A PROJECT ON

INTERNAL AIDS TO INTERPRETATION

SUBMITTED TO

Mr. Qazi Mohd. Usman

BY:

Name: Ayush Bansal Roll No: 09 B.A. LLB.(Hons.), 6th semester.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I, Ayush Bansal, would like to express my gratitude to our teacher, Mr. Qazi Mohd. Usman, for making the subject so easy and understandable to us that has helped me to put my best efforts to the assignment.

Thank you

Ayush Bansal

INTRODUCTION The term interpretation means To give meaning to. Governmental power has beendivided into three wings namely the legislature, the executive and the judici ary.Interpretation of statues to render justice is the primary function of the judiciary. It is the duty of the Court to interpret the Act and give meaning to each word of the Statute.

The most common rule of interpretation is that every part of the statute must be understood in a harmonious manner by reading and construing every part of it together. The maxim A Verbis legis non est recedendum means that you must not vary the words of the statute while interpreting it.

The

object

of interpretation of statutes is to determine the intention of the

legislature conveyed expressly or impliedly in the language used. In Santi swarup Sarkar v Pradeep kumar sarkar1 , the Supreme Court held that if two interpretations are possible of the same statute, the one which validates the statute must be preferred

AIR 1997 Cal 197.

KINDS OF INTERPRETATION. There are generally two kind of interpretation; literal interpretation and logicalin terpretation. Literal interpretation Giving words their ordinary and natural meaning is known as literal interpretation or litera legis. It is the duty of the court not to modify the language of the Act and if such meaning is clear and unambiguous, effect should be given to the provisions of a statute whatever may be the consequence. The idea behind such a principle is that the legislature, being the supreme law making body must know what it intends in the words of the statute. Literal interpretation has been called the safest rule because the legislatures intention can be deduced only from the language through which it has expressed itself. The bare words of the Act must be construed to get the meaning of the statute andone need not probe into the intention of the legislature. The elementary rule of construction is that the language must be construed in its grammatical and literal sense and hence it is termed as litera legis or litera script.

The Golden Rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. This interpretation is supreme and is called the golden r ule of interpretation. In Ramanjaya Singh v Baijnath Singh2, the Election tribunal set aside the election of the appellant under s 123(7) of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951 on the grounds that the appellant had employed more persons than prescribed for electioneering purpose. The appellant contended that the excess employees were paid by his father

(1955) 1 SCR 671 : AIR 1954 SC 749

andhence were not employed by him. The Supreme Court followed the grammat icalinterpretation of S 123(7) and termed the excess employees as volunteers. In Maqbool Hussain v State of Bombay3, the appellant, a citizen of India, on arrival at an airport did not declare that he brought gold with him. Gold, found in his possession during search in violation of government notification, was confiscated under S167 (8) Sea Customs Act, 1878. He was charged under sec. 8 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. The appellant pleaded that his trial under the Act was violative of Art 20(2) of the constitution relating to double jeopardy as he was already punished for his act by way of confiscation of the gold. It was held by the Supreme Court that the sea customs authority is not a court or a judicial tribunal and the confiscation is not a penalty. Consequently his trial was valid under the Act of 1947. In Madan Mohan v K.Chandrashekara, it was held that when a statute contains strict and stringent provisions, it must be literally and strictly construed to promote the object of the act. In Bhavnagar University v Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt Ltd4,it was held that according to the fundamental principles of construction the statute should be read as a whole, then chapter by chapter, section by section and then word by word. In Municipal Board v State Transport Authority, Rajasthan5, an application against the change of location of a bus stand could be made within 30 days of receipt of order of regional transport authority according to s 64 A of the Motor vehicles Act, 1939. The application was moved after 30 days on the contention that statute must be read as 30 days from the knowledge of the order.

3 4

[1953] S.C.R. 730 2002 AIR SCW 4939 5 [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 373.

The Supreme Court held that literal interpretation must be made and hence rejected the application as invalid.

Exceptions to the rule of literal interpretation Generally a statute must be interpreted in its grammatical sense but under the following circumstances it is not possible:-Logical defects A) ambiguity, B) inconsistency, C) incompleteness or lacunae, D) unreasonableness Logical interpretation If the words of a statute give rise to two or more construction, then the construction which validates the object of the Act must be given effect while interpreting. It is better to validate a thing than to invalidate it or it is better the Act prevails than perish. The purpose of construction is to ascertain the intention of the parliament. The mischief rule The mischief rule of interpretation originated in Heydons case. If there are two interpretations possible for the material words of a statute, then for sure and true interpretation there are certain considerations in the form of questions. The following questions must b considered: 1. What was the common law before making the Act? 2. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide a remedy? 3. What is the remedy resolved by the parliament to cure the disease of the commonwealth?
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4. The true reason of the remedy. The judge should always try to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. The mischief rule says that the intent of the legislature behind the enactment should be followed. Rule of casus omissus Generally, the court is bound to harmonize the various provisions of an Act passed by the legislature during interpretation so that repugnancy is avoided. Sometimes certain matters might have been omitted in a statute. In such cases, they cannot be added by construction as it amounts to making of laws or amending which is a function of legislature. A new provision cannot be added in a statute giving it meaning not otherwise found therein. A word omitted from the language of the statute, but within the general scope of the statute, and omitted due to inadvertence is known as Casus Omissus. In Padma Sundara Rao v State of Tamil Nadu6, it was held that the cassus omissus cannot be supplied by the court except in the case of a clear necessity and when reason for it is found within the four corners of the statute itself. Rule of Ejusdem Generis Ejusdem generis means of the same kind. Generally particular words are given their natural meaning provided the context does not require otherwise. If general words follow particular words pertaining to a class, category or genus then it is construed that general words are limited to mean the person or thing of the same general class, category or genus as those particularly exposed. Eg: if the husband asks the wife to buy bread, milk and cake and if the

(2002) 3 SCC 533.

wife buys jam along with them, it is not invalidated merely because of not specifying it but is valid because it is of the same kind. The basic rule is that if the legislature intended general words to be used in unrestricted sense, then it need not have used particular words at all. This rule is not of universal application. In Devendra Surti v State of Gujarat7, under s2 (4) of the Bombayshops and Establishments Act, 1948 the term commercial establish ment means anestablishments which carries any trade, business or profession. Here the word profession is associated to business or trade and hence a private doctors clinic cannot be included in the above definitions as under the rule of Ejusdem Generis. In Grasim Industries Ltd v. Collector of Customs8, Bombay, the rule of Ejusdem Generis is applicable when particular words pertaining to a class, category or genus are followed by general words. In such a case the general words are construed as limited to things of the same kind as those specified. Every clause of a statute must be construed with reference to other clauses of the Act.

[1969] 1 SCR 235. AIR 2002 SC 1706.

INTERNAL AIDS TO INTERPRETATION Long title A long title of a Legislation may not control, circumscribe or widen the scope of the legislation, if the provisions thereof are otherwise clear and unambiguous, but if the terms of the legislation are capable of both a wider and a narrower construction, that construction which would be in tune with the avowed object manifested in the preamble or declared in the long title, ought to be accepted9.

Exemptions An exemption clause in a taxing statute must be, as far as possible, liberally construed and in favour of the assessee, provided no violence is done to the language used10. It is true that an exemption provision should be liberally construed, but this does not mean that such liberal construction should be made even by doing violence to the plain meaning of such exemption provision. Liberal construction will be made wherever it is possible to be made without impairing the legislative requirement and the spirit of the provision.11

Provisos

Urmila Bala Dasi vs. Probodh Chandra Ghosh (1990) 184 ITR 604 (Cal) CIT vs. Dungarmal Tainwala (1991) 191 ITR 445 ( Patna) 11 Petron Engineering Construction Pvt. Ltd. vs. CBDT (1989) 175 ITR 523 (SC)
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The normal function of a proviso is to except and deal with a case which would otherwise fall within the general language of the main enactment,

and its effect is confined to that case. The main function of a proviso is to carve out object of the main enactment.12 A proviso cannot be held to control the main enactment or to withdraw, by mereimplication, any part of what the main provision has given. But it cannot e nablesomething to be done which is not to be found in the enacting clause itself, on the ground that otherwise the proviso would be meaningless and senseless. There may be cases in which the language of the statute may be so clear that a proviso may be construed as a substantive clause. But whether a proviso is construed as restricting the main provision or as a substantive clause, it cannot be divorced from the provision to which it stands as a proviso. It must be construed harmoniously with the main enactment.13 an exception to the main

enactment. It cannot, normally, be so interpreted as to set at naught the real

Explanation Sometimes an Explanation is added to a section to elaborate upon and explain the meaning of the words appearing in the section. Such an Explanation becomes an integral part of the main enactment. An Explanation to a statutory provision has to be read with the main provision to which it is added as an Explanation. An Explanation appended to a section or a sub-section becomes an integral part of it and has no independent existence apart from it. There is, in the eye of law, only one enactment, of
12 13

CIT vs. Pyarilal Kasam Manji & Co. 198 ITR 110 (Ori.) CIT vs. Ajax Products Ltd. (1964) 55 ITR 741 (SC)]

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which both the section or sub-section and the Explanation are two inseparable parts. In the absence of anything repugnant in the subject or context, the words and expressions used in the Explanation are to be given the same meaning as given to them in the main provision itself.14 The purpose of an Explanation is not to limit the scope of the main section. An Explanation is quite different in nature from a proviso; the latter excludes, accepts and

restricts while the former explains, clarifies or subtracts or includes something b y introducing a legal fiction. An Explanation may be appended to a section to explain the meaning of the words used in the section. There is no presumption that an Explanation which is inserted subsequently introduces something new which was not present in the section before. Ordinarily, an Explanation is inserted to clear up any ambiguity in the section and it should be so read as to harmonise it with the section and to clear up any ambiguity in the main section.15 The normal principle in construing an Explanation is to understand it ase xplaining the meaning of the provision to which it is added; the Explanation does not enlarge or limit the provision, unless the Explanation purports to be a definition or a deeming clause; if the intention of the Legislature is not fully conveyed earlier or there has been a misconception about the scope of a provision, the Legislature steps in to explain the purport of the provision; such an Explanation has to be given effect to, as pointing out the real meaning of the provision all along.16

14 15

CIT vs. Reunion Engineering Co. (P) Ltd. (1993) 203 ITR 274 (Bom.) CIT vs. Voltas Ltd. (1994) 205 ITR 569 (Bom) 16 CIT vs. Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Works 193 ITR 77 (Kar)

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Non-obstante clauses A non-obstante clause is usually used in a provision to indicate that the provision should prevail despite anything to the contrary in the provision mentioned in such non-obstante clause. In case there is any inconsistency or a departure between the non-obstante clause and another provision, one of the objects of such a clause is to indicate that it is the non-obstante clause which would prevail over the other clause.17

Marginal notes and headings The marginal note to a section cannot be referred to for the purpose of c onstruing the section but it can certainly be relied upon as indicating the drift of the section or to show what the section is dealing with. It cannot control the interpretation of the words of a section, particularly when the language of the section is clear and unambiguous but, being part of the statute, it prima facie furnishes some clue as to the meaning and purpose of the section.18 Marginal notes are not decisive in interpreting a substantive provision of law, but, in case of doubt, they can be relied upon as one of the aids for construction.19

Preamble

17 18 19

Parasuramaiah vs. Lakshamma AIR 1965 AP 220. K.P. Varghese vs. ITO 131 ITR 597 (SC) R.B. Shreeram Religious & Charitable Trust vs. CIT (1988) 172 ITR 373 (Bom)

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The Act Starts with a preamble and is generally small. The main objective and purpose of the Act are found in the Preamble of the Statute. Preamble is the Act in a nutshell. It is a preparatory statement. It contains the recitals showing the reason for enactment of the Act. If the language of the Act is clear the preamble must be ignored. The preamble is an intrinsic aid in the interpretation of an ambiguous act. In Kashi Prasad v State20, the court held that even though the preamble cannot be used to defeat the enacting clauses of a statute, it can be treated as a key for the interpretation of the statute.

Punctuation

There are three activities serially set out in that subclause, namely, construction, manufacture or production. A comma is, therefore, legitimately and as per the rules of grammar, required after the first activity to separate it from the second activity of manufacture. Since the second activity is followed by the word or, no comma

isrequired after the second activity to separate it from the third activity. Therefo re, punctuation is put as grammatically required. It does not disclose any intention of providing for a separate kind of business altogether. Punctuation, in any case, is a minor element in the construction of a statute. Only when a statute is carefully punctuated and there is no doubt about its meaning can weight be given to punctuation. It cannot,

20

1980 BB CJ 612

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however, be regarded as a controlling element for determining the meaning of a statute.21

Definition clause and undefined words (a) Judicially defined words It has long been a well-established principle to be applied in the construction of an Act of Parliament that where a word of doubtful meaning has received a clear judicial interpretation, the subsequent statute which incorporates the same word or the same phrase in a similar context, must be construed so that the word or phrase is interpreted according to the meaning that has previously been assigned to it.22 Interpretation of a provision in a taxing statute rendered years back and accepted and acted upon by the department should not be easily departed from.23

(b) Rule of Ejusdem generis The maxim ejusdem generis serves to restrict the meaning of a general wordtothings or matters of the same genus as the preceding particular words. It i s wellrecognised rule of construction that when two or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together noscitur a sociis, they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. They take their colour from

21 22

Hindustan Construction vs. CIT (1994) 208 ITR 291 (Bom) Barras vs. Aberdeen Steam Trawling and Fishing Co. Ltd. (1933) AC 402 (HL) 23 CIT vs. Balkrishna Malhotra (1971) 81 ITR 759 (SC)

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each other that are; the more general is restricted to a sense analogous to the less general. In order to attract the principle of ejusdem generis, it is essential that a distinct genus or category must be discernible in the words under examination. Where the statute imposes restriction on advertisement, publicity and sales promotion, se of business.24 Similarly, the words other stationary plant must be construed ejusdemgeneris with switchgears and transformers25. The rule of ejusdem generis is to be applied with caution and not pushed too far. It may not be interpreted too narrowly and unnecessarily if broad based genus could be found so as to avoid cutting down words to dwarf size.26 the expression sales promotion cannot include selling expenses incurred in the ordinary cour

Schedule The Schedules appended to a statute form part of it. They are generally added to avoid encumbering the statute with matters of excessive details, guidelines to work out. he policy of the statute, transitory provisions, rules

and forms which need frequent amendment and the like. Much importance is not given to the forms unless they contain requirements of a mandatory nature.

24 25

CIT vs. Statesman Ltd. (1992) 198 ITR 582 ( Cal.) [CIT vs. Anglo India Jute Mills Co. Ltd. (1993) 202 ITR 104 (Cal.) 26 U.P.State Electricity Board vs. Hari Shanker Jain AIR 1979 (SC) 65

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CONCLUSION Statute generally means the law or the Act of the legislature authority. The general rule of the interpretation is that statutes must prima facie be given this ordinary meaning. If

thewords are clear, free from ambiguity there is no need to refer to other means of interpretation. But if the words are vague and ambiguous then internal aid may be sought for interpretation.

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