Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No.

78742 July 14, 1989 ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN T E P ILIPPINES, INC., JUANITO D. GOME!, GERARDO ". ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO, JR., "ERNARDO M. ALMONTE, CANUTO RAMIR ". CA"RITO, ISIDRO T. GUICO, FELISA I. LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J. SAL#A, RE$NALDO G. ESTRADA, FELISA C. "AUTISTA, ESMENIA J. CA"E, TEODORO ". MADRIAGA, AUREA J. PRESTOSA, EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, FELICISIMA C. ARRESTO, CONSUELO M. MORALES, "ENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE % NAPOLEON S. FERRER, petitioners, vs. ONORA"LE SECRETAR$ OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent. G.R. No. 79&1' July 14, 1989 ARSENIO AL. ACUNA, NEWTON JISON, #ICTORINO FERRARIS, DENNIS JERE!A, ERMINIGILDO GUSTILO, PAULINO D. TOLENTINO ()* PLANTERS+ COMMITTEE, INC., #,-.o/,(0 M,ll D,0./,-., #,-.o/,(0, N12/o0 O--,*1).(l, petitioners, vs. JO3ER ARRO$O, P ILIP E. JUICO ()* PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL, respondents. G.R. No. 79744 July 14, 1989 INOCENTES PA"ICO, petitioner, vs. ON. P ILIP E. JUICO, SECRETAR$ OF T E DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, ON. JO3ER ARRO$O, E4ECUTI#E SECRETAR$ OF T E OFFICE OF T E PRESIDENT, ()* M100/0. SAL#ADOR TALENTO, JAIME A"OGADO, CONRADO A#ANCENA ()* RO"ERTO TAA$, respondents. G.R. No. 79777 July 14, 1989 NICOLAS S. MANAA$ ()* AGUSTIN ERMANO, JR., petitioners, vs. ON. P ILIP ELLA JUICO, (0 S1-/1.(/y o5 A2/(/,() R15o/6, ()* LAND "AN3 OF T E P ILIPPINES, respondents.

CRU!, J.: In ancient mytholo y, Antaeus !as a terrible iant !ho bloc"ed and challen ed #ercules for his life on his !ay to Mycenae after performin his eleventh labor. $he t!o !restled mi htily and #ercules flun his adversary to the round thin"in him dead, but Antaeus rose even stron er to resume their stru le. $his happened several times to #ercules% increasin

ama&ement. 'inally, as they continued rapplin , it da!ned on #ercules that Antaeus !as the son of (aea and could never die as lon as any part of his body !as touchin his Mother Earth. $hus fore!arned, #ercules then held Antaeus up in the air, beyond the reach of the sustainin soil, and crushed him to death. Mother Earth. $he sustainin soil. $he iver of life, !ithout !hose invi oratin touch even the po!erful Antaeus !ea"ened and died. $he cases before us are not as fanciful as the fore oin tale. But they also tell of the elemental forces of life and death, of men and !omen !ho, li"e Antaeus need the sustainin stren th of the precious earth to stay alive. )*and for the *andless) is a slo an that underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of this precious resource amon our people. But it is more than a slo an. $hrou h the broodin centuries, it has become a battle+cry dramati&in the increasin ly ur ent demand of the dispossessed amon us for a plot of earth as their place in the sun. Reco ni&in this need, the Constitution in ,-./ mandated the policy of social 0ustice to )insure the !ell+bein and economic security of all the people,) 1 especially the less privile ed. In ,-1., the ne! Constitution affirmed this oal addin specifically that )the 2tate shall re ulate the ac3uisition, o!nership, use, en0oyment and disposition of private property and e3uitably diffuse property o!nership and profits.) 2 2i nificantly, there !as also the specific in0unction to )formulate and implement an a rarian reform pro ram aimed at emancipatin the tenant from the bonda e of the soil.) & $he Constitution of ,-41 !as not to be outdone. Besides echoin these sentiments, it also adopted one !hole and separate Article 5III on 2ocial 6ustice and #uman Ri hts, containin randiose but undoubtedly sincere provisions for the uplift of the common people. $hese include a call in the follo!in !ords for the adoption by the 2tate of an a rarian reform pro ram7 2EC. 8. $he 2tate shall, by la!, underta"e an a rarian reform pro ram founded on the ri ht of farmers and re ular farm!or"ers, !ho are landless, to o!n directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farm!or"ers, to receive a 0ust share of the fruits thereof. $o this end, the 2tate shall encoura e and underta"e the 0ust distribution of all a ricultural lands, sub0ect to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Con ress may prescribe, ta"in into account ecolo ical, developmental, or e3uity considerations and sub0ect to the payment of 0ust compensation. In determinin retention limits, the 2tate shall respect the ri ht of small lando!ners. $he 2tate shall further provide incentives for voluntary land+ sharin . Earlier, in fact, R.A. No. .488, other!ise "no!n as the A ricultural *and Reform Code, had already been enacted by the Con ress of the Philippines on Au ust 4, ,-9., in line !ith the above+stated principles. $his !as substantially superseded almost a decade later by P.:. No. ;1, !hich !as promul ated on <ctober ;,, ,-1;, alon !ith martial la!, to provide for the compulsory ac3uisition of private lands for distribution amon tenant+farmers and to specify ma=imum retention limits for lando!ners. $he people po!er revolution of ,-49 did not chan e and indeed even ener i&ed the thrust for a rarian reform. $hus, on 6uly ,1, ,-41, President Cora&on C. A3uino issued E.<. No.

;;4, declarin full land o!nership in favor of the beneficiaries of P.:. No. ;1 and providin for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as !ell as the manner of their payment. $his !as follo!ed on 6uly ;;, ,-41 by Presidential Proclamation No. ,.,, institutin a comprehensive a rarian reform pro ram >CARP?, and E.<. No. ;;-, providin the mechanics for its implementation. 2ubse3uently, !ith its formal or ani&ation, the revived Con ress of the Philippines too" over le islative po!er from the President and started its o!n deliberations, includin e=tensive public hearin s, on the improvement of the interests of farmers. $he result, after almost a year of spirited debate, !as the enactment of R.A. No. 99/1, other!ise "no!n as the Comprehensive A rarian Reform *a! of ,-44, !hich President A3uino si ned on 6une ,@, ,-44. $his la!, !hile considerably chan in the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless ives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent !ith its provisions. 4 $he above+captioned cases have been consolidated because they involve common le al 3uestions, includin serious challen es to the constitutionality of the several measures mentioned above. $hey !ill be the sub0ect of one common discussion and resolution, $he different antecedents of each case !ill re3uire separate treatment, ho!ever, and !ill first be e=plained hereunder. (.R. No. 1-111 23uarely raised in this petition is the constitutionality of P.:. No. ;1, E.<. Nos. ;;4 and ;;-, and R.A. No. 99/1. $he sub0ects of this petition are a -+hectare riceland !or"ed by four tenants and o!ned by petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his !ife and a /+hectare riceland !or"ed by four tenants and o!ned by petitioner Au ustin #ermano, 6r. $he tenants !ere declared full o!ners of these lands by E.<. No. ;;4 as 3ualified farmers under P.:. No. ;1. $he petitioners are 3uestionin P.:. No. ;1 and E.<. Nos. ;;4 and ;;- on rounds inter alia of separation of po!ers, due process, e3ual protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be ta"en for public use !ithout 0ust compensation. $hey contend that President A3uino usurped le islative po!er !hen she promul ated E.<. No. ;;4. $he said measure is invalid also for violation of Article 5III, 2ection 8, of the Constitution, for failure to provide for retention limits for small lando!ners. Moreover, it does not conform to Article AI, 2ection ;/>8? and the other re3uisites of a valid appropriation. In connection !ith the determination of 0ust compensation, the petitioners ar ue that the same may be made only by a court of 0ustice and not by the President of the Philippines. $hey invo"e the recent cases of EPZA v. Dulay 5 and Manotok v. National Food Authority. 7 Moreover, the 0ust compensation contemplated by the Bill of Ri hts is payable in money or in cash and not in the form of bonds or other thin s of value. In considerin the rentals as advance payment on the land, the e=ecutive order also deprives the petitioners of their property ri hts as protected by due process. $he e3ual protection clause is also violated because the order places the burden of solvin the a rarian problems on the o!ners only of a ricultural lands. No similar obli ation is imposed on the o!ners of other properties.

$he petitioners also maintain that in declarin the beneficiaries under P.:. No. ;1 to be the o!ners of the lands occupied by them, E.<. No. ;;4 i nored 0udicial prero atives and so violated due process. Borse, the measure !ould not solve the a rarian problem because even the small farmers are deprived of their lands and the retention ri hts uaranteed by the Constitution. In his Comment, the 2olicitor (eneral stresses that P.:. No. ;1 has already been upheld in the earlier cases of Chavez v. Zobel, 7 Gonzales v. Estrella, 8 and Association o !ice and Corn Producers o the Phili""ines, #nc. v. $he National %and !e or& Council. 9 $he determination of 0ust compensation by the e=ecutive authorities conformably to the formula prescribed under the 3uestioned order is at best initial or preliminary only. It does not foreclose 0udicial intervention !henever sou ht or !arranted. At any rate, the challen e to the order is premature because no valuation of their property has as yet been made by the :epartment of A rarian Reform. $he petitioners are also not proper parties because the lands o!ned by them do not e=ceed the ma=imum retention limit of 1 hectares. Replyin , the petitioners insist they are proper parties because P.:. No. ;1 does not provide for retention limits on tenanted lands and that in any event their petition is a class suit brou ht in behalf of lando!ners !ith landholdin s belo! ;8 hectares. $hey maintain that the determination of 0ust compensation by the administrative authorities is a final ascertainment. As for the cases invo"ed by the public respondent, the constitutionality of P.:. No. ;1 !as merely assumed in Chavez, !hile !hat !as decided in Gonzales !as the validity of the imposition of martial la!. In the amended petition dated November ;;, ,/44, it is contended that P.:. No. ;1, E.<. Nos. ;;4 and ;;- >e=cept 2ections ;@ and ;,? have been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 99/1. Nevertheless, this statute should itself also be declared unconstitutional because it suffers from substantially the same infirmities as the earlier measures. A petition for intervention !as filed !ith leave of court on 6une ,, ,-44 by Aicente Cru&, o!ner of a ,. 4.+ hectare land, !ho complained that the :AR !as insistin on the implementation of P.:. No. ;1 and E.<. No. ;;4 despite a compromise a reement he had reached !ith his tenant on the payment of rentals. In a subse3uent motion dated April ,@, ,-4-, he adopted the alle ations in the basic amended petition that the above+ mentioned enactments have been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 99/1. (.R. No. 1-.,@ $he petitioners herein are lando!ners and su ar planters in the Aictorias Mill :istrict, Aictorias, Ne ros <ccidental. Co+petitioner Planters% Committee, Inc. is an or ani&ation composed of ,,8@@ planter+members. $his petition see"s to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. ,., and E.<. No. ;;-. $he petitioners claim that the po!er to provide for a Comprehensive A rarian Reform Pro ram as decreed by the Constitution belon s to Con ress and not the President. Althou h they a ree that the President could e=ercise le islative po!er until the Con ress !as convened, she could do so only to enact emer ency measures durin the transition period. At that, even assumin that the interim le islative po!er of the President !as properly e=ercised, Proc. No. ,., and E.<. No. ;;- !ould still have to be annulled for violatin the constitutional provisions on 0ust compensation, due process, and e3ual protection.

$hey also ar ue that under 2ection ; of Proc. No. ,., !hich provides7 A rarian Reform 'und.+$here is hereby created a special fund, to be "no!n as the A rarian Reform 'und, an initial amount of 'I'$C BI**I<N PE2<2 >P/@,@@@,@@@,@@@.@@? to cover the estimated cost of the Comprehensive A rarian Reform Pro ram from ,-41 to ,--; !hich shall be sourced from the receipts of the sale of the assets of the Asset Privati&ation $rust and Receipts of sale of ill+ otten !ealth received throu h the Presidential Commission on (ood (overnment and such other sources as overnment may deem appropriate. $he amounts collected and accruin to this special fund shall be considered automatically appropriated for the purpose authori&ed in this Proclamation the amount appropriated is in futuro, not in esse. $he money needed to cover the cost of the contemplated e=propriation has yet to be raised and cannot be appropriated at this time. 'urthermore, they contend that ta"in must be simultaneous !ith payment of 0ust compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., !ith money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in 2ection / of the E.<. No. ;;-. <n the contrary, 2ection 9, thereof provides that the *and Ban" of the Philippines )shall compensate the lando!ner in an amount to be established by the overnment, !hich shall be based on the o!ner%s declaration of current fair mar"et value as provided in 2ection 8 hereof, but sub0ect to certain controls to be defined and promul ated by the Presidential A rarian Reform Council.) $his compensation may not be paid fully in money but in any of several modes that may consist of part cash and part bond, !ith interest, maturin periodically, or direct payment in cash or bond as may be mutually a reed upon by the beneficiary and the lando!ner or as may be prescribed or approved by the PARC. $he petitioners also ar ue that in the issuance of the t!o measures, no effort !as made to ma"e a careful study of the su ar planters% situation. $here is no tenancy problem in the su ar areas that can 0ustify the application of the CARP to them. $o the e=tent that the su ar planters have been lumped in the same le islation !ith other farmers, althou h they are a separate roup !ith problems e=clusively their o!n, their ri ht to e3ual protection has been violated. A motion for intervention !as filed on Au ust ;1,,-41 by the National 'ederation of 2u arcane Planters >NA2P? !hich claims a membership of at least ;@,@@@ individual su ar planters all over the country. <n 2eptember ,@, ,-41, another motion for intervention !as filed, this time by Manuel Barcelona, et al., representin coconut and riceland o!ners. Both motions !ere ranted by the Court. NA2P alle es that President A3uino had no authority to fund the A rarian Reform Pro ram and that, in any event, the appropriation is invalid because of uncertainty in the amount appropriated. 2ection ; of Proc. No. ,., and 2ections ;@ and ;, of E.<. No. ;;- provide for an initial appropriation of fifty billion pesos and thus specifies the minimum rather than the ma=imum authori&ed amount. $his is not allo!ed. 'urthermore, the stated initial amount has not been certified to by the National $reasurer as actually available. $!o additional ar uments are made by Barcelona, to !it, the failure to establish by clear and convincin evidence the necessity for the e=ercise of the po!ers of eminent domain, and the violation of the fundamental ri ht to o!n property. $he petitioners also decry the penalty for non+re istration of the lands, !hich is the e=propriation of the said land for an amount e3ual to the overnment assessor%s valuation of the land for ta= purposes. <n the other hand, if the lando!ner declares his o!n valuation he

is un0ustly re3uired to immediately pay the correspondin ta=es on the land, in violation of the uniformity rule. In his consolidated Comment, the 2olicitor (eneral first invo"es the presumption of constitutionality in favor of Proc. No. ,., and E.<. No. ;;-. #e also 0ustifies the necessity for the e=propriation as e=plained in the )!hereas) clauses of the Proclamation and submits that, contrary to the petitioner%s contention, a pilot pro0ect to determine the feasibility of CARP and a eneral survey on the people%s opinion thereon are not indispensable prere3uisites to its promul ation. <n the alle ed violation of the e3ual protection clause, the su ar planters have failed to sho! that they belon to a different class and should be differently treated. $he Comment also su ests the possibility of Con ress first distributin public a ricultural lands and schedulin the e=propriation of private a ricultural lands later. 'rom this vie!point, the petition for prohibition !ould be premature. $he public respondent also points out that the constitutional prohibition is a ainst the payment of public money !ithout the correspondin appropriation. $here is no rule that only money already in e=istence can be the sub0ect of an appropriation la!. 'inally, the earmar"in of fifty billion pesos as A rarian Reform 'und, althou h denominated as an initial amount, is actually the ma=imum sum appropriated. $he !ord )initial) simply means that additional amounts may be appropriated later !hen necessary. <n April ,,, ,-44, Prudencio 2errano, a coconut planter, filed a petition on his o!n behalf, assailin the constitutionality of E.<. No. ;;-. In addition to the ar uments already raised, 2errano contends that the measure is unconstitutional because7 >,? <nly public lands should be included in the CARPD >;? E.<. No. ;;- embraces more than one sub0ect !hich is not e=pressed in the titleD >.? $he po!er of the President to le islate !as terminated on 6uly ;, ,-41D and >8? $he appropriation of a P/@ billion special fund from the National $reasury did not ori inate from the #ouse of Representatives. (.R. No. 1-188 $he petitioner alle es that the then 2ecretary of :epartment of A rarian Reform, in violation of due process and the re3uirement for 0ust compensation, placed his landholdin under the covera e of <peration *and $ransfer. Certificates of *and $ransfer !ere subse3uently issued to the private respondents, !ho then refused payment of lease rentals to him. <n 2eptember ., ,-49, the petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his small landholdin under <peration *and transfer and as"ed for the recall and cancellation of the Certificates of *and $ransfer in the name of the private respondents. #e claims that on :ecember ;8, ,-49, his petition !as denied !ithout hearin . <n 'ebruary ,1, ,-41, he filed a motion for reconsideration, !hich had not been acted upon !hen E.<. Nos. ;;4 and ;;-

!ere issued. $hese orders rendered his motion moot and academic because they directly effected the transfer of his land to the private respondents. $he petitioner no! ar ues that7 >,? E.<. Nos. ;;4 and ;;- !ere invalidly issued by the President of the Philippines. >;? $he said e=ecutive orders are violative of the constitutional provision that no private property shall be ta"en !ithout due process or 0ust compensation. >.? $he petitioner is denied the ri ht of ma=imum retention provided for under the ,-41 Constitution. $he petitioner contends that the issuance of E.@. Nos. ;;4 and ;;- shortly before Con ress convened is anomalous and arbitrary, besides violatin the doctrine of separation of po!ers. $he le islative po!er ranted to the President under the $ransitory Provisions refers only to emer ency measures that may be promul ated in the proper e=ercise of the police po!er. $he petitioner also invo"es his ri hts not to be deprived of his property !ithout due process of la! and to the retention of his small parcels of riceholdin as uaranteed under Article 5III, 2ection 8 of the Constitution. #e li"e!ise ar ues that, besides denyin him 0ust compensation for his land, the provisions of E.<. No. ;;4 declarin that7 *ease rentals paid to the lando!ner by the farmer+beneficiary after <ctober ;,, ,-1; shall be considered as advance payment for the land. is an unconstitutional ta"in of a vested property ri ht. It is also his contention that the inclusion of even small lando!ners in the pro ram alon !ith other lando!ners !ith lands consistin of seven hectares or more is undemocratic. In his Comment, the 2olicitor (eneral submits that the petition is premature because the motion for reconsideration filed !ith the Minister of A rarian Reform is still unresolved. As for the validity of the issuance of E.<. Nos. ;;4 and ;;-, he ar ues that they !ere enacted pursuant to 2ection 9, Article 5AIII of the $ransitory Provisions of the ,-41 Constitution !hich reads7 $he incumbent president shall continue to e=ercise le islative po!ers until the first Con ress is convened. <n the issue of 0ust compensation, his position is that !hen P.:. No. ;1 !as promul ated on <ctober ;,. ,-1;, the tenant+farmer of a ricultural land !as deemed the o!ner of the land he !as tillin . $he leasehold rentals paid after that date should therefore be considered amorti&ation payments. In his Reply to the public respondents, the petitioner maintains that the motion he filed !as resolved on :ecember ,8, ,-41. An appeal to the <ffice of the President !ould be useless !ith the promul ation of E.<. Nos. ;;4 and ;;-, !hich in effect sanctioned the validity of the public respondent%s acts. (.R. No. 1418;

$he petitioners in this case invo"e the ri ht of retention ranted by P.:. No. ;1 to o!ners of rice and corn lands not e=ceedin seven hectares as lon as they are cultivatin or intend to cultivate the same. $heir respective lands do not e=ceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants !ho are actually cultivatin such lands. Accordin to P.:. No. .,9, !hich !as promul ated in implementation of P.:. No. ;17 No tenant+farmer in a ricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be e0ected or removed from his farmholdin until such time as the respective ri hts of the tenant+ farmers and the lando!ner shall have been determined in accordance !ith the rules and re ulations implementin P.:. No. ;1. $he petitioners claim they cannot e0ect their tenants and so are unable to en0oy their ri ht of retention because the :epartment of A rarian Reform has so far not issued the implementin rules re3uired under the above+3uoted decree. $hey therefore as" the Court for a !rit of mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said rules. In his Comment, the public respondent ar ues that P.:. No. ;1 has been amended by *<I 818 removin any ri ht of retention from persons !ho o!n other a ricultural lands of more than 1 hectares in a re ate area or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other purposes from !hich they derive ade3uate income for their family. And even assumin that the petitioners do not fall under its terms, the re ulations implementin P.:. No. ;1 have already been issued, to !it, the Memorandum dated 6uly ,@, ,-1/ >Interim (uidelines on Retention by 2mall *ando!ners, !ith an accompanyin Retention (uide $able?, Memorandum Circular No. ,, dated April ;,, ,-14, >Implementation (uidelines of *<I No. 818?, Memorandum Circular No. ,4+4, dated :ecember ;-,,-4, >Clarificatory (uidelines on Covera e of P.:. No. ;1 and Retention by 2mall *ando!ners?, and :AR Administrative <rder No. ,, series of ,-4/ >Providin for a Cut+off :ate for *ando!ners to Apply for Retention andEor to Protest the Covera e of their *andholdin s under <peration *and $ransfer pursuant to P.:. No. ;1?. 'or failure to file the correspondin applications for retention under these measures, the petitioners are no! barred from invo"in this ri ht. $he public respondent also stresses that the petitioners have prematurely initiated this case not!ithstandin the pendency of their appeal to the President of the Philippines. Moreover, the issuance of the implementin rules, assumin this has not yet been done, involves the e=ercise of discretion !hich cannot be controlled throu h the !rit of &anda&us. $his is especially true if this function is entrusted, as in this case, to a separate department of the overnment. In their Reply, the petitioners insist that the above+cited measures are not applicable to them because they do not o!n more than seven hectares of a ricultural land. Moreover, assumin ar uendo that the rules !ere intended to cover them also, the said measures are nevertheless not in force because they have not been published as re3uired by la! and the rulin of this Court in $anada v. $uvera. 1' As for *<I 818, the same is ineffective for the additional reason that a mere letter of instruction could not have repealed the presidential decree. I Althou h holdin neither purse nor s!ord and so re arded as the !ea"est of the three departments of the overnment, the 0udiciary is nonetheless vested !ith the po!er to annul the acts of either the le islative or the e=ecutive or of both !hen not conformable to the

fundamental la!. $his is the reason for !hat some 3uarters call the doctrine of 0udicial supremacy. Even so, this po!er is not li htly assumed or readily e=ercised. $he doctrine of separation of po!ers imposes upon the courts a proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other departments, in stri"in do!n the acts of the le islative and the e=ecutive as unconstitutional. $he policy, indeed, is a blend of courtesy and caution. $o doubt is to sustain. $he theory is that before the act !as done or the la! !as enacted, earnest studies !ere made by Con ress or the President, or both, to insure that the Constitution !ould not be breached. In addition, the Constitution itself lays do!n strin ent conditions for a declaration of unconstitutionality, re3uirin therefor the concurrence of a ma0ority of the members of the 2upreme Court !ho too" part in the deliberations and voted on the issue durin their session en banc. 11 And as established by 0ud e made doctrine, the Court !ill assume 0urisdiction over a constitutional 3uestion only if it is sho!n that the essential re3uisites of a 0udicial in3uiry into such a 3uestion are first satisfied. $hus, there must be an actual case or controversy involvin a conflict of le al ri hts susceptible of 0udicial determination, the constitutional 3uestion must have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the 3uestion is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself. 12 Bith particular re ard to the re3uirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us, !e hold that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in dan er of sustainin an immediate in0ury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. 1& And even if, strictly spea"in , they are not covered by the definition, it is still !ithin the !ide discretion of the Court to !aive the re3uirement and so remove the impediment to its addressin and resolvin the serious constitutional 3uestions raised. In the first Emer ency Po!ers Cases, 14 ordinary citi&ens and ta=payers !ere allo!ed to 3uestion the constitutionality of several e=ecutive orders issued by President Fuirino althou h they !ere invo"in only an indirect and eneral interest shared in common !ith the public. $he Court dismissed the ob0ection that they !ere not proper parties and ruled that )the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushin aside, if !e must, technicalities of procedure.) Be have since then applied this e=ception in many other cases. 18 $he other above+mentioned re3uisites have also been met in the present petitions. In must be stressed that despite the inhibitions pressin upon the Court !hen confronted !ith constitutional issues li"e the ones no! before it, it !ill not hesitate to declare a la! or act invalid !hen it is convinced that this must be done. In arrivin at this conclusion, its only criterion !ill be the Constitution as (od and its conscience ive it the li ht to probe its meanin and discover its purpose. Personal motives and political considerations are irrelevancies that cannot influence its decision. Blandishment is as ineffectual as intimidation. 'or all the a!esome po!er of the Con ress and the E=ecutive, the Court !ill not hesitate to )ma"e the hammer fall, and heavily,) to use 6ustice *aurel%s pithy lan ua e, !here the acts of these departments, or of any public official, betray the people%s !ill as e=pressed in the Constitution. It need only be added, to borro! a ain the !ords of 6ustice *aurel, that G

... !hen the 0udiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departmentsD it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the *e islature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obli ation assi ned to it by the Constitution to determine conflictin claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the ri hts !hich that instrument secures and uarantees to them. $his is in truth all that is involved in !hat is termed )0udicial supremacy) !hich properly is the po!er of 0udicial revie! under the Constitution. 17 $he cases before us cate orically raise constitutional 3uestions that this Court must cate orically resolve. And so !e shall. II Be proceed first to the e=amination of the preliminary issues before resolvin the more serious challen es to the constitutionality of the several measures involved in these petitions. $he promul ation of P.:. No. ;1 by President Marcos in the e=ercise of his po!ers under martial la! has already been sustained in Gonzales v. Estrella and !e find no reason to modify or reverse it on that issue. As for the po!er of President A3uino to promul ate Proc. No. ,., and E.<. Nos. ;;4 and ;;-, the same !as authori&ed under 2ection 9 of the $ransitory Provisions of the ,-41 Constitution, 3uoted above. $he said measures !ere issued by President A3uino before 6uly ;1, ,-41, !hen the Con ress of the Philippines !as formally convened and too" over le islative po!er from her. $hey are not )midni ht) enactments intended to pre+empt the le islature because E.<. No. ;;4 !as issued on 6uly ,1, ,-41, and the other measures, i.e., Proc. No. ,., and E.<. No. ;;-, !ere both issued on 6uly ;;, ,-41. Neither is it correct to say that these measures ceased to be valid !hen she lost her le islative po!er for, li"e any statute, they continue to be in force unless modified or repealed by subse3uent la! or declared invalid by the courts. A statute does not i"so acto become inoperative simply because of the dissolution of the le islature that enacted it. By the same to"en, President A3uino%s loss of le islative po!er did not have the effect of invalidatin all the measures enacted by her !hen and as lon as she possessed it. 2i nificantly, the Con ress she is alle ed to have undercut has not re0ected but in fact substantially affirmed the challen ed measures and has specifically provided that they shall be suppletory to R.A. No. 99/1 !henever not inconsistent !ith its provisions. 17 Indeed, some portions of the said measures, li"e the creation of the P/@ billion fund in 2ection ; of Proc. No. ,.,, and 2ections ;@ and ;, of E.<. No. ;;-, have been incorporated by reference in the CARP *a!. 18 $hat fund, as earlier noted, is itself bein 3uestioned on the round that it does not conform to the re3uirements of a valid appropriation as specified in the Constitution. Clearly, ho!ever, Proc. No. ,., is not an appropriation measure even if it does provide for the creation of said fund, for that is not its principal purpose. An appropriation la! is one the primary and specific purpose of !hich is to authori&e the release of public funds from the treasury. 19 $he creation of the fund is only incidental to the main ob0ective of the proclamation, !hich is a rarian reform.

It should follo! that the specific constitutional provisions invo"ed, to !it, 2ection ;8 and 2ection ;/>8? of Article AI, are not applicable. Bith particular reference to 2ection ;8, this obviously could not have been complied !ith for the simple reason that the #ouse of Representatives, !hich no! has the e=clusive po!er to initiate appropriation measures, had not yet been convened !hen the proclamation !as issued. $he le islative po!er !as then solely vested in the President of the Philippines, !ho embodied, as it !ere, both houses of Con ress. $he ar ument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. ,., and E.<. No. ;;- should be invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits as re3uired by Article 5III, 2ection 8 of the Constitution is no lon er tenable. R.A. No. 99/1 does provide for such limits no! in 2ection 9 of the la!, !hich in fact is one of its most controversial provisions. $his section declares7 Retention *imits. G E=cept as other!ise provided in this Act, no person may o!n or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private a ricultural land, the si&e of !hich shall vary accordin to factors overnin a viable family+si&ed farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential A rarian Reform Council >PARC? created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the lando!ner e=ceed five >/? hectares. $hree >.? hectares may be a!arded to each child of the lando!ner, sub0ect to the follo!in 3ualifications7 >,? that he is at least fifteen >,/? years of a eD and >;? that he is actually tillin the land or directly mana in the farmD Provided, $hat lando!ners !hose lands have been covered by Presidential :ecree No. ;1 shall be allo!ed to "eep the area ori inally retained by them thereunder, further, $hat ori inal homestead rantees or direct compulsory heirs !ho still o!n the ori inal homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as lon as they continue to cultivate said homestead. $he ar ument that E.<. No. ;;- violates the constitutional re3uirement that a bill shall have only one sub0ect, to be e=pressed in its title, deserves only short attention. It is settled that the title of the bill does not have to be a catalo ue of its contents and !ill suffice if the matters embodied in the te=t are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title. 2' $he Court !ryly observes that durin the past dictatorship, every presidential issuance, by !hatever name it !as called, had the force and effect of la! because it came from President Marcos. 2uch are the !ays of despots. #ence, it is futile to ar ue, as the petitioners do in (.R. No. 1-188, that *<I 818 could not have repealed P.:. No. ;1 because the former !as only a letter of instruction. $he important thin is that it !as issued by President Marcos, !hose !ord !as la! durin that time. But for all their peremptoriness, these issuances from the President Marcos still had to comply !ith the re3uirement for publication as this Court held in $anada v. $uvera. 21 #ence, unless published in the <fficial (a&ette in accordance !ith Article ; of the Civil Code, they could not have any force and effect if they !ere amon those enactments successfully challen ed in that case. *<I 818 !as published, thou h, in the <fficial (a&ette dated November ;-,,-19.? 'inally, there is the contention of the public respondent in (.R. No. 1418; that the !rit of mandamus cannot issue to compel the performance of a discretionary act, especially by a specific department of the overnment. $hat is true as a eneral proposition but is sub0ect to

one important 3ualification. Correctly and cate orically stated, the rule is that mandamus !ill lie to compel the dischar e of the discretionary duty itself but not to control the discretion to be e=ercised. In other !ords, mandamus can issue to re3uire action only but not specific action. Bhenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary and unreasonable delay in the e=ercise of such duty occurs, if it is a clear duty imposed by la!, the courts !ill intervene by the e=traordinary le al remedy of mandamus to compel action. If the duty is purely ministerial, the courts !ill re3uire specific action. If the duty is purely discretionary, the courts by &anda&us !ill re3uire action only. 'or e=ample, if an inferior court, public official, or board should, for an unreasonable len th of time, fail to decide a particular 3uestion to the reat detriment of all parties concerned, or a court should refuse to ta"e 0urisdiction of a cause !hen the la! clearly ave it 0urisdiction mandamus !ill issue, in the first case to re3uire a decision, and in the second to re3uire that 0urisdiction be ta"en of the cause. 22 And !hile it is true that as a rule the !rit !ill not be proper as lon as there is still a plain, speedy and ade3uate remedy available from the administrative authorities, resort to the courts may still be permitted if the issue raised is a 3uestion of la!. 2& III $here are traditional distinctions bet!een the police po!er and the po!er of eminent domain that lo ically preclude the application of both po!ers at the same time on the same sub0ect. In the case of City o 'a(uio v. NA)A*A, 24 for e=ample, !here a la! re3uired the transfer of all municipal !ater!or"s systems to the NABA2A in e=chan e for its assets of e3uivalent value, the Court held that the po!er bein e=ercised !as eminent domain because the property involved !as !holesome and intended for a public use. Property condemned under the police po!er is no=ious or intended for a no=ious purpose, such as a buildin on the ver e of collapse, !hich should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, !hich should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. $he confiscation of such property is not compensable, unli"e the ta"in of property under the po!er of e=propriation, !hich re3uires the payment of 0ust compensation to the o!ner. In the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon , 28 6ustice #olmes laid do!n the limits of the police po!er in a famous aphorism7 )$he eneral rule at least is that !hile property may be re ulated to a certain e=tent, if re ulation oes too far it !ill be reco ni&ed as a ta"in .) $he re ulation that !ent )too far) !as a la! prohibitin minin !hich mi ht cause the subsidence of structures for human habitation constructed on the land surface. $his !as resisted by a coal company !hich had earlier ranted a deed to the land over its mine but reserved all minin ri hts thereunder, !ith the rantee assumin all ris"s and !aivin any dama e claim. $he Court held the la! could not be sustained !ithout compensatin the rantor. 6ustice Brandeis filed a lone dissent in !hich he ar ued that there !as a valid e=ercise of the police po!er. #e said7 Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the e=ercise of the police po!er deprives the o!ner of some ri ht theretofore en0oyed, and is, in that sense, an abrid ment by the 2tate of ri hts in property !ithout ma"in compensation. But restriction imposed to protect the public health, safety or morals from dan ers threatened is not a ta"in . $he restriction here in 3uestion is merely the prohibition of a no=ious use. $he property so restricted

remains in the possession of its o!ner. $he state does not appropriate it or ma"e any use of it. $he state merely prevents the o!ner from ma"in a use !hich interferes !ith paramount ri hts of the public. Bhenever the use prohibited ceases to be no=ious G as it may because of further chan es in local or social conditions G the restriction !ill have to be removed and the o!ner !ill a ain be free to en0oy his property as heretofore. Recent trends, ho!ever, !ould indicate not a polari&ation but a min lin of the police po!er and the po!er of eminent domain, !ith the latter bein used as an implement of the former li"e the po!er of ta=ation. $he employment of the ta=in po!er to achieve a police purpose has lon been accepted. 27 As for the po!er of e=propriation, Prof. 6ohn 6. Costonis of the Hniversity of Illinois Colle e of *a! >referrin to the earlier case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., ;1; H2 .9/, !hich sustained a &onin la! under the police po!er? ma"es the follo!in si nificant remar"s7 Euclid, moreover, !as decided in an era !hen 0ud es located the Police and eminent domain po!ers on different planets. (enerally spea"in , they vie!ed eminent domain as encompassin public ac3uisition of private property for improvements that !ould be available for public use,) literally construed. $o the police po!er, on the other hand, they assi ned the less intrusive tas" of preventin harmful e=ternalities a point reflected in the Euclid opinion%s reliance on an analo y to nuisance la! to bolster its support of &onin . 2o lon as suppression of a privately authored harm bore a plausible relation to some le itimate )public purpose,) the pertinent measure need have afforded no compensation !hatever. Bith the pro ressive ro!th of overnment%s involvement in land use, the distance bet!een the t!o po!ers has contracted considerably. $oday overnment often employs eminent domain interchan eably !ith or as a useful complement to the police po!er++ a trend e=pressly approved in the 2upreme Court%s ,-/8 decision in Berman v. Par"er, !hich broadened the reach of eminent domain%s )public use) test to match that of the police po!er%s standard of )public purpose.) 27 $he Berman case sustained a redevelopment pro0ect and the improvement of bli hted areas in the :istrict of Columbia as a proper e=ercise of the police po!er. <n the role of eminent domain in the attainment of this purpose, 6ustice :ou las declared7 If those !ho overn the :istrict of Columbia decide that the Nation%s Capital should be beautiful as !ell as sanitary, there is nothin in the 'ifth Amendment that stands in the !ay. <nce the ob0ect is !ithin the authority of Con ress, the ri ht to reali&e it throu h the e=ercise of eminent domain is clear. 'or the po!er of eminent domain is merely the means to the end.
28

In Penn Central $rans"ortation Co. v. Ne+ ,ork City, 29 decided by a 9+. vote in ,-14, the H.2 2upreme Court sustained the respondent%s *andmar"s Preservation *a! under !hich the o!ners of the (rand Central $erminal had not been allo!ed to construct a multi+story office buildin over the $erminal, !hich had been desi nated a historic landmar". Preservation of the landmar" !as held to be a valid ob0ective of the police po!er. $he problem, ho!ever, !as that the o!ners of the $erminal !ould be deprived of the ri ht to use the airspace above it althou h other lando!ners in the area could do so over their respective

properties. Bhile insistin that there !as here no ta"in , the Court nonetheless reco ni&ed certain compensatory ri hts accruin to (rand Central $erminal !hich it said !ould )undoubtedly miti ate) the loss caused by the re ulation. $his )fair compensation,) as he called it, !as e=plained by Prof. Costonis in this !ise7 In return for retainin the $erminal site in its pristine landmar" status, Penn Central !as authori&ed to transfer to nei hborin properties the authori&ed but unused ri hts accruin to the site prior to the $erminal%s desi nation as a landmar" G the ri hts !hich !ould have been e=hausted by the /-+story buildin that the city refused to countenance atop the $erminal. Prevailin bul" restrictions on nei hborin sites !ere proportionately rela=ed, theoretically enablin Penn Central to recoup its losses at the $erminal site by constructin or sellin to others the ri ht to construct lar er, hence more profitable buildin s on the transferee sites. &' $he cases before us present no "notty complication insofar as the 3uestion of compensable ta"in is concerned. $o the e=tent that the measures under challen e merely prescribe retention limits for lando!ners, there is an e=ercise of the police po!er for the re ulation of private property in accordance !ith the Constitution. But !here, to carry out such re ulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such o!ners of !hatever lands they may o!n in e=cess of the ma=imum area allo!ed, there is definitely a ta"in under the po!er of eminent domain for !hich payment of 0ust compensation is imperative. $he ta"in contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. Bhat is re3uired is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said e=cess and all beneficial ri hts accruin to the o!ner in favor of the farmer+beneficiary. $his is definitely an e=ercise not of the police po!er but of the po!er of eminent domain. Bhether as an e=ercise of the police po!er or of the po!er of eminent domain, the several measures before us are challen ed as violative of the due process and e3ual protection clauses. $he challen e to Proc. No. ,., and E.<. Nos. ;;4 and ;-- on the round that no retention limits are prescribed has already been discussed and dismissed. It is noted that althou h they e=cited many bitter e=chan es durin the deliberation of the CARP *a! in Con ress, the retention limits finally a reed upon are, curiously enou h, not bein 3uestioned in these petitions. Be therefore do not discuss them here. $he Court !ill come to the other claimed violations of due process in connection !ith our e=amination of the ade3uacy of 0ust compensation as re3uired under the po!er of e=propriation. $he ar ument of the small farmers that they have been denied e3ual protection because of the absence of retention limits has also become academic under 2ection 9 of R.A. No. 99/1. 2i nificantly, they too have not 3uestioned the area of such limits. $here is also the complaint that they should not be made to share the burden of a rarian reform, an ob0ection also made by the su ar planters on the round that they belon to a particular class !ith particular interests of their o!n. #o!ever, no evidence has been submitted to the Court that the re3uisites of a valid classification have been violated. Classification has been defined as the roupin of persons or thin s similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. &1 $o be valid, it must conform to the follo!in re3uirements7 >,? it must be based on substantial distinctionsD >;? it must be ermane to the purposes of the la!D >.? it must not be limited to e=istin conditions onlyD and >8? it must apply e3ually to all the members of the class. &2 $he Court

finds that all these re3uisites have been met by the measures here challen ed as arbitrary and discriminatory. E3ual protection simply means that all persons or thin s similarly situated must be treated ali"e both as to the ri hts conferred and the liabilities imposed. && $he petitioners have not sho!n that they belon to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. $he ar ument that not only lando!ners but also o!ners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementin land reform must be re0ected. $here is a substantial distinction bet!een these t!o classes of o!ners that is clearly visible e=cept to those !ho !ill not see. $here is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Con ress is allo!ed a !ide lee!ay in providin for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded reco nition and respect by the courts of 0ustice e=cept only !here its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Ri hts. It is !orth remar"in at this 0uncture that a statute may be sustained under the police po!er only if there is a concurrence of the la!ful sub0ect and the la!ful method. Put other!ise, the interests of the public enerally as distin uished from those of a particular class re3uire the interference of the 2tate and, no less important, the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the purpose sou ht to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. &4 As the sub0ect and purpose of a rarian reform have been laid do!n by the Constitution itself, !e may say that the first re3uirement has been satisfied. Bhat remains to be e=amined is the validity of the method employed to achieve the constitutional oal. <ne of the basic principles of the democratic system is that !here the ri hts of the individual are concerned, the end does not 0ustify the means. It is not enou h that there be a valid ob0ectiveD it is also necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in "eepin !ith the Constitution. Mere e=pediency !ill not e=cuse constitutional shortcuts. $here is no 3uestion that not even the stron est moral conviction or the most ur ent public need, sub0ect only to a fe! notable e=ceptions, !ill e=cuse the bypassin of an individual%s ri hts. It is no e=a eration to say that a, person invo"in a ri ht uaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a ma0ority of one even as a ainst the rest of the nation !ho !ould deny him that ri ht. $hat ri ht covers the person%s life, his liberty and his property under 2ection , of Article III of the Constitution. Bith re ard to his property, the o!ner en0oys the added protection of 2ection -, !hich reaffirms the familiar rule that private property shall not be ta"en for public use !ithout 0ust compensation. $his brin s us no! to the po!er of eminent domain. IA Eminent domain is an inherent po!er of the 2tate that enables it to forcibly ac3uire private lands intended for public use upon payment of 0ust compensation to the o!ner. <bviously, there is no need to e=propriate !here the o!ner is !illin to sell under terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in !hich case an ordinary deed of sale may be a reed upon by the parties. &8 It is only !here the o!ner is un!illin to sell, or cannot accept the price or other conditions offered by the vendee, that the po!er of eminent domain !ill come into play to assert the paramount authority of the 2tate over the interests of the property o!ner. Private ri hts must then yield to the irresistible demands of the

public interest on the time+honored 0ustification, as in the case of the police po!er, that the !elfare of the people is the supreme la!.

But for all its primacy and ur ency, the po!er of e=propriation is by no means absolute >as indeed no po!er is absolute?. $he limitation is found in the constitutional in0unction that )private property shall not be ta"en for public use !ithout 0ust compensation) and in the abundant 0urisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the re3uirements for a proper e=ercise of the po!er are7 >,? public use and >;? 0ust compensation. *et us dispose first of the ar ument raised by the petitioners in (.R. No. 1-.,@ that the 2tate should first distribute public a ricultural lands in the pursuit of a rarian reform instead of immediately disturbin property ri hts by forcibly ac3uirin private a ricultural lands. Parenthetically, it is not correct to say that only public a ricultural lands may be covered by the CARP as the Constitution calls for )the 0ust distribution of all a ricultural lands.) In any event, the decision to redistribute private a ricultural lands in the manner prescribed by the CARP !as made by the le islative and e=ecutive departments in the e=ercise of their discretion. Be are not 0ustified in revie!in that discretion in the absence of a clear sho!in that it has been abused. A becomin courtesy admonishes us to respect the decisions of the political departments !hen they decide !hat is "no!n as the political 3uestion. As e=plained by Chief 6ustice Concepcion in the case of $a-ada v. Cuenco7 &7 $he term )political 3uestion) connotes !hat it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a 3uestion of policy. It refers to )those 3uestions !hich, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their soverei n capacityD or in re ard to !hich full discretionary authority has been dele ated to the le islative or e=ecutive branch of the overnment.) It is concerned !ith issues dependent upon the !isdom, not le ality, of a particular measure. It is true that the concept of the political 3uestion has been constricted !ith the enlar ement of 0udicial po!er, !hich no! includes the authority of the courts )to determine !hether or not there has been a rave abuse of discretion amountin to lac" or e=cess of 0urisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the (overnment.) &7 Even so, this should not be construed as a license for us to reverse the other departments simply because their vie!s may not coincide !ith ours. $he le islature and the e=ecutive have been seen fit, in their !isdom, to include in the CARP the redistribution of private landholdin s >even as the distribution of public a ricultural lands is first provided for, !hile also continuin apace under the Public *and Act and other co nate la!s?. $he Court sees no 0ustification to interpose its authority, !hich !e may assert only if !e believe that the political decision is not un!ise, but ille al. Be do not find it to be so. In ..*. v. Chandler/Dunbar )ater Po+er Co&"any, &8 it !as held7 Con ress havin determined, as it did by the Act of March .,,-@- that the entire 2t. Mary%s river bet!een the American ban" and the international line, as !ell as all of the upland north of the present ship canal, throu hout its entire len th, !as )necessary for the purpose of navi ation of said !aters, and the !aters connected there!ith,) that determination is conclusive in

condemnation proceedin s instituted by the Hnited 2tates under that Act, and there is no room for 0udicial revie! of the 0ud ment of Con ress ... . As earlier observed, the re3uirement for public use has already been settled for us by the Constitution itself No less than the ,-41 Charter calls for a rarian reform, !hich is the reason !hy private a ricultural lands are to be ta"en from their o!ners, sub0ect to the prescribed ma=imum retention limits. $he purposes specified in P.:. No. ;1, Proc. No. ,., and R.A. No. 99/1 are only an elaboration of the constitutional in0unction that the 2tate adopt the necessary measures )to encoura e and underta"e the 0ust distribution of all a ricultural lands to enable farmers !ho are landless to o!n directly or collectively the lands they till.) $hat public use, as pronounced by the fundamental la! itself, must be bindin on us. $he second re3uirement, i.e., the payment of 0ust compensation, needs a lon er and more thou htful e=amination. 6ust compensation is defined as the full and fair e3uivalent of the property ta"en from its o!ner by the e=propriator. &9 It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the ta"er%s ain but the o!ner%s loss. 4' $he !ord )0ust) is used to intensify the meanin of the !ord )compensation) to convey the idea that the e3uivalent to be rendered for the property to be ta"en shall be real, substantial, full, ample. 41 It bears repeatin that the measures challen ed in these petitions contemplate more than a mere re ulation of the use of private lands under the police po!er. Be deal here !ith an actual ta"in of private a ricultural lands that has dispossessed the o!ners of their property and deprived them of all its beneficial use and en0oyment, to entitle them to the 0ust compensation mandated by the Constitution. As held in !e"ublic o the Phili""ines v. Castellvi, 42 there is compensable ta"in !hen the follo!in conditions concur7 >,? the e=propriator must enter a private propertyD >;? the entry must be for more than a momentary periodD >.? the entry must be under !arrant or color of le al authorityD >8? the property must be devoted to public use or other!ise informally appropriated or in0uriously affectedD and >/? the utili&ation of the property for public use must be in such a !ay as to oust the o!ner and deprive him of beneficial en0oyment of the property. All these re3uisites are envisioned in the measures before us. Bhere the 2tate itself is the e=propriator, it is not necessary for it to ma"e a deposit upon its ta"in possession of the condemned property, as )the compensation is a public char e, the ood faith of the public is pled ed for its payment, and all the resources of ta=ation may be employed in raisin the amount.) 4& Nevertheless, 2ection ,9>e? of the CARP *a! provides that7 Hpon receipt by the lando!ner of the correspondin payment or, in case of re0ection or no response from the lando!ner, upon the deposit !ith an accessible ban" desi nated by the :AR of the compensation in cash or in *BP bonds in accordance !ith this Act, the :AR shall ta"e immediate possession of the land and shall re3uest the proper Re ister of :eeds to issue a $ransfer Certificate of $itle >$C$? in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. $he :AR shall thereafter proceed !ith the redistribution of the land to the 3ualified beneficiaries. <b0ection is raised, ho!ever, to the manner of fi=in the 0ust compensation, !hich it is claimed is entrusted to the administrative authorities in violation of 0udicial prero atives.

2pecific reference is made to 2ection ,9>d?, !hich provides that in case of the re0ection or disre ard by the o!ner of the offer of the overnment to buy his land+ ... the :AR shall conduct summary administrative proceedin s to determine the compensation for the land by re3uirin the lando!ner, the *BP and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the 0ust compensation for the land, !ithin fifteen >,/? days from the receipt of the notice. After the e=piration of the above period, the matter is deemed submitted for decision. $he :AR shall decide the case !ithin thirty >.@? days after it is submitted for decision. $o be sure, the determination of 0ust compensation is a function addressed to the courts of 0ustice and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the overnment. EPZA v. Dulay 44 resolved a challen e to several decrees promul ated by President Marcos providin that the 0ust compensation for property under e=propriation should be either the assessment of the property by the overnment or the s!orn valuation thereof by the o!ner, !hichever !as lo!er. In declarin these decrees unconstitutional, the Court held throu h Mr. 6ustice #u o E. (utierre&, 6r.7 $he method of ascertainin 0ust compensation under the aforecited decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment on 0udicial prero atives. It tends to render this Court inutile in a matter !hich under this Constitution is reserved to it for final determination. $hus, althou h in an e=propriation proceedin the court technically !ould still have the po!er to determine the 0ust compensation for the property, follo!in the applicable decrees, its tas" !ould be rele ated to simply statin the lo!er value of the property as declared either by the o!ner or the assessor. As a necessary conse3uence, it !ould be useless for the court to appoint commissioners under Rule 91 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the need to satisfy the due process clause in the ta"in of private property is seemin ly fulfilled since it cannot be said that a 0udicial proceedin !as not had before the actual ta"in . #o!ever, the strict application of the decrees durin the proceedin s !ould be nothin short of a mere formality or charade as the court has only to choose bet!een the valuation of the o!ner and that of the assessor, and its choice is al!ays limited to the lo!er of the t!o. $he court cannot e=ercise its discretion or independence in determinin !hat is 0ust or fair. Even a rade school pupil could substitute for the 0ud e insofar as the determination of constitutional 0ust compensation is concerned. === In the present petition, !e are once a ain confronted !ith the same 3uestion of !hether the courts under P.:. No. ,/.., !hich contains the same provision on 0ust compensation as its predecessor decrees, still have the po!er and authority to determine 0ust compensation, independent of !hat is stated by the decree and to this effect, to appoint commissioners for such purpose. $his time, !e ans!er in the affirmative. ===

It is violative of due process to deny the o!ner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the ta= documents is unfair or !ron . And it is repulsive to the basic concepts of 0ustice and fairness to allo! the hapha&ard !or" of a minor bureaucrat or cler" to absolutely prevail over the 0ud ment of a court promul ated only after e=pert commissioners have actually vie!ed the property, after evidence and ar uments pro and con have been presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and 0ust determination have been 0udiciously evaluated. A readin of the aforecited 2ection ,9>d? !ill readily sho! that it does not suffer from the arbitrariness that rendered the challen ed decrees constitutionally ob0ectionable. Althou h the proceedin s are described as summary, the lando!ner and other interested parties are nevertheless allo!ed an opportunity to submit evidence on the real value of the property. But more importantly, the determination of the 0ust compensation by the :AR is not by any means final and conclusive upon the lando!ner or any other interested party, for 2ection ,9>f? clearly provides7 Any party !ho disa rees !ith the decision may brin the matter to the court of proper 0urisdiction for final determination of 0ust compensation. $he determination made by the :AR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned. <ther!ise, the courts of 0ustice !ill still have the ri ht to revie! !ith finality the said determination in the e=ercise of !hat is admittedly a 0udicial function. $he second and more serious ob0ection to the provisions on 0ust compensation is not as easily resolved. $his refers to 2ection ,4 of the CARP *a! providin in full as follo!s7 2EC. ,4. Aaluation and Mode of Compensation. G $he *BP shall compensate the lando!ner in such amount as may be a reed upon by the lando!ner and the :AR and the *BP, in accordance !ith the criteria provided for in 2ections ,9 and ,1, and other pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined by the court, as the 0ust compensation for the land. $he compensation shall be paid in one of the follo!in modes, at the option of the lando!ner7 >,? Cash payment, under the follo!in terms and conditions7 >a? 'or lands above fifty >/@? hectares, insofar as the e=cess hectara e is concerned G $!enty+five percent >;/I? cash, the balance to be paid in overnment financial instruments ne otiable at any time. >b? 'or lands above t!enty+four >;8? hectares and up to fifty >/@? hectares G $hirty percent >.@I? cash, the balance to be paid in

overnment financial instruments ne otiable at any time. >c? 'or lands t!enty+four >;8? hectares and belo! G $hirty+five percent >./I? cash, the balance to be paid in overnment financial instruments ne otiable at any time. >;? 2hares of stoc" in overnment+o!ned or controlled corporations, *BP preferred shares, physical assets or other 3ualified investments in accordance !ith uidelines set by the PARCD >.? $a= credits !hich can be used a ainst any ta= liabilityD >8? *BP bonds, !hich shall have the follo!in features7 >a? Mar"et interest rates ali ned !ith -,+day treasury bill rates. $en percent >,@I? of the face value of the bonds shall mature every year from the date of issuance until the tenth >,@th? year7 Provided, $hat should the lando!ner choose to fore o the cash portion, !hether in full or in part, he shall be paid correspondin ly in *BP bondsD >b? $ransferability and ne otiability. 2uch *BP bonds may be used by the lando!ner, his successors+in+ interest or his assi ns, up to the amount of their face value, for any of the follo!in 7 >i? Ac3uisition of land or other real properties of the overnment, includin assets under the Asset Privati&ation Pro ram and other assets foreclosed by overnment financial institutions in the same province or re ion !here the lands for !hich the bonds !ere paid are situatedD >ii? Ac3uisition of shares of stoc" of overnment+o!ned or controlled corporations or shares of stoc" o!ned by the overnment in private corporationsD >iii? 2ubstitution for surety or bail bonds for the provisional release of accused persons, or for performance bondsD >iv? 2ecurity for loans !ith any overnment financial institution, provided the proceeds of the loans shall be invested in an economic

enterprise, preferably in a small and medium+ scale industry, in the same province or re ion as the land for !hich the bonds are paidD >v? Payment for various ta=es and fees to overnment7 Provided, $hat the use of these bonds for these purposes !ill be limited to a certain percenta e of the outstandin balance of the financial instrumentsD Provided, further, $hat the PARC shall determine the percenta es mentioned aboveD >vi? Payment for tuition fees of the immediate family of the ori inal bondholder in overnment universities, colle es, trade schools, and other institutionsD >vii? Payment for fees of the immediate family of the ori inal bondholder in overnment hospitalsD and >viii? 2uch other uses as the PARC may from time to time allo!. $he contention of the petitioners in (.R. No. 1-111 is that the above provision is unconstitutional insofar as it re3uires the o!ners of the e=propriated properties to accept 0ust compensation therefor in less than money, !hich is the only medium of payment allo!ed. In support of this contention, they cite 0urisprudence holdin that7 $he fundamental rule in e=propriation matters is that the o!ner of the property e=propriated is entitled to a 0ust compensation, !hich should be neither more nor less, !henever it is possible to ma"e the assessment, than the money e3uivalent of said property. 6ust compensation has al!ays been understood to be the 0ust and complete e3uivalent of the loss !hich the o!ner of the thin e=propriated has to suffer by reason of the e=propriation . 48 >Emphasis supplied.? In 6.M. $ua&on Co. v. *and $enure Administration,
47

this Court held7

It is !ell+settled that 0ust compensation means the e3uivalent for the value of the property at the time of its ta"in . Anythin beyond that is more, and anythin short of that is less, than 0ust compensation. It means a fair and full e3uivalent for the loss sustained, !hich is the measure of the indemnity, not !hatever ain !ould accrue to the e=propriatin entity. $he mar"et value of the land ta"en is the 0ust compensation to !hich the o!ner of condemned property is entitled, the mar"et value bein that sum of money !hich a person desirous, but not compelled to buy, and an o!ner, !illin , but not compelled to sell, !ould a ree on as a price to be iven and received for such property. >Emphasis supplied.?

In the Hnited 2tates, !here much of our 0urisprudence on the sub0ect has been derived, the !ei ht of authority is also to the effect that 0ust compensation for property e=propriated is payable only in money and not other!ise. $hus G $he medium of payment of compensation is ready money or cash. $he condemnor cannot compel the o!ner to accept anythin but money, nor can the o!ner compel or re3uire the condemnor to pay him on any other basis than the value of the property in money at the time and in the manner prescribed by the Constitution and the statutes. Bhen the po!er of eminent domain is resorted to, there must be a standard medium of payment, bindin upon both parties, and the la! has fi=ed that standard as money in cash. 47 >Emphasis supplied.? Part cash and deferred payments are not and cannot, in the nature of thin s, be re arded as a reliable and constant standard of compensation. 48 )6ust compensation) for property ta"en by condemnation means a fair e3uivalent in money, !hich must be paid at least !ithin a reasonable time after the ta"in , and it is not !ithin the po!er of the *e islature to substitute for such payment future obli ations, bonds, or other valuable advanta e. 49 >Emphasis supplied.? It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional medium for the payment of 0ust compensation is money and no other. And so, conformably, has 0ust compensation been paid in the past solely in that medium. #o!ever, !e do not deal here !ith the traditional e=cercise of the po!er of eminent domain. $his is not an ordinary e=propriation !here only a specific property of relatively limited area is sou ht to be ta"en by the 2tate from its o!ner for a specific and perhaps local purpose. Bhat !e deal !ith here is a revolutionary "ind of e=propriation. $he e=propriation before us affects all private a ricultural lands !henever found and of !hatever "ind as lon as they are in e=cess of the ma=imum retention limits allo!ed their o!ners. $his "ind of e=propriation is intended for the benefit not only of a particular community or of a small se ment of the population but of the entire 'ilipino nation, from all levels of our society, from the impoverished farmer to the land+ lutted o!ner. Its purpose does not cover only the !hole territory of this country but oes beyond in time to the foreseeable future, !hich it hopes to secure and edify !ith the vision and the sacrifice of the present eneration of 'ilipinos. (enerations yet to come are as involved in this pro ram as !e are today, althou h hopefully only as beneficiaries of a richer and more fulfillin life !e !ill uarantee to them tomorro! throu h our thou htfulness today. And, finally, let it not be for otten that it is no less than the Constitution itself that has ordained this revolution in the farms, callin for )a 0ust distribution) amon the farmers of lands that have heretofore been the prison of their dreams but can no! become the "ey at least to their deliverance. 2uch a pro ram !ill involve not mere millions of pesos. $he cost !ill be tremendous. Considerin the vast areas of land sub0ect to e=propriation under the la!s before us, !e estimate that hundreds of billions of pesos !ill be needed, far more indeed than the amount of P/@ billion initially appropriated, !hich is already sta erin as it is by our present standards. 2uch amount is in fact not even fully available at this time.

Be assume that the framers of the Constitution !ere a!are of this difficulty !hen they called for a rarian reform as a top priority pro0ect of the overnment. It is a part of this assumption that !hen they envisioned the e=propriation that !ould be needed, they also intended that the 0ust compensation !ould have to be paid not in the orthodo= !ay but a less conventional if more practical method. $here can be no doubt that they !ere a!are of the financial limitations of the overnment and had no illusions that there !ould be enou h money to pay in cash and in full for the lands they !anted to be distributed amon the farmers. Be may therefore assume that their intention !as to allo! such manner of payment as is no! provided for by the CARP *a!, particularly the payment of the balance >if the o!ner cannot be paid fully !ith money?, or indeed of the entire amount of the 0ust compensation, !ith other thin s of value. Be may also suppose that !hat they had in mind !as a similar scheme of payment as that prescribed in P.:. No. ;1, !hich !as the la! in force at the time they deliberated on the ne! Charter and !ith !hich they presumably a reed in principle. $he Court has not found in the records of the Constitutional Commission any cate orical a reement amon the members re ardin the meanin to be iven the concept of 0ust compensation as applied to the comprehensive a rarian reform pro ram bein contemplated. $here !as the su estion to )fine tune) the re3uirement to suit the demands of the pro0ect even as it !as also felt that they should )leave it to Con ress) to determine ho! payment should be made to the lando!ner and reimbursement re3uired from the farmer+beneficiaries. 2uch innovations as )pro ressive compensation) and )2tate+subsidi&ed compensation) !ere also proposed. In the end, ho!ever, no special definition of the 0ust compensation for the lands to be e=propriated !as reached by the Commission. 8' <n the other hand, there is nothin in the records either that militates a ainst the assumptions !e are ma"in of the eneral sentiments and intention of the members on the content and manner of the payment to be made to the lando!ner in the li ht of the ma nitude of the e=penditure and the limitations of the e=propriator. Bith these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the content and manner of the 0ust compensation provided for in the afore+ 3uoted 2ection ,4 of the CARP *a! is not violative of the Constitution. Be do not mind admittin that a certain de ree of pra matism has influenced our decision on this issue, but after all this Court is not a cloistered institution removed from the realities and demands of society or oblivious to the need for its enhancement. $he Court is as acutely an=ious as the rest of our people to see the oal of a rarian reform achieved at last after the frustrations and deprivations of our peasant masses durin all these disappointin decades. Be are a!are that invalidation of the said section !ill result in the nullification of the entire pro ram, "illin the farmer%s hopes even as they approach reali&ation and resurrectin the spectre of discontent and dissent in the restless countryside. $hat is not in our vie! the intention of the Constitution, and that is not !hat !e shall decree today. Acceptin the theory that payment of the 0ust compensation is not al!ays re3uired to be made fully in money, !e find further that the proportion of cash payment to the other thin s of value constitutin the total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of the lands e=propriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the lando!ner. It is noted that the smaller the land, the bi er the payment in money, primarily because the small lando!ner !ill be needin it more than the bi lando!ners, !ho can afford a bi er balance in bonds and other thin s of value. No less importantly, the overnment financial instruments ma"in up the balance of the payment are )ne otiable at any time.) $he other modes, !hich are li"e!ise available to the lando!ner at his option, are also not unreasonable because

payment is made in shares of stoc", *BP bonds, other properties or assets, ta= credits, and other thin s of value e3uivalent to the amount of 0ust compensation. Admittedly, the compensation contemplated in the la! !ill cause the lando!ners, bi and small, not a little inconvenience. As already remar"ed, this cannot be avoided. Nevertheless, it is devoutly hoped that these countrymen of ours, conscious as !e "no! they are of the need for their forebearance and even sacrifice, !ill not be rud e us their indispensable share in the attainment of the ideal of a rarian reform. <ther!ise, our pursuit of this elusive oal !ill be li"e the 3uest for the #oly (rail. $he complaint a ainst the effects of non+re istration of the land under E.<. No. ;;- does not seem to be viable any more as it appears that 2ection 8 of the said <rder has been superseded by 2ection ,8 of the CARP *a!. $his repeats the re3uisites of re istration as embodied in the earlier measure but does not provide, as the latter did, that in case of failure or refusal to re ister the land, the valuation thereof shall be that iven by the provincial or city assessor for ta= purposes. <n the contrary, the CARP *a! says that the 0ust compensation shall be ascertained on the basis of the factors mentioned in its 2ection ,1 and in the manner provided for in 2ection ,9. $he last ma0or challen e to CARP is that the lando!ner is divested of his property even before actual payment to him in full of 0ust compensation, in contravention of a !ell+ accepted principle of eminent domain. $he reco ni&ed rule, indeed, is that title to the property e=propriated shall pass from the o!ner to the e=propriator only upon full payment of the 0ust compensation. 6urisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here and in other democratic 0urisdictions. $hus7 $itle to property !hich is the sub0ect of condemnation proceedin s does not vest the condemnor until the 0ud ment fi=in 0ust compensation is entered and paid, but the condemnor%s title relates bac" to the date on !hich the petition under the Eminent :omain Act, or the commissioner%s report under the *ocal Improvement Act, is filed. 81 ... althou h the ri ht to appropriate and use land ta"en for a canal is complete at the time of entry, title to the property ta"en remains in the o!ner until payment is actually made. 82 >Emphasis supplied.? In Jennedy v. Indianapolis, 8& the H2 2upreme Court cited several cases holdin that title to property does not pass to the condemnor until 0ust compensation had actually been made. In fact, the decisions appear to be uniformly to this effect. As early as ,4.4, in !ubotto& v. Mc%ure, 84 it !as held that )actual payment to the o!ner of the condemned property !as a condition precedent to the investment of the title to the property in the 2tate) albeit )not to the appropriation of it to public use.) In !e0 ord v. 1ni(ht, 88 the Court of Appeals of Ne! Cor" said that the construction upon the statutes !as that the fee did not vest in the 2tate until the payment of the compensation althou h the authority to enter upon and appropriate the land !as complete prior to the payment. Jennedy further said that )both on principle and authority the rule is ... that the ri ht to enter on and use the property is complete, as soon as the property is actually appropriated under the authority of la! for a public use, but that the title does not "ass ro& the o+ner +ithout his consent, until 2ust co&"ensation has been &ade to hi&.3 <ur o!n 2upreme Court has held in 4isayan !e inin( Co. v. Ca&us and Paredes, 87 that7

If the la!s !hich !e have e=hibited or cited in the precedin discussion are attentively e=amined it !ill be apparent that the method of e=propriation adopted in this 0urisdiction is such as to afford absolute reassurance that no "iece o land can be inally and irrevocably taken ro& an un+illin( o+ner until co&"ensation is "aid ... . >Emphasis supplied.? It is true that P.:. No. ;1 e=pressly ordered the emancipation of tenant+farmer as <ctober ;,, ,-1; and declared that he shall )be deemed the o!ner) of a portion of land consistin of a family+si&ed farm e=cept that )no title to the land o!ned by him !as to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full+fled ed member of a duly reco ni&ed farmers% cooperative.) It !as understood, ho!ever, that full payment of the 0ust compensation also had to be made first, conformably to the constitutional re3uirement. Bhen E.<. No. ;;4, cate orically stated in its 2ection , that7 All 3ualified farmer+beneficiaries are no! deemed full o!ners as of <ctober ;,, ,-1; of the land they ac3uired by virtue of Presidential :ecree No. ;1. >Emphasis supplied.? it !as obviously referrin to lands already validly ac3uired under the said decree, after proof of full+fled ed membership in the farmers% cooperatives and full payment of 0ust compensation. #ence, it !as also perfectly proper for the <rder to also provide in its 2ection ; that the )lease rentals paid to the lando!ner by the farmer+ beneficiary after <ctober ;,, ,-1; >pendin transfer of o!nership after full payment of 0ust compensation?, shall be considered as advance payment for the land.) $he CARP *a!, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and o!nership of the land to the overnment on receipt by the lando!ner of the correspondin payment or the deposit by the :AR of the compensation in cash or *BP bonds !ith an accessible ban". Hntil then, title also remains !ith the lando!ner. 87 No outri ht chan e of o!nership is contemplated either. #ence, the ar ument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily transferrin title before the land is fully paid for must also be re0ected. It is !orth stressin at this point that all ri hts ac3uired by the tenant+farmer under P.:. No. ;1, as reco ni&ed under E.<. No. ;;4, are retained by him even no! under R.A. No. 99/1. $his should counter+balance the e=press provision in 2ection 9 of the said la! that )the lando!ners !hose lands have been covered by Presidential :ecree No. ;1 shall be allo!ed to "eep the area ori inally retained by them thereunder, further, $hat ori inal homestead rantees or direct compulsory heirs !ho still o!n the ori inal homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as lon as they continue to cultivate said homestead.) In connection !ith these retained ri hts, it does not appear in (.R. No. 1418; that the appeal filed by the petitioners !ith the <ffice of the President has already been resolved. Althou h !e have said that the doctrine of e=haustion of administrative remedies need not preclude immediate resort to 0udicial action, there are factual issues that have yet to be e=amined on the administrative level, especially the claim that the petitioners are not covered by *<I 818 because they do not o!n other a ricultural lands than the sub0ects of their petition.

<bviously, the Court cannot resolve these issues. In any event, assumin that the petitioners have not yet e=ercised their retention ri hts, if any, under P.:. No. ;1, the Court holds that they are entitled to the ne! retention ri hts provided for by R.A. No. 99/1, !hich in fact are on the !hole more liberal than those ranted by the decree. A $he CARP *a! and the other enactments also involved in these cases have been the sub0ect of bitter attac" from those !ho point to the shortcomin s of these measures and as" that they be scrapped entirely. $o be sure, these enactments are less than perfectD indeed, they should be continuously re+e=amined and rehoned, that they may be sharper instruments for the better protection of the farmer%s ri hts. But !e have to start some!here. In the pursuit of a rarian reform, !e do not tread on familiar round but rope on terrain frau ht !ith pitfalls and e=pected difficulties. $his is inevitable. $he CARP *a! is not a tried and tested pro0ect. <n the contrary, to use 6ustice #olmes%s !ords, )it is an e=periment, as all life is an e=periment,) and so !e learn as !e venture for!ard, and, if necessary, by our o!n mista"es. Be cannot e=pect perfection althou h !e should strive for it by all means. Meantime, !e stru le as best !e can in freein the farmer from the iron shac"les that have unconscionably, and for so lon , fettered his soul to the soil. By the decision !e reach today, all ma0or le al obstacles to the comprehensive a rarian reform pro ram are removed, to clear the !ay for the true freedom of the farmer. Be may no! limpse the day he !ill be released not only from !ant but also from the e=ploitation and disdain of the past and from his o!n feelin s of inade3uacy and helplessness. At last his servitude !ill be ended forever. At last the farm on !hich he toils !ill be his farm. It !ill be his portion of the Mother Earth that !ill ive him not only the staff of life but also the 0oy of livin . And !here once it bred for him only deep despair, no! can he see in it the fruition of his hopes for a more fulfillin future. No! at last can he banish from his small plot of earth his insecurities and dar" resentments and )rebuild in it the music and the dream.) B#ERE'<RE, the Court holds as follo!s7 ,. R.A. No. 99/1, P.:. No. ;1, Proc. No. ,.,, and E.<. Nos. ;;4 and ;;- are 2H2$AINE: a ainst all the constitutional ob0ections raised in the herein petitions. ;. $itle to all e=propriated properties shall be transferred to the 2tate only upon full payment of compensation to their respective o!ners. .. All ri hts previously ac3uired by the tenant+ farmers under P.:. No. ;1 are retained and reco ni&ed. 8. *ando!ners !ho !ere unable to e=ercise their ri hts of retention under P.:. No. ;1 shall en0oy the retention ri hts ranted by R.A. No. 99/1 under the conditions therein prescribed. /. 2ub0ect to the above+mentioned rulin s all the petitions are :I2MI22E:, !ithout pronouncement as to costs. 2< <R:ERE:.

Fernan, 5C.6.7, Narvasa, Melencio/8errera, Gutierrez, 6r., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, 'idin, *ar&iento, Cortes, Gri-o/A9uino, Medialdea and !e(alado, 66., concur.