Intelligence and National Security Vol. 26, Nos.

23, 355376, AprilJune 2011

Interdoc and West European Psychological Warfare: The American Connection

GILES SCOTT-SMITH

ABSTRACT Interdoc, or the International Documentation and Information Center, was established in The Hague in early 1963 in order to coordinate a transnational network of institutes active in the eld of analysing trends in communist ideology and societies. The product of deliberations between intelligence agencies and the private sector in Western Europe during the late 1950s, Interdoc reected a need to develop and project a European stance on Cold War issues separate from an all-dominant US inuence. Yet the Americans were present from the beginning, and their involvement gradually increased over time. This article covers the details of this involvement and uses it to comment on how Interdoc represents an interesting case of inter-service cooperation in anti-communist activities in the West.

Introduction While the study of intelligence and security services is obviously hampered by national security considerations, the study of cooperation between intelligence services is even more problematic. The extent to which and the manner in which services cooperate is often a closely guarded secret, not least due to concerns (and jealousies) over the control of information and territory, how far such cooperation can occur between equals, and whether a common cause can actually exist enough to justify full compliance. Recent research has indicated that tensions existed between even the closest of allies.1 Power differences and lack of trust played an important role. On their respective sides of the Iron Curtain, the CIA and the KGB were the senior partners in intra-bloc security relations, and the covert Cold War is largely seen as a running contest between these two.2 As one study has put it, in the Cold War period, the overarching nature of US power within Western
For instance see Richard Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence (London: John Murray 2001). 2 See for instance Edward Jay Epstein, Deception: The Invisible War between the CIA and the KGB (New York: Simon & Schuster 1989); David E. Murphy, Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War (New Haven: Yale University Press 1997); Milt Beardon and James
ISSN 0268-4527 Print/ISSN 1743-9019 Online/11/230355-22 2011 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2011.559324
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Europe ensured that the strategic values of Washington held sway, and the emergence of a specically European strategic culture was further constrained.3 This essay covers an organization which does not easily t this dominant model of Cold War (intelligence) historiography, namely Interdoc or the International Documentation and Information Center. Established in February 1963 in The Hague, Interdoc originated out of close collaboration between the French, West German, and Dutch security services. Between 1963 and 1971 it was predominantly a DutchGerman operation with signicant contacts in Britain, Belgium, Italy, Switzerland, and the United States. Following the withdrawal of German support in 1971 due to the consequences of Ostpolitik, Interdoc continued as a kind of holding operation for a variety of projects run mainly in the Netherlands and across Europe, before ofcially folding in 1986. While some aspects of Interdocs operations have come to light, its full extent is still to be recorded.4 What will be covered here is the level of American involvement in this story. The fundamental cause of Interdocs existence was the challenge to Western interests posed by the Soviet strategy of peaceful coexistence following Stalins death in 1953. It was understood in certain circles that it no longer served any purpose to simply demonize the Soviet Union or communism in general in a world where the power balance was changing rapidly due to decolonization. The gradual normalization of EastWest relations, from the spirit of Geneva onwards, highlighted that the continuing appeal of communist ideology, particularly among youth and intellectuals, needed to be understood. Deliberations on these issues in Western Europe eventually led to the formation of Interdoc. The original intention was that it would function as an international clearing-house for information and advice on the theory and practice of communism both as attributed and unattributed material through a network of associated national institutes and contacts around Europe, North America and,
Risen, The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIAs Final Showdown with the KGB (New York: Random House 2003). 3 Wyn Rees and Richard J. Aldrich, European and US Approaches to Counterterrorism: Two Contrasting Cultures?, in R. Tiersky and E. Jones (eds.) Europe Today: A Twenty-First Century Introduction (Lanham, MA: Rowman & Littleeld 2007) pp.44142. 4 This essay is part of a book project that will examine the activities and the importance of this organization in the Cold War. See Paul Koedijk, Van Vrede en Vrijheid tot Volk en Verdediging: Veranderingen in Anti-Communistische Psychologische Oorlogvoering in Nederland, 19501965, in B. Schoenmaker and J.A.M.M. Janssen (eds.) In De Schaduw Van De Muur: Maatschappij en Krijgsmacht rond 1960 (The Hague: Sdu 1997); Giles ScottSmith, Interdoc: Dutch-German Cooperation in Psychological Warfare, in B.de Graaff, B.de Jong and W. Platje (eds.) Battleground Western Europe: Intelligence Operations in the Netherlands and Germany in the Twentieth Century (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis 2007); Giles Scott-Smith, Confronting Peaceful Coexistence: Psychological Warfare and the Role of Interdoc 19631972, Cold War History 7/1 (2007) pp.1943; David Teacher, Rogue Agents: Le Cercle Pinay Complex 19511991 (2008), pp.1116, 5http://www.isgp.eu/organisations/ Rogue_Agents_the_Cercle_Pinay_complex_1951_1991.pdf4 (accessed 20 October 2009).

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increasingly during the 1960s, through the Third World. While it also possessed a special operations function (mainly in relation to the major international youth festivals sponsored by Soviet-backed fronts), Interdoc was primarily about counter-acting the ideological threat posed by Soviet and Chinese communism by ensuring that Western societies could (literally) withstand its siren call. What is intriguing about Interdoc is the extent to which it was a European operation. There is no doubt that the early discussions (or colloques as they were termed by the French) were driven by a desire for Franco-German rapprochement following the Federal Republics (FRGs) entry into NATO in 1955, coupled with a French urge for European solutions to European problems following Suez in 1956. However, as recent research has indicated, the Franco-German relation was complicated severely by the Algerian war and the determination of the French secret service to eliminate the supply of the Algerian nationalists by German businesses.5 While the French understood by 1959 that their hard-line stance was causing their own isolation, it was only the settlement of the Algerian issue in 1962 that opened the door to substantial cooperation something which, as outlined below, never came. The Dutch were invited to join the discussions in 1958 due to the international repute of security service head Louis Einthoven. Although the colloques expanded to involve the Italians, Belgians, and British, it was ultimately the FrenchGermanDutch core that proceeded with the aim to establish the permanent institute known as Interdoc. In the ensuing discussions on the theory and practice of Interdoc, a document from October 1959 from General Hermann Foertsch (at the time the Deputy Chief of Staff for NATO Forces Europe) includes a signicant aside.6 Referring to the necessity of obtaining funding, the document remarks that ideally this could be arranged through the authority of one or more major promotors (a personality of the Catholic Church, a prominent Jewish personality, not an American).7 Even as a passing comment, this is revealing in that it indicates the extent to which Interdoc was intended to move away from a US-centric outlook on Cold War ideology. Of course, US
5 See Mathilde von Bu low, The Telefunken Affair and the Internationalisation of the Algerian War, 195759, Journal of Strategic Studies 28/4 (2005) pp.70329; Mathilde von Bu low, Myth or Reality? The Red Hand and French Covert Action in Federal Germany during the Algerian War, 195661, Intelligence and National Security 22/6 (2007) pp.787820. 6 Foertsch, chief of staff of the German army in the Balkans in 1941, was part of the wider circle of former General Staff ofcers around BND chief Reinhard Gehlen and a key player in the moves to remilitarize West Germany within NATO. See James Critcheld, Partners at the Creation: The Men behind Postwar Germanys Defense and Intelligence Establishments (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press 2003), p.100. 7 die Autorita t eines oder mehrer grober Fo rderer (Perso nlichkeit der kath. Kirche, prominente ju dische Perso nlichkeit, kein Amerikaner), Gedanken zur Errichtung einer Zentrale . . ., October 1959, in Hoofdlijnen van een International Instituut ter Bestrijding van de Psychologische Oorlogvoering van het Communisme. This Interdoc planning document was made available to the author from C.C. van den Heuvels private archive.

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involvement in the establishment of the German Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) was critical.8 But this does not mean that it controlled its entire outlook intelligence and security services are after all operating in the national interest. In this sense BND interest in Interdoc exactly represented a move towards establishing its own perspective on the division of Germany in particular and the Cold War ideological contest in general. In relation to this, the location of The Hague for Interdoc was important. It made use of both the networking and informal bridge-building skills of the Dutch (think of Bilderberg), and it recognized the value of the Netherlands as a more neutral site than any of the larger powers. But it also, due to the close relations between the Dutch and American security services, seemed to open up the possibility for greater American inuence in the organization. Relations between the CIA and the Dutch Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst (BVD) were extraordinarily close. As ex-BVD ofcer Fritz Hoekstra has recorded, in the 1950s the Americans started to strengthen their ties with the Dutch services by providing aid: They simply purchased a more or less masterservant relationship with a substantial amount of dollars.9 CIA technical and nancial support provided up to 10% of the total BVD budget during the 1950s, BVD personnel took part in CIA training programmes, and the Dutch willingly supplied intelligence to the Americans without there being a quid pro quo arrangement (or, for that matter, a formal governmental authorization for such an exchange).10 It is certainly true that the Dutch continually tried to bring the Americans into the Interdoc circle, but with mixed results. Interdoc suffered from the loss of two major patrons within a decade. The French brought their interest and input in action psychologique to the discussions, but their ofcial role as a contributing founder member ended just as Interdoc came into existence in 1963. Partly this was due to de Gaulles wish for a real de tente and rapprochement with Moscow, a goal which obviously problematized direct involvement in an international coalition developing anti-communist psychological warfare. But the French withdrawal was more immediately part of the fall-out from Algerian independence, since de Gaulle rightly did not trust elements in the military and intelligence apparatus who opposed his decision, and he sought to reorganize and re-afrm his control over ces affaires de basse police as a result.11 Already in January 1962 Dutch intelligence chief Louis Einthoven learnt from his BND partners that French cooperation could no longer be
See Mary Ellen Rees, General Reinhard Gehlen: The CIA Connection (Fairfax: George Mason University Press 1990); Critcheld, Partners at the Creation. 9 Fritz Hoekstra, The Dutch BVD and Transatlantic Co-operation during the Cold War Era: Some Experiences, Journal of Intelligence History 3/1 (2003) p.48. 10 CIA funding for the BVD was ofcially terminated in 1967. See Bob de Graaff and Cees Wiebes, Intelligence and the Cold War behind the Dykes: The Relationship between the American and Dutch Intelligence Communities 19461994, in R. Jeffreys-Jones and C. Andrew (eds.) Eternal Vigilance: 50 years of the CIA (London: Frank Cass 1997) pp.4445. 11 Richard Deacon, The French Secret Service (London: Grafton 1990) p.190.
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guaranteed, and that France could only symbolically join in with Interdoc.12 In early 1963 de Gaulle closed down the French militarys psychological warfare section known as the Cinquie ` me Bureaux, effectively excluding its leader, Antoine Bonnemaison, from further involvement.13 Cooperation would continue, but it was to be based purely on personal contacts and conned to liaison and some coordination of effort in the information eld.14 This situation mistrust between elected ofcials and the secret intelligence service undermining the Interdoc project played out in Germany as well. By the early 1960s the German impulse for supporting the formation of Interdoc came from a determination to turn increasing contacts with the East from a threat to a psychological advantage. Eventual recognition of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) would be the bitterest of pills, but it could be swallowed if it was to take place within a broad strategy to loosen the hold of communist doctrine in Soviet-bloc societies.15 In this respect, during the early 1960s the otherwise estranged partners the Sozial-Democratisch Partei Deutschland (SPD, then in opposition) and the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) were on the same line, seeing Ostpolitik as a means not to stabilize European divisions but to transform the East. The formation of Interdoc in February 1963 symbolically coincided with signicant speeches by SPD notables Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr in July that same year on the need to increase FRGGDR contacts and recognize the other sides interests.16 Therefore, when the SPD entered the governing grand coalition in 1967, there were high hopes within the BND that this would lead to a major role for Interdoc, and as a result the latter organization established an international Advisory Council for greater public respectability. But the arrival of Willy Brandt as Chancellor in 1969 instead spelled the end of such hopes. SPD suspicion of BND activities forced the sudden cancellation of Munichs support in late 1970. As with the French, private links would be maintained, but from 1971 the Germans were effectively out of the picture.
Reis Amsterdam-Munchen-Zurich-Bern-Geneve-Amsterdam, 2226 januari, L. Einthoven, n.d. [1962], File: Reisverslagen, Zwitserland, archive of CC van den Heuvel, National Archives, The Hague [hereafter CC]. 13 On the formation of the Cinquie ` me Bureaux in 1957 and their role in the Algerian war see Paul and Marie-Catherine Villatoux, La Re publique et son arme e face au pe ril subversif: Guerre et action psychologiques 19451960 (Paris: Les Indes Savantes 2005) pp.45992. 14 Interdoc, January 1963, File: Interdoc UK Algemeen Map 1 (1962, 1963), 196465, CC. Charles Howard (Dick) Ellis, a close colleague of Interdoc Director Cees van den Heuvel during the 1960s, reported in 1966: Incidentally I met Bonnemaison at lunch with [Brian] Crozier. He asked after Interdoc and said he regretted very much not being able to attend meetings. Ellis to van den Heuvel, 25 February 1966, File: UK Ellis 1966, CC. 15 See on this point Oliver Bange, An Intricate Web: Ostpolitiek, the European Security System and German Unication, in O. Bange and G. Niedhart (eds.) Helsinki 1975 and the Transformation of Europe (New York: Berghahn Books 2008). 16 Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Detente (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 2003) p.217.
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But what of the American connection? What was the American stake in Interdoc? US Inuence in the Formation of Interdoc In terms of thinking on psychological warfare, the American inuence on the European designs for Interdoc is palpable. Several aspects of this inuence will be given here. The rst concerns Project Troy, established at MIT in 1950 to examine ways to overcome Soviet radio jamming but which developed into a fullscale study of political warfare and a carefully planned series of fundamental steps to erode the [sic] Russian power.17 The ensuing report in February 1951 emphasized that a greater effort had to be made to take into account the needs and wishes of the audiences aimed at. The United States could not be packaged as a universally-acceptable message that would be understood similarly by all recipients. The report recommended that we should avoid the position, expressed or implied, that communism is bad, or any implication of contempt for communism . . . There should be no appearance of an all out overt attack upon the intellectual foundations of Soviet Society.18 The way forward in psychological operations, in other words, was exactly to respect the views of the other side and treat them seriously, not denigrate them. The second concerns Militant Liberty, the plan of US Colonel and Joint Chiefs of Staff advisor John Broger to train freedom cadres to proselytize the values of the democratic, capitalist, self-reliant, god-fearing way of life around the world.19 Using a straight-forward logic, Broger argued that since Communism is a dynamic ideology it can only be defeated by a stronger dynamic ideology.20 Signicantly, neither Troy nor Militant Liberty secured much of an impact on the practice of US psychological warfare, although Broger did proceed with various follow-through projects from 1956 onwards. Yet their inuence on the Interdoc circle is not to be denied. Crucially, however, the difference is that while the American positions were dened by an outright fear of communism, the Europeans were searching for ways to implement these ideas from a position of condence. Following on from this, the third aspect concerns the need for a positive message with which to overcome the appeal of leftist propaganda. Simply displaying the merits of the free world and opposing Soviet lies with the
17

Project TROY report, 1 February 1951, quoted in Scott Lucas, Freedoms War: The American Crusade against the Soviet Union (New York: New York University Press 1999) p.100. 18 Project TROY report, quoted in Allan A. Needell, Truth is Our Weapon: Project TROY, Political Warfare, and Government-Academic Relations in the National Security State, Diplomatic History 17/3 (1993) p.411. 19 Ken Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhowers Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas 2006) p.314. 20 Ibid., p.321.

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truth was not enough, since it did not engage with the roots of the threat. But this was not as simple as it seemed. In the wake of Hungary in 1956 C.D. Jackson, Eisenhowers special advisor on psychological warfare, bemoaned the fact that it was apparently so difcult for the West to project a positive rather than a negative approach to the peoples of the Soviet bloc, despite the realities of communist rule.21 Interdocs early moves revolved largely around this point. In 1964 its rst publication, Tasks for the Free World Today, made this explicit: Negative anti-communism tends to picture things in connection to communism in terms of black and white. It only wants to criticize communism, which is often done in a purely negative and emotional manner. Positive anti-communism wants to study communism as objectively as possible, in order to base its criticism on scientic research. It maintains an open mind regarding the possibility of favourable changes in communism and in EastWest relations.22 The crucial elements here are the scientic methodology as opposed to emotional response and the positive outlook as regards possibilities for socio-political change at both domestic and international levels. Interdoc sought to move with ahead of even the times, away from EastWest relations as a contest between monolithic blocs, away from the attempts in the late 1940s and early 1950s to stoke insurgency in the East, instead searching for more psychological and sociological channels through which to engage and alter mindsets and belief systems.23 The fourth aspect concerns the issue of brainwashing. CIA interest in mind control had begun seriously in 1949 following the Cardinal Mindszenty show-trial in Hungary, leading to large budgets for a rolling research programme known successively as Bluebird (1950), Artichoke (1952), and MKUltra (1953), a process stimulated further by the scare during the Korean war of US prisoners of war (POWs) undergoing Chinese brainwashing techniques and renouncing their homeland as a result (a scare partly fuelled by CIA propagandist-journalist Edward Hunter, who gave us the term in his expose of this phenomenon in 1950).24 The possibilities offered by the
21

Jackson to National Security Advisor Robert Cutler, 26 February 1957, quoted in Lucas, Freedoms War, p.266. 22 Notes on Terminology, Tasks for the Free World Today (The Hague: Interdoc 1964) p.9. 23 These gradations of anti-communism would be present throughout the existence of Interdoc. Thus in 1965 van den Heuvel wrote of a lm project of the British anti-communist group Common Cause as exactly the old fashioned negative approach to communism which we want to change for a more positive anti-communism. Van den Heuvel to Ellis, 6 January 1965, File: UK, Ellis 1965, CC. 24 See Edward Hunter, Brainwashing: The Story of Men Who Deed It (New York: Pyramid 1956).

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programming and controlling of particular individuals, using everything from sensory deprivation to experimental drug concoctions, was taken to a new level with the founding of the Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology by Cornell University Medical College professor Harold Wolff and his colleague Lawrence Hinkle in 1955.25 Assembled and presented as a fully legitimate research centre, this CIA treated human ecology as the study of ways to control the interaction between humans and their immediate environment, thereby manipulating behaviour. In early 1959 Cees van den Heuvel, the BVDs head of training, led a study group of four other Dutchmen to the United States to learn at rst hand American approaches to psychological defense against Soviet inuence, and the Society, contacted by van den Heuvels chief Louis Entihoven via CIA link-man John Gittinger, provided the contacts.26 Special attention was given to the vulnerabilities of Western working classes, intellectuals, youth, and the military to the Soviet cultural offensive under peaceful coexistence,27 with the goal being the immunizing of our people against this inuence which is often very rened beginning with the removal of ignorance.28 Included in the itinerary was a special conference on brainwashing held at the Societys ofce on Connecticut Avenue in Washington DC, involving various scientists connected with US Air Force research programmes on POWs. The report made clear that attention for this subject was due to the fact that brainwashing in its narrow sense (as applied by Chinese and Russian communists to prisoners) is assumed to be related in some way or other to brainwashing in its wider sense (such as the political indoctrination of the Chinese people) and with brainwashing in its widest sense (such as the communist propaganda to the noncommunist world).29 The Wests political environment, from this perspective, was being inuenced by communism was an object of active interest and it was necessary to reverse this trend by studying and applying the communist
25

John Marks, The Search for the Manchurian Candidate: The CIA and Mind Control (New York: W.W. Norton 1979) p.159. The Society became the Human Ecology Fund in 1961, and was eventually folded in 1965. 26 Contact between the Society and the Netherlands was already in progress in 1958, when a grant of $15,000 was paid to Nijmegen University for a study of Hungarian refugees as part of a wider research programme on what led people to defect. See Marks, The Search for the Manchurian Candidate, p.164. 27 Possibilities of Psychological Defense against Soviet Inuence (report of the study group visit to the United States), April 1959, p.7. Authors copy from van den Heuvels private archive. 28 Van den Heuvel to Einthoven, 8 October 1958, Stichting voor Onderzoek van Ecologische Vraagstukken (SOEV) File 1, CC. 29 Possibilities of Psychological Defense against Soviet Inuence, p.13.

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methods in reverse.30 Brainwashing had potential if it could offer blueprints for the appliance of inuence on a societal basis. The key was to link the micro and macro levels of analysis to study the forces used to maintain the cohesion of communist societies from the perspective of the individual in a controlled environment. Thus the report promoted studying brainwashing techniques to enable approaching the macro situation of communism in world politics from a micro investigation involving psychology and psychiatry, both being cutting-edge elds in American positivist social science during the 1950s and early 1960s.31 The group returned to the Netherlands convinced of the need to establish an institute for this purpose and for conducting political education on Western values and the communist threat via strategic channels: the media, trade unions, universities, churches, the armed forces. This Dutch initiative the Stichting voor Onderzoek van Ecologische Vraagstukken (Foundation for the Investigation of Problems of Ecology), founded in April 1960 and run initially from van den Heuvels front room in The Hague became the national base for the formation of the international Interdoc network three years later. Contacts were maintained between the Societys Executive Secretary James Monroe and the Dutch. Monroe himself visited the Netherlands in October 1959 and returned to the United States with plans for cooperation with several institutes in Scandinavia and elsewhere. He was also active in soliciting support in various business and military circles for the Dutch initiative, it proved difcult. In November Monroe reported that the National War Colleges seminar on national strategy (which was closely linked to the Foreign Policy Institute at the University of Pennsylvania) had established an association, which, he hoped, would provide a ready-made US Committee and a continuing source of nancial support.32 Van den Heuvel responded by referring to the scattered nature of European activities in psychological warfare and the need for coordination of all those forces. Contacts were being developed with the French, Germans, Italians, and British, but if American and European forces join in such a project, much could be achieved.33 Van den Heuvel reiterated his belief in the possibilities for a joint USEuropean operation in early 1960, stating that eventually there would be insistence on the invitation of an American observer for a general conference.34 But things did not work out so smoothly thereafter. US interest in the Interdoc project required specic details of its motivation, purpose, and activities, while the delicate business of establishing this European network, involving the coordination of already-existing national institutes (and consequently the overcoming of some spheres of interest and
30

Annual Report of the Foundation for the Investigation of Problems of Ecology, Jaarverslag SOEV: 1960, pp.67. 31 Possibilities of Psychological Defense against Soviet Inuence, p.60. 32 Monroe to van den Heuvel, 10 November 1959, SOEV File 1, CC. 33 Van den Heuvel to Monroe, 3 December 1959, SOEV File 1, CC. 34 Van den Heuvel to Monroe, 30 May 1960, SOEV File 1, CC.

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suspicion), could only move along gradually.35 Contact faded due to the inability to bridge this gap, and was more or less ended with the departure of Monroe from the renamed Human Ecology Society in January 1962.36 The NSIC: The US Link? Despite the auspicious beginnings in transatlantic contacts, it is noticeable that little came of it. US support for European initiatives was also absent within NATO. Before committing to Interdoc, during 196061 the Germans pushed for a psychological warfare apparatus within NATO to coordinate Western activities and prevent the Soviet Union beneting from divisions in the alliance surrounding the Berlin crisis. The Americans, along with the British, refused to back the proposal, and as a result the Interdoc plan was moved wholly into the civilian sphere.37 But even there the hoped-for collaboration did not emerge. In a letter from Einthoven to Prince Bernhard from early 1962, the now retired head of the BVD stated that he had undertaken the task of establishing Interdoc due to requests from French, German and American friends (Allen Dulles) to make use of his remarkable array of contacts in both NATO and the neutrals (Sweden and Switzerland).38 But this did not translate into direct support from either the CIA or from the private sector. A primary reason for this was two major scandals that rocked the BND during 19611962. Heinz Felfe, a former SS ofcer and member of Walter Schellenbergs foreign intelligence section of the RHSA (Nazi Reich Security Central Ofce) was recruited by the KGB in 1951. Soon afterwards he joined the counter-intelligence wing of Reinhard Gehlens BND, and over the next ten years he manoeuvred himself into a place of utmost condence next to Gehlen. Despite growing suspicions over the next decade, it took until the revelations of Polish intelligence defector Michal Goleniewski in 1961 to nally convince the CIA that Felfe was a traitor and, in turn, convince Gehlen. Felfes arrest and interrogation during 1962 then coincided with a serious confrontation between the BND and the German Ministry of Defence, which ended up with Gehlen being summoned to Adenauers Chancellery in November for his alleged involvement in leaking information to Der Spiegel to undermine Franz Joseph Strauss.39 The combination of these two factors ensured that the BND looked like badly damaged goods, and it is not surprising there was hesitation on the part of the CIA at that time to undertake a new cooperative venture.
35 36

Van den Heuvel to Monroe, 7 January 1961, SOEV File 1, CC. Monroe to van den Heuvel, 18 January 1962, SOEV File 1, CC. 37 See Giles Scott-Smith, Not a NATO Responsibility? Psychological Warfare, the Berlin Crisis, and the Formation of Interdoc, in A. Wenger, A. Locher and C. Nuenlist (eds.) Transforming NATO in the Cold War: Challenges beyond Deterrence in the 1960s (London: Routledge 2007) pp.3149. 38 Einthoven to Bernhard, 15 January 1962, NL File 55 Bernhard, CC. 39 See Ellen Reese, pp.14367.

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Meanwhile, Einthoven persisted in his search for US partners. He approached both the Ford and Carnegie Foundations the latter thanks to Bernhards contact with J. Johnson, both Carnegie representative and honorary secretary of the American wing of Bilderberg but was refused nancial support on the basis that we are not neutral enough. An earlier attempt by Einthoven to gain $10,000 from the Free Europe Committee probably connected to a larger proposal on covert operations in Europe was also turned down.40 In January 1963 Einthoven discussed with Dulles a memo with the title The Dialogue between West and East which called for the necessity of conducting increasing relations with the Soviet bloc from a position of psychological strength. This required the propagation of Western values among the population in general to enable them to understand the threat, and the training of cadres for the purpose of taking the ideological struggle to the East. Special attention was to be given to youth education due to the susceptibility of students to the blandishments of communist peaceful existence propaganda. Einthoven explained that while Stichting voor Onderzoek van Ecologische Vraagstukken (SOEV) was already playing this role, it did not have the necessary funds to expand its operations as hoped. He duly asked Dulles for an annual contribution of 350,000 guilders, with a start-up amount of 150,000 to get things moving. Yet the reaction was negative: he eventually let me know that there was no money available for these goals.41 Einthoven further reported to Bernhard that via Allen Dulles I tried to gain an entrance to the smaller funds, but was told that Europe must now pod its own peas [zijn eigen boontjes maar moest doppen].42 Structural funding from the United States therefore seemed to be ruled out. If there was not to be an immediate source of funding from across the Atlantic, this did not prevent continuing efforts to bring the Americans in. The important point here, however, is that this effort became a purely Dutch exercise. The French had never been interested in American input, and the Germans were equally unenthusiastic. It was the Dutch all along who tried to turn Interdoc into a transatlantic affair, probably due to ideological reasons (the ingrained Atlanticism of the Dutch, which partly stemmed from the experience of World War II) and practical reasons (the desire for a combined Western effort, and the hope for US funding to expand activities). For the French and the Germans it was precisely the opposite: American thinking on the Cold War and relations with the East was going nowhere and was preventing Europe from nding solutions that could overcome its own division. Nevertheless, the DutchGerman relationship in Interdoc during the 1960s does not seem to have been undermined by the efforts from The Hague to build bridges across the Atlantic. The focus soon lay on the National Strategy Information Center (NSIC), founded in 1962 and an outgrowth of the national strategy seminar
40

Van den Heuvel to Monroe, 18 January 1961, and memo concerning Eugene Metz of the Free Europe Committee, n.d. [January 1961], SOEV File 1, CC. 41 Einthoven to Bernhard, 19 August 1963, NL File 55 Bernhard, CC. 42 Einthoven to Bernhard, 22 July 1963, ibid.

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mentioned by Monroe in collaboration with several neoconservative institutions such as the Institute for American Strategy and the American Strategy Council, the latter stemming originally from informal contacts between the likes of Henry Luce, Clair Booth Luce, and Jay Lovestone. NSIC was led by Frank Barnett, who was previously the director of research with the Smith Richardson Foundation, and the Centers early directors and advisors included Joseph Coors of the brewing conglomerate, Frank Shakespeare (later of USIA and the Heritage Foundation), and William J. Casey. From the early 1970s the NSIC began to receive large-scale funding from Richard Scaifes various philanthropic outlets, and it worked closely with the Committee on the Present Danger as part of the right-wing antiDe tente movement that was active in the United States during that decade. NSIC is now led by Roy Godson, emeritus professor of government at Georgetown University and a well-known link-man in the Iran-Contra apparatus, whose contacts with the Center (and with a whole host of other similar institutions on the political right) go back to the late 1960s.43 In short, Interdocs contacts in the USA were rmly planted in the rightwing think-tank milieu, and here lay the central problem. The basis for DutchGerman thinking on relations with the East, as developed within Interdoc circles, was strongly related to the transformative power of an enlightened Ostpolitik. This required once the necessary preparations had been made actively pursuing increased contacts with the East at all levels and in all elds, in order, literally, to spread Western values and weaken communist rule. For the conservative right, however (and this did not just apply to the Americans, of course), such contacts were anathema and betrayed the necessity to contain the communist world by rejecting it wholesale. Dutch entrepreneurship in looking to the Americans was therefore potentially divisive for the Interdoc operation itself. In 1961 Barnett explained his position in Military Review: Political warfare, in short, is warfare not public relations . . . The aim of political warfare is not to promote mutual understanding between different points of view; it is to discredit, displace, and neutralize an opponent, to destroy a competing ideology, and to reduce the adherents to political impotence.44 Nevertheless, the approach Barnet laid out in this article did connect with the deliberations going on in Western Europe on how best to inform the public and make them aware of the continuing threat from the East. Barnett spoke of the Institute for American Strategy as a kind of traveling civilian war college, holding public and professional seminars around the country to promote the continuing study of the Cold War confrontation. There are connections here with similar ideas in Europe particularly in Germany on the need to
43

On NSIC see the information on RightWeb, run by Political Research Associates, 5http:// rightweb.irc-online.org/gw/2806.html4 (accessed 12 February 2009). 44 Frank R. Barnett, A Proposal for Political Warfare, Military Review (March 1961), p.3.

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encourage a responsible citizenry as part of the process of maintaining a democratic society. Interdoc would make use of the network of Akademies fu r politische Bildung, and particularly the Ostkolleg in Ko ln, for the purpose of training students, journalists, academics, and members of the military in the ner points of the ideological contest. But Barnetts more radical neoconservative perspective did jar with the views expressed in Europe. The link with Barnett continued through the 1960s. In MayJune 1966 van den Heuvel made a three-week trip to North America, stopping off in Montreal, New York, and Washington DC. Contacts were established for him via former MI6 agent C.H. (Dick) Ellis, effectively the main Interdoc link-man in Britain during the 1960s, and K. Donaldson of Foundation International Services Ltd, a front-man for US philanthropy (Ford, Rockefeller) in London.45 Although Donaldson did not come through with any sources, van den Heuvel felt condent enough to report in March 1966 that I have so many contacts now in the US that it will be difcult to restrict myself to the most valuable ones.46 Foremost among them was the NSIC. On 31 May van den Heuvel attended a meeting at the ofces of the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) in New York, presided over by Stewart Baeder of NAM and with both Barnett and Admiral (retired) William C. Mott of NSIC present. The Dutchman reported later that both Baeder and Mott are pressing Barnett to come to a more denite arrangement with Interdoc,47 but Baeders departure from NAM later that year effectively sabotaged the hope of nding the necessary nance to open an Interdoc ofce in New York.48 By late 1966 the situation looked bleak, as van den Heuvel explained to Ellis: What I expected has come true; Barnett who was as you will remember rather critical is even more now. Obviously he is still thinking entirely in terms of cold war and does not think much of the positive opportunities the West has in regard to increasing EastWest contacts . . . we shall have to look for someone else who is inclined to act as a focal point for Interdoc in the United States. I would not regret this development as I have always had my doubts about Barnett in regard to the right attitude towards the present EastWest situation.49 By early 1967 there seemed to be some movement. Ellis, referring to recent correspondence from Barnett, remarked that it looks as though he has had a change of heart . . . I am a bit suspicious of US mergers but there may be
45

Ellis to van den Heuvel, 20 February 1966, File: UK Ellis 1966, CC. Ellis suggested contacting Ernest Cuneo to assist with US funding options. During World War II Cuneo had been the Ofce of Strategic Services (OSS) liaison ofcer between William Donovan and President Roosevelt. 46 Van den Heuvel to Ellis, 25 March 1966, ibid. 47 Van den Heuvel to Ellis, 25 July 1966, ibid. 48 Ellis to van den Heuvel, 17 November 1966, ibid. 49 Van den Heuvel to Ellis, 14 November 1966, ibid.

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something in the concept of a closer link between certain European groups and a sort of combined US organization.50 Clearly Barnett was now interested in joining forces. Ellis reported a week later that MI6 (codename Power), which had been involved in long-running dealings over an Interdoc UK ofce, had no objection to talks with the Americans proceeding provided you are certain that you are not going to be merged into something too big, and liable to be political.51 As part of this development, Barnett and the NSIC were aiming to hold a conference in Brussels some time in late 1967 to gather together allied forces on both sides of the Atlantic.52 During JuneAugust 1967 van den Heuvel had the opportunity to take these discussions further thanks to an invitation to participate in the US Embassys International Visitor Program, an exchange programme used to bring inuential individuals to the United States for a mix of consultation with their professional counter-parts and a tour through American society. The strong implication here is that the CIA used this element of the embassys public diplomacy activities to propel the NSICInterdoc link. Van den Heuvels invitation, in his own words, was a sort of reward for the things Id done, under strong pressure from the CIA . . . They asked me to do things, not in their service but just in my own orbit. Many speculated that I was a CIA agent but I wasnt.53 Taking advantage of the trip, he conducted lengthy discussions with Barnett and others on the proposed USEuropean conference, which was now postponed to early 1968. It was agreed this would be held with the purpose of interesting the private sector, notably industry, in foreign policy, strategy, psychological warfare etc. dealing with the evolving communist threat, the signicance of contacts with the East in the context of expanding EastWest trade, and the role of businessmen and non-governmental organisations in the EastWest confrontation.54 The twist in all this was matching the original aims of a conference on EastWest trade (which appealed to the NAM) with the psywar concerns over communist ideology (which appealed to Barnett). Van den Heuvel did return from the United States with one breakthrough Crosby Kelly of NAMs Foreign Relations Committee agreed to function as a promoter of Interdoc interests and a distributor of its material within the United States, although he backed away from being the Interdoc representative. Kelly, a wellknown PR guru with Litton Industries, and a member of the famed
50 51

Ellis to van den Heuvel, 6 February 1967, File: UK Ellis 1967, CC. Ellis to van den Heuvel, 15 February 1967, ibid. 52 Ellis to van den Heuvel, 15 May 1967, ibid. 53 C.C. van den Heuvel, interview with the author, The Hague, 6 August 2002. On the circumstances of his participation on the IVP see G. Scott-Smith, Networks of Empire: The US State Departments Foreign Leader Program in the Netherlands, France, and Britain 19501970 (Brussels: Peter Lang 2008) pp.29697. 54 Report on a visit to the United States, 26 June5 August 1967, archive of the Governmental Affairs Institute, Washington DC (hereafter GAI). Van den Heuvels trip also included a visit to the Institute of Human Ecology.

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anti-Marxist network the Pinay Circle,55 explained that there were several inuential individuals in the NAM who favour EastWest trade, not in the rst place because of the expectation of any considerable prots, but as this trade will contribute to reinforce the structural changes now apparent in Communist countries.56 What happened next remains somewhat obscure. It is not clear if Barnetts plan for a Euro-American gathering in Brussels (or anywhere else) went ahead. Van den Heuvel returned to the United States in 1968, this time together with Colonel Rolf Geyer, the head of BND section III F which effectively ran Interdoc for the Germans. The fact that Geyer accompanied the Dutchman indicates that this was a serious move towards closing some kind of partnership deal with associates in the United States. Geyer, in the words of one of his former employees in III F, didnt trust the Americans.57 Interdocs Progress Report 1968 stated clearly that top of the list for this trip was to accelerate the realisation of an Interdoc-USA. Moves to secure funding from US sources was also under way, including from the Ford Foundation, which would require submitting proposals with clearly-dened projects.58 By 1969 the American presence within Interdoc was becoming clearer. After the Interdoc conference of 21 September 1969 a report from a member of the British Foreign Ofces Information Research Department remarked that On this occasion the presence of a relatively large American group which took a very active part in the discussions was especially pleasing.59 The Progress Report for that also year concluded the following: Despite the abundance of institutes in America concerned with East West affairs it appears that, in very many cases, particular interest is still being shown in Interdoc work and Interdoc publications. Interdoc has such good connections with some of these institutes and people that an Interdoc ofce in the United States can already be considered. To set up a permanent central ofce in the United States still remains the object of Interdoc aspirations.60 Van den Heuvel continued to expand his American network, meeting NSIC member William Casey for the rst time in June 1970.61 But up to this point it is not clear what the relationship between Interdoc and the NSIC was. A case in point concerns the formation of Brian Croziers Institute for the
55

Robert Hutchinson, Their Kingdom Come: Inside the Secret World of Opus Dei (New York: Doubleday 1997) pp.15358. 56 Report, GAI. 57 Interview with the author, Munich, 3 July 2008. 58 Interdoc Progress Report 1968, Interdoc, The Hague. 59 Papers of the Information Research Department, FCO 95/907 Interdoc, National Archives, London. 60 Interdoc Progress Report 1969, p.6. 61 Van den Heuvel to Ellis, 17 June 1970, File: UK Ellis 196974, CC.

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Study of Conict (ISC) in 1969. ISC only established itself thanks to a $100,000 annual grant from the Scaife Family Charitable Trusts. At rst glance it looks as if Crozier, more militant in approach, was chosen in favour of van den Heuvel to be the NSICs European outpost. This is signicant also because Crozier himself mentions that his connection to Richard Mellon Scaife was arranged by his CIA contacts, with Barnett as middle-man.62 Yet later in 1970 a major upheaval took place that allowed the American stake in Interdoc to determine the future of the institution itself. At the Interdoc conference held in Rimini in October the Germans announced the cessation of their involvement. Having heard that the German nancial contribution, running at more than 500,000 Dutch Guilders by the end of the 1960s, would be severely cut back if not stopped entirely, van den Heuvel went to the United States in November 1970 for the specic purpose of raising funds. His two contacts were Barnett and R. Daniel McMichael, a representative of various US foundations, foremost among them being Mellon Scaife. Having laid out various scenarios, the Americans agreed to make a serious effort to contribute upwards of 200,000 Guilders to enable the institution to continue functioning. Special attention was given to preparing Westerners for attendance at conferences and other meetings in the East (and encouraging certain processes of liberalization going on there), and the publication in the West of Soviet dissident literature exposing negative traits and defending basic human rights.63 To formalize this arrangement it was agreed that Barnett and NSIC/American Bar Association colleague Admiral (rtd.) William Mott would become Interdoc board members. Looking ahead, efforts would be made for closer international co-operation between Interdoc, the NSIC, Croziers ISC, and the EastWest Institute in Bern, Switzerland.64 Into the 1970s The rst fruits of this closer relationship came in early 1971. Barnett directed van den Heuvel to make a request for $30,000 from AmericanAsian Educational Exchange (AAEE), and in March the reply came that the request had been granted. With the American funding came new demands. Van den Heuvel, aware of the success of ISCs approach with the Americans, had pitched a series of publications on the theory and practice of Chinese inuence, and a conference on guerrilla warfare in Asia to be held later that year. Interdoc did already possess some resources in this eld, since an Asia
62

Brian Crozier, Free Agent: The Unseen War 19411991 (London: HarperCollins 1993) p.90. 63 Van den Heuvel, Report on a visit to the United States, 1120 November 1970, File: Financing and Reorganisation 19701973, CC. 64 Ibid. Interesting is that a report on Interdoc reorganization by German Interdoc deputy J.H. Hoheisel from September 1970 mentioned alongside these three institutions also Est & Ouest, Paris (George Albertini) as a closer partner, but this was excluded from van den Heuvels American report.

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Institute had been established at its address principally to examine Chinese and Taiwanese affairs. The AAEE agreed, but also wanted to see more attention for the relationship between the Soviet Union and Asian affairs.65 Van den Heuvel let Ellis know in mid-1971 that I expect an increasing American cooperation, and after a further trip to the United States in May he could report that his workload had increased considerably because the new American support also includes certain tasks.66 The transition of Interdoc from a German to an American sphere of inuence had one nal twist. The $30,000 was a vital life-line, but the total collapse of German funding in 1971 left the Interdoc operation with a serious shortfall for 1972. McMichael reported in August that there was no possibility of new funds from the Scaife network, and that neither Barnett nor AAEEs Frank Trager could produce anything in the short term.67 Plans were proceeding for a major conference, together with the American Bar Associations Committee on Education about Communism, to be held in November at the Freedoms Foundation in Valley Forge, Pennsylvania. Under the title of American-European Relations vis-a ` -vis Communist Objectives in Europe, this was intended to solidify the Interdoc operation in the United States and pave the way ahead. But with two months to go, it was looking more like the last hurrah. Despite some promises of alternative channels being found, German funds had after all dried up entirely. Desperately searching for funds to prevent bankruptcy and closure, van den Heuvel tried one last throw of the dice when in August 1972 he contacted the chief of the Chancellory (and supervisor of relations with the BND) in Bonn, Horst Ehmke.68 Amazingly, Ehmke came through, transferring a sum of DM 60,000 at the end of September.69 Van den Heuvel, in his thankful reply, fully acknowledged that this was a one-off transaction. But it had saved Interdoc. But the transition was not just a question of money, since the focus of Interdoc would also change. Van den Heuvel was quite forthcoming to Crozier about the different opinions involved: I think that practically all of us want to consolidate the American link with Interdoc. One or two may have small reservations as they fear that the Americans might get a too predominant position in Interdoc. I do not share that fear, Interdoc is in the rst place a European organization and it will stay that. However, for many reasons, a close co-operation with the Americans is essential. Western Europe and North America form the Western world. The unity of this Western
65

Barnett to van den Heuvel, 20 January 1971, Van den Heuvel to Frank Trager (AAEE), 26 January 1971, Trager to van den Heuvel, 4 February 1971, Van den Heuvel to Trager, 11 February 1971, and Trager to van den Heuvel, 5 March 1971, ibid. 66 Van den Heuvel to Ellis, 6 April and 2 June 1971, File: UK Ellis 196974, CC. 67 McMichael to van den Heuvel, 3 August 1972, File: Financing and Reorganisation 1970 1973, CC. 68 Van den Heuvel to Ehmke, 10 August 1972, ibid. 69 Ehmke to van den Heuvel, 26 September 1972, ibid.

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The early 1970s were of course a period of transition in the USEuropean relationship as a whole. With De tente altering the EastWest relationship there were calls from various sectors to re-align the global posture of the US military, including Senator Mike Manselds amendment to Congress in 1971 to halve the number of US forces stationed Western Europe. Although this was defeated 6136 in the Senate, it was taken as a sign that the US military guarantee could no longer be taken for granted. The conference that solidied the US link went ahead in November 1972. Including contributions from former Secretary of State Dean Rusk (on Negotiating with the East) and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson (on East Policy of the West), the event had enough of a high prole to raise the presence of Interdoc across the Atlantic. Other panel sessions addressed The US Presence in Europe and Frictions within the Alliance, and the conference served as a general gathering of representatives from research institutes concerned with Atlantic and EastWest issues. Barnett closed the conference by initiating a discussion on what next?, himself indicating that his real interest lay in a new international setup, perhaps funded by multi-national companies, which would study the problems of international security. Van den Heuvel followed up by placing Interdoc rmly within this new conguration of forces, stating that The Hague was perfectly placed as the location for a brieng centre for those doing business or otherwise travelling to the East.71 American nance was certainly present in the Interdoc set-up during the 1970s. The nancial report for 1976 for van den Heuvels Dutch base, the EastWest Institute, refers to foreign funds (buitenlandse fondsen) providing 90,000 Guilders, half of the total received from benefactors as a whole. In 1977 this was 92,000, and in 1978 71,000.72 It is hard to imagine that this money was coming from anywhere else than the United States. Van den Heuvel was travelling every year to the United States in this period in search of funds. The US input had a major effect on Interdocs set of goals, which included the following: rstly, a strengthening of opinion in civil society to promote support for the continuing presence of US forces in Western Europe. Secondly, and closely related to this, a determined attempt to build bridges with upcoming generations in order to normalize this relationship and USEuropean relations in general within a younger agegroup. Thirdly, to analyse the rising trend in political violence, terrorism, and guerrilla-type actions in the West, in conjunction with similar groups around Europe. Fourthly, to track developments in EastWest relations and

70 71

Van den Heuvel to Crozier, 11 October 1971, File: UK 19 (Crozier), CC. American-European Relations vis-a ` -vis Communist Objectives in Europe, 1718 November 1972, conference booklet, pp.3334. 72 File: AK NL 30, Finances OWI 19691978, CC.

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promote wherever possible an increasing dialogue in order to open up the East to Western ideas. As regards the rst move, results were soon in coming. In 1971 Crozier had proposed forming a pressure group to keep the Americans in Europe, a plan that van den Heuvel took up with enthusiasm. The Dutch wing of this proposed Europe-wide organization which van den Heuvel envisioned to counteract anti-American propaganda in Europe in the press, in television etc. was eventually established in 1973 as the Foundation for Solidarity and Alliance Netherlands United States (Stichting Solidariteit en Verbondenheid Nederland Verenigde Staten), and continues to this day.73 For the second move van den Heuvel operated on two fronts. An active member of World War II veterans groups, he had been occupied in the late 1960s with the fact that the New Left and its hangers-on were disdainful of the causes fought for 25 years before. Taking these concerns to the international stage, in 1970, as a member of the International Union of Resistance and Deportee Movements (UIRD), he established a Resistance and Youth Committee to promote a better understanding of democratic values. The key to this move was the suggestion that younger generations did care about human rights if a connection could be made between the older and younger generations on this ground, some consensus could be found.74 In 1974 van den Heuvel also manoeuvred his way into a prominent position as information advisor for the Dutch Atlantic Committee, the public institution created in the early 1950s to promote the goals of the Atlantic alliance within Dutch society. By October 1975 he could report several successes, the most signicant of which was the revival of the Committees youth wing under the name of JASON (Jong Atlantisch Samenwerkings Orgaan Nederland).75 Working closely with students from the Student International Relations Society at the University of Leiden, van den Heuvel nurtured JASON into the most active element of the Committee, to the point where his JASON prote ge e, Rio Praaning, became Committee director in November 1979 (with van den Heuvel himself moving to the position of Treasurer).76 The Committees location even moved to van den Heuvels trusted address on van Stolkweg in The Hague. One month later NATO took its Double-Track decision on the upgrading of its nuclear force in Western Europe, and for the next decade Praaning led the organization as an active and effective participant in the political battle over the placement of Cruise Missiles in the Netherlands. One of the van den Heuvel-esque moves during this period was the formation of the Foundation for Peace Politics (Stichting Vredespolitiek or SVP), a gathering of pro-Cruise civil society
Crozier to van den Heuvel, 5 October 1971, and van den Heuvel to Crozier, 11 October 1971, File: UK 19 (Crozier), CC. 74 File: AK International 36 / UIRD Resistance et Jeurnesse (197074), CC. 75 Van den Heuvel, Nota Activiteit Voorlichtingsadviseur Atlantische Commissie, 28 October 1975, File: Atlantische Commissie 197487, CC. 76 Remco van Diepen, Beschaafd ageren voor de NAVO: 50 Jaar Atlantische Commissie (The Hague: Atlantische Commissie, 2002) p.74.
73

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groups (some of which were more or less ctional) designed to operate as a high-prole platform for voices in support of NATO policy. The American connection played a role here too. According to the treasurer, at a particularly cash-strapped moment 10,000 Dutch Guilders was provided for the Foundation by the US Embassy consisting of ten crisp 1000 Guilder banknotes in a brown paper bag.77 Van den Heuvel was not one of the visible orchestrators of the SVP, but his guiding spirit is written all over it. The third aspect, analysing political violence, had already become an Interdoc priority during its research into the New Left during the late 1960s. Conferences on Radicalism and Security (Noordwijk, April 1970) and Guerrilla Warfare in Asia (Noordwijk, June 1970) had explored this terrain, as had two publications on guerrilla warfare in Latin America by Alphonse Max. In June 1973 this took another turn with a conference in The Hague entitled Resistance and the New Generation, which involved participants from the Netherlands, Belgium, Britain, and Germany, and which was centred around a proposal from the Resistance and Psychological Operations Committee of the British Reserve Forces Association a member of which, Arnhem veteran, Daily Telegraph military correspondent, and ISC board member Brigadier W.F. Thompson, was also the new president of Interdoc (replacing Louis Einthoven).78 The Committee proposed that Interdoc become the base for a research programme into what was termed International Revolutionary Anarchy, including the teaching of hostile ideologies in our State schools and Universities, the interference by revolutionary groups from abroad in the affairs of our countries, and the deliberate use of drugs to undermine the structure of the State. The proposal was adamant that We are NOT trying to set up any kind of secret organization. What we want is material that has been given publicity and is obviously aimed at creating doubt and unrest in the minds of the public owing to exaggeration and the distortion of facts.79 The fourth move increasingly concerned the Helsinki Accords and their follow-up. The conference Development of EastRelations through Freer Movement of People, Ideas and Information (Noordwijk, September 1973), which included a paper by the First Secretary of the Russian Embassy in The Hague, V.N. Kuznetsov, was a clear move to capitalize on and cultivate the links that were being set up under De tente. In the aftermath of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975 van den Heuvel moved his Dutch operations increasingly in the direction of a monitoring of post-Helsinki developments, thereby capitalizing on the attention given to
77 78

Winfried van den Muijsenbergh, interview with the author, Middelburg 9 January 2009. On the military career of Thompson, who died in 1980, see 5http://www.unithistories.com/ ofcers/1AirbDiv_ofcersT.htm4 (accessed 19 February 2009). 79 Politics, Violence, and the Threat to International Law and Order, G.L. [Gordon Lett], File: AK International 36 / UIRD Resistance et Jeurnesse (197074), CC.

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human rights by the Dutch government and the interests within Dutch business for increasing trade with the East. This led eventually to the formation of the Centrum voor Europese Veiligheid en Samenwerking (Centre for European Security and Cooperation, CEVS) in 1979, designed to once again gather together European allies under one umbrella in order to push for greater freedoms in the Eastern bloc as laid out in Helsinkis Basket III. CEVS ultimately had to be given up in 1982 due to a lack of funding, but van den Heuvel remained active in this eld throughout that decade. Conclusion To an extent, Interdoc displayed more the inability to achieve effective international cooperation than its full realization. Hopes for a committed input from the British, Swiss, and Italians, for instance, in the form of national Interdoc ofces, never reached the levels hoped for, although contacts were maintained throughout. The Americans only seriously came on board when it was clear that they could take a commanding role. In this sense Interdoc partly mirrored the problems encountered within NATO whenever attempts were made to establish a centralized psychological warfare capacity. Interdoc proved to be especially vulnerable to shifts in diplomatic and geopolitical outlook. Twice with the withdrawal of the French due to Gaullism and the Germans due to Ostpolitik the operation was placed in jeopardy, the second time only coming through from bankruptcy thanks to a highly irregular one-off payment from the Chancellory in Bonn. The role of the Dutch in this affair was crucial. In the 1960s they provided international credibility for an essentially German-funded and orchestrated operation, while at the same time maintaining their own wish to build a Western network that spanned the Atlantic. This displays not only commitment and exibility, but also a form of entrepreneurship. To an extent van den Heuvel was able to move with the times according to what was required of him and his institute by others, while at the same time able to maintain and pursue his own particular interests. In this way, with considerable skill, he was able to maintain the Interdoc set-up for the best part of 25 years, in doing so fullling the original intention that Interdoc would function as an international clearing house for information and institutes worldwide. Throughout its existence, Interdoc maintained contacts with the United States. These ranged from informal liaison with CIA representatives in The Hague and Washington DC and the fullling of specic tasks on some kind of contract basis, to the establishment of direct association with the NSIC and the invitation for Americans such as Barnett and Mott to join the Interdoc board. Overall, Interdoc was a hybrid. In the beginning it represented European Cold War concerns and priorities as something of a reaction to the perceived failure of US approaches. Yet the American inuence is evident throughout, from the study trip of the Dutch in 1959 to the 10,000 Guilders in a brown paper bag in 1982. For this reason it is worth

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considering to what extent Interdoc represented a European strategic culture in psychological warfare, and to what extent it was always a blend of European and American approaches, with the Dutch, primarily, doing the blending. Serious differences of opinion did open up within Interdoc circles concerning EastWest contacts. During the 1970s van den Heuvel followed through the approach of making use of an opening-up of the Iron Curtain with several trips to Poland, Hungary, and Moscow, meeting and engaging foreign policy institutes in dialogue on the situation in Europe. But this was not appreciated by everybody. At a conference in Winchester in November 1976 Crozier, who considered De tente and the Helsinki Accords to be a massive condence trick beneting Moscow, accused the Dutchman of going soft on communism. Colleagues jumped to van den Heuvels defence, in particular to reassure Barnett and the Americans, but an irreparable breach had been opened up.80 Not for nothing did he say, with much amusement, that while half of The Hague thought he was working for the CIA the other half thought he was working for the KGB.81 Ultimately, Interdocs value comes from it being a remarkable example of the way European security services sought to engage with and manipulate the public sphere, initially out of serious concerns for the effects of peaceful coexistence on Western ideological solidity, and eventually as a means to secure a strategic advantage in the Cold War. Acknowledgment I would like to acknowledge the assistance of Robbert Jan Hageman at the National Archives in The Hague, Christiaan van den Heuvel, Marona van den Heuvel, and an anonymous reviewer.

80

See van Eeghen (Berkenrode overleg) to Barnett, 30 November 1976, File: UK 19 (Crozier), CC. 81 Winfried van den Muijsenbergh, interview with the author, Middelburg 9 January 2009.