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Identity and Infallibility in Plato's Epistemology Author(s): Travis Butler Source: Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science, Vol. 39, No. 1 (March 2006), pp. 1-25 Published by: De Gruyter Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40914015 . Accessed: 03/07/2013 00:05
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in andInfallibility Identity Plato'sEpistemology

TravisButler

account traditional ofa certain haveseena reinvigoration Recent years of kind ofcognition thebest towhich ofPlato'sepistemology according butinstead true viewsaboutthem, ofholding isnota matter intelligibles soulandtheforms, therational between contact is a kindofunmediated TheGood.1 especially including tothepowerful, as a response hasoccurred Thisreinvigoration partly a attribute that Irwin and others of Fine, Annas, interpretations global to and coherentist epistemology thoroughly propositionalist broadly On this theTheaetetus.2 theearlydialoguesright Plato,from through ofits a correct account is to possessand defend view,to knowa form of and toknowTheGood is topossessan immense realnature, system less thanlay bare the explanatory such accountsthatdoes nothing order. Forthepropositionalists, ofthe world's structure then, intelligible the while discursive a matter of is understanding, systematic knowing or relation ofrapport view sees it as a nonrepresentational traditional a form. with acquaintance

Dialectic viewhavebeendefended 1 Aspects ofthe traditional Gonzalez, byFrancisco Press IL: Northwestern andDialogue Moravcsik, 1998); J.M.E. (Evanston, University Press1992); Kenneth andPlatonism Plato (NewYork: University Sayre, Cambridge and ofNotre DamePress1995); Plato's Garden Dame,IN: University (Notre Literary Press Persons Oxford 2003). (NewYork: University Knowing LloydGerson, Oxford Press 2 Julia AnIntroduction toPlato's Annas, (NewYork: Republic University andForms Oxford Plato onKnowledge GailFine, 276-93; (NewYork: 1981), University Plato's Ethics Oxford Press Press chs.2-4;T.H.Irwin, (NewYork: 2003), University 141-7 1995),

andscience for ancient APEIRONa journal philosophy Academic & Publishing 001-026 $26.00 0003-6390/2006/3901 Printing

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2 TravisButler

that Crucial to thedisagreement hereis Plato'sclaimin theRepublic whereas eventrue belief is fallible. is infallible Propositionknowledge but viewofknowledge alists tend toseethis as akintothecontemporary of notbelief truth. viewseestheinfallibility as implying Thetraditional in nature of as a muchdeeperpointaboutthedifference knowledge or involve andbelief. Because doesn't describing knowledge knowledge can kind of state that at it's not even the the Forms all, representing In Parts II and III,I try toadvance describe ormisrepresent. mistakenly ofknowledge thisissueby asking whatwe can infer aboutthenature from itsrelation todialectical understanding. While my goal is not to settlemattersin favor of the repretothe atleastinsofar as this is committed sentationalist reading reading, I am claimthat of is representations, goingto knowledge propositional in is conscious that a which thesubject must be state argue knowledge is ofthe ofinformation As such, aboutthenature ofForms. knowledge that of both states involve samegeneric as belief: thinking type they're and natures. Because their features as certain knowledge objects having must atleast andbelief ofknowledge arethis partly way,theinfallibility be a matter of the qualityof the information possessed.Knowledge whereas belief anddependable involves correct information, necessarily carries no suchguarantee. is muchmore as informational the view of knowledge Although I be think totherepresentationalist interpretation, oneshould congenial no role that Plato has claim notto infer thefurther careful straightway Thatis,the at anyplaceinhistheory. for nonrepresentational cognition is at leastin ofknowledge aboutthenature epistemological question ofwhether inthe ofmind distinct from the philosophy principle question without there is no cognition Platoholdsingeneral that representation. ThisissueI takeup inPartIV. on I'll be focusing inwhatfollows, In speaking ofknowledge largely between thetraditional thedispute thisis that The reasonfor epistni. ofthebest overthenature is primarily viewandtherepresentationalists and in Republic kindofknowledge Platorecognizes, VII,in thesecond be 'Itwilltherefore this is epistme: itis clearthat discussion ofTheLine, thesecond section tocallthefirst thought, (episteme), knowledge enough and thefourth thethird (533e7belief, justas we did before' imaging, 4al). case ofthe I takeup a kindoflimiting In thefollowing then, section, On thisview, to have accountof knowledge. nonrepresentationalist toit. identical' is tobecome'cognitionally ofan object knowledge

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in Plato'sEpistemology 3 and Infallibility Identity

is notIdentity Affinity

In thissection, Fm goingto discussseveralaspectsofthemostrecent that sees thebest ofPlato'sepistemology and fully developedaccount thesoul between relation kindofknowledge as a nonrepresentational isa kind oflimiting andTheGood.Thisview, defended Gerson, byLloyd insofar as itseesknowledge case ofthenonrepresentationalist account, kind ofcontent towhich oranyother devoidofrepresentations as wholly Persons or accuracyapply (Knowing normsof correctness [KP], 82). inforcorrect is nota matter ofpossessing on thisaccount, Knowledge, It is rather a matter of mationabout the being or natureof forms. of the Good. identical to the Form becoming thesis isthe need for Gerson's motivations Oneofthe identity primary thatknowledge is claimin theRepublic to explainPlato's important that aretruearenot.I takeup thisissue infallible whereas evenbeliefs I wantto raisesomeproblems for the in PartIII below.In thissection, in that central issue is Plato's claim mind the thesis, bearing identity ofknowledge. abouttheinfallibility evidence ofthe Thespecific primarily appealstofor passageGerson in the Phaedo: 'As we shall thesis is the (AA) Affinity Argument identity as a stateof cognitive in the AA, Plato views knowing see shortly In knowItis nota representational state. with theForms. identification what he knows' the knower becomes (KP,61). ing, account oftheAA does notmention Gerson's official cogAlthough to the nitional (KP, 79), it is clearthatthe line of reasoning identity intwosteps: from 79dl-7 thesis (1) theclaimatPhaedo proceeds identity and incontact totheforms that thesoul is akin(suggeris) (ephaptomene) and directly withthem, to (2) the claimthatthe Formsare literally that and to the claim literal is to to souls, from (2) (3) presence present be understood as identity. ofcontact, Thekeytothefirst transition is thenotion sincethenotion IfPlatowanted ofkinship is obviously weaker thanidentity. toexpress theideaofunmediated, contact wouldbe nonrepresentational presence, a useful sinceit would seemto implyor at leastsuggest the concept, Buttheproblem absenceofan intermediary. for thetransition from (1) to (2) is thatall oftheepistemic wordsPlatouses in thecontext ofthe AA toexplain howthesoulfunctions whenitoperates indicate byitself rather thanunmediated step-wise, representational thinking identity: dianoia and logismos theperson whoapproaches aretheones beingwith thatwill gain wisdom (phronsis), if anyonewill (65e8-6a6, 66a7-8, 79d6-7).

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4 TravisButler

dianoia and Whileitwouldbe possibleto see Platoas claiming that arenecessary idenlogismos stepsalongthewaytononrepresentational word is not compelling the merefactthatPlato uses a contact tity, that evidence for this view.Itseemsat leastequallylikely usingdiscurin with sive thought and reasoning aboutForms is just being contact and wisdomis theoutput and ofsuccessful them, thinking reasoning.3 and contact ofkinship can bear the Thus,I don'tsee thatthenotions to of the move from (1) (2). weight is a signifiEvenifonewereconvinced ofthis there however, move, If and it that the soul's removal cant between as well. is the case (3) (2) gap this from the also removes the need for mediation, body representational with realism: the Forms wouldseemtoleavePlato someversion ofdirect but thesouls are strongly of thesouls thatgraspthem, independent them To explaintheliteral directly. presence graspthem by cognizing in favor ofForms ofidentity is to skipoverdirect realism bythenotion is a ofsomeform ofidealism. Whileitmaybe truethat direct realism a issue from difficult to make this is different out, obviously position and contact. it'swhatPlatointends ofkinship whether byspeaking becauseevenit As I understand he rulesoutdirect realism Gerson, ThisI willdiscuss below.Thepoint here leavestoomuch room for error. in which thesoul is operating ifwe understand thesituation is that by itisa further tosouls, itself as oneinwhich theForms areliterally present in whichthe and extremely controversial stepto see thisas a situation blurred or eradicated. Given the distinction is Euthyphro's subject/object itwouldbe atleastsurprisaboutpiety, ofdivine rejection projectionism from theaffinity tothe without announcement Platomoving ingtofind thesis. identity in itsown facessevereproblems I think thesis theidentity Finally, in (l)-(3). HereI haveinmindthe ofthereasoning right, independently that The Platoclaimsexplicitly specialroleofTheGood in knowledge. anobject itisitself andcauseofknowledge, medium the Goodisnotonly itisinsomesense IndeedonGerson's ofknowledge view, 516b-c). (5083, theonlyobjectof knowledge thesis, then, (KP, 177). On theidentity it. identical to a matter of The Good is becoming knowing

access for intellectual ofvision Kahn's view:/rThe seems tobeCharles 3 This metaphor of ... Thefundamental butaltogether tothe Forms is useful conception dispensable rather thanvisualin itsorientation/ thebeginning, theForms is, from linguistic Press1996), 355. Plato andthe Socratic (NewYork: Cambridge University Dialogue

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and Infallibility in Plato'sEpistemology 5 Identity

Oneproblem with this ideais that whileitis clear that Platoseessouls and Formsin general as deeplyakin,thisaffinity mustbe somewhat inthecase ofTheGood.TheGood is nota garden limited variety object of knowledge. It is the unhypothetical first of principle everything, to knowledge, truth and being (509a). At a minimum, this superior that souls and The Good to different (i) implies belong ontological types, and (ii) souls standin a one-way withThe Good. relation dependence ofknowledge as identity suffers Thus,it seemsto me thatthenotion strain in the case of The because the of Good, surplus degree initial between souls and The Good is much smaller. affinity Theconcept that Gerson usestobridge thegapbetween theclaim that soulsarelikeForms and that souls become the forms is that of knowing transformation:
Thatis,thethinker is awarethat itis in a mental state [with wisdom] of with Forms. On this it is not difficult to see basis, consisting identity that wisdom wouldbe self-transforming. (KP,61)

When thesoulfinally TheGood,then, itis transformed ina kind grasps offusing with itsultimate object. Itis true that Platodoessometimes describe thesoul'sliberation from the body in terms thatsuggesttransformation, as in the Republic X discussion ofwhatthesoul would become ifitweretopursuethedivine with allofitself Butinthis that thesuggested (611el-5). passageitisclear transformation is from to simplicity.4 complexity Perhapsthenonrationalpartsofthesoul are so manyshellsthatwillfallaway whenit Sincetheaffinity between souls and forms graspsitskindred objects. obtains evenwhenthesoulis initsalienated and shaggy it'shard state, tobelievethat theconcept ofaffinity itself is supposedto intimate the view. identity ThusI don'tthink thiskindoftransformation movesus beyondthe Phaedo's claim thatsouls are akin to Forms.Indeed,the Republic X recalls thePhaedo its use of the notion of passageexplicitly passageby at 611a4-8, Socratesstatesthatthe same (611e2).Moreover, kinship number ofsouls alwaysexist, whichwould seemto require that souls retain their numerical distinctness all his through eternity. Despite deep

4 HereI havebeenhelpedbyChristopher Shields, Souls',in EllenWagner, 'Simple onPlato's MD: Lexington Books2001), ed.,Essays 137-56. (Lanham, Psychology

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6 TravisButler

commitment totheaffinity between soulsandForms, Platoalwaysstops short oftheidentity thesis. A final inthe concern isthat the thesis caseofTheGoodseems identity to makePlato vulnerable to David Sachs' chargethattheway Plato connects and happiness missesthepointofGlaucon'schallenge justice in BookII.5The gravamen is that Platoonlysucceedsin ofthischarge what the to connecting justice happinessby substantially changing connected Socrates to connect 'common terms mean. Glaucon challenges butSocrates connects 'Platonic' sense'justice andhappiness justice only and happiness. I think torevise to be allowedthefreedom While Platomust concepts itis clearthat wanted hisaccounts ofjustice someextent, Platohimself withthe moreordinary and happinessto make substantial contact in IV that his Book notions, Platonically justindividuals given argument willnotengageinordinary (442e-3b). injustice and knowledge Butifjustice becoming requires requires knowledge, it'snotatall first ofeverything, identical totheunhypothetical principle at all totheordinary and happiness bearanysimilarity clearthat justice ofhappiness oftheordinary notion it'ssurely notions. Forexample, part humans ofindividual oforder however similar are theprinciples that, what it to an individual is be andthe structure of the universe, intelligible If different. are radically humanand what it is to be thatstructure with the human nature one's happiness requires replacing achieving discussno longer first nature oftheunhypothetical cause,we'reclearly denies thejust that Thrasymachus happiness ingthekindofindividual to see be conceptually and grants thetyrant. Whileone might required one in a state of sense with The Good as some affairs, might good identity has to whatthisstateofaffairs to ask skeptically be similarly required human do with happiness. to I think, is that whileitis sometimes Whatthisshows, appropriate likecertain ofbecoming andepistemic norms as a matter moral describe withthose literal to require different ideals,it is altogether identity thelanguageof is that neither WhatI've arguedin thissection ideals.6

II (Notre inGregory Fallacy inPlato'sRepublic', 5 DavidSachs, Vlastos, ed.,Plato 35-51 DamePress1978), ofNotre Dame,IN: University falls likegod so faras is possible7' 'The goal of ''becoming 6 David Sedleywrites: that thewayinwhich andgoverns within ofan incarnate theconfines life, strictly

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in Plato'sEpistemology 7 and Infallibility Identity

Phaedo oftheRepublic makes itlikely the northeargumentative structure infavor thesis. that Platobypasses theaffinity thesis oftheidentity II and Information Representation

With theidentity viewis itseradication ofthesubject/ distinction, object a limiting familiar viewaccording towhich the bestkind caseofthe more ofknowledge is a nonrepresentational intothebeing graspoforinsight In thissection, I wanttochange focus from theidentity thesis offorms. in totheideaofnonrepresentational itself knowledge general, beginning with themotivation for this idea. motivation for As mentioned above, the primary epistemological that Gerson's thesis is Plato's claim unlike even true knowledge, identity It is certainly to ask thisfactabout is infallible. belief, appropriate to do its relation to theuniqueimporknowledge heavylifting, given ofknowledge andthesignificance ofknowledge totheproper role tance inthejustcity. ofthephilosopher In section III below,I'm goingto present of myown interpretation In this I wantfirst Plato'sinfallibility doctrine. togivemysense section, ofthelayofthelandandthen and explain start toclearoutspacefor the I defend in III. motivation oftheaccount themostfamiliar oftheinfallibility ofknowledge in account Perhaps Plato is presented involvestwo by Vlastos.On his view,infallibility elements: and (ii) recognition ofnecessary truth as truth, (i) necessary tocertainty. a true whereas belief canbe merely such, Thus, true, leading a pieceofknowledge must be trueand something ofwhich thesubject ' "Infallible" is certain, becauseoftheevidentness ofthetruth: then must be whatPlatomeans.So he is maintaining that is true we knowthat onlywhenwe possesstheveryhighest degreeofcertainty concerning thetruth of P.'7In cases of knowledge, thesubject is able to 'see' the orthemanifest ofitsdenial.Let'scallthis kind truth, object's absurdity ofinfallibility 'Evidence (El). Infallibility'

life is tobe led. We areurgedto achieve assimilation to god,ifat all,within our 'TheIdeal ofGodlikeness', in Gail Fine, 2 (New York: ed.,Plato present lifespan/ Oxford Press1999), at310. 309-28, University 7 Gregory 'Socrates' Disavowal ofKnowledge', The 35 Vlastos, Philosophical Quarterly at 13 (1985)1-31,

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8 TravisButler

Onewaytorespond that itrequires toEl is toclaim toomuch. On this viewofinfallibility, callitMinimal (MI),El buildstoomuch Infallibility intoinfallibility buttruth that notjusttruth, is evident as by requiring such.MI holdsby contrast thatknowledge can be sufficiently distinbeliefsolelyon the basis of the implication between guishedfrom and truth. MI: Gail Fine knowledge captures andbelief do different Plato tells knowlus,inthat work, Knowledge but belief isinfallible This (anhamarteton; 477e6-7). edge not might only that but mean not belief that's oneway(the truth; knowledge implies "if correct toread bewrong"; the can't know, only way) slogan you you andit'sthe ofthe the only reading slogan argument requires.8 MI view, Forthe the ofknowledge issimply the then, analytic infallibility connection and truth. is possible, false between Falsebelief knowledge isnot. andcertainty areoutside the ofevidentness Questions knowledge issue. scopeoftheinfallibility Fromthepointof view of thenonrepresentationalist one account, MI if that of is its for is the problem infallibility knowledge merely relation to truth, it would seem thattruebeliefshouldbe similarly truth no less thanknowledge does. But infallible.9 Truebelief implies will and belief Plato'sargument from thedifference between knowledge failifone speciesofbelief is justas infallible as knowledge. MI from Butthefundamental with this ofviewis one point problem ofcertainty. it shareswithEl, despite El's moredemanding condition as a matter that bothMI and El understand Thisis thefact knowledge aboutthe Forms. correct information ofholding true viewsorpossessing such as fallible is thus of the same cognitions as type Knowledge generic there Ifknowledge then ofan informational belief. has thenature state, - doesthe aboutthequality oftheinformation is alwaysa realquestion MI and El on Gersonrejects theFormcorrectly? information capture these grounds: inprinciple not could Ifknowledge were infallibility representational, a from wouldbe no wayofinferring be preserved because there

andForms onKnowledge inPlato inRepublic andBelief 8 GailFine, V-VIF, 'Knowledge at91 Oxford Press 85-166, 2003), (NewYork: University at 13. MI in 'Disavowal, for 9 Vlastos alsoraises this worry

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in Plato'sEpistemology 9 and Infallibility Identity

ofaffairs. There isnomental state state any objective representational isrepresentationalist truth as that mental state that entails solong state 12" itdoes if I find that "7+5= isfalse, not follow ... Even itinconceivable that itistrue. 82, (KP, 222) of raisesthepossibility It is becausethepresence ofrepresentation in the quotation thatGerson'rigorously in theway suggested error includesno repreexcludes'it from (161). If knowledge knowledge kind that err orbe mistaken. it the of state can then is not even sentation, 'in principle'. the I take it thisis what Gersonintends by qualifier a nature that in is infallibility principle givingknowledge Preserving Itis inthis ofcorrectness oraccuracy. ofnorms barstheapplication way thantobelief: and certain emotions moreanalogous topain,fevers from what differentiates representational non-repbroadly, Speaking human oractivities is epistemic For resentational states assessability. a feverish as true orfalse, whereas a belief canbe assessed example, cannot beso assessed. for state, (KP, 82) example, Let's call thisMaximalist (Max). WhatI wantto beginto Infallibility that Max a condition it'snot now is that is such strong infallibility argue is sufficient to at all clearthat knowledge nonrepresentational making it. secure inPartI above,direct realism is onekindofnonrepreAs mentioned between and object. Buton view of therelation sentationalist subject the directness of the does someversions ofdirect realism, cognition not oferror. There areatleasttwokinds ofviewsthat ruleoutthepossibility with cancombine access to the of objects nonrepresentational possibility error. and knowledge On thefirst beliefs areseenas involvway,although the thinker's relation to the constituents ofthe content, ingpropositional If in and de re. is some cases direct the content of the proposition thought is a singular for thethinker access example, mayhavedirect proposition, totheobject that stands as thesubject term oftheproposition. Thiskind in ofnonrepresentational ofan object canbe fallible, however, cognition thefollowing in sense.There be cases which the thinks she may subject is thusrelatedto an objectwhen in factthereis no object(e.g., a In sucha case,theproposition hallucination ofa dagger). is nothowthe thinker takesittobe,although he cannot tellthis'from theinside'. Ifthis kind ofcaseispossible, then de recognition ofthis sort isfallible in thesensethatthere are subjectively cases indistinguishable where

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10 TravisButler

thecognition there is no de recontact, and this is a clearsenseinwhich tobe possibleeven is mistaken.10 Sometakethiskindofde re thought withrespect in whichcase a tolerably clearanalogyto to numbers, aboutForms is possible.11 thought and fallibilOn thesecondwayofcombining nonrepresentationality indeed taken to be is priorto and ity, nonrepresentational cognition but of the of nonrepresentaexplanatory propositional ways thinking, and atleastsomeof information tothesubject, tional cognition conveys totheso-called 'relational' this information canbe mistaken. According of of for experience theory experience, example, nonrepresentational kind of of demonstrative referthe objects knowledge physical grounds butinfallibility ofinforinsuccessful action onobjects, enceexemplified Information about for to this role. mation isnotrequired experience play so an object's for can be mistaken, location, example, longas it partially to 'set thetarget' forthevisuomotor is sufficiently accurate systems inacting involved on theobject.12 itis notthecasethat themere Becauseofthese appealto possibilities, Max infallibility. for is sufficient theconcept ofthenonrepresentational in oferror ifthenature is toruleoutthepossibility ofknowledge Thus, butofinformaofrepresentation, itmust notonly be free theMaxsense, a fever in something liketheway that tionabouttheobject altogether, information aboutitscause.Thedifference toitssubject doesnotconvey oftheir is notjustinthedetails Max and theother between then, views,

Reid's ofsense sort beThomas kind ofcaseofthis 10 A different theory perception. may thesensation a sensation is a signofan external Reidclaims that object, although nor orbyphilosophers; ofthought, either Vas never madean object bythevulgar V ii:56.Thesensation into the Human AnInquiry inany hasita name Mind, language/ butnotas an object ofawareness oftheperception, playssomeroleinthegenesis involves butperception are perceived The external or thought. directly, objects 'Reid's toerror. HereI'vebeenhelped andthus is liable Greco, byJohn conception in Terence Cuneo and Renevan Woudenberg, eds., The Replyto theSkeptic', Press Reid toThomas 2003), (NewYork: University Cambridge Cambridge Companion 134-55. inJoseph 11 Thispossibility is considered Almog, 'Afterthoughts', byDavid Kaplan, and HowardWettstein, eds.,Themes (New York:Oxford John Kaplan from Perry at607. Press1989), 565-614, University Oxford andConsciousness 12 HereI haveinmind (NewYork: John Reference Campbell, 55-6. Press 2002), University

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and Infallibility in Plato'sEpistemology 11 Identity

accounts. It'sinthe theinfallibility understand condition itself: waythey Max requires thatknowledge notevenbelongto thegenus'informationalcognitive sinceifit did,thequestion ofthecorrectness of state', theinformation wouldarise. Itwillperhaps notbe surprising that in thenext section mystrategy willbe topresent an account ofinfallibility that sitsbetween theMI and Max alternatives. The infallibility of knowledge is morethanjustthe but of much less radical than the informationless truth, implication I wantto introduce relation ofMax. To conclude thissection, another - a condition condition thatPlatoimposeson knowledge thatmust coexistwiththe Infallibility Condition. It is the 'DialecticalUnderand it inpassagessuchas these: Condition' is (DUC), standing expressed whohasknowledge would be ableto (Tl) A man (aner epistamenos) anaccount ofwhat heknows, orwould henot? (Phd 76b5-6) give noonewilldispute itwhen we saythat there is no (T2)Atanyrate, other from that to dialectic] inquiry [apart systematically attempts with to each what itself the it of for all the is, grasp respect thing being other crafts areconcerned with human and desires, with opinions or or with the care of or constructed construction, growing growing (R533bl-6) things. the same tothe Unless someone can (T3)Then applies good. distinguish inan account the form ofthe from cansurvive else, good everything allrefutation, ina battle, asif tojudge inaccordance not striving things in with but accordance with and can come all opinion being, through with this hisaccount still that he doesn't know The intact, you'll say Gooditself orany other {R534b8-c5) good. In these Platoclearly associates thebestkindofcognition, passages, with successful definition of Forms and dialectical defense of epistm, thosedefinitions. Thisimpliesthatepistm is at leastintimately connected to richly informational that states we would associate withthe of and concepts explanation understanding. Thereasonsuchpassageshavenotbeentaken as proof texts against thenonrepresentationalist is that Plato short ofclaiming reading stops thatdefining and defending are the natureof knowledge. explicitly take that Nonrepresentationalist interpreters Platoonlyto be claiming correct definition and successful dialectical defense areconsequences or derivative of images nonrepresentational knowledge.

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12 TravisButler

is that withthisview of the natureof knowledge One problem as the 'copingstone',withno itself is explicitly dialectic presented thatit'sonlya derivative indication (534e-5a). epistemic phenomenon the of the Sun some suggest view of imagemight aspects Although thefact a kind of of The Good as grasping, quasi-perceptual knowledge levelofThe at thehighest and dialectic is that Platolocatesdefinition Atthevery end ofRepublic Line- thelevelofepistm. VI,Platostates that ofthecognitions theclarity alongthelinevarieswiththeshareof In thesequelin BookVII,moretruth (511e2-4). bytheobjects enjoyed as the ofepistm from theintroduction Platopassesimmediately over, and his ofthedialectician to a description namefor thebestcognition is dialectical success as inT3). IfPlatoheldtheviewthat (534a-c, ability for it not tend to clearness would andinferior a derivative phenomenon, with the truth is grasped intheareawhere himtolocate dialectic greatest accuracy. and pursue aside forthemoment Butlet'ssettheseconsiderations and dialectic areinferior that definition further thepossibility activities, Plato's love If that we are to believe from derivative despite knowledge. informaa radically as having he seesknowledge ofaccounts, different, thepossession outthat at leastturn must itpresumably tionless nature, in an intiand defense definition to successful is connected ofepistm the be the case It cannot mateand explanatory epistm merely way.13 it mustbe and dialectical successare constantly Rather, conjoined. thattheyare able to because philosophers possess epistm precisely without use of account defend their The Good and successfully define allthe of their in this Their knowledge waygrounds hypotheses. epistm this call rule. Let's claim to and thus their other justice, goods,including success and dialectical between causal connection knowledge necessary Condition' the'Dialectical (DUC). Understanding of out trueon theaccount Butit is veryhardto see how thisturns Conof the Max the construal from that follows Infallibility knowledge about ofall information Thatis,ifwe haveto drainknowledge dition.

that whoclaim isrecognized 13 Asindeed episteme nonrepresentational byinterpreters It mustbe because and dialectic. in definition or 'made manifest7 is 'exhibited7 ithas.Ifknowledge ithas themanifestations ithas that has thenature knowledge See Gonzalez, at all,how can it have thosemanifestations? is notinformational 17-28. 224andMoravcsik, Platonism, Dialectic,

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in Plato'sEpistemology 13 and Infallibility Identity

in orderto securetheinfallibility ofknowledge, itbecomes theForms as an informationless how knowledge, state,can whollymysterious dialectical that is chartheastonishingly ability comprehensive explain ofthose whoknow. acteristic to contemporary To see thismoreclearly, let'sreturn againbriefly has subOn thisview,nonrepresentational direct realism. experience I it is have work to do. For because direct stantive example, explanatory I that that am to understand 'that baseball' and of baseball able experience it.Experience, a nonrepresentational has reachup and catch cognition, from of and a nature that's different reference fundamentally knowledge butit'sabletoexplain them. is that action, experience Mypoint practical thesubject with allkinds is only abletoexplain them becauseitprovides and ofinformation aboutthebaseball- it'slocation, velocity so on. If had that could be assessed for orcorrectno content experience accuracy I what 'that it would be unable to how know ness, utterly explain itsreferent. baseball'refers toorhowI managetocatch ifepistn itseemstomethat is going toplaya substantive Similarly, and dialectical ithas to include rolein explaining definitional success, Ifknowledge information abouttheobjects ofthese activities.14 is more then no reason likea fever thanan informational there's more to belief, in a of to the of state the expect being knowledge explain understanding The Good,thanthere is to expect to cause ofthatstate, beingin fever that of state'scause. Trying to get dialectical explainunderstanding an informationless stateto whichnormsof correctness successfrom blood from a don'tevenapplywould seemtobe a case ofdemanding in which is a state stone. On theother thesubject is hand,ifknowledge conscious ofinformation abouttheForms, TheGood,then it's especially thatstateto successful and ulticlearhow we can getfrom definition dialectical defense. mately

14 Thislineofreasoning also bearson Francisco Gonzalez'claimthat propositions howa thing isqualified are'given content andmeaning stating bynonpropositional into what the is.'Ifthe aregiven content then insight thing propositions byepistm, must inmysense. be informational I'mnotcommitepistm presumably Although ifepistm to thepropositional is information and it'sgiving ting myself reading, content to propositions thathave thing it's hardto see what structure, /quality remains of Gonzalez'claimthattheinsight is nonpropositional. See Gonzalez,
170. Dialectic,

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14 TravisButler

I am notassuming is that direct realism Letmebe careful tosaythat I'm seeking to understand defensible. trueor evenultimately Rather, ifitis nonrepresentational, can nevertheless how knowledge, playthe moregenerally. To thisend,I'm relevant rolein Plato'sepistemology as a heuristic, direct realism tocontemporary alongsomething appealing likethefollowing lines: Explanandum Direct Realism Plato Explanans

ofreference nonrepresentational knowledge experience and dialectic definition nonrepresentational knowledge

relation is allegedto Inboth ofthese cases,an interesting explanatory areradieventhough their natures thetwophenomena, holdbetween is thought toexplain a nonrepresentational different: phenomenon cally with nature. a discursive, an epistemic representational phenomenon the relation I'marguing that there wouldonly behopefor explanatory stateswere statesin whichthe to obtainif the nonrepresentational Nonabouttheobjects ofthestates. ofinformation is conscious subject knowla baseball won't be able to of explain experience representational in catching of 'thatbaseball' exhibited it,and edge of the reference or won't be ableto of The Good Justice knowledge nonrepresentational unless those states and dialectical defense definition correct explain about the relevant information of conscious involve objects possession then suchinformation, Butifthey do involve theForms). (thebaseball, at sinceitwillbe possible tothem, won'tbe applicable Max Infallibility and extent oftheinformation ofthequality leastto raisethequestion is to meettheDUC, Max in thosestates. Thus,ifepistm conveyed be must up. given Infallibility I'm urging between theInfallibility therelation To see moreclearly will be useful to consider it and Dialectical Conditions, Understanding informational that a state's claim to a possible being my counter-example involved thethought be arguedthat with Max.Itmight is incompatible informais of in the conscious a which inDescartes' is state subject cogito for is ruledout,ina sensestrong buterror tionaboutan object, enough itmust be true. is tokened, Max.Anytime thethought Max rather than for case suitable What makethis justEl is that might Of oftheknown that secures thetruth actofthinking it'sthevery thing.

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and Infallibility in Plato'sEpistemology 15 Identity

for can'tbe understood as theproposition course Max,theknown thing I'ma thinking that but rather the must that or exists, thinking object thing as a thinking be myself thing. Butwhatever we understand as theobject ofthis specialknowledge, I think itshouldbe clearwhythere's to be a problem from going getting kind ofnonrepresentational to dialectical this knowledge understanding inthis oftheForms. Evenifitallowedthat theknowledge case extends it is whollyunclearhow the withthethinking to my identity thing, that thinker can getfrom thiskindofknowledge to accounts graspthe of to of ultimate dialectical each form, being saynothing defensibility. whatDescartes' To putthepoint somewhat thinker perhaps crudely, truth with is of one about variations for different herself, gets knowledge and she onlygetsitwhileshe is actively modesofthinking, thinking. Thatwellis far tooshallow togetPlato'sphilosopher where he's going: Then other I alsounderstand subsection ofthe that, bythe intelligible, that mean which reason itself the of dialectic. It does by power grasps not consider these as first but as stepping stones hypotheses principles, it totake off to reach the first from, enabling unhypotheticalprinciple ofeverything. this itreverses itself and, Having grasped principle, what hold of follows from comes down to a conclusion it, keeping at all,butonly without useofanything visible offorms themselves, forms andending informs. onfrom toforms, (511b3-c2) moving ofthis it'sclearat least Although manyaspects passageareobscure, inis step-wise, that thekindofthinking is involved reason andthesteps are different. One movesfrom thegraspofone to another, and so on. There isno indication that theobject ofthese states is thethinker himself, muchlessthat theactsofthinking arethetruthmakers. while caseslikethecogito information with someThus, maycombine like Max Infallibility, themeagerinformational resources thing they role of theacts of thinking themselves provideand thetruthmaking suchcasesfrom as modelsfor Platonic prevent serving knowledge. Whattheseconsiderations is that theDUC imposesa show,I think, constraint on ourunderstanding oftheInfallibility Condition. Because in has to be a state which the is conscious of informaknowledge subject about tion theForms, itsinfallibility must be understood very differently from Max.Theinfallibility ofknowledge must be connected bothtothe correctness of theinformation of the possessedand thedefensibility accounts that that information. embody

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16 TravisButler

III Knowledge and Infallibility Iftheargument is sound,then theinfallibility ofthepreceding section in ofknowledge must atleast consist the of the information partly quality in knowledge In short, states. must aboutForms embodied infallibility at leastpartially thecorrectness oftheinformation. The havetodo with will how infallible and true be to explain is knowledge challenge then ifthey belief bothinvolve correct information. is not, I think he has a numberof different kindsof To Plato's credit, it'snecessary availabletoexplain so I don'tthink resources infallibility, content either todrain ofitsinformational (as on Max),orto knowledge beas a unitary exhausted see infallibility by theconnection concept and truth tween (as on MI). knowledge and truth is a signifitheconnection between Ofcourse, knowledge In an important oftheconcept. cantelement methodological passagein inorder that areproper that togiveanswers to theMeno, Socrates states Recallalso theanswers must be true(75d2-7). dialectic (dialektikteron), that thecognitive clarity alongTheLinearesaidtohaveas much powers have a sharein thetruth section as thecontents ofthecorresponding that whenPlatoclaims dialectic Thus, aletheias, (metechei 511e2-4). grasps as different from and defines The Good else,we must everything being and thedialectician understand these as success verbs: grasps correctly In this a is state defines thebeingofeachthing. way,again,knowledge information aboutthebeing inwhich ofcorrect thesubject is conscious this of belief does not The state ofintelligible carry implication. objects. contact tothis ofnonrepresentational defenders As we'veseen, object totruth that whiletheconnection on thegrounds ofinfallibility account ingeneral, itcannot from belief distinguish knowledge maydistinguish with concerned this and Plato is from true belief, especially knowledge interit is possiblefortherepresentationalist HereI think distinction. toestablish ofinfallibility oftheconcept toappealtoother aspects preter belief.15 and true between thedistinction knowledge been made by C.D.C. Reeve. One relevant pointherehas recently oftheir knowers that whenPlatoclaimsthat Reevesuggests givelogoi he means mean he doesn't accounts, argudefining just hypotheses,

I have with me.Although inthis do notoriginate section 15 Many ofthe ideasI present in constructing this see especially on them notdrawn Annas, section, specifically
143-7. 272-93and Irwin,Plato'sEthics, Introduction,

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and Infallibility in Plato'sEpistemology 17 Identity

Ifwe takethe that maketheir truth evident merits 510dl).16 {phaneron, in theMeno(87a-c), ofhypothesis thiswould amount explicit example and knowledge havetobe given totheviewthat notonlywouldvirtue need to show the correct the dialectician would accounts, defining an connection between them then wouldthere bygiving argument. Only be knowledge ofthehypothesis that virtue is knowledge. Truebelief, by ineither does notrequire theaccount orargument sense. contrast, logoi in Butnotice that thiskindofevidentness neednotimply certainty, EL like the sense of When the anything hyper-rationalist philosopher defines virtueand knowledge and makesevidenttheir successfully will notnecessarily their connection involve connection, appreciating all rival views as the connection manifestly contradictory. seeing Seeing canbe consistent with alternatives. coherently entertaining Another resource from theMenois Plato'sclaimthatthedifference and truebeliefis thatthe former betweenknowledge is stableand doesn't because it is tied down with about thecause wander, reasoning If with we connect this the claims that dialectic (98al-4). Republic's point the of each and defines and defends the correct (i) grasps being thing, (ii) account ofTheGood,twofurther of the of aspects infallibility knowledge canbe seentoemerge. itis difficult to determine whatPlatohas in First, although precisely it that Platoseestheinfallibility ofknowledge as deriving mind, is clear from theobjects ofknowledge themselves: partly We've nowdiscovered, itseems, that tothe convenaccording many tions ofthe ofpeople about andthe the others, majority beauty [many beautif are around asintermediates between what isnot and uls] rolling what is... And weagreed that of that kind would have purely anything tobecalled the not the knowable ... What about the ones who opinable, ineachcasestudy the themselves that arealways in the same things Won't wesaythey know anddon't every respect? opine? Necessarily. d7-8, (479d3-5, e7-9) Letmefocus hereon theaspects ofthis chunk ofdoctrine relevant to the themes discussedabove. RecallPlato's claimthatthe cognitions moreclearly as we ascend.Thus,belief has alongThe Linegrasptruth

16 C.D.C. Reeve, 'Plato's Metaphysicsof Morals', Oxford Studiesin Ancient Philosophy 25 (2003) 39-58,at 40-1

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18 TravisButler

intruth, that does.Clearly someshare butnotthesameshare knowledge thisis relatedto the claimin T2 above thatthe dialectician grasps we underwhat it is. Whether the of each thing systematically being orboth, stand thecontrast classas including sensible objects, properties, to suchentities that that makereference it'sclearPlatothinks accounts rather thanthe'truecause' orbeing conditions graspat bestnecessary whatis a inquestion And oftheobject (Phaedo 99a-b). nothing prevents F a from sufficient case of condition for some sensible being necessary for colorcanbe necessary case ofnot-F. condition for someother Bright suit.17 theugliness ofa leisure and sufficient for thebeauty ofa sunset arebeautiful, somethings Becausehaving color is a wayinwhich bright butit colordoesnotmissthetruth theviewofbeauty as bright entirely, with connected no more is certainly and indeedperhaps fallible, closely than with its opposite. beauty in T2 above,in theclaim A secondkindofinfallibility is suggested at refutaall attempts survives that of The Good dialectical knowledge of the in If one's account a battle.18 in a victor the manner of tion, all examisurvive of can first unhypothetical principle everything really ofthisaccount there is a clearsensein whichone's knowledge nation, andinno danger andperhaps that dependson itis infallible everything is paradigmatically ofwandering from one'ssoul.Thiskindofaccount that or in that there is no the sense argument consideration dependable, 'unmoved is in it the it.As Plato canundermine Timaeus, knowledge puts belief whereas eventrue givesin (51e4). bypersuasion', thetwokindsof a connection between there is undoubtedly Finally, To theextent sketched. from and freedom wandering just infallibility account is one's at best that one's account conditions, necessary grasps as These of liable to refutation. tothat extent aspects 'infallibilitydependand thuscanserveto thecoreaspectoftruth, from aredifferent ability' as well. belief but from true notjustfrom belief, knowledge distinguish the view for oneproblem ofviewofMax Infallibility, From thepoint then areboth andbelief ifknowledge I'msketching isthat informational, those willbe able to distinguish thatthesubject no guarantee there's that are those and that are states her informational knowledge among

93. Plato onKnowledge, 17 HereI follow Fine, canbe thought that this Reeveargues ofMorals', 18 On p. 50 of'Plato'sMetaphysics ofas a kindofelenctic proof.

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in Plato'sEpistemology 19 and Infallibility Identity

these is radically intrinsic character belief. Unlesstheir different, merely inside'. seem the same 'from the states may that that whenoneknows This for Plato, p,oneknows worry supposes toPlato, the it is to attribute this view that oneknows While p. plausible all in whichsomething are contexts contexts likethisdoctrine emerges and second-order in whichthe strong is thatboth firstsuggestion of dialectical examination of thefirst-order come knowledge by way and craftsmen to see item.Socratesexaminesthe poets,politicians true. whether their second-order beliefs aboutwhatthey knowareinfact Because their first-order beliefs do notsurvive are shown refutation, they to lackknowledge ofwhatthey knowand don'tknow(Apology, 21-3). IntheCharmides, defends hisexamination ofothers Socrates byreference tohisownself-knowledge:
How couldyoupossibly think that evenifI weretorefute everything I it would be for other reasons than theoneI would yousay, doing any - thefear a thorough ofmyownstatements of givefor investigation I know when I not. do (166c7-d2) unconsciously thinking something

We've alreadyseen thatthedefensibility condition appliesevento ofTheGood. Another with is Socrates' discussion knowledge example theslaveintheMeno. Socrates There states that thedifference explicitly between theslave'strue and theknowledge belief he maycometohave is further If questioning, presumably leadingto maximal defensibility. such questioning takesplace,theslave's knowledge will become'as accurate as anyone's'.Here it maybe important thattheknowledgewordPlatochoosesfor theterminus is 'episfni' (85dl).19 I think, Thissuggests, Platodoesbelieve that that, although knowledge with itknowledge carries ofknowledge, he doesnotdefend this claim by to some internal mark of states such as appealing knowledge nonrepresen-

19 I cannot Gonzalezand Nicholas Smith who independently agreewith arguethat the factthatepistem can come in degreesof accuracy shows thatit mustbe Bothauthors thefact that for one nonpropositional. arguefrom anyproposition, either itoronedoesn't knows tothe that fact cannot come propositional knowledge in degrees. Butsurely this is notthecase withother attitudes. Two propositional soccer fans both willwinthe World fanatic has may hopethat England Cup,butthe a greater abouttheexistence of a degreeof hope thanthecasual fan.Nothing threshold that who meets it standsat theverysameplace.See implies everyone Gonzalez(1998),171,and Nicholas D. Smith, and 'Knowledge by Acquaintance What" inPlato's 18(1979) at285. 281-8, "Knowledge Republic', Dialogue

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20 TravisButler

has to do with or 'clarity and distinctness'. themark Rather, tationality and claimsmustbe established by accounts defensibility. Knowledge between theintelligibles that render evident theconnections arguments and ultimately in question and knowledge) andjustice, virtue (e.g., piety to (1) If itfollows from Plato'scommitment TheGood.So, I don'tthink that also committed to(2) that knows he's S knows that S knows she p, , state IfS knows that knows because the that S knows she knowledge , mark via an internal oftruth.20 as knowledge announces itself Thus,whileit would be open to Plato to explainwhyknowledge tosomekindoftransparofknowledge byreference implies knowledge thatone becomes rather evidence the textual doctrine, suggests ency it as knowledge awareofone'sknowledge against bytesting successfully dialecticians. and alternatives offellow theobjections that thenotion ofinfallibility To reiterate, defensibility incorporates inthesense inthis will involve not certainty, subjective necessarily way is item's toconceive ofthedefended oftheinability Myaccount falsity. which this EL But the to Max and in this than both weaker degree way For be overstated. should not from kind ofdefensibility certainty departs at thatone's accountsmustsurviveall attempts when Plato insists who are made in mind has he refutation, surely by people attempts and Itwon'tdo toseekoutthecobblers dialecticians. themselves skilled If to their and The Good virtue scrutiny. the subject yourviewsabout an account, undermine cannot ofthebestdialecticians bestarguments not fail' is between 'hasn'tfailed thedistance perhaps yet'and 'cannot intheGorgias: outlater Thisidea is borne terribly great.
discusinourprevious earlier at which we arrived Theseconclusions, of ironand sionsare,I'd say,held down and boundby arguments rudeto sayso. So itwouldseemanyhow. evenifit'srather adamant, then than forceful more Andifyouorsomeone youwon'tundothem,

insofar as it is not 'adventitiously is infallible 20 Gersonarguesthatknowledge be must is known that what infers Buthethen tothetruth'. connected immediately andobject between canonly andthis true, subject byidentity happen self-evidently a state can agreethat aboutjustification rabidexternalist (157).Buteventhemost Ifa state is theproduct tothetruth. connected is notadventitiously ofknowledge it won'tbe merely forexample, reliable of a generally adventitiously process, is onlyone of indefinitely Self-evidence to thetruth. connected manyways of fact see Robert ofthis Fordiscussion condition. thenonadventitiousness satisfying 371-91. The Monist ofReliabilism', andBlindspots (1998) Brandom, 'Insights

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and Infallibility in Plato'sEpistemology 21 Identity than whatI'm nowsaying cannot be whosaysanything other anyone well. (508e6-9a4) speaking

ofhisownview Notice that Socrates is willing toinfer from thedefense that itis notpossible rival for view to be wellsaid.21 oion, 509a3) any (ouk an account's his earlier claim that Thisis whatwe shouldexpect given notbeingrefuted is a mark ofitstruth (473b 10-1). While this viewmakesthemark ofknowledge tosomeextent public andintersubjectively it does not makethe standard available, necessarily ofknowledge or otherwise Thisis so, subjective judgment-dependent. becauseknowledge truth and truth is made evident first, requires by but it isn't constituted defensibility by it, and, second,because the standard ofultimate be an objective standard to defensibility mayitself which 'reallife'examinations and defenses standin variousdegrees of closeness. to see knowledge and itsinfallibility in thedialectical Finally, way described above is notnecessarily to embrace thecoherentist idea that theonly ofan account is itsdefensibility warrant-increasing property by reference toother accounts orbeliefs.22 Itmaybe that someaccounts also havea degree ofwarrant truth orevident ofcertainty) becauseof (short their internal character. Forexample, Socrates' definition ofshapeas the limitof a solid presumably derivesits warrant both from relations involvedand from relations of dependence and amongtheconcepts it and between other claims But whatever (Meno, 76a4-7). explanation we sayaboutthepresence offoundationalist inPlato'stheory elements as a whole,I think that thetextual evidence that the strongly suggests of has as much to with do the of infallibilityknowledge dependability

21 Perhaps then what we should ultimate in sayis that defensibility yields infallibility the sense thatthe defended belief cannotbe overridden. No consideration or canjustify oneinbelieving elseon thetopic. Thisleavesopen argument anything thepossibility thatthebelief can be undermined. Socrates was If,forexample, convinced ofmedical that a brain tumor was systematically bya number experts histhinking andreasoning, this leadhimrationally togiveup his distorting might but thiswould of coursesimilarly undermine in any other confidence account, account. HereI havebeenhelped A Priori Casullo, (NewYork: byAlbert Justification Oxford Press 56-62. Thanks toBryan for discussion. 2003), University Belknap 22 As perhaps is suggested in Fine, Plato onKnowledge, 112-6. Fineallowsthat Plato thenonrepresentational, shecastsdoubton the mayhavesomerolefor although ideainfootnote 50 on 114.

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22 TravisButler

contexts as with the implication between knowledgein dialectical and truth. knowledge IV Conclusion: A Role FortheNonrepresentational? theepisteIn myintroduction, I claimed that it'spossible todistinguish kindof nature of the best of whether Plato sees the mological question Plato from the of whether as question knowledge nonrepresentational in at hasreason torecognize cognition anyplace his nonrepresentational a I'd like to To conclude, wayin speculate bitabouta different theory.23 a in role Plato's which theory might play nonrepresentational cognition ofcognition moregenerally. itis that itis noteworthy As a waytobeginthespeculation, although ofa globalTwo-Worlds' nottypically used as thefoundation interpreto describe one kind ofcontact Aristotle also uses themetaphor tation, IX 10,noesis of simples(ta In Metaphysics of thinking aboutessences. contact. The or is described as asuntheta) onlykindof error touching failure of contact. due to in these cases is (agnoia) ignorance possible that involves from Nous-as-contact is distinguished thinking synthesis inthestandard in states that aretruth-evaluable and thusresults way. of account as a complete forward WhileI do notput thefollowing is reaching I think at leastpartofwhatAristotle these vexing passages, between is a distinction in speaking for ofthought-as-contact synthetic of conditions and cognitive that aretruth-evaluable necessary thoughts truthinto Inorder tocombine suchthoughts.24 thoughts unsynthesized with thecomponents. tomakecontact first itisnecessary evaluable ones, is notpossible, tosynthesis, is logically Becausecontact only falsity prior . contact-failure ofjudgment these issuesinAristotle's Itseemstomethat philosophy may shed some lighton Plato's responseto Meno's paradox.As I Meno's paradox, understand partofwhatPlatois askingaboutis an Thisis theissueofthe to at theend oftheTheaetetus. issuehe returns

that it'sworth Gail Finealso suggests 23 In hermostrecent paperon thesetopics, in theMeno', and TrueBelief thesequestions. Oxford 'Knowledge distinguishing
27 (2004) 41-81,at 49. in Ancient Studies Philosophy

inAristotle MindandImagination 24 HereI havebeeninfluenced Wedin, by Michael 131-3. Press1988), CT: YaleUniversity (NewHaven,

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in Plato'sEpistemology 23 and Infallibility Identity

ofan object, oftheconditions notjustfor having knowledge stringency Forif butfor aboutitat all (209a-c). truth-evaluable judgments making them theconditions for are satisfying may judgment verydemanding, knowwhatthere is to render further otiose- one willalready inquiry we can see know.Ifthisis partofwhatPlatois interested in, whyhe itas a serious and also addresses philosophical problem, perhaps why he thought therecollection was on point. story it is possible to offer a repreAs Gail Fine has demonstrated, sentationalist account oftheMenopassagesin whichall ofthe'otheraspectsoftheresponse worldly' dropout.On Fine'sview,Platoonly needsto appeal to true truebeliefs to go on, belief: giveus something butbecausethey're with inferior toknowledge, still leave us somethey in to do. Since the disembodied described the recollecthing cognition it isn't tion storyisn't necessary forthe possessionof truebeliefs, toPlato'sresponse toMeno'sparadox.25 necessary that Critics ofFine'saccount haveargued hertreatment ofthe paradox seesitas a problem aboutinquiry whenthesecondhorn ofthedilemma itas a problem 'Ifyoushouldmeet reveals with aboutdiscovery: how it, willyouknowthat is thething that did this not know?' (80d7-8)26 you Butthisidea sitsuncomfortably withthefact thatSocrates himself refers to it as a problem aboutinquiry The for (80el-5). difficulty us is which about Plato is trying to raise. determining just problem inquiry To lend credence to theidea thatthe discussion in the ofjudgment Theaetetus is relevant I think toMeno'sparadox, it'sworth that noticing a number oftheissuesraisedin thediscussion ofMeno'sparadoxare also raisedat theend oftheTheaetetus: between true (1) thedistinction belief andknowledge, must be added to true (2) theviewthat something belief to getknowledge, and (3) thequestion ofwhatis required to fix on an object for in general, truth-evaluable to thestage judgment prior ofknowledge.27

25 Fine,Platoon Knowledge, 44-65 26 PanagiotisDimas, True Beliefin theMeno', Oxford Studiesin Ancient 14 Philosophy

1-32. Forthe Recollection andExperience idea,seealsoDominic Scott, (1996) discovery Press1995), 30-5. (NewYork: Cambridge University

27 Similarities inthelanguage oftheMeno's discussion ofrecollection and theendof theTheaetetus arepursued inThe (NewYork: byDavidSedley Midwife ofPlatonism Oxford Press 28-30. 20-1, 2004), University

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24 TravisButler

on issue (3) mayserveto illuminate bothMeno'sparadox Focusing andinformation. itself as wellas the broader issuesaboutrepresentation WhatI'm suggesting is that thetwoendsoftheparadoxworktogether infixing on an object for toraisethefollowing issue:howdo we succeed furso muchaboutitthat truth-evaluable without knowing judgment ther is otiose?28 inquiry I haveinmind, let'sconsider the As anexample ofwhat passageabout in thePhaedo. In thatdiscussion, Socrates statesthatboth thevirtues Ifwe andjustice arepurgings ofall things moderation (69b8-c3). bodily ofbodilythings' as a preliminary think of 'a certain kindofpurging and justice, thenit seems thatSocrates accountof bothmoderation with bothvirtues. associates thesameinformation into further inwhich wants toinquire ina scenario Socrates Butthen it'sunclear howhe willbe able ofmoderation orjustice, oneortheother that hisinformatheother, infixing onone,rather than tosucceed given them. between kindofpurging') does notdistinguish tion('a certain not for be a seems to on the one there Thus, hand, problem just having on but forfixing and justice, ofmoderation determinately knowledge not does the information further since either one for possessed inquiry, between them. distinguish them is between todistinguish ifwhatis required On theother hand, it would seem then kind of which to determine are, they purging just to is required likea definition that by genusand differentia something kind of this if has one at all. fixon them for Ofcourse, already inquiry is called for. it'sunclear definition, inquiry whyfurther in theparadoxis notnecessarily thisway ofconstruing Noticethat that idea.Thatis,it'sperfectly withthediscovery possible competition ofinquiry aboutthebeginning to raiseone problem Platois trying don't nature we on an objectwhose how do we succeed in fixing - howcanwe - and oneproblem abouttheendofinquiry understand from themerely tellcasesofgenuine apparent? discovery

andeasy out'trivial turns theinquiry I don't think Dominic 28 So,pace Scott, problem howwe won't topartial tosolve'.Merely necessarily explain knowledge appealing that towhich as opposedtosomeother inthinking ofa given succeed object object, is aboutthe aboutinquiry The question be common. might knowledge partial we want on theobject willallowus tofix that kindofpartial knowledge particular 30. See Scott, for room still tofix onwhile Recollection, progress. leaving

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in Plato'sEpistemology 25 and Infallibility Identity

ofinquiry is thequestion Butifthefirst aboutthebeginning problem for thesakeoftruth-evaluable on an object ofhowwe succeedinfixing belief viewseemsunsatisfactory, since aboutit,then thetrue judgments thekindofcontact or'fixing on' at aboutobjects true beliefs presuppose true beliefs aboutan object seemsmore that we canform issue.Thefact rather thanan acceptable likepartoftheexplanandum explanans. ofcontact is tosuggest then thepoint ofPlato'suse ofnotions Perhaps of forms: there is a nonreprea bipartite of the soul's cognition theory information element sentational contact (CE) and a representational CE and IE coincide, element (IE). Whenthesoul is operating by itself, all orpartofIE Butwhenthesoulis embodied, and there is knowledge. examination and dialectic. and must be recovered is lost, by CE remains true. Thatis,itremains Despitetheloss ofIE, however, withintelligible truethatthe soul has observedand been in contact flesh and blood humans are able to fix Because of this contact, objects. conscious ofinforon and inquire intoobjects, evenwithout possession mation aboutthenatures ofthose objects. makesuse of nonrepresentational it thispicture contact, Although aufond Twodiffers from thetraditional Worlds viewbecauseitrejects theidea that contact is thebestkindofknowledge nonrepresentational in it isn't at all.Thebest offorms. the absence of IE, Indeed, knowledge of kindofknowledge conscious requires possession specialinformation itrequires abouttheForms, The Good. Moreover, including thorough anddefense oftheaccounts that that information.29 examination embody ofPhilosophy Department Iowa State University 402CattHall IA 50011 Ames, U.S.A. tbutler@iastate.edu

29 Forcomments I amgrateful anddiscussion, toBryan Heimir Geirsson and Belknap, an anonymous referee for this journal.

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