Critical Incident

Management of Institutional Risk and Critical Incident Management Name AJS562 Date Professor

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Management of Institutional Risk and Critical Incident Management The Arizona Department of Corrections Morey Unit hostage situation was the longest hostage crisis to ever occur within a prison setting. On January 18, 2004 Prison inmates, Wassenar and Coy enacted an escape plan that resulted in the two inmates taking over a prison tower and holding two prison guards hostage. The two inmates took advantage of lapses in security and failures of correctional staff to stay alert and aware in order to successfully begin an escape attempt. Due to the complacency of the prison staff two dangerous inmates were able to seize a prison tower and begin a fifteen day hostage crisis. Hostage Situation The crisis began when Ricky K. Wassenar and Steven J. Coy put into motion there escape plan. The crisis began in the kitchen when the two dangerous, prison inmates used a premade shank to take over kitchen staff. First Coy enters the kitchen and blocked the entryway where at 3:15am there is only one correctional officer present in the kitchen as well a female, civilian kitchen worker and prisoners assigned to kitchen duty. Once Coy blocked the door Wassenar took the shank and threatened the prison guard. He ordered him to remove his uniform and then handcuffed him to a cage in the tool room. The prison inmates then tied up the female kitchen worker before gathering up the kitchen workers and offering them a chance to escape. Each of the kitchen inmates refused to join the two inmates so they were all locked in a dry storage area. Once the two inmates had taken over the kitchen Wassenar grabbed the guards key and unlocked the yard with a large, metal stirring paddle as a weapon (Crawford, 2004). While Wassenar was looking for an escape route, Coy

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raped the female kitchen worker. Wassenar continued to the guard tower in the yard and pressed the buzzer. In the tower there were prison guards, one female and one male, responsible for watching inmates in the red yard and stopping any escape attempts. When Wassenar pressed the buzzer, the male prison guard let Wassenar in the tower gate thinking he was a fellow prison guard. The male guard, Auch, then remotely opened the lower tower door allowing Wassenar into the actual tower. Auch then met Wassenar at the top tower door and was hit in the face with the stainless steel paddle. The hit to the face immediately broke his nose and incapacitated the guard. The unmade female prison guard was then immediately subdued by Wassenar and cuffed. Once Wassenar forced the guards to show him how to control the guard tower he ordered Auch to the lower part of the tower. While Wassenar is in the tower Coy is still in the kitchen when correctional officer Cornett arrives early for his shift. Coy using his shank to Cornett hostage and placed him in the kitchen office with the female civilian worker and other prison guard. When other kitchen guards arrived they got into a confrontation with Coy who fled into the red yard and was surrounded by officers. Wassenar saved Coy by shooting at the guards and letting him into the tower. Now the two inmates have taken over a tower in a maximum security prison after using a shank and a stirring paddle to thwart the efforts of a total of eight prison guards. The inmates took control of the tower and the two guards while prison guards alerted the appropriate officials and DOC Inmate Management System (IMS) policy went into effect. The hostage situation lasted for fifteen days were prison staff and even the Governor negotiated with the inmates to safely release to the prison guards.

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Risk Assessment After the incident at Morey it is essential to conduct a risk and critical incident assessment of the prison to identify the failures and even the successes to ensure an incident of this magnitude never occurs again. The first problem at Morey was ineffective staff. First there was only one, unarmed, prison guard put in charge of a large group of dangerous inmates. Amongst the inmates there were prisoners serving life sentences and inmates sentenced for violent crimes, such as rape or murder. Not only was Martin left alone with these dangerous inmates the prison staff was also not adequately trained. The ability of two prison inmates armed with a shank and a stirring paddle to take control over five prison guards and thwart the effort of several more to stop the attempted prison escape shows the prison guards at Morey were not properly trained to deal with the dangerous prison inmates. An assessment of Morey revealed situational errors and complacency by prison guards and the administration as well as inadequate staffing, poor equipment, bad prison design, inadequate security measures, and ineffective communication. In order to prevent further escapes all of these security lapses will need to be addressed. Having recognized what went wrong, it is vital that we also acknowledge what went right (). No correctional officer died even with Wassenar firing an AR15 directly at five correctional officers and while the inmates took over the tower in the red yard the rest of the prison remained secure. When the prison staff was alerted of the critical incident they immediately employed the DOC Inmate Management System (IMS) and were able to eventually negotiate the safe release of both of the prison guards (Crawford, 2004). The IMS is sufficient and effective for handling all security situations that surface at the prison but security measures must be reformed.

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Findings and Recommendations The prison staff at Morey failed to properly secure the prison in order to ensure the events of January 18, 2004 had not occurred. In order to prevent other prison inmates from creating a security crisis at the prison the prison staff will need to be totally retrained and a new set of rules and regulations established for the prison. The current security measures being used at the prison are ineffective for ensuring there is no further prison breaks. Once the warden and prison administrators have established more effective security procedure the prison staff needs to be retrained on keeping inmate secured and keeping other officers safe within the prison. Even if the prison staff is properly trained and all possible security measures have been put into place if there is not sufficient prison staff in place the security measures will be ineffective. Instead of just having one prison guard in the kitchen with the maximum security inmates their will need to be a minimum of three officers to ensure no further escape attempts are made and the civilian kitchen staff can be safe. One recommendation is not to hire female civilian workers for a maximum security mens prison. Women are extremely vulnerable in an environment where there are rapists and other violent inmates. Prison overcrowding is another major problem in Arizona prisons. At the Arizona State Prison Complex every unit within the prison is overcrowded making it harder for prison staff to properly secure the inmates. One minimum security unit at the Tucson complex holds 456 prisoners, some in tents and trailers bought 15 years ago to solve a "temporary" capacity problem (Garrett, 2004). In order to ensure inmates in the Morey Unit and other units in the prison are properly secured overcrowding needs to be reduced with the building of more prisons needs to occur to ensure this relief in the prison population will in fact occur.

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The second recommendations for Morey Unit security begins with the kitchen security procedures. Instead of leading prison inmates straight to the kitchen they first need to be searcher before going about their duties. If Coy had been searched the shank would have been found and the hostage crisis would have never occurred. The prison also needs to establish a Special Contraband Squad (SCS) tasked with surprise searches of inmate cells to ensure any contraband can be effectively confiscated. Another recommendation is to change up security measures and make them more random. Prison inmates live in the prison environment and observe the behaviors of the prison guards. Coy and Wassenar were successful because they learned the prison schedule of the prison officers and knew there would be insufficient staff present at the morning to thwart their escape attempt. With more staff present in the kitchen and other areas of the prison the likelihood of another hostage crisis will be reduced. Next the gravel in Red Yard three needs to be changed out for a hard surface. Prisoners can easily hide weapons in the yard under the gravel that can then be used against prison staff. Lastly prison guards in the tower must follow more rigorous security protocols o ensure inmates cannot take over the tower. This should begin with the prison guard verbally identifying themselves while in the tower gate. Until the guard can be confirmed they should not be allowed in the prison. Conclusion The Morey hostage situation was the result of more than one failure in the prison. The staff had become complacent despite the fact they were tasked with securing dangerous, prison inmates. In order to prevent this type of crisis situation from ever occurring again, the

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recommendation from conducting the risk assessment and implementing effective, critical incident management.

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References Crawford, A. (2004). Inmates hold 2 officers at Lewis prison. Retrieved September 14, 2013 from http://www.azcentral.com/specials/special48/articles/0119prison19.html?&wired Garret, M. (2004).Arizona's prison system is overloaded and its staff is overwhelmed. Retrieved September 14, 2013 from http://www.tucsonweekly.com/tucson/in-need-of-correction/Content?oid=1076508