The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers Author(s): Mona El-Ghobashy Reviewed work(s): Source: International Journal of Middle

East Studies, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Aug., 2005), pp. 373-395 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3880106 . Accessed: 11/04/2012 02:36
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Int. J. Middle East Stud. 37 (2005), 373-395. Printed in the United States of America DOI: 10.1017.S0020743805373041

Mona El-Ghobashy THE METAMORPHOSIS MUSLIM BROTHERS

OF THE EGYPTIAN

Jihane al-Halafawi'ssmall apartment above a barbershopin Alexandriais exceedingly a cool oasis on a summer afternoon.Plant leaves brush up against orderly, sweltering curtainsundulatingwith the breeze from the nearbyMediterranean. As she walks into the living room with a tray full of cakes and tea, al-Halafawiis the picture of a kindly Egyptian mother,a genuine smile gracing her youthful face. But when this fifty-yearold motherof six and grandmother announcedher candidacyfor Egypt's parliamentary elections in fall 2000, the stategearedup a massivesecurityforce outsidepolling stations; leftists shruggedher off as a "front" for her husband;and state feminists dedicatedto the electoralempowermentof women were silent. When Halafawioutperformed her rulingin rival the first the Interior round,despite rigging, party Ministrypromptlystepped in and canceled the results on the pretextof respecting an earlier court ruling postponing the elections. Alexandria'sal-Ramldistrictwent withoutparliamentary for two years representation as al-Halafawiand her legal team battledthe state in the courts. Finally, in June 2002, a Supreme AdministrativeCourt ruling compelled the Interior Ministry to hold the by-elections.On election day,securityforces blockadedroadsleadingto polling stations, arrestedal-Halafawi'slegal team and 101 of her supporters, roughedup journalists,and aside as in workers bused from outside the districtvoted for her stepped public-sector rival. Unusually, the six o'clock news was interruptedthat evening to announce the sweeping victory of the two ruling National DemocraticParty(NDP) candidatesin the Raml by-elections.1 Al-Halafawi's experience is one dramaticpiece of a larger story, the story of the group of which she is a part:the Society of Muslim Brothers(Jama'atal-Ikhwanalthe Society of Muslim Brothers(Ikhwan) Muslimun).2Over the past quarter-century, has morphedfrom a highly secretive, hierarchical,antidemocraticorganizationled by anointed elders into a modern, multivocal political association steered by educated, savvy professionals not unlike activists of the same age in rival Egyptian political parties. Seventy-sevenyears ago, the Muslim Brotherswere founded in the provincial city of Ismailiyya by the charismaticdisciplinarianand shrewd organizerHasan alBanna (1906-49). With a vision of an Islamic renaissanceand a chalkboardunderhis arm,al-Bannarecruitedmembersdoor-to-doorandbuilt a welfare society-cum-athletic
Mona El-Ghobashyis an Instructor in the Political Science Department, ColumbiaUniversity,New York,N.Y. 10027, USA; e-mail: me27@columbia.edu. @ 2005 CambridgeUniversityPress 0020-7438/05 $12.00

374 Mona El-Ghobashy league-cum-anticolonial movementheld togetherby meticulousorganizationand strict master-disciplerelations.Today,the social-welfareactivitiesof the Ikhwanareas strong as ever, but the enforced top-downunanimityof the group is a thing of the past. and ideological transformations The Ikhwanhave come to experienceorganizational endemic to anypartyor social movement:splits along generational lines, intenseinternal debates about strategy,and a shift in their ideological plank from politics as a sacred mission to politics as the public contest betweenrivalinterests.I arguethatthe Ikhwan's energetic capitalizationon Egypt's sliver of electoral competition for seats in Parliament, the professionalunions, and municipalcouncils has had an especially profound The institutionalrules of authoritarian effect on theirpolitical thoughtand organization. electoral politics have led to both organizationaland ideological change within the group. change is most conspicuous in the rise of middle-agedIkhwanproOrganizational fessionals who came of political age on college campuses in the 1960s and 1970s, differentcreaturesfrom the Ikhwanelders who cut theirpolitical teethin fundamentally the tumultuous,ideologically polarizedEgypt of the 1940s. While the group's highest executive post is still the turf of the older "prisongeneration,"middle-aged members formulatepolicy, act as spokesmen, and representthe group in Parliamentand professional unions. Indeed, generationaldynamics are behind organizationalrumblingsin all Egyptianpolitical institutions,includingthe NDP, as disenchantedyounger activists turntheirbacks on ossified "historicalleaders"and craftnew politicalprojectsbasedon their independentassessmentof existing institutionalconstraints. Ideologically, one of the most visible byproductsof the Ikhwan'spolitical engagement has been a decisive move away from the uncompromisingnotions of Sayyid Qutb (1906-66) as outlined in his tract Ma'alimfi al-tariq (Signposts) and towarda of the ideas of founder al-Banna.A relatedinnovationis the cautious reinterpretation of moderateIslamist thinkers'works authenticating Ikhwan'sappropriation democracy with Islamic concepts. Democracyhere is defined as (1) broad,equal citizenship with personnelandpolicies, (2) bindingconsultationof citizens with respectto governmental state action.3Severalposition papersissued and (3) protectionof citizens from arbitrary turnand its by the Muslim Brothersin the 1990s documentthe group's prodemocratic role of the and women's on views Egyptian political pluralism, rights, parties revamped of violence. and and the morality utility political Copts, of the Muslim Brothersfrom a religious mass movementto what The transformation looks very much like a modem political party has its roots in electoral politicking that began in the 1980s. Yet this change has been eclipsed by both Ikhwancritics and boosters,the formerdenyingany change or belittlingit as mereposturingby the Muslim Brothersto gain power,the latterfolding any innovationinto the prearranged plan of the all-wise founderal-Banna.Both are inaccurate.The Ikhwanare in no way invulnerable to the political changes that have engulfed Egyptian society over the past twenty-five years, both good and ill. The Muslim Brothersare consummatepolitical actors, neither extraordinarily gifted at mobilization nor historically adept at deception. The fevered attentionaccordedIslamistgroupsby Westernpolicymakers,Arabstateelites, and some academicsexaggeratestheirperceivedthreat(to democracy,Westerninterests,stability, or "nationalunity")and organizational capabilitiesand occludes clear thinkingon how they are shapedby their institutionalpolitical environment.

The Metamorphosisof the EgyptianMuslimBrothers 375 My argumentimplies the following. First,differentquestionsneed to be asked about Islamists' participationin politics. Conjectural,aimless "are they or aren't they?" debates about Islamists' commitment to democracy should take an analytical back seat to how Islamists actually behave in semidemocraticpolitical theaters. Second, if Islamists are treatedas political actorsjockeying for advantage,relevance,and support, their ideological pronouncements can be analyzed as effects and not predictorsof their This is not a call for a purely instrumentalistunderstandingof political experience. nor an intervention into the ideology perennial debate on which has causal primacy, or action. It is to for a critical rethinkingof the assumptionof excepideology argue tionalismwith which Islamistmovementsare approached. Finally,since Islamistparties are subject to the same institutionalrules of the political game, then it is reasonable to assume that they will show some, if not all, of the stresses experienced by their non-Islamist competitors.The influence of common institutionalvariables on the organization and ideology of both secular and religious political parties merits further study.
WHY AND HOW POLITICAL PARTIES CHANGE

In 1914, the radicalGermanSocial DemocraticParty(SPD), a majorantiwarplatform, rushedto supportthe world war as soon as it was declared.As Seymour MartinLipset reports,Lenin "was convinced that the issue of the party newspaperVorwartscalling for supportof the war effort was a forgery."4 Neither a cynical bid to curry favor with the authoritiesnor a clumsy grab at popularity,the SPD's decision was beholden to a as RobertoMichels famously argued. deeper force: the "instinctfor self-preservation," In his classic 1911 study of the SPD, much of which presagedthe party'sprowarstance, Michels postulated an "iron law of oligarchy" where the imperativeof organization necessitates rule of a minority over a hapless majority even in the most avowedly democraticorganizations. The one partyone would expect to resist fads and stay trueto its principleswas compelled to follow a more bewitching siren. Michel's heirs shifted their focus from the logic of organizationto the exigencies of electoralparticipation. OttoKirchheimer arguedthatfollowing WorldWarII, traditional class mass anddenominational "catch-all" partieswere giving way to streamlined parties that are "non-utopian,non-oppressive,and ever so flexible." The imperativeof votemaximizationled partiesto shed ideological baggage, move to the center, and woo the elusive "medianvoter."' Partyanalystsrevisitedthe case of Europeansocialists in the 19thcentury,tracinghow socialist partiesthat set out to bring about a socialist revolutionthroughthe ballot box were instead irrevocablytransformedthemselves.6 Since then, socialist parties' goals were endlessly modified and entire planks abandonedto signal credibility and ensure inclusion in the democraticgame. After WorldWarII, spurredby a new generationof socialists, the GermanSPD publicly disavowedits centralideological tenets andpurged radicals from its ranks at the Extraordinary Congress at Bad Godesbergin 1959.7 The Ikhwan'spublic repudiation of Sayyid Qutbin 1969 and adoptionof democracyin 1995 are but echoes of the "Godesbergeffect." What about parties in authoritarian-democratic hybrids where the contest for votes is stuntedby state repression?The growing literatureon electoral authoritarian regimes

376 Mona El-Ghobashy suggests that an electoral logic is also palpablein such environments,but scholarshave had to modify the standard typology of partiesas vote-seeking,office-seeking, or policyAs Scott seeking organizations. Mainwaringsensibly states, "Rational partyleaderswill not make vote maximizing their first priorityif votes are not the primarycurrencyof politics."' Mainwaringargues that parties in authoritarian regimes play "dual games": an electoralgame with the objectiveof winning votes and seats, anda regime game. The regime game can either be steady participationwith the hope of effecting a transition to democracyor a delegitimationgame where partieswork to underminethe legitimacy of the authoritarian regime. Parties in authoritarian regimes play electoral and regime with on the games simultaneously, emphasis regime game.9 contexts Many of the internalfactional strugglesin partiesoperatingin authoritarian revolve aroundwhich games to prioritizeand how to balance the regime and electoral games. Seen in this light, parties are by definition dynamic organizationsin perpetual transformation,and religious parties are no exception. The trajectoriesof Christian Democratic parties in Europeand Latin America show that they are as much products of political entrepreneurship as "ordinary" parties and are just as malleable, neither nor beholden to uniquely refractory nonnegotiableideological codes.
1928-81: THE RISE AND ECLIPSE OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERS

At its founding in 1928, the Society of Muslim Brotherswas one prominentpartof a handfulof ideologicalmass-basedpartiesled by political mavericksseekingto challenge the dominantstyle of politics of notables.A decadeinto its existence,the society hadbuilt its identityas an internallydisciplined,financiallyresourceful,pro-Palestine anticolonial movement appealing to educated lower-middle- and middle-class effendis who were alienatedby the exclusionarypolitical and economic system of interwar Egypt.i' Hasan al-Banna'svision of moraluplift based on faith-basedaction and self-improvement was also an explicit responseto influential,state-sponsoredsecularprojects,exemplifiedby Taha Husein's EurophiletractMustaqbalal-thaqafafi misr (The Future of Culturein Egypt). Insteadof slavishly aping Westernideas, al-Bannaargued,a returnto the precocious wisdom of Islam was the solution: The MuslimBrothers believethatwhenAllahmostHighrevealed andordered the Qur'an this to follow in He this true all the foundations Muhammad, worshippers placed religion necessary for the renaissance and happiness of nations... globalism, nationalism, socialism,capitalism, of wealth, therelationship between andconsumer and Bolshevism, war,thedistribution producer near andfartotheseconcerns that thepoliticians andphilosophers of nations everything preoccupy of society.WebelieveIslamhasgoneto theheart of all theseissues."I Workingfor a Muslimstatewas not a priority; calling for Islamizingsociety andapplying sharicawere.'2 The details of its foundingand early historyrevealthatthe Society was poised to be a of ordinarypartiesand highly adaptivepolitical creature,weatheringthe permutations experiencingtheirusual crises. Internalschisms andchallenges to al-Banna'sleadership surfacedin 1932 and 1939, the latterwhen a splintergroup calling itself Muhammad's Youth seceded or was expelled for protesting al-Banna's political pragmatism.'3

The Metamorphosisof the EgyptianMuslimBrothers 377 Al-Bannaenthusiasticallyembracedelections andran and lost in parliamentary contests in 1942 and 1945.14 The Muslim Brotherspromulgatedtheir political and economic platformin 1952 when relationswith the new militaryregime were still warm, but the The subsequentdissolution of the Society in 1954 and experimentwas soon aborted.5" of its leaders and followers by the Nasser regime promised years-long imprisonment to completelyextinguishits presencein political life. It was only afterits cadresemerged fromprisonduringSadat'sde-Nasserizationthatthe society beganto engineerits reentry into an alteredEgyptian political landscape.The Ikhwan's activism since the 1970s is thus the firstsustainedengagementwith stateinstitutionsandcompetingpolitical groups that can be analyzed to gauge theirpolitical transformation. First, a look at the structureof the Society of Muslim Brothers. There are three pillars of the group's organization.The 100-memberShuraCouncil (Majlis al-Shura), is the group'slegislative body,responsiblefor issuing bindingresolutionsand reviewing the annualreportandbudget.The ShuraCouncilconvenesperiodicallyevery six months; membersserve four-yearterms and must be at least thirtyyears old. The council elects the thirteen-member GuidanceBureau(Maktabal-Irshad),the Brothers'politburowhere all policy decisions passed by the ShuraCouncil are executed. Membersof the Bureau serve renewable four-year terms and must also be at least thirty years of age. The highest executive office is that of the GeneralGuide (al-murshidal-'~cmm), who is the chief executive officer and official spokesmanof the group.The GeneralGuide must be at least forty andis elected by an absolutemajorityof the ShuraCouncilfrom candidates nominatedby the GuidanceBureau.16 This organizational structure remainedessentially intactuntil 1992, when a provision was added for the reelection of the general guide and terms of office were set at five years, although no term limits were specified.17 Yet because of the Society's illegal status and attendantsecurityclampdowns,it has been difficult to convene the required institutionsin accordancewith the bylaws. In 1977, the second GeneralGuide, Hasan al-Hudaiby,died, and 'Umar al-Tilmissany was selected as his successor. 'Umar alTilmissany reports in his reflections that, since the group could not activate regular internalelection procedures,his selection as the third general guide was based on his status as the seniormostmemberof the GuidanceBureau.'8 The selection proceduresof the subsequentgeneral guides MuhammadHamed Abu al-Nasr (1986-96), Mustafa Mashour (1996-2002), and Ma'mun al-Hudaybi (20022004), son of the second general guide, were secretive affairs that followed no clear logic of seniorityor election. Insteadthey were shapedby the force of circumstanceand internalmaneuveringfor power.A significantchange followed the death of al-Hudaybi at age eighty-threein January2004 with the announcementthat the next guide would be selected by a majorityvote of the GuidanceBureau.The reasons for this change are explored later.
THE 1980S: ELECTORALISM AND THE POLITICS OF ADAPTATION

The thaw in state-Ikhwanrelationsbegun under Sadat continued underthe regime of Husni Mubarak,but there was no question of legalizing the Muslim Brothers,only de
facto toleration. Not content to assert their presence merely through their newsletter

al-Da'wa (The Call) or financingsocial welfare activities, the Ikhwanbegan to develop

378 Mona El-Ghobashy the sedulous electioneering strategy that would become a centerpiece of their selfpreservation.Al-Tilmissany,the society's third general guide, recalled the decision to contest the 1984 elections: Whenwe werereleased we werein a stateof near-recession. fromthe 1981detention, Wesetto a lawful for to out activities means our without or looking troubling carry security challenging Theparliamentary thelaws.Allahsawfit to findus a lawfulwayin theviewsof officials. session hadjustendedandthinking elections. It wasthe opportunity of beganon thenewparliamentary hadtheIkhwan a lifetime, let it slipfromtheirhands havecounted the theywouldsurely among of theneglectful.19 ranks Not one to pass up a political opportunity, al-Tilmissanynegotiatedan alliance with the Wafd,one he insisted on calling a "cooperation" and not a tacticalor strategicmove. to he authenticate the Perhaps partnership, explained that in the 1930s he had been an old Wafdist "with all my being" while a devoted member of the Ikhwan at the same time.20 In February1984, at the home of the Wafd's chairman,Fu'ad Siraj al-Din, a bargainwas struck.The eminently reasonablelogic was that the Wafdprovideda legal channelwhile the Ikhwanoffered a popularbase, both seeking to reclaim theirplace on the nationalstage after long years of state-enforcedabsence. There was an even more compelling institutionalcause of the Wafd-Ikhwanalliance, however.The controversialElectoralLaw 114/1983 passed by the outgoing Parliament was a consummateinstance of electoral engineering.The governmentacceded to the representation opposition'sdemandsfor a moreequitableproportional system in contrast to the pluralitysystems of the past,butwith a twist.Forthe firsttime in Egyptianelectoral history,partylists under a proportional system replaced single-member representation constituencies,which ruled out anyonerunningas an independent.The law specifically prohibited candidates of different parties from running on the same lists, in effect deterringparties from pooling their efforts.2'An added novelty was that the electoral law then set a relatively high thresholdof 8 percent of the nationalvote for a partyto Votes to opposition parties that fell short of qualify for parliamentary representation. 8 percent were automaticallytransferredto the NDP. The restrictionsof PartiesLaw 40/1977 and Election Law 114-throttling partyformation,eliminating independents, and setting new barriersto parliamentary access-impelled the Wafd and Ikhwan to collude or perish. The law had its intendedeffect: only the Wafd-Ikhwanalliance overcamethe threshold, securing 15.1 percent of the nationalvote, while the Laborparty got 7.7 percent. Out of 448 seats, the Wafd slate gained fifty-eight, eight of which went to Ikhwancandidatesand an additionaltwo to independentIslamists.The NDP garnered389 seats, or 87.3 percent.Postelection evidence suggests that the Ikhwan paid particularattention to their oversightrole: while they constitutedonly 1.8 percent of parliamentary membership, they were responsible for 18.5 percentof interpellationsdelivered duringthe termfrom 1984 to 1987.22 three-yearparliamentary The Wafd-Ikhwancooperationinside Parliament afterthe elections nearlyevaporated due to the restrictive natureof parliamentary rules,which areexplicitlydesignedto thwart collaboration between oppositionparties.23 The 1984 elections, however,establishedthe Ikhwanas a leading political contestant,strikingelectoral alliances in both Parliament and the professionalunions andjoining the opposition in extraparliamentary coalitions

The Metamorphosisof the EgyptianMuslimBrothers 379 for reform. The Ikhwan were poised for the next round of electoral sparringwith the in expectationof a ruling government.In 1986, when the presidentdissolved Parliament of unconstitutionalityby the Supreme ConstitutionalCourt (SCC) of Law 114/1983 for discriminatingagainst independents,the governmentquickly passed ElectoralLaw 188/1986. The new law maintainedthe 8 percentthresholdand the party-listsystem but canceled the automatictransferring of all votes below 8 percentto the majoritypartyand reservedforty-eightof Parliament's 448 seats for candidatesrunningas independents. The oppositionimmediatelybeganto devise ways to overcomethe hurdlesof Electoral Law 188. IbrahimShukri,chairmanof the LaborParty,approachedthe Ikhwan'snew general guide, MuhammadHamed Abu al-Nasr,and proposed an alliance. A deal was struck,and the minuscule al-Ahrarparty also signed on, having failed to get more than .7 percentof the nationalvote in 1984. It was agreedthatthe slate would be apportioned with 40 percent for the Ikhwan, 40 percent for Labor, and 20 percent for Ahrar.The motives of the Labor Party were clear: stung by its 1984 failure to meet the required threshold, it sought to guaranteeits chances in 1987 by courting a movement with a tangible streetpresence and electoral trackrecord. As for the Ikhwan,their 1984 alliance with the Wafd had shown them the limits of from the perch of an establishedand ideologically coheraugmentingtheirparticipation ent partysuch as the Wafd.By 1987, the Ikhwanhadclearlyoutgrowntheirjunior-partner status in the Wafd alliance and wagered on the weaker and more ideologically flexible LaborPartyas a base of operationsfor the next stage of their development. What was soon billed as the "Islamistalliance" al-islami) was the biggest news of the 1987 elections, paving the way for(al-taha.luf the progressive Islamization of the Labor Party and its mouthpiece,al-Sha'b. Both as a response to critics of the Muslim Brothers'indeterminate election slogan "IslamIs the Solution"(al-islam huwa al-hall) and the exigencies of vote seeking, the Muslim Brothers-dominated alliance distributed a booklet detailing its seven-point electoral program.The booklet stated that Copts are full citizens and that applying and codifying (tatbTq shari'a is a longwa-taqnTn) range process not confined to Islamizing penal provisions but extending to the entire It called for closing down governmentliquor manufactoriesand legal infrastructure. the banning of nightclubs and casinos, as well as comprehensivegovernmentregulation and strategicplanningof the economy.24 the anti-systemicJama'at Unsurprisingly, al-Islamiyya'sstatementagainstthe elections echoed the protestationsof radicalsocialists in the 19th century.It lamentedthe naivete of the Ikhwanfor participating in a farce and accused it of burnishingthe image of the regime and, tellingly, "helpingto build the institutionsof the secularregime."25 In what would become a familiarelection ritual,hundredsof Muslim Brothers'supportersandpoll watcherswere arrestedand detaineda few days before the elections. On election day on 6 April, observersreporteda far less free atmospherethanthe 1984 poll, with rampantgovernmentmeddling, ballot stuffing on behalf of the NDP, and outright turningaway of voters for opposition candidates.The government'slegal engineering before the elections, coupled with physical interferenceduring and after the vote and questionableallotmentof losing partyvotes, conspiredto give the NDP a parliamentary majorityof just under80 percent.The alliance garnered17 percentof the nationalvote, which translatedinto fifty-six seats. Thirty-six went to Muslim Brothers. The Wafd secured thirty-fiveseats. Immediatelyafter the elections, prominentold-guardMuslim

380 Mona El-Ghobashy the emerging Brothersmembersand futureGeneralGuideMustafaMashourarticulated electoral creed of the Ikhwan: of elections for ourfuture, forelectionsarean artwithits Wemustbenefitfromthe experience andwe mustpushthosewhohavegivenup on reforming ownrules,expertise, andrequirements, andregister to voteas soonas possible.26 thisnation, pushthemto get ridof theirpessimism as leadersof the oppoThe Ikhwan'srelativelylargepresencein the 1987 Parliament sition for the first time in Egyptianhistoryraisedthe specterof divisive identitypolitics, But gloom-and-doomforecastsdid not especially regardingthe applicationof shari'a.27 under the rotundaveered between dramatic behavior out. The Ikhwan deputies' pan with Parliamentary in intricate coordination in Speaker performances plenary sessions, Rif'at al-Mahgoub,androutinecommitteeworkaway from the limelight. Parliamentary leaders from the NDP and Ikhwan MPs incessantly negotiated and renegotiatedtheir termsof interaction,alternatelyescalatingand containingcriticismsin response to each shari'awas other'scues and events transpiring outside Parliament.28 Counterintuitively, not the pivotal issue for Ikhwan deputies. One study shows that their prioritieswere political freedomand staterepression;culturalandeducationalissues, includingshari'a; and economic concerns.29 Applying the sharica took a back seat to heated sparring with pugnaciousInteriorMinisterZaki Badrover torturein prisons and police stations, security forces' storming of mosques, and police violation of Ikhwan MPs constitutional immunity,including an unprovokedassault on IkhwanMP Essam al-Eryanby a policeman. An astuteelection observerarguedthatthe Ikhwan'ssuccess in the 1987 electionswas attributable to a conspicuous cooperationbetween old and young Muslim Brothers.30 Almost all of the young MPs had distinguished themselves in a previous electoral arenaduringthe 1980s: the influentialprofessionalunions, historicallypowerfulinterest groups that organizedmiddle- and lower-middle-classpublic opinion. The Muslim Brothers' visibility in the unions began in the 1984 elections to the board of the medical association and grew incrementallythereafterthrough shrewd alliance building and horse tradingwith major political groups. Significantly,the Ikhwannever fielded between candidatesfor the chairmanshipof the unions, part of a tacit understanding the governmentand all opposition groups that the post be reserved for a ruling-party In the 1990s, the slates of Islamist member to facilitate bargainingwith authorities."3 candidatesand their allies swept elections in all the majorprofessionalunions.32 Much has been written on the Muslim Brothers' "takeover"and "back-doorinfiltration"of the syndicates.33Yet informed scholarly accounts tell a different story. Amani Qandil, Egypt's leading sociologist of professional associations, observes that in the associationsis due to theirsuperior the Muslim Brothers'successful performance of the syndicates' andget-out-the-voteskills andtransparent management organizational buttireless, open campaigningin free and fairelections andthe finances. Not infiltration provision of a generousnetworkof post-electionservices is responsiblefor the Muslim Brothers'success.34 The new generationof Muslim Brothersactivists who transformedthe professional unions are a majorcausal force behind the society's adaptationinto a flexible political
party, particularly its ideological amendments. While still in their thirties, they were

alliance with the Wafd among the mastermindsof the Muslim Brothers'parliamentary

The Metamorphosisof the EgyptianMuslimBrothers 381 in 1984 andthe LaborPartyin 1987. Muhammad Abd al-Quddus,currentlya memberof the press syndicateboardand a leading Muslim Brothersfigure,participated in the 1984 that alliance. Abd the al-Moneim Abu Wafd-Ikhwan al-Futuh,now a meeting produced memberof the Society's GuidanceBureau,was a memberof the meeting that clinched the Muslim Brothers-Laboralliance in 1987. The physician Essam al-Eryanand the lawyer MokhtarNouh were two of the most active IkhwanMPs in the 1987 Parliament. Abu al-Ela Madi was a drivingforce in the politics of the engineering syndicate in the early 1990s before his defection from the Ikhwanin 1996.
1990-95: POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT RECONSTRUCTION AND THE POLITICS

OF IDEOLOGICAL

Just as there is a widespreadyet unfoundedassertion that the Muslim Brothers"took over" professional associations, there are equally ubiquitous allegations that they are drivenby immutablesacredtexts that make them untrustworthy political contestants,35 and avid theocratsintenton overturning the secularstate.37 "shamdemocrats,"36 None of these claims is corroborated credible evidence. When it comes to by any democracy,as Ghadbian "so far Islamists have been to moral standards quips, Najib subjected higher than the other players in the arena, as if they were the only authoritarians among an of tried and true democrats."38 assembly Commitmentto democracyis a seriousissue butcannotbe gaugedby hurlinggroundless accusations. This section probes in more detail the ideological changes wrought fromthe MuslimBrothers'electoralparticipation as a more substantive indicatorof their commitmentto democracy.It also traceshow thatparticipation raisedthe government's hackles and subjectedthe Muslim Brothersto a series of grave althoughnot crippling crises. Ideological revisions and organizationalturmoil were the fruit of the Ikhwan's electoral engagement. By 1990, the Ikhwan were exceptionally attuned to the rules of the authoritarian political game. Along with the Wafd,they led a boycott of the 1990 elections afterLaw 188/1986 was declaredunconstitutionaland the 1987 Parliamentwas dissolved. From the perspective of the dual games employed by opposition parties, the boycott was the parties' prioritizationof the delegitimation game to protest the government's incessant electoralengineeringeven as this strategyrobbedthem of a much-prizedforum in Parliament.In 1990, the Ikhwanemphasized coordinationwith the opposition over their hallowed electoral creed while continuingtheir assiduous electioneeringfor seats on municipalcouncils and professionalassociations' boardsin 1992. The year 1992 was a turning point in the government's approachto the Muslim Brothers,shifting from tenuoustolerationto furtherlegal and then physical repression. That year, Ikhwancandidatesswept elections to the medical and bar associations and outshone the government'sbumblingand languorousresponse to the devastatingCairo earthquakein October.In response to the Muslim Brothers' efficient pooling of contributions to earthquakevictims, the prime minister issued Military Decree 4/1992, requiringgovernmentapprovalfor the collection of donations. In February1993, the governmentrailroadedthroughParliamentduringa midnight session Law 100/1993. Governmentspokesmen in Parliamentdefended the law as an effort to combat the "dictatorship of the minority,"a clear reference to the Ikhwan's

382 Mona El-Ghobashy effective electioneering. The Orwellian-titled"Law for the Guaranteesof Democracy in ProfessionalAssociations"requireda 50 percentquorumfor union elections, constitutingthe most visible interferencein internalunion affairssince Sadat issued a decree law in 1981 dissolving the bar association'sboardfor its oppositionto the CampDavid Accords. Professionalunions immediatelymobilized againstthe law, and the majority of members,regardlessof theirpolitics, opposed it on principle.39 Mobilizationagainst the law dovetailedwith rising demandsfor political and constitutionalreform. This was the moment that the new generationof Muslim Brotherscame into their own as skilled organizers and alliance builders with other middle-aged activists of varying political commitments.A two-day Conferenceon Freedomsand Civil Society was held in October 1994 at the medical association and organizedby Muslim Brothers Essam al-Eryan and Abu al-Ela Madi, bringing together hundreds of prominent activists and intellectuals, including governmentfigures, to hammer out a consensus on basic rights. A delegation from the conference that included the two co-organizers visited the Nobel Laureate Naguib Mahfouz in the hospital to express high-profile support and condemnation of his stabbing by militant Islamists. At the same time, the Ikhwanwere issuing communiquescondemningevery attackby militant Islamists on governmentfigures and tourists, and even brokereda cease-fire deal between the radical Islamists and the government during the United Nations' Cairo Population
Conference.40

The first glimmers of the Ikhwan'sideological revisions emerged in 1994 and grew out of the youngergeneration'snetworkingandresponseto theirinterlocutors'demands to clarify their positions on foundationalissues. In March 1994, the Muslim Brothers issued definitivestatementson women's rightsandpartypluralism.The formerstatement their belief in the rights of women both as candidatesfor public office (save articulated for the highestexecutiveoffice in the land)andas voters.The positionpaperfollowed on the heels of actual practice.In a little reportedincident precedingJihane al-Halafawi's high-profilecandidacyin 2000, the female doctor,Wafa' Ramadan,ran for elections to the medical-associationboardon the Ikhwan'sslate in 1992.41 from both theirfounder'sand the old guard'sconservative Mindfulof their departure views on women, the Ikhwanhave devoted much space in theirargumentson women's Qur'anicinjunctionsthat citizenshiprightsto refutingobstinateviews andreinterpreting specify men's tutelageover women, especially Qur'an4:34. Theirstatementarguesthat the verse appliesto householdrelationsonly anddoes not extendto the workplaceorpubarelaced with the Society's utilitarian lic affairs.The Ikhwan'sdoctrinalreinterpretations electoralcredo. As a Muslim Brothersapologist argues,"Limitingthe Muslim woman's right to participatein elections weakens the winning chances of Islamist candidates."42 Contrast this pragmatism to the finality with which former General Guide Umar al-Tilmissanypronouncedhis views on women: butI want orcowardly, women. Modem I do notliketo talkabout peoplemayfindthisshameful, I stillbelievethata man andtheequality of menandwomen. theories to do withmodem nothing her.... A womanwhobelieves is a mananda womanis a womanandthat'swhyGodcreated anddignity.43 whohaslostherfemininity, virtue thatsheis equalto a manis a woman The revampedideology animatedfurtherpolitical action. The Ikhwan'sposition paper on women was invoked by Jihane al-Halafawias an impetus for her contestation

The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers

383

of the 2000 parliamentary elections. Seasoned Ikhwan watchers were not surprised by Halafawi's candidacy, belonging as she does to the generation of middle-aged activists changing the face of the organization. Married to one of the Muslim Brothers' leading architects of electoral strategy, the Alexandria physician, Ibrahim al-Za'farani, Halafawi reflects the younger generation's signature amalgam of flexible ideology and vote seeking. She took pains to point out the critical role of women voters. In her words: The Muslim Brothers' views about women in public life are clear, as evidenced by the March 1994 statement.This is what encouragedme to contest the elections. My decision to run was also to make use of the opportunity presentedby the state'sdesire to integratewomen into the political process, and to clarifythatIslam does not compromisewomen's rights.... Therewas tremendous supportfor me withinthe group.Womenarevery active in the [MuslimBrothers],thoughperhaps not visible. Rememberthatwomen voters areresponsiblefor the success of the seventeenIkhwan membersof Parliament.44 The language of the Ikhwan's statement "Shura and Party Pluralism in Muslim Society" is a similar synthesis of Islamic values and contemporary experience.45 It argues that the Qur'an stipulates a rule of public consultation in governance, sura, "and this means that the umma is the source of all powers." The statement bows to the stock demand for shari'a but affirms the need for a written constitution specifying a "balance of powers"; emphasizes public freedoms for both Muslims and non-Muslims; and calls for a legislature with oversight functions and binding decisions. Depending on one's perspective, the explicit call for a written constitution is either an evasion or realization of the Ikhwan's enduring slogan "The Qur'an is our constitution." The statement concludes with a newfangled Qur'anic justification of political parties as a necessary institutionalization of God-given differences. As Essam al-Eryan later elaborated, "God created humans with differences, so plurality is the normal state of things. The problem is how to organize these differences without turning them into chaos, and that's why you need several parties."46The endorsement of multiple political parties is in blatant contradiction to Hasan al-Banna's famously hostile attitude toward parties; he derided hizbiyya (partisanship) and viewed parties as nothing more than vanity projects of warring politicians that diverted the country's energies from resisting the British.47 To explain the discrepancy, the Ikhwan historicize al-Banna's aversion to parties. In a much quoted rationalization, the prominent scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a member of the Ikhwan in the 1950s and a longtime sympathizer based in Qatar who was offered but declined the Ikhwan's highest post of general guide in 2002 after Mashour's passing, writes: I am awarethatthe martyred ImamHasanal-Bannadeploredpartisanlife andthe establishmentof partiesin Islam due to whathe witnessedin his time of partiesthatdividedthe ummain confronting the enemy. They were partiesthatrevolvedaroundindividualsinsteadof clear goals andplatforms. It is all right if our interpretation differs from that of our Imam, may God have compassion on him, for he did not disallow those who came after him to have their own interpretations, especially if circumstances change andpositions and ideas evolve. Perhapsif he lived till today he would see what we see. Fatwaschange with changingtimes, places, and conditions,especially in

384

Mona El-Ghobashy

ThosewhoknowHasan al-Banna knowthathe wasnotrigidbut affairs. ever-changing political available to him.48 his ideasandpoliciesaccording to theevidence developed series of events for the Muslim continueddespitea traumatic Ideological amendments Brothersbeginningin 1995, when theirheretoforeopaqueorganizational dynamicswere laid open for all to see andthe groupceased to speakwith one disciplinedvoice in public. In retrospect,it is clear thata confluence of events immediatelybefore and during1995 proveddecisive and catastrophicfor the Ikhwan.In the early 1990s, Americanofficials to commentangrily PresidentMubarak made contactswith Ikhwanmembers,prompting to the AmericanjournalistMary Anne Weaverin November 1994: Thishasall withtheseterrorists fromthe Muslim Brotherhood. is in contact Yourgovernment themistakes without ourknowledge at first.Youthinkyou cancorrect beendoneverysecretly, withthe Ayatollah Khomeini andhis fanatic thatyou madein Iran,whereyou hadno contact will never takeoverthis But I can assure these before seized you, groups they power. groups country.49 election year, eightyIn January 1995, at the very beginning of the parliamentary two of the Ikhwan's leading middle-aged activists convening the Muslim Brothers' Shura Council were roundedup and detained in the first round of a sweeping crackdown unseen since the 1950s. They were charged with plotting to overthrow the regime and referred to a military tribunal,a forum heretofore reserved for Islamist radicals. On 26 June, a failed assassination attempton Mubarakin Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, furtherinflamed the already tense relations between the Ikhwan and the regime and pushed the regime to dispense with any distinctions between radical Islamists and the Muslim Brothers.Thoughthe Ikhwanscrambledto condemnthe assassinationattempt, rumorsswirledthatthey hadknownaboutthe plot, andthe state'sstancesoon took on the of a vendetta.On 23 November,a week beforethe startof elections, the military character tribunalsentencedfifty-fourMuslim Brothersto three to five years in prison, including many of the Ikhwan's election whiz kids who had planned to run in the elections, chiefly Essam al-Eryan,Abd al-Moneim Abu al-Futouh,Muhammadal-Sayed Habib, MuhammadKhayratal-Shater,and Ibrahimal-Za'farani.Yet as hundredsof Muslim Brotherspoll watcherswere preemptivelydetainedby the InteriorMinistrydays before elections, the Ikhwanstill did not resortto the delegitimationgame. Instead,they fielded approximately 150 candidates. Following the most violent vote in Egyptian electoral history, resulting in 61 dead, 1,313 injured,and 2,400 detained, the Muslim Brothers securedonly one parliamentary seat."' more At the height of the crackdown,the Ikhwancontinuedto produceincrementally detailedstatementsof theirpositions. By farthe most significantdocumentwas whatthe on Democracy," a documentwhose purposewas MuslimBrothersdubbedthe "Statement to affirm the society's commitmentto playing the democratictransitiongame despite state repression.The paper outlined the Society's stance on four pivotal issues: nonbetweenreligionandpolitics, violence andpolitics, andhuman Muslims,the relationship of its revamped rights. It was the closest the group had come to a public announcement ideology and as such deserves some attention.:

The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers

385

On the issue of non-Muslims, the statementasserts: andnotjudges,andthuswe do not We the MuslimBrothers alwayssay thatwe areadvocates to his in with God'swords:"No everconsider accordance belief, anybody change compelling inreligion." inEgypt Our ourChristian brothers andtheArab world compulsion position regarding is explicit,established andknown: theyhavethe samerightsanddutiesas we do.... Whoever extracts fromthe Ikwan's believesor actsotherwise is forsaken by us. [Thisandall subsequent be in n. statement can found Arabi, 51.] Rowaq democracy As attacks by radical Islamist groups on the life and propertyof Coptic Christians mountedin the mid-1990s,the MuslimBrotherswere pushedto enunciatea clearposition on the status of Copts in their ideal Muslim state. Their affirmationsof Copts' equal status ranged from hagiographicnarrativesof Hasan al-Banna's warm relations with Copts to more substantiveideological constructions such as the one quoted above.52 The Ikhwan's emphasis on Copts' full citizenship rights relies heavily on the panconfessional concept of citizenship developed by the moderate Islamist thinker and formerjudge, Tariqal-Bishri.53 On religion and politics, the Muslim Brothers' statement asserts that there is no ineluctablecontradictionbetween vox populi and vox dei-that is, popularsovereignty and a sharica-based system. "Thelegitimacy of governmentin a Muslim society should be derivedfrom the consent and choice of the people ... people have the right to invent differentsystems, formulas, and techniquesthat suit their conditions, which definitely would vary accordingto time, place, and living conditions."They restate the constitutionalistjustificationfor an organizedoppositionmade in the 1994 pluralismstatement and devote considerablespace to refutingthe chargethat they countenanceviolence. On human rights, the statementratherbombastically claims that "Islam has been and still is the only intellectual and political model that honors man and humanity, differencesin language,color, andrace."Perhapsas a nod to criticisms,the disregarding statementis also addressedto Muslim Brothers,calling on each one "to open his mind and heart to all people; he should not treat anybody haughtily or insolently,"in effect admittingandvowing to spurnthe Muslim Brothers'self-image as a political movement a cut above the rest.
1995-2000: TURMOIL CRISIS AND THE POLITICS OF ORGANIZATIONAL

The state'stargetingof the group'smiddle-agedcadresin 1995 took a serioustoll, andthe Society of Muslim Brothersbegan to show the organizationalstresses familiarto other Egyptianpolitical partiesand from which the grouphad long considereditself exempt. The periodfrom 1995 to 2000, when the Muslim Brothers'best minds were imprisoned, witnessed the selection of a new, intransigentgeneral guide; factional disputes and devastatingpublic splits; worrying ideological reversals rather than renewals; and a between olderMuslimBrothersandthe younger seeming end to the fruitfulcollaboration The first generationthathad madethe society such a resilientandenergeticorganization. indication of reversalscame in August 1995, when all opposition parties were on the cusp of signing a documentof "nationalconcord"(al-wifaq al-watani) outlining their unitedstanceon a basic minimumset of democraticrightsaheadof the fall parliamentary elections.The initiativefell apartwhen Ma'munal-Hudaybi refusedto sign the document

386 Mona El-Ghobashy and profferedhis own alternative Left in the hands plan filled with clauses on shari'a.54 of the old guard,the common ideological frontwith otherpolitical partiespainstakingly built by the Muslim Brothers'youngercadreswas unmistakably eroding. Much as the Ikhwanclaimed that,unlike otherEgyptiangroups,they were an organizationbased on rules andnot persons,the selection of MustafaMashouras generalguide in 1996 had a profoundinfluence on the group's trajectory. The death of ailing fourth GeneralGuide MuhammadHamed Abu al-Nasr in 1996 led to a quiet leadershiphandover to MustafaMashour,the now infamous "cemeterypledge of allegiance"(bay'at al-maqabir) that evaded the Ikhwan'sbylaws. Immediatelyafter the burialof Abu alNasr, a tight-knit circle led by Guidance Bureau members Ma'mun al-Hudaybi and Mashourhimself essentially anointed Mashourto the highest executive post without election or consultationwith ShuraCouncil members,citing as justificationthe security clampdownon the last ShuraCouncil meeting in 1995. Mashour had been a member of the Muslim Brothers' controversialparamilitary wing, the Special Apparatus(al-Nizam al-Khas), formed in 1940; its establishment irrevocablyalteredthe organizationand bred a cadre of hard-linemilitants steeped in the conspiratorial political mind set of the 1940s. Mashourwas imprisonedin 1954 and in the 1970s as a key decision-makerduring the tenures of General Guides emerged and Abu al-Nasr.One Ikhwananalyst claims that these two guides were al-Tilmissany as frontsfor the real powerresidingin Mashourand chosen mild-mannered deliberately a handfulof ironfistedformermembersof the Special Apparatus.55 Tangiblepower dynamicsratherthanadherenceto the group'sbylaws also governed the role of Mashour'sconfidantMa'munal-Hudaybi.The lattercarvedout a high-profile position for himself as "official spokesman,"though this post is nonexistent in the Ikhwan'sbylaws. Membersrationalizethatthis was made necessary by GeneralGuide Abu al-Nasr's failing health and MustafaMashour's"personalreasons "-namely, that "he was not very patient,"in the words of Guidance Bureaumember Abd al-Moneim Abu al-Futuh.56 That might have been a politic reference to a disastrous interview given by Mashourin 1997 in the midst of local council elections that Muslim Brothers memberswere contesting. In a taped interview,Mashourmaintainedthat in an Islamic state, Coptic citizens should be barredfrom top posts in the army to ensure complete states,anda specialtax (jizya) wouldbe collected loyalty in confrontinghostile Christian from them in exchange for protectionby the state.57 The remarksdid nothing to help MuslimBrotherselection candidatesandcast seriousdoubtson the Ikhwan'sideological revisions. Al-Hudaybi wrote letters of "clarification," but attemptsat damage control as a tolerantmovement.58 only reinforcedsuspicions of a bigoted groupmasquerading UnderMashourand al-Hudaybi'stenure,rumblingsof organizational discontentrose to the surface in an unprecedentedly public manner.The most serious rift to beset the Ikhwansince the 1950s came in 1996 when the engineer Abu al-Ela Madi and several associates petitioned the government'sPolitical PartiesCommitteeto form the Center Party (Hizb al-Wasat). The initiative was initially thought to be a Muslim Brothers projectfrontedby its youthful members,but it soon became all too clear thatthe Wasat was a group of Muslim Brothersbreakawayswho felt muzzled by the Ikhwan'srigid, top-down structure.As the voluble Wasat member Essam Sultan asserted, there was pervasive "organizational unemployment"within the Muslim Brothers,and plenty of young cadresfoundthemselveswith no say in the runningof the organization.59 Mashour

The Metamorphosisof the EgyptianMuslimBrothers 387 Muslim andal-Hudaybireactedfuriouslyto Madiandhis associates' project,threatening Brotherswho supportedthe Wasatwith disciplinaryaction and dismissal and going so far as to aid the government'scase againstthe fledgling group.The governmentswiftly referredthe Wasatfoundersto a militarytribunal,the first time in Egyptianhistorythat citizens were triedfor petitioningto form a legal party,and the tribunalsentencedsome The irony of old-guardmembersin both the state and of the foundersto prison terms.60 Ikhwancolluding to stifle the Wasatdid not go unnoticed. The Ikhwan-Wasatsplit received an enormous amount of local and international presscoverageandgenerateda veritablecottageindustryof Ikhwanology,endless media speculations over the supposedly cut-throatpolitics and factionalism of the famously tight-lippedorganization.The row had all the makingsof a choice political scandal:the prominentAnglican scion Rafiq Habibis a foundingmemberof the Wasat;the dissident Essam Sultan's wife is Ma'mun al-Hudaybi'sniece; famous figures from across the political spectrumthrew their weight behind the Wasat, from the Doha-based Islamic scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawito the leftist doyen MuhammadSid Ahmed. Madi and his associates became darlings of the secular intelligentsia and used the media to their advantage,accusing their formerleaders of dictatorialmanagementand stale thinking, while al-Hudaybiand otherIkhwanshruggedoff the Wasatas a bunchof media-hungry self-promotersbent on tarnishingthe Muslim Brothers. Less well noted is that the split coincided with a spate of similar tribulationsin virtually all Egyptian opposition parties, where paralyzing disputes eruptedbetween hoary party elders and restless middle-aged activists with a fundamentallydifferent vision of how to play the electoral and regime games. Young activists had almost the leftist Tagammu',so the dictatorialmien andpro-government completely abandoned of its Rif'at al-Saidcame in for open criticism (now chairman) secretary-general fawning from seasoned party activists of his own generation.Forty-somethingNasserists broke off from their party to form their own groups-notably, Hamdeen Sabahy's Karama (Dignity) movement. And soon, the new Wafd Party chairman,No'man Gom'a was The Wasat expelling and alienatingmembersandMPs for daringto disagreewith him.61 a Ikhwan into of the the normalization heralded Egyptian opposition typical episode party, experiencing the same organizationalills other parties had been less adept at concealing.

A NEW

MILLENNIUM

AND

A NEW

SOCIETY

OF MUSLIM

BROTHERS?

in the fall of 2000, the governmentstruckagain elections approached As parliamentary with a roundupof twenty would-be candidateswho were then tried and sentencedby a and in November2000. Steeringa mediancourse between participating militarytribunal Jihane al-Halafawi. Ikhwan fielded the candidates, low, including only seventy-five lying The group secured seventeen seats under the individual candidacy system, more than all the oppositionpartiescombined.Severalmonthslater,the Muslim Brothersemerged victorious in another electoral arena. In February2001, in the first elections at the bar association since Law 100/1993, a "national slate" put together by the Ikhwan comprising eight Muslim Brothers,four NDP members, a Nasserist, a Wafdist, and a

388 Mona El-Ghobashy The parliamentary andbarelections hintedat a revival Coptwon elections to the board.62 of the Ikhwanand its matchless electoraldeal-makingskills. The unknown second-tierMuslim Brothersmembersturnedparliamentary deputies soon made a nationalname for themselves, adoptingthe simultaneouslyconfrontational and low-key style of theirpredecessorsin the 1987 Parliament. Not surprisingly, culture and identity issues were among Ikhwandeputies' main but certainlynot sole concerns. Muslim Brothersparliamentary deputy Gamal Heshmat caused a stir when he filed a routineparliamentary whathe claimedwere state-funded inquiryregarding racynovels.63 His MuslimBrotherscolleagues underthe rotundadecriedthe frivolityof the Miss Egypt beauty pageant at a time that Palestinianswere being brutalizedby Israelis, they said, and filed inquiriesaboutsuch mattersas the distribution of feminine sanitarynapkinsin and schools. Asked to the rationale for the lattermove, Muhammad junior high explain Mursi,the spokesmanfor the unofficialMuslim Brothersbloc, first said, "Inour culture, these matters are dealt with between a mother and her daughterin the privacy of the home."When askedfor furtherclarificationon why the issue was worthyof being raised in Parliament,Mursi said, "We object to the use of schools as advertisingspace for certain brandsof sanitarynapkins. They were distributingonly the AmericanAlways brand;schools shouldn'tbe used to marketspecific productsto students."64 Also similar to the 1987 Parliament, Ikhwandeputiesfocused on cases of abuseby securityforces and devotedconsiderabletime to theirconstituents'bread-and-butter issues, unemployment the topping list.65 Authoritiesmade clear their displeasurewith at least one Ikhwan parliamentarian, engaging in the novel mechanismof electoral engineeringafter the 2000 vote to unseat the irksomeGamalHeshmat.For the first time since 1991, the parliamentary leadership decided to implementa courtreporton election irregularities, even thoughit had rejected or ignored hundreds of such reports challenging NDP deputies' election. Heshmat was strippedof his parliamentary membership,and in January2003 the government orchestrated a rerunof the election in his Damanhour district,installing500 trucksfilled with riotpolice to preventHeshmat'ssupporters fromvoting. The elections were a replay of the tamperedwith Alexandriabyelections in June 2002 orchestratingal-Halafawi's defeat, althoughthis time Heshmat'sseat went to a Wafdmember.66 A formerNasserist and a physicianby training,Heshmatblamed"themedia"for exactivitiesto bringabouta crisis with the government. After aggeratinghis parliamentary his ouster, he went back to college to obtain a postgraduatediploma in parliamentary studies and was subsequentlydetained for several months and then released in 2004. Before his detention,Heshmatinsistedthathe had been ousted from Parliament because of his active parliamentary oversightactivities:
The governmentcouldn't standto have a representative who actually listened to his constituents. When they saw that I as a Muslim Brothersdeputy didn't speak in an offensive, preachyway but used modernlanguage, they feared this even more. In the two years I was an MP,my thoroughly documented parliamentaryquestions and requests for clarification led to the dismissal of six officials, including a deputy minister of education in Beheira Province and a supervisorof the Mubarak job-trainingprogramfor college graduates.This was the reason for my ouster.67 As the seventeen turned-sixteen deputies were maintaining a visible Ikhwan presence in Parliament, the cadres interned in 1995 emerged from prison in 2000 and seamlessly

TheMetamorphosisof the EgyptianMuslimBrothers 389 assumed their leadershiproles in the Muslim Brothers organization,patching up the Wasatsplit and reestablishingboth ceremonial and substantiveties with other political groups. The annual traditionof the Ikhwan's Ramadan iftar at a five-star hotel was sprucedup with noticeablewomen and secularguests; in 2001, the AmericanUniversity was prominently himself now a prisongraduate, in Cairosociologist SaadEddinIbrahim, the MuslimBrothers seatedat the headtablenextto Ma'munal-Hudaybi.Conspicuously, never missed a chance to cooperate with state authorities,even as a military tribunal sentenced sixteen more of their members to prison in July 2002. In the wake of the American-ledinvasion of Iraq in March 2003, the Muslim Brotherscoordinatedwith the governmentand organized a thousands-strongantiwarrally, invoking their stock argumentof preservingnationalunity in the face of foreign occupation.Startingin April 2003, however, security forces resumed detaining leading Muslim Brothersfigures in variousprovinces who had been active in managingantiwaractivities.68 Incrementalideological articulationpicked up where it had left off in 1995. The released Muslim Brothersredoubledtheir efforts to standardizeand fine-tunethe group's ideological pronouncements,restating their positions on democracy,women's rights, and, especially, Coptic rights, diligently working to erase Mashour's 1997 comments from national memory. The physicians Essam al-Eryan and Abd al-Moneim Abu alFutuh, members of the Shura Council and Guidance Bureau, respectively, emerged as the most visible spokesmen and ideologues of the Ikhwan,grantinginterviews and media.In the pair'spronouncements, ambigupenningarticlesin a varietyof non-Ikhwan ous issues became more concrete:the Ikhwan would respect a democraticallyelected communistgovernment;democracyis not simply compatiblewith shurabut "partof a common humanheritage";the Muslim Brotherswould unconditionallyaccept a Coptic president of Egypt elected in fair elections; the issue of an Islamic state was already resolved since "the constitution already says that Egypt is an Islamic state and that Islamic shari'ais the basis of legislation;"the Muslim Brothersconsiderthe constitution and the ballot box to be the ultimatejudges; women's "hijab is merely a question of identity and belonging, just as saris are for Indians";the Muslim Brothers"engagedin militaryactivities when the countrywas underoccupation.This is a historical fact, but there is no room for its repetitionin a countrygovernedby its own citizens, regardless of how divergentthey may be in opinions and attitudes."69 The passing of Mashourin 2002 andof al-Hudaybiin 2004, as the last of the influential of the Society of old guard,is the most significantopening for the furthertransformation Muslim Brothers.Indeed,as the customaryspeculationraged over who would steer the group, GuidanceBureaumembersfor the first time announcedto the public a specific procedurefor electing the coming general guide,70 and the circumstantialposition of "official spokesman"carved out by al-Hudaybiwas scrapped.Also, the posts of two deputy General Guides stipulatedby the Ikhwan's bylaws were filled with "younger" generationBrothers,geologist MuhammadHabib and computerengineer KhayratalShater.As soon as he was elected in January2004, MuhammadMahdi Akef reiterated the group's desire to operate as a legal political party, and in a dramaticgesture he conveneda press conferenceon 3 March2004 to announcethe Muslim Brothers'vision of a republican, civil government bound by law. Aside from the usual demand for applying sharica, Akef's programdid not departin any meaningful sense from every demand of the Egyptian opposition over the past thirty years. Immediately, Interior

390 Mona El-Ghobashy MinisterHabibal-Adli statedthatas an illegal organization the Muslim Brothershad no business floating programsand rebukedthe press syndicatefor offeringAkef a venue.71 Forthe firsttime, ideas developedby the comparatively young membersof the Muslim Brotherswere officially and publicly adoptedby their general guide. Akef's message was intended for several audiences: the Egyptian government;opposition parties and independentintellectuals; and all-importantforeign parties demanding Arab reform, andits "Greater MiddleEastInitiative." To American principallythe Bush administration and Europeanpolicymakers,Akef's announcement was a riposte to governmentclaims that Islamists constitutethe most potent dangerto the futureof the Arab world. It also signaled an end to the entrenchedtraditionjealously guarded by Arab governments of claiming all-knowing tutelage over their citizens and their exclusive representation abroad.To other Egyptian interlocutors,it was a message that the Muslim Brothers and they are in one camp, speak the same constitutionalistlanguage, agree on the foundationalissue of the division and rotationof political powers, and can be counted on in any futurecommon initiatives. Above all, Akef's announcementwas self-preservation throughself-clarification,an to heal the rift between old and new attempt generationsand reestablish a coherent, line for the adherents and potential members. Muslim revamped ideological group's Brothersleaders'increasinglytransparent and forthcomingimpartingof information on is directed in the main to a reassurance members, decision-makingprocedures potential that decisions are made relying not on the seniority principle or a prison stint but the modernelectoralmechanismof one man, one vote. "Of course, we're a partof Egyptian society which is naturallyvery paternalistic,but the truthis that the Murshidhas only one vote, no more."72

CONCLUSION

Setting out to win Egyptian hearts and minds for an austere Islamic state and society, Hasan al-Banna's Society of Muslim Brothers was instead irrevocably transformed into a flexible political party that is highly responsive to the unforgivingcalculus of electoral politics. The Muslim Brothers have left no political opportunityuntapped, plunging with gusto into the vote-seeking game, pushing other political forces and the state to take seriously what began as a farcical marginof electoral competition in the 1970s. The case of the Ikhwanconfirmsthat it is the institutionalrules of participation ratherthanthe commandments of ideology thatmotivatepolitical parties.Even the most ideologically committed and organizationallystalwartparties are transformedin the with competitors,citizens, andthe state.Ideology andorganization process of interacting bow to the termsof participation. The ghost of Roberto Michels looms large over the Ikhwan's trajectory,and his moralizedcritiqueis echoed by many of theircritics:"Partylife involves strangemoral and intellectual sacrifices."73 Ayman al-Zawahiri,a leading member of the Egyptian Jihadgroup,right-handman to Osamabin Laden,and fierce critic of the Ikhwan,rues: The Ikhwan in electionsin Egypt,Jordan, Sudan, Kuwait, participate Algeria,Syria,andother Muslim lands infidel What is is of governed by governments. truly regrettable theIkhwan's rallying thousands of duped Muslim before ballot boxesinstead of liningthem youthin voterqueues upto

The Metamorphosisof the EgyptianMuslimBrothers 391 Allah's withtheconditions andregimes fightin thecauseof Allah.Theyhavesubstituted bidding of theinfidels.74 Yet as this article has argued, regardless of moral valuations, the rules of political engagement hold powerful sway over the behavior and make-up of political actors. There is no clearerevidence of this than the recent desire of radicalIslamist groups in Egypt to morphinto legal political partiespartakingof the electoral game, stuntedand distortedas that game is in authoritarian Egypt.75 Yet it behooves us to note that the Ikhwanare not losing ideological uniquenessand indicates,they still becominga "catch-all" party.As theirbehaviorin the 2000 Parliament culture and in issues of their with the caveat that grant identity pride place platform, as the culturewars rage on in Egypt, particularly over Americanizedglobalization,the Ikhwan'sgripes over the moralturpitudeof Egyptiancultureare soundingless and less distinctive.76 Unlike other Egyptianorganizations-notably, opposition parties and advocacy nongovernmental organizations-the Ikhwanseem to have successfullymanaged andformalized,if not resolved,differentcurrents of opinionwithintheirgroup,so thatthe and dissension from the high-profileexpulsions partyleader's line still routinein other are now less visible the Egyptianparties among Ikhwan,despite the sensationalismwith which the press continuesto speculateover strugglesfor power withinthe group'sranks. The Ikhwan'sevolutionholds an important lesson for theoriesof partytransformation out of cases in advanced industrialized democracies.Electoral authoritarian developed such as show that regimes Egypt's party adaptationis still possible and even considerable, but not due solely to damaginglosses at the ballot box. Instead,partiesin electoral authoritarian regimes adaptto fend off staterepressionand maintaintheirorganizational existence. It is not Downsianvote seeking but,rather,Michels's self-preservation thatis the objective of a partyin an authoritarian defined regime, self-preservation broadlyto includejockeyingfor influenceandrelevancewith the publicandinfluentialinternational actors. If the Ikhwanhave respondedwith such flexibility to the threatsand opportunities of their authoritarian environment,one can speculate how much more they would acclimate themselves to the rigors of free and open electoral politics undistortedby repression. The trajectoryof the EgyptianIkhwanurges a returnto empiricalstudies of Islamist groups and their interactionwith their political contexts, informedby the accumulated democknowledge on partybehaviorin 19th- and 20th-centuryadvancedindustrialized racies. It is by no means a law thatpartiesadaptor moderatetheirplatformsin response to electoral participation,and there are well-known cases of reversals or adoption of more extreme ideological and policy positions.77But it is striking how a majorityof party organisms,regardlessof ideology, modulate their organizationaland ideological featuresto align with changing environmentalcues and incentives. Islamist partiesare no exception.78
NOTES Author's note: I thank ProfessorJuan Cole and the anonymousIJMESreviewers for their detailed and very helpful comments. 1For a description of the byelections, see Abdalla Hasan, "Democracy Died Today,"Cairo Times, 410 July 2002.

392 Mona El-Ghobashy

21 use the terms "Society of Muslim Brothers,""Muslim Brothers,"and "Ikhwan"interchangeablyin this article. The ubiquitous "Muslim Brotherhood"is a glaring but persistent mistranslation,reinforcing mystification of the Ikhwan's genesis and development. Issues of translationare more than semantic. The sociologist Bryan Turnerproclaims,"Indeed,the word brotherhooditself indicates the presence, in Weber's terms, of closed/communalties within the open/associationalworld of state arrangements": Bryan Turner, "Islam,Civil Society, and Citizenship:Reflections on the Sociology of Citizenship and Islamic Studies,"in Citizenshipand the State in the Middle East: Approachesand Applications,ed. Nils Butenschon (Syracuse, N.Y.: SyracuseUniversityPress, 2000), 28-48. Arabic-speaking scholarsarenot immunefrom mistranslation. The highest post of the Muslim Brothers,the generalguide (al-murshidal-'a-mm), is renderedominously the "GrandMaster"in LarbiSadiki, The Searchfor Arab Democracy:Discourses and Counter-Discourses(New York:ColumbiaUniversityPress, 2004), 358. 3This definition is a median between purely proceduraland substantivecomponentsof democracy.See CharlesTilly, Stories, Identities,and Political Change (Lanham,Md.: Rowmanand Littlefield,2002), 94. in RobertMichels, Political Parties: A Sociological Studyof the 4SeymourMartinLipset "Introduction," Oligarchical Tendenciesof ModernDemocracy (New York:Free Press, 1962), 19. of the WesternEuropeanParty Systems," in Political Parties 5Otto Kirchheimer,"The Transformation and Political Development,ed. JosephLaPalombara and MyronWeiner(Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversity was influencedby AnthonyDowns's theoryof partiesas vote-maximizing Press, 1966), 177-200. Kirchheimer machines:AnthonyDowns, An Economic Theoryof Democracy (New York:Harperand Row, 1957). 6AdamPrzeworskiandJohnSprague,PaperStones:A Historyof Electoral Socialism(Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1986). 7StathisN. Kalyvas, "CommitmentProblemsin Religious Democracies:The Case of Religious Parties," ComparativePolitics 32, 4 (2000): 379-98. SScott Mainwaring,"PartyObjectives in Authoritarian Regimes with Elections or Fragile Democracies: A Dual Game,"in ChristianDemocracy in Latin America: Electoral Competitionand Regime Conflicts,ed. Scott Mainwaringand Timothy Scully (Stanford,Calif.: StanfordUniversityPress, 2003), 18. 9Ibid., 3-29. 'oBrynjarLia, The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928-1942 (Reading:IthacaPress, 1998). 11 Majmu'atal-rasa'il al-Imam al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna (The Collected Epistles of the MartyredImam Hasan al-Banna)(Beirut:Dar al-Hadaraal-Islamiyya, 1981), 46-47. 12Richard P.Mitchell, TheSociety of the MuslimBrothers(New York:OxfordUniversityPress, 1993), 236, 245. '3Lia, MuslimBrothersin Egypt, 249. MuslimBrothers,307-13. 14Mitchell, 5The programis reprintedin MahmudAbd al-Halim, al-Ikhwanal-Muslimun:ru'ya min al-dakhil (The Muslim Brothers:An Inside View) (Alexandria:Dar al-Da'wa, 1985), 118-25. 16See the Ikhwan's bylaws, reprinted in Abdalla al-Nafisi, ed., al-Haraka al-islamiyya: ru'ya (The IslamistMovement:A Future-Oriented View) (Cairo:MaktabatMadbuli, 1989), 401-16. mustaqbaliyya 17Abd al-MoneimAbu al-Futuh,memberof the GuidanceBureau,interviewwith the author, Cairo,24 June 2003. Al-Futuhexpressedregretthat no term limits were set and indicatedthatthis would be the first orderof business in upcomingamendmentsto the statute. 18Umaral-Tilmissany,Dhikrayatla mudhakkirat (Memories Not Memoirs) (al-Qahira:Dar al-Tiba'awa al-Nashral-Islamiyya, 1985), 212. 19Ibid.,197. 20Ibid.,22. 21Fora fine-grainedanalysis of the numerousadditionalrestrictionsof the law, includinggerrymandering, see HasanaynTawfiqIbrahimand Hoda RaghibAwad,al-Dawr al-siyasi li-Jama'atal-Ikhwanal-Musliminfi dhil al-ta'addudiyya al-siyasiyya al-muqayyadafimisr (The Political Role of the Society of Muslim Brothers in the Contextof RestrictedPolitical Pluralismin Egypt) (Cairo:Markazal-Mahrusa,1996), 44-60. 22Ibid., 196. 23Formore detail, see ibid., 191-217. 24Theprogramis reprintedin Ahmad Abdalla,ed., al-Intikhabat al-barlamaniyyafi misr: dars intikhabat
1987 (Parliamentary Elections in Egypt: The Lesson of the 1987 Elections) (Cairo: Markaz al-Buhuth alArabiyya, 1990), 305-17.

The Metamorphosisof the EgyptianMuslimBrothers 393

al-Islamiyyastatement,reprintedin ibid., 318-20. 25Al-Jama'at 26Cited in Tawfiq Yusuf al-Wa'i, al-Fikr al-siyasi al-mu'asir 'inda al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin (The Muslim Brothers' ContemporaryPolitical Thought) (Kuwait: Maktabat al-Manar al-Islamiyya, 2001), 165. 27See SalaheddinHafez, "OurConstitution... Put to the Test!"al-Ahram,6 April 1987, 13. 28Forthe minutes of parliamentary plenary sessions featuringthe Ikhwan, see Mohsen Rady, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimuntahtqubbatal-barlaman(The MuslimBrothersunderthe Parliamentary Rotunda),2 vols. (Cairo: Dar al-Tawziwa al-Nashral-Islamiyya, 1990). For an analysis of IkhwanMPs' parliamentary conduct, see Ibrahimand Awad,al-Dawr al-siyasi, 361-406. 29AmmarAli Hasan, "Ada' al-tahaluf al-islami fi majlis al-sha'b khilal al-fasl al-tashri'i al-khamis: dirasafi al-riqabaal-barlamaniya" (The Performanceof the Islamist Alliance in the Fifth Legislative Session of Parliament:A Study in Parliamentary Oversight), in al-Tatawwural-siyasi fi misr 1982-1992 (Political Development in Egypt 1982-1992), ed. MuhammadKharbush(Cairo: Markaz al-Buhuth wa-l-Dirasat al-Siyasiyya, 1994), 133-60. 30BertusHendriks,"Egypt'sNew Political Map,"Middle East Report (July-August 1987): 23-30. elections of 2001 and 2003, voting andjournalistsupendedthat traditionin their transformative 31Lawyers in the Nasserist activists Sameh Ashouras chairmanof the bar and Galal Aref as chairmanof the journalists' union. In a bid at cooptation, both were appointedto the government'sNational Human Rights Council in January2004. 32Forspecifics, see Amani Qandil,al-Mujtama'al-madanifi misrfi matla' alfiyyajadida (Civil Society in bi-l-Ahram, Egypt at the Dawn of a New Millenium) (Cairo:Markazal-Dirasatal-Siyasiyya wa-l-Istratijiyya 2000), 31. 33For the "takeover" 47; SheriBerman,"Islamism, "Islam,Civil Society, andCitizenship," view, see Turner, Revolution,and Civil Society,"Perspectiveson Politics 1, 2 (2003): 257-72; AhmadHusein Hasan, al-Su'ud al-siyasi al-islami dakhilal-niqabatal-mihaniyya(The IslamistPoliticalRise in the ProfessionalAssociations) (Cairo:al-Daral-Thaqafiyyali-l-Nashr,2000). 34AmaniQandil, "al-Tayaral-islami dakhil jam'at al-masalih fi misr" (The Islamist Trend in Egyptian InterestGroups), Qadayafikriyya (October 1989): 162-68. See also CarrieRosefsky Wickham,Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), chap. 8. 35 JohnWaterbury, "DemocracywithoutDemocrats?The Potentialfor Political Liberalizationin the Middle East,"in Democracy withoutDemocrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World,ed. GhassanSalame (London:I. B. Tauris,1994), 45. 36AsFareedZakariaopines in "How to Save the ArabWorld," Newsweek,24 December 2001, 24. 37HalaMustafa,member of the NDP Policies Secretariat,is a consistent exponent of this view: see Hala Post, 18 November2003. Mustafa,"BuildingArabDemocracy," Washington and theIslamistChallengein theArabWorld(Boulder,Colo.: Westview Democratization Ghadbian, 38Najib Press, 1997), 76. 39Fora detailed discussion of the law and its 1995 amendments,see Abdalla Khalil, AzmatNiqabat alMuhamin(The Crisis of the Bar Association) (Cairo: Markaz al-Qahirali-Dirasat Huquq al-Insan, 1999), 108-21. 40See three such press releases in MuhammadMuru, al-Haraka al-Islamiyyafi misr min 1928 ila 1993 (The Islamist Movement in Egypt from 1928 to 1993) (Cairo: al-Dar al-Misriyya li-l-Nashr wa al-Tawzi', 1994), 199-201. The Ikhwan'sbrokerageis reportedin RobertFisk, "Deal Silences the CairoHardMen,"The Independent,11 September1994. 41Ramadan was not successful. AmaniQandil,al-Dawr al-siyasi li-jama'atal-masalihfi misr (The Political Role of InterestGroupsin Egypt) (Cairo:Markazal-Dirasatal-Siyasiyya wa-l-Istratijiyya bi-l-Ahram,1996), 72. al-Fikral-siyasi al-mu'asir, 253. 42A1-Wa'i, Dhikrayat,21. 43Al-Tilmissany, 44Jihane al-Halafawi,interviewwith the author,Alexandria,11 June 2003. 45Thestatementis reproducedin al-Wa'i, al-Fikr al-siyasi al-mu'asir, 127-32. 46Quotedin "The Doctor Is Out,"Cairo Times, 9-22 March 2000, 14-16. The statementon pluralismis reprintedin al-Wa'i,al-Fikr al-siyasi al-mu'asir, 127-32. al-rasa'il al-Imamal-Shahid, 326. 47Majmu'at

394 Mona El-Ghobashy

48Yusufal-Qaradawi, Minfiqh al-dawlafi al-Islam: makanatiha,tabi'atiha,mawifuhamin al-dimuqratiyya wa-l-ta'addudiyyawa-l-mar'awa ghayr al-muslimin(On the Theory of the State in Islam: Its Role, Characteristics, Natureand Positions on Democracy,Pluralism,Women, and Non-Muslims) (Cairo:Dar al-Shuruq, 1997), 157. 49MaryAnne Weaver,A Portrait of Egypt: A Journey through the Worldof Militant Islam (New York: Strausand Giroux, 1999), 165; emphasisin original.For a recent interviewwith Mubarakin which he Farrar, Post, 23 March expressed similarsentiments,see "Democracy:Be CarefulWhatYou Wish For,"Washington 2003. SoSee the EgyptianOrganization for HumanRights (EOHR),DemocracyJeopardized:Nobody Passed the Elections: TheEOHR'sAccount of the 1995 EgyptianParliamentary Elections (Cairo:EOHR, 1996). 51Thecomplete 1995 statementis reprinted in RowaqArabi, January1997, 139-43. 52The Islamist writer and Muslim BrotherssympathizerFahmi Huwaydi waxes poetic about al-Banna's close ties to Coptic figures such as MP Louis Vanos and prominentCoptic scion MakramEbeid: Fahmi Huwaydi, al-Islam wa-l-dimuqratiyya(Islam and Democracy) (Cairo: al-Ahram li-l-Tawzi' wa-l-Nashr, 1993), 278-79. 53Seehis seminalal-Muslimun wa-l-aqbatfiitar al-jamacaal-wataniyya(MuslimsandCoptsin the National Community),2nd ed. (Cairo:Dar al-Shuruq,1988). Foranalysisof Bishri'sconceptof citizenship,see Leonard Binder, Islamic Liberalism:A Critique of DevelopmentIdeologies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 243-92. 54NabilAbd al-Fattah, ed., Taqriral-hala al-diniyyafi misr (EgyptStateof Religion Report),5th ed. (Cairo: Markazal-Dirasatal-Siyasiyya wa-l-Istratijiyya bi-l-Ahram, 1997), 171. 55Abdalla al-Nafisi, "al-Ikhwanal-Muslimun fi misr: al-tajribawa-l-khata'"(The Muslim Brothersin Egypt: The Experienceand the Mistake,"in al-Harakaal-islamiyya: ru'ya mustaqbaliyya,234-39. 56Abual-Futuh,interview. 57ThejournalistKhaled Dawoud then handedthe tape to the governmentweekly tabloid Ruz al-Yusuf,a leading anti-Muslim Brothersmouthpiece, which published the interview as "The Latest Inventionof the Muslim Brothers:Kick Them Out of the Army!"Ruz al-Yusuf,14 April 1997, 22-23. 58AhmadHamroush,"A GeneralGuide in Need of Guidance!"Ruz al-Yusuf,28 April 1997. 59Sultaninterviewedby MahmoudSadeq, al-Ikhwanal-Muslimun:al-azma wa-l-tashattut(The Muslim Brothers:Crisis and Division) (Cairo:Akhbaral-Yawm,2002), 181-92. 60AnthonyShadid, Legacy of the Prophet: Depots, Democrats, and the New Politics of Islam (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2002), 253-71. See also Tal'at Rumeih, al-Wasat wa-l-Ikhwan(The Wasat and the Brothers)(Cairo:MarkazYafa li-l-Dirasatwa-l-Nashr,1997). 61Paul Schemm and Simon Apiku, "The Battle of the Generationsin Egypt's Opposition,"Middle East Times, 23 August 1998. MuhammadHamdi, "Egyptian Parties Aflame with Splits," al-Ahram al-arabi, 20 November 1999. In June 2002, The Tagammu'politburomemberAbd al-GhaffarShukrwrote a position a Serious and Sincere Discussion of the Futureof Tagammu'," paper titled, "Toward calling for a thorough overhaulof the party'spersonalizedleadershipstyle andcollusion with the government: Abd al-Ghaffar Shukr, interview with the author,Cairo, 9 July 2003. turnoutwas 49.7 percent:"Springtime of the Syndicate,"Cairo Times, 1-14 March2001. 62Voter Cairo Times, 18-24 January2001. 63"We're Innocent,YourHonor," 64Muhammad Mursi,interviewwith the author,Cairo, 26 June 2002. 65Fora roundupof Parliament'sfirst season, including the Muslim Brothersdeputies' performance,see Cairo Times, 19-25 July 2001. "Arisen," Barredat 66See "HardTimes for Heshmat,"al-AhramWeekly,19-25 December 2002; and "Brotherhood the Poll," al-AhramWeekly,16-22 January2003. 67GamalHeshmat,interviewwith the author,Cairo, 24 June 2003. 68"JiltedBrothers," Cairo Times,24-30 April 2003. 69The statementsof Eryanand al-Futuhare culled from the following sources: "Victoryin defeat,"Cairo Times, 10-16 February2000; interviewswith Eryanand al-Futuhin Cairo Times,9-22 March2000 and 1824 January2001, respectively; a two-part interview with al-Futuh in al-Arabi, 28 September 2003 and 5 October 2003; Eryan, "The Reform That Needs to be Realized,"al-Dimuqratiyya4, 13 (2004): 111-14; al-Futuh,"The Islamic Pathto Reform,"al-AhramWeekly,5-11 February2004. 70AbdulRaheemAli, "SecretVote to Elect Muslim BrotherhoodLeader," Islam Online, 12 January2004. Availableat: www.islamonline.net./English/News/2004-01/12/article07.shtml.

TheMetamorphosisof the EgyptianMuslimBrothers 395

Gesture?"al-AhramWeekly,11-17 March2004. 71Fora lucid analysis, see Amr Elchoubaki,"Brotherly 72Abdal-MoneimAbu al-Futuh,interviewwith the author,Cairo,January2004. 73Michels,Political Parties, 362. 74Aymanal-Zawahiri,al-Hasad al-murr: al-Ikhwanal-Muslimunfi sittin 'amman (Bitter Harvest:The Muslim Brothersin Sixty Years)(n.p.: Dar al-Bayareq,1999), 25. al-AhramWeekly,16-22 September1999. 75DiaaRashwan,"IslamistsCrashthe Party," 76Foran outragedcritique of the moral depravityof Egyptian television, see the column by the secular economist GoudaAbd al-Khaleqin the leftist al-Ahali, 18 November 2003. NorrisandJoni Lovenduski,"WhyPartiesFail to Learn:ElectoralDefeat, Selective Perceptionand 77Pippa British PartyPolitics,"Party Politics 10 (2004): 85-104. KatrinaBurgess and Steven Levitsky, "Explaining Populist PartyAdaptationin LatinAmerica,"ComparativePolitical Studies 36 (2003): 881-911. on the "political learning"of Islamists in Iran, 78Fora comparisonof the effects of electoral participation Lebanon,Jordan,Egypt, Palestine,Qatar,and Turkey,see JamesPiscatori,Islam, Islamists,and the Electoral Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World, Principle in the Middle East (Leiden: International 2000).