ZORETA V. SIMPLICIANO A.C. No.

6492; November 18, 2004 FACTS: Complainant Zoreta filed a claim for damages by Breach of Contract against Security Pacific Assurance Corporation (SPAC). Respondent Atty. Simpliciano was the counsel of the latter. It was alleged by the complainant that the respondent notarized several documents affecting the case where he was involved during the year 2002 after his commission as notary public had expired. IBP conducted investigation and the allegations of the complainant were proven. Furthermore, 509 other documents were notarized by the respondent without authority to perform such conduct. Thus, a disbarment case was filed against him on the ground of gross misconduct. ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of the respondent warrant his disbarment as a notary public. RULING: The Court ruled in affirmative.

Practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. . A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law only during good behavior and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded him. It must be understood that the purpose of suspending or disbarring him as an attorney is to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to an office of attorney, and thus to protect the public and those charged with the administration of justice, rather than to punish an attorney. The Court also noted that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the

basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Because of his misconduct, respondent Simpliciano was barred permanently from being a notary public and suspended from practice of law for two years.

QUINGWA V. PUNO A.C. No. 389 February 28, 1967

FACTS: Complainant Quingwa filed a disbarment case against respondent Puno on the ground of gross immorality and misconduct. It was alleged that by means of promising marriage to the complainant, respondent successfully and repeatedly had carnal knowledge with the former against her will and caused her impregnation. It was established that after repeated demands, respondent never fulfilled his promise to marry. Complainant contended that she submitted to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of respondent's promise of marriage and not because of a desire for sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion. On his answer, respondent admitted such promise to marry and its non-fulfillment. However, he averred that his acts did not constitute grounds for disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of the former Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the breach of promise to marry warrants respondents disbarment. RULING: The Court ruled in affirmative. The acts of the respondent in having carnal knowledge with the complainant through a promise of marriage which he did not fulfill and has refused to fulfill up to the present constitute a conduct which shows that respondent is devoid of the highest degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of and must be possessed by members of the Philippine Bar. Well-settled is the rule that one of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the applicant must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of law, it is essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. In the case, the Court was convinced that the respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and violated the fundamental ethics of his

profession. Indeed, it is important that members of this ancient and learned profession of law must conform themselves in accordance with the highest standards of morality. Thus, the Court ruled for the disbarment of respondent Puno.

ROYONG V. OBLENA A.C. No. 376; April 30, 1963 FACTS: Complainant Royong charged respondent Oblena with the crime of rape. The latter denied the crime alleged upon him but admitted the illicit relationship he shared with the complainant. It was also established during the investigation that the respondent was in a common-law relationship with a married woman, and the former contended that he entered into a relationship with the complainant for the purpose of having a child which his common-law wife could not give. The Solicitor General filed a separate complaint against the respondent, charging the latter of falsely and deliberately alleging in his application for admission to the bar that he is a person of good moral character and alleging the same aforementioned facts regarding rape and adulterous relationship with a married woman, thus rendering him unworthy of public confidence and unfit and unsafe to manage the legal business of others. On the other hand, respondent denied the allegations of the complainant and contended,

among others, that his conducts were nonprofessional activities and that he cannot be liable for disbarment because he has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. ISSUE: Whether or not the illicit relations with the complainant and the open cohabitation with a married woman warrants the respondents disbarment. RULING: The Court ruled in affirmative. Well-settled is the ruled that moral turpitude for which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his professional or nonprofessional activities. Thus, respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer. As to the contention of the respondent that he has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, the Court held that while it is true that the respondent has not been convicted of rape,

seduction, or adultery, and that the grounds upon which the disbarment proceedings was based were not among those enumerated by Section 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court for which a lawyer may be disbarred, it has already been held that this enumeration is not exclusive. The power of the courts to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the profession is inherent. Furthermore, the blunt admission of his illicit relations with the complainant reveals the respondent to be a person who would suffer no moral compunction for his acts if the same could be done without fear of criminal liability. He has proven himself to be devoid of the moral integrity expected of a member of the bar. Thus, respondent Oblena was disbarred.