RULE 14, SEC. 6 &7 DOMAGAS vs.

JENSEN, 2005 FACTS: Domagas filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondent Vivian Jensen before the MTC of Calasiao, Pangasinan. The summons and the complaint were not served on the respondent because the latter was apparently out of the country. This was relayed to the Sheriff by her (Jensens) brother, Oscar Layno, who was then in the respondents house. The Sheriff left the summons and complaint with Oscar Layno, who received the same. Nonetheless, the court rendered judgment ordering the respondent and all persons occupying the property for and in the latters behalf to vacate the disputed area and to pay monthly rentals therefor, including actual damages, attorneys fees, and exemplary damages. Jensen failed to appeal the decision. Consequently, a writ of execution was issued. Jensen filed a complaint against Domagas before the RTC of Dagupan City for the annulment of the decision of the MTC in the Civil Case on the ground that due to the Sheriffs failure to serve the complaint and summons on her because she was in Oslo, Norway, the MTC never acquired jurisdiction over her person. In her answer to the complaint, Domagas alleged that the service of the complaint and summons by substituted service on Jensen, the defendant in the Civil Case was proper since her brother Oscar Layno, received the complaint and summons for and in her behalf. ISSUE: WON there was a valid service of summons and complaint in the civil case on Jensen who was the defendant in the said case. HELD: NO, there was none. The action of Domagas for forcible entry is a real action and one in personam. By its very nature and purpose, an action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is a real action and in personam because the plaintiff seeks to enforce a personal obligation or liability on the defendant under Article 539 of the New Civil Code, for the latter to vacate the property subject of the

action, restore physical possession thereof to the plaintiff, and pay actual damages by way of reasonable compensation for his use or occupation of the property. Considering that the respondent was in Oslo, Norway, having left the Philippines, the summons and complaint in the Civil Case may only be validly served on her through substituted service under Section 7, Rule 14. In the Return of Service filed by Sheriff Abulencia on the service of summons, there is no showing that the house where the Sheriff found Oscar Layno was the latters residence or that of the respondent herein. Neither is there any showing that the Sheriff tried to ascertain where the residence of the respondent was on the said date. The service of the summons on a person at a place where he was a visitor is not considered to have been left at the residence or place or abode, where he has another place at which he ordinarily stays and to which he intends to return. In sum, then, Jensen was not validly served with summons and the complaint in the Civil Case by substituted service. Hence, the MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent; as such, the decision of the MTC in the Civil Case is null and void. RATIO: In Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals the Court stated that: In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by personal service of summons as provided under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If he cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable time, substituted service may be made in accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service may be resorted to: (a) substituted service set forth in Section 8; (2) personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or (4) any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Thus, any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and void. Strict compliance with the mode of service is required in order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The statutory requirement of substituted service must be followed faithfully and strictly and any substituted service other than that authorized by the statute is rendered ineffective.

The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officers Return; otherwise, any substituted service made in lieu of personal service cannot be upheld. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It is a method extraordinary in character and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the requirements of substituted service renders said service ineffective. In Keister v. Narcereo, the Court held that the term "dwelling house" or "residence" are generally held to refer to the time of service; hence, it is not sufficient to leave the summons at the formers dwelling house, residence or place of abode, as the case may be. Dwelling house or residence refers to the place where the person named in the summons is living at the time when the service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time. It is, thus, the service of the summons intended for the defendant that must be left with the person of suitable age and discretion residing in the house of the defendant. Compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as much important as the issue of due process as of jurisdiction.

RULE 14, SEC. 6 &7 ALEGAR CORPORATION vs. ALVAREZ, 2007 FACTS: The Legarda family, owner of a parcel of land assigned its rights and interests over it, by a Deed of Assignment in favor of Alegar Corporation. The Legarda family had verbally leased the property on a monthly basis to Catalina Bartolome (Catalina). Even after Catalinas death, her children continued to occupy the property. Because of non-payment of rentals, Alegar Corporation, by counsel, sent a letter addressed to the "Heirs of Catalina Bartolome" demanding them to vacate the premises and pay their arrearages within 15 days from receipt of the letter. 3 Based on a certification issued by the Manila Central Post Office, the letter was received via registered mail by Emilio Alvarez, a son of Catalinas son Benjamin. Its demands having remained unheeded, petitioner filed before the Manila MeTC a complaint for unlawful detainer against the "Heirs of Catalina Bartolome, Spouses Amado and Jane Doe, Bartolome, and those persons claiming rights under them." The original of the summons bears the signature of one Guilberto Acosta who received it for the defendant Ramon Alvarez. Emilio Alvarez questioned the service of only one set of summons, despite the number of defendants, and even the service thereof on one Guilberto Acosta who was not authorized to receive the same. ISSUE: WON the substituted service was validly effected. HELD: NO. As was held by the CA (the case was dismissed without prejudice), the substituted service of summons was not validly effected on [respondent] because the return of the process server did not clearly indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time upon the [respondent]. More importantly, the summons was merely left behind to a certain Gilbert Acosta, whose relation to the case remained a mystery to this day. There was no explanation whatsoever in the return as to indicate any effort exerted if any on the part of the process server in verifying

the whereabouts of the [respondent] from any responsible person of sufficient age, and there was no indication in the return that personal service was impossible. The return merely made general statements that [respondent] could not be found. Emilio Alvarez questioned the service of summons on one Guilberto Acosta who, by his claim, was not authorized to receive summons on behalf of the defendants. Assuming that Guilberto Acosta was not so authorized to receive summons on behalf of the defendants, the summons, together with a copy of the complaint, must have reached respondent; otherwise, he could not have filed an Answer to the Complaint. Respondent in fact participated in all the proceedings of the case. Thus, the purpose of summons, which is to give notice to the defendant or respondent that an action has been commenced against him, was sufficiently met. That the MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of Emilio Alvarez does not, however, extend to the other defendant Ramon Alvarez on whose behalf Acosta allegedly received the summons with copy of the complaint. Based on the Return of Service of Summons submitted by the Process Server, it appears that indeed, only one set of summons and complaint was served that which was received by Acosta. The rest of the therein named defendants-children of Catalina having died or are living elsewhere, it would appear that only the therein named defendant, Ramon Alvarez, together with those deriving rights under him, was served with summons thru Acosta. There is, however, no showing that substituted service of summons on Ramon Alvarez, under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. In fine, only Emilio Alvarez, a person who claims right from his now deceased father Benjamin, is bound by the trial courts decision. The appellate courts dismissal of the complaint, without prejudice, except with respect to respondent, is thus in order.

RULE 14, SEC. 6 &7 WONG vs. KOYAMA, 2009 FACTS: The present controversy originates from a Complaint for specific performance, sum of money, and damages, filed with the RTC by private Koyama against Wong, docketed as a Civil Case. The RTC issued summons addressed to Wong at his residence. However, the original summons and the accompanying copy of the Complaint and its Annexes were eventually returned to the RTC by Sheriff Baloloy, who indicated in his Sheriffs Return that said court process should already be deemed "DULY SERVED." According to his Return, Sheriff Baloloy had repeatedly attempted to serve the summons at Wongs residential address, but Wong was always not around according to the latters housemaids, Sheriff Baloloy then attempted to leave the summons with Wongs caretaker, who is of legal age, and residing at the same address for two and a half years, but Mira refused to acknowledge or receive the same. After the lapse of the 15-day reglementary period without Wong filing an answer to the Complaint in the Civil Case Koyama moved for the RTC to declare him in default, and to allow her to present her evidence ex parte and/or to render judgment in her favor. The RTC issued an Order declaring Wong in default. Wong subsequently filed with the RTC, by registered mail a Manifestation claiming that he did not receive any summons from said court. Wong, by special appearance of counsel, then filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss the Civil Case asserting, among other grounds, that there was no service of summons upon him, hence, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over his person; and that he was not given the opportunity to oppose Koyamas Motion to have him declared in default. In her Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, Koyama maintained that there was a proper substituted service of the summons, consequently, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of Wong; and that Wong was served a copy of the Motion to have him declared in default, as evidenced by the Registry Return Card.
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ISSUE: WON there was proper resort to substituted service by Sherriff Baloloy upon Wong. HELD: NO. The SC after a careful study of Sheriff Baloloys Return, found that he improperly resorted to substituted service upon Wong of the summons for the civil case. Apart from establishing that Sheriff Baloloy went to Wongs residence on three different dates, and that the latter was not around every time, there is nothing else in the Sheriffs Return to establish that Sheriff Baloloy exerted extraordinary efforts to locate Wong. Evidently, the Return failed to relay if sufficient efforts were exerted by Sheriff Baloloy to locate Wong, as well as the impossibility of personal service of summons upon Wong within a reasonable time. Sheriff Baloloys three visits to Wongs residence hardly constitute effort on his part to locate Wong; and Wongs absence from his residence during Sheriff Baloloys visits, since Wong was at the office or out -oftown, does not connote impossibility of personal service of summons upon him. It must be stressed that, before resorting to substituted service, a sheriff is enjoined to try his best efforts to accomplish personal service on the defendant. And since the defendant is expected to try to avoid and evade service of summons, the sheriff must be resourceful, persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the process on the defendant. Nevertheless, even without valid service of summons, a court may still acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, if the latter voluntarily appears before it. The RTC acquired jurisdiction over Wong by virtue of his voluntary appearance before it in the Civil Case. The Court, calls attention to the RTC Order allowing Wong to cross-examine Koyama. Wong, through his counsel, took advantage of the opportunity opened to him by the said Order and aggressively questioned her during the hearing, despite his knowledge that the RTC had not yet lifted the Order declaring him in default. By actively participating in the hearing, he effectively acknowledged full control of the RTC over the Civil Case and over his person as the defendant therein; he is, thus, deemed to have voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of said trial court.