Hedonism and Stoicism: a comparison

One of the latest defenders of hedonism (thousands of years after Epicurus) is Roger Crisp. In his article (Well-being) on the Stanford Encyclopedia of hilosophy! Crisp pro"ides the follo#ing defence of hedonism from the $philosophy of s#ine% ob&ection (basically the same argument can be found in his most recent boo' $Reasons and the (ood%) *entham tended to thin' of pleasure and pain as a 'ind of sensation! as the notion of intensity might suggest. +..., -homas Carlyle! for e.ample! described the hedonistic component of utilitarianism as the /philosophy of s#ine0! the point being that simple hedonism places all pleasures on a par! #hether they be the lo#est animal pleasures of se. or the highest of aesthetic appreciation. +..., 1o# this is not a 'noc'do#n argument against simple hedonism. +..., *ut there is an alternati"e to simple hedonism! outlined famously by 2.S. 3ill! using his distinction bet#een /higher0 and /lo#er0 pleasures (4556 +4678,! ch. 9). 3ill added a third property to the t#o determinants of "alue identified by *entham! duration and intensity. -o distinguish it from these t#o /:uantitati"e0 properties! 3ill called his third property /:uality0. -he claim is that some pleasures! by their "ery nature! are more "aluable than others. ;or e.ample! the pleasure of reading Sha'espeare! by its "ery nature! is more "aluable than any amount of basic animal pleasure. <nd #e can see this! 3ill suggests! if #e note that those #ho ha"e e.perienced both types! and are /competent &udges0! #ill ma'e their choices on this basis. < long-standing ob&ection to 3ill=s mo"e here has been to claim that his position can no longer be described as formally hedonist. If higher pleasures are higher because of their nature! that aspect of their nature cannot be pleasantness! since that could be determined by duration and intensity alone. <nd 3ill any#ay spea's of properties such as /nobility0 as adding to the "alue of a pleasure. 1o# it has to be admitted that 3ill is sailing close to the #ind here. *ut there is logical space for a hedonist position #hich allo#s properties such as nobility to determine pleasantness! and insists that only pleasantness determines "alue. *ut one might #ell #onder ho# nobility could affect pleasantness! and #hy 3ill did not &ust come out #ith the idea that nobility is itself a good-ma'ing property.%

What could be a Stoic reply to this contemporary re"i"al of the $Epicurean% position> ?et us imagine a dialog bet#een a stoic and a hepicurean! respecti"ely S. and @. S) you insist that nobility can determine pleasantness! but only pleasantness can determine "alue. @o#e"er this cannot be a defense of hedonism! since admitting that nobility can determine pleasantness leads to thin' that the goodness of the li"es of different people depends from their nobility. -his leads some support to the stoic position according to #hich nobility or honesty is the only authentic good. @. *ut this position is indefensible since a honest or noble life is not good #hen it does not contain also pleasure. S. <n authentically noble person #ould al#ays gain pleasure from acting "irtuously. If she does not! she is not authentically "irtuous. @. *ut this is ob"iously falseA Consider the honest &udge=s lac' of pleasure in applying certain la#s to certain cases! for e.ample #hen he has to e.propriate the po"erty of a poor and honest man to gi"e it to a rich and e"il man. S. Well! the &udge is not authentically honest! or he lac's pleasure #hen he does #hat is &ust. -he &udge you are imagining is not doing something &ust! because he is applying un&ust la#s. -his is not to say that he should bend the la#s. Rather a honest person #ould not occupy such a role as the &udge in a country #hich has un&ust la#s. Summing up! a la# is either a good la# or a bad la#B and that if it is a good la#! the &udge should be pleased to apply it! #hile if it the la# is a bad one! an honest &udge should not apply and should resign office. @. -his "ie# of the la# is totally unplausible. < good or &ust la# is a la# #hose consistent application fosters human happiness. *ut #e can ha"e no guarantee that a &ust la# #ill do al#ays more good in every particular case. <s @ume clearly sa#! e"en the best la# can produce more harm than good in some particular case of its application. -herefore it is perfectly natural for a &udge - #ho! being human! possesses sympathy - to lac' pleasure in applying some &ust la#s! in particular circumstances. 4

S. < good la# must be such that its application produces most of the time more good than harm! and hence a honest &udge #ill find pleasure in his e.ercise of honesty more often than not. So the honest #ill be happy in a country that has good la#s. @. *ut then a &udge cannot be both happy and honest in country #hose la#s are imperfect or unfair! say because they produce harm rather than good in most casesA @. *ut is that a parado.> 3y "ie# leads to thin'ing that no &udge can be perfectly honest (and therefore happy) in a society li'e ours! society #hich has some la#s #hich can only be applied reluctantly. It leads to thin'ing that people #ho co"er a certain social position cannot be perfectly happy and honest but in a society #ith &ust la#s. Is that such a parado.ical result> 4<s @ume puts it) C< single act of &ustice is fre:uently contrary to public interestB and #ere it to stand alone! #ithout being follo#=d by other acts! may! in itself! be "ery pre&udicial to society. When a man of merit! of a beneficent disposition! restores a great fortune to a miser! or a seditious bigot! he has acted &ustly and laudably! but the public is a real sufferer. 1or is e"ery single act of &ustice! consider=d apart! more conduci"e to pri"ate interest! than to publicB and =tis easily concei"=d ho# a man may impo"erish himself by a signal instance of integrity! and ha"e reason to #ish! that #ith regard to that single acct! the la#s of &ustice #ere for a moment suspended in the uni"erseC (-reatise on @uman 1ature! 8.9.9! D5E)
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