Borower has submitteda resetdementplan to the Bank that wi allowthe Bankto appraiseresettlment feasibty and cost in the contextof the fullproject. Substantial progress hasbeen madesincethe 1986resettlement review, which foundthat only 14 percent of the then-activeprojects had prepared resettlementplans that includedthe minimum r e of a baselinesurvey, timetable, budget,and a set of rehablitationpopos. For the 1986to 1993period, an averageof about55 percentof Bank-assisted projectscoulddlaim to have appraisedfull resettlementplans

Qsgsae&s S. *RE.m

Xii

with sdernvwew, trend is dearlyvisiblemin theped impeet A progressive 53. momentumrapidlybuildingup over the last couple of yearn. For the FY93-FY94al the key areconsiderblyhigher indicators for the basicprojectprocssingandportfolo managmentactivities opers ae nowbetter prepared than for the fist yearsof the periodunderreview.Rsette and flly appraised. As with the increasein baselinesurveys(pamrSO), the proportionof project resettlement plansat appraisal stagehas increasedaswexl in FY93andthe fist ten monthsof FY94 all but one of the 18projectsapprovedhad a resettlementplan at appraisal. 54. Whe an mprovementover the 1986review findingshas been made, the level projectscurrently under implementati that manyBank-financed achieved stillmeans,nonetheless, diplacements,such got off to a poor start due to difficultesin planning Projecs with sigmt as Indonesia'sJabotabekUrban project (FY88) China's SichuanHihways project (FY88) and JiangsuPwvincal Transportproject (FY91), ndia's TalcherIhernal project(FY87) and Punjab Irigation project (FY90), Guinea's SecondUrban project (FY90),Nigeria'sMulti-StateWater project (FY92),and others, did not have a prepared,feasibleresetdementplan at appraiL The absenceof sucha plan meansthe absenceof a fullyfundedpackageto assistresettler. Remed actionshavebeen taken or are underway for these projectsto improveplannng and resouesd 55. The qualityand adequacy of resettlementplaning has variedwdely. Despite an
30 pert overall objectve of restorimg omes andlhivg standards for displacedfamules,less ta

of the resettlement plans have made income restoration a primarygoal TIs has affcted While superior to resttlement cases in the same countrythat werenot funded by the perfomanc by the Bank Bank,the technicalquiqt of resettlementplaning by Browers for projectsfinanced has often remainedbelowthe highstandardsrequiredby the Bank. 56. A side-by-side comparative studyof involuntary andvoluntaMr settlementprogram highlighted the siificantcontrastbetweenthe resouces and apprc. -chesusedto preparesetment whereinvolmtay resettlementis and programs development is the mainobjective, programsnwhere a subordinatedcomponen Te instutional and davdopnt pakges of projects assisting vol&tary setdements offer valuable models that can be adapted and emulated in hwolwtay resettlementoperations, resettlementprojects Furthermore,the large size of some involuntary and expertiseof treated as projectcomponent anclay to civl woris, typicalyeceeds the capacity the engineering entitiesthat manageinfr astrutprqects. The exprence of stand-aloe voluntay settlment prjects suggests the suitabilty of such full projects as vehicles for ivoluntary soluion was intodced in FY94, resetlement, paricularlyin lrge-scale operatioun An innovative dam and the resettement it causesae treated as two interrelatedbut where a a's Xiaolangdi develoment project as a full-scale distinctprojects:one for the damand the other for resettlement in well-specified stes, its rvp Thisallows the resettlementprojectfullyto plananddesign, approach,based on differentialpackagestailored to the incomesand potentialof the afected populations, categor by catego. 57. Manyof the projectslacng reettlemet plans at appraisaldevelopedsuch plans nts for reseement plans until 1992overallcompance with Bank requ afterward. However, workandin staffappraial reports(SARs). Lrely becauseof both in preparation wasincomplete, the resiance or weak capacityof borrming agencies,or insuffcient staff resources,divisional of with operationaldirective In turn, instances did not ahlaysinsiston fullcompliance managers idntifed by in-house reviewsof preapprad project noncompliancewere not systematically documentationand of SAs. Clearmce was given to prjects that did not fully meet Bank maage and the Loan Commitee wasnot flaggedto regional safeguars andsuchnoncomplance befor loan approval hese departu from intenal project procesing norm weakned project
_AWMrffVMWX6C6WAF xsv

lackof resettlementplans has undercut the chancesof satisfctory qualityat entry. In partidcular, resettlementis feasiblewhensound approachesare applied,doingit recovery. Whileinvomntary adequately is hardlypossible when long-et procedures, germaneto policygoals,are not rigorously execution, bypassing procedures merely postpones problems Such applied.Ratherthan accelerating gapsin the Bank'sownworkbecomeparticularly significant in caseswhere the Borrowerdoesnot share the sameperspectiveon resettlment and has no nationalpolicyfEramework to addressthe issue. In practice,Bankstaffoften havehad a hard uphillstruggle to obtain compliance with agreed project guidelines, especiallywhen the work of technicalagenciesexecutingthe project is not systematically monitoredby the borrowing governments.Actionsto improvework processesand strengthen accountability havebeen initiated dunngthe resettlement review, andadditional measures to mcreasestaff and managers'awareness have been adopted. 58. In somecases, the divisions in chargeagreedthat Borrowers couldsubmitresettlement after project inception.Tiis provedto be of little help and tended to condone plans considerably underestimation of resettlementbyborowing agences,whileholding the Bankhostageto practices it has longrejected. Experience has shownthat postponing consideration of resettlementplansuntil after appraisalis costlyto the borrowingagenciesas welL For the ongoingAndhra Pradesh irrigationII project(FY86),estimated initially to displace about63,000 people,the division in charge agreedto appraisewithouta resettlementplan and then madesubmission of a satisfactory plan a conditionof project effectiveness Hobwever, the Borrower did not submita satisfactory plan,thus missmng three successive deadlinesfor projecteffectiveness; as a resultthe projectwas delayedand the fees inurred bythe Borrower for the delayexceeded startedonly14 monthslater. Commitment costof preparing the resettlementplan. Lackof correctprojectpreparationresurfaced againin midterm when it becameapparentthat the actualnumberof affectedpeoplein this projectwasmore than double the appraisalestimate, totalingabout 150,000people. For over 85,000people additionalto what the Borrowerindicatedduringpreparation,appraisaland negotiations- no resettement resourceshad been earmarkedat appraisal. 59. Tlmetablef Good practiceprudentlyspreadsmassiverelocationsover the entire durationof the project,carryingout resettlementa step in advanceof civilworksto avoidbunching at the end of a project. Poor practiceleavesthe bulk of the population transferfor the last one or two years of a project's -to-10year lifetime,subjectingresettlers to increased risks. Explicit resettlementtimetables, synchronized withcivilworks, were foundto be missing frommorethan half CountryDepartments have initiatedmeasuresto work of the ongoing projects Duringthis review, withBorrowers to deviseexplicit timetablesfor resettlementin all ongoingprojects. 60. Td_anMlng fo resettlement. hadequatefinancial planning has been a majorproblem in resettlement,explaining much of the uneven performance. Many borrowingagenciesdo not recognizeand calcuate all the cost of displacement incurredby the people affectedand do not incorporateful resettlementand r n costs in overallprojectexpenditures.Ibis leaves in thewaySARstreat weaknesses alsofoundmethodological resettlement underfnanced.The review for standardiing dimensions of resettlement.Banktechnicalguidelines the economicand financial issuedin 1988,were seldomused the economicand financialanalysis of resettlementcomponents, costsfor lost betweencompensation either by Borrowers or by Bank economists.Tne distinction basis,with neededfor reestablishing resettlerson a productive assetsandthe costsof newinvestments adequateshelter and services,has been seldommade, and such investmentcosts have not been reseters are and of relocating publicsectorinfau budgeted. Whenthe costsof relocating famlies lbe to displaced lack of distinction tends to masklow per capita allocations consolidated, overallresult resourcesearmarkedfor resettlementfall short of what is needed.

Q:OMMUUM

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61. The Banl's overallfinancing of resettlementcostsin FY86FY93 projectshas not been commensurate withthe importance the Bankattachesto thisprojectcomponent.Lossthan 15 percentof projectresettlementcomponents are cofinanced by the Bank - and whenthey are, the share of Bankfinancing isusuallysmaL Substantially increasing the Bank'sfinancing for productive developmentat relocationsites could improveresourceflowsto resettlers,enhance resettlement qualityand projectcapacityto restore incomes,and stimulatelocaldevelopment in relocationhost areas. Direct lendingfor resettlementshouldsupportBankpolicymoreconsistently.

IMPLEMENTATION AND SUPERVMIONOF RESETTLEMNT

62. Gradualbut unevenprogresshas been made between 1986to 1993in supervising resettlement. The supervision of resettlementcomponentsimprovedimmediately after the 1986 review, but afterward the frequency of supervision missions settledat a newplateau (higherthan the pre-1986 level) until the beginning of this review,dunrngwhich it again went up sharply. Resettlement components in all large irngation and hydroelectricprojects received reguar projectsand in projectswithsmaller supervision, but in transport,water, and urban development resettlementoperations,supervision was sporadic.Whereresettlementin some projectswith large displacements, particularly in the urban sectorwasleft unsupeised for severalyears - suchas in for the Bank to get a goodgrasp on how the IndonesiaJabotabekurban project- it was difficult peoplewere resettled. 63. The recent improvements in the qualityand continuity of resettlementsupervion used for the group of projectsinvolving must be sustained. Resettlementspecialists are regularly largeresettlements, but socialstaffscarcitykept specialist supervision of medium-sized and smaller resettlementcomponents belowdesirable levels,a situationpartlycorrectedthroughmorefrequent employment of consu'.ants. Technical Departments are thinlystaffedwithsocialspecalists,and must splittheir effortsamongmanyCountryDepartments.Resettlement involves not onlysocialbut also many technicaldimensionsin both agricultural and urban settings Technicalstaff of Country Departments, withsomeimportant exceptions, areonlysporadically usedto coverresettlement during normalsupervision.The resultsare often tardyidentification of implementation difficulties -with late signalsabout problemsto managementand delayedBank reaction to borrowingagencies The Bank'sstoreof multidisciplinary technical talentisan important responsible for implementation. resourcethat regularly mustbe broughtto bear on resettlement hasbeen monitored primariyfor specific 64. Borrowers' compliance withlegalagreements for physical targetsandseldomforthe quality of resettlement work. Manyproblems datedcovenants fromresettlementplans and were foundbysupervision missions, including departuresby Borrowers provisions of legal agreements. Better monitoring and enforcement of legalagreementsregarding resettlementhold great potentialfor increasing consistency betweenoperationsand policy. In the reasons. last 18monthsdisbursements on three projectsweresuspendedfor resettlement-related the resourcesdevotedto 65. One outcomeof the 1993reviewis to increaseconsiderably acrossthe Banl Two-thirds of all resettlement supervision missions during resettlement supervision intensified use of resettlement 1993included resettlementspecialists, often throughthe temporarfly consultantsneededfor quickcapacitybuild-up. The 1:2ratio of staff to resettlementconsultants employed duringthe 1993reviewhelped,but it isneither sustainable nor healthyfor the institution in the long term, as it does not build in-housecapacityand expertise(the same ratio of staff to consultants in overallportfoliomanagementis 1.05). As consultantsrespond to other demands, continuity in resetlement portfoliomanagement suffers.
C:vP6_~~~~0 ia a% xvi

IMPROVEMENTS IN PORTFOLIO AMAGEMENT DURING 1993

66. The managementand the performance of the Bankesresettlementportfoliowere improved in importantways in 1993. As the reviewidentified problems, relevantBankunits,jointly withBorrowers, initiatedmeasures to addressthem. Throughoutthisprocess,the Banlc (i) strongly intensified supervision of resettlement; (ii) increased technical assistance to Borrowers for corrective actions;and (iii) improved the immediate workon newprojectsin the FY94-FY97 pipeline. 67. Duringthe 1993review,the Bank tripledits resourcesfor resettlementsupervision. Mostprojectsinvolving the resettlementof more than 1,000peoplewere supervised at leastonce, andover 40projects,including the largest, weresupervised twice. The regionssent moresupervision missions for resettlementduringthe past 12monthsthan in the previous thee yearstaken together. 68. Remedialactionsbegunduringthe reviewinclude: (i) reassessing the magnitude of resettlement;(ii) adjusting timetablesfor resettlement;(iii) increasing the participation of affected people; (iv) findingbetter relocation solutionsor ways to reduce displacement; (v) providing additionalfinancialresources;and (vi) supportingBorrowers'efforts to expand organizational capacity. These remedial actionshave considerably improvedthe Bank'soverall portfolio,as a numberof "problem resettlementprojects - suchas TurkleysIzmirWater and Sewerageproject, Madagascar's Tana Plainproject,andseveralprojectsin India- havebeen put on a soundpath to improvement.In India, for instance,following intensivesupportby Bank staff and management, significant remedialactionshave been agreedupon in the Maharashtra Irrigationm Project,with 168,000affected people, in the context of project restructuring,and in the Upper Krishna IrrigationII Project, with over 220,000affectedpeople, where improvedresettlementwork has recentlymadepossible the lifting of disbursement suspension. Morecorrective actionsareenvuaged. 69. In-house analyticalwork, and training offered to country officials,have also contributedduring 1993to improving portfoliomanagement. All regions have prepared reports analyzing the statusof resettlementoperationsnot onlyon a project-by-project basisbut alsoas a subsetof the region'sportfolio.Centraldepartments havepreparedsector-focused and iss-focused resettlementreportson agriculture, hydropower, and urban andtransportation; theywillcontinueto monitorspecificaspectsof the resettlementportfolio. The legal aspectsof resettlementhave been analyzedby the LegalVice Presidency.In 1993,EDI organizedresettlementtrainingseminarsin India,China,and Turkey,and agreedwithvariousBorrowers to continuesuchtraining. 70. The entire reviewprocesshas been an exceptional opportunityfor leaminghow to do resettlementbetter, for identiyinggood practices,adjustinggeneral approachesto particular sectorsandcircumstances, building institutional capacity for resettlement, andrefininganalytical and evaluationmethodologies. Whilea considerable part of these lessonsare presentedin this report, a numberof other economic, sociological, legal,and technicalstudieshave been completedor are underway. The findingsof these studies will be widelydisseminated to help expand available knowledge and best practices.Contributions fromthe LegalDepartmentincludepioneering studies by the Bank'sGeneral Counselon the legal issuesinvolvedin populationdisplacement by public sectordevelopment interventions, whichhelp both the Bank and Borrower in protecting resettlers' rightsand entitlements.The Environment Departmentalsoprepared a set of new instruments for improving future resettlementwork,imcluding:revisedguidelines for the economicand financial analysis of resettlement; a computer-based project-level monitoring system forresettlement execution; guidelinesfor developing reservoirfisheriesfor resettlers;and studieson expenenceswith urban
t_ r el Is"o M. *AVU

resettlement. Support was givenfor the preparationof a technicalmanualfor planningurban resettlementby the RotterdamInstitutefor HousingStudies. The AfricaRegion (AFTES), which has synthesized and publishedits bi-annualreviewsof resettlementcarried out since 1988,also organized an international conferenceand publisheda volumeon resettlementin Africa. 71. The activities throughout1993in the Bank and in the fielddemonstratethe Bank's andthe Borrowerse abilities to learnfromexperience, to respondeffectively to resettlement problms, andto set clear institutional priorities.Both are nowbetter equipped to cary out resettlementwork in forthcoming projects. Nonetheless, since considerable additionalresourceswere needed and allocated to achievethese results,it willbe a challenge for all to maintainthe recent levelof effort.

ACTIONS TO IMPROVEBANK RESETTLEMENT WORK

72. The generalconclusion of the resettlementreviewis that the qualityof the Banks resettlement project portfoliohas improved,particularly after 1991. The review also revealed importantweaknesses, and actionshave been, or willbe, taken to achievefurther improvements 73. Strateec Priorities. Withinthe Bank'sexisting policyfor resettlementcenteredon incomerestoration, work willbe guidedby the following strategicpriorities,vwhich matchthe key lessonsdescribed in this report Ensure the Borrower'scommitment The Bank willnot financeprojectsinvolving large resettlementoperationsunlessthe government concernedadoptspoLicesand legalframeworks apt to leadto resettlement withincomerestoration.Agreement on policy should be explicit from the outset, with due considerationgiven to circumstances in countries witha federalsystem, wherethe policiesflegal frameworks mayfallwithinthe jurisdiction of the state/provincial governments.Loansin sectors with high resettlementneeds should providefor gradualextensionof improved resettlement standardsfrom the project level to impact more broadlythe whole sector. Enhancethe Boer's institutionalcanacltv.The Bankwillhelp Borrowers build their institutionalcapacityto implementresettlementbefore displacement starts, including the clarification of legalframeworks, witha viewto protectpeoples rights. For Borrowers with severalBank-assisted resettlementoperations,the Bankwillbe prepared to support special institutional development projects to assist the government in improving organizational capacities for addressing retlement needs throughoutproject designand implementation (e.g.,capacitiesfor site preparation, land resourcestudies,monitoring and evaluation, training). SuchBank institutional supportwil focusprimarily on nationalandstate agencies - suchascentralirrigation and water departments, electricity boards,corporations - aimng to developtheir overallcapacityon technical,social,and environmental matters,and specifically to developdesignstandards, rulesand regulations that couldhelp translateresetement policy and legal provisionsinto project practice. NGOs can play a big role in increasing localinstitutional capacity, andthe Bankwillencourage their involvement &-proveprolect desij Bank-assisted projectsshouldavoidor reducedisplaoement as much as possiblethrough technicaland social studies for project design and ewecution. Everyeffortwillbe madebefore projectstart to searchfor technical and
_ _ _ s. 1000.m.t ALiiN

socialoptionsto reduceresettlement.The Bankwillmake specialeffortsto identify anddisseminate bestpractices, particularly as regardsresettlement in urbanand semiutban contextsfor whichoperationalapproachesmust be further refined. Ptoject designand explicit timetables shouldcreateinteral mechanisms that linkprogress in civilworkswith gradualadvancein resettlement.Thesewil be describedin project SARs. lromote geoW_es pardndato, The Bank requires the active participationof would-be resettlersin the preparation, planning, and implementation of resettlement. As part of regular environmental assessments (EA), resetdementplans are made available to the public.Reliableinformation mustbe available to the project-affected people regardingresettlement and rehabilitationpolicy,entitlements,eligibility, options,due process,and appealsmechanisms.Publicconsultation on resettlement planswillstimulateparticipation of resettlerand hostpopulations in preparingsuch plans,and later in executing them. Pride adeauwte Bankfinancin. To preventimpoverishment, all futureprojectswill internalizethe fullcost of resettlementand of the investments requiredfor income restorationwithintotal projectcosts. In .he contextof the overallprojectfnancing plan, the Bank will be prepared to increase its share in financingresettlement operations, as needed from case to case. As adequate financingstill remainsa problemin some recentlyapprovedprojects,the Bank willconsidersupplementary financing wheneverappropriate. Increasedfinancing from domestic- and, when appropriate, frombilateral sources- for resettlementactivities shouldbe alsosought. Diversifv groiectvehicles.The Bankwillconsider twin-project approaches for largescalecivilworkscausing resettlement.Futureinfrastructural operationsthat displace a largenumberof peoplewillnormalybe processedas twinprojects, with the actual thresholdfor the stand-aloneprojectto be determinedon the basisof countryand local capacity. Processing of large-scale resettlementoperationsas components of largerprojectswillrequirejustification in the StaffAppraisalReport. Treatmentof major resettlement operations as full fledged projects wailbetter mobilizethe appropriateadministrative frameworks and skils needed to carryout resettlement successfully. An additionaloption is to use two-project sequences, with a rural or urbandevelopment projectimmediately following up in the resettlement zone on the heels of the infrastructure operationinvolving displacement; this option shouldbe considered based on needs in each projectarea situation. Stren thenthe Bank'sinsfftutionalspaacit. The Bank is increasing its capacity to addressthe social and technicaldimensions of resettlementprojects,in order to sustainand buildon the recentimprovements outlinedin paras.66-71. Particularly importantarebetter use of existing staffskills, additional staffcapacity in critical fields such as socialareas,enhancedprojectreview, and ongoingperformance monitoring andevaluation.Managers willallocatesufficient resources fromwithintheir budgets to achievethese improvements.To support overallstrengthening of workon the socialdimensions of projects,the Bank willallocatefinancial resourcesto a central fund designedto providesupport for innovative projectsaddressing prioritysocial dimensions,such as participatorypoverty assessments, methodologies for social analysis,the organization of natural resourceusers, NGO involvementin project designand implementation, and others
-

i* _ S. 1067M _ A ,.m

and retmfitftg actions. Near-termremedialactionswillbe continuedor Remedial 74. initiatedfor activeprojectsthat fall short of policyand legalprovisions.For the ongoingprojects remedialactionplans are being identifiedby each region as havingseriousresettlementproblems, prepared by the Borrowerswith Bank assistance,and the preparationof all such plans will be or the creation financing, additional mayrequirerestructuring, Someprojects bymid-1995. completed of resettlementagencies. Bank by the regionsas havingmoderateor minorproblems, For the projectsassessed 75. by each Country supervision assstancewillcontinueto be providedthroughregularor intensified withinprojectbudgets to reallocatefinancialresources wouldbe expected Department. Borrowers and, when requested,the Bank will consider additional to completeresettlement successfully, financing plans agreedwith the Bankwere not caseswhereresettlement The reviewidentified 76. projects haveleft a numberof resettlersworseoff. The andcompleted bythe Borrower implemnented in the remedialactionsthey proposeto take. to Borrowers Bank standsreadyto provideassistance shouldidentifythe peopleaffected to the extentpossible, bythe Borrower, actions Such"retrofitting" actions agreedupon betweenthe Bank The retrofitting impovenshment. and seek to reversetheir thermalprojectsis (NTPC)for severalcompleted and India'sNationalThermalPowerCorporation a recent examplethat representsprogress.
Full compliance with procedures and established vne grolect Drocess. 77. resettlementplans and safeguardsfor ensuringprojectquality- such as baselineincomesurveys, projects packages,timetables,and budgets - is essentiaL The fact that nearly all FY93-FY94 submittedto the RegionalLoan Committeescomplywith establishedproceduresindicatesthat Regional Vice Presidenciesare focusingon these requirements. While full implementation to follow Bank staff have their own responsibility governments, rests with borrowing esponsibility in sensitive risks involved the high of Because and outcomes. impacts, on performance, up carefully and care are prudence particular projects that dismantle and reconstructpeoples' livelihoods, warated by Bank and Borrowerstaff. It is essentialthat the Bank address- and be clearlyseen call on borrowing in additionto the Bankes wore effectively, to address- its own responsibilities to do the same. goveinments

of resettlementat have been and are beingmade in (i) the analysis Improvements 78. appraisaland in the designof developmentpackagesfor resettlers,(ii) the in-housereviewof and (iii) the to the RegionalLoan Committee, before projectsubmission resettlementcomponents of operationalunitsto enablethem to addressresettlementprofessionaly staffingand organization resettlementresidesin neededfor doingsound,successful Muchof the knowledge andconsistently. thisknowledge staffresources, it. Withwell-deployed the Bank,andthe presentreviewhas enriched must now be more fullyused. operations, and duringthe preparationof largeresettlement At projectidentification 79. of proposed the adequacy to test schemes out pilot to carry Borrowers the Bank willencourage use of ProjectPreparationFacilityresourcesand of the solutionsand arrangements. Systematic support for technical windows financial Fund (IDF) willopen additional Development Institutional and capacitybuildingto Borrowersin the decisivepreparatoryphases. In major operationsstagesto using givenin the earlyidentification is increasingly for dams- consideration particularly dam safetypanels. panel, alongthe lines pursuedin establishing a resettlementadvisory

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80. Bankprovisions for resettlementappraisal, as definedin OMS2.20and OD 4.30,are adequate and will be implemented. Appraisalwill explicitly assessand report on the socialand economic risksinvolved in the proposed resettlement operation,distinctfromother projectrisks,and ensure that the socio-economic reconstruction packageaddressesthese risks. Consistent with the Bank management decisionon preparing an Implementation Plan for each projectat appraisal, the resettlementplan willbe incorporated in the overallimplementation plan. 81. The contentof SARsfor projectsinvolving resettlementisbeingimproved to ensure that essentialinformation about resetdement is providedto management and the Board. A distinct SAR subsectionfor the resetdement componentwil include the basic indicatorson affected populations,developmentpackages,risk mitigation, timetable,and budget. The overallcost of resettlement willbe specified as an identifiable partof projectcostsandwilldistinguish compensation costsfromthe costsof investments rneeded to reconstruct a viable socio-economic basisfor resetders. 82. Supervision. Considerablescope exists for further improvingthe content and frequency of resettlement supervision. Regularand adequately staffedsupervision missions willtake place at least every12months,including on-the-ground visitsto the placeswheredisplacement and relocationactuaUy occur. Intensively usinglocalspecialist consultants willsignificandy increasethe reach of Bank supervision worlk The goodpracticeintroduced by the East AsiaandAfricaregions to support monitoringpanels appointedby the Borrowerimprovesimplementation and will be extended. 83. Bank divisions responsible for projectswith complex resettlementneed to allocate ncreased staff time to supervisethese operations. However,no amount of increasedBank supervision can substitutefor Borrowers' defaultsor weakcommitment to carryout agreedactions. Whencompliance withlegalagreements isfoundlacking, decisions to continuedisbursements require approvalat the sameregionalmanagement levelsthat clearproposals to suspenddisbursement (this apphiesto all non-compliance and not only to non-compliance with resettlement agreements). Becauseof the sensitivity and risksof resettlement, currentmechanisms for reportingfieldfindings to divisional and regionalmanagers(throughForm 590)willbe improved. 84. To sustain the progress achievedduring the review and to monitor continued compihance with Bank guidelinesand procedures,regional units will prepare annual reports on projectswithresettlementin their portfolio, as part of the AnnualReview of PortfolioPerformance (ARPP). These reports wil cover the managementof the resettlementproject portfolio along measurableindicators- specifically the frequencsy of supervisionmissions, and assessments of livelihood recoveryas displacedpeople resettle,and majorimplementation problems,if any. As regardsthe processing of new projectswith resettlement, the reportingwillcover the presenceof resettlementplans,incomesurveys, timetablesand budgets,and consultation with localpeople.

85. Strengtheningits assistanceto Borrowerson resettlementwork and improving resettlementperformance is of highpriorityfor the Bank,and part and parcelof the Bank'scentral missionto alleviatepovertyand promotesustainable development.The importantlearning process that has taken place over the last fewyearshas increased awareness of the complex issuesand risks
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invoved,and the Bankand its Borowers ar muchbetter equippedthan in the past to workin this area Much of the necessaiytechnicaltalent for this workeiists in the Bavk, and the limitedinhouse capacityfor social analysisis being strengthened Diversifiedproject vehiclesand more financialresourceswill be used by the Bank to assist Borrowerswith large scale resettlement operations. it assists, andpromoting resettlers' 86. Bysettingmoreexacting normsfor the operations incomelevels,the Bank is worling to narrowthe gap or improved reestablisment at comparable betweenresettlementgoalsandpastentrenched practicein manycountries.Closing thisgaprequires time,resourcesand steadyeffortbyboth the Bankand its Borrowers.Unfortunately, bad standards continueto prevailin muchof the displacement takingplace todayoutsideBank-assisted programs; as Bank-financed projectsdo notoccurin isolation, suchstandards slowprogress underBank-financed agencies and multilateral andbilateraldevelopment projectsaswell. For thisreasonall governments the prospectsfor improving the livelihood policiesand approaches, to maximze mustpursuesimilar of resettlers. the Bank By supportingresettlement centered on preventing impoverishment, 87. projects. Improving and approaches that are relevantfar beyondthe Bank-assisted promotespolicies operations,but also the much broader Bonrower's capacitywill benefit not only Bank-assisted largernumbers of people. Thisis the road that must resettlementactivities of entire sectors,affectiDng be travelledin future resettlementwork,even though it is not an easyone. Ihere wil be many challengefor Borrowersas well as for the difficulties, becauseresettlementremainsa formidable to help its Borrowers move progressively Bank Ihe Bank recognizesits importantresponsibility alongthis road, to improveresettlementwheneverdisplacement cannotbe avoided,and to extend improved approachesto sectorand nationalcontexts.

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Introduction and Background

attentionto involuntary 1. Duringthe past 14 years,the WorldBankhaspaidincreasing resettlementissuesin its institutional policyand operations. A year-longBankwide reviewof the resettlementportfolio carried out in 1993engaged all relevantunits of the Bank This report activities, findings and the actionstaken to improveresettlement presents the review'sobjectives, work and performance. ob,eti The Bankwide ResettlementReviewwas initiatedin 1992,to 2. Review and to assess all projectswithresettlement in the Bank'sportfoliobetween1986and 1993 encompass consistency between policyand operations. The institution-wide portfolioreviewwas initiatedto ensure adequate attention to projects with resettlementin the current portfolio and to further proceduresfor new projects. strengthenprocessing 3. The review's specificobjectives are: *
3

To ascertainthe scaleof involuntary resettlement in the Bank'sportfolio, and determineregionalandsectoraltrendsand composition. with for their quality,consistency resettlementprograms To analyzeongoing stated policy, and actualoutcomes. To identifyrecurrent problemsaffectingresettlementperformance, initiate midstreamremedial actions to enhance quality, and prepare a follow-up resettlementmoreeffectively. strategyfor addressing

involuntary resettlementactive T.me fme. The reviewcoversprojectsinvolving 4. duringthe 1986-1993 period in al1lendingsectors. For comparative purposes,the review'sTask components completed projects withimportantresettlement Bank-assisted Forcealsostgdiedselected projectsoutsidethe Bank'sown portfolio- financed as wellas numerousresettlement before 1986, by other donors The pipelineof forthcoming either from domesticsourcesonly,or co-financed trendsin futureBank lending. as well,to discernresettlenment projects(FY94-FY97) was examined reviewhad a broader Review metbodoloyand organization.The 1993resettlement 5. scopethan the firstresettlement reviewcarriedout in 198S/86 anddiffersin someunusualways from were results,the review'sconceptand methodology traditionalreviews. To obtain on-the-ground of the broadenedat the beginning of 1993 enabling it topuwueimmediate improvements in the quality field supervision through more frequent and resettlementportfoliothroughout1993. Intensified reasonablemeasures better staffedmissions ar 4lyzed currentstatusand workedout with Borrowers resettlementoperationsgone awry. for adjusting review isnotsinply thepresentfinal repor4 but 6. Themainproductof thiscomprehensive the vastworkprocess on resettlement that the review tiggered throughout 1993across theBank and on from theground. Mandatedto analyzethe consistency of operationswith policy, the renew moved to enhancing it. This made the resettlementreviewone of the centralactions assessiag consistency undertakento strengthenthe Bank'sportfoliomanagement. Becausethe reviewcoupledfieldwork on all majoroperationswith regionaland sectoraloperational back up studies,as well as withlegal, the Bankwith its first trulycomprehensive pictureof sociological and economicstudies,it provides resettlement. The review'skey feature was to carry out portfolio analysis on-site through field
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misions,rather than remaina headquarters exercise.Bydesign, it initiateda broad problem-solving effEort, involving aUregionslointly with the Bankes Borowers 7. IThe responsibility for the Bankwidereview was assignedto the Environment Department, whichcreateda specialTaskForce headedbythe SeniorAdviserfor SocialPolicyand Sociology to coordinate the review and carty it out jointly with the regional departments.' Resettlementreviewworkinggroupswerecreated in all regions,consisting of technicalandcountry departmentrepresentatives, plusthe SeniorOperations Advier to eachregional Vice-President. The LegalDepartmentandseveralcentralsectoraldepartments undertookspecialstudiesfor the review. & A Bankwide SteeringCommittee chairedby the Vice Presidentfor Environmentally Sustainable Development (ESD), and including the ChiefEnvironmental Adviserto the President and Directorof the Environment Department, and the operationalcomplex's technicaldepartment 2 The centralTask Force acted as the focal directors, wascreatedfor overallguidance to the review. point for the reviewand providedsupportto regionalactivities. 9. The Environment Departmentin the ESDVice Presidency experimented witha new pattem of operationalsupport to the regionsthat went beyondthe supplyof individual staff for discretemissions.It involvedjoint effortsby the regionsand ESD to pursuepolicyconsistency in operations and to improve the socialandenvironmental components of the portfolioon a region-wide rather than piecemeal basis. The cooperationbetweenthe regionsand ESD in carryingout this approachwasveryeffective, confirming the usefulness of suchan approachfor Bank practice. 10. The review has consulted andinterviewed projectTaskManagers andDimsion Chiefs. Professionally conductedfocus groupswere carried out vwith 20 percent of the task managersof projectsvith resettlementcomponents.ESD,ENV, and regionalunits also consultedon-sitewvith variousnon-governmental organizations (NGOs)and resettlementresearchers, and invitedseveral NGOs to carryout fieldstudiesof resettlementas part of this review. 11. In August1993, theTaskForcesubmitted a mid-term Progress Report to management on the firsthalf of the reviewperiod;the report wasforwarded to the Boardfor information.'The Board discussedthe review'spreliminary findingsas part of the 1993 annual report on the environment. 12. Basedon the review's workduring1993and on the regionalreports preparedby all the regionsabouttheir resettlementportfolios, the presentreport is organized as follows:chapterI discusses the nature of resettlementand the substanceof the Bank'spolicy; the next fivechapters discussthe findings of the review:the Bank'scurrentresettlement portfolio(II);the impactof Bank policyand the reductionof displacements (m); the restorationof resettlers'livelihood and the risks of impoverishment (IV); workprocessesthat accountfor resetflement projectperformance (V and VI); chapterVII reports the correctie actionstaken during1993; and the actionstakento improve resetdementperformance are discussed in chapterVIIL

I SeeAnnm1, Review Tak Fore

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1. The Nature of Involuntary Resettlement and the Bank'sPolicy

1. An old adagesaysthat a drop of watermayreflectan ocean. Siilay, lnvoluntaiy resetlement refec the complexity of socialdevelopment.One can hardlyfind a greaterpardo than disntling the socio-ecoomic systemof large groups of people for the sale of fuue development And one can hardlyfind a greaterchallengethan rapidlyreconstrcting dimatled icrasocieties and rebuldingthe lvelihoodsof uprooted people. It is therefore no wonderthat resettl nt, whichaffcts only 15 percentof the Bank'slending,has gainedsuchcentral vi ty in the Bans activities.And it is no wonderthat the intansiccomplexty, pain,loss,and hardship of involuntary displacement makesuchprojectscontroversiaL 2. Complex asit inevitably is,however, ivoluntaty resettlementisneithertechicallynor socdy intractable, and canbe sucesfuL If addressed withpolitical commitment, adequatefinancial andinstitutional resources, and participatory execution, the formidable taskof population relocation my reslt in beneficialdevelopment. 3. lhe ptsent reviewis rooted in the understanding of involuntary resettlementas an
integal part of some major development programs. Ihe starting point of the Bank's resettement

poiy, adoptedin 1980, wasto giveits staffandBorrowers a simplemessage:it is essential to handle the difficult process of resettlement equitably and efficiently,if involuntaryresettlement is 1 mismanaged, the displaced peoplewillsufferunjustifiably and willbe impoverished. 4. 'he currentreviewis one morestep in the continuous effortsof the WorldBank to higight the social,cultural,and economic complexities of resettlement, and to addressthem better in prace. It comesafter three roundsof improvements in the Bank's1980policyand opetional procedures whichwere introduced in 1986,1988,and 1990.

THENATURE ANDFEASIBILITY OF RESETTLENT

S. Ddfin resettlmeut twourocesses.It is appropriate to beginthisreport byasking: 'What is the socil naatm of involuntary resettlement? Whyis resettlementsucha difficut part of development'? The answerdefinesthe unusualkinds of processes that Borrowersand Bank staff have to grapplewith in projec involving forcedresettement. 6. What is usualy describedas involuntary resettlement'consistsof two distinct,yet closelyrelated socialprocesses: dplacment of people and reconsmudonof their livelihood;this reconstructonis alsooften callednhabilWaWon. Each hasits owndemands,risks, cost, logstics,and socio-cultural and economiceffDctLs.

7.

isplacement concerns howland and other assetsare expropriated to allowa prqject for the overallsocil goodto proceed Rehabilitation concernsthe fate of the displaced people. In theory,the two processes are segmentsof a singlecontinuum; in practi, the first does not ahway
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bring about the second. Whenpeopleare displaced by projectsfor nright of way",they lose either their land- in fullor in part - or theirdwelling, or both. As a consequence, resettlementoutcomc mayvaryconsiderably from people'si;iitialstndards of lving. Indeed,whetheror not involuntary resettlementresults in re-establishing people's incomesand lvelihood depends largelyon how displacement isplannedandcaried out. It alsodependson whetherresettlers n assre ed to rebuild their Ivelihood.In India- a country tested by muchresetdementanddistinguished by a vastsocial sciencelterature aboutit - this understanig has been refinedand two distinctconceptsare used for the two processes: resettlementso rehabilitation (R&R). Thus,the Indiansocialscienceand legal literatu emphasizethe fact that rehablitation"does not occur automatically, just because people are resettled. Indeed, resettlementmay occurwithoutrehabilitation, and unfortunately, it often does. & Invohuntaryresettlement is also distinct from volntary population movements. Voluntary mobility, including rural-urban migration, stimulates economic gowth, reflecting people's willing pursuitof newopportunities. In contrast,involuntary resettlement doesnot includethe choice to remainin place,and resetflersoften facemorerisks than opportunities. 9. Are Involnar disiacmn Inevitable? aean drinking water, energy for expandingindustries,and irrigation water for thirsty fields are needed for improvig human livelihoods in developmg countries.Soare widerroadsin clogged downtowns, hospitalbuildings and schoolsin residentdal areas,or sewagetreatmentplantsin pollutedcities. Suchdevelopments make dramatic reanrangements in human settlementsinevitable,and they are not new: historically, voluntary resettlements go back to ancienttimesand becomeubiquitous in modemtimes. 10 The inevitability of involuntary resettlementis wrtten into the historyof industrial counties. Installingmajor hydropower dams,irrigationand drining water systems, or extending hiwa networks has entaileddisplacements fraughtwnth hardships and depnvationfor many. The drama of forced urban displacement in Boston's West End has spawnedan entire sociological htetur. The beautfil master-plan of today'sPariswasmadepossible by painfulrelocation in the daysof Baron Haussmann.New York'simpressive CrossBromn Expressway slas!iedthroughmany neighborhoods, of whichsome- at leastin hindsight - couldhavebeen saved.' Hugehydroelectric complexes in Canadahave requiredthe uprootingof manyindigenous groups.e'he exprinw with various types of involuntaryresettlement has generated increased knowledge for planning resettlementand a robust set of policiesand legal framworks that effectively guaranteethe rights and entitlementsof resettlers 11. The need for Investmentin Infastrcture. Each year developing countriesinvest around US $200 billion in new infrastructur The social and economicreturns from these investments have been high. In the past 15 years,the share of households with accessto clean waterhas risenby50 percent,bringing significant improvements in healthand the qualityof life. Per capita accessto electricpowerand telephoneshas doubledin the same period,enablingincreased productivity and humanwelfar Food productionhas risensharply- doublingin the past quarter century - with over half this gain comingfrom investments in irrigation. And investments in transportation have reducedcostsand improved farm gate and producerprices.
'Hbert J. Gts, Peol edPI= Enapw an thban mbob & Sohao,, New York Basi Boobm1968

ARobertA Cmo,7hePowkroe - RobotMAa and PA FaNw Yofor, NewYotk Rand= Hom, 1975. 'JaetM MndniBUbn, "Opportu1oTrhVd: ThelmpactofCandiaResettent Polonnbut F smAea" i, Reviw
of Caadin
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but they typicaily The infrastructureprojects underpingrowth and development, 12 involvechangesin land andwater use patterns: often this requiresthat people be displaced. The situations,but the need resettlementcan oftenbe reduced,in specific of peoplerequiring numbers will of resettlement that the volume cannotbe elinated. Nor shouldit be assumed for resettlement and are to electricity still lack access biDion people than two future. More be muchlower in the and 1 billion forcedto use sticksand dungfor their energyneeds; 1.7billionlackseweragesystems deathof 2-3milion infnts andchildren in the unnecessary lackaccessto cleanpipedwater,resulting without willneed to doubleagainin the next40 years- an impossibility eachyear. Foodproduction And the world'spopulationwillgrowby almost1 billioneach additionalinvestmentin irrigation. willthus be absolutely in infrastructure further investment decadeoverthe sameperiod. Substantial essentialif povertyis to be reduced. of infrastructure provisions D;e to accelerated gronortions. ofworldwlde A problem 13. is a programs causedby development displacement population pressures, demographic and growing toil of the 300 large dams that, on average,enter into growingproblem. The displacement and constructioneveryyear is estimatedto be above4 millionpeople. The urban development an to displace countriesare estimated beingstartedeachyear in developing programs transportation that about80 to 90millionpeoplehavebeen involuntarily 6 millionpeople. It isestimated additional andurban for dam construction, programs resettledover the past decade,as a resultof infrastructure in other sectorshave increasedthis numberfurther. development.Investments and transportation shareof thistotaL accountfor a small,but significant programs WorldBank-financed 14. of 2 million the resettlement Projectscurrentlyin the Bank'sactiveportfolioare expectd to involve for some 3 percentof projectsaccount,conservatively, period. Bank-funded peopleover a 10-year the resettlement caused by dam constructionworldwideand for about one percent of the world. projectsin the developing causedby urban and transportation displacements terms,is nonetheless whilelimitedin relative inresettlement, TheBank'simvolvement 15. projects,the Bank has a of great importance. For those people resettled under Bank-financed improve, ensurethat everyeffortis madeto restore,and if possible to help Borrowers responsibility that far exceedsthe also has a broadersignificance, their livelihoods But the Bank'sinvolvement sizeof resettlementunder the projectsit assistsdirectly.Indeed,overthe past fourteenyearssince soughtto workwith it has increasingly guidelines, resettlement its path-breaking the Bankestablished at and beyondthe for resettlement, to promotebetter policiesand legal frameworks governments for implementation. to promotebetter procedures agencies projectlevel,and withprojectexecuting as a classof socialprocesses, inevitable makesdisplacements Althoughdevelopment 16. or justified.Historyis unavoidable caseof proposeddisplacement in practice,noteveiyindividual of individual andoutcomes that the magnitude - confirms recentWorldBankexperiences including waysto avoid,reduce, can be influenced.As this reportwillshow,there are realistic displacements or mitigatespecificinstancesof involuntarypopulationdisplacement. Fnding and using these is the cornerstoneof the Bank'sresettlementpolicy. possibilities Economicand social disruption. The reasons for avoidingor reducingforced 17. ethical,and culturaLWhilemost projectscausingdisplacement are social,economic, displacements for may be necessaryand beneficial the larger society,for those directlyaffected compulsory representsthe imposedunravelingof their microsociety.When people are forcibly displacement residential settlements are moved, production systems may be dismantled, long-established and kinshipgroups are scattered. Many jobs and assets are lost. Informalsocial disorganized, networksthat are part of dailysustenancesystems- providingmutual help in child car food
\"FWM1W&%VMMM JI&8WAOMM&W 0. Is"M0
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secwity,revenue tr fer, short-termcredit, labor exchange,and other basicsources of socioeconomicsupport- collapse becauseof community breakdown.Healthcare tends to deteriorate. Link between producers and their customersare often severed, and local labor markets are dirupted. Local izons and formalor informal associations disappear becauseof the sudden dipasion of their membes Traditional authorityand management systems can losetheir leaders Symbolic markers,suchas ancestralshrinesand gres, are abandoned, breakinglinkswith the past andwithpeoples'cultural identity.Not ahways visible or quantifiable, theseprocesses are nonetheless reaL 'Thecumulative effect is that the socialfabricand economy are torn apart 18. The risk of ImnosbeL The mainrisk arisingfrom forceddisplacement is the impoverishment of the affected people. TIis risk is not abstract. Criticismof involuntary resettlementhas mouited, and a vast bodyof research- especially researchby developing and developedcountryscholarsover the last 10 to 15 years,'includingpioneering work by the World Bank 7 - has documentedthat poorlymanagedresettlementcan cause increasedpoverty. Well managedresettlement, on the other hand, can be an integralpart of a nation'spovertyreduction strategy. Whileworkingto reduce poverty,the Bank and its membercountriescannot overlook projectfactorsthat makesomepopulationsegments worseoff The impovershmentrisksinvolved in forceddisplacement (see risk model,Chapter4, para. 16-21) heightensthe moralimperative of ensuringadequateresettlement. 19. Movng people involuntarily also raises legal issues. The potential for violating individual and group rightsunder domesticand international law makes compulsory resettlement unilXeanyother project activity.The fact that projectsare frequentlydelayedby courts,and that compensation levelsare raisedsignificantly on appeat reflectsthe recognition in legal systems that people cannot be arbitraly displacedwithout just compensation,regardlessof national need. Affectedpartiesfrequently have accessto legalremedies to enforcethoserights. Whenresettlement processesare carriedout in a lawiul mannerthat fullyrespectsthe rightsof resettlersand hosts, opposition to projectsby adversely affectedpeopleis reduced(althoughnot eliminated) andoverall project implementation is likelyto unfoldmoreeffectively.Canrying out resettlementin a manner that respectsthe rightsof affectedpersonsis not just an issueof compliance with the law,but also constitutes sounddevelopment practice. Thisrequiresnot onlyadequatelegalframeworks, but also a change in mind-set- towardsrecognizngresettlers' entitlements,rghts, needs, and cultural identities

See for ample, HussdnFablim, Emi Nubanz Raetdkn andYeawof CcbW, Salt LakeCity UniWvsitof UtahPress, 198, Walter Fernandes andEL GangukyTh kral,De op DiagwsndRAabi*adi, NewDelhi:Indian SocalInstitute, 1969; Thayer Scudder, "What it Meansto be Dammed:Ibe Anthopoly of LargeScaeDevelopment Projcets", Eninev* and Scee, VoL 54,4, 1981; T. Scuddr, 'Deveopment-Induced Reocion and ReugeeSudis 37Yeamn of Change and Conuy AmongZambia'sOwembe Tbong,Jwna of Rf6e Stdla, VoL6, 1993,p.1; Anthon OliverSmith and An Hansen,eds, JnvolwyM*andRe =ebwntBoulder, oorandoWeatewPress,1982; FR. Fran Suare andB.Cohen,EfeaoSocla deIs Gade R.was a Ameia Latha, BUeMS AieNs, 1965; YaoFa Huang, On e Rfom of Relenews Poklies Chi a, Beijing, 1987; S.C Varma,fwnanReu thdwLmwNmadBan,Bhopak Goenment Central Press,198S; . Ganuy*1hulkaled.,l DaM lcedPeoplk, NewDehi: SagePublications,99
7 bmahlm F.L Shihaa 'Ivoluntaxy Resettlmn

voLIbahlm FL Shlhata, TheWodBao*hsa Chanrg World, The Nerlndsa Matinn Ngho Publsheas, 1991, pp. 181,97; MicaedlML Cen m,ewha,byRuesd.ahiD. wsmwojeca PolicyGudeinh WorlBankFcedPojecs, Washgton, DO WoddBan 1985ALCrna,AnhrpaAnd Socolgil ReeaeJ for Poliy Dewomen on Popula,don ReiUmn, inAnuhopokoWdapvroacto Raedulun,eds. M.ML CentesandS.Guggenheim, Bouklw Weshe Pres, 1993; MALCernes, Bd*g*eRaepachDU&e &unfRJfitwanrdDw1opmenrOtwO u,Enionmet Deparhtmnmt Washington, DC WoddBank, 1993 Scott E. Guggenheu_, and the Dynamics of Dspaement, in vol.RAa n of PRon Dlaced by Deilpnen ProJc, ed. Alo P. Fenunde7,Banglota lnttute for Socialand Economic Change, 1989,p. 9 iliaM L Panridge, lnvoluntaylu eeatir.eDevet ipmloprqjePts,IkwnadofRqfi4St&q, Vol.2, No.3,1990,p. 373;David Butcher, Rviv of die hcaWnt of vh&m_ aAspcts ofBan Ena Prjcts, PRE Working Paper,Washnton, DC, Mach 1990.
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Bank Fiancd

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a change in mind-set- towardsrecognizing resettlers' entidtlements, rights,needs, and cultural identities. 20. The International debatearound resettlement Becauseof its adverseeffects,in recent years populaton displacement by development projects has become the focus of a wide interational debate, engagingand polarizing governments and non-governmental organizations, public opinion groups,parliamentarans,developmentagencies,and the media. Tle critiqueof involuntary resettlementoften evolvesinto a rejectionof the goalsand legitimacy of development itself. By and large, the Bank has not engageddirectlyin this controversy and perhaps has not contnrbuted enoughto clarifying either the development issuesat stake, or the historical record. 21. Two majorstreamsof arguments are advanced by criticsof resettlement. ITe first deniesin principlethe acceptability of anyinvoluntary resettlementand arguesthat no development programthat entailsresettlement shouldbe undertaken.The secondcriticizes the qualityof specific resettlement operations. Considerable criticism of both kindsis directedat Bank-assisted projectsprimarily in hydropower, irrigation, and flood control. 22. It is clearlyunrealistic to reject all resettlement. Developing nationscannotforego the benefitsof major infrastructural investments that alsoentail unavoidable population relocation. The questionishowto mimize the sizeof displacement andhowto respondeffectively to the needs of the people beingresettled. Thus, the WorldBank fullyshares the concernsof the criticswho deplorebad resettlementoperations. The Bankhas becomeincreasingly receptiveto their specific signalsand constructive contributions.It regardstheir concernfor the welfareand livelihood of the displacedpopulations as justifiedand germaneto the Bank'sown mandateand policies. Criticism by NGOs and other groupsof poor resettlementoperations,including failuresunder Bank-assisted projects,has helped the Bank improveits policiesand operations. The Bank itself has delivered perhapsthe strongest,mostconsequential criticism of bad displacement practices by its verydecision to adopt an institutional policybasedon equitable principles and soundapproaches.The Bank also statesunambiguously that progressin policyneedsto be followed bysystematic progressin effective implementation, a processthat is not always smooth,as thisreport willshow. But by settinga policy and promoting its implementation the Bankhelpsimproveperformance in a mannerrelevantto the worldwide resettlementproblem. 23. TheChallenae of incomerestoration. The basicthrustof resettlement- to restore comparable standardsof livingto those displaced, leavingpeopleno worse-off is a soundobjective, but not an easy or simpleone. To dismantlea functioning productionsystemis "easy'and fast; to reconstruct a newone is slow,risky,and difficult.Closinga smallworkshop or business maybe done overnight; settingup a thrivingnewone that must gainnew customers in a strangenew locationis a difficultchallenge,fraughtwith uncertainty.When this task concernsnot one producer,or one hundred,but manythousandsor tens of thousandsof people,the inherent complexidties of the task are compounded exponentially. The restorationprocess is alsocompounded andlengthened because its actors,the displaced people,are traumatized bythe material and spiritual lossesimposed on them, oftenaffectingtheir socialandculturalidentity as wellas theirincomes. Thisiswhyrecognizngthe intrinsicdifficult>of resettlementis the prime step for addressing this task seriously, with all the means that can be mobilized. This is the only realisticlens throughwhich the requirementsof resettlementworkcan be viewedwithoutself deception. 24. If the disorganization inducedby displacement is so profoundand traumatic,can it be overcome?Canthis challenge be realistically met? Whatdoesit take for a development project to make adequateresettlementfeasible?
W_ W%CNAMMMe. __M t ISM7M eoL

1/5

25. Meetgg the challeue: an exampleftm CiLn The Mim River flowsmajestically throughsome of the most fertile landsof Fujianprovincein southeasternChina. It irrigateslush paddyfieldsand orchards,crossespine and fir forests,and flowsaroundthe commercial center and lowland suburbsof NanpingCity. Years ago a majorhydropower dam wasenvisaged at Shuikou the intendeddam wouldprovidea dependable capacityof 1,000MW and generateenergyvitalfor the entire industrial development of East China,that wouldotherwisecomefromcoal-fired thermal platnts.To buildthe dam,however, 88 villages belonging to 15townships in three counties,andlarge partsof Nanping Citywouldbe inundated, displacing morethan 20,000 households withabout68,000 rural and urban people; 26. In 1986the Bankappraisedthe projectfor buildingthe ShuikouHydropower Dam on the Min River. Tis wasthe firstBank-assisted projectin Chinato whichthe Bank'sresettlement policyand the recommendations of the just-completed 1986resettlementreviewwere fuUly applied; it wasbased on a substantive policydialogue withthe Borrower, whosenationalresettlementpolicy and legalprovisions providefor resettlement withdevelopment The projectbecamea set modelfor the manysubsequentprojectsinvolving resettlementthat the Bankis assisting in the countiy. 27. Ihe resettlement component in Shuikou wascarefully prepared-600 localstaffyears went into resettlementpreparationalone The project and the Bank have assistedindependent sociological research, throughoutimplementation, on resettlement progressand impacts. Bank missionshave evaluatedincome restoration for the fist groups resettled around the dam and ascertained that nowthey are gaming averageincomes per family fromon-farmandoff-farm activities that are higherthan they had before resettlement 28. Projectplanning emphasized restoring people'sproductive capacity, bringing newland intocutivation,creating jobsor newcommercial opportunities, andproviding newhousing withmore floorspace per capita and newsocialamenities.Detailedresettlementprovisions were included in the projectSAR and legalagreement. The projectstartedin 1987,and by end 1988the first 1,400 resetders movedfrom the dam site to newhouses. The borrowingagency was strongly committed to successful resettlement.Relocation advanced at a well-synchronized pacewithdamcivl worksand reuar supervision by Bank specialist staff providedtechnical assistance. 29. The project terracedland and removedstoneson formerlyuncultwvated steep hills. On the new terraces,fruit trees were planted at project expensefour to five years in advanceof resettlers'arrival. Bythe time displaced families movedin, the new orchardswerecloseto fruition and producedcashcrops. Projectbudgetsfor resettlement havebeen supplemented weennecessary, food rationswere distributed to resettlersfor short intervals;andvillageand township leadershave been involvedin planningthe relocationjointlywith project authorities. By 1993,six years into project implementation, about 67,200 people(99 percent) had moved. Families comprising 27,700 peoplehad obtainedjobs at a rate of one per family,families comprising another severalthousand people still need jobs, a remaining strong concernof the project'smanagement.The balanceabout half the population- has been resettledthrough a land-based strategyon a newlycreated productivebasis. New vilage sites have been constructedby the project With the housing compensation and materials received - timber, cement and iron - villagers were able to hire their own contractorsand buildnewhousingwith morefloor spacethan before and modemequipment. 30. Ihe oldlandscape aroundthe MinRiverhas nowvirtually disappeared, andeven old roads,graves,shrines,and landmarks have been moved.But the cultual shockof displacement has been gradually absorbedand overcome: new and better-builtschoolsreceivetheir childrenin the regroupedvillages; newresidentialandpublicbuildings have replacedthe lowland areasof Nanping
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1/6

City. Moving peoplein groups, andonlyto shortdistances, haspreservedmuch,even if not all,social ties. Familynetworkshave helped cushionthe difficulties, and projectstaff continueto monitor adaptationandrespondto unresolved problems.Altogether, a considerable amountofwell-managed changehas been compressed into a short period. In Shuikou,resettlementhas groven to be not only feasiblebut successful Resettlersdescnbetheirnewlife as a considerable improvement overlife in the pre-displacement period. The vast amountof energyto flowfromthe ShuikouDam's turbines will feed new industries,create more employment and better lives for manythroughout Fujian provinceand beyond,and also supplyelectricityto all resettlementsites. The Shuikouproject experience demonstrates that involuntary resettlementcan be done well,relocatedpeoplecan share in projectbenefits,and can improvetheir livelihood. 31. The broaderquestionthat loomsbeyondthis and similar cases is how to movefrom good case practiceto good generalpractice. The answerlies in the powerof politicalcommitment and the role of policy. It is therefore appropriateto examinethe basicelements of the Bank's resettlementpolicy, notjust as embodied in Shuikou, but as the maintool adoptedbythe Bankmore than a decade agofor generalizing an effective treatmentof resettlementissues. RESETTLEMENT POLICY AS CODIFIED GOOD PRACTICE

32. The Bank'spolicyon involuntary resetdement was preparedin 1979and issuedearly in 1980. In the 1960sand 1970s,before the policywas adopted,involuntary resettlementin many projects had been dealt with on a case-by-case basis, as a low-priority side-effectof major iastructural worksthat was entirelyleft to borrowing agencies, with little,if anyBank assistance. The lackof explicit norms,procedures, andadequateresources for handling resettlementresultedin seriousnegativeeffectson the peopledisplaced, on the host populations at relocation sites, and on the environment.Allowing sucheffectsto occurwithlittlemitigation wasgenerally an unwrittenyet acceptedrule in developing countries, toleratedbygovernments andoverlooked bysponsors of major projects. 33. By issuingresetflement policyguidelines, and proceduresthe Bankbecamethe first multilateralinstitutionto enact a policyframeworkfor displacement and to providelandmark thinking about resetement. As the Bank's first major environmentalpolicy,it defined the sociological, economic, and institutional contentof Bank workregardingresettlement.The Banc's share in actual resettlementworldwide is very limited,between 1 and 3 percent depending on the givensector,but the importanceof the Bank'spolicy far exceeds the scopeof resetlement wnderits diswaoperadons.By moving awayfrom a focuson compensation and removal,the policyregarded resettlement asa development issue, providing guidance onhowdevelopment-oriented planning could address the difficult,costly, and painful problemsthat arise whenever people are involuntarily removedfrom their land and homes. 34. The fundamental goal of the Bank'spolicyis to improvethe former ling standards andearningcapacities of displaced persons- or at leastto restorethem.*Its proviionsprotectand enlargethe entitlementsof displaced peopleand promotea safetynet approachfor restoringtheir livelihoods. Whenever possible,the Bank's policy calls for transformingpeople's involuntary resettlementinto an opportunity for development and for enhancingtheir pnor livingstandardsby enablingresettlersto sharea the benefls of the development projectthat causestir displacement.

Opmadsl DkecUw 430, inao&y Rsean.A4June29,199.

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35.

Restoringpreviousstandards

l,

of livingis a formidable taskin practice. By Box 1.. Keystes i te hl pursuinga development-oriented outcome, othe Bank's resettlement policy the Bank's resettlement policy raises a major chaUenge for both Boffowers and the on feedbacknd :sd Bank but a challengefidly consistent with wqerdI., the forauaton of he B'* tt thepoveny alleviation policiesof bon"owing poicy basevolved stay tugh sao govemments.However, the nature and the iprovme
dimensions of the tasks at hand in
o:..:

the

implementingthis policy must be well understood. The absence in many

developing countries of effectively

l
-s: i

functioningland and labor markets, the substantiveand proceduralinadequacies of compensation systems for property appropriatedby the state, and the absence of adequate social safety nets, are three central reasons why the simple cash compensation of property losses under
eminent domain laws cannot realisticallybe expected at this time to provide satisfactory outcomes for project-affeted people in

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developing countries. This mIakes ~ compellingthe need for the approachto .; : resettlementthat the Bank has adoptedas its policy, in order to prevent the . - m inwoveishmentofpeople displaced byBankfinanceddevelopment projects. 36. Attainingthisobjectiveoften requires changes in the policies, legalga Z

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current practicesof manyBorrowers.Tbis challenge is faced anew in everysingledevelopment projectthat entailsdplamt. Meetng it successfully demandsthat a systematic effortismadeeachtime,including improving policy, alocating appropriateresources, and fosteringthe participationof resettlers and hosts Bank-supported projects,however, arenot isolatedfromnational policycontexts andframeworks. Hence,in countries

fameworks, institutional

capacities, and

where the Bankisfinancing, or isconsidering financing projects which involve resettlement, theBank also assistsgovernments in establishing or improving nationalresettlement policiesand legal frameworks, building on project-level experiences (see further, Chapter3). 37. Overthe years,the Bank'spolicy hasbeen confirmed and strengthened (boxL.). Currentpolicy is formulated in Operational Directive 4.30InvolunbyR vetteme, issued in 1990, the basicBankapproach to the social issues inresettlement, andin general in projects appraised for Bank support,is also formulated in the Operational ManualStatement 2.20regarding project appraisal, particularly in the definton of sociological elmets of projectapraaL Through its institutional guidelines, the Bankprovides leadership in addressing one of the thorniest issuesin development.
' Wordd Bk OperonalManual Satement 2.20, Pojc A
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38. Byformulating a policyframewotk for resettlementoperations, the Bankmadeat the end of the 1970sone major step on a new road, reconizingthe social dimensos of induced development and startingto includesuch dimensionsin the Bank'slending. Severad other steps graduallyfollowed. The Bank rejected the argument that impoverishing resettlets was an unavoidable, if lamentable, facetof development, and predicatedits approachon the argumentthat appropriatedevelopment strategies couldproducebetter outcomes.By that step, the Bankset new standards for itself, for the development communityat large, and for borrowingand executing agencies- standards that wouldievitablytake timeto be absorbed byall concemed, but that in the longrun wouldplaceresettlementoperations in the developing countries on a newpath. The Bank's policy is also consideredby independentevaluators to be sound and advanced. The Morse IndependentReview, whichcriticized the designand implementation of the Bank-sisted Narmada SardarSarovarprojectsin India,alsoassessed the Bank'sresettlementpolicy and concluded that the Bankhas "setthehighest standards of anyaidorlendingorganizaton in theworld for mtiga adverse consequences to human well-being causedbyinvoluntary resettlement. Iw 39. Betweenthe time the Bank's policywas first issuedin 1980(OMS 2.33) and the publication of its latestresettlementdirectives (OD. 4.30),the policy's provisions werestrengthened, refined,and adaptedbetter to projectneedson the ground(boxL2). The essentialmessage of the Bank'sresettlementpolicyis that the affectedpeopleshouldbe protectedfrom impoverishment. Manypeople adversely affectedby relocationare alreadypoor or marginal; further deprivation of incomeand economicmarginalztion is contraryto the verypurposeof development.Manymore people who reside either in the project area or at vast distancesbenefit substantially from the projects' outcome. Therefore, diplaced peopl mustalso sham in the benfits which theymake possile.
Means and hsdtitonal procedues. Together with its policy guidelines, the Bank the lessonsof best practwe,the Bank alsodefinedthe meansto achieveits objectives.Bycodifying has established institutional procedures, in particularfourrequirements:that Bank-sisted projects that involve resettlementstartwith population andincomesurveys; that they formulateresettlement action plans containingdevelopmentpackages;define a timetable;and are based on adequate budgets.Theseprocedures desenbenot onlywhat Bankstaffmustdo to assistgovernments, but also the conditions that borrowing agencies are epected to meet in Bank-aisted operationsinvolving involuntary resettlement. 40.

41. Responsibifty. The responsibility for resettlementrests with the Borrower. IThe ownershipby Borrowersof the projectsand all their components, includingresettlement,is the andis reaffirmed in the legalagreements betweenBorroes and foundationof that responsibility, the Bank. The resettlementpolicydefines cleadythe Bank'srole as well the Bank 'supports strategies, Borrowers'effortsthrough: (i) assistance in designing and assessing resettlementpolicy, laws,regulations, and specific plans;(ii) financing technicalassistance to strengthenthe capacity of agencies responsible for resettlement; and (iii) direct financingof the investmentcosts of for pursuingthe goalsdefinedby the institution's policy resettlement.""Bank staffare accountable and for carying out the basicworkproceduresinstitutedto makethe policyeffectv 42. Pursuing adequateresettlement is not easyfor developing countrygovemments, who constraints.The Bankworkswith facecompeting needs,resourcelmitations,andmanyinstitutional
&*rr Sdwva She Repot of tXeId_ep "Operational Direte 4.30,Iwoua, Ranzi
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RevW, Outaa, CadE pa 23

Reur

tes Intefu aeonsl Inc, 1992p. 37.

119

governments to promote better

--.

policies for resettlement, and BZ 12. TheBank's resettlemt#plicy vwth borrowing agencies to promote better methods in Basedon fedbaek fi fidd expes and h s resettlementoperations The 10 , ed dIaopnemtof the Ba s r:s Bank recognizes i evolved sadny s 1980 thrug wad ke sps in responsibility to help its Borrowers on a wide front, Im thasio elm of h as res tln primarily throughthe modelset by its policyaswel as through * -bv-. mtu# d&pamet shl oid4d;iq z its finahnlal and operational -asi1)le, WI ho _ d d assistance, so that improved . . resettlement approaches under v- <s ;
:.
..

anidnationalcontexts. Helping developing countries address resettlement is part of the dnd1 Bankes broader strategy to addressthe socialcosqecs*Dslcdlmnshudb of economic growth and to improvethe treatmentof=social issuesin development. Resettlement. . Essentialto the Bank's poulcy isto requirethe Borema. in Bank-financed projects entailing displacement to
prepare and carry out a population and incomesuvy a detailed resettlement plan, a

Bank-assisted projects can graduallyextend to full sectors

s t. assist dis -.O. p i -; least om ivw U nt a 4 ths 0*06V iv c...s.stWft peamln b. .zcte the .... oaf~st1ein.issa v4~m

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timetable, and the budget for. resettlment. hese must be prepared before appraisa and must be linked closelyto the timetable for the main civlw workscausing the displacement.Lf* Resettlement plans should be
buit

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ktgalaaaws

tid

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strategy and package of provisons able to improve or restore the economicbase of

those relocated. Just as general invetments, preparing

around a development...*

Bank procedures require professional appraisa of project

and
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appraisng a resettlement plan equally wellt as the main invstmntassures the Bank that its policyobjectives are incorporated into the pro)ject.
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1/10

44. The 1985 mesettl_nt reviw. When the fist Bank epaeiences with the new resettlementpolicy were aceumuated, a portfolio review wascarriedout in 1985for allBank-financed agriculture andhydropower projectsapproved between197941985. That firstreviewfoundthat Bank policyled to substantial improvements in resettlementcomponentsThe consistency curve"between projectsand policyoscillated, howevr, runninghigherin projectsappraised in 1980to 198Zshortly after the policywas issued,than in projectsappraisedduring1983-1984, whenattention lapsedand the curve declined. In February 1986,Bank managementdiused and adopted the review's recommendations on operationalpolicyand staffing.Bymanagement decision, joint remedialwork withBorrowers wasinitiatedon a numberof projects,andthe reviewgeneratedimprovements in the Banklstechnicaland policyprovisions 45. Ihe presentcomprehensive portfolioreview, covering the periodfrom 1986to 1993, goesfartherin both breadthanddepth,andis moreexacting in its methodology than the 1985 review. It encompasses eightyears,has shiftedthe analysis fromheadquartersto the field,and goesbeyond projectsin hydropower and agricultureto coverthe Bank'sentire portfolio,including lendingfor urban,mining,transportation, thermalpower,and watersupplyprojects.

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2. Resettlement in Bank Operations: 1986-1993

1. This chapter provides an overall picture of the portfolio of projecs invoin displacement and resettlement. The Task Force reviewedthe entire Bank project portfolo for FY 1986&1993 withregionalresettlementteams,identifying projectsrelevantfor the presentanaysis 1. A MasterData Bank was constructed in ENV for all projectsinvolving resettlementup to FY97

This chapter analyzes the portfolio of

projects involvingresettlement along several

dimensions: distributionby regions and breakdown by sectors;weightin the Bank's total lending;trendsand evolutionby fcal
year, concentration in key countries and

2.1. Tabl2.1. Entyofproje into the mentpordtflio

FiYa

CountryDepartments(CDs); composition by size of resettlement operation; and impactsin terms of affectedpeople. The chapter also examinesthe current Bank pipeline of projects for FY94-FY97. Portfolio analysis helps define the magnitude of resettlement on the Bank's current agenda,identifyrecent and future trendsforwhichthe Bankneeds to prepare, and assessthe staffworkloaddemandedby resettlement. The Task Force is confident that the Bank now has a good geipon its resettlementportfolio,by sectors,size and composition. Finally, in order to put displacements caused by Bank-assisted projectsin a broader context,comparisons
are made with non-Bank assisted

Proj1cts Aproved 13

Peopb A

1984

275,0o0
187,000

1985
1986

10
10 1 14

422,000
143 ,000

1987

1988
1989
1990
l

21 17
14
21

187,000 308,000 126,000

55,000 160,000

1991 1992

1993
1

21
21

lSS
1000

displacements occurring world-wide.

MAGNffUDE OF RESETTLF1T 2. Portfoliosize The FY86-FY93 portfoliohad 192projectsinvolving displacement and resettlement,59 approvedbefore FY6, and 133after. Of these,forty-six closedbeforeFY93,and 146 projectswere still activein FY93,almost50 percent more than estimatedbefore the review. Over the last 10years,the numberof projectswith resettlementapprovedper year has inceased slightly, whilethe numberof peopleaffectedby newprojectsper year has decreasedsincethe mid1980s(tabk 21).

b Daft Bak craed for th review, f manaIned,coud emm fi

4607
*ML% am'.2/

nd

in thftu

2m/t1du

1W"rI&u%IEAP2.MVMvW:0WAX

3. Number of protects. Projectsinvolving resettlementhave remaineda very small 1900in FY93,or about 8 percent of the minority of activeBankprojects,146out of approximately resettlemententeredthe portfoliothan Bank'slendingoperations.Eachyearmoreprojectsentailing total closd, accounting for the gradualbut steadyincreasein the numberof projectsin the Bankes 21). Duringthe reviewperiod activeprojectswith resettlementincreased activeportfolio(igurm of projectswith in numberby 125 percent Thislargeincreaseis party due to better identification resettlement, especialyin TWU. Bycomparison, the total numberof activeBankprojectsincreased 32 percent,from 1438at end-FY85 to 1897at end-FY93.

Figue 2.1
BYYEAR IMAGEOF THERESEIM A YEAR IENT pORTFOIjO

Projects Closed,Approved,and ActiveDunng eachFiscd Year 160 140 120 100

80

YE:AR292 FISC.AL

Number of afected people. About 2.5 millionpeople have been scheduledto be 4. review movedfrom their homes, their lands,or both, under the 192 projects of the FY 1986-93 under the 46 projectsthat had closedby the end been relocated 543,000 peoplehave already peniod. of FY93,and almost2 millionmore are in variousstagesof resettlementunder the current active the numberof projects,the numberof people to be resettledby new projectshas portfolio. Likce eeded the numberresettled under projects closedthat year 6fu 2.2). The total generallyexc people, than the numberof people to be resettle is 47 percent higher,or an additional625,000 totaled 134 million.Data suppliedbymanyBorroweis estimatemadeat the timeof appraisalwhich understatedthe numberof people affected.The real at preparationand appraisalhave commonly numberbecameapparentonlypart waythroughthe project.
6.___ 2e v ."0

Figure 2.2
A YEAR BYYE IMAGE OFTHERl

IME PORTFOLIO

People Dsplaced by Projecs Closed,Approved,and ActiveDurig eachFiscal Yen 2000

~1800
L

1200
0

1100

~~~~~AcTIvs
89 g 1 9

8788

COMPOSMON BY REGIONSAND SEORS

Redonal dost o Ihe 146activeproec with rsettment are spread among 39 coumties. Becauseof their high popuiation densty and land scarcity, the East Asiaand South Asia regionshave a muchlargershare of the BaniksresettlementProects (60 percent) and people displaed (82 pect) than their share in the Bank's overall project portfolio (32 percent) (Pfpe 2.3). India2(974,000 people) and China(483,000 people)together accountfor 74 percent of the people to be displacedunder the current active portfolio. Ihe revene is true for Latin America,whoseshare in the total Bank projectportfoliois 18 peroent,whie its share for both the number of projects and the number of people in the resettlement portfolio is only 9 percent (Tabe 22). Africa,Europe/entral Asia, and MiddleEat/North Afica together accoumt for less than 10percent of the people in the resetdement portfolio,and each of their shares of the resettlementproject portfohlo is smallerthan their share m the Bankoverallprojectportflio.

5.

2Aped Apt ,

bmIL Co uyDeaw
s -

.nhdq * an

uty zetUeamet h sll Ibc

mJ .
D

Bauksulscdpmjoe to hIi iB =rem* bedi pmd

byXe

uM

1.I36im&mZ e

FIgue 2.3
PEOPLE DPACED BY REION
PojCWsAhive DURagFY S3

L=N_~~~13O aao.oao - . -,

umz aasran~i
32,00

MOW
iIA A

A.:
.

-'-'

= *

~~~~so= =
I

~1-

4-r;>

,U4-O

i . SI

Number

Pt

umbrPI

a.

..-.

Aica
South Asia

656

34.6

34
= 29

-233 113,000 a 5.8

Tabk2277R
326 120

14.6

i~ a19.9

1,024,000 588,000 27,00

S2.1

ButAsia
BurpelstirlAsda

a17.2

58

139.7
3.4 4.8

130.0
1.4

16.3
-;=&

5
7

:;MIMI. Bu/N. Africa _;~~~~~~~~~~10 178 9.4

32,000 a1.6

IAdnAmuica
ms~aI~hawmwwpue120

Micz 340

*s 17.9

~~~~~~~~~~~2 13 a, 8.9 180,000 a9.1

146 Sfl
|

TtBk1897 j 1_ij 6.32

18 10 34

11.

tratement portfolio distribuion. The mostsignificant shiftin the Bankes 6. Sectoral since 1986has been the increasein the numberof transportation, water supplyand urban projects (IWU) involving resettlement Roads,railways, sanitaryinfrastructure, and facility upgrading have joined the traditionalurban housingprojectsas importantcausesof displacement Indeed,because of the emphasisby Borrowersand the Bank on lendingfor improvedurban infrsstructureand services, TWU,whichrepresents23 percentof total activeBankprojects,is nowthe sectorwiththe mostprojectsinvolving resettlement(51 percent) - morethan agriculture (AGR) (14 percent) and energy(IEN) (29 percent)combined(table23). However, whileTWU accountsfor moreprojects, AGR affectsmore people (52 percent of the total displaced)than TWU (28 percent)and EEN (18 percent)combined(figure 2.4).

Figure2.4

BYSECIOR PEOPLE DISPLACED

PojectsAcive Dusing FY

TRANSPORTIWAT19UUR
550.000

_
_

-i
|

NATURALmBOUtRM

11__.

|~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1

Table 2.3. Sectora ditbuto

projects active In FY93

of

Rogion Adhutue IndustyandEneg

TansxtiWaer/U*ban Other

TotalDBank Ptojeots withRetent PloJe_ts__ Number| PcU Number PPc jt People

482

PeL

437
436 542

l* 23.0
t 23.0 a 28.6

25.4

21
-

43
75 7*

l ! 29.4
S

14.4

1,030,000

360,000

I- 52.5
S

18.3

51.4
4.8

550,000 I 23,00

28.0 1.2

Total Bank

1897

X_1007 146

100 1,93000,
piojects.

* Five popuation and humanrsouce

projects;two aroumet

7. The cauL of dis_hacement Categorizing projects accordingto sector does not necsarily describe the physical infrastrture components that caused resettement. Hydropower, irrigation, and drinking waterprojects,whichfal into three differentBank sectors,displaceexisting o pants for the same reason dam and reservor construction. Similary,a projectmay contain components whichcause displ nt that are not readilyimagined as belonging in the sector to whichthe projectbas been assigned. Thus,for example,AGR operations mid includetwo phmsphate industry projects,and UEN operationsincludeopen pit coalMIg and land4banking for an expectedexpansion of thermalprojects,all of whichlead to resettlement & Dams and reservoirs are the most frequentcauseof dispMlOement, and accountfor 63 percentof the peopledisplaced.Transportation rankssecond,both in number of projectsand peopledisplaced (tbe 24). Howevr, there are sevral other causesof displacement besidesdams and highways.Extensive rightsof wayalongcanals,drains,and transmission, water, and sewerage linesare nowmoreevidentascausesof displacement. Projects in the forestry sectorhave alsogrom in importanceas causesof rement he o project with the largestresettement in Aftica,for example,is the Cote d'lvoire Forestryproject The Borrowerproposedto displaceas manyas 200,000 people,but thisnumberwasreducedto 40,000 afterthe Banks intervention.Envmironmental protecton, parfticularly floodcontrolinfrastructure, is alsoemerging as a causeof resettlement. 9. Thermalpower projectsare alsoa significant causeof resettlement.These projects usualy do not displacemany people, but two India projects - Faraka II and SingrauliH displaced about5O,OO peopleeach At the timeof appraisal, neher the Borrower nor the apprsal mission addressedthe issueof resettlementin either project Singrauli isstillresettlingpeoplenearly five years after the project closed. In thermalprojectspeople are usualy displacednot by the
physical works per se, but mail by land banking for waste disposal (ash), open pit mining, subsequent expansion, and otber related land uses

s. _S

s*_

Table 2.4. Distributionof projects by cause of displacement

Projects with
Cause of Displacement* Resettlement

PeopleDisplaced
_ _ __ l

Number Dams(including access) Transportation Watersupply,sewerage Thermal(mcluding minisg) Urbaninfastructure Irrigation,canals

protection Environmental

% of Total
S

Number 1,233,000 I 311,000 * 59,000 94,000 73,000 *

'

%of
Total

39 36 18 s 1S 12 7

26.6 24.7

62.8 15.8 3.0 4.8 3.7 3.6

3.8
l

l 4
s
_

12.3 10.3 8.2 4.8

3.4

I. I.
a

I I

71,000 |
74,000

5
4 2 8
146

Industry Forestry Other

TOTAL
*

2.7 1.4

2,000 45,000 1,000

1,963,000

m 0.1 * , 2.3 0.0 100

5.5

100

are categoriedby Projects with morethanone causeof displacement the component that displaces the most people.

10. Sizeof resettlementcomunen Resettlementvariesfrom a few families to more than 200,000people in the largestprojects. Five large agncultureprojectsin ndia account for 41 percent of the people displaced in the total Bank portfolio. Eight other projects,morebroadly distibuted regionallyand sectorally,account for another 20 percent of the people displaced 39 percent,or 770,000 people,of which the remaining (table25). The other 133projectsdisplace of projectswith resettlement 85 displacemore than 1000peopleeach (table2.6). The importance components in the "below100O0 categolyor "below500"categoryat appraisalshould not be by ordersof magnitude during underestimated.Often projectsthat start vwthlownumbersmultiply of the problemsindividually incurredbythe peopleaffectedis the same,and execution.The severity these problems. large aggregatesizesat projectleveltend to compound 11. Focussing on resettlementsizeper projecthighlights a paradoxin typicalBankand Borrower practice. When the Bank finances voluntarysettlement operations, much smaller population sizesare sufficient to justifya stand-alone Bank-assisted project. Ihe Bankhas financed stand-alone voluntary settlementprojectsfor asfewas5,000-6,000 people. Eventhe largestvoluntary settlementoperationswere smallerin terms of the numberof relocatedpeople than the largest ivoluntary resettlementoperations. However, in the case of involuntary resettlement,despitethe eaormous size of the populationto be resettledin some projects,these operationsare treated as content of the project. comonents whichare subsidiary to the maininfrastructural

X 1"Mo

-%

2/7

Table 2.S. Lrge Bank-awlste re

CounbSy
Indis

mentprojet
FY
89

Pto30et o
upper Krish_ _

$Sctor
AGR

PeopleDisplaced
220,000

Pecnl
11.2

India
India India India China India Argentina Brazil Inionema India C8t. d'lvoire China
*

MCIPm rrgation
AndhraPradesh Irf. 1 GujaratMediumIrr. Sardar Sarovar ShuikouI & U Hydo Farakka I Thermnd Yacyrea I & U Itaparica Jabotdak Urban I HydembadWatr/San. Potry Sector

AOR
AGR AUR AOR MN WEN MEN AGR TWU TWU AGRl EN

86
86 84 85 87/91 84 80/92 88 88 90 90 86

168,000
150,000 140,000 127,000 67,000 53,000 50,000 50,000 28,000* 42,000 40,000 40,000

8.6
7.6 7.1 6.5 3.4 2.7 2.5 2.S 2.3 2.1 2.0 2.0

YantanHydro

Daft on this projectar currny underveificadon. An addional 56,000 people are reportedto be adverely affectedin various ways.

Table2.6. Distributonof the resttlement portfelio

|___________
Rangeof people displaeod
100,001-200,000 40,001-100,000 10,001-40,000 1,001-10,000 501-1,000 0-S00

by size of displceen
mt Perenta
3.4 4.1 18.5 39.7 8.2

Projets withRI Number

5 6 27 58 12

Dis People Number

806,000 307,000

Pert
41.1

1S.6
30.1 12.4 05

591,000 7 243,000 10,000

38

26.0 100

6,000

0.3

TOTAL

146

1,963,000

100

__

a 1 igs.a6

,..M

2*S

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHIARACTERISTICS
12. Theoeopledisaeed Comprehensive information on the socioeconomic composition of displaced populations andtheir sustenance strategiesis lacking.The majoityof the displaced are rural and poor becausenewprojectsare broughtto the mostunder-developed, poorestareas,where inastructure is largelylackingand where land and politicalcosts are lowest For example,in Thailand's Thid Powerprojectarea,per capitaincomes of the resettlersare less than one-thirdthe nationalaverage.The remotelocations of manydamsites are ofteninhabitedby indigenous people, ethnic minorities,or pastoralgroups,whichexplainswhy issuespertaning to tribal and cultural differences P:eso prominentin resettlement Halfof the 16,000 personsdisplaced by India'sUpper Indravatiproject,for instance,are tnbal people,as are morethan haif of the peopleaffectedbythe Nanmada dam and canalprojects. The Miaoand U ethnicminorities representthe majorty of the 24,000peoplethe Daguangba reservoirin Chinawil displace. 13. In urban areasthe demographic and occupational composition of affectedpeople is different People to be relocatedare employed in industry and services.Smallbusiness peoplesuch as shopkeepers,artisans,food-stall ownersand vendorsare a muchlarger proportionthan in rural areas. But projectsconsidered"urban" also displace farmersand other rural inhabitantswhenever drinking waterresenoirs or peri-urbaninfrastructure isfinanced.Sincethe peoplein urban projects are sociallyand culturally differentfrom those in rural projects,and depend on differentincome sources,the trend towardmore urban displacement is placingnew and differentdemandson those responsibbk for resettlement programs.In general,landless laborers,tenants,urbansquatters(some of whom may have been residentsfor a generationor more), and cultivators with onlycustomary tenure,suffermorefrom displacement becausedomestic policiesrarelyprovidethemwithadequate compensation and rehabilitation. 14. Womenmayexpenence the adverse consequences of resettlement morestrongly than men. First and foremost,this is becausecompensation payments are usuallypaid onlyto the heads of households, covmting the collective assetsof the fiuly to cashin malehands,andleaving women and childrenat higherrisk of deprivation. Female-headed households, whichin some casesrange rom 20M40 percentof the affectedhouseholds, suffermost fromsuchexclusionary policies, as in the GuatemalaChxoyproject In urban areasbeingupgradedthere is evidencethat displced women are harder hit by resettlementthan men sincethey are more likelyto earn their livingfrom smal businesses locatedat or near their residences. Womenmayalso be affecteddisproportionately in rural areas since they are often more dependent on commonpropertyresources. For example, gardensmaymorefrequently be on unregistered land than fieldsownedbymen. In semi-arid regions of India,91-100percent of firewood, 66-84percent of domesticfuel, and 69-80percent of grazing needs of the poor come fromcommonproperties.3We return to these pointsin Chapter4 during the discussion of incomerestorationand impoverishment risks. 15. rolet beneficiaries. Projects causing displacementhave many times more beneficiariesthan victims. Urban commuters,slum dwellers,farmerswith non-irrigatedlands, industriesand theiremployees, and citiesas a wholemayallgainsignificant advantages fromprojects that entailresettlingpeople. In the largeBank-assisted irrigation projectsin India,15families benefit for each familydisplaced(India IrrigationSectorReview,1991),while the ratio is even higher in TWU projects.

Deb= Sequcira, Gmd# md RaWa

nw

wad kpUad

%, dra, Deuber 1993

WUsIifauMORWaMOAM~

S. tM7M af%2

FUTURE TRENDS
16. LendiL treds. Investment in majorinfrastructure remainsessentialin ptomoting equitabledevelopment (see WorldDevelopment Report,forthcoming, 1994). So too, reanging humansettlementpatterns - voluntanly and involuntarily - will remaina constantcompanion of development in the contextof urbanpopulation growthand competing demandsfor land,water,and forests. In lightof this,the numberof operations involving resettlementis likely to be approximately the sameor to increasein the coming yearsdespitedeliberateeffortsmade by the Bank to reduce the size of proposeddisplacements.Preliminary estimatesof displacement from all projectsto be approvedin FY94were about 437,000people;in FY9S-FY96 the preliminary, and still incomplete, estimateis about 135,000 people (table2.7). llis Table 2.7. Projeeted entryof earlyassessment allowsbetter advancepreparation pjec io troetedet and allocation of staff resources.
portfolo 17. A significant amount of the
l

estimated displacementannounced by Borrowersin

FiscalYear .

their project proposalsmay still be reduced or avoided,however. The earlier the recognition of potential involuntary resettlement, the more possible it is to consideralternatives that reduceor eliminate the need to displace people. For example, Pakistan Sindh Special Development poject was ableto reducethe numberof peopleto
be displaced in the first phase of the project from

No. of

Peopl 437,000
115,oo0

N.focPqd rojects 31 45

1994 I 1995 19

is

20,000

40,000 to less than 1000(see Chapter3, parm. 24). I& Distribution. Regionaland sectoraldistributions predictedfor the coming yearsare silar to those for the activeportfolio,althoughenergyand agncultural projectsmayregistersome declinerelativeto urban projects.

THE BANK'S PROGRAM IN CONTEXT

19. There are no officialstatistics on howmanypeopleare displaced world-wide outside Bank-assisted projects. In the world as in Bank-assisted projects, the two principalcauses of resettlementare dams and urban development.World-wnde construction of high dams (above 15 meters)has averagedabout 300 new dams per year durng the early 1990s. By comparison, the construction of Bank-financed newdamsaveraged18per year during1980-1985 but has decreased to 6 new damsper year during1986-1993, and is thus only2 percent of the globaltotaL SimiLarly the Bank's share of people displacedin dam projectsaccountsfor only 3 percent of world-wide resettlementcausedby dams:that is approidmately 100,000 people per year out of a globaltotal estimatedat over 4 million. Preliminary estimatesfor the next three years remainat 6 newBankassisted dams per year.

20. Urbandisplacement in developing countries isestimated to be approximately 6 mIllion people per year. By comparison, smce 1988the Bank has approvedprojectseach year that are expectedto displacea total of approxmately 85,000peopleover the lifetimeof the projects. The Bank'sshare is about 1.4 percentof the developing countries'total.

%Wft1W&EwWW"Maw arW:WmcoW.

S. 147.00

2110

Even in regionsand countrieswhere resettlementunder Bank-finced projectsis 21. share of people displacedis dwared by high such as in India and China, the Bankes particularly involuntatyresettlementunder projeciswithoutBank interventionand, typicall, with much less 31.5 an estimated urban,and waterresourceprojectsdisplaced mitigation.In China,transportation, and wasstill millon peoplebetween1950and 1989.' Chinabuflt 523damsa year from 1951-198Z since1980the Bank on 150 damsa year in the early 1990s' By comparison, startingconstruction Furthermore of 167,000 people. a total in China displacing of 7 dams construction financed the has (319,000), Sanmenia displacements: the Bank has not financedthe Chinesedamswith the largest and nowThree Gorges(1.1 million). (383,000), iDanjiangkou activeprojects largerrole in India. Bank-assisted The Bank has playeda relatively 22. will displaceover 900,000people,but this is still a smallnumber comparedto variousestimates rangingfrom 16-21millionpeoplerelocatedin Indiafrom 1951to 1990. OutsideIndia and China secondin theworldwithover 150damsunder ranking sharply.In Turkey, the Bank'srole dmininshes people. morethan 20,000 in only4 dams,none of themdisplacing the Bank isinvolved constructiont, onlyone or two damsin each of fourteenother countries.No more The Bankis currentlyfinancing dams in any of these fourteen other than 50,000people are being displacedby Bank-financed countries.

'cha

and Mongoli Comuy Department, IWahaswy

Rawkmav4 June8, 1993,p. 2. dnat CommioalsDaSaunM

anua y193, p2 /1

'IntnatiComsaononLapDaWam
of Dams Under Couo 6
%WM"rsiuaLW1AMWW*= S. ss~ioaa2111

Redd ofDanm,1988, pM;and

in M1991, Wat Pow .. d Dm C_nuc,

~~~~~~~~, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~ ~ ~~~~

~ ~ ~ 7*"**~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ U~~~~~~~Z#Tb3 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~;; X.:~X ~~~J~~~~~~IAw ~~ ~ ~

. .......... ,~~~~~

~~~~~~~~~..~~~~~~~----..

****.~~~~

...

Wl,.

.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~m

3. Performance: Influencing Policy and Reducing Displacement

1. Havingidentified the composition of theBank'sresettlement portfolio, thereviewnow answers the keyquesdonson performance.Three questionsare asked: * * * First, what has been the impact of the Bank resettlement policyon the resettlementpoliciesof Borrower countries? Second,what has been the Bank's performancein implementing the first principleof its policy- to avoidor reducedisplacement magnitude whenever feasible? Third,to what extenthas the Bank accomplished its policygoal of restoring resettlers'incomes?

The firsttwoquestionsare addressedin thischapter. The following chapteris dedicated to the third question. 2. Nanoma the 'developmentimp'. As the Bank's policy sets new standards standards that are aboveroutinepracticein resettlement- a "development gap"is created,between the new standardand the old. Such "gapse appearalways when newpoliciesareformulated Jn any domain, policiesthat set challenging objectives intendedto improveprior practice and to induce changeand development.For the Bank,settingmoreexactingnormsfor the operationsit assists, includingresettlement operations, is intrinsicto its role and responsibilities as a development institution.However, the normsand objectives the Bankhas set for resettlementoperationsare not aitrary or subjective: they codifygood practice,are based on social research,embodylessons learnedthe hard wayfrompast experience, and are aimedat overcoming perceivedproblems. 3. Closing this kind of "developmentgap' is preciselythe challenge at hand in resettlement. Examining performance in this reviewmeansexamining how,step by step, this gap becomesnarrower in Bank-assisted operations.Likeanyother development gap,it cannotbe closed overniht, byflat. Liftingup averages on a widefront, in many counnies, is a verycomplex process, and changing emrwchedbadpracdces takestme. Everystep on thisdifficult road is one more step awayfrom the unacceptabledisplacement practicesof the past. Such practices,unfortunately, continueto prevailin muchof the displacement takingplacecurrently in manydeveloping countries and not onlyin the smallshare of infrastructure projectsfinancedby the WorldBank. Thi iswhy the Bank'seffortto promotean improved policy for resettlement in borrowing countriesisultimately even more consequentialthan the assistanceprovided by the Bank to individual resettlement components. The overallresettlementrecord in manydeveloping countries,as documentedby an expanding volumeof socialscienceresearch,providesa sobering contextfor discussing the progress and problemsidentified by the present review.

MAIN FiNDWGS
4. The TaskForce has foundthat,during1986-1993, the Bank'sresettlementpolicyhas made considerable progressamongBorrowers, and that it has provided increasedprotectionto the interestsand entitlementsof resettlers. The mainfindings are:
-

.W9St

--

--

8.

3/1

Chanalni uolcv evironments. Ihe explicit adoption by a number of Borrowers of newdomestic policies and legalframeworks for resettlement, or the improvement of existing fmeworks, has been one of the principal results of the Bankiscapacitybuildingwork and policydialogueswith Borrowers during1986-1993. Byenactingguidelikes at the nationalor sectorallevel,the Borrower assumes political and institutional responsibilityfor sound resettlement, and not only for compensating the losses caused by expropriation.

PolIco modifies Terfoce. here is a clear associationbetween resettlementperformance and the presenceor absenceof a domestic policy and organizational frameworks on resettlement. Performanceis strongly country-dependent, rather than strctly project-dependent.The Task Force has concludedthat the Bank has been far more effective,has reached a broadersectoral-scale impact,and actualoperationshave gainedmorewhen theBanksucceeded in this policy-doptioneffortthan whenthe Bank'sefforts were confinedto legal agreements for individual projectsonly. In turn, the obligations laiddownin individual loan legalagreements, and the agreedupon "projectpolicy", havesometimes formedthe basisfordiscussing andimproving broaderdomestic policyand legalframeworks
suDiaphement can be reduced. In a number of projects the scale of

displacement was considerably reduced, and sometimesdisplacement was avoidedaltogether, throughpolicy-driven technicalredesignof civilworks. * Unused There is considerableroom to expand and eievate TotentIaL vigorously the Bank's efforts for poly refonr,parftcular.y with counties with largeresealementportfolios. As the numberof growing economies wnthboth highdemographic pressureandmultipleresettlement operationsisexpanding, policydialoguesand agreementsshouldprecede Bank financialsupport to projectsthat entail population displacements.

THEBANK'S IMACT ON RESETTLEMENT POLICIES

NATIONAL POUCIES 5. Enacting policy frameworks for resettlementis pivotal for expandingBorrowers' institutionalcapacity. The review ascertainedthat the Bank intensifiedits catalytic efforts, prticularly after 1986,in workingwith both Borrowers and donors for expanding the adoption of plc prncple regardingresetdement. Sustainedchangesin Borrowers'planningapproachesto resettlementcan hardlybe promotedby the Bank throughprojectsalone,if the proposedstandards and entitlements for affectedpeopleare not basedin domestic policyandlaw. As the Bank'sgeneral counselhasconcluded, "lessons derivedfromBank-assisted projects involving resettlement[show] that in many countries the national legal frameworkof resettlement operations is incomplete.. Resettlementlegalissues[are treated]as a subset of propertyand expropriationlaw. For various reasons,these nationallawsdo not providea fully adequateframework for development-oriented resettlement. Newlegislation often mustbe introduced, or existing lawsmustbe modified, in order

N_I&aIV#JWV*AP

S.IMM&tnU

1 Therefore,the Bank has recommended to plan and carryout involuntary resettlementadequately." poliy refonn in tdusarea to aUl Botrowerswhoseprojectsentail involuntaryresettlement. In turn, the

Bank has studied country policies and approaches and has leamed from national experiences with effective provisions for resettlement. 6. Encouraging policyreform is part of a broader Bank effort to foster local institutonal and resources. To achieve such reform, capacity,defined as synergybetweenpolicies, organizations, the Bank has initiated: policy dialogues on resettlement with some Borrowers; negotiations on resettlement strategies and legal issues as part of sector lending and studies; as well as technical discussionsand legal work in the context of project preparation and appraisaL During the period 2 In a under review, the Bank also published its internal resettlement guidelines for the first time. collectiveletter to the Bank's President, the largest international NGOs saluted the publicationof the Bank's policy and its content. 7. The policyenvironmentssurroundingdevelopment-caused resettlement havechanged considerablyover the last six years. Unprecedented progress has been achieved in the policies of several developingcountries and international agencies. These changeswere, in part, a result of the Bank's policy influence, as well as a consequence of public opinion demands, of resistanceto dsplacement by affectedpeople, and of strongadvocacyby many NGOs. Severaldeveloping countries have recently adopted explicitpolicyor legal frameworksdefiningtheir own commitmentto income restoration, resettlers' eligibilityfor compensationand other entitlements, and to the consultation of affected people:
=

BraziL Resettlement guidelines very similar to the Bank's guidelines were developed in 1990for Brazil's power sector by Electrobras,jointly with major power sector companies. Bank-Borrower work to prepare Brazil's power sector loan resulted, inter alia, in guidelines aimed at fully internalizingthe costsof resettlement and reducingits magnitude;these were introduced in the sector's second Environmental Master Plan (1990) and in subsequent expansion plans. The advantage of the sectoral rather than the piecemeal project approach appears obvious: Brazil'snew guidelinesare valid for all the new hydroelectricplants (about 36 in a ten-year period), much more than the two or three which might have been cofinancedby the Bank. Brazil's central power planning group excluded from the ten-year expansion plan four dam construction projects (Santa Isabel, Belem, Pedra Branca and Ilha Grande) tecause of their displacement effects. That would have required forcibly removing between 154,000 - 188,000 people; these projects are to be restudied. China. Initial policy guidelines and legal provisions for resettlement were developed in China independent of the Bank's guidelines. Since the mid1980s,however, there were several rounds of policydialogueswith the Bank, particularly over China's water resources sector. In the case of reservoir resettlement, Bank involvement appears to have significantlyhelped in the

I Ibrahim F.L Shihta,

1wnoluntalyResettlement In World Bank FinancedProjects, in The WorldBankin a Chanhm World,The Nethertanda Martinus NijhoffPublishers,1991,p. 181. 2 hshatayseRawat in Developnent Projecu Poiy Guidehnfor Wrld Bank FiancedProjects,WoddBank Techucal Paper

No.80, Wasbngton, DC, 1988.(Inadditionto theBank's publiationin English, FrenchandSpanish, the paperwasndependently sated and publishedin China, Indonesia,and recentlyin Turkey).
W V 0. 1S54e7:00 oAo

3R

improvement of Chinese policy guidelines, legalprovisions, planning practices, and resettlementperformance. In turn, the Bank has learned from the effective policy approachesused in China in the last decade and their implementation.
* India - Guelart State. In the context of the major problems affecting the

implementation of the Narmada Sardar Sarovar projects, extensive negotiations betweenthe Bank and the Government of Gujarat,India,have resulted in significantimprovementsin the state's legal regulationsfor resettlement,formally grantingcertain importantentitlementsto displaced people. These entitlements exceedthe provisions of the NarmadaTrbunal for Gujaratoustees. However, the improved regulations are projectspecific and shouldbe extendedto similaron-going projectsin Gujaratstate,but this has not yet happened. * Colombia. Country-wide policy guidelinesfor resettlementin the power sector were adopted in 1990. The dialoguebetween the Bank and the Borrowerduring a sector loan preparation, and the process which was followed by Colombia's powerutilities,led to the generationof resettlement guidelines with clear Borrower ownership (see bRx3.1). One of the very few in the world policieson urban resettlementwas issuedin the Philippines as the Urban Development and HousingAct of 1992,whichputs restrictions on displacement and mandates participation and consultation.
The hlIInes.

. One of the fewdeveloping countries havinga clearlawfor regulating resettlement, Turkeyhas welcomed policydiscussions withthe Bank and has
improved its legal provisions. Because of this legal framework and recent

improvements in its application,the governmentcan allocate substantial inancialresourcesto resettlement,includingsupplementalallocationsfor correctiveactionsinitiatedunder this review(see Chapter7, para. 11).

Lqj4l. Following negotiatonswith the Bank,in May 1993India's National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) adopted a Resettlement and 3 Rehabilitation Policyfor all its operations,an importantsectoralprecedent. The policyclearly definesallcategories of projectaffectedpeople,emphasizes the principleof incomeimprovement or at leastrestoration,and guarantees specificentitlementsto each categoryof displacedindividuals as well as to communities, entitlements that were not provided for in displacements caused by earlierNTPC projects.

&* Pluhtna poliwv vacuums. The Bank's concern for countriesadoptingtheir own guidelines resultsfrom learningthe hard waythat the absence of policyis a policyby default. The fact that a numberof borrowing countries havenot adoptedstrictguidelines for displacement reflects the assumption that there is no need for such a policyor that resettlementprojectsshouldnot be done differently from the past. Someborrowing agencies prefer to maintaina policyvacuumrather
'Naa7l ThlodowCowdo (NMzaR toudRa e Rep%, As& - I PC xwr G_ate ,oc4 Anna .4,AppeX 3. Je anPolcyjune4,993. (SaeWoMaB=kStaffAppraia

19).

_WW

*A

3/4

than issuebinding normsandlegalstrictures.In effect,some agencies are aggressively reluctant to formulateor accept publicsector guidelines for activitiesthat they know are goingto be problematic, diffcult, or controversial; the net resultof such an anachronic posture andmindset is that the interestsof the displaced people, and of developmentin a broader sense, are negatively affected. negativelyAvoiding Avoiding aSocted. formal I1988 policy commitments may leave more operational flegdbily min the short term,but at the expense of higherlongtermcosts,etemalizedto others.
Low level policyresponses to such issuesare an

Box3.1. Creating and affirming poliy ownership: Colombia The Ba1khas worked with Colombia's energy sector to revise the country'srestlement nomsto focus onetring the economic and sociaX b of those displaced. The contexd for this seoAelectric poicy dialogue was the preparto of the power sector loan. At the Bank's suggesdon, an interagencyworig gMoup was creat toprepare an environmental andsocialpoligy ramework for the sector. The woring group (CASEC) consis of representives of power utilities,companymanagers,social soientists, and planers, as well as the Ministy of Minesand

enduringcauseof poor performance. 9. Legal vacuumsand absence of

policy for resettlement result sometimes in the

:Bay
t

and the NationalEnvironment and Natural Rew0 s Depament The working group' had

us of violentdisplacement procedures, without

due recognition and protection of the basic

.sl
To develop a setof resettlement guidelines, expliing the policy objectives for all projectsdtit etail displacement and other adverseimpacts. To prepareterms of reference keyedto the ector's project cycle,outlining whatkind ofresettementplanninginformationhad to -i a a eh s. of project

rightsandentitlementsof those uprooted. The Bank has steadilyand effectively opposedsuch practicesas unacceptable, and preventedthem from occmuing in Bank-assisted A of two projects in tbeprojects. samesector comparison . . i thesamesecto. . but in two differentcountries, one not assisted by the Bankand anotherfinanced by the Bank, reveals the perverse consequencesof policy vacuumsand the beneficialimpact of policy drivenrestrictions (see next chapter,bor 4.4) 10. The adoptionof soundnational or sectoralresettlement guidelines in a gradually

development. To mae a seotorvide amsse of the needs of profesiona socia staff for reseZment work,andof trainingneedsin
uty.

increasingnumber of borrowng countries -The policydraftdeveloped by CASEC went extends the impactof the Bank'spolicybeyond beyondanalyzing the impacts of resettlemen'within
the projects the Bank is financingdirectly, helpingto containunnecessary impoverishment on a wider scale (see bax3.2). For example, over 97 percent of the high dams constructed individual projects, include methodologiesfor
resetemeatissuesacrossthe entire power sector. The legal agreement with the Bank required

worldwide in the last decadehave been built

without World Bank financing. Because dam .thout fi.anin World Bank Because dam reservoirs are - and are likely to remain- the single largest cause of displacement, the enactment of domestic sectoral resettlement policies can have positive effects for a populationfar largerthan under Bank financed

projets.

forimazingthe sector's policy,and thispolicywas muimed in 1990.For the firsttime the energyse t had spelled out explicitcriteria, procedues antd objectivesfor projectsinvolvingdisptacement and resettlement. The 1988WorldBank loan also includedfiAding to strengthen the setor's *environmental and social planning cpabWilities. lBased onan internaldiagnosis of likelyresewtement needs, eachutility created a sociaandeavironmental | -wing, with professionally trained staff,

11. The Bankcandeclinealtogether project proposals that entail displacement, panriwlay where countrypoliciesdo not yet exist. However,this approachwill leave important
_WinflhiIW
ft&AC*l4c#aWa.Sua,o a.,

3/5

lix S= b m . solid development grounds, they would _ _ ia.$tb eventuafly be undertakenanyway, witout ;Q i Bank assistance, without a country :f flwt# -I resettlementpolicyin place,and withoutan s sIhta.otau4by1**Iit*u agreedprojectframework for resettlement l Ci The ultimatepurposeof largeinfrastructure

projectsin crucialsectorswithoutsupport.

If those projectsare indeedjustified on

'

..

projects for power generation, irrigation,or urbanization is to overcome underdevelopment and improve the quality of lfe

f
.

= ;

*
.

i th b s
i ~pxr. ~
taai

of largenumbersof people. Ensuringthat_ | suchprojectsprotectaswellthe interestsof '~6kaa.> those to be resettledis morebeneficial than 7 ~.4% bypassing such projects altogether. Governmentofficials of severaldevelopinmg
countries, as well as some NGOs otherwise

eti.,,f

crtical of the Bank,have emphasized that

the Banies policy hasposivelyinfluenced,

__
*

_
~~t

and can further influence, the development ~b4tn ihDn ~G.A of improveddomestc policy framewvorks Og1a.ibhasc.oi4ofow. and practices. But for nations,as for the Bank,pronss in adoptngpoliy needsto be followed bysystematic implemenaton 12.

_
t~&

CLMonsaene ofnol on.The case of Chiina dmntae that its improved on-the-ground perormnceachieved in the last decadeis t directlyassociatedwith the majorchanges ~~*,#~b intiroduced in its nationalpoliciesand legal _ enviroment surrounding resetdement.The Banks lendingto China has been greatly facilitated by China's reform of its policy ( . 4 fianeworL Before the late 1970, vast mi dislaemetscaused byhighdamsin China A1orw.fh resultedin the disastrous imoeihetOf $ .. ta*W4 many people and ilk serious sca n spM1il~IfYIfUlA, ng political instability. At that time, C lacked a legal or policyfrmwkfo resettlement: the results were tragic displacement operations,suchas those fromthe Sanmenxia and Danjiangkou damsreservoirs in the 1960s and 1970s.To correctthis,a seriesof lawsand regulations were adoptedand refinedin steady succesion - in 1978,1982,1985,1988,1991, and1992- either withnationalapplicability or tailored to specificinvestment sectorssuchas water,transport,industry, and urban. Theseregulations apply to all typesof resettlementprojectsand,takentogether,protectthe lvingstandards of thoseaffected and affinn the pri=cpk of Wresettlement with developmnr. This principle requires makng resettlementa development opportunity and improving resetders'livelihood after relocation.
'
--

MtAsa bRgon,Rms
_wrs. ... -a.

Raektfor iu .m

dwxanbidRmavsnRg*,

Decembe lmI

3M6

13. Ihe benefitsof enactingpolicyare also obviousin thst av soids lit of resetlcmet to the weakestagencies, definin insteadclear isdtutdonalrespoies for both te central genment and the entities at regionalor local lveL In the cue of China, for inte, nation resettlementlawtypicalyestablishes generalprincipes;it leavesmore detailedregulation to the sector, and makes provincialand local tion accountablefor adjmes and excudon Withsome limited differnces, Chineselawand regulations nowgeneralycove with the Banks policydictves on resetement. The tangiblebenefitsto China from enactingan encompming domestic policy and legal frameworkare major imprvements in resettlemt performance comparedto the past. Iff&aC ON 93 INATIONALPOLIGIE

14. In additionto recentchanges in domestc policies on resettlement, the Bankhas be instrumental in promotingimportantpoliy changesat the iueraiol leveL A large numberof multiateradand bilateral donors have very recetly prepared or adopted resettlement guidelines similarto the Banks for the projectsthey support. *
e

The Inter-American Development Bank adopted an internal set of resettlementguidelines in 1990. The AsianDevelopment Bankpreparedandpublished detailedguidelines fir resettlemen ruent with the Word Bank's guiel in 1992,and is oniderig adoptingthem fomaly for the projectsit f enanmse The Overseas Deveopment Administration (UK)has adoptedgieine that essentially are the sameas the Bank's ODA also proposedthat withinthe OECD all bilateraldonors formally institutesimilarguidelinesfor their aid Japans InternationalCooperationAgency(JICA)is currtly preparingits own technical guidelines for resettlement, to whichthe Bankhas contributed adviory assistance. Durng 1989-1990, the WorldBank was invitedto providesupport to the OECD in preparing resettlement guidelines for bilateral aid agencies congruentwiththe Bank'sguidelines.In 1991the development misters of all 23 OECID countrieshave sanctionedand enacted uniformresettlement guidelines for their countries'aid agencies.'

15. Theconcenedeffortof many international agencies forpromoting better resettlement approaches willhelp narrowthe gapbetweennewsoundstandards and entrenchedpractices in many countriesin the past. Wherebad standards are toleratedin displacements tag placeoutsideBankassisted progms, including some projectsthat receiveintenational aid financing, they sow down progre8s under Bank-financed projectsas weL This is whyall Governments and multilateraland bilateraldevelopment assistance institutions must pursuesimilarpoliciesand approaches, if there is to be hope of impoing the lvelihoodof resettles
'Adz D' Dewoome Bank GeddeIaor p AD_st C_,mfrZAeA Gcs Gsdd A* POW r OECD.1g92 _swf a tmaft A-A* b ofDwlepasw h*ca. Mauh 1991.,. 4n. A aw an m awetiy DLlauamfO Am _

h(D

_wqumt
317

DIFFICULTIESIN POLICY REFORM

16. Notwithstanding such significant progress,the Bank has also encounteredserious difficulties in dialogueswith some Borrowersabout adoptingdomesticresettlement regulations. Advancesin instituting policyare always subjectto variousdomesticfactors - including financial, institutional,and land-scarcity difficultiesthat Borrowersthemselvesare facing - and many commitments madeby Borrowers are still to be met. 17. For example, Indonesiaissueda newdecreeon landacquisition in 1993,emphasizing consultations with affectedpeople,but restoraton of livingstandards is not one of the goalsof the new decree. Whileregulations for land acquisition have been improvedin Korea, restorationof livingstandardsfor displaced people is not an explicitpolicyobjective;the reviewhas found that there remain "somesignificant differencesbetween Bank and Korean policies". The degree of receptivity or opposition to Bankproposed policy guidelines variesamong different executing agencies in the samesector, becausethe sector itselfdoes not have an unifiedapproach. One examplein Indonesia(box3.3)showsthat the rejectionor acceptance of Bankguidelines bylocalagencies results in widelydifferentconsequences for the affectedpopulation. 18 Similarly, the resettlementreport of the South Asiaregion emphasizedthat "...the absenceof nationalresettlementpoliciesin counties like Paldstan,Nepal,and Indiahas been a key 9 In India, where many factor in preventinga coordinatedapproachto plannig resettlement" resettlementoperationsin both non-Bankand Bank-assisted projectshave failed to rehabilitatea proportionof the displaced people,no federallegislation or policystatementdefinesthe country's generalresettlementnorms;resettlementis beingregardedas a state, not a federalmatter. In tum, however, most Indianstates still lackstate-levelresettlementpolicies;they use expropriation laws, whichprovide for compensation onlybut do not provide for socio-economic rehabilitation.Thishas oftenstrongly hampered performance. Dialogue betweenthe Bankandborrowing stategovernments, with some notable exceptions(see para.7), has still to yieldsignificant results. In severalBankassistedirrigationprojectscausing displacements in Orissa,the state government committed to issue a resettlementpolicy, yet duringa four to fiveyear period the Banksupervision missions were told that a "draftis still under preparation."In Karnataka, a state resettlementpolicyregardedby the Bankas crucialfor largescaleprojectswasagreedupon at pwjectinception, but nevertheless it has not been finaly signedand enactedsixyears afterprojectstart Recently,Indiainformed the Bank that some federalministries are draftingguidelines for resettlementand rehabilitation, but no such guidelineshave yet been issued. In the meantime,a group of Indian NGOs proposed and circulateda draft nationalpolicy for resettlement.There is growing positive recognition in Indiathat a shifttowarda full-fledged socio-economic approach to resettlementissues, rather than an "eminentdomain"approach,is necessaryand mustbe formally instituted. 19. An independent legalsurvey of country policies andlegislation acrossAfricahasfound that in sub-Saharan Africano countryhas a resettlementpolicyor legal framework;-, this finding
AaotherIndon law,issuedin 1961, provid moeesplit ciaria for fae compewa*o. It specifietbatcompensation must aflowformer owner/knants to ontinuethelr productive aties at tMe same"economic lever as prior to epropriation * East AsmRegion, Rpa on fieRnWanatr d, BmdiadeRaegseew. AsiaTechnical Departmen4 Sbad Ada RejonRqu on Rue.ksev far te Ba ibvidR&aek.wu Res*w. ' SouthAsiaRegion, Repo on Raea_nea for de Banoid. ReseakemaReviev,November993. t C. Okidi-Okidl. Poil and Legl Rmww has Dhampnw-Mm nhua Readrnau hA4fi*an Cosa , Kenya:Md Umvent, Scool of Enviromt Studs. Thestdywas sponsored undera nt fm thegovmet of the N ds See also,ILW.O. Okoh-Ogeudo, Ta oftse oEfwJ Evaon of gwm Law d brdson hPKenhya, Naikobi, 1991.
7 %WV1W&W"
E _*M0WMd

a *g"M

3/8

is confarmedby the Africa regiotes

report on resettlement.2 The issue is

B, 3.

complicated by the fact that in Africa

makea diffeene

Does Bank

Xnvhllvemen

to displaced eople? most countries operate within a dual lawfor ystemof modernandcustomary Buect 4Wd landsL Under the Cote dlvoire w i mr e Forestty project, for example, the government committed to issuing a d wc t prths o* U_ formalpoicy durmg the project's first | diff:?t . year,1989,but fivesucoessive deadlines I : v5 N i and commitments were not met by the Borrower. The draft policy is sil * ~ iruigb ie hne oeoe o awaiting goeNmment ratification..iLipno.C~eejgwudM
_

20. Many engineering ( t conulting firms, responsi-ble for the ~OtW akg,ndBn tfaudta l technical design of major infrastructure l project worldwide,routinely display ihIWQI$lveiboateDXto.e i. o obliviousnessto the adverse social implications ofthe designs they pwpose,n ct sheltered by the absence of policyor ~t*aptfecd legal demandsin the client countries. studiesdisplay hat Toooftentheirfeasibility an"enfr gbWia andwsnderesma s of social-cultural vatiables, an approach Li20) O~o.tt ie ie hneat mrv that backfire later during project raietwn execution. The studies prepared by ~~AO otm& such firms tend to end up with budgets wheneverthe rea,; misleading full costs of displacement and 1vr h ~ksprslmsli e resetlemnt are omitted. bsufficient s o
.

attention in many such studies is giveni

ad~X$pr)~P'

to integratingresettlementinto a river basinplanningperspectio 21.

kssonpomprogress Jhe e to date in actpo&y
conducie to improved resetlment
is to ' :vut:n.

4=

_igiven to tar
.'

- -- r

pesevere. The Bank shouldcarty out this effort primarilythroughpoliy and kgal diloge withits Borwers, not just throughimposing projectconditionality. The approachto policydialoguewith Borrowers has not been the samein all the relevantCountryDe?artmentsof the Bank. In somecases,and depending on country-specific contexts,morestafftimeand effortwas inested insqueezing out incremental piecemeal improvements fromprojectexecuting agencies rather than in negotiating agreements on basicissuesofvisionandpolicy reformat political decision-making levels. This lessonof the present reviewis particularly importantnot onlyfor the current country portfolioswith manyresettlementoperations. It is alsostrongly relevantto future Bank lendingto countries withgrowing economies, highinftastructural needs,andhighdemographic pressures - such
n Atica Tehnca Depaent, R
_

anw Raekm

ford.e B

RextlanrnR eviww. 3/9

uaf sa.

as Pakistan,Bangladesh, Vietnamand Indonesia- whichwillexperienceresettlementincreasesin their industrialization and urbanization programs. 22. One of the mostimportantfndingsof thisreviewisthat addressing the plightof the manymillions of peoplebeingdisplaced bypublicor privatesectorprogramsthroughbetter policies on resettlement(which wouldapplyto both Bank-funded andnon-Bank fundedprojects)constitutes a key premise for improvingthe performanceof the Bank's resettlement portfolio. Better resettlementlegislation is part of better governance. Whileeachprojectisan opportunity to develop 1 the a 'project policy" jointlywiththe Borrowerandconfirmed in legalloan andcredit agreements, Bankshouldalsosystematically provideassistance to Borrowers interestedin tailoringtheir broader policyenvironments to the demandsof development and in strengthening their institutional capacity for dealingwithdisplacements and other socially adverseeffects.

REDUCING DISPLACEMENTS IN PROJECTS

23. lroject-level technicalalternatives. During 1986-1993, the Bank has significantly improvedits performancein implementing the fist principleof the resettlementpolicy: to avogi resettlementor reduce its magnitudewheneverfeasible. To achievethis, Bank work paid more attentionto the technicalparametersof proposeddisplacements. 24. The 1986reviewfoundthat technical optimization studiesfor alternative designs that would avoidresettlementwere seldomundertaken. By comparison, in the last severalyears the concernfor avoidingor reducingresettlementis increasingin the Bank'swork culture,when the likelihood of displacement is identified early. Importantlessonsabout creative,innovative waysof reducingdisplacement have been leamed (bar 3.4). However,project proposalsand feasibility studies, many prepared by respected consulting firms, are too often too permssive about displacements. Ihe Bankhas declined financing for somecivil worksand hasworkedwithBorrowers to findeconomically viabletrade-offsor engineering alternatives that causeless displacement. * Indonesia Redesign of the Saguling Dam engineering proposal loweredthe dam height by five meters, reducingdisplacement from 90,000to 55,000 people,withonlya smalllossin generatingcapacity. Thailand. Resiting the Pak Mun Dam to a less populated locationand loweringits height has reduced displacement from about 20,000people to about 5,000. Ecuador. Redesign of canallayoutsin the GuayasFloodControlprojecthas elitninated the need to displaceanypeopleunder thisproject. China. Resitingthe main pipelinein the ShanghaiSewerageproject and using tunnels rather than surface channels for pipes reduced anticipated resettlementof morethan 8,000peopleby half In other ongoingprojects, suchchanges havebeen madeeven after projectappraisal:in the Beiliugang Thermal project transmission line corridors were altered, reducing displacement from1,500to 300people;in ZouxianThermal,resettlement was

* *

Leo Depatment, Lgl biur in Invar

le ft

Ramkmw, dmRf, November 1993

WMWWH1MS*W8AC.p0AD

.m

3110

reduced from 200 to only5; in the families Taihu Basin project, redesignof flood dikes reduced displacementby

Box3.4. Avoidingd

c.; f

aridnortha sta Iu BrazilPs

inlitia1 estimate.

1,800 people below the Bak * Pakistan.

dialogue with the

government led to the redesign of the Left

isassisdati e ligao I-: Baia, ad Piai, theBa*k beotow". Irrigan of51,700 provide Projectthe will wt and the setement of aboutS,376f pr ec proi ole meditm 1 andal etims. i irrigatio, electricity,and Bspriakder to landtidt forsmallfservices, in addition
The bo rw8 otigiua dp bel0t5 works currntly lad for project

nvA*rs,sm4holders,sqa pepb) fom* and prW

ehse,=d`
of t d.

Bank Outfali project, one of the world's

largest drainage

to* w tl Tis lnd wasto bo reallocated e 1,170 mI about displacing reby

that reduced operations, displacement by half (about 5,000people).

25. Reducing the scale of

.d
: ki di

wereto be provi
ne*v a _0# :ovillae).

resettlement depends on having accrae....~O of of the implications informationand analysis d early in project design. When displacement
such information is not accurate the opposite

fo

rjeti-vuedt~lir
t~pIl

ta .pl.een

orpae
E _
t .

. i occurs: the number of would-be resettlers i . e M minasese after pi oject start, as a result of 4 ) For instance, underestimation. massiveinitial eoa.rlt4possvlb. tIi$eZOl) when phase one of the Karnataka Irrigation 14 eeette g amr t 9 f~e. project was approved in 1978, before the a t Bankes policy was adopted, the Borrower S plots t people. At of 20,000 indicateda displacement e ed r . s e J S that it appeared in 1987, two, phase the start of more than 220,000peoplefaed displacement, at an enormously increased project cost. By was well that time, however,dam construction nonunder way. A muchbetter resettlementplanwaspreparedwith the supportof an experienced not or But whether insistence. steady Bank's at the time this MYRADA, organization, governmental reflected been had the true size of displacement the Bank would have financedthis investment studies,is not clear. In most casesprojectswith resettlementcan in the initialcost-benefit correctly costs. neededto reflecttrue resettlementscaleandinvestment in costestimates toleratethe increases investments casesprojectswouldnot have been least-cost it islikelythat in someparticular However, had full populationdata and resettlementcosts been factored into the economicand financial in the futurewillencouragemore strenuoussearchesfor analysis.Costingresettlementaccurately that requireless displacement. technicalalternatives
.t...

redesign, Beyondengineering disDlacements. deterrentsfor reduclun Macmnoplicv 26. guie that poies macro the in improving resides displacement or reducing the potentialfor avoiding energyor occursmainlywith dams for irrigation, in energyand water. Displacement inveshments
EatyEqwicc in theOBDsaudy, "IT& caseis careull mvlewad Raulamt Inb_Jwsty wi&h

v~~~~~~~I

M.f

3/11

potable water. Manydeveloping countriessubsidizeenergyand water. The WorldDevelopment Report 1992on Development and theEnviromnent foundthat prevailing electricity pricesrepresent, on average,onlyabout 30 percentof the costsof supply. If consumers paid the long run marginal costof supply, theywouldlikely usesome20 percentlesselectricity; if lessenergyisdemanded, fewer communities wouldbe dislocated.To someextent,the problemof displacement is thus a problem of distortedpricingof energyandwaterin the developing world. Althoughpricingissuesmayseem removedfrom the socialdynamics of population relocation,changesin broad pncing policiescan exercisesomebeneficial deterrenteffecton displacements. The Bank'spolicyfor the electricpower sector pursuessuchchangesby promoting realisticpricingfor energy:thispolicysupportsboth the development of newenergysourcesand increased investments by developing countriesin strategies 1 5 By following for demandmanagement. strategiesfor demandmanagement for the outputs from projectsthat wouldcause resettlement, developing countriescan reducedisplacements as well 27. Summing up the answersto the two keyquestionsaskedat the start of thischapter, it appearsthat: * Farst,throughoutthe periodunder review, the adequacy and effectvenessof the Banlksorientationto promotingpolicyreformin resettlementhas been fullyconfirmed bythe positive resultsachieved.The impacton domestic and international policiesrelevantto involuntary resettlementhas been strong, wide, and consequential for practicalpurposes. There is considerable room
and need to connue tds effort in the followingyears.

Second, the orientation toward downsizing displacement has also yielded tangibleresultsin a numberof projects,and the Bankhas been able,in these cases,to financealternatie withlessharmfuleffects. Experience showsalso that the potendalfor minin populaton displceet through improved engineeringand better design alternativesis much ker than pemwly realied, particularly in urban development and transportation projects Tis typeofsocialoptimio of infrasura investnents mustbefimp ued by the Bank and its Borrowers in the future.

l WadwB V

RnldwecA"Pw bk

Saeco-PoiecasforEffctive
GonCsen hdDdwnae Counia-

_yadaR.L, anAgxRn,
d1wWABnI'sAol,

a wodd

Bank Poiy papew; andaVgyEficnyand

a Wodd B1anky

"a, Wasbhngt, DC 1993

VMGI&&VCpAJNXlAA 4 SOlk4M
AL

3/12

X0

.............

.. ................. ...........

......... . ..... . ............... .

17

4. Performance: Restoring Incomes and Livelihoods

Povenyreduction is the benchmark again whichour perfo,mance as a development instiaion must bejudged. Lewis T. Preston

1. nThe ultimate test of consistencybetween resettlement operations and policy is the degree to which the Bank's basicgoal - reestablishingresettlers at an improvedor at least the same levelof living- is achieved. Continuingthe analysisof resettlement performance,the present chapter addresses the question: to what extent has the Bank accomplishedits goal of restoring resettlers' income?

MAIN FINDINGS
. The Task Force has found considerableprogressin Bank-assistedprojects in providing displaced familieswith access to sufficient productive resources to help recreate, and sometimes improve,lost productivesystemsand lvelhoods. The analysisof on-the-groundperformance - based on Borrowers reports, Bank assessments, OED analyses, and the resettlement anthropological literature - showswhat works for good resettlement and where unsatisfactoryperformance results in impoverishment:
0

Effective Income tai Projects that resettle people productivelyon land and in jobs restore income more effectively,after a transition period, than projects which hand out compensation only, without institutional assistance for resettlement. Successful income restoration was achieved primarilywhen projects enabled resetdlersto share it the mmedite beeftt createdby the veryproject thatcauseddisplacement,by, movingresettlers into the newly irrigated command areas; helping them develop reservoir aquaculture; favoring resettlers to exploit commercialopportunities around newly constructed infastructure; or assistingthem in building more durable housing. Overall, ongoing Bank assisted projects create better conditions for resettlers than similar Bank-misted projects did in the past. Polic yields results. Where policy agreements reached at the project leel between the Bank and its Borrowers are applied consistently, resettlement performance on-the-ground is usually better than in comparable operations without Bank-assistance. When guidelines and agreed procedures for protecting resetders' entitlements are incompletelyapplied or ignored the results drop to unsatisfactorylevels.

rE Imacts. Inadequate resettlement design or implementation in a number of completed projects has left many resettlers worse off While systematicdocumentation is not available for all projects completed during 1986-1993, existingevidencepoints to unsatisfactoryincome restoration more
,
"i lme M am.m

QtOWWW"HDaWflp

4/1

frequently than to satisfactory outcomes, particularly in projectscompletedin the earlier years of the period analyzed. Decliningincomeamongaffected populationsis significant, reachingin some cases as much as 40 percent amongpopulations that were pooreven beforedisplacement. Contraction or non-replacement of income-generating assetsreducesthe resettlers'ability to recoverin a sustainable manner. Unsatisfactory performance in reetablishing resettlers at an equal or better level of livingstill persistson a wide and unacceptable scale. Retrofitting actionshave been started in some recently identifiedcasesand other correctiveactionswilD followup after this review. * Mitigatingrisks. The risksintrinsic in displacement occuralongseverallines - landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, foodinsecurity, decreasein health levels,or cultural alienation. Not all risks affect various resettler groups equally,and somevulnerable groupshave higherdegreesof exposureto the risks of economicand habitat displacement and to the loss of their social support networks. Increasedpopulationdensity at relocationsites often increasesthe risk of environmental degradationand of adverseeffectson hosts' accessto natural resources. Understandingthese specificrisks, as identified by the review, informs policy makers and planners how impoverishment occursand how to target projectsto mitigateand eliminate suchrisksin futureoperations.Bettermonitoring systems havebeen initiated through this review and wil be expanded to provide the Bank with operationally usableinformation about incomerestoration. Stratefv effectiveness? land versus cash The singlemostimportantstrategy variablein rural resettlementis whether people are relocatedon land of adequatecapability andwithcleartitle. In mostsituations, the land for land' strategyleads to resultsfar superior than paymentof cash compenation. Four technical land-related issuesare of paramountimportance for effective resettlement: land valuation;land compensation; land capability and the institutionalabilityto identifyand facilitate -land for landr resettlement
programs.

Continuingremedialwork RemedialactionbyBorrowersand the Bank is required now, withoutwhich a significantnumber of people now to be resettledwillnot recovertheir previousincomeand livelihood levels Such remedial workhas been initiatedunderthis review, is currentlyongoing, and mustcontinuesystematically after the review's completion. Methods for imurovement The causesof incomedeterioration and the review'sfindingsabout both the strengths and weaknessesin recovezy strategies demand substantialchangesin: the way policy objectivesare translatedinto operationalstrategyand project provisions for resetdersby Borrowers and the Bank;the wayresettlement isco-financed bythe Bank;the wayeachresettlementprojectcomponent and its effectson people'swelfare, 1 are monitored.

Someof tee apects iier to wok poses

durt Ite pject cyde andtheirdicig

wmv be caued In tde ns mu

%WM%1rV%W%MHA4cgm&4oM

B. 1Ss4M?:OeOa

42

INCOMERESTORATION ASSESSING
in termsof incomerestoration Regionalreportsanalyzedresettlementperformance 3. in mostof the projectsfor whichOED tepors however, levels. The paucityof baselineinformation, data even in recent PCR and OED audit reports, have limitedthe are available,and insufficie'lt aggregatedataon the abilityof the resettlementreportsby all Bankregionsto developcomparative (box4.1). The objectves restoration income to meet countries of various failures or achievements lackof adequatedata is itselfa findingthat pointsto the need to sharpenthe designof rehilitation calledattention systems.The currentresettlementreview aswellasto improvemonitoring provisions of baselinepopuation incomesurveys problemand triggeredthe establishment to this information duringFY94and beyond. Al newprojectswith resetlement in all projectsscheduledfor appraisal approvedduringthe firsteight monthsof FY94institutedincomesurveys. components deeperthan a mere that the shortageof datareflectssomething concluded The review 4. or simpleneglectin data gathering:it reflectsthe pesitence or ex-postinformation lackof ex-ante agencies,mirroredin their desigp differentstand on the part of manyborrowing of a conceptually stillsee their taskto be the of resettlementwithoutful focuson rehabilitation.Whensuchagencies rather than the restorationof incomes,they do not designresettlement paymentof compensation to measureit, but provideonlyfor with a clearlydefinedeconomicrecoverytarget and benchmarks wordedas 'rehabilitation." vaguely compensation The Bank has done much tenacious groundworkto change this cncptally 5. asshowni the previous of countryagencies, witha goodnumber stand. It hassucceeded miadequate chapter, and still needs to perseverewith manyother agencies.The messagethe Bank is gving its of a strategiesmust be guidedfrom the outset by the discipline Borrowers is that reestablishment
comparatve stance betweentwo points in ime -pre-isplacement time and tget-ime -for come

etoraton. Income data shouldalso be gatheredby the Borrowers'monitoringand evaluation after relocation,to measureprojectimpact,and be reported in PCRs and PPARL mechanism characterof the avaiable Successf_Incomerstoraton Despitethe fragmentary . and failure The partialdata enabledthe reviewto discerncertaintrendsaboutsuccess nformation, projectreports that incomesfor aUl for the Thaiand Khao Laem Hydroelectric impactassessment goalwasacbieved.The roseafterresettlement.Thisisa projectin whichthe basicpolicy households II project - significantly, Irrigation samewas true for about half the familiesin the Maharashtra into benefitsby moving these are the resettlerswho were able to share in the project'simmediate area. the irrigatedcommand Resettlers succeededin restoringtheir incomesmost often where the productive 7. families.The clearestcase well the displaced potentialcreatedbythe projectwasusedto reestablish studies,is the wayseveralproject documentedthrough both Bank and independentsociological and other fishery-related resettlersin aquaculture harnessedthe newreservoirs'potentialto involve generated2.6 from rice farmingto aquacuiture employment.Indonesianresettlerswho comnerted timesmorerevenueper acre (see bao4.2).

~~~.

413

Box 4.1. Leaing about Incomerestorton

Regional resettlement worlng roupstriedto lean whetherdisplaced families werer; incomesand productive capacities. To do so they reviewed performance in activeand receity cy projects. Lackof systematic monitoring dataappeared to be a seriousconstraint. Arica oncluded that 'Giventhe inadequacy of thebaselinedataandthe uncertinty of it wouldbe meaninglesst specuat as to the uumber of resettled people whowil haveth n eir immediately uponresettlement or sometime thereafer'. Ihe MiddleEast aad North Afrkca,noted that*theprimay measureo je t resettlementissue referst icome restoraon for the affected uatios, and cncld tt did nottakethiscriticalfactoriut onsideration and filed, i all butone case,to designof theprojectth provisioni ddto deteminesific om levelsof affee resettlement'. East As and acl r a id recod. deonated Mere l restoring the standard of livin of ep andsttong niect evidence that the aff;cted 1 eo6 h and Thailandmight be benefiti 'fro the rapid pacc of:development of these c T informationrequired.to demonstratedtatpple in specific 2prWec ableto improveor et of livingare not available. However,:te available evidencesuge t of taedp_ Indons have ia notbeeble tir e tdar of . inpreventting an oblectiveanayss of th acivmnsad Polcy oetives.. SoothAsiOund thAatBan prceurso difficult to deemn o hepoet ae afce alr ftecoutiso t h ei neBzk

procesg"andoum

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Latin Aerica andite C aribean,noting recent proveme in

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a

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of income are toolswell surveys, kinwii

so th:edslced ; popuaions,vethuhorfrty pe.ce twerecappro e rfte T quarterat eat afeai ftrthtui deline weret pub!liiaed.
orroers a*ltiV rS. Al Bn ra a .

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8. Preliminary findingsin more recent projectssuggestsomewhat better average performance regarding economicreestablishment. Clearevidenceof the vralue of governmenlt commitment for resettlement performance is provided by projects with resettlement in China (bar 4.3). Projects in China receive no moreattention fromtheBankthanthosein othercountries.
13161
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4/4

F - .

iiBox 4.2. Resrof isheries

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Howevr, China overhauledits policies after internal evaluationstudies showedthe extent of resettlment discontent caused byearlierdevelopment-related impoveishment andpolitical disastrous national during the 1960sand early 1970s(see previouschapter). Since 1980,comprehensive resettlers'essentialproduction commitment to reconstructing expressthe government's regulations systems. The Bank's sectoral analys of resettlementimpacts in China reached the folowing conclusions: * In urban projects,urban housingstandards,floorspace Urban Rese clmen per capita and servicestend to be much improvedthrough resettlement, althoughfrequentlyat the cost of a longercommute.The value of the new housingunit is often two to four timeshigher than the value of the unit replaced. Enterprisefailureas a resultof exropriation is rare Peoplewho protection untilnewjobsare found. losttheirjobsget someformof economic Countyand township govemrment persistence in findingfull successful job reestablishment. employment for resettlersresultsin generally
hTnoaton:

Reseivoirs:Wherethe standardof incomerestorationis pursued,as it is for Bank-funded projects, international experts rate Chinese reservoir business amongthe best in a difficult resettlementperformance

Not all pmjects in China do well: projects in the poorest regions, particularly those record. There alsoappearto and have a lesssatisfactory minorties,facedifficulties with indigenous govenment andnon-Bank supportedprojects Because be somedifferences betveen Bank-supported 9.
%WIt _RVH _SI*M** S. I4ft?M a

4/5

Box 4.3. Evidenceof successfulurban resettlement

Resettlementin Chinese cities usually provides not benefits to the affected people. The table below provides estimates of the depreciatedvalue of old dwelling units, the actual constructon costs of the replacementunits (excludingland or infrastructurecosts) and net differencesbetween the two costs, taking into considerationchangesin the size of the new unit provided to the tenant. In some cases, the value of the new unit is nearly four times greater than the value of the unit replaced.

'''' 'csn 0"CVahae'7 ~~ ~ ~

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commitment exists,however, mostsuchdifferences concernthe morelimitedfinanciDg of the latter rather than the legaUy mandatedapproach.On the whole,projects withresettlementin China,which appearto meet the represent25 percentof the Bank'stotal portfolioof projectswithresettlement, and lhving standards Banks policyobjective of improng or restoringlost productioncapacity

DMPOVERISHMENT RISKS AND TRENDS

with Involuntary Resettlement," Comparedto the OED studies,"EarlyExperiences 10. this review found better which mostly referred to projects started in the early and mid-1980s, or ongoing projects, arilarly performance, as detailedabove,in a numberof recentlycompleted the reviewcomesto the same in countries withrobust resettlement policies suchas China. However, in reestablisingresettlers conclusion as the OED studiesthat projectshavetoo often not succeeded at a better or equal living standardand that unsatisfactory performance still persistson a widescale projectbenefits, projectsare consistentneither withthe anticipated Resultsfrom manyinvestment nor with the Bank'spolicygoals. 11. Performanceregardingincome restoration is of particularconcern in India and Indonesia, whichlackcountry-wide resettlement policiesand whichtogetheraccountfor 54 percent of the numberof peoplebeingresettledunder currentBank-financed projects. The SouthAsiaand the East Asia regions'resettlementreports, the India CountryDepartment'ssectoral report on resettlement (June 1993), variousPCRs,and OEDauditsfoundandanalyzed failures in severalmajor and incomerestoration. projectsin rehabilitation 12. IssuesIn the India portfolo. Conclusions on projectsin Indiaare available fromthe South Asia regionalreport and the SA2 sectoralresettlementreport. In the Gujarat Medium Irrigationproject,whichtotalsa displacement of over 140,000 people,"...above all, the poorest and tribal people,representingmore than 50 percent of all affectedfamilies, have not recoveredtheir livingstandards.,<The FarakkaIHthermal project affectedsome 53,500people: "i total, 353 fimilieshave been employedby NationalThermalPower Corporation(NTPC)and about 3,000 families obtainedtemporary jobswiththe contractors.The condition of the remaining 7,000families some project,whichdisplaced is not knownto the Borrower."In the UpperIndravatiHydroelectric 16,000people, most of them tribal farmers,affectedfamilieshave been able to purchase only 1.2 acres of non-irrigated land on average,whereas the state-recognizedviable minimumis 3 acres.' of nearly 168,000 Irrigationm project,whichtotalsa displacement In the MaharashtraComposite people, landed famflieshave regaineda reasonablestandardof livingbut the landlessfamilies, affected.0 Basedon the projectsit evaluated representing more than S0 percent,havebeen severely that "as far as projectsin India are concerned, OED's recent report concludes after completion, mayhave not been ableto regain that until 1992most affectedfamilies available evidenceindicates their previousstandardof living." Recent projectsin India approvedduringthe last three to four years have started on a much better footing and are expectedto yieldbetter resettlementand rehabilitation results.

AsiaTedCdall Departnt Su Ada RPnal Ropt for Ox RatanmiRew, Country D _parm SA2, hsdkX A Rei*wwf Rai ad RdWbAwkas, June1993. 'AsiaTechnica Deputtment, SouthAna Rq ot RwlReforsjbtheRleawkatReview, Country Depimat SA2. hula: A RMewof 4 OED,EarEaic
VM_
_

wh hq wtoky RwwknwemReponlNo 12142.

SAL

eW"SW&MftV . Iesmv

47

13. Issues to the fndonesia nOrLLo The performance in Indonesia combinessuccessf income restoration and land titling in some projects, as detailed earlier in this chapter, with serious failures in other projects, partculaly in the urban and transportation projects. Such perfmance variation is accounted for by the lack of uniried country frameworksand slowttansfer of ecerienc and approaches between agencies. 14. Indonesiahas nine activeprojectswith resettlementand willrequire more resettlement if the country's rapidlygrowingneeds for urban and saDitationinfrastructure are to be met In most cases, cash compensationhas not been adequate - neither in amount, nor as an approach - and the resettlers have not been able to restore their former livingstandards!S The Regional Cities Urban Transport project affected 13,000people in Z530 families. Howeer, out of the 840 displaced families,project authorities helped to relocate about 60. At least half the 1,690 partially affected households received no compensation for their land. Intermiews vwthpeople from the Jabotabek I project - whichdisplacedabout 28,000people and negativelyaffected in variouswaysanother 56,000 - indicate that the compensation rate offered to those with legal ownership was only about 40 percent of the estimated value of their land at the time of acquisition. Those with any of the several weaker forms of tenure on their houseplots were eligible for only 25 to 90 percent of the market value - makingtheir real compensationsomewherebetween 13 and 40 percent of the market value and clearly insufficientto repurchase a houseplot. 15. How does such serious failure in resettlement permance occur? What has ths reviewlearned about resettlers becomingworse off? And howcan bong agencies lverage their knowledgeabout risksfor preventing impovershment in the futue? To better undertand the salient

trends, andto augment the bodyof empirical datafor anaysis,the review examined information from both Bank-assisted andnon Bank-assisted projects,including projectsfinanced dther frm domestic sourcesalone or with assistance from aid donor agencies withor withoutpolicygideines
16. How Ipmo shrent bI_pes. a risk mod When displacement and relcation leve peopleworseoff, the empiricalevidencerevealsa set of eight recurrentcharacteritic that need to be monitoredclosely. While each is irreducibleto the others, they have a common denominator they contributeto a processof impoveishment.Ihese hi makeup a risk modeL6The modelpointsto the 'risks to be avoided" in displacement These majorrisks capture socialand economic proceses that occurwith higherfrequency than others, despitethe enormous variability of individuals situations. These are: (a) (b)
(c)

Landlessness; Joblessness;
Homeessness;

(d) (e) (f)

(g)

Maginalization; Morbidity; Food insecurit,

Loss

of accessto common propert assets; and

(h)

Socal disartcuation.

17. Taken together,these characteristics of impverishmentprovidea risk modelthat synthesizes the lessonsof manycomplexreal processes;it is, at the same time, a warningmodeL
S JS MicbdmeLN.c DS O%VPovRM#JhWIR Popukim 14mnme HIDDDP SSS, 1990.
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swa WARmw.wD.d.p,amt%nbdip

ifaiad

iWanky,

418

Abstracting the particular(local)detailsbeyondthe tale of case-by-case anthropological studies, govemmentaccounts,OED audit reports, or mediastories,and recognizing patters beynd the accidental,is necessaryfor actingto contain such proces These adverseprocessesmust be brought under controlwith a strategy,rather than just throughcaseby case responses. 18. However,these processes are not unavoidable.Theymust be seen as a set of ris that either become real, or can be avoidedif knownand counteracted. Like everyrisk forecast derived from past experience,this risk-predictive model is apt to serve as a "selfdestroying prophecy."' It alertspolicymakersand plannersto the kindof targetedactionsthat are needed. 19. The evidencethat substantiates these trendsis abundant;to explainthem, seal examples willbe cited for each: * Landlessness. Land expropnationtakes awaythe foundationupon which social and economic production systems are constructed. Unless that foundationis reconstructedelsewhere,or replaced with stady incomegenerating employment, landlessness sets in, socialand economic productivity cannotbe reestablished,and the affectedfamilies are impoverished. In the KiambereHydropower projectin Kenya,a Borrower-sponsored studyfound that farmers'averageland holdingsafter resettlementdropped from 13 to 6 hectares; their livestockwas reduced by more than a third, yields per hectare decreased by 68 percentfor maizeand75 percentfor beans Family incomedropped from Ksh. 10,968to SIL 1,976,a loss of 82 percen' In Indonesia,the Instituteof Ecologyof PadjadjaranUniversity carried out a socialsurveyseveralyears after reservoirfamiles who were gien, in early 1980s,cash compensation; it was found that their land owneship was 47 percent lowerand theirincomewas halved.Impactstudiesfor the Cirata dam,alsoin Indonesia, found that while59 percent of the poor households improvedtheir incomesafter relocation,about 21 percent were worse off primarily becauseof lossof land,with a 25 percent loss from their prviou incomelevels. Simlar evidenceis availablefrom BraziLWFimdinlgs from sociological and anthropological fieldstudiesshowthat for farmfamilies loss of farmlandhas generalyfar moresevereconsequences than the ossof their house. Joblessnessaffectsboth urban andrural resettlers. For seeral categories of people whoseexistencedepends on jobs - includinglandlesslaborers in reservoirareas; employees of community based services;and shopkeepers, shop-workers, and smallbusinessmen- displacement effects are stronger throughthe loss of job than the lossof home. The employed landless, rural or urban,lose in three ways: they lose accessto land ownedby others and leased or share-cropped; job opportunities,primarly in urban areas; and foregoneassets under commonpropertyregimes In the Madagr Tarna Plainproject,privatesmaDl enterprises beingdisplaced in 1993- worlshops,
Ch Ulnwyctado Prm

RobeaR Mrton, TheSooiouf$Scdc TharlandEaiJk*x,

EdwadR Mbsuup,A Rae*t1ewt & h Ox JPCnbe Hydrok Pow Iitjeos - pW yon, Mad 1988* ' FawimmnaldhpWWAn4w*of d1w Cata Den Padjadjaim Univetrai Istm ateo EbotoW, March 1989 3 Mouot Lao JiA, NyrodwJk Devdow ad IiWolmwy RP_aInu h kbil &w Anwk PAft aid IE&_, EdhburgkCobbam Raource Comubtns&
:wS5 -- .. -- S.issazos 4

food-stalls,artisan units - are entitled to no compensation, and lose their place of trade and their customers. A 1988study of people resettled in the first phase (early 1980s)of the Argentina-ParaguayYacyreta project found a 17 percent unemploymentrate in the resettled communities,much higherthan the rates in the population as a whole." Vocational re-training, offered to some resettlers can provide skillsbut not necessarilyjobs. Creating newjobs as a mitigation measure, particularly in urban settings, is one of the costlier and least certain strategies, and is infrequently used. Similar findings come from developed countries: in the Churchill-Nelson Hydro project in Manitoba, Canada, the economic activitiesof resettled indigenouspeople fisheries, waterfowl capture, fur processing - were curtailed; field studies found a significant increase in non-productive time in the community. Evidence compiled from several non-Bank financed and some Bank-financed 2 shows that the employment boom created by the new dam projects," construction temporarilyabsorbssome resettlers but severelydrops toward the end of the project, compounding the incidence of permanent or temporary joblessnessamong the displaced population.
0

Homelessness. Loss of shelter is temporary for most of those displaced,but for some familiesit may remain a chronic condition. If resettlement policies do not explicitly provide improvement in housing conditions, or if compensationfor demolishedshelters is paid at assessedmarked value rather than replacement value, the risk of homelessnessis increased. A 1990Bank report on the Cameroon-DoualaUrban resettlement completedin 1989found displacedfamilieswere hindered in their efforts to set up new that over ZOOO permanent houses; less than 5 percent receivedloans to help pay for assigned houseplots. From the Danjiangkou reservoir, not Bank-financed,China has reported that about 20 percent of the relocatees became homeless and destitute; this and the disastrous results of Sanmenxiaproject displacement, although not Bank-financed,led to the adoption of new resettlement policies in China. Violent destruction of houses of people labeled as squatters is a procedure still used in some places to speed up evictions. The "emergency housing center" or "relocation camps" used as fall-back solutions in poorly planned resettlement tend to make homelessness chronic rather than temporary. When resettlers cannot meet the time and labor costs involvedin rebuilding a house, they are compelled to move into "temporary' shelters, which then tend to become long-term sheltes At the Foum-Gleita irrigation project, Mauritania, only 200 out of the 881 displaced familiesreconstructed their housing, the rest livingprecariouslyfor two years or longer in tents or under tarpaulins.' A Bank field review of a large scale resettlement found that prolonged lack of support made the temporary shelters into permanent residences, in which resettlers shared common sleeping spaces with their animals. But homelessness- like joblessness,marginalization,morbidity,or other social risks - are not imminent and unavoidable in inoluntary

t *

1992. San Hamlon, YaqwaEva&aadSa', Sywse Univemty, the Clin-Gezhoba dam, Brazil-Tucunddam, and Turke-Aaturk dam,whichwen:an not Bank-financed;or Togc-Bern tE4,
Nangbo Hydrpower dams, and Korea-Cungju dam as Bank-finand project&

Th B0C Ond P wnp of Inpga 5stcms n Mhan (19) Soo-EEam~ bI Naesl, Tae (LandReourcn), Univty of Wosin-Madiso p.twz bIs sUbmit for Mase of Science
.. loftm

bI m OFaw-kea

asm

4/10

resettlement.The comparison betweentwo verysimilarprojectsin the same sector(see box4.4) convincingly illustrates that homelessness is an avoidable condition, inflictedoften by poor resettlementpractices. * Marginalizatbon. Marginalization occurswhen familiescannotfullyrestore lost economicstrength. Middle-income farm householdsdo not become landless, but becomesmallholders. Families previously in precarious balance above the povertyline may fall belowit and never recover,even without becoming landless. For farm families, partialbut significant loss of farming land to roadsor canalsmaymakesome farmseconomically nonviable.High productivity farmerson fertile valley-bottom land are marginalized when moveduphillto marginal, unfertilesoils,even thoughthey maybe giventhe same area of land. In the Nepal KulekhaniHydroelectricproject, an independentstudyfoundthe majority of displacedpeopleworseoff socially and economically, due to lowerproductivity of newland,and less diversified production.Marginalization alsooccursthroughthe lossof off-farm income sources; in SriLanka'sKotmale projectfinanced by a Europeandonor,a field studyassessedthat marginalization occurredbecauseopportunities for nonfarmincomegeneration were lostor limited throughdisplacement, increasing the economic differentiation betweenevacueesand hosts.' Marinalization of resettlersis implicitly acceptedin all caseswhen localagencies consider it a matter of coursethat those displaced cannotbe providedreestablishment at their prior standardof living. Morbidity. People forcedto relocate have a higherdegreeof exposureto illness,and to comparatively more severe illness,than those who are not. Adversehealth effectsof displacement, particularly when projects do not incorporatepreventativeepidemiological measures,are well documented, though much more for projectsnot assistedby the Bank. The direct and secondaryeffects of involuntarydislocationwithout preventativehealth measures rangefromdiseases of poorhygiene, suchasdiarrheaand dysentery, to outbreaks of parasiticand vector-bornediseasessuch as malaria and schistosomiasis causedby unsafe,insufficient watersuppliesand inadequate sanitary wastesystems.At Akosombo, an early 1960s reservoirresettlement in Ghana,the prevalenceof schistosomiasis aroundthe reservoirrose from 1.8 percentpriorto resettlement to 75 percentamongadultlake-side dwellers and close to 100percent among their children,within a few years after impoundment. In the Foum-Gleita irrigation project, Mauritania,the predicted increase of schistosomiasis was exceeded,reaching 70 percent amongschoolchildren; farmers'healthworsened fromcontaminated drinking waterandagrochemical intoxication. Anoutbreakofgastro-enteritis occurred along the Victoriadam reservoirin Sri Lanka (not Bank-flnanced).'3 At NamPong,a damin Thailand (not Bank-financed), monitoring confirmed that local

Ula T. eSd, On Evacuaio of Peoplein the KotmakHydroPowerPmjoaLExpeaence fom a Soclo-Encomic Impact St", , June 1990. " Re, Ala W.and PA Drve (1986)fiWkwdmof tO a Den puwjct un XSi LmnL volumemL ttl Evauatin of te Soia and Env_ramenal Impactof the Victa Dam prect. Anna J SocialAnlysaL Anne K EnlrmW Ahlyai
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we. w

-.

rates of morbidity- from liver fluke and hookworm infection - were higher than provincial levels, the result of deteriorated living conditions and poor practices of waste-disposaLIncreased mortalityrates are also reported, as a result of epidemic outbreaks of malaria in displaced populations around new bodies of water and to accidents associated with new reservoirs Lack of proper precautionarymeasuresresulted in 106deaths by drowningat Saguling Lake during the first 14 months of operation; at Cirata reservoir (Indonesia) 16 ten people drowned in the first ten months after impounding. * Food Insecurlty. Undemourishment is both a symptom and result of inadequate resettlement. Forced uprooting increasesthe risk that people will fall into chronic food insecurity,defined by the Bank as calorie-proteinintake levelsbelow the mmimumnecessaryfor normalgrowth Sudden drops in food production and loss of harvests during the transfer from old to new sites are predictable;in addition, rebuilding food production capacityat the relocation site may take years. At the Foum-Gleita irrigation project, Mauritania,when multiplecropping and husbandrywasreplacedwith paddy-ricemonocropping, diet and cash-crop income deteriorated. In 1986at the Victoria dam project, financed by a European donor, some 55 percent of resettled familieswere still receivingfood stamps after a long period, compared to a much lower rate in the country as a whole. Because the area of cultivated land per capita in the Bailiambe reservoir in China (not Bank financed) decreased from 1.3 mu to only 0.4 mu after relocation, local food production became insufficientand 75,000tons of food relief annually had to be provided for several years. Loss of access to common nrouertv. For poor and marginal people, particularlyfor the landlessand otherwise assetless,loss of common property belonging to communities that are displaced represents a cause of income stream deterioration that is systematically overlooked. Fruit and other edible forest products, firewood and deadwood for use and sale, common grazing areas, and use of public quarries, account for a significant share of poor households"income. The review found that only the Lesotho Highlands Water project includes explicitprovisionsfor compensatingthis loss, but the project's management unit is laggingbehind in the implementation of the rural development programfor resettlers. Losing accessto common property under traditional or controlled circumstances, displaced people tend to encroach on reserved forests or increase the pressure on common property resources of the host area population, a source of socialtension and increased environmentaldeterioration. Secondaryadverseeffectsof resettlementon the environment occur also when oustees who do not receive cultivatable land move uphill in the reservoirwasteland,intensifydeforestation and cultivation of poor soils, and accelerate reservoir siltation. Social disarticulafon. The disintegrationof social support networks has far reaching consequences (see bar 4.5). It compounds individuallosses with a loss of social capital: dismantled patterns of social organization, able to mobilize people for actions of common interests and for meeting pressing immediate needs are hard to rebuild (see bar 4.6). Such loss is higher in
e Cirra Dom, Padjadjam
-A

%*,mmte
W

AMacAnaowL of
0. lUA7O

UnWivty.

4113

projects that relocate 4-5. Soda people in a dispersed |o4 abillty maner rather th in :- Et - : groups and socialunits. # n .s kV oUY VIla Field studies have a e ont ofsoci datW documented that such ecdea W 'elusive disarticulation sociapot itleadsto entilements, people,sbaec processes undermine livelihoods in ways and uncounted by unrecognized planers, andare part of stapa n eooi Do a,tese ithe icomplexcauses of
impoverishment. In the
tecou s.

Rengali dam project in

eo1li A1O1l.Z not Bankrwteatnino ~Wodrt financed,a sociological i Ck l iste study found various iorB e peole Project, a : social of manifestations toche lc M such as disarticulation,

India,

grcuwvtgalienation and intimate bonds, the

of ano*ae, theloosening
of controlon weakening interpersonal behavior, and lower cohesion in
family structures.

am9,

yblo

SuekagtO?trptetQIIol 'hchhvcotbtetodl4nte ~ E overt pr d M.

: ;s
rto4yecid anigislddhgwy

weredeferred Marriages .o.it to the ni because dowry, feasts, ;:-: pt ;: and gifts became _ :e:_:_.:_. I_ unaffordable. Resettlers' obligations wereerodedandinteraction kinsmen non-displaced towards andrelationships in group participation As a result, was reduced. families individual between postabsentfromsettlements; conspicuously leadersbecame actiondecreased; dailyinformal feasts and pilgrmageswere discontinued; harvest communal burialgroundsbecame and common wasseverelycurtailed; socialinteraction
17 shapeless and disordered.

model a warning provide of impoverishment Takentogether,theseeightcharacteristics 20. pointsto whatmustbe avoided.The of manyreal proceses and clearly the lessons that concentrates predictivecapacityof such a model informswhat are the main social risks to be expectedin measuresfor risk populationdislocationand helps adopt timelycoun eractingor compensating
management. 21.

is not hevitabe displacement through It is crucial to emphasize that impovershment trendsand risksis that it offersthe and anticipating of identifying in resettlement. The advantage failure to to take policyand projectactionsthat couldcounter the risks. Conversely, possibility
Bhuwr, " PJCNyak Rmaltnm atRasli Dwm,
W1I&W*CNMtA**WS.IMM x

Ofisa,19S,p SO.

4/1

Box44Inorml ocalnetworks and rset rer onoinI

uifm AD onsorod.etIa to dWrtet6unreiad rsetlmn,ddo Ispersved, appetaossto thening, eintinr dpeismantledd

i~~~~~~~~-o
6 In"hii

~~4~~tanfr~~~~pokta$sts.

~~~~~~~~m "'0a , ,: ... Z transferals~ ~ ~ ~~~~IC;W oslol uh w%cnhgbrhnre rvt t .rau.rsa. ctoIa norpocei 1.twcazethe rsaginherosenalng thes dalyicnoei alflows tuhe sooral dun to unfolunipeed causingu to transform i ehel empovrishmelt nscopel winth ovt ahog selxetorzual propen .cy.go~4o

22 ne JAnzaaextesvrvivof thny,ged. anthrvopobicaand socioulogica resar chm)I iterature. on resettlement,of theioptrtynteoas porae to assess do niskpolacmn ispct worldwide,found-and
this cncusonbearsrepeain-hat4 thel motfeqyulenth adisevrebu ases of in mpoeismnthv

occuxTed i onopor ms unguide b ndomesffc or internaffonalponlicy nform.Natsomeims neo impvershmnt anohe of theeloigera Improveadh approuchele rssbcomnre9t mlimtio plm, evenisomle roealty fe intancin alndiinlementidglrsetwzutlemet ~proj ecrt tasfwers e polcesnto exist suhows iap how seensiofvand vlnerablethese oipaeration auIre. Ict ils thew Thowimperativ it s toe Plimplementf poliynoms onsistet sthefrtand mohe lmowesnt liniUe ofeprthectiiomn. er ta~pet recozeonomhically-viberet cong theise hneomes a snchml so cit nseks to uengemlo umete8 e. L ased anothe o these getndteira risks, 23. 4becmerality everniing Reseottlenment somila programsj projets iaiPmin wic.osther theprevernt poies do lexit civreate ipoerihet show ofhueod retrIncome htarend

r eonsiethve risk iunheretablon these lpraiones allowstasucshoilrss tow unfoldiv unistoimpedmed,cwng resettlement coga are ont bye the vdsk b to realassess dimplaenmeough products land foundtmsa ipolicenrmshmentsmroedtl approTntachems lnig iacnn implementingnresetlementeareoap
tois ciba con repeat -that taes imst freq onstianseverecass o ia overismnt have

r3 esettlement, addotbh noccurednpogrcamsial ung

Trgamsk Force toasseves displaceentsimpactrstworldie, fcouend creand muide ibydoesti noral inteoptionalo pwol gnerals.tratoegimes oanebaor

23.Reettlement

programsaebsdoaicming tpreventlr wimpeoverihmet presutore

iandcomrebuand crate

Inew, econWRomial-vp,%Iabl co mmuite nomlyaotoeow

enrlsrtge.Ln-ae

and smail rural businesses Non-land based resettlementstrategiesincludes actities such as occupational training diected credit,or industrial and servicesectordevelopment for job creation 24. Bothstrategiesmaysometimes be necessaywhena particular resettlementoperation involves both urban and rural people. Successl experiences documentthat, whichever strategyis seleted, a set of common fictorssuchasincentives for resettlers, involvement of alistakeholders and particularly of host populations, and stronginstitutional supportare necesary (see bao4.7). 25. Los learned daboduEnt 1m verlshm Reviewsm social science lterature, as wellasthe reviewof Bankprojectexperiences, showed that the mostimportantstrategy variablefor preventing impoverishment in rural resettlementis relocationof resettlerson lnd of adequate capabilityand with clear title. In urban resettlement,it is the restoration of gainful WV4WOmor self-emlopent, accessto adequateservices and, if possible, improved housing.

.~~~~~~J~

.~~~~~~~~~~~~I a.k

4g7 Th rein

fp pbcS

. ........

i~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ T. V,ii
.. ~~~~~~~~W ...... v ...

.'.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ VW VW. ..

26. The prncipal resettlement activityin rral as is providing&placed fimiles nth eplacement lnd. In most stuations, the dlfoan r land" strategy lads to reslts far sperior It l _X.p6a 0WO SAI

4116

paymentof cashcompesation. Bank cxperience withcompensation exclusively in moneyhas been largelynegatie, especiay in rural resettlement." Bankfindings aboutthe differential performance of cashverus landfonms of compensation are similar to those ofindependentevaluadons of the nonBank-financed SrisailamLowerManair,and Rengalidam in Indiaand in manyother counties9 27. Ihe need for formsof compensation other than cash is mostapparentin the caseof tribal or other minority populations whoseancestrallands have been exproprated. Resettlement posesa specal challenge to approaches basedon cashcompensation becausethe initialdisplacement is not the result of a voluntary land sale, wherepeoplecan choosehow to investcash,but a forced "sale by peoplewithno choice. The economies of manytribalgroupsis oftensemi-monetied,and peopleare not acctomed to managing cash,especially in largeamounts. Cashrecived is not only typically insufficient in a competitive marketsituation, but alsotendsto be frequently usedfor paying off debts,or maing rtual expenditures, rather than for producte investments.Culturalreasons converge witheconomicfactorsinto laving resettlersimpoverished and unableto reconstitute their formereconomy. 28. Four land-relatedissuesare of paramountimportancefor effectiveresetdementin rural areas: (i) eligiity (ii) landvaluation;(iii)replacm t land quality; and (iv) the institutional abit to identify and tamsfer lnd for land" to resettlers
3

. Landacquisition laws usually provide compensation onlyto formal ownersof land. However, in most projectareas, a large numberof people withoutfornal title to landbut dependenton it are alsoaffected. Thesecan
EjglflfbN

include tnbal groups whose ancestrallands were expropriated or never titded,

whie in urban areas they often includeestablished squatter neighborhoods and ifomal urban settlers. The recognitionof these affected peoples ntitlements is weak, most often unlegislated,and prone to subjective interpretations of rightsand durationof residence.The Bankhas taken the postion that customary land rghts shouldbe recognized under Bank-assisted projectsas validand eligiblefor land compensation. lAId oi Recognition of land rights,however, is the prelHmnary step only to assessingland value. Bank policyrequiresthat "displaced persons shouldbe compensated for their costsat full replacement prior to the actual move." In most counties, however,propertyvalues are calculatedon an asesd, or "book" valuethat is oftensignificantly less than the replacement value of the lost asset. The absenceof efficientland marketsmakes the calculation of market valuesa difficultprocess,and most govemmentsuse indirectmetxodssuchas tax recordsor land ceilinglawsto assessthe market worth of land. The LegalDepartment'sreviewand other studiesfound that in severalcountriesthe compensation is commonly chaUenged, wherecourts routinely enhance the awardby 50 to 200 percent for those who are ableto bring suit. Such decisions reflect the inadequacyof land valuation mechanisms. In urban areas,wherelandis scarceandexpensive, the question
n ad Rueulm hiAsf, ASThR dmft1991.
P.w U<LwMean*

Farsa Miar dbscwalof lod bunsinzub _mma sweLmdAcvLs

Seee of SrLuhn ? _ikdA&a Affsed?m

ned &doeaakomcV

of r.e*ffctd

Don,Hydmbeu Bu oulgBeandStaUs, a Gaat ovemntotAndus Pdb, 196; N.Beh acd P1.N y*ah y Jmwaid die a.sg hr'am of RD: A S&w*h Co*, 1993;B. GSuy-1uz and W. Femnas La, DaIopnmgDLIawitdPRdsaad w NcwDeL: ian Sodial JJtutea 1989; 03DCEa*Eqi whwy
_nsme, Repot No. 12142, M9I

--

--- i

0. S1oSam%

4/17

is whetherit is possible to pay enoughcompensation to enable a person to buy a comparableproperty, or whether cash compensationshould be supplemented by provision of replacement assets(ie., an apartmentor shop) to reconcilenationalneeds and individual entitlements. * lad quality.In manyprojects,the land proposedfor resettlementissurplus government land,littlesuitablefor farming.Fewprojectscoveredduringthe courseof thisreview had included landcapability surveys.Soilsurveys caried out in the first resettlementsites proposedfor the MexicoHydroelectric project,for example, showedthat the resettlementareas couldnot support viable fiamingsystems. Implementation of the resettlementplan for the HyderabadWater Supplyproject similarlyfound that the farms will not receivethe irrigation on whichthe resettlementfarm modeldepended. Instftutionalabilityto locateland. There are manyagencies andprocedures involvedin both expropriating condemnedland and acquiringreplacement land for resettlers. The role of institutionsand projects is essential,and institutional assistance, rather than simplecash, must be made available to resettlersto enabletheirrelocation on land. There are two apparently similar but analytically verydistinctaspectsto replacing lands. First,sufficient, goodqualityland mustbe identified.In mostparts of the world,agricultural land that can be cultivatedis alreadybeing cultivated. Countnes under high demographic pressuresuchas India,Bangladesh, China,or Indonesiado not have large amountsof uncultivated land that can be used for resettlement, and per capitaland ratiosare decreasing.The secondproblemis that, once identified, land mustbe transferred.A recurrentfeatureof the unsuccessful resettlementschemesreviewedby the Bank is that market mechanism are rarelyusedto identify replacement land,nor are marketpricespaid byproject agenciesto obtainit for resettles

29. Practical approaches to findLq land. A practicaldifficulty facedby manyprojects is findingthe land necessaryfor resettlingpeople productively.Experence has revealedsome methodsfor locatingland that maybe usedto advantage.Three highlycontrasting approaches for acquiring adequateland can worksuccessfully, each under appropriateconditions. 30. The first is to centralizethe task in the hands of the organization carrying out the project The typicalmethodused is to find one or more large resettlementsites, to whichrural communities or urban neighborhoods move more or less in their entirety, or as natural social
subgroups. The main advantage of this approach has typicallybeen that it takes advantageof land

alreadyownedby the government. Land acquisitioncosts are thus low,and the land is readily available.Nevertheless, experiencehasshownthismethodto be of limitedeffectivenessLand that is not developedis often not very good quality land, that it is expensiveto make productive. However,the resettlement operation does not alwaysrequire uniformlylarge plots or high development costs. Projectsthat alreadyplan to investin improving landquality,suchas irrigation commands or urbanimprovement operationswherelargehousingstocksare beingcreated,canopen up resettlementopportunities provided that provisions are madeto ensure resettlers'accessto the newsites. 31. A secondmethodis for the projectto act as the brokerfor individual plots of land. In the state of Gujarat,for example, land purchasecommittees were convenedto help individuals
SmWWIIAM.U~puiApi _ 19eft6 .R

4/18

negotiate fair prices for land and to help resettlers assessits technical suitability. The land purchase committees, which include local NGO and government representation, have had considerablesuccess in identifying land which oustees alone were unable to

Box 4.8. Innovative ways to identify land for restfiers: land consolidatio Although most reseiement orti : spci sllyor concentrat on locating relaement and displaced famiies, ina number of situ atimarewie is usd It *ames restementwiin ran approach abroader aricultual technical improvement and*form' Land conwodatioji lad consolidatio program of pinsoperit a rtitorAto fosra - n, an roadss0itablyrented 's Suchpo]rams brng resWersand waterapplitio ostsogether it aeasbigovedbyhproject; they oidis fr reseties to ha, t and y e e bOf 'n ia T Angesandconslid were used in ch proects as 's Sasi Provincial InteWsificQtio0 Agricltural ad theIritd Agricultural projects,Brazil's on Subsector program,and
Tailand's CinaoPhrya proJect. la these cas oplev

find, and in assuring orderly land

transactions. Priority for the institution acting on resettlers' behalf in acquiringland through the market is particularly appropriate when hfmers who have newly received irrigation sell off surplus land to gain capital and avoid land ceiling laws, which are usually lower for irrigated lands. Land consolidation in newly created command areas, in addition to its technical advantagesfor water management, provides another very promising approach for the reestablishment of those affected (see box 4.8). 32. A third approach is to allow resettlers or their representatives to find land themselves. This limits the burden on the agency,and allowsthe complexpersownal strategies and knowledge of individuals to come into play. In Orissa state in India, the Resettlement Unit of the Upper Indravati project put compensation and ex-gratia

fundsintoblockedaccountsforresettlers,to
be released at the time of the land he rsettets.land transctio by negtiatd transaction negotiated by the resettlems. Where resettlement needs are relatively small, "fi'-inu operations, at times with NGO assistance, minimize resettlement
distances. A transition period in which

diplacedprimarily by cnl as roads,rather.th by reservoirs alone,wereincluded in the poolof farmers provided ith cosoed, irrigated fms. eIence r have' t shows ouh someh to conoliatin cn b expected, fiarmer eventualy ofthedramatically theconceptstronglybecause supported inreas producton ad its:arWmanmer of spreading small lossesof landamong bothcategories: fmers ipaed bynewcanasor roadsand farmersbenefiting fromtheirrigadonthatthe projectoffers.
consolidation is no an ewy sol"on, neithertechnicallynor socially, but is superiorto many It requirescarefuladvmce planning otherapproaches. tlatiwludeskadteaure srveys, land evaluaton; and
This advance design of the irrigation infasucture.. process requires contnuous participation of the farmers and their represenaives by means of mechanism to resolve grievaces and generats the confidence that the

people have access to their old sites to

sustain their income while the new sites are

being made more productive can keep

claimed benefits will materialize for the great

number

ofpeople. resettlers' incomes at satisfactory levels, Such access is especially important where new land treatments, tree crop plantings,or the synergies needed for intensificationwill take several years to be profitable. Particularities of different crops demand careful timetables for movingpeople. Whenever income streams tend to fall, direct food support should be incorporated into project planningto address temporary pauperization and the risks of malnutrition.

33. Other income generatine uadcas,es. Most resettlement exercises currently focus on replacing assets. While this is a necessarystep, it is a limited one. In many cases, replacement is hampered by a shortage of resources (e.g., availabilityof arable land, particularlyin Asian countries)
_9"m %Wft"MV*WWn.CVM"ie

e. Q

t%

4/19

and strict duplicationof pre-moveconditionsis often not possible,nor is it alwap desirable. Householdscan and often wish to adapt to new environments by changingtheir mix of income sources,providedthat newalternatives are realisticand sustainable. 34. The Bank'sexperiences withlandsettlementandirrigation projectsreinforce the need for a broader approachto incomerestoration. Rural as well as urban communities almostnever engagein singleoccupations.Furthermore,in largeprojectsthat displace entire communities rather than individualhouseholds,significantproportionsof people affected by the project may not themselves be landowners:the rurallandless wholosetheiremployment, forexample, mayconstitute up to 50 percentof displaced communities. In landsettlementandirrigationprojects,an important part of projectimplementation is devotedto furnishing newsettlerswithtechnicaladviceon crops, agricultural practices, loans,marketing opportunities, etc. Allthese activities are necessaryto attain projectbenefits(measured bythe increasein farmers' output). A similar approach shouldbe adopted in resettlementplanning,namelyto designincome-generating packages that foster the productivity of the resettledpopulation(a more detaileddiscussion follows in the next chapter). 35. Job creo The need for generating employment for involuntary resettlersis real and mustbe addressed; but doingthisfor a largenumberof resettlersis not a likelyprospectunless substantialnumbersof jobs are alreadybeing created by an expandingeconomy. The Bank's expenence with employmentgenerationholds few clear signalson how to produce sustained employment for people,especially when manyof them have few of the skillsneeded for off-farm worL Chinaregularlypromises employment in newlocalindustriesto resettlers,allowing them to jump the queue ahead of other job aspirants,but so far there has been little evaluationof the success of this effort Experience withsmall-scale creditprogramsis mixed,and improving, but the real issueis the range of economicpossibilities for whichcredit maybe useful. It is unlikely that morethan some fractionof resettlersin anyparticularsituation willbe ableroutinelyto use credit as a keyingredient of their economic rehabilitation, andit isunrealistic to dispense credittoo Liberally in the hope that it willbe an effectivelever for restoringlost incomes. More promising are the strategies descnrbed in the firstpart of thischapter,that makeimmediate use of project-created new resources(e., reservoirfisheries, commercial opportunities, etc.) for the benefit of the resettles

36. The reviewof the economicperformanceof resetdementschemesreveals both successes and disquieting results. It also leadsto importantlessonsabouthow resettlementcan be done better. It showsthat with appropriateapproachesand resources, livelihoods can be restored sooner rather than later, but that wnthout sound project approachesresettlerswillinevitably find themselves worse off It showsthat recoveryis intrinsically difficultand complex- difficultfor resettders, difficult for the hosts,difficult for borrowing agencies, difficult for the Bankas well. Some socio-economic risks, real as they are, are not easy to counteract;and there are multipleand surreptitious socialrisksthat need to be counteracted. 37. The analysisalso provideswarnings, and most importantly, knowledge about what needs to be done, and can be done,whensome displacements becomeinevitable, particularly about suchbasicissuesas those related to land identification and reallocation.Mobilizing the energiesof

MIWa_aV4SWa..

s. Isma,

ama

4r20

all the social actors involvedin resettlement- resettlers,hosts,govemmental agenciesand nongovernmental organizations - is the onlywayto overcome the difficulties intrinsic in suchprocses. 38 Thefollowing chaptersof this review wfllanalyze *work processesthat are crucialfor prqect successand that maylargelyaccountfor the achievedresults. Someof the causesfor both success or failure can be traced back to the initial preparation and subsequent management of resettlementcomponents.

--

_Q

421

RAa
. . . ....... ..........

"i"
... .......... .

Zil

gx-m

5. Preparationand Appraisal of Projectswith Resettlement

1. Bank Borrowersare expectedto prepare a resettlemcntplan that addressesthe compensation, relocation, and rehabilitation of peopledisplaced by projectsin a waythat meetsthe resettlementpolicyobjectives. Projectappraisalevaluatesthe technical,financial, socialand legal resourcesand capabilities to implement the plan. This chapter is about the congruence between institutional policyprocedures, and their actualimplementation. 2. Four basicrequirements have guidedBank resettlementoperationssince 1980. All inmvestment projectswith resettlementsupportedby the Bank are expectedto include: * * * * Baselineplanningsurveys of affectedpopulations Resettlementtimetables coordinated with civilworksconstruction Resettlementplansto restore lost incomes A resettlementbudget.

MAIN FINDINGS
3. Previousreviewsdeterminedthat a majorweakness in resettlementworkis a failure to prepareand appraiseresettlementplansadequately.Between1986and 1992there were gradual improvements in resettlement preparation,but problems in the qualityof project preparation remaineda concem. Since 1992there has been a significant improvement in the resettlement portfoliocharacterized in particularby local involvement and participation by NGOs, institutional reformsthat increaseBorrowers' capacity to carryout resettlement operations,andbetter assessment of rehabilitation costs. But despiterecent improvements, recurrentfailuresin project preparation and appraisalremain the root cause of much problematicresettlement. Regionaland sectoral assessments of the resettlementportfolioshowthat. = The availability of baseline hnformationhas improved. Since FY91, 72 percentofall newprojectsincludedbaselinesurveysand this figurerose to nearly 100 percent during the reviewyear (1993). Inadequatebaseline workmeansthat projectplannerslacka realisticpictureof the numbersor the social and economicorganizationof affected people, which prevents realisticdesignof rehabilitation options. Forty-fourpercent of FY86-FY93 projectswithresettlementincluded baselinepopulationsurveys The numberof projectsinvolving resettlementwith apprised reetlmet plans rosefom approximately 50 percentbetween1986-1991, to 77 percent in FY92, 93 percentin FY93 and 100 percentin FY94.lhus, whilethere has been a major turnaround in the past two years, almosthalf of all active projectsinvolving resetdementhavegone to the Boardwithoutresettlement planspreparedby Borrowers and appraisedbythe Bank. All of these were approvedwellafter the resettlementpoliciescame into effect in 1980.

_ tap0 _

aw*

5/1

lmIse of flkanclaa _loctions earmarkedfor resettlementalso rose. On the whole,resettlementbudgets rose from an average2 to 3 times per capita GDP in the earl 1980sto 3 to 5 times per capita GDP by the 1990 Fmancialreporting also improvedover the review period, and in 1993 100percent of investmentprojectswith significant resettlementincludeda separate budget for land acquisitionand resettlement. Nevertheless, the availability of resources remainsa majorconstrainton successful resettlement. Costanalysis andfinancial planning for resettlementare ofteninadequateand financialobligations unclear, and resettlementoperationsfrequentlysuffer fromlack of funds.

4. Appraisal workfor resettlement operations hasalsobeen uneven,althoughtherehave been significant, demonstrable improvements in the pasttwoyears.LatinAmerica andthe Caribbean show the greatestimprovement, and energyprojectsare appraisedrelatively well. TWU projects, particularlythose involvingurban infr-astructure rather than housin& o 5 H d as v w often containlittle morethan broad proposa that mustbe reformulated in significant ways during impemetaton. While some hlee f4a we nabsie3rvyai. reformulation during J.Imhvrapojosolhvm implementatiois normal for al 1 i project activities,many ostensile lelsndast,n rpi plans depart dramatically from fiedd~~1 realiti the plan ae not acceptableto the people affected, resettlement sites are already Ailuote ~ ul ok oth
occupied or unsuitable for
I

resettement; and resettlement agencieslack mandate, experience, and ability.~.

S.

ao A _

When resettlement

''

plans were not incorporated into projec documnents, Borrowers' ~am. understandings of theirresettement
obligations have not been clear, nor

1t

need are ot k

rzas n etrZai,o so=

fi

nrsrcw are
i -.

wasBank management assuredthat

projects contain the measures

.i :as.tesil

ul them el
e

hu oelcsn
p

needed to attain the Bank's resettlementpolicyobjectives.As a

result of poor apprisal there is a

f . *44f***.

significant numberof activeprojects that do not contain the planning proyisons needed to restore the income of the people who will be displaced.

.
.

.-

S
* rt l!oe eoa

]RESET LEMENT PLANNING

6. Resettlement planscan onlybe as goodas the information on whichthey are based. Bank policysince 1980has requiredbaselinesuveys to: (i) identifythe scaleof resettement and establisheligibility criteria;(ii) calulate the incomelevelsthat resettlementplanningmust aim to restore;and (iU)monitorprogressand assessthe success of resettlementprograms. 7. Bse Tite auab ty of baslne iormation has improved substantially since the 1986review,particularly in the energysector. Only21 percent of FY8OFYB project reported baselie censusdata. In the FY86FY93period thisfigurerose to 45 percent (tabLe 5.1) and, sinceFY91,72 percent of newprojectsincludebaselinesurveys.

Table 5.1: Activeprojects with baselinesurveys by appraisal, FYS&FY93W

Afiica East Asia and Pacific East Europe and CentralAsia Latin Americaand Caribbean MiddleEast and North Africa South Asia
|~~~~~~~~

18 39 3 6 5 16 87 fiDar not nhade motorpjeot

peoo, or pajeta id lotW in th moviw.

7 19 1
3

39 49 33

_
20 50
I. -

1 8 39

Total

45

orpnMeowmaimed to dislac kwstha 200

& Ifcorrectlyassessing the sizeof the population to be displaced bysignificant amounts usuallyleads to major problems during project execution: project delays, resource short, compensation disputesand an institutional inability to prepare adequatereplacementresourcesfor the resettles Without baseline surveys,population counts rise unexpectedlyduring proect implementation, and programindicatorsand implementation benchmarks lose their effectvenesL Table5.2 describessome of the widestgapsbetweenBorrowerand Bank estimatesand the actual number disovered during project implementation. The lack of baseline work also makes it impossible to makedefinitive statements aboutthe extentto whichin-migration of peoplehopingfor compensation accountsfor the numberinflation,althoughfollow-up studiesfor mostof the prjects cited in tabk 5.2 did not find thisto be a majorproblem(box5.1).

_19"M.

51

Table 5.2: Project impacts of iacute

baseihe surveys

Zwe | E1 Ruzizi India Irndia Turkey Colombia India India 9.

than expeted:

1984 1982 1984 1987 1981 1989 1981 1986

135
0 ~

15,0Q -~~ 49,000 53,5Q0 13,000 5,500 24,000 19,000 150,0O0

I&It Singrauli Farakla IzmirWaterSupply GuavioHydroelectric MadhyaPradeshMediumIigation AndhraPradesh rltion II

0 3,700 1,000 12,500 8,0OO 63,000

Cameroon SecondUrban

here are four mainresons why affectedpopulations are often significantly larger * Projectpreparationoften uses outdatedsecondary sourcesor indirectcounting ratherthan datageneratedthroughup-to-date methods suchasaerialphotographs
site-spedfic social surveys

to increae the maybe revied duringprojectimplementation * Inadequatepolicies eligibility of affectedpeople not covered under the initia inadequatepolicy t framework are oftenundefined untiltheyare underway andresettlement * Projectcomponents is one of manyfactorsconsidered duringdetaileddesignL * Long overallproject life spansor implementation delaysoften associated with land acquisitionproblemslead to esistingfamilies growingand increasingthe numberof affectedpeople. Al of these reasonsargue for advance agreementson resettlementprinciples,procedures,and to respondto suchchanges. mechanisn that can provideprojectswith the flexibility adjustment

In theNmda SardarSan w praect:, t Bow

nialy dd no Incude ma of thetnwa ciaM ladin fo ad tita Borw,u poicIeswae adjustedto icu all peope affeced by the prqect, as agd wth the B and requi by te govenmentsorigina Nannada Wate Disut Tribnal Award.fi Whnsuvc wer update and adjuste to refec apanie ty 127,000 in 199 peopleIn 198 to app reettler populatio re hom67,000 _itkkme4t th totoal __VWW~9 4om

1Wn

&7ft

514

PREPARATION OF PLANS TO RESTORE LOST INCOME

10. Restoringincomeis the core of the Bank'sresettlementpolicy.Planningfor income restorationis neededbecawetraditionalprocedures for landacquisition and propertyexpropriadon often do not provideadequatemeansfor displaced peopleto replacetheir lostassets. Nevertheless, manyprojectslacktechnically soundresettlementplans,and severallackedplansto restore income altogether. Ts findingis buttressedby the regionalreports. Both the East and South Asia resettlement reviews reportedthat resettlement programs rarelyincluded adequately preparedincome restoration programs.The IndiaCountryDepartmentsingledout as its highestprioritythe need to provideoperationally meaningful definitions of "income restoration" that addressthe poverty profiles of affectedvillagesand prospective communities. Latin Americaalso found that until recently projectslackedadequatemitigation plans to preventincomedeteriorationamongaffectedpeople. 11. How can the lack of planning for economic re-establishment explained? Developing economicproductionis the Bank'score actnity,and the Bank has de-A..s of planning experience on whichto draw. Nevertheless, fewerthan 30 percentof allresettlementplansmention economic rehabilitation programs beyondcompensation. Despitean unambiguous Bankrequirement that resettlementprograms concentrateon incomerestoration,a first explanation for resettlement failuresis that in most projectsrestoringincomesis not a projectobjective from the outset. 12. ComwarLson of volontarY and involuntar resettlementschemes. Usefullessons about why resettlementprojects have often been unable to restore incomescan be drawn by comparngBankpreparationof voluntary and involuntary settlementschemes.Differences between voluntary and involuntary resettlementin rural areasrevolve largelyaroundpreparationand project recruitment.In inoluntary schemes, all families mustleave,no selectioncan be madeto recruitthe vohmteersmost likelyto succeed,and return migrationis impossible if the resettlementdoes not work Thus,involuntary resettlement shouldbe moredifficult thanvoluntary onesandshouldreflect morecarefulattentionto ensuringadequateplanning. 13. The recordisverydifferent.Ftvepairsof projectsinvolving voluntary andinvoluntary resettlementdesigned and implemented in the sameperiodand in adjacentareaswerecomparedin 2 Pairingthe vrojects termsof Bank staff inputs,preparationquality,and designfeatures. showed stildng contrastsin their approaches.Voluntary settlementprograms broughta v& ntyof technical skis to bear, prepareddetailedprograms to help farmersadaptto new physical and socioeconomic environments, and internalized settlementcostswithinprojectbudgets. With the exceptionof the Chineseproject, involuntary components were treated as an unfritunate side-effect of the main project,withpoorlydefinedcostsand no definedbenefits?. 14. Staffinput, differedconsiderably betweenthe two typesof project. The projects with involuntary resettlementcomponents concentrated almost exclusively on civil worksandusedalmost none of the Bank's staff expertisefor assisting with rural development, except for the Shuikou hydroelectric project in China. By comparison, voluntaryschemesused a diverse mix of Bank specaliststo reviewthe technical, social,and economicsoundnessof proposedfarm models. This

2tmae

wem Br=*

Paolo AIV

(inounta),

Agiutural Developmen mand ewnvoent

Proto,

Mato Grmo Rul

Deeopmnt (tvounay); hbde ih Power inlary), Tmsmgatlon iL xL IV (volnay) bnilwGO4ar Igation (Involuqnty, RajahnCana Command AmeDeveopment (voluntar)bNm Shlkou Hydroelectri (nvolu"nay, Red Soils Arm Development (volUntry); Ghana Kpou Hydroelectric (involuntay) VoltaRegionAgriultura Developmen (Voluna"y)
J E1lbarACanpwq#fVokoaymd4wayRsaiunmin WuBakAuiuedo , paperpmarepdtorthBaakwlde

Rmettlmc
rntlm_nwwEn,miD.i

Review,19936
0A. am

515

of staffinputsinto lies in the leveland diversity performance suggests that a secondcausefor Moor resettlementprojectdesigns of voluntaryand involuntaryprojectsprovideinsight into othe The comparison 1S. aspectsof resettlementprogramdesignand management: * Mana-erlal focus. In all of the voluntary settlementprojects,managerial focu development project,or waseither on resettlementas the core of an agricultural processin whichan effectivefkm reselement development on an agricultural successof the project. Thiswas not the case programwascriticalto the overal) projects that involvedinvoluntazy dev..lopment in any of the inErastructure resettlement. of newsite. In mostof the voluntary * Assessment of incomegeneratng gotential faced effortswere made to relate the resourceconditions settlementprograms, by farmersto realisticappraisalsof the income generationpotentialsof the of alternativescenariosand assessments enterprisesbeing promoted,including resettlementprogramsbenefitedfrom a assumptions.None of the involuntary families comprehensive analysis of the resourcesavailable to displaced * Farm models. The packageof resettlementoptionswas muchbroaderin the voluntary programs. "neynot onlypresenteda range of frm: models,but they also assistedsettlers to developoff-farmbased incomesourcesto complement farm income. Not only were the voluntaryfarm modelsfar more detaild at appraisal, but they were also moreintensiely monitoreddurng impletatio andin somecasesmodified as monitoring systems correctedmistaken assumptions The involuntary programs either had a single,generalzedfarmmodelor none at all, exceptfor the Chineseproject,whichprepareda varietyof resettlementfum
options.

sI- Plannersof voluntaryprogms producedpreparationreports that had muchbetter discussions of risksto farmersinitiatingagricultumal enterprisesin new and unfamiliar locales. Theyalso assessed risks fromuncertaindelhew of plans andback-up mitigation assumptions support,andtriedto adoptconservative devotedto were in everycasewholly programs of risk for involuntary Discussions investment risksby the Bank and participating donors There wasno indication that planners analyzedthe comparativerisks to the displacedfamiliesfrom adoptingdifferentresettlementoptions.

analysis of the supportthat settlerswould included * Duraion. Voluntayprograms need until full farm developmentand describedprovisionsmade to be sure supportwouldbe in placewhenthe projectfinished.The singlebiggest planning was limitingthe life of the proect to the programs with involuntary deficiency without proviing time necessaryto complete main project in sufficient post-relocationassistanceto the resettlers. Subsequent Project that therewasno correlationbetweenthe repeatedly Reportsshowed Completion development andthat neededto stabilize timeneededto completeinfErastructural new farmenterprises.

iuaXoo~

SF6

* iLvesttent levels. Voluntarysettlementprogramsinvest in productiveassets eightto ten timesthe amountof moneytheyplanto produceas an annualincome stream for settler families. The best - generallythe most recent - projectsin the Bank'sresettlementportfolioattain this level of investment,but the large short majorityappearto fal significantly that often revealsmajorplanningdeficiencies Plannlng adequacv. Implementation 16. for MTe originalplandeveloped or socially unacceptable. technically makeresettlementcomponents project, for example,failed to evaluate the qualityof the soil in the the MexicoHydroelectric principalrelocationarea whichwas not suitable for agriculture. In later sites selected by the workalsohas soilqualityturnedout to be adequate. Poor qualitypreparation resettlersthemselves, River Basin Komati for Swaziland's preparation been a problemin manyprojectsin Africa. Early workers into sugarcane populations couldbe transformed that pastoral assumed project,for example, once the project convertedtraditionalgrazinglands into canefields. Ethiopia'sAmibaraForestry wouldwiingly abandonherdingto workon forest assumed that Afar tribespeople project similarly that provedto lackanyfoundationonce the projectstarted. plantations,an assumption in resetlement fromparticipating affectedpeopleand localgovernments Excluding 17. in manylarge problems planninghas been at the root of manyproblems(box5.2). Preparation work firmsthat do the engineering projectscan oftenbe tracedto expatriateconsulting investment and governments More to workwith localpopulations staffor willingness but lackthe experience, Dam in Turkey or the LesothoHighlandsWater recent projectssuch as the Berke Hydropower Supply project, which incorporatedresettlement into the consultingfirms' terms of reference, and have made goodprogressduringimplementation. preparedplans that met Bank requirements sklls, firmsoftenstillfail to incorporateresetdement the reviewfoundthat consulting Nevertheless, with components teams,nor do theyprepareresettlement into their design localexpertise, especially the samerigor as the engineering components All of the regional reports found that involvingaffectedpopulationsin project I&* weremore for sustainedlocalparticipation that builtin mechanisms preparationand projectdesigns effective than traditional,top-downplans Aided by consultationprocedures deveoped for showmuchmoreattentionto methodologies morerecentprojectdesigns assessments, environmental project (FY94),for Sindh SpecialDevelopment Palistan's in planning. that promoteparticipation NGO witha strongfieldpresence an experienced set an importantprecedentby involving example, resettlementoptions and managingthe resettlementprogram. in setting up fora for identifying Remedialaction programsprepared for the Upper Indravatiand Gujarat Medium IrrigationII projects similarlyuse NGOs and communityorganizationsto promote income restoration in resettlementcomuunities. Use of pilot ro-lects. Becauseresettlementis often neglecteduntil late in.project 19. preparation,there are few caseswherepilot operationshave fed back into projectdesigns.' Fieldbody have a sufficient shouldbe a highprioritybecausefew countries testingresettlementproposals fine-tuning operations are underway, of accumulated resettlementexperiences.Once resettlement and the pressures complexity becauseof their logistical resettlementproposalsis usuallydifficult schedules in construction scheduleson the mainproject. limited flexibility created by construction reinforcesthe need for advanceplanningto ensure that results from pilot programscan inform overallimplementation.

iude twovey re ptecIMa, ' Important amceptioas

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20. Thetables. A signaficanttest of preparation quality and SAR adequacy s the presence of a sound schedule for executing the resettlement operation evenly over the project' durtion and avoidthe dangerous risk of end-hunching(see box 5.3). Carefidlydeveloped schodule are indispnsalin projects with large resettlement components, where planning must ordiate the logistics,budgetary outlay, technical preparation and staffingneed invoved in movijg tens of thousands ofpeople at a tma Monmtoring pMogressiSs-ular hindered when there s no timetabb descaninng wrhereresettlement operautonsare supposed to be at a given pomt i time. Prjects that do not adhere to the schedule must either patch together last-mnute resettlement operations or delay civl works to avoid resettlement rmises.

ml__,_@,1WMO#W 0. msetoSA1

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4

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21. Usefulresettlement timetables linkresettlement programs to keypointson the critical path of the project'scivilworksin waysthat meet construction deadlines but do not overwhelm the administrative abilitiesof resettlementagencies.These linkagesprovideboth planning oordiaa and measuringpoints during implementation to ensure synchronization of different activities. Effective timetablesalsorequirea mechanism to confirm that newsitesare readyto receivesettlers. Both principles were stronglyemphasized by Bank management and the Boardin the benchmark set for the Narmada SardarSarovarproject. Nevertheless, the reviewfoundvery few projectsthat includeda resettlementtimetablein the appraisalreport, althoughsome have timetableson fle. With a few importantexceptions, mostrelocationtimetables were drivenbyconstruction timetables rather than resettlementneeds(bor5.3). Theydidnot link displacement to plansfor preparing new resettlement sites,nor didprojectsincludeformal mechanisms to recalibrate timetables and resources whendelaysoccurred. Re-adjusting timetablesto reflect realistic targetshas been a majorfunction of the specialcorrective actionscarriedout as part of the Bankwide Review,andcloseBankfllowup willbe required.

PROGRESS IN RESETTLEMENT APPRAISAL

22. Resettlement plans. Resettlement plansappraised by the Bank andnegotiatedprior to Boardpresentationhavebeen a coreBankrequirement since1980.Ihe IQ86 reviewreportedthat only30 percentof the activeprojectswithresettlementhad appraised resettlementplans Between 1986-1991, the numberof plansactuallyappraisedby the Bank remainedlimited,hoveringaround 50 percent. Overthe last twoyears,however, the numberof projectswithappraised plansincreased to 77 percent of all projectswith resettlementin FY92,92 percent in FY93 (see tabl 5.3), and 100percent in FY94. 23. Planshave not been appraisedin a significant numberof still-active projects. Only six out of the 22 active projects listed in the June,1993India portfolio review had submitted resettlementplans prior to Boardpresentation'. Failureof the responsible organization to submit a formalresettlementplan in BangladeshYs Dhaka Urban Developmentproject (box5.4) led to cancellation of the component, andno resettlement planswereappraised for the threeprojectsactive in Pakistan when the reviewbegan. Of fiveprojectsin Indonesiaknownto involve land acquisition and resettlement,only two had resettlementplans when the projectswere appraised,all of the projects without plans have required correctiveactions and remain problematic. Only LAC consistently requiredresettlementplansfor projectsinvolving displacement prior to their appraal
(tabl 5.4).

Of the remainIg 16 prqects, one was a sector om, whibe anotho involvedonly 17 tamiles nd dd not Xnqi Fourtee ploects Iloing a total of SO0,M00 reseutle did not conform to this bsic Bak requiement otprpaig

p- bythe timne ofappralsal.

Pim
IM. mmO

a formal pa *ettl a

5/10

plans In Table 5.3: AppraIsl of resettlemfent

Bank-asssted projects, FY 198193

1986

13 12 13 10 6 13 13 7

__7

14
38 33 69 50 33 77 92 SS
ls a 200

1987
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 |TlOTAL |
fl

5
4 9 5 2 10 12 48

Does not includesedor poject or pojecs asumeb to diplc le in ft view. peol, or proj identified

24.

that

proceeded without

several projects

..
V .....

4 1IipA~*

appraised plans hav since incoportedrequremntsfor plans into conditkonfor Boar

presentation or loan ~~

201

effectiveness, with varying degreesof successin terms of

subsequent sumission and The quality. planning ECAlMNA report, for example,

'.P__4 =|

found that "commitmentsto submit resettlement plans subsequentto Staff Appraisal Reports were not always i upheld. Nevertheless,eve if a
plan is presented later, failingto plans rttement appri

_tE_l'
J4

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WE~Q~t

I __ _

.-

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concrrenlyvwth other project components deprive Bn

manageen_t of stafPs best
- ttsan..MG .

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assesmentof the adequacy and estimated costsof the ful project,including resttemen prposs and significantly reducesthe room available to reachagre_mt with Borrowers on basicobjeclvs and processes for resettlement 25. The ouallq f rsettlemelnt plans. The quality of resettlement plas varies considerably. Resettlementplansfor project suchas the Cuitiba urban resetement component in the BrazilWaterQualityand Pollution Controlprojectandthe Ertan Hydroelectric projectm Chia reflct closeattention to preparationof viableresetement packages, oordiation withciv wod constuction, and effectiveinstitutional delivery mechanisms 26. Bycontrast,in Africa,only15of the projectsactiveduringthe reviewperiodincluded appraisedreettlement plans;of these,anly 10were consideredto be adequateby Bank reviees No plan other than a consultant's report identifying likelyresettlementissueswasever locatedfor the Malawi Transportprojector the GuineaUrban E project,both of whichexperienced signficant resetflementproblems duringtheir implementation.

Table S.4: Active projects with appraised resettlenut pls

by reion, FY86-FY93'

APR
EAP ECA LAC MNA SAS TOTAL
Al Donahwouesor hlt in the .viw. poe

1_ 39 3 6 5 16 87
orpjoa

10 23 1 6 1 7 48
nd to dil

56 59 33 100 20 44 55
n 200peopb, orp*ot ;ideife

27. The IndiaDepartment'sreviewalsohighlights problemsm plan qualit, partularly in the income restoration aspects of the resettlementprogram. Me plan for the Maharashtra Composite ration M project consisted of little more than a re-statement of govenment compensation principles, and it is no surprisethat this was one of the first project that had to be restuctured following the Morse review. The PPAR for the Subernarekhaproject noted similar weaknessin the appraisal reporL The SAR stated that the Govenment of Bihar had formulateda general polcy on R&R, but the policy could not substitute for
-_Us15wzoXAD.i 5.sesaos
am

5/12

planning and the statement turned out not to be correct Ihe their layouts,the preparationof of relocationvillages, identification a detailed logisticplan for relocationand more specificplans for upon, andthe legal shouldhavebeen insisted economic rehabilitation worded(PPAR p. 6). shouldhave been suitably documents Regionalreports prepared for the BankwideResettlementReviewhighlightthe 28. general lack of careful resettlementappraisal. To the extent that resettlementplans are not it is rarelyclearwhetherresettlement by the Bank alongwithother projectcomponents, appraised proposalshave been fullyembracedby the government.The Africaregionalreport, for example, that: concluded work and appraisal Little is knownabout the qualityof preappraisal in the field,except in the few cases where resetlement speciafists Reportsdevoteonlyone or MostStaffAppraisal have been involved. to resettlement.Reportsoften usevagueexpressions two paragraphs rather than mentioning or "a few families" such as "somefamilies" or specificnumbers,and state onlythat "a plan has been developed" the affectedpeople. "a programhas been prepared"to recompense andfinancing.The implementation Fewdetailsaregivenon planning, of carefl containevidence projectfiles,on the other hand, generally betweenthesegood resettlementplanning.Ihe frequentdivergence in the field as noted by recent supervision plans and performance missionsindicates that appraisalmissionshave not paid enough preparedbyconsultants, that theseplans,usually attentionto ensuring were realistic and were fully endorsed by the government,the and the peopleinvolved. paticipating agencies,
29. Excess aggralsal
entimism One of the majorcticms made by the Wapenhans and Morse reports and repeatedby the 1993OED

i |
.*

I3

.*

resettlement study was that Bank

3EWibU4Y.

tended to overetiatet likly appraisals

performance and thus failed to put

1w

o h

ea~nPQ

a r enough emphasison capacitybuilding 4 ~ opoh f i to ensure proper needed ' implementation (see bor 5.5). The .a 3 X assessment. this confirms currentreview 4inlV'*~b. Correcting this deficiency requires 1 & carefulassments of previousproject performance in restoring resettler yet very few appraisalreports incomes,

r.t~

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|

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E

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|

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have included assessments of past resettlement performance (see Box5.6).

'l

Q.l||_ Isewme _WftrVIr4%V%9W*=AW

5/13

30. L e ga I 1;;<< documentation.A review by

the Legal Department found that wherever project descriptions included appraised resettlement plans, Borrower obligations were adequately reflected in the relevant legal

Bax5.6 Lessonsleedthelad

:ay
l

documents (loan agreements,

agreed minutes of negotiation, etc). Lawyers have been attuned to the legal obligations of resettlement plans and frequently incorporate resettlement and rehabilitation obligations into project documents where preparation and appraisal were lacking. Nevertheles, last minute
covenants cannot substitute for

ThehisWyof the.*mat MedimkripTi . ... -I Phase-U projects (Cr. 14966N8N shs the of prompUy learning Ina second project fom ite exae,of a ' om-. he phase proectconsistof 24dams,whdto of 14000eople. The projectcompletion rort t h ist ps nt #i *Qowisg lesons:-I *
.

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programs planned by the Borrower(see box 5.7). 31. Sectoral and program loao. Lending for . urban/municipaldeeomn, *ee water and sewerage, mediumsae irrigation, forestry, and othiertype of project is Often.yhpee.
i

pesnom __ _
t

opeaulilmn

tae _

n$a4.m .Fndpnrem

cates -e
._

chaeled

though stor

orettlement

program loans. Such subprojts am prepared andu e apprised by Borrowersduring projestm sre mentplanontn wt projectimplementation, but the th ess eyla.eA*in&eo4 ifw gIt4 Bank appraises the adequacy of The Pecstn ary SectorEergt pro vide a positioe the overallapproach rather than prgasfrteae iez-roet. mn 3(8A individual investments.i.ncasesimtmula i ~p14inoeponti where resettlement needs are not knownin advance, the Bank P* require only that appraisal os.
,

assesses

overall

resettlement

.,.

...

....

poficies, institutionadc.pacities,

and broadlyestimatednumbers of affectedpeople,althoughi individual sub-projects shouldprepareresettlement plansconsistentwith Bankpolicyas partof their design. The Pakistan PrivateSector Energyprojectprovidesa positve exaple of innovativearrangements (Box5.8).

Lga Aepct ofkhwohaay Rareui.nau draft report prepared by theLega Depauteme fortheEankuld ReetementwReview,

Februay, 1994.

%WM.KKWMWrAPd Is 0. M ,L

5/14

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policies witheffectveprograms to fortif socialandenvironmental capabilities. In seco loams wihere .mprovements to social and environmentalcapacitieshave not been explicitgoals,resettement performance is muchmore difficult to evaluate. The reviewwasnot ableto assessthe effectveness of the sectoral approach in achievingthe Banks resettlement policyobjectivesin such cases, priualy in urboan sector loans.

:RESETEMENT COSTS; ANDPROJECT BUDGETS

33. A majorfmnding of the 1986 reviewwasthat resettlement costswerepoorlycalculated and were not adequatelyreflected in project h~udgets.Despite some notable imprvmns inadequatefinancial planning remainsa weakness in resettlement components, andexplains muchof resettlement's unevenperformance.Particularly seriousare: * The poor qualit of financialreportingin projectdocuments.

* Incomplete calculations of allthlecosts accrung to displaced people.

* Inadequatebudgetsfor resettlementactivities. * The failureto includethe fullcostsof resettlement in the economic and finanlcial assment of the overallproject

m__ wwm...a,..

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5S /15

FINANCE ENSURINGADEQUATE
34. B2Rpde facial lnformatl Only 50 percent of the currentlyactiveprcts displacingmore than 200 people includeda budget for resettlement. The number of SARs earmarking resettlement funds follows the same overall patern describedearlier for other resettlementactivities less than half of the FY86-FY91 projects include resettlementbudgets, followed by a suddenjumpto 85 percentin FY92,and approaching 100percent in FY93-FY94.

A "A

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35.
to be a sigicat

C5osts forcpesto

components of a projocts andvewAtfement canbesubstantial

ent costscan imbas highas 35 percentwhetevery

showsthat raesetln t aeab d total cost A sample of 20ckxWprojectinoling rese.ttlement resettement hasbeen nwn that fornanyprojects thusMlustratig ninepercet ofapprail c0ots,
cost for some time. Rese

niumbers of people are are involed (Korea: TaeguUrban), large, highcopnainpayments prtect Yaqyreta - 50,00 people)or therelocated (China:Shuibou.-67,000people,Argentina: (Colombia: Guatapee I1). undergoes a difcut resttlmellt process infoarmation avaitale in SARsreflect littte oomcn for 36. Priorto 1990, fimancial for activitieL AlthoughwrittenspeaSkaDay adequatefinancialprvisioniog for resettlement
vmi *AL

sn6 A

resettlment planning, Bankeconomicand fiancial gudelines(see box5.9) have aely been used, despiterecurrentproblemswith resettlementfmancial aLysisSeveral projectsmergedresetement costs and land acquisitionas "prelimiay costse. Others - such as Medicos Hydroelectric Development project,India'sUttarPradeshPowerprojectand the CentralAfricanRepublic's M'bali Energyproject - added environmental investment to resettlemen Projectbudgetsoften did not disinguishbetween land acquisition, compenation costs,and the costsof providingdevelopment opportunitiesto resettlers in their new sites. They rarely distinguishbetween the costs of compensation for publicand privateassets,thoughthe cost of reimbursing a rtailway company for a singlebridgemay outweighthe costs of resettlingan entire village. Ite distinction is more than formal,becauseapparently high resettlementbudgetsoften maskvery low per-capitaresettlement aflocations.

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37. Resettlement costreportinghasimproved in the lastthree yea Resettlement plans after 1990usuallyhavea fairly detailedcostpresentation that discdminates betweenthe costsof land expropriation and socio-economic restitution,as in Turkeys BerkeHydroproject,Thailand's Ihird
_WS
-. -

Wm

5/17

Power project,the LesothoHighlandsWaterSupplyproject, and Argentina'sYacyretaI project. Evenso, becauseno standardpresentation form(seebar 5.9)basedon systematic criteriaiscurretly used to break costsdown,comparison and retrospective analysis remainsdifficult. 38. The lackof a standardpresentation of resettlement costshasseveraldrawbacks ; with the information curtentlyavailable, it is verydifficult to: * Checkfor coverageand accuracy of resettlementcosts. * Evaluateindicators useful for reviewing overall adequacy suchasprice-per-bectare or investment-per-person ratios. * Compareresettlementcostsacrosscountriesor projects. * Arriveat systematic standards or criteriato help country departmentsprepareor assessresettlementprograms. * Provide guidelinesand establishrequirementsfor Borrowers, consultants, and 7 contractorsto assessand present resettlementcOsS. Tese limitations affect the Bank'sown abilityto evaluateand financeresettlementproposals 39. Coss aggd to disuLahed neonke Whenresettlement cnstsareassessed incorectly, localcommunities mustbear an undueshare of the burden. Two typesof problemsare prominent. 40. Frst, compensation rates rarely reflect the true replacementvalue of lost assets, particularly for resettlerswho mustreplacelost land. Depreciationof assetsthat must be replad at marketcosts andpropertyunderassessments are both common.BankpolicycautionsBorrowers against providingcompensationat less than market rates because the resettets themslves, involuntarily displaced from their homes,have no choicebut to buy new assets. In China,private businesses are oftenundercompensated for lostassets;in projectssuchasthe Shanghai Metropolitan UrbanTransportor ShangbiiSewerage, state-owned enterprisesandprivatebusinesses are expected
to absorb many resettlement costs Since profitabilityaffects the enterprise worker whose salaries

are made up in significant part of bonusesfrom profits,such cost apportioning techniquesforce employees to bear a disproportionate share of resettlement'scosts In the Ksrnataka rrigation prect m India,localcourtsrabed compensation rates up to fivetimesthe valueasessed byproject officers, but onlyfor those whocouldaffordto bringa case. A Bankreview of compensation in four Indianstatesfoundchronicproblems in compensation assessments and payment.!Recalculated costs for landacquisition andre-ttlement in Turkey's delayedKayraktepe projectwent froman estimated $30 millionin 1986to mc...,than $180millionin late 1993,an increasedue partiaDy to economic growthbut primarfly to initialunderasments of propertyvalues. 41. Second,delaysin payingcompensation erodethe real valueof the compensation and forcedisplaced families to maintain themselves, leaving themwithinadequate meansto acquirea new permanentsite. Long delaysin payingcompensation are common: a case studyin Nepalfoundan
'See Davd NaMe,e 7nkcoResk cvob&y of Ra_on A Repoti to te WoddBnk, for a moredetled tatment of the fdancal calationof Iese_mt cass I Bankprojec 'h*a hwokaity hsw1nww: Repon No.116414CA, JUIe8, 1993 S Su*etBoe, bsda: LandAuds ad Ranet Pocvea andPwocdws, Ma, 1991. m

~..

X i6 s.

AL

5118 /OM

averagedelayof ten yearsbetweenpropertyexpropriation andcompensation payment.OEWs 1992 studyof the KarnatakaIrrigation projectfoundfamilies, displced in the mid-1970s, that had yet to receive their compensation. In Ghana's Kpong project, governmentalshortfalls meant that compensation was never paid to the 7,000affectedpeopleand their host communities. 42. Adeqanac of resetlement budgets.Reviews of recentlycompletedprojectspointto recurrentunderestimations of resettlement's true costas a chronicproblem. No activeprojectshave spentlessthan appraisal estimates on per capitaresettlement exceptby dropping the component, and the majority are spending significantly more. Costoverrunsfor resettlement havegenerally exceeded overallprojectcost increasesconsiderably. The Bank'sIndustryand EnergyDepartment'sanalysis of all energy projectsinvohling resettlementfound overallcost overrunsaveraged35 percent for hydroelectricdams and 10percent for thermal power plants, while resettlement cost overruns 10 The two Asia regionalreviewsfound shortfals in initial financing averaged54 percent. in all projectsreviewed. Cost inflationfor resettlementin Latin Americahas been equallyserious. Of eight projects,none began with an adequatebudget and the averagecost overrun in the region exceededoverallprojectcost inflationby appromxmately 70 percent. 43. More recent projectsshowa sgnificantincreasein per capitabudgetallocations for resettlement, reflectingbetter financial provisioning in general,with significant variations between projects. On average, projectsthat closedin the 1980s spent twoto three timesthe per capitaGNP of the Borrowercountryon resettlementby project completion.StaffAppraisalReports of most recentresettlementprojectsestimateper capitaresettlement costsat 3 to 5 timesthe per capitaGNP of the Borrower countryin the appraisal year. Ihe closecorrelationbetweenper capitaexpenditure and overallresettlementperformance suggests that thisgrowthrepresentsa positive trend,provided that the aUtoo commonincreasein the numberof people to be resettleddoes not pul downfinal per capitafigures. 44. Klgwm5.1 graphs resettlement budgets by comparingper capita resettlement 11 The graph showsthe high degree of vaiance in the allocations with per capita GNP figures. capitalinvtments allocatedfor resettlement. China'sErtan Hydroelectric project, for example, provides resettlerswith nearly13 timesthe resources/income ratio that the Tana Plainprojectdoes in Madagascar.As a whole,in fact,China'sinvestment ratioscomparefavorably with resetdement in the United States, Canada,or France. There was little variationby sector,althoughvwthin the same countryagricultural projecs reservedsomewhat less moneyfor resetdementthan energyor ifastructure projects As notedbelow, on average newerprojectsinvested considerably moremoney in resettlementthan did olderprojects. 45. Ihere is a closecorrelation betweenthe investment levelsdescnbedin table5.5 and project capabilities. None of the projects with a ratio of 3.5 or higher has reported major resettlementdifficulties In contrast,virtuy all of the projectswith a ratio lower than 2.0 are exerencing seriousimplementation difficulties.Throwing moneyat resettlement willnot solveal resettlementproblems, but starvingresettlementof resourcesis clearlythe first step towardsa resettlementfailure.

"See Deni Anderonad PabloGutman, IuY Rneultem Rew, L993

Rmkwm W Hyb" ft*o,

ae prepd

byWENED fo the Bwde

CtaGe cavets arec F1l, percta GNPfigures arc at besta rough:datw regoal nd loal varia canllt themhrn COmpah vestm budget witM cuet inomewould w ha beenpfabl butther wereso fewcases ere basine amp record curent ime hat thiswasnot possPolc Second, prect budget ofte agte rmt budges withcompbatioil for; w this casep- wererewed to remv Mm An 4gres are adjusted to 1991levl
_W51UMOWny"

s@

51/19

Figure 5.1

ResourceAllocalton for Resettlement

Projects CHINa -I:WA- 3
uter 0ttNA - doCA 3 Rd Arun EAN CHIN - Ya9ntan CHINA- ta. l1* 4 i

tan

_v

_I

4.BN- ZhfncPro

tor -

CJ*0Ifo' 4 i1A9im - Tultu hod _I CHINA - 3 Pt UWiADA - t^> a _b CARWID

I
_

CAWMN

b_ - wb & 2 PHILtPPINES- Onn shttlen faunc

INDIA- NTPC:VlIct_"_ Pro it_Z CHINA- Jlal _ LEt>DHio1lan t _ CHINA CHINA - Otume M*npil _a M4ALAH - N Trwneort _ Poltr

| I I I I I_ I

_ __
_

d
aa 1 ** 1 @ I I t | p | 1 * I | e

e
n d

f
o

e as the Hdr IrDIc INDIA - NtPC:Rlb w|W INDIA - 4pp D121 h1 NIGERIA - NUIttst c as - supp. I INiDIA b fr W-

rt I

12
|

10

S1

1991 Cal~~~~~~~OP./13P

res.Frt than 1 percent of the projeects reseemnFewer for 46 Bankfl ce fiSen,e fpndingfor resettlementacdvities Lackof Bankparticipaeonin resetblement inaudedBatek in a com son cause cited by task managteland counterpartstaff for ma resettlementproblemsc pr by creewg the rats can be overcome budgetsand unrenablefinancn provmiioaing Constrained is eligibptfor Bank an stancer More finance. Post-re.cation development share in resewoement
recet projects such as the Hyderabad Water Supply project in India or the Vi'etnam Highways

projectincrect Bank supportfor reset

mtlement.

COSTS OF REETTLMNT THE ECONOMIC

47.

PROGAI

objectives in two senses.First, canundermine a projec.seconomic Poor resettlement

nadequate preparation can cause project delays,which n tur can reduce project beneft Second, in some cases, faffingto account adequatelyfor resettlement can exaggrate a project's attractiveess and, in extreme cases, can encourage economicallymargina projects to proceed when alternative mnvsmnts would have beeri supenor. Sound resettlement preparation, on the other hand, can enhance a project's retumns. It facilitates smooth implementation, and the increased incomes of resettlers can boost a project's rate of return.

0__, --

.114a

U2

4& Poorlyplannedresettlementoften leads to delaysin project benefits In a recent revrw of 123 projects in the Asian region,as manyas 30 percent were delayedbecauseof lnd twoyears.A draftrevew the averagedelaywasapproamately problems; andresettlement acquisition of more than 580 irrigationprojects(OED, 1993)found that 22 percent of the projectsreported delays from similarland acquisitionand resettlementproblems. Projects in Africa,such as the fundsfailedto materialize Cameroon Urban II have been haltedbecausecounterpartcompensation andlocalresidents refusedto be resettled. Suchdelays and costoverrns have contrbuted to driving downthe actualor expectedeconomicrate of return of severalprojectsto very low levels(ndia: Andhra Pradesh Irrigation;Mauritania: Gorgol lrigation; India: SubernarekhaIrrigation). Colombia's GuatapeII Hydroprojectoffersan extremeexample: who were of the individuals ...the resettlement and compensation affectedby inundation requiredlengthynegotiations, largelybecause the Borrowerand the Bankfailedto anticipatethe compleatyof the problem involved...Thefinal costs of the resettlement,in US$ equivalent,was more than double the original estimate and the processtook about three years longerthan envisaged This delay, whichin turn delayedthe filing of the reservoirand storingof water energy, cost the economy the equivalent of..energygenerationfor an entire year. (WorldBank, 1981 PPAR Colombia: GuatapeII p.iv). llj&oelecricProjec,Repot No. 3718, to 18percent equivalent lossesamountedto $25.5millionof unsoldenergy, lhe resultingelectricity of the total projectcost. 49. Whenthe benefitsof a projectare delayedby one or moreyears,the economic rate of return can fail by severalpoints. A one-yeardelay in project benefits (with no delay in the scheduleof projectcosts)willreducesome project'snet present valueby almosta third; a two-year more than sufficientto delay,by more than hal Gainsfrom avoiding theselargelossesare usually finance the entire cost of resettlement. In Colombia'sGuatape L a project with very high - foregone benefitsfromevena one-yeardelayrather resettlementcosts-22 percentat evaluation costs. wouldhaveamountedto 83 percentof resetdement experienced, than the three yearsactually This proportioncan be muchhigherfor projectswith smallresettlementcomponents.In Turkey's Berke Hydroelectric project,whereresettlementcostsare only 1 percentof total costsat appraisal, five a hypothetical delayof one year wouldreducethe project'spresentvalueby$30 milliondollars, timesthe project'sappraisedresettlementcosts. 50. Successful resettlement, on the other hand can augmentprojectbenefits. In India: who were resettledin the command area MaharashtraComposite IrrigationII project,individuals fisheriesin the Sagulingreservoir(Indonesia: significantly. Likewise, increasedtheir productivity Tenth Power project)have come up with a thrivingbusinessthat adds to overallproject benefits. Indeed, 5 percent of the resettled populationproducesseveral times the previousagricultural productionof the entire floodedarea (see Chapter4, box4.2). 51. Resettlement costsand pro,ect returns. Providing adequatefinancefor resetdement to ensure incomerestoration,and accounting fullyfor suchcostsin a project'seconomicappraisal will affect the overall attractiveness of the project. But could providingadequate finance for resettlementjeopardizeprojectviabiLity? Ihe evidencesuggests that in mostcases thisis unlily. A carefulreviewof completedprojectsshowsthat cost overrunsfor resettlementwere not a major worksand delas brought project performance.Cost overrunsfor physical cause of disappointing
S IS"
.&.M a

512l

about by resettlement were the dominant reasor- why some projects perform lss well than anticipated. 52. It maybe argued,however, that even whereresettlementcostsrose abovewhat had been projectedat the timeof appraisal, financial allocations were stillinadequate.Wouldfurthercost increaseshave jeopardizedproject viability? Here again the evidence suggeststhat providing adequate resourcesfor rehabilitation wouldseldommale the overallproject unattractivebecause resettlementgeneraUy (though not always) accountsfor a smallproportionof total costs. TIis is illustratedin table5.5, whichshowsthe sensitivity of rates of return in dam projectsto increased spendingon resettlement. In a smaUnumberof projectswhereresettlementis large and project retums are not muchgreater than the opportunity costof capital,the viability of the projectmaybe threatenedif fullprovisioning ismadefor resettlement.In suchcases,majorrethinkdng of the project clearlyis required. For most cases,however,the evidencesuggeststhat it is poor resettlement planningand management rather than providingadequatefinancing for resettlementthat reduces project returns. 53. It has been arguedthat if all resettlementcostswere assessed, some projectswould be discarded oneconomic grounds.Thisargument assumes that resettlement andenvironmental costs are muchhigherthan currentlyestimatedat projectappraisal. However, whileseveralevaluations of severalclosedprojectsin the Bank'sportfolioconfirmthat cost overrunshave reducedprojects' economicbenefits,overrunswere rarelylargeenoughto jeopardizethe project'seconomic benefits by themselves.Instead,a combination of overallcost increases(including resettlementcosts)and reducedearningsare usualy identified as the sourcesof project failures(examples includeZaireRwanda-Burundh RuziziII; Guatemala Chixoy).

COMMONFACTORS IN PEPARATION AND APPRAISAL DIFFICULTIES

54.
This

chapter has documented recent progress in project preparation and appraisaL

buthas focusedprimarily on areasneedingimprovement. In reviewing existing weaknesses, a number of commonfactorsemerge: * gompensation,not Income restoration has been the objective of manv resettlementplans prepaged by Borrowers If straightcompensation rather than socioeconomic restitution is the goal,it is not surprising that baseline surveywork and development of rehabilitation packagesare wealk Only 30 percent of the reviewedresettlementprogramsdefinedincome restorationas their objectiv Technicalskillsnormally used by the Bank and Borrowers for rural and urban projects that intend to develop productivityare rarely used in resettlement operations.

._

tasao

AL

5)2

TableS5S: SenstMvity of the internaleoomic rate of return to resettlement cost ovwus o activehydropower projectswith resttien t
Nccesry Reglon/Cournty/Ptoject Projet Appov Estimaed Rate of Retr (1) Resealemet as % of total poject cost (2)

incrcasin
stement cods to wr t projects rtum beow 12 pert

d&ka

C.A.R, M'BhliEnery * Lesodto,Highlands China, YantanHydro China, EbtanHydro China, Daguangba Hydro China, ShuikouI and I India, Upper Jndavasi Hydro India, KRla Power India Nag"paJhakr Hydro Thailan Power Sydatn m Tuwkey, BErko Hydro Almfrka ond the Caribbean Argentina,Yaoyfea I and H MexicoHydroelectric

1989 1992 1986 19 1992 1987 1983 1985 1989

1992

14.6 12.0 12 IS 15 14-19 12 13 17 16 15 24-28 13

5.3-8.9 4.8 12.9 6.4 17.3 28.2 5.2 3.0 0.04 4.8 1 14 2.3

337-566 416 77 375 145 71-248 200

500
11,250 62S 3,000 571 652 259 IS8

1992 1992 1989

Averagefor 13 projcts where esdinued resetlment coss in SARs wer 4 percet or more of tow cost Avemage for 6 projecs where esimated resettlemnt costs in SARswere 10 percent or more of
totaloosts_____

IERR. Intral EconorAic Rate of Return. (1) Etimatd intnral oonomicrate of return (IER) at appraisl. (2) Figuressae taken from Andersonand Gutman,1994with all the restictions mentioned therein. (3) 11is measur the pert incea in rm ent coststhat wouldreducethe IURRbelowthe opotnity of capital (assumedto be 12peren conservatively).

cost

Failure to conmlt with affected DeoDle other govesment aeneies. and

NGOsproducespoorquality pbns. Plansthat are negotiatedwith affected people and establishgnievance proceduresare more realisticand likelyto worlc Top-down plans are often technically inappropriateand not accepted by the people and agencies expectedto implement them. * Thefinancdal grEslonungand adeonacy of resou_reflowsfor resettlmnt costs are often measured has fallen short of what ls needed Resettlement againstoutdatedand inadequatecompensation recordsrather than the real budgets costsofincomerestoration that the resettlersmustbear. Constrained
sAi

_WGm*AeI 042O

5123

and rgid procedures withinprojectagencies furtherlimittheir abilityto make investments neededfor incomerestoration.
*

NAd a8pu rUce8 aveofte be earmarked for other grolget com Uonents nd are nt availablefor-develoin resettlement _~uii. Becauseit iscomple, resettlement is a staff-intensive activity,yet few projects allocate adequate, incrementalresources for preparing and appraising resettlemnt and available Bank resources(PPF) are rarely used by Borrowers for resettlementplanning.
Prnat

Interal reviewgrocedures vwit the Bankhave not adeguately captured BrJtel no w it eme t at a sunfflentlyearlystage Until 1990, there was no systematic flagging of resettlementat an IEPSstageand no mechanism to checkthe qualityof projectpreparation.Resettlementplanningoftenbegan late in projectdevelopment, withoutadequatetechnicaldesignor adequate understanding or agreementby Borrowm. Manyof the plans are prepared to meet a formalprocessing requirement,rather than the result of carefud preparationby the Bormwerthat has been revwed bythe Bank. Attempts have been made to correct this through the revied EA proceduresand greater use of PEPS and RegionalLoan Committee meetings.

Processln bas contued despitehcomplete

planin An appraised resettlement plan has been a Bank processingrequirementsince 1980. Nevertheless,although project appraisal may determine that plans are inadequate, projectprocessing oftencontinued throughto negotiations, Board presentation or projectimplementation rather than requiringan acceptable plan before any further processing took place,as is standardpracticewith other components.

55. Eachof theseproblems can be remedied.Govenmentplanningcapabilities are being strengthened and new approaches introduced to sectoral agencies. Processingresettlement components that meet the spiritaswellas the letter of Bankresettlementpolicy mustbe internalized withinindividual countrydepartments, andresettlementneedsto becomean integralpart of project designs.Countrydepartmentdirector$projectadviser, andregional managers need to be kept fully awareof the statusof resettlementoperations, andmustenhancetheireffortsto ensurethat the final designfor eachprojectimvolving resettlement fullyreflectsBankpolicy.Actionsunderway to address shortcomings in preparationand appraisalare discussed in Chapter&

_Wpomp

I_

0.

^msem

5/24

.4 v.'..

.. *

..

.4.

.............

I .A........

4.,..,.

w
/.. '...'.',..'...... ,., . .. .

6. ProjectSupervision and Implementation Performance

1. Implementation of resettlement components isthe responsibility of the Borrower, but the Bankalsohas a responsibility to ensurethat implementation isconsistent withprojectdocuments of whichproject and Bank policies. The Bank has severaltools to assessprojectimplementation, supervision is the most important.' Supervision missions * * * * MonitorBorrower compliance withdevelopment objectives andprojectplans Providetechnicalassistance. Suggestmid-course corrections. InformBankmanagement on implementation statusand requestintervention if required.

2. Resettlement supervision is in principle no different fromthe supervision of anyother of project component,althoughthe time, resources,and skillsrequired for effectivesupervision resettlementmaydiffer. Effectivesupervision dependson CountryDepartments' abilityto allocate resourcescommensurate with the complexity and specificneeds of individual projects,and their dependslargely the findings. Project performance, on the other hand, willingness to act promptly on on Borrowers'commitment to projectobjectives or "ownership", and their institutional and other capacities to executethe project

MAINFINDINGS
3. The frequency, quality,and effectiveness of resettlementsupervision haveimproved substantialyin the past two yeats. Nevertheless, problemsremainthat require significant changes in how countrydepartments approachresettlementsupervision. * Frequency.The proportion of supervision missions reporting on resettlement was constant or increased slightly between FY86-FY92,with a major improvement taking place during the FY93 review period. Resettlement componentsin virtuallyall large irrigationand bydroelectric projectsnow receiveregularsuper-sion, manyby resettlementspecialists.Nevertheless, missions to projects with resettlementactually only56 percentof allFY86-93 andlessthan 25 percentusedresettlement reportedon resettlement progress, specialists. Quamlty. The qualityof Banksupervision is variable. Neitherthe Bankas a wholenor mostcountrydepartmentshave had sufficient specialist resources Technical departments, whichare expected to provideadequatesupervision. to provide specialistassistance,have tended to concentratetheir scarce
n, Marnc 1989(rvisd Januay 1993).
MAm

tSee OD abS, ltoject S&V _

*_ w~
0,gs0o

611

resourcesprmarily on project design and appraisaLRecent initiaties to strengthensupenrvsion capabilities by developing Bank regional officesor resident missionsand Borrowers' own monitoringabilities have led to significant improvements. * Availabiity of information. Lack of resettlement plans and inadequate reportingformatshave made it difficultfor Bank supervision missionsto obtain necessaryinformation in a consistentmanner. The qualityof Bank back-to-officereports has been mixed, reflecting a limited ability of supervision missions to makefieldvisits. Effectveness. Supervsin has not been usedas effectively as it couldhave been. Resettlementsupervision is most effectiveas a form of technical assistance to help Borrowers refine and improveresettlementplans already agreed with the Bank. It is least effectiveas a substitutefor adequate planning. Supervision also helps to assure that policyobjectiveswill be achieved whenadvanceplanningis not possible, such as for programlending or projectswheredetaileddesignsare finalized onlyduringimplementation. Suchprojectstypically receivethe least supervision.

4. BorrowerImgiementatlon rfiormance.Supervision missionshave identifiedfive factors that accountfor uneven project implementation.These are: (i) inadequategovernment commitmentand non-complance with project agreements;(ii) failure to aliocate resources; (ii) institutional weaknesses; (iv)lackof pecples participation in projectdesignand execution; and (v) poor technicaldesigns in resettlementplans. SUPERVISION IN PRACTCE Supervision of activeptojectsreflectsthe overallprogresson resettlementmade by the Bank between 1986and 1993.2The number of projectswhere resettlementwas supersed increased immediately afterthe 1986review but declined somewhat untilthe beginning of the current review. The extra attention and resourcesrecentlyassigned to resettlementproduceda dramatic increasein resettlementsupervsion in the PY93-FY94 reviewperiod (tiguw6.1). Resettlement components in alllargeirrigation andhydroelectric projectsnowreceiveregularsupervsion. Projects involving large-scale displacement increasingly use suchadditionalinstruments as mid-termreview and sometimes independenttechnicalreviewpanels appointedby the Borrowers to assessproject implementation.
3.

6. Tbis improvement is in contrastwith earlieryears The reviewof 80 activeprojects involving resettlementrevealsgreat variability in the intensity of supervision betweenFY86-FY93. The reviewof supervision filesfoundthat, priorto FY93,130missions whichsupenised 15projects resetding 105,000people, made no reference to resettlement. At least annual supervision of resettlementoccurredin only55 percent of the sample,and only30 percent of the projectsin the

2This chaptp is basedon superviion rewdf. ora sample of 80projects. Codig the adequacy of resettlemetsperAi

prests sveral metdolcal dicuti For the purposes of th review, resettent was counwdas supevind Ueitherthe aidemeoirc left wth the govriment or the mnlsdon bawk-to-offiSc report _lcl commed on _ueflemeat Becae svea addiional projts wih previous uucted reselemen wereidentified duringthe coure of the rview whichwae rary
supevision fiequenciesupwanhs

supervised for resettkment sample bias ska

_mtwavawusw6suewm 5 .is 5 i S. 10alO a*A

6Q2

sample werevisitedregularly byBankresettlement specialbts.Resettlement specialitswere involved in 24 percentof the 696missions supervising projectswithresettlement.However, until the teview began,approximately 40 percentof allspecialist missions hadconcentrated on just nine projectswith the largestresettlementoperationsand with the most complex implementation problems.
7.

Significant regional differencesexdst in the extent to which l resettlement is supervised. LAC scores particularly
well: task managers
l00

Fiur Resettlement

6.1

Supervision In Percentage

supervisel resettlement on a regular basis, and

this region takes so Supersion onceear
+ Supervsionby
40

greatest advantage of specialist e=pertisc (tabl 6.1). 1

South Asia's

supervisioncapacity h a s b e e n
strengthened

significantly since the formationof the resettlementunit in the New Delhi

offae. In contrast,

specialist

20

resettlement

in
o
1NSS 19890 01881 1992 1390
_,,---.___ __---_ ___,__.__--_

projects in Africa

was supervisedonly 1998097 interm itte tl either l by specialistsor by task managersuntilthe reviewbegan.

& There are also significantvariations in sectoral approaches to resettlement. Resettlementwas supervised at least annuallyin nearlyall agricultureand energyprojects,but 45 percent of the 49 transportation, water supply,and urban (TWU)projectswith resettlementin the sampledid not refer to progressin resettlementin anymission reports. Specialist supemision shows a similardistribution(table6.2).

\~ _

~~~

8,O

sAL7 %

613

Table 6.1. Resettlement supervision by region 1986 - 1993 REGION

Numberof projects with resettlement %withresettlement suprvised at leastonce per year
[

|
19 47

EAP ECA LAC MNA SAS TOTl

26 42 4 s0 6 100 3 33 22 68

% with specialistsuperviion at least once per year

11

27

25

100

33

32

* This umbe efe to the sampe for the idph

sp

n study.

ADof the regional reports prepared for the review indicatethat socialspeiblists contributea distinct"valueadded!to implementation qualityand performancein resetlement. The Africaregionalreport states this pointwell:
9. Use of spelalis.

he lnks between project performanceand participationof a reselement spedacast ame increasingly clear. Continuous involvement of a specalist helps produce good project designs and resolve implementation problemsas they come up. Of course, it cannot overcome the obstacles presentedby lackof political willon the part of government, andcan onlypartlycompensate for lackof capacity on the part of the implementing agency.But the generalconclusion from thesespecialist vicitsis that much more couldbe done to enhancethe development mact of projects by attding more closely to die prbkems of displacedpeople, even when resettlement is being executedin a satisfactozy way. Resettlementspecialists have been ableto assistgovernments in dealingwithunanticipated problemsand to bring other actors (NGOs, donors) into the picture. Such assistance has generally been welcomed by the implementing Governments,and their supervisionrecommendations have been followed up on the ground."'

Africa Tedic
MrW_WWAF *

DepaUMe,
S.a

egial R
sm

exeRa

R Rt

fr

ee BnhlWe Re

November 15, W&

6/4

Table 6.2. Resetlement supervisionby sectors, 86 - 1993

Resettlementsupervised at least once

per year (percent)

80 50

75 42

39 18

Specalits used at least once per year (percent) MissiaDons reportiig on resettlement
(percent) Missions using specaist (percent)
3T wn & of 80 prqieat inClud
_

67
__

64
27

46
15
in this tb.

40

1 ENV and I PHR project. They wmvot incldd

la

Actual use of resetement expertise on projects has been uneven. Only 18 percent

of TWU projectsweresupervised annually byspeciaists,despitethe fact that TWU accountsfor 51 percent of aI projectsinvoling resettlement. Participationof resettlementspecialstsis thus not routine. Specis tend to be usedwhenresettlementis identified as an issuedurng projectdesig and appraisa or when resettlement has become a major problem, either because it delays implementation or tdggerspubliccriticism. 11. Does * Ltte ack of resettlementsupervson does not necessarily mean that projectsawe not performing well. SeveralChineseprojectssupervised duringthe Bankwide Review, for example,were implementing resettlementprogramsadequately withoutrequing specialBank attentin Resettement in Inda's NathpaJhakrihydropower projectalsoappearsto have performed 12. In mostcases,however, ignoringresettlement until it becomesa problemis counterproductive for the BankaswellasBorrowers (bor6.1). Resettlement operationsin severalpreviously unsuperised projects, suchasthe DoualaInfastucture projectin Cameroon, the Nigera Multi-State Water Supplyproject,and the RegionalCitiesUrban Transportin Indonesiahave alreay become problematic.In suchcases,belatedsupervisonis better than no supervision, but it is unrealistic to expectmuchto be accomplished so late into projectimplementation. 13. The debateover 'Icrementallsue. For someyearsthere has been an activedebate in the Bankover the suitability of %ncrementalr approaches to resettlement. 'Incrementaisme means that supervisionis used to obtain successive, small improvements to achieve overal project resettlementobjectives when preparationhas not been adequateand the Bank and Borrowerhave not agreedon resettlementobjective and means Much of the debate over the Baniksstrategyin the NatmadaSardar Sarovarproject, for example,was about the adequacyand effecdveness of incrementalism6
~ ~~~ Xm~e&. *6

\|

ulg*at

ii55 vE r[Lv

14. dI'at. seA mrmetL

debat,phowm,~s is mtore semanti ta n subtantia AlU develovmt ii ome no ~ amon ts*of advn u planmgcanavoi t totm nee roj fof 4adjus~tments, iw a

and closeattenintofed ra tieL4s Yet tm~v.oA stheextentthat pincremento*h iused. asasusitt the mc.mnta aprah the Bank foundt whf at thr weremany.
an bc-sh i

*much~o f thIisl
Fu~r

progs wa neededwasimply

ovroeo6alsotii to

lmntr

sene nementas nos mrasmount ofeadvned plnigcayvi theBorw,whsa need foreajsmentshu, imprmovemens and closes attntcontoatfildreparaties. Yet tohe Uperxtesnt thiatincemntalismt reausedasga subtitut reeforets betien the resettlement plannigdfne.yBnSpolicy,o theusel recred itshaiue of aseqany ofperatina

strteg isclar Evenindth p resettlment'

inaermadacs wiher thek Bankgr putiunprecdente n

resorelveala intobe

jctives and the vreseittlemnt

plnsupervision nest n thesfocusedonthe99 (adeuc of la

'B."4ZAwld LMoewLeea d
gWiS --

WmdeEWpeuiaww. ,s eIda anirsarvs r (Nanada) hjVSe ecmn93416, May24,193

a t.700

*m./

16. Absence of percehedn_ed Becauseresettlement has oftenbeen scheduldo to ocur in the latter phases of a project, task managershave often not perceiveda need to supervise esettlementin the project'searlyyeas In reality, the earlyyearsare vitalfor telocationpreparation.

J<ox6.2.
2a0mO-. pop...le..;.. ^ 49i, <i> '. a .

r'"ycte

ithe Uppe KrsnMrjc

g .i the Qoenoto A

portfolor

0.. -

.IUI"J,'Wi4a'"4
X,

~~~~~~~~~~...-..., .. ,-....-.. .o -

-a.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~C
X r =~~~~~~~~~b-ad W...

17.

Absence otfresources for suprnision. Task managers havesometimes assumed that to happen duringgeneral

super 0 sing resettlement requires sacdficing supervisionof other project components. Unless there

is an explcit demandto superviseresetdement, .celyit has been less

project supervision because of time constraints and demands on misson time for reviewiogcdvi

works financia, and pocurement components. In large operations,resettlementsites can be at substantil distances romthe mm projectwork The numberof available mision daysis often gsufficient to vmgt resettlement operations and makesite assessments of performance. Meetings with

"MrJavaWWW"

MAN&v~

Xeelio *^%

tm

resettlers,localgovermet official, and localorganizations require additional time unlikey to be availabbfor teamswhosemainconcernsand professional expertiseare elsewhere. I& Absenceof merormaneIndicators. To a large extent, the problem of absent performance indicators flows romthe lackof adequateplansagainst whichprogress can be assessed, andlackof reliableproject-generated information. Taskmanagers andspecialists alikehavedifficulty ihterpeting the findings of brief fieldvisitsunlessthere is a consolidated initialplan and timetable for what is supposedto happen,againstwhichprogresson the variablescriticalfor resettlement success can be measured. 19. Absence of ia rogiate skill mixes. Taskmanagers havesometimes felt ill-equipped to assesswhether resettlementoperationsare being successfully implemented. In hydropower projects,for instance, rural resettlementinvolves a highdegreeof agricultural development planning and urban resettlementcausedby transportor waterprojectsessentially involves housingand urban development: both sets of skis are verydifferentfromthose of the poweror highwy engineer.Not including technicalspecialists is only part of a broaderproblem. The most successful operations includemixesof skills such as agricultural economists, soilspecialists, architects, or urban planners as they are needed, in additionto overallspecalists in resettlementoperationsas such. Ihese technicalskils normallyexdst in the neighboringsectoral divisionswithin the same Country Departments.

RECENT MROVEMENTS
20. The qualityand intensity of resetdementsupervision improved dramatically overthe courseOfthe Bankwide review.The 12monthperiodprovidedtime for two roundsof supervision, particularly of projectswith large resettlementcomponents. The first round identifiedissuesand reached agreementswith Borrowerson specificremedies;the subsequentround evaluatedand reportedon the improvements actually implemented (table6.3). In total, 93 projectswere reviewed in the field,including almostallprojects withresettlement affecting over 1000people,througha total of 158missions. 21 Sending out sucha largenumberof missions in 1993 wasa substantial effort;a limited segmentof the portfolio,consisting of projectswithless immediate supervision needs,couldnot be covered. The capacities of all Techical Departments(TDs),relevantCountqy Departments, and manystaffwere stretchedto meet the review's supervision schedule, aswellas to continueto prepare FY94-FY95 projectswithresettlement.The fieldprogram wouldnot havebeen feasible withoutthe $500,000 mid-year supplementary budget allocatedby managementfor this exercise.It was used primarily for additional consultantsto join supervision missions.

0, Im7

M*A

61

Table 6.3. Resettlementsupervision,1993

r
Region Ptjects Ith R melem 26
7 l .b

Flat Supelo

bawy June I Spedalst ia 16 12 13

4 2

SeoondSupervsiaon

Jul

December

bWl

PFectj 22 13 25
4

ProectS ted 22 14 9
4

Speciaist A 1S 12 2
4 2.

Prject e Vld 26 1l

.p' ais Assbtauoe :

AMR SAS EA4PJ'

ECA

32

S55
S
8

30 .%
l

MNA
IAC oTh.
pnjects

S
7 76 esetem
paut of the Review.

S
7

6
7
9

8 134'
tned in the lat

3 38
supeviio

S4

61

Iwsomeactie poj

has bbencompleted and didnot requirertement

Tbetab doesnot include

22 Thereview's fieldmissions were carriedout under "Generic Termsof Reference" for the revew/speiion mions, developedby ENV's Task Force and approvedby the Steering Committee. The terms of reference requiredthe missionsto go beyondshort-termaspectsand explorebasicgo andtcal issuesin resetdement components:restoration of pre-displacement ncomelevels:landavailabfilty andvaluation; cashcompensation patterns;consultation with affected people;and the Borrowes organizational capacity for resettlement(seeAnna 2, GenericTOR). 23. Ihe skill mix used for supervising and guding projects was changed to increase specialistuse. Bank Task Managersperceivedthis as welcomesupport. In the Africaregion,for example,projects with resettement rarely had the benefit of specialistsupervision. With the eeption of the Cote d'IvoireForestry,the LesothoHighlandWaterproject,the Central Affican RepublicMbali Energyproject, and the KenyaThird NairobiWater project,none of the active projectswithresettlementin the regionhadbeen superised bya resettlementspecialist. Duringthis review,the Africa region sent resettlementspecialists to analyzeproject situationsand propose remedialactionsnot only whereTask Managershad identificda crisis,but also to manyprojects 5 Bythe completion wherereguar projectsupervision hadreportedno problems. of the review, more than two-thirds of activeprojectsin the portfolio(withthe exceptionof recently identifiedprojects) were visited at least once, and in some cases twice,by a resettlementspecialist. Resettlement specialists, staff or consultants, were on 71 percent of supervision missionsin the first round and 58 percentin the secondround. The sameistrue for the MiddleEast/European andLatin America Carnbbean departments. 24. Much of the specialistexpertiseused on resettlement came from the country. Experiencein the reviewthus demonstratedthat significant human resourcesexist to help solve resettlementdifficulties that canbe usedmoreextensively by the Bank in futureworkthat wouldnot involvethe high costs and complicatedarrangementsof intemnational recruitment. Involving

Afica Tecnclu Department h Arol

tomUp
S.

RmIkme

Ap

forthd Bnlv

RXvew, November 15,1993

a Issnis

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6/9

on Bank supervision missions also helps the Bank and Borrower specialists from area institutions agencies developnationalcapacity. 25. Regionalmanagers note that it is unlikely that supervion levelsachieved duringthe reviewcan be sustainedafterards unless in-housespecialist staff are available. The MNAJECA regionalreport pointsout that even if TaskManagersobtain short-termconsultantexpertise'they do not have the capacityto followup recommendations of consultants. Without in-housestaff expertiseavailable to them,TaskManagers willcontinueto have difficulty with compliance; without regionaloversight, this lackof compliance willgo unnoticed."

'..:. . ... .

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e,,.e

i_retw

26.

SupemsonmLssion tuenvdto rpr an rltivlysmlnube

ISk

Ehin

ec

owecrrn

unpleentaton prbhemkuestWementdidoprth1dions.inn~asphMdbdoa Bn 27. LackMI5Wi of g am ie~n c ommietment to mno argesetha he emental *portfolio relets i~~~n mircompoblems reportedby ~tro4sh~d theirrffomnaeetTs epe Fo~rce conlevingBondrrowe s'ack ofoveru1a4 co ~mpliac wiha legaly covenantsacind proej ak nlueasectigemns(a 64.lasthreveChndroapur ThermalPower projelt,~ for e op e suprvisonfoud asrompensat.i~onlbeMiongpaid orsetdes 27. Lac ofqvrmn omtett1eeteeu eeteetprflorfet i=Sn mircs plm reoZe byth potoi mnaentTs Forc cocrnn Borwr'lc despitaeq exp wan wit agreemnttoresetle peopl monre pcqidunth ee1lt landasd ahrshtrDisplaced PersonsAleoL oThePC fopr th1Madbya PradesahMhedu prankc*Bund fo that: 4t td implEmation pl in relenortn 10 freurn

Sl~W.IANIU.i *

7A..

.. . ..

.' .

26. A/W

Suervision D mission

theeC4 nd toreport aqt relatiely smal nmbe

byfar the mostunsatisfactory aspectof projectimplementation was R&R of dam oustees. This may be consideredto be due to...the inability to proceedaccording to the MP ResettlementAct 1985as rulesto applythe Act had neverbeen promulgated.The last pointis of particularimportanceas GOMP had assuredthe Bank at Credit negotiationsthat the Act was being introducedand would be the vehiclefor R&R activities under the project. In the event, it was never applied. (PCR Cr. 1108-IN) 28. Failure to provide counternart resources. Timelyavailability of adequatefundsis a severe constraintin a large numberof projects;it may be the single most powerfil explanatory operational variablebehindthe failureto implement resettlement operationswel. In addition, costs often risebecauseof faultypreparationthat underestimates the numbersof peopleaffectedand the costsof compensating them. BecauseBank participation in financing resettlementprograms is very smallor non-existent in mostprojects,the entire burdenof resettlement financing faUs on Borrowers. These funds frequentlydo not materialize. Supervision for the January-June1993period of the Bankwide reviewfound that a major issue in approximately half of the projectswas inadequate resource levels availablefor resettlement activities. Thus, the South Asia resettlement report concluded that timely disbursements of agreed-upon resources to resettlement organizations, andfrom the resettlementorganizations to the resettlers, has generally been the exception rather than the rule. In projectssuchas Cameroon SecondUrbanand IndonesiaRegional CitiesUrbanTransport,failure to releasecompensation fundshas led to costlyimplementation delays. 29. Inability to meet hist1tutionalcommtments Major problemswith resettlement institutions are veryfrequent: for example, two-thirds of the projectssupenised in the secondhalf of FY93reportedmajorinstitutional difficulties due mainlyto lackof institutional coordination and BorroweWs' failureto allocateadequatequalified stafL Although localgovernments mustoftenbear manyof the mediumandlongtermcostsof resettlement, fewprojectsincludemeasures that enhance their capacityfor respondingto additionalneeds. Resettlementin large projects,such as the Narmada Sardar Sarovar, Daguangba Multipurpose, Hyderabad Water Supply, Rio Flood Reconstruction and Prevention,Upper IndravatiHydroelectric, and the YacyretaII Hydroelectric projects,is adversely affectedby failuresto assignkey staff in all of these projects,at one pointor andthersupervision foundBorrowers' staffingto be half or less than agreedlevels. 30. Lack of gando Lack of participationof affected communities and host populations in resettlementdesignand management is a majorcauseof implementation problems, especially whenthe institutions chargedwith executing resettlementprogramsare themselves weak (box65). Involving local peoplereducesthe burdenon institutions and givesa monitoring role to peoplewiththe greatestinterestin goodperformance.In China'sDaguangba Multipurpose project, for example, failureto involvelocalpeoplein selecting designsled to a near-universal rejectionof the contractor-built houses. Not providingadequate informationto affected people leads to entitlementabuse(bar 6.4) andhostility to projectauthorities.Inadequateparticipation alsocuts off projectaccessto an importantsourceof necessary information. In the Medo Hydroelectric project, for example,relocationsites selectedby project authoritieslackedsufficient water. Significantly, when the project adopteda more participatory approach,later sitesselectedby the resettlershave proven to be satisftory. Projectswith greater local contact and involvement, such as the Khao Laem Hydroelectric project,the ITird Urban Development projectin Jordan,or the KenyaThird NairobiWater Supplyproject,have also experienced fewer conflictsand delaysbecause of more participatory approachesto resettlement.

--

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6/11

OK46.4, 'Thepl

of

c.

........

1.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ =. ... ..
h C,'olomiam Ani, little cocte informatoabout t prejecw alandrgly iterawpeople whowod d i iif,
1S'. *w bits ei,hftfl= Atdd nottakelong forIoa nrpeer orlz ht owwstl pepl ith falseinformation that 'wasnot countere by the contruton Ompn. ~~W

:
d ,*p'y:_

n
l

__e W

1M

ae l~ nle hcayhmm

ocupiedby peple w hAdecf, foimdit OP

atet

nptar

thatecria probie hek oldetak y hearste areevrl reen exbn~fuamplecsof t4zehialyfut~ pla. .. .. ........................ p3eoptle werepersadnid ... to relqihe 0 0.. 42a00 riopls afEecste polasa otthrecodraa W ther upypoet onpe cashned in the idngirrnwln igtl on i govemmetis h in the 4 eeteetiae:rcn iaiSt
....... '..

scuiesfounvhterreootwe , su

ppoiscaest tare notto aequt landtanll thaey ba riainhe

fgimNT

31. TechnIcal urLblems T'here are several exmples of technically planning& the pWaterQality landPolto4. to rjc nBairecent ure u ob mnsbet fakulty mlmn
Resettlement planning for the 42,000 people affected by the Hyderabad Water Supply project, for

example, depended on providing irrigtion facfiliues in the 140resettlement villages:recentfeasibility studiesfoundthat groundwater suppliesare not adequatefor irrigation.The resettement plani for the Water Qualityand Pollutton C-ontrol projectin Brazi turnedout to be,impossi'ble to implement becauseenvironmental clearances for the newsiteshad not been obtainedin advance,Supervision of the resettlementsite proposedfor the Bangladesh Urban projectfoundthat it was under several feet of waterandno technical analysis of its potentialsuitability for resettlement hadbeen performed.

IMPROVMIG THEEECTIVES OF IRESETTEMNT SUPEMRVISON

32. The Bank's legal department found that the main obligations of Borrowersand implementing agenciesare coveredadequately in the projects'legaldocuments. Lackof ovenants has not been a barrierto effectivesupervision or actionbythe Banicwheneveroperational staffhave soughtto exercise remedies for failureto carny out resettlement, they havenotbeen thwated byleg
documentation. Nevertheless,the effectivenessof Bank action varies considerably. 33. Supervisioneffectivenessdepends primarilyon four major fctors:

Borrowerownership. Where countriesdo not agree with Bank poliqyad have not preparedgoodresettlementplansby appraisal, supevison wMnot be able to correct the deeper disagreement, regardlessof the number of covenants and conditionalitiesincluded in loan documents (bax 64 Supervision can lead to constructive actionsduringimplementation when it
A

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6Q12

,,.,:..

, ,ute .

folw pon overa icnagre.tement onroetsettlmet objgecdmande po p tedy . to toe z.Itiv of pe tell 0*activ eypvojlets atmind, in the sample,s IdequteclI attnio a The aounpaido vst tn~o4 resetaemet dun rparalou ~agndn appmsaLNotableepton we aoval iforat p~Mctsc Hyderteme estatc Indoiam - Upp er M h4riptio A bia Eta of as ~ n Hdoeetrc anote,~o van(.~Mdh ot ader oeht= ptojects.1 ManyaciveY) prnect lack Powu (PXTh ad Upett~lemnluans.iat* Thus,~ i faultyk) pulation~ haedequaiie of tisitnioue comuipensatiopln, and fanyur etopaotinswc drg systm. ~~s 1sup Reseth~ktlemnt supervision mimions1 spenk ra lo time '''~ ~ ~~frc ervaton. regional'sv ereor noe.freape ht"poetfnsitne o * aggregat andying-to optaeae with.thqeser rvaowg 3patbery13Wmessing ~rojct.y-prj pibea of preeoluslo, mew mainann mne nte tjo ~otv~4 _;~~~~oioigadeauto ciite eeotndvre oohrproe goveinww of projector in w*g ao ManyBouowers tnot have induded 243:~~urn Aoeeqletouxa mlmetto. Tescoa rvefoChnsilaycnlud tadwutr pjIlqsptemfo pfrtofecth pafoaetnemm ve when mouitoing and S_S_~~~ha whle atmoaihe teoealpractoestemetwsaifcor,niably anW~as for te a uaticof sa uy stemsareinclued however theyare often not efed h
pmblassa& Africa regitIandrpr notes,for mpethtpjet h.inds intnde fo

~~~~~ifre

jgemet abouIt porSs followbil upon overallagproementon resettlementobjecativsfcoy and strategiy.

tofmntoe8rav projects perframncead inpathews arecunadequtwe attentio wask Hy dreluaercanotemortnglmste recenty pojuet.Manyn mactvepojecs loacke resett ementpas. hs pro faulty puelainudesmts,ndqae VMWWW0M%CHA&FPVA1&O~ evaluation s r eyef . ' lniamipoisaMeior flh ao
Hylaerom Ucrnc Namdia-Uapedsce.gtonI, bta-ra iw~~somwu~swdemelecu an otheto mote teetprjc1n3chepoecslc

M& nnfm

systemso mmkuformntorng projecat pnerfrac.Evnwe

ontrn

Prompt maagement follow-up,The MorseCommission noted that muchof the necessary fieldinformation on whichtheir recommendations were based had alreadybeen reported by the Bank'ssupervision missions to the Sardar Sarovar project,yet technicalassessments had not caused an approptiate response,a findingalso repeated in the OED evaluationof resettlementin the Karnataka Irrigationproject The readinessof CountryDepartment management to follow-up on tission findings vaned significantly (bao 63, 6.5, and 6.6). Not sendinga clear signalto a Borrowerwhen resettlement programsare not proceeding accordingto plan, suggeststo Borrowers that resettlementis not a high priority.

34. Untilrecently, the overallimpact of supervision on resettlement performance hasbeen limited.Achievements, withsomenotableexceptions, werelargelyrestrictedto smaller projectsand projectsoperatingunder favorable conditions.In spite of significant progress madeoverthe pastfive years, resettlementsupervisionbecameroutine only with the extra attention and resourcesfor resettlementthat were generatedby the review. For supervision to makesignificant contributions to improving performance, basicchangesare beingmade in the wayprojectsare supervised.

35.Supervision *monitorigo and technca t e _asistace muy be rationa 3t~S.~~lak Supenion requirementf rqiremnt s for formonIeitoringu and ass1istanc musta bae) raiofl

througha carefldassessment of the spefic mnputs neededto improve resettlement performance. The supervision strateg shouldforman integmgrt of the projectimplementation plan, and progress shouldbe reflectedin the AnnualReview of ProjectPerformance (ARPP). Wherereseement is lre or particulartlcomplex, projectsshouldincludeadditonalformsof assistance suchas mid-term
reviewsand technical reviewpanels that include resettlement specialists (bo2x 6X77. 36. requied. Unty recently, the quahltyand fequency of superision was not commensuratewith

the compleatyof resetsement or its importanceto the Bank Hoveres, gemater frequencyof supervisionalone wl not be sufficient fundamentalenhancementof supenta sion splngr is

sold

rfedi

tR10he A

6o14

Irwm

;. .B-z6 7 ;oIorn

-ael

-n mi- te

reew
gulatXank .up.ui'

May ot d- mow" ntptojtslwioMogwaettlemmteompl

awohsiis+ft_ Fthp imprvor.ett6,ntiinpmtt

_f~~~~W
3zjcsuQ ClaboaiTefcs eoh ghad .e of tuhpl Projiis toe bhuil Erup t~Ohei1sitti P~rjec~ m thAtetzapacities of p y, ifc imp rlemeting agencestincdcrae in rmwol b ~uotthuizt s agil ee.ing t oni o~verall obectives andls prceues.Ie Baapontkb diee Btrowork a. y.g~~~~~~~~~~ynn Mitlwwlany 4th exctoa egncyuragdtey gra ta uefcof ntiona sotcial scrveience Band oa t lhepa ii~ k poet~ial iecni c kI.noldein erestlmn rjc ei.ladeeuinTeei ~Th Cin SulonRerabeJet l rojcatlet and thme tenya hregNardbin reeteettate C8p1y1re~ be

Mmxn

plnnd14t-i reettletpetfrianc. tevlewsbyte i . adB TeBank rt asdBoroes hol * Coltaboratie efforul The focusof thiswork is to buildup the institutional .v*~n n~sa indicaors nd project ations. ul impleme itos abe carried outat spehigher indi thmowc gI for capacitiesof nting agencies andstavel create a framework agreeing on overaeobjectives and procedure The Bankneeds to workwith At minimum,~ a to encourage progresonieo k idiztoring masured lar iruta rsetlemen Borrowers greater usery of national social science and local technicalknowledge in resettlementprojectdesigpand execution. iheteis considerable localtalentand competence, regardingrcsettlementthat can be used by the Bank for monitoringand technicalassistane work, and by Borrowers, for better implementation work~ * EJ2d-sqedfpeIfc n2ELrfonnau Indicators. T'he Bank and Borrowers should agree in advanceon a relatively smallnumberof objective, project-specific indicatonand actions to be carriedout at specified stagesin the projectcycle. At a minimua, progresson key indicators, measuredagainsta resettlement timetable, shouldincludeprojectsutafingcompensation payments, allocation of productin resources,and the status of resettlementfinancal accounts Asesi progresson these actionsshouldbe the focusof supervion. Steno hen non-formalsunervislonmelalsn h most effecdive contro over resetlmient peifoimwnce isby the peopleaffected. The Bankcanfacilitte and promote greater control of resettlement by helping Borrowers: (i)promote effective communicationbetween project authorities and representative bodies of affected people; (i) provide more access to informationrelated to the project and resettlement;and (iii) ensure that projects include effective,neutral mechanisms for resolvingdisputesand

monitoring implementationi of resettlement plans.

-.

ISWo*6/15

Build unon the UnbIes betweenthe resettlement compot ad the cdvil woQEE Thne review showedthat overtimeprogress on resettlement oftenfal behindadvances in civilworks.Projectsupervision thusneedsto calibrate the resettlementcomponent with overallproject progress. Imurove the caliberand availablit, of nationalest Many projects will continue to rely on local consultants for project supervision. Training programs are neededto improvethe available cxpertise neededto assisttask managers.Virtually everydeveloping countryhasskilled professionals, anddeveloping localcapacity throughtrainingandinvolvement in projectsis an importantopportunity to help both the Bankand Borower EDI is contributingby expandingits taining of trainens programs in resetlement.

_,

0 .@

616

7. Recent Improvementsin Portfolio Managementand Quality

1. Importantimprovements in the management andcontentof the Bank'sresettlement portfoliowere accomplished duringthe 1993review, consisting of * * * Increasedon-the-ground supervision. Expandedtechnicalassistance to Borrowers. Consistency with policyand basicproceduresin all new projects

2. As a result, intensivereviewwork and correctiveactions have resohledserious were setforlonger tem vementsthrough problems in someongoing operations.Thefoundations additionalemphasis on regional portfolioanalyses and strategy work. 3. Improvementfactors. These overall improvements are the result of important effort throughout1993. Mhese are: decisions and measuresadoptedin 1992,and of a verysustained * Decisionsmade by managementregardingthe Bank's resettlementwork, together with the Board's recommendations followingthe 1992 Morse IndependentReview, Decisions regarding portfoliomanagement adoptedin lightof the Wapenhans report; The end-1992Bank reorganization and the creationof the Central VicePresidencies (CVPs),one of whichwas givena specialmandateto improve resettlement; The institutionof the Bankwideresettlement review,conductedby the Enironment Departmentin cooperation vith all regions,and the significant effort d-ployedby Bank staffengagedin the review.

*
3

4. A ncess across the Bank In more than one way,these streamsof important organizational decisions and staffeffortsconverged and reinforcedeachother. their synerVmade andpvducts, to help the Bankwide reviewmore effectv The renew focusedon bothprocesses knowledge, and improve in-houseandBorrower workprocesses, provide corrective actions, additional strategy. lhe mainproductof the mviewis not sunp tdu repor but theprocess developa follow-up the reviewtngered thrughout 1993acrss the Bank. Continuingthis processafter the review's completion willensurebetter performance. 5. The reviewhaspursuedthe goalre-affirmed bythe Bank'sPresidentat the beginning in lending is to reducepoverty.On-the-ground benefits- rather than of 1993: The Bank'sobjective loan approvals- shouldbe the measure of our success.... We are changingour processes. to underlinethat point acrossthe BanIlc to identified problems wasan 6. Improving portfoliomanagement and findingsolutions exerciseinvolving the Bank and Borrowers'executingagencies. The resourcesspent directlyon

%W1&KACWJ#%**A

. NMo.

7/1

improving resettlement supervision roughlytripledduring1993. If the estimatedcostsof additional analytical and researchworkare included, expenditures quadrupled. 7. Moresupervision missions forresettlement weresent outduringthese 12 monthsthan in the three previous years. By design,the 12 monthsof the reviewprovidedtime for two rounds of supervision, particularly to projects withlargeresettlement components.The firstroundidentified problemissuesand reachedBank-Borrower agreements on specific remedies;the subsequent round evaluatedand reported on the improvements that took place. Resettlementcomponents that had not been supervised for two or three yearscameunder analysis, andmorethan 40 complex projects werevisitedtwice. Whenmajorimplementation problems surfaced in the firstmission, the follow-up was moresubstantial and prompt. This considerably increasedthe substantive technicalassistance offeredto Borrowers and helpedovercome, rather than simply identify, problems. Plansmade bythe regionscalledfor covering 59 projectsin the firsthalf of January 1993;in fact,76 projectswithresettlementwere covered. In the secondhalf, supervision missions to 61 projectswent to the fieldcomparedto the 70 planned. All regionsexceptEAP spreadtheir supervision effortsmore or less evenlyover the year,as needed.
&

Table 7.1: ReviewField Work on Resettlementduring 1993

.,_____ Projects Visited in the Field

Region i
_

Projectswith Resettlement

1st ~~~~~~~Rounds Round 17 8 4 3 7 4 43 4 5 21 1 0 1 32

Both

2nd Round 5 6 5 1 0 1 18

Total 26 19 30 5 7 6 93

ProjectsNot Visited* 0 13 25 0 1 2* 41

l _~~~~~~~~~Only Only

AFR SAS EAP ECA LAC MNA TOTAL

*In

26 32 55 5 8 8 134

someactivepnqect, zusttlmet has be enompeted amd dwd na treuire inclde pwroectidntified in the blatr put of te Review. prqjc intrrute by war.

oeselment supevision. Mi tabl doesne

*Ome

9. Table7.1 reflectsthe vastvoume of staff and manageiial workand tine devotedto dwing 1993. It also showsthe intensified analysis and increased resettlementfolio management projectportfoliohas neverbeen examined technical assistance givento Borrowers.The resettlement so comprehensively as in 1993, and the scopeof workof mostmissions exceededregularsupervision.
U111E_ 7^. ISMs.o a.

in the field,through peoplewerereviewed over 1000 all projectswithresettlementaffecting Virtually a total of some 160missions. unknown, previously to projectswithserious, Several CDssentmorethan twomissions 10. Izmir Water Supply and projects, such as Turkey problems. Several complex implementation in one missions YacyretaDams,had up to five supervision Sewerageand the Argentina-Paraguay provide to Bank concernsand to explicitBorrowerrequeststhat Bank specialists year,responding agencies. to executing increaseddirect assistance An illustration ofsomeof the moreintenseprojectefforts,as requiredbythe situation 11. found in the field, is the 1993reviewworkon the Turkey- LImir Water Supplyand Sewerage project. Ihe first review missionin March 1993found that the project did not have a plan for resettlingthe estimated3,700people. Moreover,the size and cost of the resettlementcomponent andthe Bank. Togetherwiththe Borrower's byboth the Borrower underestimated had been grossly people, and rereassessedthe size of the affectedpopulationto be up to 13,000 staff, the mission estimatedthe real costs,staffing,and time requirements. 'Me missionworkedout a substantially plan and timetable. including an implementation revisedresettlementapproachwith the Borrower, for resettlement. The real cost of land Cnancing agreedto supplemental In turn, the government bythe projecttaskmanager wasreassessed to be $30million, at appraisal initially assessed acquisition, morethan a 300 percentincrease. The Borroweragreedto shift and the Borrowerat $125million, resourcesto meet the real land costs. and to allocateadditional components funds from cancelled the Bank agreedto increasefrom 30 percentto 35 percent In tur, for certainprojectexpenditures, wentto thisprojectduringthe review, for disbursement.Four moreBankmissions the share eligible up with the Borrwer on the measures in May, June, November,and December1993,following adoptedduringthe Marchmission.In cooperationwitha TurkishNGO and variousline agencies, resettlementtrainingcoursein Turkey EDMEMT and ENVorganizedin October 1993a five-day resettlement.Thi overall, projectsinvolving of otherdomestic for Izmirprojectstaffandfor officials displacement outcomein a projectwithmoremassive disastrous sustainedeffortaverteda potentially than initiallyassumed. a numberof 'best have also identified Fieldmissions Bestrce dissemiato 12. in findingrelocationoptions. As a generalpattern, practicese that involveresettlers'participation include: such 'best practices* * * * by the Bank in resettlementplanningand in consultations Earlyinvolvement with affectedpeople; specialists in preparing andothertechnical of resettlement Directinvolvement optionsfor resettlers; alternativeproduction-based agencyto strengthencapacity reformswithinthe implementing Institutional for meetinghigherresettlementstandards; Better Bank-Bofrowercollaborationin addressing specific resettlement difficulties.

work duringthe 1993 The key explanationfor the overallincreasein supervision 13. Bankwidereview,and for more prompt Bank follow-upon missions'signals,is the enhanced impoance given by CD and TD managei to improvngponfoio managment.

lW

l_1*rV%W0ND"#Agi

a. 18M7:O

e..73

14. The review's Steering Committee, consisting of representatives of ai regons, andthe TaskForc, havecIosely monitored the progress of ths intensified supervision processandits lessons. Throughoutthe review,seniorBank and regionaloperationsmanagers receivedregularmonth-bymonth Progress Reports from the TaskForce.' Bankseniormanagement requestedregionalVimce Presidentsto translate this intensified scheduleinto direct involvement of CountryDepartments (CDs)and TaskManagersin resettlementas "an intera part of the [Bank'sJ commitment, and to 2. conveythismessageto all Borrowers" 15. Resouc cowstnts. Forthe Technical Departments andCountry Dts, and for the staff directdy involved, sendingout such a large numberof wissionsin 1993was a tai endeavor;a limitedsegmentof the portfolio, consisting of projectswith lessimmediate supervion needs,couldnot be covered. The field-work programwasmadepossible through a significant midyear supplementary budget allocatedby managementfor this exercise,used primarily for hiring temporaryconsultants. 16. In part, however,such shortagesof resourcesare also a byproductof past project packaging andcanbe correctedthroughthe decisions madebasedon thisreviewregarding dverified project vehicles(see Chapter8, para. 2). In practice,some infrastructureprojects with massive resettlementcomponents are intrinsically two complexprojectssqueezedinto one. The standard allocationfor supervising such "double-barreled" projects is the same as for projectsthat do not containwidelydivergentactivitieswithina singleframework. Real staff costs to the divisions in chargeof suchprojectsare muchhigher,andsomeaspectsof the project,mainly resetdement,have receivedless attention. In the future, processing large resettlement operationsas stand-alone projects,cross-linked to the civilworkprojects, willgo a longwaytowards eliminating thisconstant TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR PORTFOLJO QUALITY 17. Impved qualty of tehncl assiance to Borrowers was achievedin two ways: by designing specialTerms of Reference(TOR) for the review'ssuperion work; and by improving supermion skillsthroughwider use of socialspeaists capableof providig in-depthguidanceto excti agencies. 18. Baskc M and m Ies. The reviewsfield missions werecarriedout under "GenericTORs"developedby the review's Task Force and approvedby the SteeringCommtteeThese shiftedthe emphasis awayfromstrictlyshort-termphysical progressaspects;the fieldreviews explored performancein terms of basicpolcY goals, socio-ccnomic,and tecncal problemsin resettlement operations: restoration of pre-displacement income Ievels;land avalaility and valuation;cash compensationpatterns; consultationwith affected people; and the Borrower's organizational capacityfor resettlement(see in Annex2 GenericTOR for reviewsupervision). 19. Prioritygivento these policyand technical issueshas resuted in more effictivehelp to Borrowers andin the design of correctveactionsconsistent withpolicygoals he qualityof many projectcomponents wasipnved duugh re-pannLn& reso concenfrto anddnnovaiesouim to neglectedaspects(bat 7.1). In manyprojecs the resetrs vamsehave been broughtmore directlyinto the process of findingsolutions. The assessment systemfor monitoringand rating

Eight E M Rop es frm s Tadk Faroc to Managemet areable an Le 'Ad= ftb Mr. IL Stan to Region Vle.taea December 2B,992; Ma 22, 1993andMy 17, 13

_ws1m*wsNDMnNapmia.i wv.jwco .~

714

progressin executing heavily on physical performance in resettlement operationsusedto concentrate issuesto the forefront. The relocation; the reviewbroughtimpoverishment and incomerestoration Ministries- has been redirectedto attention of Borrowers- from project units to responsible or failutes throughbadresettlement.Potentialproblems and destitution preventing impoverishment to judgeperformance and indicators situations, in a timeliermannerthan in previous were addressed are beingshiftedto socio-economic reestablishment, equity,and participation of resetters in project benefits

.)edgndt~

...

..e es

..t j,MfBrti's

ugetyI.

t..e.. -;

:.

_ .

;' ,,=

project
*;n

.n

had reporte
c tm

By _ s ; problemat
fr
iiA

ew's.en

ore thnw
Nm

.':,

dfctv

i ~ to1onI~& ~

~ wUga4 :!Af9fF nOWX )1gh&

*~~~pp$to

_t

armhsa weltomesupn n~ 4gtheAtiay rega,for ___.n.rug~1t iI _X_~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ th oevew the w Afnca region~ smWent reetlemen soabss to ana.lyzeeproVorand propse remed chmged and Bank Tloasktioiagsbm pemve
=__~~~

n changed

akTscaaesprevedby~~ aAjithsawecmsupr.

Inte.Fc

ein

thi rviw,the

Aii.

egosn

11E

resetdemnt pets

to~b analyze i projo

tsnmoe

remdia

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

thsas wcomeis,upporso tn mth cangedn andtBankywhr Task Managers percienified

Afrojcaswhr region fr

4. By the review's end, more than1 twothrs of activ project supervision had reported no problems

'Afrca Tcdal * bi
_W5WEND1WuM

_.teu lheRgcPdRssnv

R_A,w JbrAuBnxweReeu Novmer iS,1093

0. Ue1@

7/5

projectsin the entire Bankresettlement portfolio(withthe exceptionof recentlyidentified projects) were visitedat least once, and in some cases twice,by a resettlementspecialist. Resettlement specialists, staff or consultants, wenton mission to 71 percentof the projectssupervised in the first round and to 62 percent in the second round. Supervision by specialist staff or consultantshad increased immediately after the 1986review, but decreasedafterwards, duringthe 1988-1992 period. It increaseddramatically again during 1993as a result of management's decisionsimplemented throughthis review(seealsofigre 6.1 intheprevious chapter). 21. Task Managers and specialiststaff All of the regional resettlement reports emphasized the task managers' need to use moresystematically the distinct'value added"that socFl specialists provide- in additionto what generalists, engineersor financialanalystscan do - for managing resettlementoperations. Specialists suppliedtechnicalguidance otherwiseunavailable to some Borrowersand providedcompetenthelp to Task Managersin attendingmore closelyto the problemsof displaced people. 22. Task Managers (TMs") are the staff directlyresponsiblefor the projects with resettlementcomponents.Ihe Task Force foundthat about92 TaskManagersare responsible for the 146 projects in the FY93 active portfolio. By professional skills,this group consistsof 60 technicalexperts (civilengineers,etc.) and 32 economists(including financialanalysts, operations officers, etc.). Giventheir maininfrastructural content,projects withresettlementare twiceas likely to be managedby an engineeror technicalspecialist than by an economistor financialanalyst;the only region that deviatedfrom this pattemn was South Asia,where economists slightly outnumber engineersas Task Managers. Sixty-two percent of these TMs are responsiblefor one project involving resettlement, amongthe severalprojectsthey manage;28 percentare responsible for two projects;and 10 percent have each betweenthree and six projectsinvolving resettlementas their responsibflity. 23. Typically, most Task Managersdevolvework on resettlementto the resettlement specialists in the TD. The leitmotifs heard strongestfrom Task Managersthroughoutthe review, particularly duringthe direct interviews carriedby the Task Force and duringthe two focusgroups 5, were: (a) for a Task Manager, designingor overseing conducted by outside professionals resettlementcomponents is amongthe most staff-intensive activities; (b) Task managers feel they have little,if any,professional knowledge for thisjob themselves; (c) they ask for considerable more staff inputfrom Bank specialists and consultants. 24. Portfoliosize and pipelinetrends are the measure of the workloadrequired for resettlementstaff-work,Bankwideand by regions. By this measure, current staffingpatterns, althoughimprovedduring1993,are inadequate. Whilethe resetdementportfoliohas grown,only partialadjustments of in-house skillshavebeen made. Nowhere is thisclearerthan in EAP andSAS: in FY93the fewresettlementspecialists in these regionshad to contributetheirworkto 87 ongoing projectswith resettlementand,simultaneously, had to assistin the preparationof a projectpipeline for the next severalfiscalyearscontaining nearly70 projectsby December1993. Clearly,onlypart of this workloadcould be met satisfactorily, despite the full-fledged efforts of all availablestaff specialists.

twofcsooupwere
BMIon,a sooog

ducted byprofentained

modeaton oman indepent conautlngfirmand

marh (Owup DImsion Resarc A

Dr.Janet

isthfield sprie

In involuntaryr_eulmet

lzadda, VA) and

Randolph Harris (MPSVP).

rW_ WlcHDfl.FNinOApi 3. 1O7O 4A.L

7K6

25. The bulkof staffspecialists'work on resettlement iscarriedout byTDsthroughCAM withthe taskat hand. Aggregate of TDsare not commensurate requestsfromCDs,but the resources at the beginning of the fical CAMrequestsfromCDsto TDs on socialissues(notonlyresettlement) year sometimes exceedby200 to 300 percentwhatthe TD couldsupply.As one regionalreporton higher'but it is not formulated for suchworkis considerably resettlement noted, the "latentdemand" as effectiveCAMdemandbecauseit cannotbe satisfiedanyway. The best option for the future aswellas in residentoffices, in the CDs themselves, moresocialstaffresources appearsto be placing
together with regularly using more local consultantsin countries with large resettement portfolios.

orientationin theirstaffing.Resident takenthisinnovative A fewCounttyDepartmentshavealready missions with capacity for resettlementexistin India and China,and the EAI CountryDepartment issues. has recentlycreate a residentunit for socialand environmental the social for resettlement ispart of the broaderBankconcernfor addressing 26. Staffing dimensions of developmentactivities. For FY94,senior managementset the and environmental to those alreadyexistingin-houe. The incremental hiring12 socialspecialists target of externally emergesas a citical factor for meetingthe demands is that staffstrengthening review's conclusion as of the resettlementportfolio,as wellas of other socialissuesin the Bank'score worlk However, of the Task Force is that importantas strengthening socialskils in-houseis, the recommendation socialspecialists alone wouldnot be the adequatesolutionto improveworkon resettlement. It is team basis, importantto organize the Bank's work on resettlement operations on a nulidiscifinwy get involvedin addressing jointlywiththe socialspecialists, so that all neededtechnicalspecialists, and relocation, puttingthe focuson creatingthe productive the complex problemsof displacement or equal levelof livelihood. the resettlersat an improved base neededfor reestablishing
27. Consultant specalists on short-term assignments,while able to advise Borrowers

competently, cannotbe as effectiveas in-houseBank staff specalists:the latter can pursueissueresolutionwith in-housecontinuitvover long in-houseperiods and increase Bank institutional is not reinforcing the Bankes capacity. An excessively high rate of consultantsto staff specialists that noted that it is unlikely capacity for long-termeffectveness(see bor 7.2). Regionalmanagers allocations) can be with additional budgetary duringthe review(partly levelsachieved supervision they indicatethat suchstaff staff are available; unlessmore in-housespecialist sustainedafterwards report pointsout that even if TaskManagers regional broughtin. The MNA/ECA willbe gradually to followup recommendations obtainshort-termconsultantexpertise theydo not have the capacity Managers willcontinueto to them, Task staff expertise available Without in-house of consultants. have difficultywith compliance;without regional oversight,this lack of compliancewil go 7 Improving will addressthis of in-housestaff specialists the presence and continuity unnoticed." need.

Repct on a aneamt jifr dseBkAwd Reskw. Relbpan Tecdial Depqatmeat, ECAAMNA 22,1993 Reuanau Rep, December Ih ECIMA Rq9bnal Dep_tment, ECA/MA Technical
%WVG1V*V1
__EWACHArn iAV Xa lM

7. O1

7,,7

Box72. S-ta

g Inadequacyand remedis

- h ratfio betwe 8stfadconsltnswokng onsocial issues ingeneal,andonrtesetlauentcs. in partiula, is In shrtpcontrattot Bn' ae overall averaes. Work onresettlementportfolio mmapnag dur%ndwtyear long reviewoffersan interestg comparison with finings of the reent portl.management TaskFoce.Foral projects, theratioof affto consltants involved in portfolio management overa threeyear period was66 percntto 34 pert ora 1:0.5 o(1550stffl820 constas). e of , a coarbuted80 pe taudcosltant20 paeuofthetottmepetonportfolo uent p.* :i retlment work}, howevr therview for 1993 sbows 8thepposite: te rato of qwist taff so eaesslementeonsltana i1. -13jotaltimespt, theratio san estmated 40pecenstaff timeompr to 0 eren cosutat tme. ,, .,,,,,, -00rootoni oto lie wit thsank' everf atveraes. tcall atten060tio t60he olowin w
M'-'-.' *,"u'1||iWa@d faots~ ~ '. ...... S k

I~~~~~~

.-w- - -

- -f :::.t*

-.. re.ettlement

pet .

:...compone:ts, t ..

-o of

~~~~~~~IM

2& DuriBottrhbem revie ye ar, thre actied atr rmdivioalacind.ees atth iproject aklevlemerge thino ash resetlof ient~tifiedgl rweakhi rnghe faaniues iearler pandes of izprojectas proesingaiactivtie (as istnd stainl. in chapterespecan, th pre ese lkwemariuaryte resultliof deposrtd elartueslro thett)I

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
defin veryclearl k inthem Bak a otbe ufiinl nore.Teefr,tepoetao
28. During the reviewyear, the need for remedial actions at the project level emerged mainlyas a result of identifiedweakesses or failuresi earlier phases of project processing activities Banks wellestablished work procedures for handliuig resettlement operations. The responsibilityof staff and Divisionalmanagersfor complying with establishedproject processingprocedures, although defined vety clearly in the Bankc, had not been sufficientlyenforced. Therefore, the potential for improvingresettlement, intrinsicin the Bank's directives,has been realized only partiaily. Remedial actions initiated during the review have helped correct problems arisingfrom such prior departures from establshed procedures. 29. The technical and social issues identified on the ground by field missions ranged broadly from those requiring relatively simple remedies to a number of serious problems. The
_w1WWv InMApi __ta:e2os

(as discussed mainlyin chaptersS and 6). Thesewere particularly the resultof departuresfrom the

7/8

missions foundcases of breakdown in policyagreements betweenthe Bankand Borrowers, as weln as in basicprocedures; seriousunpreparedness by projectauthoritiesfacingmountingresettlement difficulties andlackofresources,unaddressed tensions betweenprojectunitsandwould-be resettlers, absenceof plansand unacceptable delays Someof theseresettlementoperations are already in midstream,and showonlylimitedpromiseof incomerestorationfor the frst groupsof people aleady relocated; in thesecases,the missions carriedout substantial discussions withborrowing agencies and workedout detailed,sometimes radical,corrective actions. 30. Most of these correctiveactionsstarted right away. In the more seriouscases, however, these corrective actionsaddressproblems that do not lend themselves to quickresolution, and are not easyto remedy in mid-stream, requiring consistent follow-up workafter the review's end. 31. Tpesof remedialacdons. Remedial activities initiatedduringthe reviewgenerally tend to be of severaltypes: reassessing the magnitude of resettlementmeasuresrequired,adjusting resettlementtimetables; increasing affectedpeople'sparticipation in formulating needs and claims; finding better relocation solutions or ways to reducedisplacement; identifying additional financial and material resources to meet the costs of resettlementoperations;and restructuringBorrowers' organizational and institutional capacity.In Madagascares TanaPlainproject,for instance,the field reviewresulted in a clusterof remedialactions,with energeticfollow-up measuresby the Bank Division responsible for the project(box7.3). 32. Scale. Severalprojectsare displacing three, four, or five times more people than estimatedat project approvaL This is hardest to correct in mid-stream, inasmuchas incomplete projectswithoutthe financial andorganizational meansto addressthe problems.For example, in the NigeriaMulti-State Water project,withan estimatedresettlement of 1,000people at appraisal,the reviewmissionfound that some 4,000 people are affected. The correctve action plan is being prepared. 33. PlanninEissues. All of the regionalreports indicatethat planningproblemsare present with variabledegrees of intensityor concentration in severalcountryportfolios. Basic problems,hard to correct in a short time, have been identifiedby the CountryDepartmentand TechnicalDepartment,primarityin the South Asia portfolio. Some of these issuesoriginatein weaknesses from earlieryears,parficularly the mid-1980s, and the relevantBankunits are focussed on their adequateresolution. The regionalreport indicatesthat "forthe 23 projectscoveredin the Indiaportfolioreviewof June 1993,resettlementplanshad been submitted for onlysixprojectsprior to Boardpresentation_... Between1988and 1993,agreements were reachedwith the Borrowerto prepare or substantially revise resettlement plans for 17 projects after appraisal. Similarly, a resettlementplan was prepared prior to negotiations for only one of the four projectsinvolving resettlementin SAI (Bangladesh portfolio).In the SA3portfolio(Pakistan) resettlementplanswere 8 not preparedfor either of the two projectsinvolving resettlement". 34. Incomerestorationissiues. Serious difficulties inrestoringadequate standards ofliving were identifiedin the sectoralreviewpreparedby the India CountryDepartment(SA2)and in the regional TD report - presentedtogetherwithsuggestions about actionsto remedy the situation.The project-by-project notes preparedby SA2 aboutprojectsin India ".... provideclear evidence of the declinein the standardof livingof personswho have been affectedby someof the Bank-financed projects...[they]showthat priorto the initiation of remedialactionsthe performance of none of the projects imvolving large-scale resettlement couldbe judgedsatisfactory.... Available evidence indicates
Asia Techn Depament SouthAsbRegloo, Rpowt onRae
ft,oo .*.

wf re Banbde R

nu R_w. Noveme1

%WMVJtEVWWWHWJA _ _ nA.

719

that until 1992 most project-affected people may have not been able to regain their prviok standardsof living.. Thissuggests the real currentdifficulty in achieving the standardsset out and the need to consider separateinvestments forproject-affected persons'incomegeneration activitiesf'

**

fie4~se

iciiy

inmfi

Y49

ttit_e

35.
fotgnee
-

slto.. _.l iheI1~~b elast proposal al Miise two consiode*irs fo efow-pnestments a .rlal fiorw resltowith.mr . reroabepn1odmm.verthenod fw

wtyp orediwalcto .se !yeasDun the review

35 hsls Aoo rpsl-t osdrflo pivsmnsa eeilato itapearethyamtione cauise ofi, reetntl~e .rsbeing wttorseofi rahnum.erof yeo projets i.Indaa.

ustecretosta r nipnal,ytufail ntesottr,o h aaiy iaca o mar.priationcmenaf1tio,rahr than s, .ooeoomiceons.truction bofa the prssoductnive fotneddfrrslto ihnaraoal eidoe h etfwyas uigterve t affecoted Me htoero pheope' Moving a fiibhv itapae asEro frstlr h itapoc engwreofi otescn,a ubro rjcsi ni n SIaNnj to 3JW e do e ote onre,i htteapoc orstlmn n eaiiainwspiaiyfcsdo tly Ds* indicated, woul.fostr importantchangefs) an imrvmnsi s) ~the bowgaecc apoachsand actiitiL~n opehe n.W~ usa~u oosinls. h1 Ie
36. AssLsaU m e _ea1 Iovn M*aIe_earh

n1ze Ojtoher "

ao

ehnicalremedit

l actions we. e

during thaer4evie itou pnjects in thic Wihoe~m theibsi appac

waforret

easi

FnTdhoariehoto missinsRtoavpNtu th actvities aprahsA and 2duthA =Rh ekwAmilatak dirufrdsa wBitvidere

Dbando InthJA . eeiga ft OE rpot,Fy tpa*tati WA1 twhe ysRwedN( sad th Nr$ovembinon tetsa types remedialactionswr 36. Assistac laspropsl- nw eto cnie. fOth-p ner oftchia intwhichbli baiprahwshorr-ect, the yet dhely fin inoporathed durreciong thet areve intospoecnsabe
* oo ateinig ne ded a mr rstionet
othercountns,is vpr tha the op Reriobdioer withinsia reasonableio thenex fewk guedars.Dring Noehereview

repts,ettlvementw waInd rhaboiyRitationmwa Norembarilfcu91 o appretngon s teoE

aaiyo

a.t tuoes~aton rathe thnscoeoomcrcntutono1h0rdctv

coordination amongimplementing agencies createrisks. Es typeof situationrequires staff-intensive Bank assistance, plusstrengthening the institutional willand capacityof borrowig agencies. he positve experiencewith the severalBank missionssent during 1993to the Yacyretaprqject in Argentina-Paraguay is illustrative (box 74).

.th 44 ft h

dl

t37. t Sugeras ond Baftr noion) dosve i Aan pnous ntiv utoatb%z j o 1A2 fe the Countr nb qart w A tin&th, y aft p d Dep e nt wasdtoiontinu seningasuper evisiwon muosviuonsto oepoetsta eeahedk d pmeratschmea.-. Puod!suavbinatteprojadi t ;wnd;tpoud;Bl wtoeedab, butwhee te nsaifatry r99 s, ts atlosngand pr thelrenme 4 o freset4led entop~le affant.

the Banes ontinued isvolvrne b

foarot ex

ample I AdacSub .temrckhaIrrigation, withM 63900 people

afiethed, and ettIndi tand-Sringrui Iheral wieUthabount 49g00peo le.n Il Country e Deatm. as n tifedthe Boffowertantsa itwoudt not c .onsiderthe a u praisQal of ap.psed.t wwdph. o h Submaekh pojliecItW autiess sati.factr resoluti.on rpachee is lda inteoutsanding resetemn prolemo thnfe fin1 phease.b postiotion, led toth brou4ader Bn dcsonta thteBank i@nn.

Deatm gentwas troronwatinuesenin spervso

t~ reb ~ Wfutvs M b undaeeeai sm fo r a1ypoumb1 ear f let ftom idt odraneulatkenrVo Ih miwf .dd wb4t d m*w ajoriy h of dkfeadlpnes bd toaW bedefn est b d reIi uagme3 d for thoue cotstre6 a . hdemb
m~,k Dashmedfu osm rjcstat uo~soaissions wer aolredlosed, ot the f h acle SA2 Country

but wherethe unsatisfactory resultsat closingand the largenumberof resettledpeoplewarranted the Bank'scontinuedinvolvement: for example, India-Subernarekha Irr.igation, with 63,000 people affcted, and India-Singrauli Thermal,with about 49,000people. The CountryDepartmentalso notifiedthe Borrowerthat it wouldnot considerthe appraisalof a proposedsecondphase of the Subernarekhaproject unless satisfactory resolutionis achievedin the outstandingresettlement 11 Thispositionled to the broader Bankdecision problemsof the first phase. that the Bankwillnot
tt mai project has beens undersevee cdticism for a number of yearsfro aional and International grops Te reiwfoud ta whilethe majority of the affectd peoplehad alred beenl resettledand received grantsfiorhousecostuctin a condrabe number weresill awing threeyeanafter proect cIosure, "..o begiven eitheraeplaccact lhnd, jobs,or tobe coeed b1 ncm gee_tn Schemeaj' Periodic sllpevso afterproect closure IaIntended tOsatisf the Bank thatworktot resolve theseprOblems continues. (Asia Tenm De _rmn SouthAsbaRert p. Ut). _wnwaw.ae.ci.a. ~7/11 ane

37. pqto ownrvs ha 0k7/le11 af" t ther core A poe onittive * chp*tw n.(Asa invhDep are: Sot Aban Ruepost p. Idbp'

financeany new project involing resettlementfor a bonowingagencythat is not livingup to its existingcommitments for resettlementin an ongoingproject.
nm on am OU . Even though the present reew's focus is on current activeprojects,throughoutthe reviewBank staff have been stronglyconcernedthat newprojects under preparationbe fullyconsistent with al policyrequirements.A1lregionshave reported the strong beneficial impactof the reviewon the preparationof projectsin the immediate pipeline: 38.
0

In Pakistan,duringthe pre-appraisal of the SindhUrbanprojectapprovedby the Boardin earlyFY94, a spring1993fieldmission foundnot 500-600 people to be resettled,as the Borrowerinitiallyassumed, but some 40,000people potentially affected by displacement, 11,000 of whomwere to be relocated in the first projectphase. The missionrefocussedthe first phase of the new project towardbuildingthe institutional capacityfor resettlement,without beginning any actual large-scaledisplacement. The new resettlement organization willexploretechnicalalternatives for miimizing displacement and willplan a reducedrelocationfor the secondphase. In Indonesia, onlyone of severalon-going projectsinvolving resettlement had a resettlementplan in placewhen the loan was approved. For all the new projectsappraisedto date durng FY94(not all yet approved), resettlement planshave been preparedand appraisedin the field. In Turkey, Borrower's workto createthe premises for fullincomerestoration in the Kayktepe Hydropower projecthasbeen intensified. The resettlement plan willbe fullyre-appraised in 1994,in the contextof a re-appraisal of the project itself;a local NGO has been commioned by the governmentto completea sc io-economic population survey. One of th most comprehensive cases of meticulousresettlementproject preparation - for which work parallelledthe reviewthroughout 1993- is the MChina XaolangdiDam project,whichwillrelocate182,000 people. Several preparation missionswent to the field in 1993,with teams consistingof technicaL social,andeconomicexpertsworking jointlyon resetdement.This project will include several specificstrategies for income reconstruction, aimingto turn displacement into a genuinedevelopment opportunity for the affectedpopulation.Lendingfor this dam and its entailedresettlementwas processedunder a twin-projects approach- one projectfor civilworks,and one stand-alone projectfor resettlement- and representsan uvation in Bank ac&ives for simultaneous, integratedtreatmentof such endeavors

39. Fivenewlending operationsinvolving involuntary resettlement were Board-approved in the first half of FY94. Their sectionson resettlementdemonstratea significant improvement in preparationandappraisal work,aswellasin analytical StaffAppraisal Report (SAR)treatment. One projectin Vietnamand two newprojectsin Chinacontainextensive summaries of their resettlement and incomerestorationplans,incorporating timetablesandbudgets.

__FS1lU~cII7iWpMOD

0. ,S0.190O AA

7/12

SUSTAINING THETREND
40. Reqired eentlnulty. All the portfolio mangement and quality impvements dicussd aboverepresenta solidstart. The completion of the 1993reviewexercise, however, does not meanthe end of corrtve actions.It isof paramount importance that theseare carriedon with and achievedin-house, continuity, commitment, and adequateresourceallocation.The momentum must be sustained. in the Bans iateractionwith Borrowers, 41. Two other types of importantreview actmties, each with long-termimpact,have for laythe groundwork contributedto the changesmadethroughthe 1993review. Theseactivities ensuringlong-termsustainability of improved workin resettlementon a countryor portfoliobasis: analtical work insidethe Bank;and trainingfor Bowers' and Bank staff. workhas been carriedout in all regionsto analyze Reilonal reports. Considerable 42. resettlementnot only on a project-by-project basiswith particularcharacteristics and demandsbut also as a subset of the region'sportfolio. Each region has finalizeda report on its portfolioof status,andissuesthat need to date,implementation analyzing performance prqjects withresettlement, to be addresed. Basedon dialogue betweenthe Environment Deparment, CounttyDepartments, thesereportsalsooutlinestepsto be taken in each region. 1Te regionandTechnal Departments, specificreviewsare intendedto becomeworing toolsin the handsof regionalmanagers for further as wellas aboutresettlement, withBorrowers for dialogue portfolioimprovementad management, for region-specific trang coursesfor regionalBank and Borowers stafE EA2 Departments, reports,two Country to the regional Coumtr rports. In addition 43. andSAZ have preparedreportson countryresettlementportfoliosfor ChinaandIndiarespecdvely. The reports analyze in-depth policy and operational matters, and highlightbest practicesor weaknesses. The China countryreport was disced in a formalpolicydialoguewith country and achievedimportantagreements.A draft Indiareport wassubmittedin 1993to Indian officials, authoritiesin anticipation of a policydialogueand is being completedin parallelwith the present Bankide report. The EA3 Departmenthas started an internalreviewof Indonesia'sexpanding during1994. particularly in urban and roadprojects,whichwillbe completed resettlementportfolio, Thesethree countriescontainabout40 percentof the 1994-97 pipelineof projects;policydialogue effecton a largesegmentof the futureBank resettlement withthem is expectedto havea multiplier the operationsnot financedby the Banlc Concentrating portfolio,and on other similardomestic issuesbeyondindividual projects and Bankstaffon country-level resettlement attentionof Borrowers management to is consistentwith the Bank'scurrent overalleffort to shift from project-by-project managing lendingas a countryportfoliounit. 44. The need for broaderpolicyapproaches, on a sectoror country basis,is nowperceived more clearlyby someBorrowers.Allregionshave emphased in their reports that this orentation shouldbe at the heart of theirfurther workandcountrydialoguesAfrica'sregional report forcefuly do not portfolio, statingthat 'when govermments reaffimed thislessonbasedon its ownresettlement if not it has been difficult, give their formal,explicitagreementwith Bank policiesand guidelines, with satisfactory results. Similarly, the LAC impossibk,to implementresettlementcomponents regionalreport emphasized that the Bank shouldgo beyond -..the projectagreementsreachedin the urban lendingoperations, whichare merelytemporary accommodations to the proposals of the coveringthe sector and seek to reach agreements Bank and have little lastingand broaderimpact,

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or the countzy."2 In the same spirit,the South Asia Region report emphasizedthat 'the Bank shouldfocuson encouraging Borrowers to developa generalframework and sector poicies.'" 45. Less developmentimpactthan possibleis achievedwhen policiesformulatedat a countryor state levelare decreedas applicable onlyto Bank-assisted projectmvestments, as happens in some borrowingcountries,or states in India. The overallconclusion arrivedat by the present reviewis that whRe'project policy" is very important,and policyand legal arrangements must be ageed upon betweenthe Bankand Bonrowers for eachproject,the broadercountry-level or sectorlevelpolicywilladd considerable strengthto project-based arrangements and wil buildinstitutional capacityfor the long termn 46. Sectoralsties. For a longer-termapproachto portfoliomanagement- and to complement the project-by-project fieldreviews- the Task Force invitedseveralstudiesby central units (AGRandlEN), whileotherswere carriedout bythe Environment Department.Thesestudies focusedon fundamental issuesin resettlementas seensectorally in the Bankes keylending subsectors of energy,agriculture, and urban/transportation/water supply.The LegalDepartmentcarriedout a studyof institutional and legalissuesacrosssectorsin resettlement.Thesestudiescovered:
*

in downstream areasof irrigation dam projects,in lightof issues Resettlement raised by the Morse Independent Reviewreport regardingthe Narmada SardarSarovarCanals project(Agricuht andNatural Resources Depamen). Forestry lending,resettlementtrends, and alternativesto resettlement in forestrysector projects(gricuture and Naural Resources Department). Lending for hydropowerand resettlement issues (Indusfty and EneIV Depatment,FPD). Legal aspects in Bank-assistedprojects with resettlement (Leal Vwce
P)sency).

*
*

*
*

Resettlementissues and approachesin urban and infrastructureprojects (Environment Deparomen4 ESD,and hnsportation,Water SupplyandUrban Depaulnne ESD).

understanding of sectoral These issue-focused sector studieshelp enrich the Bankes 47. speciffcties in resettlement.TheywillassistBank andBormwers operationalunitsin framing sectorspecificapproachesand solutions in futurelendingoperationsentailingresettlement.

TRAINIG FOR BORROWERS AND BANKSTAFF

48. ConsuatIon with Borrowers.In viewof the difficulties manyBorrowers encounter good practices, a broad training with resettlement, and to help explainBankpolicyanddisseminate programwasdeveloped jointlyby the Economic Development Institute(EDI) andthe Environment Department. Its implementation has startedwith regional support. EDI beganthis program with a

a LAC Tchia Depatment, LA4C RegIo Rept onRzealmm R ft B kw a idcRaucun Rv*w, October 23 I93 SouthAa R*ear Rpwt onRaenunm for theBankide Raw, 1993 Ada Tecal Deparmen,

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consultative workshop with officials fromseveralBorrowercountriesand NGO representatives, to define better the clients'trainingneeds. 49. Trabig courses. In the secondhalf of the reviewperiod,three trainingcourseson resettlementpolicyand practicewere held in three majorBorrower countries: * India. A 12-day trainingseminarrun jointlyby EDI and the Administrative Staff College of India, for staff in energy parastatals and for NGO representatives; September1993.

Qlina. A training seminar organizedjointly by EDI and the National

ResearchCenter for Resettlement(NRCR) and Hohai University, for 60 seniorofficials workingon resettlement; November1993.

Turkev. A seminaron planningand monitoring resetdement,run jointlyby EDI, a local NGO, and Turkey'sDirectoratefor HydraulicWorks,for 85 staft November 1993.

50. Ihese trainingcourseswere effectiveand highlyappreciatedby Borrowers. EDI, ENVSPand EMTENare nowengagedin further preparationand publication of trainingmaterials on resettlement,includinga modular manual and videotapes. EDI's program for FY94-FY95 increasingly emphasizes trainingof trainerson resettlementissues,particularly seminarsfor policy makers support for EMTENtrainingin Turkey,and collaborative resettlementtrainingwith the AsianDevelopment Bankin Indonesia, Bangladesh, and the Philippines. 51. In parallel, ENVandPAAorganized insidethe Banktwotrainingseminars forproject Task Managersduringthe reviewperiod.

OTHER PRODUCTS OF THE BANKWDE REVIEW

52. Whilea considerable part of the lessonsdistilled by the revieware presentedin this report, a numberof other economic, sociological, legal,and technical studieshavebeen completed or are underway.The findings of thesestudieswillbe widely disseminated to help expandavailable knowledgeand best practices. Perceivinga need for developingbetteriutsmentsfor cany7ng out the Bank's resetkment work,the regional teamsand the ENVs TaskForce concentrated on producing severalsuch toolsfor use by Bank staffand Borrowers alike. Somehave been deliveredalready. 53. The data bank The Task Force developed a full data bank on the Bank's resettlementportfolio. Maintaining it beyondthe review's completion as a regularinstrument will providea better graspon the resettlementportfolio, a system of experience transferbetweenregions, and the capability for operationsand Bank management to monitorprogressand trends. 54. Technical guidellUes for economic and financialanalysis of resettlementSimplified technical guidelines for improving the ex-anteeconomic andfinancial analysis of resettlement andfor internalzingit better withinoverallprojecteconomic analysis have been preparedby the TaskForce and are readyfor testing. After adequatetesting,these technical guidelines willbe made available to Borrwers and as a workingtool for Bank stafE

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7/15

projectlevel Moitorifi system ffor resettla et mphmuatalon A computer-based 5S. tool for monitoring resettlement frominitialplanming to finalexecution- the ARMSsystem- was developedby ENVs Task Force, withthe cooperationof Colombian consultants is systemwas tested in Colombia and willbe disseminated gradually to all Bor s interestedin usingit. 56. DdO lies. al Severaltechnical studieson specificissueshavebeen preparedby ENV and someBavk regional departments.Theseincludea studyon urban resettlementpublished in 1993; legalframeworks for resettlementdeveloped bylegalscholars in Kenyaand applicable, with adjustmenis, to other countries in Africa; studiesaboutsustainable reservoir fisheries as a production resource for resettlement;a volume on involuntatyresettlement in Africa, the result of an 1' organized by the Africaregion(AFTES); internationaconferenceon settlementand environment and a technicalmanualfor urban resettlementplanningdevelopedby the RotterdamInsttute for HousingStudieswithassistance fromthe Task Force. ITese studieswdll help spreadgoodpractices resettlementissues. and guidein the resolutionof practical 57. Other reiew produets.Workon three other instruments for impng resettlement technical guidelines operationswasstartedduringthe reviewperod. The LACregioncommissioned on resettlementpreparationand regional development planning.The IndiaDepartment, supported that provides field by the AsiaTechnicalDepartment,is alsopreparinga resettlementsourcebook methodsand best practiceexamples tailoredspecificaly for resettlement in India. Ihe Environment with EDI, has started a sernesof trainingvideoson and Social Policydivision,in coRaboration resettlement. IS THERE A CHANGE IN BANK CULTURE? In additionto the state of the resettlementportfolio,a salientquestionabout the mustbe answered.The impactof "organizational culture"on Bankstaff Bank'sinternalwork-culture andBankperformance arebeingincreasingly recognized. Looking beyondthe immediate "mechanice in thisreview succeeded actionsrecentlyundertaken, it is importantto ask: "has of all the corrective and work, or hasit onlyiroduced discrete influencing theBank'ssub-cdur underpmnngresettlement
S. Psn changes"

somestaffexpressed in writingthe skepticalbeliefthat this 59. At the start of the review, reviewwillbe "dested for the back bumee. Under management's guidanceand support, it has unfoldedpreciselyin the oppositedirection: the Bankwide resettlementreviewhas engagedall
relevant Bank compartments - stretching from senior management who initiated it, to project Task

and to manyborrowingagencies.The Managersat the project level,to countryresidentmissions, Bank has good reason to be proud as an institutionfor its policyleadershipin a frontier area of staff development.It is probably fair to say that the reviewhas been an importantstep in modifying perceptions,attitudes, and practices towards translatingthis policy into project reality more systematically. yet it is tangible. During1993 witha yardstick, 60. Culturalchangecannotbe measured resettlementworkhas clearlymowd up on the agendaof all regionsand of manyCDs or divisions opportunity for previously lessconcernedwithi. The entire reviewprocesshas been an exceptional learning how to do resettlementbetter, for identifying goodpractices,adjusting generalapproaches
Am%asoy a_d.av hi ApJW Sdeed P*ame m a ConqJbw on Endonm _S DC, 1994. Cok,Wod Bak Tedi Papr No.227,W ntbla wsswvswaawrnurnmcXpuiae. 1W
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to particular sectorsand circumstances, building institutional capacityfor resettlement, and refining and knowledge staff awareness The reviewhas heightened analytical andevaluationmethodologies. at manylevelsabout issues,difficulties, and approachesin resettlement. The projectportfoliois andits statusmoreregularly reportedto relevant "owned" morefully, better supervised, better known, has been brought to an improved degree at different levels The project portfolio Bankmanagers of consistency with Bank policy,and is more apt today than it was two years ago to reach the developmentgoals set by both Borrowersand the Bank. The combinationof intensifiedfield dialogues, issue-focussed sectorreportsandpolicy ofregional portfolios, country supervision, analyses them,or settingthe correcting problems, studies,and training- has proveneffectivefor identifying period. stagefor their correctionin the follow-up in the Bank's Mostimportantfor futureworkis that the largegroupof professionals 61. are nowbetter informed and morealert to the complexity, staff,as wellas the Bank as an institution, and resettlement. The social and human side of demands,risks,and hardshipsof displacement developmentprogramshave come more directlyunder the limelight. The link between good - is more clear than ever before. - the Bank'smainmission resettlementand povertyalleviation of manyresettlershas becomemorevisible and tangibleto many. A The pain and impoverishment enterprisewasembedded powerful messageaboutthe humanvaluesthat underliethe development blocks of culturalchangeare fallinginto placeand in the verygoalof the review.Significant building is gradually infusing the work addingup, and a climateof heightenedawareness and responsibility culturewillhelp the Bankto have better the powersof organizational on newprojects. Harnessing domain. preparedand better designedoperationsin thiscomplex From culture to nstitutional structure. Culturalchangemaygo a long way,but 62. alone it is not sufficient: it needs further support from iutional stucture. Sustainingthe foreordained outcome.Criticalareas recentlyachieved, however, isnot an automatic, improvements on currenttrends, and it willbe a challengefor of workemergefor the Bank to buildsuccessfuly all to maintainthe recentlevelof effort. 63. The next chapter presents the importantactionstaken by the Bank,based on the and improvefuture findingsof the present review,in order to meet this challengesuccessfully performance in resettlementwork

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....

.......

8. Actions to Improve Performance

of the resettlementreviewis that the qualityof the Bank's 1. The generalconclusion resettlementproject portfolio has improved,partic!:-ly after 1991. The review also revealed importantweaknesses, and actionshave been,or willbe, taken to achievefurther improvements. 2. Strategic priorities.Withinthe Bank'sexisting policyfor resettlementcenteredon incomerestoration,work willbe guidedby the following strategicpriorities, whichmatchthe key lessonsdescnbedin this report. Ensure the Bomws commitmentThe Bank willnot financeprojectsinvolng largeresettlementoperationsunlessthe government concernedadoptspoliciesand withincomerestoration.Agreement on legalframeworks apt to leadto resettlement policy should be explicit from the outset, with due considerationgiven to circumstances in countries witha federalsystem, wherethe policies/legal frameworks mayfallwithinthe jurisdiction of the state/provincial governments.Loansin sectors with high resettlementneeds should providefor gradual extensionof improved resettlement standardsfrom the project level to impact more broadlythe whole sector. Enhancethe Borrower'sinstitutonal cait. The Bankwillhelp Borrowers build tLzir institutionalcapacityto implementresettlementbefore displacement starts, including the clarification of legalframeworks, witha viewto protectpeople'srights. For Borrowers withseveralBank-assisted resettlementoperations,the Bank willbe prepared to support special institutionaldevelopment projects to assist the government in improving organizational capacities for addressing re. -ttlementneeds throughoutprojectdesignand implementation (e.g, capacities for site preparation, land resourcestudies,monitoring and evaluation, training). SuchBank institutional supportwillfocusprimarily on nationalandstate agencies - suchas centralirrigation and water departments, electricity boards,corporations - aimingto developtheir overallcapacityon technical,social,and environmental matters,and specifically to developdesignstandards, rulesand regulations that couldhelp translateresettlement policy and legal provisionsinto project practice. NGOs can play a big role in increasing localinstitutional capacity, andthe Bankwillencouragetheir involvement. projectsshouldavoidor reducedisplacement urolectdesfr'L Bank-assisted ImDrove as much as possiblethrough technicaland social studies for project designand execution.Everyeffortwillbe madebefore projectstart to searchfor technical and socialoptionsto reduceresettlement.The Bank willmakespecialeffortsto identify anddisseminate best practices, particularly asregardsresettlementin urban andsemiurban contextsfor whichoperationalapproachesmust be further refined. Project designandexplicit timetables shouldcreateinternalmechanisms that linkprogress in civilworkswithgradualadvancein resettlement.Thesewillbe described in project SARs. Promote peo_le?s Rard_cipatoin. The Bank requires the active participationof of resettlement. andimplementation would-be resettlersin the preparation,planning, As part of regularenvironmental assessments (EA), resettlementplans are made
%WMEAPS ~ S.71W7 as

8/1

available to the public.Reliableinformation mustbe available to the project-affected people regardingresettlement and rehabilitationpolicy, entitlements,eligibility, options,due process,and appealsmechanisms.Publicconsultation on resettlement planswfllstimulate participation of resettler and host populations in preparing such plans,and later in executingthem. ProvideadeguateBankfiancand. To preventimpoverishment, all futureprojects will internalizethe full cost of resettlementand of the investments requiredfor income restorationwithintotal projectcosts. In the contextof the overallprojectfinancing plan, the Bank will be prepared to increase its share in financingresettlement operations, as needed from case to case. As adequate financingstill remains a problemin some recentlyapprovedprojects,the BankwIllconsidersupplementary financing wheneverappropriate. Increasedfinancingfrom domestic- and, when appropriate, frombilateral sources- for resettlementactivities should be alsosought.
Diversify

nrolect

The Bank willconsidertwin-projectapproaches for large'ehicles.

scalecivilworks causing resettlement.Futureinfrastructural operationsthat displace a largenumberof peoplewillnormally be processed as twinprojects,withthe actual thresholdfor the stand-alone projectto be determinedon the basisof countryand local capacity. Processing of large-scale resettlementoperationsas components of larger projectswillrequirejustification in the StaffAppraisal Report. Treatmentof major resettlement operations as full fledgedprojects will better mobilize the appropriateadministrative frameworks and skillsneeded to carryout resettlement sequences, with a rural or successfully. An additionaloption is to use two-project urban development projectimmediately following up in the resettlementzone on the heels of the infrastuctu operationinvolving displacement; this option shouldbe consideredbasedon needs in each projectarea situation. Strengthenthe Bank's hstitutional cnacltv. The Bank is increasingits capacityto addressthe social and technicaldimensions of resettlementprojects, in order to (see paras. 66-71in the Executive sustain and buildon the recent improvements Summary, andChapter7). Particularly importantare better use of exstingstaffskills, additional staffcapacity in criticalfieldssuchas socialareas,enhancedprojectreview, andongoing performance monitoring andevaluation. Managers willallocate sufficient resourcesfrom within their budgetsto achievethese improvements To support overallstrengthening of work on the socialdimensions of projects,the Bank will allocate financialresources to a central fund designed to provide support for innovative projectsaddressing priority socialdimensions, suchas participatory poverty assessments, methodologies for socialanalysis, the organization of natural resource in projectdesignand implementation, and other users,NGO involvement 3. Remedialand retrfitting actions. Near-termremedialactionswillbe continuedor initiatedfor activeprojectsthat fall short of policyand legalprovisions.For the ongoingprojects identifiedby each regionas havingseriousresettlementproblems, remedialactionplans are being and the preparationof all such plans will be prepared by the Borrowerswith Bank assistance, additional financing, or the creation completed bymid-1995. Someprojectsmayrequirerestructuring, of resettlementagencies. bythe regionsas havingmoderateor minorproblems, Bank 4. For the projectsassessed supervision by each Country assistance willcontinueto be providedthroughregularor intensified
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Department. Borrowers wouldbe expectedto reallocatefinancialresources withinprojectbudgets to complete resettlementsuccessfully, and, when requested, the Bank will consideradditional financing. 5. The reviewidentified caseswhereresettlementplansagreedwith the Bankwerenot implemented bythe Borrower andcompleted projectshaveleft a numberof resettlers wors oft The in the remedialactionstheyproposeto take. to Borrowers Bank standsreadyto provideassistance Such"retrofitting: actions bythe Borrower, to the extentpossible, shouldidentify the peopleaffected and seek to reversetheir impoverishmentThe retrofittingactionsagreedupon betweenthe Bank and India'sNationalThermalPowerCorporation(NITPC) for severalcompletedthermalprojectsis a recentexamplethat representsprogress. dprocassi Full compliancewith proceduresand established 6. Improvin prolect safeguardsfor ensuringprojectquality- such as baselineincomesurveys, resettlementplans and projects packages,timetables,and budgets - is essentiaL The fact that nearly all FY93-FY94 submittedto the RegionalLoan Committeescomplywith established proceduresindicatesthat Regional Vice Presidenciesare focusingon these requrements. While full implementation to follow governments, Bank staff have their own responsibility responsibility rests withborrowing in sensitive impacts, andoutcomes.Becauseof the highrisksinvolved up carefully on performance, particularprudence and care are projects that dismantle and reconstructpeoples' livelihoods, warrantedby Bank and Borrower staff. It is essentialthat the Bankaddress- and be clearlyseen to address- its own responsibilities more effectively, in additionto the Bank'scall on borrowing to do the same. governments 7. Improvements have been and are being madein (i) the analysis of resettlementat appraisaland in the designof developmentpackagesfor resettlers,(ii) the in-housereviewof resettlementcomponents before projectsubmission to the RegionalLoanCommittee, and (iii) the staffingand organization of operationalunitsto enablethem to addressresettlementprofessionally and consistently. Muchof the knowledge neededfor doingsound,successful resettlementresidesin the Bankl, andthe presentreviewhas enriched it. Withwell-deployed staffresources, thisknowledge must nowbe more fullyused. & At projectidentification andduringthe preparation of largeresettlement operations,
the Bank will encourage Bornwers to carry out pilot schemes to test the adequacy of proposed

solutionsand arrangements.Systematic use of Project PreparationFacilityresourcesand of the Institutional Development Fund (IDF) willopen additional financial windows for technicalsupport and capacitybuildmgto Borowers in the decisivepreparatoryphases. In major operaons stagesto using is increasingly givenin the earlyidentification for dams - consideration particularly a resettlementadvisoxy panel, alongthe linespursuedin establishing dam safetypanels as definedin OMS2.20and OD 4.30,are 9. Bankprovisions for resettlementappraisal, adequate and will be implemented. Appraisalwill explicitly assessand report on the social and economic risksinvolved in the proposedresettlement operation,distinct fromotherprojectrisks,and ensure that the socio-economic reconstruction packageaddressesthese risks Consistent with the Bank management decisionon preparingan Implementation Plan for each projectat appraisal, the resettlementplan willbe incorporated in the overallimplementation plan. 10. The contentof SARsfor projectsinvolving resettlement is beig improved to ensure that essentialinformation aboutresettlementis providedto management and the Board. A distinct SAR subsectionfor the resettlement componentwill include the basic indicatorson affected
WVW W I W170 m.W

8a3

populations,developmentpackages,risk mitigation, timetable,and budget. The overal cost of resettlement willbe specified as an identifiable part of projectcostsandwilldistinguish compensation costsfromthe costsof investments neededto reconstruct a viablesocio-economic basisfor resettles 11. Supervislon. Considerablescope exists for further improvingthe content and frequency of resettlement supervision. Regularand adequately staffedsupervision missions willtake place at leastevery12months,including on-the-ground visitsto the placeswhere displacement and relocationactually occur. Intensively usinglocalspecialist consultants willsignificantly increasethe reachof Bank supervision worlk The goodpracticeintroduced by the East Asiaand Africaregions to support monitoringpanels appointedby the Borrowerimprovesimplementation and will be extended. 12. Bank divisions responsible for projcs with complex resettlementneed to allocate increasedstaff time to supervisethese operations. However,no amount of increased Bank supervision can substitutefor Borrowers' defaultsor weak commitment to carryout agreedactions. Whencompliance withlegalagreements is foundlacking, decisions to continue disbursements require approvalat the sameregional management levelsthat clearproposals to suspenddisbursement (this applies to all non-compliance and not only to non-compliance with resettlementagreements). Becauseof the sensitivity and risksof resettlement, currentmechanisms for reportingfieldfindings to divisional and regionalmanagers (throughForm 590)willbe improved. 13. To sustain the progress achievedduring the review and to monitor continued compliance with Bank guidelinesand procedures,regionalunits will prepare annual reports on projectswithresettlementin their portfolio, as part of the AnnualReviewof PortfolioPerformance (ARPP). These reports wil cover the managementof the resettlementproject portfolioalong measurableindicators- specifically the frequencyof supervisionmissions, and assessments of livelihood recoveryas displacedpeople resettle, and major implementation problems, if any. As regardsthe processing of new projectswith resettlement, the reportingwillcover the presenceof resettlementplans,incomesurveys, timetablesand budgets,and consultation with localpeople.

14. Strengtheningits assistanceto Borrowerson resettlement work and improving resettlementperformance is of highpriorityfor the Bank,and part and parcelof the Banlkscentral missionto alleviate povertyand pmmotesustainable development.The importantlearningprocess that has taken placeoverthe last fewyearshas increasedawareness of the complex issuesand risks involved, and the Bank andits Borrowers are muchbetter equippedthan in the past to workin this area. Muchof the necessarytechnicaltalent for this workexistsin the Bank,and the limitedinhouse capacityfor social analysisis being strengthened. Diversifiedproject vehiclesand more financialresourceswill be used by the Bank to assist Borrowerswith large scale resettlement operations. 15. Bysettingmoreexacting normsfor the operations it assists, andpromoting resettlers' reestablishment at comparable or improvedincomelevels,the Bank is workingto narrowthe gap betweenresettlement goalsand pastentrenched practicein manycountries.Closing thisgaprequires time, resourcesandsteadyeffort byboth the Bank and its Borrowers.Unfortunately, bad standards
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programs; takingplacetodayoutsideBank-assisted continueto prevailin muchof the displacement suchstandards slowprogress underBank-financed as Bank-finced projectsdo not occurin isolation, agencies andbilateral development andmultilateral projectsaswelLFor thisreasonallgovernments must pursuesimilarpolicies and approaches, to maxmizethe prospectsfor improving the lvelihood of resettlers. 16. By supporting resettlement centered on preventing impoverishment, the Bank that are relevantfar beyondthe Bank-assisted projects.Improving promotespoliciesandapproaches operations,but also the much broader Borrower'scapacitywill benefit not only Bank-assisted of people Tbisisthe road that must of entire sectors,affecting largernumbers resettlementactivities be travelledin future resettlementwork, even though it is not an easy one. There will be many difficulties, becauseresettlementremainsa formidable challengefor Borrowers as well as for the Band The Bank recognizesits importantresponsibility to help its Borrowersmoveprogressively alongthis road, to improveresettlementwheneverdisplacement cannotbe avoided,and to extend improved approachesto sector and nationalcontexts

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Annex1

Task Force and Steeig Committee for the Bankwide Resettlement Review
The TaskForce for the Bankwide Resettlement Review.A TaskForceto coordinate the Bankwide reviewandcarryit out jointlywiththe regional operational unitswasestablished in the Environment Department. The Task Force was led by MichaelM; Cernea,SeniorAdviser,Social Policyand Sociologry it consistedof Scott Guggenheim, senior anthropologist, Lars Soeftestad, Deepai Tewariand WarrenVan Wicklin IIL Part-timemembers of the TaskForce were alsoDan Aronson,AbdulSalamn, and TovaSolo. MichaelM. Cernea and ScottGuggenheim wrote the presentreport WarrenVan Wicklin m developedthe review's data bank and preparedChapterII. The preparationof the present report wascarriedout under the overallguidance of lsmaU Serageldin. Mohamed El-Ashry, AndrewSteer,PierreLandell-Mills andGloriaDavisread many draftsof variouschaptersand provided veryvaluablecomments and insights. SteeringCommittee for the Bankwide ResettlementReview. The activities of the Bankwide ResettlementReview were guidedby a SteeringCommittee chairedby IsmailSerageldin, Vice President (ESD), and included representativesfrom all regional Vice-Presidencies, the Environment Department, the Legal Department, the Agriculture and Natural Resources Department, and the Industryand EnergyDepartment. The membersof the Steering Committeeconsistedof: IsmaflSerageldin,Vice President, ESD (Chairman); MohamedT. El-Ashry, ChiefEnvironmental Adviserto the Preddent and Director, EnvironmentDepartment;M. G. Sr-ram Aiyer,Director,Latin Americaand the Caribbean Technical Department; KevinM. Cleaver, Director,AfricaTechnical Department; Daniel Ritchie,Director, Asia TechnicalDepartment;Andres Rigo, AssistantGeneral Counsel,Legal Operations; Anil Sood,Director,ECA/MNA RegionsTechnical Department;MichaelM. Cernea, Senior Adviser,Social Policy and Sociology, EnvironmentDepartment;Andrew Steer, Deputy Director,Environment Department;DennisAnderson,Adviser, Industryand EnergyDepartment; DavidR. Steeds,Division Chief,NaturalResourcesDivision, AGR A large numberof Bankstaffand consultants contributedto the preparationof this report, throughtheir fieldworkand reports. Muchof the analysis and fieldwork data on whichthis overallreport is based camefrom eachregion'sown resettlementreport In Asia,regionalworking groupsled by Robert S. Drysdale(SAS)and AbdallahEl Maaroufi(EAP) were both supportedby ASTHR,particularly byAsbrafGhani,EllenF. Schaengold, andDavidButcher. Latin America and the Caribbean's regional report wasthe joint product of William L Partridge, MariaClaraMejia,and Maria Teresa Serra. In Africa, CynthiaC Cook and KristineM. Ivarsdotterformed a regional resettlementworking groupand preparedtheirregionaloveniiew.AnandK Seth,AyseKudat,and Stan Peabodypreparedthe ECA/MNA regional report Sectoralstudiesfor AGR, IEN, and TWU
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Hort Wager, Rachel of DavidSteeds,Herve Plusquellec, were prepared with the able assistance Crossley,and Mei Xie (AGR); Dennis Anderson and Paolo Gutman (IEN); Ian Newport,S. review. Al Habsy,and ALGopal preparedthe Legal Department's Severalexperienced consultants alsocontributed studiesforthe review: DavidPearce, John Erikson,WalterFernandes,and MariaFidesBagasao. GracieM. Ochieng,Paula McPoland, and processedthe text the reviews's documentation AnjuSachdevaand KerniBradyably managed Weithers, JoyceSaid, Mason,Camille John Kellenberg, Jocelyn morethanonce. BruceRoss-Larson, Debra Sequeira,and SamanthaMerton assistedwitheditingor data research.

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Annex2

Generic Termsof Reference ResettlementReviewSupervisionMission

1. Thi note providesgenerc TQRs for what should be supeised about the resettlement component duringupcoming missions andreportedback asan attachmentto Form590s. Field visits to departure and receivingsites are a criticalpart of resettlementsuperviion, and adequate field time should be allocatedto the resettlementcomponent. Takinga resettlement or particularly complex specialist maybe mostusefutfor projectsthat involve significant displacement resettlementcomponents. 2. The Bank'soverallpolicyobjective is to help peopledisplaced by project activtes restoreor improvetheir incomeand productive capacity.Thus,supervision shouldfocuson whether executingagencieshave developeda resettlementactionplan able to achievethis goal,and on its are: status. The mainpointsto be addressed implementation (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) incomelevels; restorationof pre-displacement organizational capacity for resettlementand follow-up; physical progressof relocation work-; consultation with affectedpeople; compensation; project-specific issues

work, a few, more detailed items are suggestedfor 3. To assistwith the supervision supervision for each of the abovepoints,to be usedas appropriate. 4. IncomeRestoratlon- Giventhe Bank'spolicyobjectives of restoringlostincomes, on the following key items: missionshouldconcentrate supervision (a) (b) (c) (d) of what pre-moveincomelevelsare; is there accuratebaselineinformation do the proposalsamount to an appropriateset of measures to restore incomes; are people'slivingstandardsand incomelevelsbeingadequatelymonitored by the projectauthorities;and in the mission's judgement, howlongwillit take for resettlersto recovertheir lost living standards,and what measures willsustainthem until then.

shouldassessthe qualityof the studies missions Where resettlementis land-based, 5. done, the amountand pace of land identification, and how the acceptability of replacementland is evaluated. Proposalsfor using non-land based income generatingschemeseither alone or in combination with land shouldbe reviewed for the successof their performance.

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6. BaseflneN&mbes- Missions shouldobtain the most up-to date estimatesof the numbersof people to be affectedby loss of land,loss of house,or both. Wherethe basisfor the resettlememestimateis not clear, they shouldask the borrwer to explainhow the numberwas obtamed,and the cniteriausedto determinewhen peopleonlypartialy affectedby the project are eligiblefor resettlement. should (i) identify the position of the OriZton-Mission Resetlnt 7. sucture; (ii) assessthe resettlementorganiation or unit withinthe overallproject management that adequacy,numbers,and skill of resettlementstaff; (iii) reviewthe efficiency of mechanisms the usefulness of the roleplayed agencies involved in resettlement; (iv)assess coordinate the different and,whereappropriate,indicatehowit can be improved. by NOOs and loca organizations & Resettlement Budfet - Missions shouldreviewand evaluatedetailedresettlement budgets Resettlement budgetsshouldat a minimum be divided into publicandprivatecompensation, of overall should assess(i) the adequacy costsfor the resettledfamilies.Missions and redevelopment resettlementbudget,(ii) actualexpenditures; (iii) per capitabudgetedexpenditure for resettlement, budgets;(v) the availability of resourcesfor fieldstaff (vi)the causesof (iv)provisions for adjusting annexesto World shortfalls.You mayalsowishto consultthe technical cost overrunsor budgetary Bank Technical Paper No. 80, "InvolwaryResetlmnt in DeveopmentProjects.PolicyGuines and economic guidelines; it is available for moredetaied financial in World Bank-flnnced Projects' in Spanish,French,and English. 9. Ilmetables - The first, critical element to review is whether progress on the in tandemwith the maininvestmentthat is causingthe resettlementaction programis proceeding and shouldevaluate actualversus plannedresettlementperformance, displacement. Supervision match deviationsfrom the resettlementscheduleagainstthe overallproject timetable. A second timetableconcernrefers to the adequacyof preparationof resettlementsites when resetdersare movedthere, and superision shouldassessboth the mechanism to signalthat preparationis ready as well as its effectiveness. 10. nitQriz-Supervsionshouldreviewthe workdone bythe project'smonitoring usedto obtain data,whoreceies it, how is it processedthrough systems.What is the methodology and howcouldit be improved. the executingagency,
11. ConSultation-Resettlement ph normalyinclude mechaims forgiev /dispute

ofresettletswiththeir integration includeassetcompensation, concern resolution.Areasofparticular of promisedbenefits. Missionsshouldcheck to see that such host villagers, and timelydelivery do in fact exist,and are working mechanisms is issuesinclude(i) whethercompensation Compensafton - Common compensation 12. of its delivery to the affected eligibility, (iii) the efficiency at replacementcost; (ii) compensation (v) compensation for publc propertyand private againstcompensation; people;(iv) hiddencharges businesses. resettlement involves transferring alladministrative 13. HandoverConers - Successful Is to the resettledpeopleand theirrepresentatives.Howwillthisbe accomplished? responsibilities there an adequate,phasedprogramto devolveresponsibilities, including budgetaryresources? 14. !roposals - Progress to date, as well as difficultiesand problems with the resettlementcomponentthat are identified by the supervision mission, shouldbe discussed with the
VMWFV*#ffit_QVo1__t 0, 1m &AL a

borrowerin order to agreeon actionsfor the next 6-8 monthsthat willbring the resettlementinto line with projectagreementsand policyguidelineL 15. rd - Detailedback-to-office reports shouldreviewthe above points,and includeproposalsfor what the Bank coulddo to providetechnicalor other assistance.

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