‘Glow YOURSELF, KNOW Youn EXE + ASUNDHED BATTLES, A HUNDHED vicToarzs", sou Tay(8), Physics fitness of the troops. ~- €@) ity of commanders at all levels to ‘the men under their comand. 2 ._ fhe Review vas to be carried out by Lieut General Srigedter PS Susur We ‘niet of te ‘Levter’> 70512/3/C0s5, dated Ae Decenbery 1965 — annemare 1}. 3 In order, however, to assess the above empects, it is Recessary, at first, to exanine the develomesta and events prior to the nostiilties as also the balasce, posture, and ‘streagth of the day st the outbreak of hostilities. with this foundation, it will thea be easy to follow the operations as vell as understand the reasze ai caises for the Various < actions and the turn in evestes LATOT? OF THE RSYIEW 4 The backgroud of developsests and tie poise of the say ure more in the stratecio ophere and, therefcre, the concern of arny Heaiquarters, end, perhaps, that of tie Commands. The ations itself exbrace both the stratesica as well as the entical aspect end hence require exezination dove to Corps Level and eves lover. Tt vould, trerefore, nave been coavectest 2d Logieal to trace the events fros iray “eaiquerters ond thea move dova to Comande for more details, a-d, fizally, Nith field foraations for the battle itself: 5 Review of the functioning of army Healcuarters, Ras not been dealt wit: o” the eivice of the Chief of the Amy Staff. Thus, perforce, the actions and developments at aray Hesiquerters have hai to be traced from docaneats available at Comsend Headquarters. Ir this process, a wacber of Loose ecds goneerning Army Heaiquarters could not be verified and have been Left unanevered. The relationsrip betvee: Defence Ministry and Headquarters and the directions gives by the foraer to the Letter could, thezefore, also sot be exatineds 6 | The major Lendaarks in the developneats o: the INDO-TIBET Border, broaily speaking, are as under:— (a) In October, 1959, the IiD0=TTE:7 Borde: Decame the responsibility of the Ary. iis vas es aremlt of Chinese aggressive action at U1GJJ in NEFA in August, 1959, end at KOGKALA in LADAK: in Ostoborya (>) The tntroduction 6f the "Forverd Policy* — t Novender/Deceuber,. 1961, (s)! Fhe surrounding of GitWaN Post in LabixH - ' “30 Joly, 1962, ond DHOLA Post in WEFA — 8 Septeaber, igsz, ie 1 neae HAR BSR \d) The rat: of IV and the announcenent of (0 iae stiatiee paneer t eee nee (e) The outbreak of hostilities on 20 October, 1962. (2) Cease Fire on 21 Noveuber, 1962. 7, It will be seen thet each of the above events marked | successive stages in the border developments and requires stratogioal reappratssl at each stage. ‘Thus, it vould be convenient to consider the developments within these stages and ot tho sppropriate Levels fron Command dowivards. It 3 | also obvious that the developments in NEFA vere clo corslLated to those in LADAKE, and, thus, any study of HEPA operations must be carried out in’conjuiction with dovelop- ments and operations in tho Western Theatr. Tho Roview, therefore, eabraces both Western snd astern Comands, bit, for stmpltcity, each has been studied soparately.. aotions oa one front that hed repercussions on the otier heVe, hovever, eon corelateds 8 The Layout of the Review is, therefore, broadly as unders- Paty (a) CHAPTER T_— WESTERN comyanp This Chapter deals vith the developments and operations as viewed fron Western Command. (b>) GHAPTSR 11 — BASTERT cota This deals with the developments in UEFA upto the outbreak of hostilities. (ec) GHAPTER TIT ="IV cones. Ths Chapter covers the deteils of operations in NGFA end includes, where applicable, the commend and control exercised at various levels froa amy Heatguartere dovaverdss (4) HAPTER IV — concumstoxs ‘This Chapter brings out the salient factors and actions that led to our reverses and the Lessons derived from them. PaRT IT ‘DETAILED Lessons In this are included the detailed lessons, and covers all the facets, as required in the Terms of Reference. These are largely in the tactical sphere and are meant for more general distribution, ‘Top _suoneralive one. In consequence, the Army was nade responsible z i i f ' a 8 ; i i under Bastern Comand, ooked after by ‘The developments ia NEFA vill be considered Later Only LADAKH will be dealt with in this Chapters The developments in LADAKH fall into three distinct phases and hence this Chapter is dividea into sections to correspond with the phases as under:- (a) Section 1 (b) Section 2 (e) Section 3 (@) Section 4 October, 1959, to Hovesber/ December, 1961, the time of introduction of the "Porvard Policy®. Toveubor/Decenber, 1961, to 20 Dotober, 1962, outbreak of hostilitios. 20 October, 1962, to 21 Novenber, 1962, the of Cease Fire. Conclusion. aR ATE1 The period October, 1959 ~ November/December, 1961 vas mainly devoted to the consolidation by the Army of the territory actually 4n pessestion of our forces in LADAKH, It vas also a period for appraical of the Chinese threat and for planning anf ‘building up of our forees in the LADAKH Sector. 2 ' dn intelligence appreciation was issued by Aray Headquarters in October, 1950, and this vas folloved up by Operational Instruction Wo 26 issu: 1960, It is significant vas Puction to be seued by Arey Headquarters and vad, therefore, currenty and could be considered the basis of our planning to moet the » Chinese aggression in 1962. How far short vere these arrangenents, 4m the light of tho subsequent build up of the Chinese and other of the border, will be 4a more 11 as events unfold themselves. It is thus important that ‘nd arrangements thea undertaken are ctudied in pEanning sone detail. 3 A systematic appraisal vas carried out, and, as vo ho en, an intelligence appreciation vas made,” Based on it and the dinttation imposed due to the terrain and other factors, tasks vere allotted, comensurate vith the forces that could be indueted into LABAK, 4 This process of planning and issue of orders vas findertaken at successive levels. It would take a great deal of time and space to examine the planning and orders at each of these levels. Tims these are being grouped together and the general situation existing in 1959-1960 in LADAKH is being dealt with in detail. - GITUATION IN LADAKH ~ 1959 - 1960 Ghinese threat, 7 5 The Chinese were in the process of building up their Strength and improving commintcations and as sueh it was not expected that they would be in a position to launch a major offensive during 1959-1960. It was estimated, however, that the Chinese could deploy over a regiment plus (equivalent of fa brigade plus of ours) with some tanks against LADAKH, The jmain sectors where operations could be expected were as undert- (a) DEMCHOK - CHUSHUL, with min) ‘attack on CHUSHUL with a reginent ) supported by tanks. (Arrow A) ) (b) Battalion group along GHANGCHEMO ) towards HOF SPRING and SHYOK. ) See (row 8) 3 Sketen F a (e) Battalion group on KARAKORAM route! ‘to LE. (Arrows G, C1 and C2). or (@d Battalion group through KAURIK D and B) SETS ) ? ) ) )Generally, therefore, tt could be said that the Chinese would wert aateetiony ‘their eres to part peaoencteee of” “company telion strength and would h e to launch a bigger offensive during this periods SHS Ee a Bonlovment ant taske = om forces A total bafld up of a brigede group vith two additional “4 and K Militia battalions wae planned by Army Headquarters. bi f Headquarters 114 Infantry Brigede vas established at L2H on 4a Fh Mey Ant) a 7 sas i o8 ipa aap Leas formed a ‘a series of forward posts/picquets. The reusinder of the Brigade Group, however, could not be ‘Andacted into LADAKH owing to shortage of air lift. s ‘The task in general given to the Brigede was to restrict & any FURTHER (capital letters used for emphasis) See ee into Indian territory along the INDO-TIBET Border in le ; Along vith this, the particular task given to the Brigade was to hold the general line MURGO ~ TSOGSTSALU = PHOBRANG CHUSHUL = DEMCHOK and defend LEH. (See Sketch A). The screen established by 7 and 14 J and K Militia Battalions by middle of 1960 generally followed this line. (Refer to relevant ortions of Army Headquarters Operation Instruction No 26 at Kinemre 2, Aray Neadquarters Intelligence Appreciation at Annexure 3, and Western Command Operation Instruction No 26 at dnnemre 4). © Army Eeadquarters also laid down that the status quo in the disputed areas should bo maintained and patrolling was to de cartied out to ensure that no further ingress vas made. (innemares 5 and 6). The Chinese Claim, as then known, was |) the 1054 line (Seo Sketch B)» It vill be seen that, except | perhaps for DENCHOX, there was no difference between the line || Setmatiy neta by us’and the Chinese Clain, The Chinese from |] PHOBRANG Northwards actually held positions well BAST of thetr claims. The exact positions were not known, but it could be taken tobe DEHRA Li, XONGKA LA, KHURWAK Fort, and. SPANQGUR, )) Gketoh A, Line ¥).” Thus thore vas a vide gap between the to || torces and a great deal of territory claimed by the Chinese | was not then occupied by either sides Unequal race 10 _Im the meantime, in 1960, the Chinose hed ‘grafually tonsolidated and strengthened their positions. & reappraisal was, therefore, made through a var gare run in Western Comaand In October, 1960. This brought ‘Sut that @ aintmun o davis! Fequired to mest the Chinese eee is toot, Recommendations emerging frou this war game were forwarded to ‘Aray Headquarters by Western Command, and, after sone corresponionce between the tvo Headquarters, a firm deaand of a division with additional aéninistrative troops was Subsitted by Western Command in Septouber, 1961. Wo decision on thie vas given ty Arny Headquarters. (Relevant extracts from Western Command Exeretse 'SHREL' Annenire 7, Western Comman’ letter Ho 2019/16/4/38(Ops), dated 29 Septenber, 1061, Annemire 8)- 11 Arwy Headquarters, by October, 1960, issued a % consolidated Intelligence Review on CHINA’and TISET, bringing ESI PEAK are ‘Top sgcRET