Consolidated Cases for Political Law Review Mid-term Exam

ATONG PAGLAUM V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS - LIAO

Facts: 52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 5 wit! t!e "upreme Court #"C$ in an effort to reverse various resolutions %y t!e Commission on Elections #Comelec$ dis&ualifying t!em from t!e May 2'() party-list race* +!e Comelec, in its assailed resolutions issued in -cto%er, .ovem%er and /ecem%er of 2'(2, ruled, among ot!ers, t!at t!ese party-list groups and organizations failed to represent a 0marginalized and underrepresented sector,1 t!eir nominees do not come from a 0marginalized and underrepresented sector,1 and2or some of t!e organizations or groups are not truly representative of t!e sector t!ey intend to represent in Congress* Petitioners argued t!at t!e poll %ody committed grave a%use of discretion in denying some of t!e petitioners3 application for accreditation and cancelling t!e existing accreditation of t!e rest* +!ey also lamented t!e poll %ody3s 0denial1 to accord t!em due process in t!e evaluation proceedings* Issue4 5!et!er or not t!e said party-list groups were validly dis&ualified Held4 +!e 5 petitions were remanded t!ese petitions to t!e Comelec* +!e party-list groups and organizations covered %y t!e ( petitions t!at o%tained mandatory in6unction orders from t!e !ig! court still stand a c!ance to ma7e it to t!e 2'() party-list race as t!e !ig! court ordered t!e poll %ody to determine 0w!et!er petitioners are &ualified to register under t!e party-list system and to participate in t!e () May 2'() partylist elections1 under t!e new parameters set fort! in t!e /ecision* +!e rest, meaning, t!e () ot!er petitions, were remanded to t!e poll %ody merely for purposes of determining w!et!er t!ey may %e granted accreditation under t!e new parameters %ut may not participate in t!e May 2'() elections* +!e /ecision, !owever, clarified that the poll body may not be faulted for acting on the basis of previous rulings (Ang Bagong Bayani, BANAT of the high court regarding the party!list system" These earlier rulings enumerated guidelines on #ho may participate in the party!list system" +!ere are t!ree groups t!at may participate in t!e party-list system4 #($ national parties or organizations, #2$ regional parties or organizations, and #)$ sectoral parties or organizations* -n t!e part of national parties or organi$ations and regional parties or organi$ations w!ic! intend to participate in t!e party-list race, t!e new guidelines state t!at t!ese parties 0 do not need to organi$e along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any %marginali$ed or underrepresented sector"&' 8s for political parties, they may participate in the party!list race by registering under the party!list system and no longer field congressional candidates" +!ese parties, if t!ey field congressional candidates, !owever, are not %arred from participating in t!e party-list elections9 w!at t!ey need to do is register t!eir sectoral wing or party under t!e party-list system* +!is sectoral wing s!all %e considered an 0independent sectoral party1 lin7ed to a political party t!roug! a coalition*

+!e &uestion is4 #here does representation of (marginali$ed and underrepresented' sectors come in) The ans#er: on the sectoral parties or organi$ations that intend to participate in the party!list system" +!e !ig! court !eld t!at purely sectoral parties or organi$ations may either represent (marginali$ed and underrepresented' constituencies or those (lac*ing #ell!defined political constituencies"' +!e !ig! court went on to enumerate 0 marginali$ed and underrepresented' sectors, as follo#s: labor, peasant, fisherfol*, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas #or*ers" The sectors that lac* (#ell!defined political constituencies' include professionals, the elderly, #omen, and the youth" +!e rule on nominees and mem%ers coming from t!e sector t!ey intend to represent also applies only to t!e sectoral parties or organizations* +!e !ig! court ruled t!at it is enoug! t!at 0:a; ma6ority of t!e mem%ers of t!e sectoral parties or organizations< must %elong to t!e =marginalized and underrepresented sector t!ey represent*31 +!e same is true for t!ose w!o lac7 0well-defined political constituencies*1 8s for t!e nominees of t!ese sectoral parties and organizations, t!e new guidelines provide t!at t!ey must eit!er %e mem%ers of t!e sector or !ave a trac7 record of advocacy for t!eir sector* "!ould some of t!e nominees of t!ese national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations %e dis&ualified, t!e party or organization itself will not %e dis&ualified 0provided t!at t!ey !ave at least one nominee w!o remains &ualified*1 +!e party-list system, according to t!e /ecision >uoting C!ristian Monsod, t!e main proponent of t!e party-list system, t!e !ig! court stated t!at it is (not synonymous #ith that of the sectoral representation" 1 +!e !ig! court stressed t!at t!e framers of t!e (?@A Constitution did not intend to leave out 0non-sectoral parties1 in t!e party-list system and exclusively limit it to sectoral groups* 0+!e framers intended t!e sectoral parties to constitute a part, %ut not t!e entirety, of t!e party-list system< Bn fact, t!e framers voted down , (?-22, a proposal to reserve t!e party-list system exclusively to sectoral parties* 0+!ere can %e no dou%t w!atsoever t!at t!e framers of t!e (?@A Constitution expressly re6ected t!e proposal to ma7e t!e party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties only, and t!at t!ey clearly intended t!e party-list system to include %ot! sectoral and non-sectoral parties,1 t!e /ecision read* +o amplify its position, t!e !ig! court pointed out "ec* 5#($, 8rt* CB of t!e (?@A Constitution, w!ic! states4 "ection 5* #($ +!e Douse of Representatives s!all %e composed of not more t!an two !undred and fifty mem%ers, unless ot!erwise fixed %y law, w!o s!all %e elected from legislative districts apportioned among t!e provinces, cities, and t!e Metropolitan Manila area in accordance wit! t!e num%er of t!eir respective in!a%itants, and on t!e %asis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and t!ose w!o, as provided %y law, s!all %e elected t!roug! a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations* 5D8+ B" +DE +,--F THAT TH. +A,T/ 0I1T 1/1T.2 I1 N-T .34051I6.0/ F-, 1.4T-,A0 +A,TI.1)

"EC+B-. 5#2$, 8R+BCLE CB -E +DE (?@A C-."+B+F+B-. 5DBCD M8./8+E" +D8+, /FRB.G +DE EBR"+ +DREE C-."ECF+BCE +ERM" -E C-.GRE"" 8E+ER +DE R8+BEBC8+B-. -E +DE (?@A C-."+B+F+B-., 0-.E-D8LE -E +DE "E8+" 8LL-C8+E/ +- P8R+H-LB"+ REPRE"E.+8+BCE" "D8LL IE EBLLE/, 8" PR-CB/E/ IH L85, IH "ELEC+B-. -R ELEC+B-. ER-M +DE L8I-R, PE8"8.+, FRI8. P--R, B./BGE.-F" CFL+FR8L C-MMF.B+BE", 5-ME., H-F+D, 8./ "FCD -+DER "EC+-R" 8" M8H IE PR-CB/E/ IH L85, EJCEP+ +DE RELBGB-F" "EC+-R*1

Moreover, "ection 5#2$, 8rticle CB of t!e (?@A Constitution mandates t!at, during t!e first t!ree consecutive terms of Congress after t!e ratification of t!e (?@A Constitution, 0one-!alf of t!e seats allocated to party-list representatives s!all %e filled, as provided %y law, %y selection or election from t!e la%or, peasant, ur%an poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, yout!, and suc! ot!er sectors as may %e provided %y law, except t!e religious sector*1 +!is provision clearly s!ows again t!at t!e party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two o%vious reasons* Eirst, t!e ot!er one-!alf of t!e seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally %e open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating t!e idea t!at t!e party-list system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing t!e 0marginalized and underrepresented*1 "econd, t!e reservation of one!alf of t!e party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for t!e first 0t!ree consecutive terms after t!e ratification of t!is Constitution,1 clearly ma7ing t!e party-list system fully open after t!e end of t!e first t!ree congressional terms* +!is means t!at, after t!is period, t!ere will %e no seats reserved for any class or type of party t!at &ualifies under t!e t!ree groups constituting t!e party-list system* Dence, the clear intent, e7press #ording, and party!list structure ordained in 1ection 8(9 and (: , Article 6I of the 9;<= 4onstitution cannot be disputed: the party!list system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for non!sectoral parties" +!e /ecision also pointed out pertinent provisions of Repu%lic 8ct (,A No" =;>9, also 7nown as t!e +arty!list 1ystem Act, specifically from "ec* ) #/efinition of +erms$4 #%$ 8 party means eit!er a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties #c$ 8 political party refers to an organi$ed group of citi$ens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and w!ic!, as t!e most immediate means of securing t!eir adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and mem%ers as candidates for pu%lic office #d$ 8 sectoral party refers to an organi$ed group of citi$ens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in 1ection 8 hereof #hose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector 8gain, t!e !ig! court noted t!at defining t!ese parties or groups, one from t!e ot!ers, could only mean t!at t!ey are not one and t!e same* +revious rulings reversed by Atong +aglaum 8s earlier stated, t!ere are previous rulings on t!e party-list system in t!e case of 8ng Iagong Iayani v* Comelec and I8.8+ v* Comelec

CHAVEZ VS. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL - MONSANTO

Facts: 4have$ ?uestioned the then composition of the @B4* Fnder t!e Constitution, t!ere s!all only %e = mem%ers, one of #hom is a member from the 4ongress * +!e t!en KIC !as 2 mem%ers from t!e Congress L Rep* +upaz from t!e Douse and "en* Escudero from t!e "enate, resulting to an @-mem%er KIC* C!avez argued t!at its composition clearly violates an express provision of t!e Constitution* Constitutional Law; Supreme Court; Jurisdiction; Declaratory Relief; .otwit!standing t!e fact t!at only &uestions of law are raised in t!e petition, an action for declaratory relief is not among t!ose wit!in t!e original 6urisdiction of t!e "upreme Court as provided in "ection 5, 8rticle CBBB of t!e Constitution*M+!e Constitution as t!e su%6ect matter, and t!e validity and construction of "ection @ #($, 8rticle CBBB as t!e issue raised, t!e petition s!ould properly %e considered as t!at w!ic! would result in t!e ad6udication of rig!ts sans t!e execution process %ecause t!e only relief to %e granted is t!e very declaration of t!e rig!ts under t!e document soug!t to %e construed* Bt %eing so, t!e original 6urisdiction over t!e petition lies wit! t!e appropriate R+C* .otwit!standing t!e fact t!at only &uestions of law are raised in t!e petition, an action for declaratory relief is not among t!ose wit!in t!e original 6urisdiction of t!is Court as provided in "ection 5, 8rticle CBBB of t!e Constitution* Same; Same; Judicial Review; Limitations on the Supreme Courts Power of Judicial Review. +!e Courts3 power of 6udicial review, li7e almost all ot!er powers conferred %y t!e Constitution, is su%6ect to several limitations, namely4 #($ t!ere must %e an actual case or controversy calling for t!e exercise of 6udicial power9 #2$ t!e person c!allenging t!e act must !ave 0standing1 to c!allenge9 !e must !ave a personal and su%stantial interest in t!e case, suc! t!at !e !as sustained or will sustain, direct in6ury as a result of its enforcement9 #)$ t!e &uestion of constitutionality must %e raised at t!e earliest possi%le opportunity9 and # $ t!e issue of constitutionality must %e t!e very lis mota of t!e case* Generally, a party will %e allowed to litigate only w!en t!ese conditions sine &ua non are present, especially w!en t!e constitutionality of an act %y a co-e&ual %ranc! of government is put in issue* Same; Judicial and ar Council !J C"; +!e claim t!at t!e composition of t!e Kudicial and Iar Council #KIC$ is illegal and unconstitutional is an o%6ect of concern, not 6ust for a nominee to a 6udicial post, %ut for all citizens w!o !ave t!e rig!t to see7 6udicial intervention for rectification of legal %lunders*M8 vast num%er of aspirants to 6udicial posts all over t!e country may %e affected %y t!e Court3s ruling* More importantly, t!e legality of t!e very process of nominations to t!e positions in t!e Kudiciary is t!e nucleus of t!e controversy* +!e Court considers t!is a constitutional issue t!at must %e passed upon, lest a constitutional process %e plagued %y misgivings, dou%ts and worse, mistrust* Dence, a citizen !as a rig!t to %ring t!is &uestion to t!e Court, clot!ed wit! legal standing and at t!e same time, armed wit! issues of transcendental importance to society* Same; Statutory Construction; Bt is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction t!at t!e language employed in t!e Constitution must %e given t!eir ordinary meaning except w!ere tec!nical terms are employed

Constitutional Law; Judicial and ar Council; /ou%tless, the Framers of our 4onstitution intended to create a @udicial and Bar 4ouncil (@B4 as an innovative solution in response to the public clamor in favor of eliminating politics in the appointment of members of the @udiciary*M +!erefore, to allow t!e Legislature to !ave more &uantitative influence in t!e KIC %y !aving more t!an one voice spea7, w!et!er wit! one full vote or one-!alf #(22$ a vote eac!, would, as one former congressman and mem%er of t!e KIC put it, 0 negate the principle of e?uality among the three branches of government #hich is enshrined in the 4onstitution"' Same; Doctrine of #perative $acts; %n the interest of fair play under the doctrine of operative facts& actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are le'ally reco'ni(ed. In the interest of fair play under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recogni$ed" They are not nullified"

LAYUG VS. COMELEC ANGUB

Facts: -n Marc! )(, 2'(', petitioner 0ayug, in his capacity as a ta7payer and concerned citi$en, filed pro se a +etition to Ais?ualify Buhay +arty!0ist from participating in the 2ay 9B, :B9B elections, and Brother 2i*e from being its nominee * De argued t!at Iu!ay Party-List is a mere Nextension of t!e El "!addai,N w!ic! is a religious sect* 8s suc!, it is dis&ualified from %eing a party-list under "ection 5, Paragrap! 2, 8rticle CB of t!e (?@A Constitution, as well as "ection O, Paragrap! ( of Repu%lic 8ct #R*8*$ .o* A? (, ot!erwise 7nown as t!e NParty-List "ystem 8ct*N .eit!er does Irot!er Mi7e, w!o is allegedly a %illionaire real estate %usinessman and t!e spiritual leader of El "!addai, &ualify as None w!o %elongs to t!e marginalized and underrepresented sector xxxN, as re&uired of party-list nominees under "ection O #A$ of C-MELEC Resolution .o* @@'A, t!e NRules on /is&ualification Cases 8gainst .ominees of Party-List Groups2-rganizations Participating in t!e May (', 2'(' 8utomated .ational and Local Elections*N Bn t!eir 8nswer, Iu!ay Party-List and Irot!er Mi7e claimed t!at Iu!ay Party-List is not a religious sect %ut a political party possessing all t!e &ualifications of a party-list* Bt is composed of groups for t!e elderly, t!e women, t!e yout!, t!e !andicapped, as well as t!e professionals, and Irot!er Mi7e %elongs to t!e marginalized and underrepresented elderly group* +!ey li7ewise argued t!at nominees from a political party suc! as Iu!ay Party-List need not even come from t!e marginalized and underrepresented sector* Record s!ows t!at Layug received a copy of t!e aforesaid 8nswer only at t!e !earing conducted on 8pril 2', 2'(' after !is lawyer, 8tty* Rustico I* Gagate, manifested t!at !is client !as not received t!e same* Counsel for private respondents explained t!at t!eir liaison officer found LayugPs given address L QA' /r* Pilapil "t*, Iarangay "an Miguel, Pasig City L to %e inexistent* +o t!is, 8tty* Gagate was said to !ave retorted as follows4 N+!e good counsel for t!e respondent could send any 8nswer or processes or pleadings to my #sic$ address at Iam%ang, .ueva Cizcaya Hour Donor, t!ey could come over all t!e way to .ueva Cizcaya, we will entertain !im*N +!e C-MELEC 2nd /ivision issued a Resolution denying t!e petition for lac7 of su%stantial evidence* 8 copy t!ereof was sent to Layug via registered mail at QA' /r* Pilapil "treet, Iarangay "an Miguel, Pasig City* Dowever, t!e mail was returned unserved wit! t!e following notation of t!e postmaster4 N(st O22)2(' un7nown9 2nd O2252(' un7nown9 and )rd attempt O22@2(' R+" B."FEEBCBE.+ 8//RE""*N "u%se&uently, in its -rder dated Kuly 2O, 2'(', t!e C-MELEC "econd /ivision found Layug to %e a

Np!antom petitionerN %y Nseeing to it t!at pleadings, orders and 6udicial notices addressed to !im are not received %y !im %ecause t!e address !e gave and maintains is fictitiousN* 8ccordingly, Layug was deemed to !ave received on Kune 2), 2'(' a copy of t!e Resolution dated Kune (5, 2'(' and, t!ere %eing no motion for reconsideration filed wit!in t!e reglementary period, said Resolution was declared final and executory* Bt was entered in t!e Ioo7 of Entries of Kudgment on Kuly 2@, 2'('* 8s a conse&uence of suc! entry, t!e 4-2.0.4 .n Banc, sitting as the National Board of 4anvassers for +arty!0ist, promulgated on @uly CB, :B9B NB4 ,esolution No" 9B!BC> proclaiming Buhay +arty!0ist as a #inner entitled to t#o (: seats in the House of ,epresentatives * Ieing t!e fift! nominee, ho#ever, Brother 2i*e #as not proclaimed as the representative of Buhay +arty!0ist" Meanw!ile, on Kuly 2@, 2'(', Layug moved for reconsideration of t!e Resolution dated Kune (5, 2'(' %efore t!e C-MELEC En Ianc claiming denial of due process for failure of t!e C-MELEC to serve !im, !is representatives or counsels a copy of said Resolution* De alleged t!at it was only on Kuly 2O, 2'(', after learning a%out it in t!e newspapers, t!at !e personally secured a copy of t!e Resolution from t!e C-MELEC* Dis motion for reconsideration, !owever, was denied %y t!e C-MELEC "econd /ivision in its -rder dated 8ugust , 2'(' for %eing filed out of time* Issues: 8ggrieved, Layug filed t!is petition imputing grave a%use of discretion on t!e part of t!e C-MELEC for t!e following acts and omissions4 (* +DE C-MELEC "EC-./ /BCB"B-. /B/ .-+ B""FE 8 .-+BCE -E PR-MFLG8+B-. +- +DE PE+B+B-.ER3" C-F."EL 8" RE>FBRE/ IH RFLE () -E +DE RFLE" -E C-FR+, +DEREIH C-MMB++B.G 8 CLE8R CB-L8+B-. -E PR-CE/FR8L /FE PR-CE""* 2* IH B""FB.G +DE )' KFLH 2'(' RE"-LF+B-., +DE C-MELEC E. I8.C F.L85EFLLH .EGLEC+E/ +DE PERE-RM8.CE -E 8. 8C+ 5DBCD +DE L85 "PECBEBC8LLH E.K-B." 8" 8 /F+H RE"FL+B.G ER-M B+" -EEBCE, 5DBCD B" +- DE8R 8./ /ECB/E +DE PE+B+B-.ER3" M-+B-. E-R REC-."B/ER8+B-. 5DBCD 58" +BMELH EBLE/* Bn t!eir respective Comments to t!e petition, respondents assail the Durisdiction of the 4ourt arguing that, #ith the proclamation of Buhay +arty!0ist on @uly CB, :B9B and the assumption into office of its representatives, Mariano Mic!ael /M* Celarde, Kr* and 5illiam Brwin C* +ieng , it is no# the House of ,epresentatives .lectoral Tribunal that has the sole and e7clusive Durisdiction over ?uestions relating to their ?ualifications" Held4 5e rule for t!e respondents* (* The 4ourt not the H,.T has Durisdiction over the present petition * "ection (A, 8rticle CB of t!e (?@A Constitution provides t!at the House of ,epresentatives .lectoral Tribunal (H,.T shall be the sole Dudge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and ?ualifications of its 2embers * "ection 5 #($ of t!e same 8rticle identifies w!o t!e Nmem%ersN of t!e Douse are4 "ec* 5* #($* +!e House of ,epresentatives shall be composed of not more than t#o hundred and fifty members, unless ot!erwise fixed %y law, w!o s!all %e elected from legislative districts apportioned among t!e provinces, cities, and t!e Metropolitan Manila area in accordance wit! t!e num%er of t!eir respective in!a%itants, and on t!e %asis of a uniform and progressive

ratio, and t!ose w!o, as provided %y law, s!all %e elected t!roug! a party list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations* #Fnderscoring added$* Clearly, the members of the House of ,epresentatives are of t#o *inds 4 (9 members #ho shall be elected from legislative districtsE and (: those #ho shall be elected through a party!list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organi$ations" Bn t!is case, Iu!ay Party-List was entitled to two seats in t!e Douse t!at went to its first two nominees, Mariano Mic!ael /M* Celarde, Kr* and 5illiam Brwin C* +ieng* -n t!e ot!er !and, Irot!er Mi7e, %eing t!e fift! nominee, did not get a seat and t!us !ad not %ecome a mem%er of t!e Douse of Representatives* Bndu%ita%ly, t!e H,.T has no Durisdiction over the issue of Brother 2i*eFs ?ualifications" Neither does the H,.T have Durisdiction over the ?ualifications of Buhay +arty!0ist, as it is vested by la#, specifically, the +arty!0ist 1ystem Act, upon the 4-2.0.4* "ection O of said 8ct states t!at Nt!e 4-2.0.4 may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organi$ation or coalition xxx*N 8ccordingly, in t!e case of 8%ayon vs* DRE+, 5e ruled t!at t!e DRE+ did not gravely a%use its discretion w!en it dismissed t!e petitions for &uo warranto against 8angat +ayo party-list and Iantay party-list insofar as t!ey soug!t t!e dis&ualifications of said party-lists* +!us, it is t!e Court, under its power to review decisions, orders, or resolutions of t!e C-MELEC provided under "ection A, 8rticle BJ-8 of t!e (?@A Constitution and "ection (, Rule )A of t!e C-MELEC Rules of Procedure t!at !as 6urisdiction to !ear t!e instant petition* :" 0ayug #as not denied due process" 8 party may sue or defend an action pro se* Fnder "ection ), Rule A of t!e Rules of Court, N#e$very pleading must %e signed %y t!e party or counsel representing !im, stating in eit!er case !is address w!ic! s!ould not %e a post office %ox*N 8 6udicious perusal of t!e records s!ows t!at Layug filed pro se %ot! t!e Petition to /is&ualify and !is Position Paper %efore t!e C-MELEC "econd /ivision* Bn t!e Petition to /is&ualify, !e stated !is address as QA' /r* Pilapil "treet, Iarangay "an Miguel, Pasig City* 5!ile 8tty* Rustico I* Gagate appeared as counsel for Layug during t!e !earing conducted on 8pril 2', 2'(', !e nonet!eless failed to provide eit!er !is or !is clientPs complete and correct address despite t!e manifestation t!at counsel for private respondents could not personally serve t!e 8nswer on Layug due to t!e inexistence of t!e given address* .eit!er did t!e Position Paper t!at was su%se&uently filed pro se on 8pril 2), 2'(' indicate any forwarding address* Bt s!ould %e stressed t!at a copy of t!e Resolution dated Kune (5, 2'(' was mailed to Layug at !is stated address at QA' /r* Pilapil "treet, Iarangay "an Miguel, Pasig City, w!ic! !owever was returned to sender #C-MELEC$ after t!ree attempts due to insufficiency of said address, as evidenced %y certified true copies of t!e registry return receipt, as well as t!e envelope containing t!e Resolution9 t!e Letter of Pasig City Central Post -ffice Postmaster CB Erlina M* Pecante9 t!e Certification dated .ovem%er 2, 2'(' of t!e Postmaster of Pasig City Post -ffice9 and t!e 8ffidavit of "ervice of C-MELEC Iailiff 8rturo E* Eorel dated 8ugust (), 2'('* Conse&uently, t!e C-MELEC deemed Layug to !ave received a copy of

t!e Resolution on Kune 2), 2'(', t!e date t!e postmaster made !is first attempt to serve it* +!ere %eing no motion for reconsideration filed, t!e C-MELEC issued an -rder on Kuly 2O, 2'(' declaring t!e Resolution final and executory, w!ic! t!ereafter %ecame t!e %asis for t!e issuance of t!e assailed C-MELEC En Ianc3s .IC Resolution .o* ('-') dated Kuly )', 2'('* Erom t!e fact alone t!at t!e address w!ic! Layug furnis!ed t!e C-MELEC was incorrect, !is pretensions regarding t!e validity of t!e proceedings and promulgation of t!e Resolution dated Kune (5, 2'(' for %eing in violation of !is constitutional rig!t to due process are doomed to fail* Dis refusal to rectify t!e error despite 7nowledge t!ereof impels Fs to conclude t!at !e deli%erately stated an inexistent address wit! t!e end in view of delaying t!e proceedings upon t!e plea of lac7 of due process* 8s t!e C-MELEC aptly pointed out, Layug contemptuously made a moc7ery of election laws and procedure %y appearing %efore t!e Commission %y !imself or %y different counsels w!en !e wants to, and giving a fictitious address to ensure t!at !e does not receive mails addressed to !im* De cannot t!us %e allowed to profit from !is own wrongdoing* +o rule ot!erwise, considering t!e circumstances in t!e instant case, would place t!e date of receipt of pleadings, 6udgments and processes wit!in LayugPs power to determine at !is pleasure* +!is, 5e cannot countenance* Bt %ears stressing t!at t!e finality of a decision or resolution is a 6urisdictional event w!ic! cannot %e made to depend on t!e convenience of a party*) /ecisions or resolutions must attain finality at some point and its attainment of finality s!ould not %e made dependent on t!e will of a party* Bn sum, t!e Court finds no grave a%use of discretion amounting to lac7 or excess of 6urisdiction attri%uta%le to t!e C-MELEC in issuing .IC Resolution .o* ('-') dated Kuly )', 2'(' proclaiming Iu!ay Party-List as a winner in t!e May (', 2'(' elections on t!e %asis of t!e final and executory Resolution dated Kune (5, 2'(' denying t!e petition to dis&ualify private respondents* C" 2andamus does not lie to compel the 4-2.0.4 .n Banc to rule on 0ayug&s 2otion for ,econsideration" Mandamus, as a remedy, is availa%le to compel t!e doing of an act specifically en6oined %y law as a duty* Bt cannot compel t!e doing of an act involving t!e exercise of discretion one way or t!e ot!er* "ection ), Rule O5 of t!e Rules of Court clearly provides4 "EC*)* Petition for mandamus R 5!en any tri%unal, corporation, %oard, officer or person unlawfully neglects t!e performance of an act w!ic! t!e law specifically en6oins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes anot!er from t!e use and en6oyment of a rig!t or office to w!ic! suc! ot!er is entitled, and t!ere is no ot!er plain, speedy and ade&uate remedy in t!e ordinary course of law, t!e person aggrieved t!ere%y may file a verified petition in t!e proper court, alleging t!e facts wit! certainty and praying t!at 6udgment %e rendered commanding t!e respondent, immediately or at some ot!er time to %e specified %y t!e court, to do t!e act re&uired to %e done to protect t!e rig!ts of t!e petitioner, and to pay t!e damages sustained %y t!e petitioner %y reason of t!e wrongful acts of t!e respondent* #Emp!asis supplied$ Bn t!is case, t!e C-MELEC En Ianc cannot %e compelled to resolve Layug3s Motion for Reconsideration of t!e Resolution dated Kune (5, 2'(' t!at was filed on Kuly 2@, 2'(' after said Resolution !ad already attained finality* Bn fact, t!e C-MELEC "econd /ivision denied t!e same Motion in its -rder dated 8ugust , 2'(' precisely for t!e reason t!at it was filed out of time* Bt s!ould li7ewise %e pointed out t!at t!e aforesaid Motion for Reconsideration was filed wit!out t!e re&uisite notice of !earing* 5e !ave !eld time and again t!at t!e failure to comply wit! t!e mandatory re&uirements under "ections and 5 of Rule (5 of t!e Rules of Court renders t!e motion defective* 8s a

rule, a motion wit!out a notice of !earing is considered pro forma* .one of t!e accepta%le exceptions o%tain in t!is case* Moreover, t!e Motion was filed %y a new counsel L Evasco, 8%inales and Evasco Law -ffices L wit!out a valid su%stitution or wit!drawal of t!e former counsel* +!us said t!e C-MELEC4 5* Bn spite of t!e finding t!at petitionerPs given address PQA' /r* Pilapil "t*, Iarangay "an Miguel, Pasig CityP cannot %e found, a new counsel, PEvasco 8%inales and Evasco Law -fficesP filed on Kuly 2', 2'(', an PE.+RH -E 8PPE8R8.CE 8" C-F."EL #for petitioner Layug$ 5B+D M8.BEE"+8+B-.P, at t!e %ottom of w!ic! appear t!e name and signature of petitioner Roland /* Layug expressing !is conforme, wit! !is given #sic$ at t!e same PQA' /r* Pilapil "t*, Iarangay "an Miguel, Pasig City9P it is noted t!at t!e entry of appearance of a new counsel is wit!out t!e %enefit of t!e wit!drawal of t!e former counsel* Considering, t!erefore, LayugPs utter disregard of t!e rules of procedure for w!ic! !e deserves no empat!y, t!e Court finds t!at t!e C-MELEC exercised its discretion wit!in t!e %ounds of t!e law t!us warranting t!e dismissal of t!e instant case* 5DEREE-RE, t!e instant Petition for Certiorari is !ere%y /B"MB""E/* "- -R/ERE/*

PHILIP SIGFRID FORTUN V. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ET AL., G.R. NO. 19029 , MARCH 20, 2012 !AND OTHER CONSOLIDATED CASES" LIAO
TH. FA4T1 -n .ovem%er 2), 2''?, !eavily armed men %elieved led %y t!e ruling 8mpatuan family of Maguindanao gunned down and %uried under s!oveled dirt 5A innocent civilians* Bn response to t!is carnage, President 8rroyo issued on .ovem%er 2 , 2''? PP (? O declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, "ultan Sudarat, and Cota%ato City* -n /ecem%er , 2''?, President 8rroyo issued PP (?5? declaring martial law and suspending t!e privilege of t!e writ of !a%eas corpus in Maguindanao except for identified areas of t!e Moro Bslamic Li%eration Eront* -n /ecem%er O, 2''?, President 8rroyo su%mitted !er report to Congress* -n /ecem%er ?, 2''?, Congress convened in 6oint session to review t!e validity of t!e President3s action* Iut two days later, or on /ecem%er (2, 2''?, %efore Congress could act, t!e President issued PP (?O), lifting martial law and restoring t!e privilege of t!e writ of !a%eas corpus* TH. I115.1 /id t!e issuance of PP (?O), lifting martial law and restoring t!e :privilege of t!e; writ in Maguindanao, render t!e issues moot and academicT TH. ,50ING :+!e Court /B"MB""E/ t!e consolidated petitions on t!e ground t!at t!ey !ave %ecome M--+ and 8C8/EMBC*; /.1, the issuance of ++ 9;HC, lifting martial la# and restoring the Iprivilege of theJ #rit in 2aguindanao, rendered the issues moot and academic" Prudence and respect for t!e co-e&ual departments of t!e government dictate t!at t!e Court s!ould %e cautious in entertaining actions t!at assail t!e constitutionality of t!e acts of t!e Executive or t!e

Legislative department* +!e issue of constitutionality, said t!e Court in Iiraogo v* P!ilippine +rut! Commission of 2'(', must %e t!e very issue of t!e case, t!at t!e resolution of suc! issue is unavoida%le* +!e Court does not resolve purely academic &uestions to satisfy sc!olarly interest, !owever intellectually c!allenging t!ese are* +!is is especially true, said t!e Court in P!ilippine 8ssociation of Colleges and Fniversities v* "ecretary of Education, w!ere t!e issues 0reac! constitutional dimensions, for t!en t!ere comes into play regard for t!e court3s duty to avoid decision of constitutional issues unless avoidance %ecomes evasion*1 +!e Court3s duty is to steer clear of declaring unconstitutional t!e acts of t!e Executive or t!e Legislative department, given t!e assumption t!at it carefully studied t!ose acts and found t!em consistent wit! t!e fundamental law %efore ta7ing t!em* 0+o dou%t is to sustain*1 -f course, t!e Court !as in exceptional cases passed upon issues t!at ordinarily would !ave %een regarded as moot* Iut t!e present cases do not present sufficient %asis for t!e exercise of t!e power of 6udicial review* +!e proclamation of martial law and t!e suspension of t!e privilege of t!e writ of !a%eas corpus in t!is case, unli7e similar Presidential acts in t!e late O's and early A's, appear more li7e sa%errattling t!an an actual deployment and ar%itrary use of political power* The issue of the constitutionality of +roclamation 9;8; is not unavoidable for t#o reasons: 9" +resident Arroyo #ithdre# her proclamation of martial la# and suspension of the privilege of the #rit of habeas corpus before the Doint houses of 4ongress could fulfill their automatic duty to revie# and validate or invalidate the same" 8lt!oug! t!e a%ove vests in t!e President t!e power to proclaim martial law or suspend t!e privilege of t!e writ of !a%eas corpus, !e s!ares suc! power wit! t!e Congress* +!us4 (* 2* )* * +!e +resident&s proclamation or suspension is temporary, good for only HB daysE De must, #ithin >< hours of the proclamation or suspension, report his action in person or in #riting to 4ongressE Both houses of 4ongress, if not in session must Dointly convene #ithin :> hours of the proclamation or suspension for the purpose of revie#ing its validity 9 and +!e 4ongress, voting Dointly, may revo*e or affirm the +resident&s proclamation or suspension, allo# their limited effectivity to lapse, or e7tend the same if 4ongress deems #arranted" xxx xxx xxx

:F;nder t!e (?@A Constitution t!e +resident and the 4ongress act in tandem in e7ercising the po#er to proclaim martial la# or suspend the privilege of the #rit of habeas corpus" They e7ercise the po#er, not only se?uentially, but in a sense Dointly since, after t!e President !as initiated t!e proclamation or t!e suspension, only t!e Congress can maintain t!e same %ased on its own evaluation of t!e situation on t!e ground, a power t!at t!e President does not !ave* Conse&uently, although the 4onstitution reserves to the 1upreme 4ourt the po#er to revie# the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the 4ourt must allo# 4ongress to e7ercise its o#n revie# po#ers, #hich is automatic rather than initiated" -nly w!en Congress defaults in its express duty to defend t!e Constitution t!roug! suc! review s!ould t!e "upreme Court step in as its final rampart " The constitutional validity of the +resident&s proclamation of martial la# or suspension of the #rit of habeas corpus is first a

political ?uestion in the hands of 4ongress before it becomes a Dusticiable one in the hands of the 4ourt" Dere, President 8rroyo wit!drew Proclamation (?5? %efore t!e 6oint !ouses of Congress, w!ic! !ad in fact convened, could act on t!e same* Conse&uently, t!e petitions in t!ese cases !ave %ecome moot and t!e Court !as not!ing to review* The lifting of martial la# and restoration of the privilege of the #rit of habeas corpus in 2aguindanao #as a supervening event that obliterated any Dusticiable controversy* :" 1ince +resident Arroyo #ithdre# her proclamation of martial la# and suspension of the privilege of the #rit of habeas corpus in Dust eight days, they have not been meaningfully implemented* +!e military did not ta7e over t!e operation and control of local government units in Maguindanao* +!e President did not issue any law or decree affecting Maguindanao t!at s!ould ordinarily %e enacted %y Congress* .o indiscriminate mass arrest !ad %een reported* +!ose w!o were arrested during t!e period were eit!er released or promptly c!arged in court* Bndeed, no petition for !a%eas corpus !ad %een filed wit! t!e Court respecting arrests made in t!ose eig!t days* +!e point is t!at t!e President intended %y !er action to address an uprising in a relatively small and sparsely populated province* Bn !er 6udgment, t!e re%ellion was localized and swiftly disintegrated in t!e face of a determined and amply armed government presence* Bn a real sense, t!e proclamation and t!e suspension never too7 off* +!e Congress itself ad6ourned wit!out touc!ing t!e matter, it !aving %ecome moot and academic*

AMORA VS. COMELEC - ROJAS

8mora filed !is Certificate of Candidacy #C-C$ for Mayor of Candi6ay, Io!ol* +o oppose 8mora, t!e .ationalist People3s Coalition #.PC$ fielded -laivar for t!e mayoralty post* Respondent -landria was one of t!e candidates for councilor of t!e .PC in t!e same municipality* -landria filed %efore t!e C-MELEC a Petition for /is&ualification against 8mora* -landria alleged t!at 8mora3s C-C was not properly sworn contrary to t!e re&uirements of t!e -mni%us Election Code #-EC$ and t!e 2'' Rules on .otarial Practice* -landria pointed out t!at, in executing !is C-C, 8mora merely presented !is Community +ax Certificate #C+C$ to t!e notary pu%lic, 8tty* Granada, instead of presenting competent evidence of !is identity* Conse&uently, 8mora3s C-C !ad no force and effect and s!ould %e considered as not filed* -n !is part, 8mora insists t!at t!e Petition for /is&ualification filed %y -landria is actually a Petition to /eny /ue Course since t!e purported ground for dis&ualification simply refers to t!e defective notarization of t!e C-C* 8mora is adamant t!at "ection A) of t!e -EC pertains to t!e su%stantive &ualifications of a candidate or t!e lac7 t!ereof as grounds for dis&ualification, specifically, t!e &ualifications and dis&ualifications of elective local officials under t!e Local Government Code #LGC$ and t!e -EC* +!us, -landria3s petition was filed way %eyond t!e reglementary period of twenty-five #25$ days from t!e date of t!e filing of t!e disputed C-C* Moreover, 8mora maintains t!at !is C-C is properly notarized and not defective, and t!e presentation of !is C+C to t!e notary pu%lic to w!om !e was personally 7nown sufficiently complied wit! t!e re&uirement t!at t!e C-C %e under oat!* The :nd Aivision of the 4-2.0.4 granted the petition and dis?ualified Amora" +ending 2,, Amora #on the elections but his 2, #as denied by 4-2.0.4 en banc" Dence, t!is petition" I115.4

Khether or not an improperly s#orn 4-4 is e?uivalent to possession of a ground for dis?ualification" H.0A4 No, it is not a ground for dis?ualification because it is not one among those enumerated in 1ection 9: or H< of the -mnibus election 4ode and 1ection >B of the 0G4 * 8 petition for dis&ualification on t!e one !and, can %e premised on "ection (2 or O@ of t!e -EC, or "ection ' of t!e LGC* -n t!e ot!er !and , a petition to deny due course to or cancel a 4o4 can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false * The petitions also have different effects* 5!ile a person #ho is dis?ualified under 1ection H< is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person #hose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under 1ection =< is not treated as a candidate at all, as if heLshe never filed a 4o4" +!us, in Miranda v* 8%aya, t!is Court made t!e distinction t!at a candidate #ho is dis?ualified under 1ection H< can validly be substituted under 1ection == of the -.4 because heLshe remains a candidate until dis?ualified9 but a person #hose 4o4 has been denied due course or cancelled under 1ection =< cannot be substituted because heLshe is never considered a candidate* 4ompetent evidence of identity is not re?uired in cases #here the affiant is personally *no#n to the Notary +ublic, w!ic! is t!e case !erein* +!e records reveal t!at :petitioner; su%mitted to t!is Commission a sworn affidavit executed %y .otary Pu%lic Granada, w!o notarized :petitioner3s; C-C, affirming in !is affidavit t!at !e personally 7nows :petitioner;* :Respondent;, on t!e ot!er !and, presented no evidence to counter Granada3s declarations* Dence, Granada:3s; affidavit, w!ic! narrates in detail !is personal relation wit! :petitioner;, s!ould %e deemed sufficient* +ec!nicalities and procedural niceties in election cases s!ould not %e made to stand in t!e way of t!e true will of t!e electorate* Laws governing election contests must %e li%erally construed to t!e end t!at t!e will of t!e people in t!e c!oice of pu%lic officials may not %e defeated %y mere tec!nical o%6ections*

BAYAN MUNA VS ROMULO GR NO. 1#9$1% - BARDO&UILLO

FA4T1 -F TH. 4A1.: +!is petition for certiorari see7s to nullify t!e 0.on-"urrender 8greement1 concluded %y and %etween t!e RP and F"8* Petitioner Bayan 2una is a duly registered party!list group established to represent the marginali$ed sectors of society * Respondent 8l%erto Romulo was impleaded in !is capacity as t!en Executive "ecretary in place of Ilas E* -ple, deceased "ecretary of Eoreign 8ffairs* +!e relevant treaties and laws in t!is case are4 #($ +!e ,ome statute #hich established I44 #ith the po#er to e7ercise its Durisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern such as genocide, crimes against humanity, #ar crimes, and crimes of aggression and shall be complementary to the national criminal Durisdictions* The ,ome statute #as signed by 4harge d&Affaires .nri?ue A" 2analo and #as not ratified by the 4ongress as of the filing of the instant petition" #2$ RP-F" .on-"urrender 8greement, t!e RP, represented %y t!en /E8 "ecretary -ple, agreed wit! and accepted t!e F" proposals em%odied under t!e F" Em%assy .ote adverted to and put in effect t!e 8greement wit! t!e F" government* Bn esse, the Agreement aims to protect #hat it refers to and defines as Mpersons of the ,+ and 51 from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in international tribunals * Bt is reflective of t!e increasing pace of t!e strategic security

and defense partners!ip %etween t!e two countries* 8m%assador Ricciardone replied in !is letter of -cto%er 2@, 2'') t!at t!e exc!ange of diplomatic notes constituted a legally %inding agreement under international law9 and t!at, under F" law, t!e said agreement did not re&uire t!e advice and consent of t!e F" "enate* I115.1: P#L%)%C*L L*+, 5-. petitioners !ave legal standing to file t!e petition* #LEG8L "+8./B.G$ 5-. t!e 8greement was contracted validly, w!ic! resolves itself into t!e &uestion of w!et!er or not respondents gravely a%used t!eir discretion in concluding it #EJECF+BCE 8GREEME.+ C" EJCD8.GE -E .-+E"$ 5-. t!e 8greement, w!ic! !as not %een su%mitted to t!e "enate for concurrence, contravenes and undermines t!e Rome "tatute and ot!er treaties #R8+BEBC8+B-. -E +RE8+BE" IH "E.8+E w2 C-+E -E 22) -E 8LL MEMIER" -E "E.8+E2 F.R8+BEBE/ +RE8+H C" EJECF+BCE 8GREEME.+$ H.0A: /.1" +.TITI-N.,1 HA6. 0.GA0 1TANAING Locus standi is Ma right of appearance in a court of Dustice on a given ?uestion" "pecifically, it is Ma party=s personal and su%stantial interest in a case w!ere !e !as sustained or will sustain direct in6ury as a result of t!e act %eing c!allenged, and Mcalls for more t!an 6ust a generalized grievance* +!e term Minterest refers to material interest, as distinguis!ed from one t!at is merely incidental* +!e rationale for re&uiring a party w!o c!allenges t!e validity of a law or international agreement to allege suc! a personal sta7e in t!e outcome of t!e controversy is Mto assure t!e concrete adverseness w!ic! s!arpens t!e presentation of issues upon w!ic! t!e court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional &uestions* 0ocus standi, ho#ever, is merely a matter of procedure and it has been recogni$ed that, in some cases, suits are not brought by parties #ho have been personally inDured by the operation of a la# or any other government act, but by concerned citi$ens, ta7payers, or voters #ho actually sue in the public interest" Going %y t!e petition, petitioner=s representatives pursue t!e instant suit primarily as concerned citizens raising issues of transcendental importance, %ot! for t!e Repu%lic and t!e citizenry as a w!ole* In cases of transcendental importance, #e #rote again in Bayan v" Namora, MThe 4ourt may rela7 the standing re?uirements and allo# a suit to prosper even #here there is no direct inDury to the party claiming the right of Dudicial revie#" /.1" TH. AG,..2.NT I1 4-NT,A4T.A 6A0IA0/ 8n e7change of notes falls Minto the category of inter!governmental agreements, #hich is an internationally accepted form of international agreement" +!e terms Mexc!ange of notes and Mexecutive agreements !ave %een used interc!angea%ly, exc!ange of notes %eing considered a form of executive agreement t!at %ecomes %inding t!roug! executive action* -n t!e ot!er !and, executive agreements concluded %y t!e President Msometimes ta7e t!e form of exc!ange of notes and at ot!er times t!at of more formal documents denominated agreements= or protocols* Bt is fairly clear from t!e foregoing dis&uisition t!at E2. IE--'2@-')LL%e it viewed as t!e .on-"urrender 8greement itself, or as an integral instrument of acceptance t!ereof or as consent to %e %oundLLis a recognized mode of concluding a legally %inding international written contract among nations*

N-" The Agreement does not need the concurrence of the 4ongress and does not undermine the ,ome 1t +!e 4ourt has, in Eastern "ea +rading, as reiterated in Iayan,, given recognition to the obligatory effect of e7ecutive agreements #ithout the concurrence of the 1enate 4 x x x :TJhe right of the .7ecutive to enter into binding agreements #ithout the necessity of subse?uent 4ongressional approval has been confirmed by long usage" Erom t!e earliest days of our !istory, we !ave entered executive agreements covering suc! su%6ects as commercial and consular relations, most favored-nation rig!ts, patent rig!ts, trademar7 and copyrig!t protection, postal and navigation arrangements and t!e settlement of claims* +!e validity of t!ese !as never %een seriously &uestioned %y our courts* International agreements may be in the form of (9 treaties that re?uire legislative concurrence after e7ecutive ratificationE or (: e7ecutive agreements that are similar to treaties, e7cept that they do not re?uire legislative concurrence and are usually less formal and deal #ith a narro#er range of subDect matters than treaties* 5nder international la#, there is no difference bet#een treaties and e7ecutive agreements in terms of their binding effects on the contracting states concerned" +!e 8greement does not contravene or undermine, nor does it differ from, t!e Rome "tatute* Ear from going against eac! ot!er, one complements t!e ot!er* 8s a matter of fact, t!e principle of complementarity underpins t!e creation of t!e BCC* 8s aptly pointed out %y respondents and admitted %y petitioners, t!e 6urisdiction of t!e BCC is to M%e complementary to national criminal 6urisdictions* +!is provision indicates t!at primary 6urisdiction over t!e so-called international crimes rests, at t!e first instance, wit! t!e state w!ere t!e crime was committed9 secondarily, wit! t!e BCC in appropriate situations contemplated under 8rt* (A, par* ( of t!e Rome "tatute* B. "FM4 +etititioners have legal standing because such petition is of transcendental importance" .7ecutive may enter into international agreements through formal agreement or e7change of notes and both are recogni$ed as international agreements"

A&UILINO &. PIMENTEL, JR., ET.AL. VS. SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE 'HOLE - ENGUITO
+!e 8ntecedents -n (5 "eptem%er 2''@, "enator Panfilo Lacson #"enator Lacson$ delivered a privilege speec! entitled NSa%an ng Iayan, IantayanUN2 Bn !is privilege speec!, "enator Lacson called attention to t!e congressional insertion in t!e 2''@ General 8ppropriations 8ct, particularly t!e P2'' million appropriated for t!e construction of t!e President Carlos P* Garcia 8venue Extension from "ucat Luzon Expressway to "ucat Road in ParaVa&ue City including Rig!t-of-5ay #R-5$, and anot!er P2'' million appropriated for t!e extension of C-5 road including R-5* "enator Lacson stated t!at C-5 is w!at was formerly called President Carlos P* Garcia 8venue and t!at t!e second appropriation covers t!e same stretc! L from "ucat Luzon Expressway to "ucat Road in ParaVa&ue City* "enator Lacson in&uired from /IM "ecretary Rolando 8ndaya, Kr* a%out t!e dou%le entry and was informed t!at it was on account of a congressional

insertion* "enator Lacson furt!er stated t!at w!en !e followed t!e narrow trail leading to t!e dou%le entry, it led to "enator Cillar, t!en t!e "enate President* Petitioners raised t!e following grounds4 (* +!e transfer of t!e complaint against "enator Cillar from t!e Et!ics Committee to t!e "enate Committee of t!e 5!ole is violative of "enator Cillar3s constitutional rig!t to e&ual protection9 2* +!e Rules adopted %y t!e "enate Committee of t!e 5!ole for t!e investigation of t!e complaint filed %y "enator Madrigal against "enator Cillar is violative of "enator Cillar3s rig!t to due process and of t!e ma6ority &uorum re&uirement under 8rt* CB, "ec* (O#2$ of t!e Constitution9 and )* +!e "enate Committee of t!e 5!ole li7ewise violated t!e due process clause of t!e Constitution w!en it refused to pu%lis! t!e Rules of t!e "enate Committee of t!e 5!ole in spite of its own provision :w!ic!; re&uire:s; its effectivity upon pu%lication* Bn its Comment, respondent argues t!at4 (* +!e instant petition s!ould %e dismissed for failure to 6oin or implead an indispensa%le party* Bn t!e alternative, t!e instant petition s!ould %e arc!ived until suc! time t!at t!e said indispensa%le party !as %een 6oined or impleaded and afforded t!e opportunity to %e !eard9 2* +!ere was no grave a%use of discretion on t!e part of respondent Committee9 )* Petitioners are not entitled to a writ of pro!i%ition for failure to prove grave a%use of discretion on t!e part of respondent Committee of t!e 5!ole9 * +!e principle of separation of powers must %e up!eld9 5* +!e instant petition must %e dismissed for %eing premature* Petitioners failed to o%serve t!e doctrine or primary 6urisdiction or prior resort9 O* Bt is wit!in t!e power of Congress to discipline its mem%ers for disorderly %e!avior9 A* +!e determination of w!at constitutes disorderly %e!avior is a political &uestion w!ic! exclusively pertains to Congress9 @* +!e Bnternal Rules of t!e "enate are not su%6ect to 6udicial review in t!e a%sence of grave a%use of discretion9 :and; ?* +!e Rules of t!e Et!ics Committee, w!ic! !ave %een duly pu%lis!ed and adopted allow t!e adoption of supplementary rules to govern ad6udicatory !earings*( The Issues (* 5!et!er "enator Madrigal, w!o filed t!e complaint against "enator Cillar, is an indispensa%le party in t!is petition9 2* 5!et!er t!e petition is premature for failure to o%serve t!e doctrine of primary 6urisdiction or prior resort9 )* 5!et!er t!e transfer of t!e complaint against "enator Cillar from t!e Et!ics Committee to t!e "enate Committee of t!e 5!ole is violative of "enator Cillar3s rig!t to e&ual protection9

* 5!et!er t!e adoption of t!e Rules of t!e Et!ics Committee as Rules of t!e "enate Committee of t!e 5!ole is a violative of "enator Cillar3s rig!t to due process and of t!e ma6ority &uorum re&uirement under 8rt* CB, "ection (O#2$ of t!e Constitution9 and 5* 5!et!er pu%lication of t!e Rules of t!e "enate Committee of t!e 5!ole is re&uired for t!eir effectivity* ,uling: Bndispensa%le Party Bn t!is case, 1enator 2adrigal is not an indispensable party to the petition before the 4ourt" 5!ile it may %e true t!at s!e !as an interest in t!e outcome of t!is case as t!e aut!or of P*"* Resolution A'O, t!e issues in this case are matters of Durisdiction and procedure on the part of the 1enate 4ommittee of the Khole #hich can be resolved #ithout affecting 1enator 2adrigal&s interest * +!e nature of 1enator 2adrigal&s interest in this case is not of the nature that this case could not be resolved #ithout her participation" Aoctrine of +rimary @urisdiction +!e doctrine of primary 6urisdiction does not apply to t!is case* +!e Court !as ruled4 x x x Bt may occur t!at t!e Court !as 6urisdiction to ta7e cognizance of a particular case, w!ic! means t!at t!e matter involved is also 6udicial in c!aracter* Dowever, if t!e case is suc! t!at its determination re&uires t!e expertise, specialized s7ills and 7nowledge of t!e proper administrative %odies %ecause tec!nical matters or intricate &uestions of fact are involved, t!en relief must first %e o%tained in an administrative proceeding %efore a remedy will %e supplied %y t!e courts even t!oug! t!e matter is wit!in t!e proper 6urisdiction of t!e court* x x x +!e issues presented !ere do not re&uire t!e expertise, specialized s7ills and 7nowledge of respondent for t!eir resolution* -n t!e contrary, t!e issues !ere are purely legal &uestions w!ic! are wit!in t!e competence and 6urisdiction of t!e Court, and not an administrative agency or t!e "enate to resolve* 8s regards respondent3s invocation of separation of powers, t!e Court reiterates t!at Nt!e inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among t!e legislative, executive or 6udicial %ranc!es of government %y no means prescri%es for a%solute autonomy in t!e disc!arge %y eac! of t!at part of t!e governmental power assigned to it %y t!e sovereign people*N+!us, it !as %een !eld t!at Nt!e power of 6udicial review is not so muc! power as it is :a; duty imposed on t!is Court %y t!e Constitution and t!at we would %e remiss in t!e performance of t!at duty if we decline to loo7 %e!ind t!e %arriers set %y t!e principle of separation of powers*N +!e Court, t!erefore, is not precluded from resolving t!e legal issues raised %y t!e mere invocation %y respondent of t!e doctrine of separation of powers* -n t!e contrary, t!e resolution of t!e legal issues falls wit!in t!e exclusive 6urisdiction of t!is Court* Transfer of the 4omplaint from the .thics 4ommittee to the 1enate 4ommittee on the Khole Reviewing t!e events t!at led to t!e constitution of t!e "enate Committee of t!e 5!ole, t!e Court notes t!at upon t!e election of "enator Enrile as "enate President on (A .ovem%er 2''@, t!e Et!ics Committee was also reorganized* The ,ules of the .thics 4ommittee provide that Oall matters relating to the conduct, rights, privileges, safety, dignity, integrity and reputation of the 1enate and its 2embers shall be under the e7clusive Durisdiction of the 1enate 4ommittee on .thics and +rivileges"O Dowever, in t!is case, t!e refusal of t!e Minority to name its mem%ers to t!e Et!ics Committee stalled t!e investigation* Bn s!ort,

w!ile ordinarily an investigation a%out one of its mem%ers3 alleged irregular or unet!ical conduct is wit!in t!e 6urisdiction of t!e Et!ics Committee, t!e Minority effectively prevented it from pursuing t!e investigation w!en t!ey refused to nominate t!eir mem%ers to t!e Et!ics Committee* Even "enator Cillar called t!e Et!ics Committee a 7angaroo court and declared t!at !e would answer t!e accusations against !im on t!e floor and not %efore t!e Et!ics Committee* Given t!e circumstances, the referral of the investigation to the 4ommittee of the Khole #as an e7traordinary remedy underta*en by the .thics 4ommittee and approved by a maDority of the members of the 1enate" Adoption of the ,ules of the .thics 4ommittee by the 1enate 4ommittee of the Khole 8gain, we reiterate t!at, considering t!e circumstances of t!is case, the referral of the investigation by the .thics 4ommittee to the 1enate 4ommittee of the Khole is an e7traordinary remedy that does not violate 1enator 6illar&s right to due process * Bn t!e same manner, t!e adoption by the 1enate 4ommittee of the Khole of the ,ules of the .thics 4ommittee does not violate 1enator 6illar&s right to due process" The 4onstitutional right of the 1enate to promulgate its o#n rules of proceedings has been recogni$ed and affirmed by this 4ourt" The only limitation to the po#er of 4ongress to promulgate its o#n rules is the observance of ?uorum, voting, and publication #hen re?uired" As long as these re?uirements are complied #ith, the 4ourt #ill not interfere #ith the right of 4ongress to amend its o#n rules * +rior +ublication Petitioners assail t!e non-pu%lication of t!e Rules of t!e "enate Committee of t!e 5!ole* Respondent counters t!at pu%lication is not necessary %ecause t!e "enate Committee of t!e 5!ole merely adopted t!e Rules of t!e Et!ics Committee w!ic! !ad %een pu%lis!ed in t!e -fficial Gazette on 2) Marc! 2''?* Respondent alleges t!at t!ere is only one set of Rules t!at governs %ot! t!e Et!ics Committee and t!e "enate Commitee of t!e 5!ole* Bf it was t!e intention of t!e "enate for its present rules on legislative in&uiries to %e effective even in t!e next Congress, it could !ave easily adopted t!e same language it !ad used in its main rules regarding effectivity* Lest t!e Court %e misconstrued, it s!ould li7ewise %e stressed t!at not all orders issued or proceedings conducted pursuant to t!e su%6ect Rules are null and void* -nly t!ose t!at result in violation of t!e rig!ts of witnesses s!ould %e considered null and void, considering t!at t!e rationale for t!e pu%lication is to protect t!e rig!ts of t!e witnesses as expressed in "ection 2(, 8rticle CB of t!e Constitution* "ans suc! violation, orders and proceedings are considered valid and effective* The 4onstitution does not re?uire publication of the internal rules of the House or 1enate" "ince rules of the House or the 1enate that affect only their members are internal to the House or 1enate, such rules need not be published, unless such rules e7pressly provide for their publication before the rules can ta*e effect"

Dowever, if t!e "enate is constituted as a Committee of t!e 5!ole, a ma6ority of t!e "enate is re&uired to constitute a &uorum to do %usiness pursuant to "ection (O#2$, 8rticle CB of t!e Constitution*)5 -t!erwise, t!ere will %e a circumvention of t!is express provision of t!e Constitution on &uorum re&uirement*

-%viously, the ,ules of the 1enate 4ommittee of the Khole re?uire modification to comply #ith re?uirements of ?uorum and voting #hich the 1enate must have overloo*ed in this case * Bn any event, in case of conflict bet#een the ,ules of the 1enate 4ommittee of the Khole and the 4onstitution, the latter #ill of course prevail" 5DEREE-RE, we GR8.+ t!e petition in part* +!e referral of t!e complaint %y t!e Committee on Et!ics and Privileges to t!e "enate Committee of t!e 5!ole s!all ta7e effect only upon pu%lication of t!e Rules of t!e "enate Committee of t!e 5!ole*

AMPATUAN V. PUNO - VERONILLA

FA4T1: -n 2 .ov* 2''?, t!e day after t!e Maguindanao Massacre, t!en Pres* 8rroyo issued Proclamation (? O, placing 0t!e Provinces of Maguindanao and "ultan Sudarat and t!e City of Cota%ato under a state of emergency*1 "!e directed t!e 8EP and t!e P.P 0to underta7e suc! measures as may %e allowed %y t!e Constitution and %y law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence1 in t!e named places* +!ree days later, s!e also issued 8- 2A) 0transferring1 supervision of t!e 8RMM from t!e -ffice of t!e President to t!e /BLG* "!e su%se&uently issued 8- 2A)-8, w!ic! amended t!e former 8- #t!e term 0transfer1 used in 8- 2A) was amended to 0delegate1, referring to t!e supervision of t!e 8RMM %y t!e /BLG$* 4laiming that the +resident&s issuances encroached on the A,22&s autonomy, petitioners 8mpatuan et al*, all A,22 officials, filed this petition for prohibition under ,ule H8" +!e alleged t!at t!e President3s proclamation and orders encroac!ed on t!e 8RMM3s autonomy as t!ese issuances empowered t!e /BLG "ecretary to ta7e over 8RMM3s operations and to seize t!e regional government3s powers* +!ey also claimed that the +resident had no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency, especially in t!e Province of "ultan Sudarat and t!e City of Cota%ato, w!ere no critical violent incidents occurred* +!e deployment of troops and t!e ta7ing over of t!e 8RMM constitutes an invalid exercise of t!e President3s emergency powers* Petitioners as7ed t!at Proclamation (? O as well as 8-s 2A) and 2A)-8 %e declared unconstitutional* Issue4 K-N the +resident invalidly e7ercised emergency po#ers #hen she called out the AF+ and the +N+ to prevent and suppress all incidents of la#less violence in 2aguindanao, 1ultan Pudarat, and 4otabato 4ity H.0A4 #same wit! "CR8$ The deployment is not by itself an e7ercise of emergency po#ers as understood under 1ection :C (: , Article 6I of the 4onstitution, w!ic! provides4

"EC+B-. 2)* x x x #2 In times of #ar or other national emergency, the 4ongress may, by la#, authori$e the +resident, for a limited period and subDect to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to e7ercise po#ers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national

policy" 5nless sooner #ithdra#n by resolution of the 4ongress, such po#ers shall cease upon the ne7t adDournment thereof* +!e +resident did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned* 8nd she did not act pursuant to any la# enacted by 4ongress that authori$ed her to e7ercise e7traordinary po#ers" The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress la#less violence in such places is a po#er that the 4onstitution directly vests in the +resident" 1he did not need a congressional authority to e7ercise the same" +!e +resident&s call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress la#less violence springs from the po#er vested in her under 1ection 9<, Article 6II of the 4onstitution , w!ic! provides4 "ection (@* +!e +resident shall be the 4ommander!in!4hief of all armed forces of the +hilippines and #henever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress la#less violence, invasion or rebellion * x x x 5!ile it is true t!at t!e Court may in&uire into t!e factual %ases for t!e President3s exercise of t!e a%ove power, it would generally defer to !er 6udgment on t!e matter* 8s t!e Court ac7nowledged in BIP v* Don* Wamora, it is clearly to t!e President t!at t!e Constitution entrusts t!e determination of t!e need for calling out t!e armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence* Fnless it is s!own t!at suc! determination was attended %y grave a%use of discretion, t!e Court will accord respect to t!e President3s 6udgment* +!us, t!e Court said4 If the petitioner fails, by #ay of proof, to support the assertion that the +resident acted #ithout factual basis, then this 4ourt cannot underta*e an independent investigation beyond the pleadings* +!e factual necessity of calling out t!e armed forces is not easily &uantifia%le and cannot %e o%6ectively esta%lis!ed since matters considered for satisfying t!e same is a com%ination of several factors w!ic! are not always accessi%le to t!e courts* Iesides t!e a%sence of textual standards t!at t!e court may use to 6udge necessity, information necessary to arrive at suc! 6udgment mig!t also prove unmanagea%le for t!e courts* Certain pertinent information mig!t %e difficult to verify, or w!olly unavaila%le to t!e courts* Bn many instances, t!e evidence upon w!ic! t!e President mig!t decide t!at t!ere is a need to call out t!e armed forces may %e of a nature not constituting tec!nical proof* -n t!e ot!er !and, t!e +resident, as 4ommander!in!4hief has avast intelligence net#or* to gather information, some of #hich may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state" In the e7ercise of the po#er to call, on!the!spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property* Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress la#less violence must be done s#iftly and decisively if it #ere to have any effect at all * x x x* Here, petitioners failed to sho# that the declaration of a state of emergency in t!e Provinces of Maguindanao, "ultan Sudarat and Cota%ato City, as #ell as the +resident&s e7ercise of the (calling out' po#er had no factual basis" +!ey simply alleged t!at, since not all areas under t!e 8RMM were placed under a state of emergency, it follows t!at t!e ta7eover of t!e entire 8RMM %y t!e /BLG "ecretary !ad no %asis too* +!e imminence of violence and anarc!y at t!e time t!e President issued Proclamation (? O was too grave to ignore and s!e !ad to act to prevent furt!er %loods!ed and !ostilities in t!e places mentioned* Progress reports also indicated t!at t!ere was movement in t!ese places of %ot! !ig!powered firearms and armed men sympat!etic to t!e two clans* +!us, to pacify the people&s fears and

stabili$e the situation, the +resident had to ta*e preventive action * "!e called out t!e armed forces to control t!e proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle t!e armed groups t!at continuously t!reatened t!e peace and security in t!e affected places* "ince petitioners are not a%le to demonstrate t!at t!e proclamation of state of emergency in t!e su%6ect places and t!e calling out of t!e armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence t!ere !ave clearly no factual %ases, t!e Court must respect t!e President3s actions*

NAPOCOR VS TUAZON GR 19 02
FA4T14

- SAMONTE

.apocor3s transmission line traversed on respondent3s property* Respondents demands t!at t!ey %e paid full value of t!eir land as 6ust compensation* .8P-C-R argues t!at it s!all only pay easement fee pursuant to section )-a#%$ its c!arter, R*8* O)?5, w!ic! prescri%es a formula for easement fee* (In this case, instead of initiating expropriation proceedings, NAPOCOR entered into a mere right of way agreement with Mr. T a!on which inc" ded the payment for #damages on impro$ements, easement tower and occ pancy fees and, additiona" damaged impro$ements% pro$ided nder RA &'(). Respondents thereafter fi"ed a case to demand * st compensation + t this was dismissed +y the RTC +ased on the motion of NAPOCOR stating that the respondents were a"ready rendered f "" satisfaction of their c"aims. CA, howe$er, re$ersed the decision of the RTC stating that the demo"ition of the "and as we"" as the insta""ation of the transmission "ines constit tes #ta,ing% nder the power of eminent domain. Th s, respondents sho "d +e entit"ed to * st compensation. CA a"so r "ed that NAPOCOR cannot hide nder the mant"e of RA &'() as an exc se of dismissing the c"aim of the respondents-appe""ants since the determination of * st compensation is a * dicia" f nction.. I115.4 K-N the installation of the transmission lines is a form of ta*ing under the po#er of eminent domain and does not establish a right!of!#ay easement Q K-N the determination of Dust compensation is a Dudicial function ,50ING Petition of .8P-C-R is devoid of merit " The determination of Dust compensation in e7propriation cases is a function addressed to the discretion of the courts, and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government" The formula provided in NA+-4-,&1 charter is not binding on the court" It is only a guide" 1ection CA!(b of ,"A" No" HC;8, as amended, is not binding on the 4ourt" The determination of Dust compensation in eminent domain cases is a Dudicial function and that any valuation for Dust compensation laid do#n in the statutes may serve only as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining Dust compensation but it may not substitute the court&s o#n Dudgment as to #hat amount should be a#arded and ho# to arrive at such amount" +!e failure of t!e respondents3 predecessor-in-interest #Mr* +uazon$ to oppose t!e installation of transmission lines on t!eir land is irrelevant* +!is cannot !ave t!e effect of t!warting t!e respondents3 rig!t to 6ust compensation

Private land ta7en for t!e installation of transmission lines is to %e paid t!e full mar7et value of t!e land as 6ust compensation* "C remanded t!e case to t!e R+C for t!e determination of 6ust compensation 1/00AB514 -minent Domain; Just Compensation; Just Compensation should .e e/uivalent to the full value of the land traversed .y the transmission lines. 0 in !olding t!at 6ust compensation s!ould %e e&uivalent to t!e full value of t!e land traversed %y t!e transmission lines, we said4 granting arguendo t!at t!e petitioner ac&uired over respondent3s property was purely an easement of a rig!t of way, still, we cannot sustain its view t!at it s!ould pay only an easement fee, and not t!e full value of t!e property* +!e ac&uisition of suc! an easement fails wit!in t!e purview of t!e power of eminent domain* +!is conclusion finds support in similar cases in w!ic! t!e "C sustained t!e award of 6ust compensation for private property condemned for pu%lic use* Same; Same; Courts pronouncement in 1utierre(& 234 SCR* 2 !2332" that the e5ercise of the power of eminent domain necessarily includes the imposition of ri'ht6of6way easements upon condemned property without loss of title or possession 0 remains doctrinal and should .e applied 0 t!e application of Gutierrez to t!e present case is well ta7en* +!e facts and issue of %ot! cases are compara%le* +!e rig!t-of-way easement in t!e case similarly involved transmission lines traversing privately owned land* Bt li7ewise !eld t!at the transmission lines not only endangered life and limb, but restricted as #ell the o#ner&s use of the land traversed * -ur pronouncement in Gutierrez -- t!at t!e exercise of t!e power of eminent domain necessarily includes t!e imposition of rig!t-of-way easements upon condemned property wit!out loss of title or possession L t!erefore remains doctrinal and s!ould %e applied* Same; Same; Section 46*!." is not conclusive upon the courts 0 we !ave !eld in numerous cases t!at section )-8 #%$ is not conclusive upon t!e courts* Bn .8P-C-R vs Maria Iagui, et al, we categorically !eld4 Moreover, "ection 8#%$ of R8 .o* O)?5, is not %inding on t!e court* Bt !as %een repeatedly emp!asized t!at t!e determination of 6ust compensation in eminent domain cases is a 6udicial function and t!at any valuation for 6ust compensation laid down in t!e statutes may serve only as a guiding principle or one of t!e factors in determining 6ust compensation %ut it may not su%stitute t!e court3s own 6udgment as to w!at amount s!ould %e awarded and !ow to arrive at suc! amount* Same; Same; the determination of 7ust compensation in e5propriation cases is a function addressed to the discretion of the courts& and may not .e usurped .y any other .ranch or official of the 'overnment 66 t!e determination of 6ust compensation in expropriation cases is a function addressed to t!e discretion of t!e courts, and may not %e usurped %y any ot!er %ranc! or official of t!e government* +!is 6udicial function !as constitutional raison d3etre9 8rt* BBB of t!e Constitution mandates t!at no private property s!all %e ta7en for pu%lic use wit!out payment of 6ust compensation*

LAND BAN( OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SEVERINO LISTANA !$#) S ##9 , JULY 2*, 2011" - MEDINA

RE4 Petition for review on certiorari of t!e decision of t!e C8 *'rarian Reform Law; -minent Domain; Just Compensation; The valuation of property in e7propriation cases pursuant to ,A HH8= (4omprehensive Agrarian ,eform 0a# , is essentially a Dudicial function #hich is vested in the ,T4 acting as 1pecial Agrarian 4ourt and cannot be lodged #ith administrative agencies such as the Aepartment of Agrarian ,eform (AA, 5!ile a petition for t!e fixing of 6ust compensation wit! t!e "pecial 8grarian Court #"8C$ is not an appeal from t!e agrarian reform ad6udicator3s decision %ut an original action, t!e same !as to %e file wit!in t!e (5-day period stated in t!e /epartment of 8grarian Reform 8d6udication Ioard #/8R8I$ Rules9 ot!erwise, t!e ad6udicator3s decision will attain finality* --- +o resolve t!e conflict in t!e rulings of t!e Court, we now declare !erein, for t!e guidance of t!e %enc! and to t!e %ar, t!at t!e IE++ER RFLE is t!at stated in P!ilippine Ceterans Ian7, reiterated in Lu%rica and in t!e 8ugust ( , 2''A /ecision in t!is case* +!us, w!ile a petition for t!e fixing of 6ust compensation wit! t!e "8C is not an appeal from t!e agrarian reform ad6udicator3s decision %ut an original action, t!e same !as to %e files wit!in t!e (5-day period stated in t!e /8R8I Rules9 ot!erwise, t!e ad6udicator3s decision will attain finality* +!is rule is not only in record wit! law and settled 6urisprudence %ut also wit! t!e principles of 6ustice and e&uity* Cerily, a %elated petition %efore t!e "8C, e*g* one filed a mont!, or a year, or even a decade after t!e land valuation of t!e /8R ad6udicator, must not leave t!e dispossessed landowner in a state of uncertainty as to t!e true value of !is property* +!ere exists no compelling reason to 6ustify relaxation of t!e rule on t!e timely availment of 6udicial action for t!e determination of 6ust compensation* --- Petitioner clearly slept on its rig!ts %y not filing t!e petition in t!e "8C wit!in t!e prescri%ed (5-day period or a reasona%le time after notice of t!e denial of its motion for reconsideration* Even assuming t!ere was already a consummated sale wit! respect to t!e (5(*( (? !ectares and LIP3s valuation t!ereof !ad %een fully paid to t!e respondent, t!e amount already paid %y LIP s!all %e deducted from t!e total compensation as determined %y t!e P8R8/* .ota%ly, LIP ex!i%ited lac7 of interest in t!e disc!arge of its statutory functions as it failed to actively participate in t!e summary administrative proceeding despite due notice of t!e !earings* Clearly, t!ere exists no compelling reason to 6ustify relaxation of t!e rule on t!e timely availment of 6udicial action for determination of 6ust compensation* Remedial Law; Jud'ments; $inality of Jud'ments; * decision that has ac/uired finality .ecomes immuta.le and unaltera.le& and may no lon'er .e modified in any respect& even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law& and whether it may .e .y the court that rendered it or .y the hi'hest court of the land; -5ceptions 666 +!e only exceptions to t!e general rule on t!e finality of 6udgments are4 0nunc pro tunc1 entries w!ic! cause no pre6udice to any party, void 6udgments, and w!enever circumstances transpire after t!e finality of t!e decision w!ic! render its execution un6ust and ine&uita%le*

Bndeed, litigation must end and terminate sometime and somew!ere, even at t!e ris7 of occasional errors*

(ULAYAN V. GOV. TAN ABUBA(AR G.R. NO. 1%*29%. JULY

, 2012

(4alling!-ut +o#ers .34051I6.0/ vested #ith the +resident Eacts4 8fter ) mem%ers of t!e Bnternational Committee of t!e Red Cross #BCRC$ were 7idnapped %y t!e 8%u "ayaf Group #8"G$ on Kanuary (5, 2''?, "ulu Governor +an organized t!e Civilian Emergency Eorce #CEE$, a group of armed male civilians w!o were redeployed to surrounding areas of Pati7ul w!ere t!e alleged 8"G mem%ers !ide* -n Marc! )(, 2''?, Gov" Tan issued +roclamation No" 9!B;, declaring a state of emergency in the province * Bt descri%ed t!e 7idnapping incident as a terrorist act violative of R8 ?)A2 or t!e Duman "ecurity 8ct* Gov* +an invo7ed "ec* O5 of t!e Local Government Code #LGC$, w!ic! %estows on t!e Provincial Governor t!e power to carry out emergency measures during man-made and natural disasters and calamities* Bn t!e said Proclamation, Tan called upon the +N+ and the 4.F to set up chec*points, conduct general search and sei$ures including arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure public safety" -n 8pril (O, 2''?, 8tty* Sulayan, et*al* filed t!e present petition for certiorari and pro!i%ition, claiming t!at Proc* (-'? was issued wit! grave a%use of discretion, as it t!reatened fundamental freedoms guaranteed under t!e Constitution* They contend that +roc" 9!B; is an ultra vires act of the Governor, violating 1ecs" 9 and 9< of Art" 6II of the 4onstitution #hich grants the +resident sole authority to e7ercise emergency po#ers and calling!out po#ers as the chief e7ecutive and commander!in!chief of the armed forces* I115.1: 5-. Gov* +an can exercise calling-out powers %y declaring a state of emergency under t!e LGC* 5-. Gov* +an is clot!ed wit! aut!ority to convene t!e Civilian Emergency Eorce* ,50ING4 +.TITI-N I1 I2+,.11.A KITH 2.,IT" +roc" 9!B; is null and void" (* It is -N0/ the +resident, as .7ecutive, #ho is authori$ed to e7ercise emergency po#ers as provided under 8rt* CB "ec* 2) of t!e Constitution, as #ell as #hat became *no#n as the calling!out po#ers under 8rt* CBB "ec* A t!ereof* 5!ile t!e President is still a civilian, 8rt* BB "ec* ) of the 4onstitution mandates that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military, ma*ing the civilian president the nationFs supreme military leader" +!e Constitution does not re&uire t!at t!e President must %e possessed of military training and talents, %ut as Commander-in-C!ief, !e !as t!e power to direct military operations and to determine military strategy* Regarding t!e countryPs police force, 8rt* JCB "ec* O of t!e Constitution states t!at t!e "tate s!all esta%lis! and maintain one police force, w!ic! s!all %e national in scope and civilian in c!aracter, to %e administered and controlled %y a national police commission* 8 local chief e7ecutive, such as the provincial governor, e7ercises operational supervision over the police, and may e7ercise control only in day!to!day operations" In issuing +roc" 9!B;, Gov" Tan e7ceeded his authority #hen he declared a state of emergency and called!upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his o#n 4.F" The calling!out po#ers contemplated under the 4onstitution is .34051I6. to the +resident * 8n exercise %y anot!er official, even if !e is t!e local c!ief executive, is ultra vires, and may not %e 6ustified %y t!e invocation of "ec* O5 of t!e LGC*

5nder 1ec" >H8 of the 0G4, the governor is certainly empo#ered to enact and implement emergency measures during these occurrences" But the *idnapping incidents in the case at bar 4ANN-T B. 4-N1IA.,.A A1 A 4A0A2IT/ -, A AI1A1T., * +!e LGC does not involve t!e diminution of central powers in!erently vested in t!e .ational Government* The intent behind the po#ers granted to the 0G5s is fiscal, economic, and administrative in nature* +!e Code is concerned only wit! powers t!at would ma7e t!e delivery of %asic services more effective to t!e constituents, and s!ould .-+ %e unduly stretc!ed to confer calling-out powers on local executives* 2* Pursuant to t!e national policy to esta%lis! one police force, the organi$ation of private citi$en armies is proscribed" Art" 36III 1ec" :> of the 4onstitution mandate that private armies and other armed groups not recogni$ed by duly constituted authority shall be dismantled * 8ll paramilitary forces not consistent wit! t!e citizen armed force esta%lis!ed in t!e Constitution s!all %e dissolved or, w!ere appropriate, converted into t!e regular force* 8dditionally, 8rt* JB "ec* 2( states, N+!e preservation of peace and order wit!in t!e regions s!all %e t!e responsi%ilities of t!e local police agencies w!ic! s!all %e organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in accordance wit! applica%le laws* +!e defense and security of t!e regions s!all %e t!e RE"P-."BIBLB+H -E +DE .8+B-.8L G-CER.ME.+*N

RENALD F. VILANDO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL CAPON

: G*R* .os* (?2( A X (?2( ?, 8ugust 2), 2'(( ; Facts4 0im*aichong ran as a representative in t!e (st /istrict of .egros -riental* Iecause of t!is, !er opponent, +aras and some other concerned citi$ens filed dis?ualification cases against 0im*aichong* +!ey alleged that 0im*aichong #as not a natural born citi$en of the +hilippines because #hen she #as born her father #as still a 4hinese and that her mother, lost her Filipino citi$enship by virtue of her marriage to 0im*aichong&s father * /uring t!e pendency of t!e case against Lim7aic!ong %efore t!e C-MELEC, Election day came and votes were cast* Results came in and 0im*aichong #on over her rival +aras * C-MELEC after due !earing declared Lim7aic!ong as dis&ualified* Eew days after t!e counting of votes, C-MELEC declared Lim7aic!ong as a dis&ualified candidate* -n t!e following days !owever, notwit!standing t!eir proclamation dis&ualifying Lim7aic!ong, t!e 4-2.0.4 issued a proclamation announcing 0im*aichong as the #inner of the recently conducted elections" +!is is in compliance wit! Resolution .o* @'O2 adopting t!e policy-guidelines of not suspending t!e proclamation of winning candidates wit! pending dis&ualification cases w!ic! s!all %e wit!out pre6udice to t!e continuation of t!e !earing and resolution of t!e involved cases* Paras countered t!e proclamation and s!e filed a petition %efore t!e C-MELEC " 0im*aichong asailed +aras& petition arguing that since she is no# the proclaimed #inner, it should be the H,.T #hich has the Durisdiction over the matter and not the 4-2.0.4" 4-2.0.4 agreed #ith 0im*aichong * Issues: (* 5-. t!e proclamation done %y t!e C-MELEC is valid* 2* 5-. t!e DRE+ already ac&uired 6urisdiction over t!e case* )* 5-. Lim7aic!ong is &ualified to !old an office in t!e Repu%lic of t!e P!ilippines Held4

(* +!e proclamation of 0im*aichong #as valid * Lim7aic!ong timely filed wit! t!e C-MELEC En Ianc !er motion for reconsideration as well as for t!e lifting of t!e incorporated directive suspending !er proclamation* +!e filing of t!e motion for reconsideration effectively suspended t!e execution of t!e C-MELEC3s Koint Resolution* "ince t!e execution of t!e Koint Resolution was suspended, t!ere was no impediment to t!e valid proclamation of Lim7aic!ong as t!e winner pursuant to "ection 2, Rule (? of t!e C-MELEC Rules of Procedure* 2* The H,.T must e7ercise Durisdiction after 0im*aichong&s proclamation * +!e "C !as invaria%ly !eld t!at once a #inning candidate has been proclaimed, ta*en his oath, and assumed office as a 2ember of the House of ,epresentatives the 4-2.0.4&s Durisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and ?ualifications ends, and the H,.T&s o#n Durisdiction begins * Bt follows t!en t!at the proclamation of a #inning candidate divests the 4-2.0.4 of its Durisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation" +!e party &uestioning !is &ualification s!ould now present !is case in a proper proceeding %efore t!e DRE+, t!e constitutionally mandated tri%unal to !ear and decide a case involving a Mem%er of t!e Douse of Representatives wit! respect to t!e latter3s election, returns and &ualifications* +!e use of t!e word 0sole1 in "ection (A, 8rticle CB of t!e Constitution and in "ection 25' of t!e -EC underscores t!e exclusivity of t!e Electoral +ri%unals3 6urisdiction over election contests relating to its mem%ers* )* Records disclose t!at Lim7aic!ong was %orn in /umaguete City on .ovem%er ?, (?5?* +!e governing law is t!e citizens!ip provision of t!e (?)5 Constitution* +!e DRE+, t!erefore, correctly relied on t!e presumption of validity of t!e Kuly ?, (?5A and "eptem%er 2(, (?5? -rders of t!e Court of Eirst Bnstance #CEB$ .egros -riental, w!ic! granted t!e petition and declared Kulio "y a naturalized Eilipino a%sent any evidence to t!e contrary* ,espondent 0im*aichong falls under the category of those persons #hose fathers are citi$ens of the +hilippines * #"ection (#)$, 8rticle BC, (?)5 Constitution$ Bt matters not w!et!er t!e fat!er ac&uired citizens!ip %y %irt! or %y naturalization* +!erefore, follo#ing the line of transmission through the father under the 9;C8 4onstitution, the respondent has satisfactorily complied #ith the re?uirement for candidacy and for holding office, as she is a natural!born Filipino citi$en" Respondent participated in t!e %arangay elections as a young voter in (?AO, accomplis!ed voterPs affidavit as of (?@ , and ran as a candidate and was elected as Mayor of La Li%ertad, .egros -riental in 2'' * +!ese are positive acts of election of P!ilippine citizens!ip* +!e case of Bn re4 Elorencio Mallare, elucidates !ow election of citizens!ip is manifested in actions indu%ita%ly s!owing a definite c!oice* 5e note t!at respondent !ad informally elected citizens!ip after Kanuary (A, (?A) during w!ic! time t!e (?A) Constitution considered as citizens of t!e P!ilippines all t!ose w!o elect citizens!ip in accordance wit! t!e (?)5 Constitution* +!e present petition filed by 6ilando #as AI12I11.A * +!e Court affirms t!e Marc! 2 , 2'(' Aecision of the H,.T declaring that 0im*aichong is not dis?ualified as 2ember of the House of ,epresentatives representing t!e Eirst /istrict, .egros -riental* "ylla%us4 Citi(enship; collateral attac8 prohi.ited. Cilando see7s to dis&ualify Lim7aic!ong on t!e ground t!at s!e is a C!inese citizen* +o prove !is point, !e refers to t!e alleged nullity of t!e grant of naturalization of Lim7aic!ong3s fat!er w!ic!, !owever, is not allowed as it would constitute a collateral attac7 on t!e citizens!ip of t!e fat!er* 5nder +hilippine la#, an attac* on a person&s citi$enship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity"

Citi(enship; forfeiture; application for an alien certificate of re'istration. Cilando3s assertion t!at Lim7aic!ong cannot derive P!ilippine citizens!ip from !er mot!er %ecause t!e latter %ecame a C!inese citizen w!en s!e married Kulio "y, as provided for under "ection ( #A$ of Commonwealt! 8ct .o* O) in relation to 8rticle 2 #($ C!apter BB of t!e C!inese Revised .ationality Law of Ee%ruary 5, (?5?, li7ewise failed* 6ilando #as not able to offer in evidence a duly certified true copy of the alleged 4hinese ,evised 0a# of Nationality to prove that 0im*aichong&s mother indeed lost her +hilippine citi$enship* De failed to esta%lis! !is case t!roug! competent and admissi%le evidence to warrant a reversal of t!e DRE+ ruling* 8lso, an application for an alien certificate of registration(A4, is not an indubitable proof of forfeiture of +hilippine citi$enship" -btaining an A4, by 0im*aichong&s mother #as not tantamount to a repudiation of her original citi$enship * .eit!er did it result in an ac&uisition of alien citizens!ip* +!e "upreme Court !as consistently !eld t!at an application for, and the holding of, an alien certificate of registration is not an act constituting renunciation of +hilippine citi$enship" For renunciation to effectively result in loss of citi$enship, the same must be e7press" "uc! express renunciation is lac7ing in t!is case* 8ccordingly, Lim7aic!ong3s mot!er, %eing a Eilipino citizen, can transmit !er citizens!ip to !er daug!ter* Citi(enship; natural6.orn citi(en. 5it! Lim7aic!ong3s fat!er !aving %een conferred t!e status as a naturalized Eilipino, it follows t!at s!e is a Eilipino citizen %orn to a Eilipino fat!er* Even on t!e assumption t!at t!e naturalization proceedings and t!e su%se&uent issuance of a certificate of naturalization were invalid, 0im*aichong can still be considered a natural!born Filipino citi$en having been born to a Filipino mother and having impliedly elected Filipino citi$enship #hen she reached maDority age" The H,.T #as, thus, found to have ruled correctly in declaring that 0im*aichong is a natural!born Filipino citi$en* 9ouse of Representatives -lectoral )ri.unal; 7urisdiction * +!e H,.T has Durisdiction over ?uo #arranto petitions, specifically over cases challenging ineligibility on the ground of lac* of citi$enship" The 9;<= 4onstitution vests the H,.T #ith the authority to be the sole Dudge of all contests relating to the election, returns and ?ualifications of 2embers of the House of ,epresentatives* +!is constitutional power is li7ewise ec!oed in t!e 2'' Rules of t!e DRE+* Dowever, such po#er of the H,.T, no matter ho# complete and e7clusive, does not carry #ith it the authority to delve into the legality of the Dudgment of naturali$ation in the pursuit of dis?ualifying 0im*aichong" To rule other#ise #ould operate as a collateral attac* on the citi$enship of the father #hich is not permissible*

BETOY VS. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, NAPOCOR - BABATUAN

,eorgani$ation of +ublic -ffice 8 public office is created by the 4onstitution or by la# or by an officer or tribunal to #hich the po#er to create the office has been delegated by the legislature * The po#er to create an office carries #ith it the po#er to abolish" Abolition of a public office is usually done thru reorgani$ation * Reorganization can involve t!e reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or even a%olition of positions %y reason of economy or redundancy of functions* ,eorgani$ation ho#ever, must be done in good faith to be valid" Bn t!is case, employees affected %y t!e privatization of t!e .PC led %y Ietoy filed a petition directly to t!e "upreme Court praying to declare t!e %oard resolutions providing for t!eir termination wit! separation

%enefits null and void* +!e petition %asically &uestioned certain provisions of Rep* 8ct .o* ?()O or t!e Electric Power Bndustry Reform 8ct of 2''(* +!e Court in t!is case sustained t!e reorganization of t!e .PC involving t!e reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or a%olition t!ereof %y reason of economy or redundancy of functions* +!e court did not lend credence to t!e allegation of t!e petitioner t!at t!e reorganization was tainted wit! %ad fait!* Facts4 -n Kune @, 2''(, t!e .+I,A .lectric +o#er Industry ,eform Act of :BB9 (.+I,A #as enacted by 4ongress for the restructuring of the electric po#er industry and privati$ation of the assets of the National +o#er 4orporation (N+4 " "ection O) of t!e .+I,A provides for separation benefits to officials and employees #ho #ould be affected by the restructuring of the electric po#er industry and the privati$ation of the assets of the N+4* +!e NA+-4-, Board passed a ,esolution #hich, among others, resolved that all N+4 personnel shall be legally terminated on @anuary C9, :BBC and shall be entitled to separation benefit s* 8s a result of t!e foregoing .PI Resolutions, petitioner Enri&ue F* Ietoy, toget!er wit! more t!an eig!t t!ousand of !is co-employees from t!e .PC was terminated* Dence, !erein petition for certiorari %efore "C* Issue4 Is the N+4 Board ,esolution null and void for being violative of their 4onstitutional rights) ,uling4 8nent t!e &uestion of t!e constitutionality of "ection O) of R8 ?()O, as well as Rule )) of t!e BRR, t!is Court finds t!at t!e same is wit!out merit* A reorgani$ation involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions * Bt could result in t!e loss of one3s position t!roug! removal or a%olition of an office* Dowever, for a reorganization for t!e purpose of economy or to ma7e t!e %ureaucracy more efficient to %e valid, it must pass t!e test of good fait!9 ot!erwise, it is void a% initio* Bt is undisputed t!at N+4 #as in financial distress and the solution found by 4ongress #as to pursue a policy to#ards its privati$ation" The privati$ation of N+4 necessarily demanded the restructuring of its operations" To carry out the purpose, there #as a need to terminate employees and re!hire some depending on the manpo#er re?uirements of the privati$ed companies" The privati$ation and restructuring of the N+4 #as, therefore, done in good faith as its primary purpose #as for economy and to ma*e the bureaucracy more efficient" #"ylla%us of t!e /issenting -pinion not included$

DATU MICHAEL ABAS (IDA ET. AL. VS SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET. AL. GR NO. 192$2*1. OCTOBER 1%, 2011 - BILOCURA

1yllabus !Constitution; -lection Law;" 5!ile t!e Constitution does not expressly state t!at Congress !as to sync!ronize national and local elections, t!e clear intent towards t!is o%6ective can %e gleaned from t!e +ransitory Provisions #8rticle JCBBB$ of t!e Constitution, w!ic! s!ow t!e extent to w!ic! t!e Constitutional Commission, %y deli%erately ma7ing ad6ustments to t!e terms of t!e incum%ent officials, soug!t to attain sync!ronization of elections* !Same;" Erom t!e perspective of t!e Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local governments, as evident from 8rticle J of t!e Constitution entitled NLocal Government*N 8utonomous regions are esta%lis!ed and discussed under "ections (5 to 2( of t!is 8rticle L t!e article w!olly devoted to Local Government* +!at an autonomous region is considered a form of local government is also reflected in "ection (, 8rticle J of t!e Constitution* !Same;" Bn t!e present case, t!e records s!ow t!at the +resident #rote to the 1pea*er of the House of ,epresentatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a la# synchroni$ing the A,22 elections #ith the national and local elections * Eollowing our +olentino ruling, t!e +resident&s certification e7empted both the House and the 1enate from having to comply #ith the three separate readings re?uirement" !Same;" )he 9ouse of Representatives and the Senate L in t!e exercise of t!eir legislative discretion L gave full recognition to t!e President3s certification and promptly enacted R8 .o* ('(5)* Fnder t!e circumstances, not!ing s!ort of grave a%use of discretion on t!e part of t!e two !ouses of Congress can 6ustify our intrusion under our power of 6udicial review* !Same;" Even assuming t!at R8 .o* ?))) and R8 .o* ('(5) did in fact amend R8 .o* ?'5 , t!e superma6ority #22)$ voting re&uirement re&uired under "ection (, 8rticle JCBB of R8 .o* ?'5 )2 !as to %e struc7 down for giving R8 .o* ?'5 t!e c!aracter of an irrepeala%le law %y re&uiring more t!an w!at t!e Constitution demands* !Same;" +!e re&uirements of R8 .o* ?'5 not only re&uired an unwarranted superma6ority, %ut enlarged as well t!e ple%iscite re&uirement, as em%odied in its "ection ), 8rticle JCBB of t!at 8ct* 8s we did on t!e superma6ority re&uirement, we find t!e enlargement of t!e ple%iscite re&uirement re&uired under "ection (@, 8rticle J of t!e Constitution to %e excessive to point of a%surdity and, !ence, a violation of t!e Constitution* !Same;" R8 .o* A(OO already provides for t!e sync!ronization of local elections wit! t!e national and congressional elections* +!us, w!at R8 .o* ('(5) provides is an old matter for local governments #wit! t!e exception of %arangay and "anggunian Sa%ataan elections w!ere t!e terms are not constitutionally provided$ and is tec!nically a reiteration of w!at is already reflected in t!e law, given t!at regional elections are in reality local elections %y express constitutional recognition* !Same;" The grant of legislative po#er to 4ongress is broad, general and comprehensive * +!e legislative %ody possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil government* 8ny power, deemed to %e legislative %y usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed %y Congress, unless t!e Constitution !as lodged it elsew!ere* Except as limited %y t!e Constitution, eit!er expressly or impliedly, legislative power em%races all su%6ects and extends to all matters of general concern or common interest* #"ame9$ Bn relation wit! sync!ronization, %ot! autonomy and t!e sync!ronization of national and local elections are recognized and esta%lis!ed constitutional mandates, wit! one %eing as compelling as t!e ot!er* Bf t!eir compelling force differs at all, t!e difference is in t!eir coverage9 sync!ronization operates

on and affects t!e w!ole country, w!ile regional autonomy L as t!e term suggests L directly carries a narrower regional effect alt!oug! its national effect cannot %e discounted* #"ame9$ "ince elective 8RMM officials are local officials, t!ey are covered and %ound %y t!e t!ree-year term limit prescri%ed %y t!e Constitution9 t!ey cannot extend t!eir term t!roug! a !oldover* 8s t!is Court put in -smeVa v* C-MELEC* #"ame9$ Bt is not competent for t!e legislature to extend t!e term of officers %y providing t!at t!ey s!all !old over until t!eir successors are elected and &ualified w!ere t!e constitution !as in effect or %y clear implication prescri%ed t!e term and w!en t!e Constitution fixes t!e day on w!ic! t!e official term s!all %egin, t!ere is no legislative aut!ority to continue t!e office %eyond t!at period, even t!oug! t!e successors fail to &ualify wit!in t!e time* #"ame9$ Congress, in passing R8 .o* ('(5), made it explicitly clear t!at it !ad t!e intention of suppressing t!e !oldover rule t!at prevailed under R8 .o* ?'5 %y completely removing t!is provision* +!e deletion is a policy decision t!at is w!olly wit!in t!e discretion of Congress to ma7e in t!e exercise of its plenary legislative powers9 t!is Court cannot pass upon &uestions of wisdom, 6ustice or expediency of legislation,O2 except w!ere an attendant unconstitutionality or grave a%use of discretion results* #"ame9$ +!e constitutional power of t!e C-MELEC, in contrast wit! t!e power of Congress to call for, and to set t!e date of, elections, is limited to enforcing and administering all laws and regulations relative to t!e conduct of an election*O5 "tatutorily, C-MELEC !as no power to call for t!e !olding of special elections unless pursuant to a specific statutory grant* #"ame9$ Bn t!e same way t!at t!e term of elective 8RMM officials cannot %e extended t!roug! a !oldover, t!e term cannot %e s!ortened %y putting an expiration date earlier t!an t!e t!ree #)$ years t!at t!e Constitution itself commands* +!is is w!at will !appen L a term of less t!an two years L if a call for special elections s!all prevail* Bn sum, w!ile sync!ronization is ac!ieved, t!e result is at t!e cost of a violation of an express provision of t!e Constitution* #"ame9$ +!e power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and t!e limitations on or &ualifications to t!e exercise of t!is power s!ould %e strictly construed9 t!ese limitations or &ualifications must %e clearly stated in order to %e recognized*A) +!e appointing power is em%odied in "ection (O, 8rticle CBB of t!e Constitution* #"ame9$ "ince t!e President3s aut!ority to appoint -BCs emanates from R8 .o* ('(5), it falls under t!e t!ird group of officials t!at t!e President can appoint pursuant to "ection (O, 8rticle CBB of t!e Constitution* +!us, t!e assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional %asis* #"ame9$ +!e legal reality is t!at R8 .o* ('(5) did not amend R8 .o* ?'5 * R8 .o* ('(5), in fact, provides only for sync!ronization of elections and for t!e interim measures t!at must in t!e meanw!ile prevail* 8nd t!is is !ow R8 .o* ('(5) s!ould %e read L in t!e manner it was written and %ased on its unam%iguous facial terms*A5 8side from its order for sync!ronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure responding to t!e ad6ustments t!at t!e sync!ronization re&uires* #"ame9$ 5!ile autonomous regions are granted political autonomy, t!e framers of t!e Constitution never e&uated autonomy wit! independence* +!e 8RMM as a regional entity t!us continues to operate wit!in t!e larger framewor7 of t!e "tate and is still su%6ect to t!e national policies set %y t!e national government, save only for t!ose specific areas reserved %y t!e Constitution for regional autonomous determination*

#"ame9$ 5e find t!at Congress, in passing R8 .o* ('(5), acted strictly wit!in its constitutional mandate* Given an array of c!oices, it acted wit!in due constitutional %ounds and wit! mar7ed reasona%leness in lig!t of t!e necessary ad6ustments t!at sync!ronization demands* E8C+"4 +!e case is a consolidation of seven petitions, all assailing t!e constitutionality of R*8* ('(5)* R8 .o* ?'5 #entitled N8n 8ct to "trengt!en and Expand t!e -rganic 8ct for t!e 8utonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, 8mending for t!e Purpose Repu%lic 8ct .o* OA) , entitled 8n 8ct Providing for t!e 8utonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as 8mendedN$ was t!e next legislative act passed* +!is law provided furt!er refinement in t!e %asic 8RMM structure first defined in t!e original organic act, and reset t!e regular elections for t!e 8RMM regional officials to t!e second Monday of "eptem%er 2''(* Congress passed t!e next law affecting 8RMM L R8 .o* ?( '( - on Kune 22, 2''(* +!is law reset t!e first regular elections originally sc!eduled under R8 .o* ?'5 , to .ovem%er 2O, 2''(* Bt li7ewise set t!e ple%iscite to ratify R8 .o* ?'5 to not later t!an 8ugust (5, 2''(* R8 .o* ?'5 was ratified in a ple%iscite !eld on 8ugust ( , 2''(* +!e province of Iasilan and Marawi City voted to 6oin 8RMM on t!e same date* R8 .o* ?)))2 was su%se&uently passed %y Congress to reset t!e 8RMM regional elections to t!e 2nd Monday of 8ugust 2''5, and on t!e same date every ) years t!ereafter* Fnli7e R8 .o* OA) and R8 .o* ?'5 , R8 .o* ?))) was not ratified in a ple%iscite* Pursuant to R8 .o* ?))), t!e next 8RMM regional elections s!ould !ave %een !eld on 8ugust @, 2'((* C-MELEC !ad %egun preparations for t!ese elections and !ad accepted certificates of candidacies for t!e various regional offices to %e elected* Iut on Kune )', 2'((, R8 .o* ('(5) was enacted, resetting t!e 8RMM elections to May 2'(), to coincide wit! t!e regular national and local elections of t!e country* -n Kune )', 2'((, Repu%lic 8ct #R8$ .o* ('(5), entitled N8n 8ct Providing for t!e "ync!ronization of t!e Elections in t!e 8utonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao #8RMM$ wit! t!e .ational and Local Elections and for -t!er PurposesN was enacted* +!e law reset t!e 8RMM elections from t!e @t! of 8ugust 2'((, to t!e second Monday of May 2'() and every t!ree #)$ years t!ereafter, to coincide wit! t!e country3s regular national and local elections* +!e law as well granted t!e President t!e power to Nappoint officersin-c!arge #-BCs$ for t!e -ffice of t!e Regional Governor, t!e Regional Cice-Governor, and t!e Mem%ers of t!e Regional Legislative 8ssem%ly, w!o s!all perform t!e functions pertaining to t!e said offices until t!e officials duly elected in t!e May 2'() elections s!all !ave &ualified and assumed office*N +!e early c!allenge to R8 .o* ('(5) came t!roug! a petition filed wit! t!is Court L G*R* .o* (?O2A() assailing t!e constitutionality of %ot! DI .o* ( O and "I .o* 2A5O, and c!allenging t!e validity of R8 .o* ?))) as well for non-compliance wit! t!e constitutional ple%iscite re&uirement* +!ereafter, petitioner Iasari Mapupuno in G*R* .o* (?O)'5 filed anot!er petition also assailing t!e validity of R8 .o* ?)))* 5it! t!e enactment into law of R8 .o* ('(5), t!e C-MELEC stopped its preparations for t!e 8RMM elections* +!e law gave rise as well to t!e filing of t!e following petitions against its constitutionality* +!e petitioners assailing R8 .o* ?( ', R8 .o* ?))) and R8 .o* ('(5) assert t!at t!ese laws amend R8 .o* ?'5 and t!us, !ave to comply wit! t!e superma6ority vote and ple%iscite re&uirements prescri%ed under "ections ( and ), 8rticle JCBB of R8 .o* ?'? in order to %ecome effective*

+!e petitions assailing R8 .o* ('(5) furt!er maintain t!at it is unconstitutional for its failure to comply wit! t!e t!ree-reading re&uirement of "ection 2O#2$, 8rticle CB of t!e Constitution* 8lso cited as grounds are t!e alleged violations of t!e rig!t of suffrage of t!e people of 8RMM, as well as t!e failure to ad!ere to t!e Nelective and representativeN c!aracter of t!e executive and legislative departments of t!e 8RMM* Lastly, t!e petitioners c!allenged t!e grant to t!e President of t!e power to appoint -BCs to underta7e t!e functions of t!e elective 8RMM officials until t!e officials elected under t!e May 2'() regular elections s!all !ave assumed office* Corrolarily, t!ey also argue t!at t!e power of appointment also gave t!e President t!e power of control over t!e 8RMM, in complete violation of "ection (O, 8rticle J of t!e Constitution*

B""FE"4 B* 5!et!er t!e (?@A Constitution mandates t!e sync!ronization of elections BB* 5!et!er t!e passage of R8 .o* ('(5) violates "ection 2O#2$, 8rticle CB of t!e (?@A Constitution BBB* 5!et!er t!e passage of R8 .o* ('(5) re&uires a superma6ority vote and ple%iscite 8* /oes t!e postponement of t!e 8RMM regular elections constitute an amendment to "ection A, 8rticle JCBBB of R8 .o* ?'5 T I* /oes t!e re&uirement of a superma6ority vote for amendments or revisions to R8 .o* ?'5 violate "ection ( and "ection (O#2$, 8rticle CB of t!e (?@A Constitution and t!e corollary doctrine on irrepeala%le lawsT C* /oes t!e re&uirement of a ple%iscite apply only in t!e creation of autonomous regions under paragrap! 2, "ection (@, 8rticle J of t!e (?@A ConstitutionT BC* 5!et!er R8 .o* ('(5) violates t!e autonomy granted to t!e 8RMM C* 5!et!er t!e grant of t!e power to appoint -BCs violates4 8* "ection (5, 8rticle J of t!e (?@A Constitution I* "ection (O, 8rticle J of t!e (?@A Constitution C* "ection (@, 8rticle J of t!e (?@A Constitution CB* 5!et!er t!e proposal to !old special elections is constitutional and legal*

RFLB.G4 B* Hes, sync!ronization is a recognized constitutional mandate* "ections (, 2 and 5, 8rticle JCBBB #+ransitory Provisions$ of t!e (?@A Constitution, w!ic! provide4 "ection (* +!e first elections of Mem%ers of t!e Congress under t!is Constitution s!all %e !eld on t!e second Monday of May, (?@A*

+!e first local elections s!all %e !eld on a date to %e determined %y t!e President, w!ic! may %e simultaneous wit! t!e election of t!e Mem%ers of t!e Congress* Bt s!all include t!e election of all Mem%ers of t!e city or municipal councils in t!e Metropolitan Manila area* "ection 2* +!e "enators, Mem%ers of t!e Douse of Representatives and t!e local officials first elected under t!is Constitution s!all serve until noon of Kune )', (??2* -f t!e "enators elected in t!e election in (??2, t!e first twelve o%taining t!e !ig!est num%er of votes s!all serve for six year and t!e remaining twelve for t!ree years* xxx "ection 5* +!e six-year term of t!e incum%ent President and Cice President elected in t!e Ee%ruary A, (?@O election is, for purposes of sync!ronization of elections, !ere%y extended to noon of Kune )', (??2* +!e first regular elections for President and Cice-President under t!is Constitution s!all %e !eld on t!e second Monday of May, (??2* 5!ile t!e Constitution does not expressly state t!at Congress !as to sync!ronize national and local elections, t!e clear intent towards t!is o%6ective can %e gleaned from t!e +ransitory Provisions #8rticle JCBBB$ of t!e Constitution, w!ic! s!ow t!e extent to w!ic! t!e Constitutional Commission, %y deli%erately ma7ing ad6ustments to t!e terms of t!e incum%ent officials, soug!t to attain sync!ronization of elections* +!e o%6ective %e!ind setting a common termination date for all elective officials, done among ot!ers t!roug! t!e s!ortening t!e terms of t!e twelve winning senators wit! t!e least num%er of votes, is to sync!ronize t!e !olding of all future elections L w!et!er national or local L to once every t!ree years* +!is intention finds full support in t!e discussions during t!e Constitutional Commission deli%erations* Bt is li7ewise evident from t!e wording of t!e a%ove-mentioned "ections t!at t!e term of sync!ronization is used synonymously as t!e p!rase !olding simultaneously since t!is is t!e precise intent in terminating t!eir -ffice +enure on t!e same day or occasion* +!is common termination date will sync!ronize future elections to once every t!ree years #Iernas, t!e Constitution of t!e Repu%lic of t!e P!ilippines, Col* BB, p* O'5$* +!at t!e election for "enators, Mem%ers of t!e Douse of Representatives and t!e local officials #under "ec* 2, 8rt* JCBBB$ will !ave to %e sync!ronized wit! t!e election for President and Cice President #under "ec* 5, 8rt* JCBBB$ is li7ewise evident from t!e x x x records of t!e proceedings in t!e Constitutional Commission* :Emp!asis supplied*; 8lt!oug! called regional elections, t!e 8RMM elections s!ould %e included among t!e elections to %e sync!ronized as it is a NlocalN election %ased on t!e wording and structure of t!e Constitution* 8 %asic rule in constitutional construction is t!at t!e words used s!ould %e understood in t!e sense t!at t!ey !ave in common use and given t!eir ordinary meaning, except w!en tec!nical terms are employed, in w!ic! case t!e significance t!us attac!ed to t!em prevails* Fnderstood in its ordinary sense, t!e word NlocalN refers to somet!ing t!at primarily serves t!e needs of a particular limited district, often a community or minor political su%division*(A Regional elections in t!e 8RMM for t!e positions of governor, vice-governor and regional assem%ly representatives o%viously fall wit!in t!is classification, since t!ey pertain to t!e elected officials w!o will serve wit!in t!e limited region of 8RMM*

Erom t!e perspective of t!e Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of t!e forms of local governments, as evident from 8rticle J of t!e Constitution entitled NLocal Government*N 8utonomous regions are esta%lis!ed and discussed under "ections (5 to 2( of t!is 8rticle L t!e article w!olly devoted to Local Government* +!at an autonomous region is considered a form of local government is also reflected in "ection (, 8rticle J of t!e Constitution* BB* .o, t!e passage of R8 .o* ('(5) does not violate "ection 2O#2$, 8rticle CB of t!e (?@A Constitution* "ection 2O#2$, 8rticle CB of t!e Constitution provides t!at %efore %ills passed %y eit!er t!e Douse or t!e "enate can %ecome laws, t!ey must pass t!roug! t!ree readings on separate days* +!e exception is w!en t!e President certifies to t!e necessity of t!e %ill3s immediate enactment* +!e Court, in +olentino v* "ecretary of Einance, explained t!e effect of t!e President3s certification of necessity in t!e following manner4 +!e presidential certification dispensed wit! t!e re&uirement not only of printing %ut also t!at of reading t!e %ill on separate days* +!e p!rase Nexcept w!en t!e President certifies to t!e necessity of its immediate enactment, etc*N in 8rt* CB, "ection 2O:2; &ualifies t!e two stated conditions %efore a %ill can %ecome a law4 :i; t!e %ill !as passed t!ree readings on separate days and :ii; it !as %een printed in its final form and distri%uted t!ree days %efore it is finally approved* Bn t!e present case, t!e records s!ow t!at t!e President wrote to t!e "pea7er of t!e Douse of Representatives to certify t!e necessity of t!e immediate enactment of a law sync!ronizing t!e 8RMM elections wit! t!e national and local elections*2' Eollowing our +olentino ruling, t!e President3s certification exempted %ot! t!e Douse and t!e "enate from !aving to comply wit! t!e t!ree separate readings re&uirement* +!e Douse of Representatives and t!e "enate L in t!e exercise of t!eir legislative discretion L gave full recognition to t!e President3s certification and promptly enacted R8 .o* ('(5)* Fnder t!e circumstances, not!ing s!ort of grave a%use of discretion on t!e part of t!e two !ouses of Congress can 6ustify our intrusion under our power of 6udicial review* Bn any case, despite t!e President3s certification, t!e two-fold purpose t!at underlies t!e re&uirement for t!ree readings on separate days of every %ill must always %e o%served to ena%le our legislators and ot!er parties interested in pending %ills to intelligently respond to t!em* "pecifically, t!e purpose wit! respect to Mem%ers of Congress is4 #($ to inform t!e legislators of t!e matters t!ey s!all vote on and #2$ to give t!em notice t!at a measure is in progress t!roug! t!e enactment process* BBB* .o, t!e passage of R8 .o* ('(5) does not re&uire a superma6ority vote and ple%iscite* BBB* 8* .o, t!e postponement of t!e 8RMM regular elections does not constitute an amendment to "ection A, 8rticle JCBBB of R8 .o* ?'5 * +o recall, R8 .o* ('(5) is not t!e first law passed t!at resc!eduled t!e 8RMM elections* +!e Eirst -rganic 8ct L R8 .o* OA) L not only did not fix t!e date of t!e su%se&uent elections9 it did not even fix t!e specific date of t!e first 8RMM elections,2 leaving t!e date to %e fixed in anot!er legislative enactment* Conse&uently, R8 .o* AO A,25 R8 .o* @(AO,2O R8 .o* @A O,2A R8 .o* @A5),2@ and R8 .o* ?'(22? were all enacted %y Congress to fix t!e dates of t!e 8RMM elections* "ince t!ese laws did not c!ange or modify any part or provision of R8 .o* OA) , t!ey were not amendments to t!is latter law* Conse&uently, t!ere was no need to su%mit t!em to any ple%iscite for ratification*

BBB* I* Hes, t!e re&uirement of a superma6ority vote for amendments or revisions to R8 .o* ?'5 violates "ection ( and "ection (O#2$, 8rticle CB of t!e (?@A Constitution and t!e corollary doctrine on irrepeala%le laws* "uperma6ority voting re&uirement is unconstitutional for giving R8 .o* ?'5 irrepeala%le law* t!e c!aracter of an

Even assuming t!at R8 .o* ?))) and R8 .o* ('(5) did in fact amend R8 .o* ?'5 , t!e superma6ority #22)$ voting re&uirement re&uired under "ection (, 8rticle JCBB of R8 .o* ?'5 )2 !as to %e struc7 down for giving R8 .o* ?'5 t!e c!aracter of an irrepeala%le law %y re&uiring more t!an w!at t!e Constitution demands* "ection (O#2$, 8rticle CB of t!e Constitution provides t!at a Nma6ority of eac! Douse s!all constitute a &uorum to do %usiness*N Bn ot!er words, as long as ma6ority of t!e mem%ers of t!e Douse of Representatives or t!e "enate are present, t!ese %odies !ave t!e &uorum needed to conduct %usiness and !old session* 5it!in a &uorum, a vote of ma6ority is generally sufficient to enact laws or approve acts* Bn contrast, "ection (, 8rticle JCBB of R8 .o* ?'5 re&uires a vote of no less t!an two-t!irds #22)$ of t!e Mem%ers of t!e Douse of Representatives and of t!e "enate, voting separately, in order to effectively amend R8 .o* ?'5 * Clearly, t!is 22) voting re&uirement is !ig!er t!an w!at t!e Constitution re&uires for t!e passage of %ills, and served to restrain t!e plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal t!e laws it !ad passed* BBB* C* Hes, t!e re&uirement of a ple%iscite applies only in t!e creation of autonomous regions under paragrap! 2, "ection (@, 8rticle J of t!e (?@A Constitution* "ection (@, 8rticle J of t!e Constitution states t!at t!e ple%iscite is re&uired only for t!e creation of autonomous regions and for determining w!ic! provinces, cities and geograp!ic areas will %e included in t!e autonomous regions* 5!ile t!e settled rule is t!at amendments to t!e -rganic 8ct !ave to comply wit! t!e ple%iscite re&uirement in order to %ecome effective,)5 &uestions on t!e extent of t!e matters re&uiring ratification may unavoida%ly arise %ecause of t!e seemingly general terms of t!e Constitution and t!e o%vious a%surdity t!at would result if a ple%iscite were to %e re&uired for every statutory amendment* "ection (@, 8rticle J of t!e Constitution plainly states t!at N+!e creation of t!e autonomous region s!all %e effective w!en approved %y t!e ma6ority of t!e votes case %y t!e constituent units in a ple%iscite called for t!e purpose*N 5it! t!ese wordings as standard, we interpret t!e re&uirement to mean t!at only amendments to, or revisions of, t!e -rganic 8ct constitutionally-essential to t!e creation of autonomous regions L i*e*, t!ose aspects specifically mentioned in t!e Constitution w!ic! Congress must provide for in t!e -rganic 8ct L re&uire ratification t!roug! a ple%iscite* +!ese amendments to t!e -rganic 8ct are t!ose t!at relate to4 #a$ t!e %asic structure of t!e regional government9 #%$ t!e region3s 6udicial system, i*e*, t!e special courts wit! personal, family, and property law 6urisdiction9 and, #c$ t!e grant and extent of t!e legislative powers constitutionally conceded to t!e regional government under "ection 2', 8rticle J of t!e Constitution*)O +!e date of t!e 8RMM elections does not fall under any of t!e matters t!at t!e Constitution specifically mandated Congress to provide for in t!e -rganic 8ct* +!erefore, even assuming t!at t!e superma6ority votes and t!e ple%iscite re&uirements are valid, any c!ange in t!e date of elections cannot %e construed as a su%stantial amendment of t!e -rganic 8ct t!at would re&uire compliance wit! t!ese re&uirements* BC* .o, R8 .o* ('(5) does not violate t!e autonomy granted to t!e 8RMM*

"ync!ronization is an interest t!at is as constitutionally entrenc!ed as regional autonomy* +!ey are interests t!at t!is Court s!ould reconcile and give effect to, in t!e way t!at Congress did in R8 .o* ('(5) w!ic! provides t!e measure to transit to sync!ronized regional elections wit! t!e least distur%ance on t!e interests t!at must %e respected* Particularly, regional autonomy will %e respected instead of %eing sidelined, as t!e law does not in any way alter, c!ange or modify its governing features, except in a very temporary manner and only as necessitated %y t!e attendant circumstances* 5!ile autonomous regions are granted political autonomy, t!e framers of t!e Constitution never e&uated autonomy wit! independence* +!e 8RMM as a regional entity t!us continues to operate wit!in t!e larger framewor7 of t!e "tate and is still su%6ect to t!e national policies set %y t!e national government, save only for t!ose specific areas reserved %y t!e Constitution for regional autonomous determination* C* 8* .o, t!e grant of t!e power to appoint -BCs does not violate "ection (5, 8rticle J of t!e (?@A Constitution* "ection (5* +!ere s!all %e created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in t!e Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geograp!ical areas s!aring common and distinctive !istorical and cultural !eritage, economic and social structures, and ot!er relevant c!aracteristics wit!in t!e framewor7 of t!is Constitution and t!e national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of t!e Repu%lic of t!e P!ilippines* Relation "ection (A and "ection (5, t!e Constitution and t!e supporting 6urisprudence, as t!ey now stand, re6ect t!e notion of imperium et imperio in t!e relations!ip %etween t!e national and t!e regional governments* C* I* .o, t!e grant of t!e power to appoint -BCs does not violate "ection (O, 8rticle J of t!e (?@A Constitution* +!is provision classifies into four groups t!e officers t!at t!e President can appoint* +!ese are4 Eirst, t!e !eads of t!e executive departments9 am%assadors9 ot!er pu%lic ministers and consuls9 officers of t!e 8rmed Eorces of t!e P!ilippines, from t!e ran7 of colonel or naval captain9 and ot!er officers w!ose appointments are vested in t!e President in t!is Constitution9 "econd, all ot!er officers of t!e government w!ose appointments are not ot!erwise provided for %y law9 +!ird, t!ose w!om t!e President may %e aut!orized %y law to appoint9 and Eourt!, officers lower in ran7 w!ose appointments t!e Congress may %y law vest in t!e President alone* "ince t!e President3s aut!ority to appoint -BCs emanates from R8 .o* ('(5), it falls under t!e t!ird group of officials t!at t!e President can appoint pursuant to "ection (O, 8rticle CBB of t!e Constitution* +!us, t!e assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional %asis* C* C* .o, t!e grant of t!e power to appoint -BCs does not violate "ection (@, 8rticle J of t!e (?@A Constitution* Generally, aut!orizing t!e President to appoint -BCs in place of elective officials in t!e 8RMM, an existing local government unit, contravenes "ection (@, 8rticle J of t!e Constitution, w!ic! mandates t!at t!e Nexecutive department and legislative assem%lyN of t!e 8RMM Ns!all %e elective and representative*N Elective local offices in t!e 8RMM, after t!e 8RMM3s creation and !olding of regular local elections,

cannot %e filled up t!roug! t!e appointment of -BCs %y t!e President wit!out violating "ection (@, 8rticle J of t!e Constitution* Dowever, under "ection , 8rticle J of t!e Constitution, t!e President exercises Ngeneral supervisionN over all local governments* Bn case it is a%solutely necessary and unavoida%le to 7eep functioning essential government services, t!e President may, under !is power of general supervision over local governments, appoint -BCs w!ere vacancies occur in existing elective local offices and t!e law does not provide for succession, or w!ere succession is inapplica%le %ecause t!e terms of elective officials !ave expired* +!us, t!e President may appoint an officer-in-c!arge in t!e office of t!e 8RMM Governor pending t!e !olding of special local elections in t!e 8RMM* +!e appointment of suc! officer-in-c!arge is a%solutely necessary and unavoida%le %ecause someone must insure t!at essential government services continue to function in t!e 8RMM* +!e officer-in-c!arge s!all exercise t!e powers and perform t!e functions of t!e 8RMM Governor under R8 ?'5 and related laws until t!e assumption to office of t!e elected 8RMM Governor* Dowever, all appointments made %y t!e officer-in-c!arge s!all terminate upon t!e assumption to office of t!e elected Governor* CB* .o, t!e C-MELEC !as no aut!ority to order special elections* 8not!er option proposed %y t!e petitioner in G*R* .o* (?A2@2 is for t!is Court to compel C-MELEC to immediately conduct special elections pursuant to "ection 5 and O of Iatas Pam%ansa Iilang #IP$ @@(* +!e power to fix t!e date of elections is essentially legislative in nature, as evident from, and exemplified %y "ection @, 8rticle CB of t!e Constitution* Doldover option is li7ewise unconstitutional* Bn t!e case of t!e terms of local officials, t!eir term !as %een fixed clearly and une&uivocally, allowing no room for any implementing legislation wit! respect to t!e fixed term itself and no vagueness t!at would allow an interpretation from t!is Court* +!us, t!e term of t!ree years for local officials s!ould stay at t!ree #)$ years as fixed %y t!e Constitution and cannot %e extended %y !oldover %y Congress* Bf it will %e claimed t!at t!e !oldover period is effectively anot!er term mandated %y Congress, t!e net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint t!e occupant for t!e new term* +!is view L li7e t!e extension of t!e elective term L is constitutionally infirm %ecause Congress cannot do indirectly w!at it cannot do directly, i*e*, to act in a way t!at would effectively extend t!e term of t!e incum%ents* Bndeed, if acts t!at cannot %e legally done directly can %e done indirectly, t!en all laws would %e illusory* Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint t!e occupant of t!e position for t!e new term* +!is is effectively an act of appointment %y Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into t!e constitutional appointment power of t!e President*5O Dence, !oldover L w!ic!ever way it is viewed L is a constitutionally infirm option t!at Congress could not !ave underta7en* Conclusion4 R*8* ('(5) is constitutional*

GARCIA VS. E+ECUTIVE SECRETARY ALO G.R. NO. 19%##) $** SCRA *#0

Rig!t to speedy disposition of cases Bn determining w!et!er or not t!e rig!t to t!e speedy disposition of cases !as %een violated, t!is Court !as laid down t!e following4 ($ t!e lengt! of t!e delay9 2$ t!e reasons for suc! delay9 )$ t!e assertion or failure to assert suc! rig!t %y t!e accused9 and $ t!e pre6udice caused t!e delay* L .o less t!an our Constitution guarantees t!e rig!t not 6ust to a speedy trial %ut to t!e speedy disposition of cases* Dowever it needs to %e underscored t!at speedy disposition is a relative and flexi%le concept* 8 mere mat!ematical rec7oning of t!e time involved is not sufficient* Particular regard must %e taen of t!e facts and circumstances peculiar to eac! case* E&ual Protection of t!e Law9 +!e application of 8rticle 2? of t!e Revised Penal Code in t!e 8rticles of 5ar is in accordance wit! t!e E&ual Protection Clause of t!e (?@A Constitution9 +!e purpose of t!e e&ual protection clause is to secure every person wit!in a state3s 6urisdiction against intentional and ar%itrary discrimination, w!et!er occasioned %y t!e express terms of a statute or %y its improper execution t!roug! t!e state3s duly-constituted aut!orities* L 8ccording to t!e long lines of decisions, e&ual protection simply re&uires t!at all persons or t!ings similarly situated s!ould %e treated ali7e, %ot! as to t!e rig!ts conferred and responsi%ilities imposed* Bt re&uires pu%lic %odies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner* +!e purpose of t!e e&ual protection clause is to secure every person wit!in a state3s 6urisdiction against intentional and ar%itrary discrimination, w!et!er occasioned %y t!e express terms of a statute or %y its improper execution t!roug! t!e state3s duly-constituted aut!orities* Bn ot!er words, t!e concept of e&ual 6ustice under t!e law re&uires t!e state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions %etween individuals solely on difference t!at are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental o%6ective* Bt, !owever, does not re&uire t!e universal application of t!e laws to all persons or t!ings wit!out distinction* 5!at it simply re&uires is e&uality among e&uals as determined according to a valid classification* E8C+"4 Ma6or General Carlos Elores Garcia #Garcia$ was c!arged and found guilty of a violation against t!e 8rticles of 5ar #8rticle ?O$, Conduct un%ecoming an -fficer and a Gentleman for failing to disclose2declare all !is existing assets in !is "worn "tatement of 8ssets and Lia%ilities and .et 5ort! #"8L.$ for t!e year 2'') as re&uired %y Repu%lic 8ct .o* )'(?, as amended in relation to Repu%lic 8ct OA()* 8fter t!e c!arge was filed, %y t!e aut!ority of t!e Provost Martial General of t!e 8rmed Eorces of t!e P!ilippines #8EP$, !e was placed in confinement since t!e case was pending starting -cto%er () 2'' * Marc! O, 2''O, t!e decision was released and indorsed to t!e President for Confirmation* Dowever, it was only on "eptem%er ?, 2'(( w!en t!e Confirmation of "entence was released and t!at Garcia was already released from t!e Camp Crame /etention Center from !is preventive confinement since /ecem%er (O, 2'('* Part of t!e sentence was to !ave Garcia confined for a period of two #2$ years in a penitentiary and s!all not %e remitted2mitigated %y any previous confinement, w!ic! caused t!e arrest and detention of Garcia on "eptem%er (O, 2'((* Petitioner t!en filed wit! t!is Court t!e present petition for certiorari and petition for !a%eas corpus, alternatively* +!e Court denied t!e petition for !a%eas corpus and t!e su%se&uent MR* Bn t!e petition for certiorari, petitioner argues t!at t!e confirmation issued %y t!e -ffice of t!e President directing !im to %e confined for two #2$ years in t!e penitentiary !ad already %een fully served in view of !is preventive confinement w!ic! !ad exceeded two #2$ years* +!erefore, according to !im, t!e -ffice of t!e President no longer !as t!e aut!ority to order !is confinement in a penitentiary* -n t!e ot!er

!and, t!e -"G opines t!at petitioner cannot legally demand t!e deduction of !is preventive confinement in t!e service of !is imposed two-year confinement in a penitentiary, %ecause unli7e our Revised Penal Code w!ic! specifically mandates t!at t!e period of preventive imprisonment of t!e accused s!all %e deducted from t!e term of !is imprisonment, t!e 8rticles of 5ar and2or t!e Manual for Courts-Martial do not provide for t!e same deduction in t!e execution of t!e sentence imposed %y t!e General Court Martial as confirmed %y t!e President in appropriate cases* Bn addition, petitioner raises t!e issue of t!e 6urisdiction of t!e General Court Martial to try !is case* 8ccording to !im, t!e said 6urisdiction ceased ipso facto upon !is compulsory retirement* +!us, !e insists t!at t!e -ffice of t!e President !ad acted wit!out 6urisdiction in issuing t!e confirmation of !is sentence* B""FE4 5DE+DER -R .-+ +DE RBGD+ -E +DE 8CCF"E/ +- "PEE/H /B"P-"B+B-. -E C8"E" 58" CB-L8+E/* RFLB.G4 .o* Bn t!is case, t!ere was no allegation, w!atsoever of any delay during t!e trial* 5!at is %eing &uestioned %y petitioner is t!e delay in t!e confirmation of sentence %y t!e President* Iasically, t!e case !as already %een decided %y t!e General Court Martial and !as also %een reviewed %y t!e proper reviewing aut!orities wit!out any delay* +!e only t!ing missing t!en was t!e confirmation of sentence %y t!e President* +!e records do not s!ow t!at, in t!ose six #O$ years from t!e time t!e decision of t!e General Court Martial was promulgated until t!e sentence was finally confirmed %y t!e President, petitioner too7 any positive action to assert !is rig!t to a speedy disposition of !is case* +!is is a7in to w!at !appened in Guerrero v* Court of 8ppeals, w!ere, in spite of t!e lapse of more t!an ten years of delay, t!e Court still !eld t!at t!e petitioner could not rig!tfully complain of delay violative of !is rig!t to speedy trial or disposition of !is case, since !e was part of t!e reason for t!e failure of !is case to move on towards its ultimate resolution* Dowever, applying t!e provisions of 8rticle 2? of t!e Revised Penal Code, t!e time wit!in w!ic! t!e petitioner was under preventive confinement s!ould %e credited to t!e sentence confirmed %y t!e -ffice of t!e President, su%6ect to t!e conditions set fort! %y t!e same law* +!is Court ruled t!at a court-martial case is a criminal case and t!e General Court Martial is a NcourtN a7in to any ot!er courts* +!e words 0any court1 include t!e General Court-Martial, and a courtmartial case is a criminal case wit!in t!e meaning of t!e a%ove &uoted provisions of our Constitution* Bn t!e present case, petitioner was c!arged wit! and convicted of Conduct Fn%ecoming an -fficer and Gentleman #?Ot! 8rticle of 5ar$ and Ciolation of t!e ?At! 8rticle of 5ar, or Conduct Pre6udicial to Good -rder and Military /iscipline, %ot! of w!ic! are not defined and penalized under t!e Revised Penal Code* +!e corresponding penalty imposed %y t!e General Court Martial, w!ic! is two #2$ years of confinement at !ard la%or is penal in nature* +!erefore, a%sent any provision as to t!e application of a criminal concept in t!e implementation and execution of t!e General Court MartialPs decision, t!e provisions of t!e Revised Penal Code, specifically 8rticle 2? s!ould %e applied*

GUTIERREZ VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE !IMPEACHMENT" - MONSANTO

+!e Case4 Petitioner--m%udsman c!allenges Douse Resolutions of "ept* ( and A, 2'(' finding two impeac!ment complaints against t!e petitioner, simultaneously referred to t!e Douse Committee on Kustice, sufficient in form and su%stance on grounds t!at s!e was denied due process and t!at t!e said resolutions violated t!e one-year %ar rule on initiating impeac!ment proceedings for impeac!a%le officers* Court dismissed t!e petition* "alient Points on Gutierrez case4 Bmpeac!ment9 Kusticia%le Controversy

Bn t!e present case, petitioner invo7es t!e Court3s expanded certiorari 6urisdiction, using t!e special civil actions of certiorari and pro!i%ition as procedural ve!icles* Dowever, t!e Court finds it well-wit!in its power to determine w!et!er pu%lic respondent committed a violation of t!e Constitution or gravely a%used its discretion in t!e exercise of its functions and prerogatives t!at could translate as lac7 or excess of 6urisdiction, w!ic! would re&uire corrective measures from t!e Court*

Bndu%ita%ly, t!e Court is not asserting its ascendancy over t!e Legislature in t!is instance, %ut simply up!olding t!e supremacy of t!e Constitution as t!e repository of t!e sovereign will*

Re&uisite of Ripeness4 6usticia%le 0case or controversy1

Pu%lic respondent argues t!at w!en petitioner filed t!e present petition on "eptem%er (), 2'(', it !ad not gone %eyond t!e determination of t!e sufficiency of form and su%stance of t!e two complaints* 8n aspect of t!e 0case-or-controversy1 re&uirement is t!e re&uisite of ripeness* +!e &uestion of ripeness is especially relevant in lig!t of t!e direct, adverse effect on an individual %y t!e c!allenged conduct* Bn t!e present petition, t!ere is no dou%t t!at &uestions on, inter alia, t!e validity of t!e simultaneous referral of t!e two complaints and on t!e need to pu%lis! as a mode of promulgating t!e Rules of Procedure in Bmpeac!ment Proceedings of t!e Douse #Bmpeac!ment Rules$ present constitutional vagaries w!ic! call for immediate interpretation*

+!e unusual act of simultaneously referring to pu%lic respondent two impeac!ment complaints presents a novel situation to invo7e 6udicial power* Petitioner cannot t!us %e considered to !ave acted prematurely w!en s!e too7 t!e cue from t!e constitutional limitation t!at only one impeac!ment proceeding s!ould %e initiated against an impeac!a%le officer wit!in a period of one year*

Rules on Bmpeac!ment +!e rules on impeac!ment, as contemplated %y t!e framers of t!e Constitution, merely aid or supplement t!e procedural aspects of impeac!ment, and, %eing procedural in nature, t!ey may %e given retroactive application to pending actions*R +!e reason for t!is is t!at, as a general rule, no vested rig!t may attac!

to, nor arise from, procedural laws*1 Bn t!e present case, petitioner fails to allege any impairment of vested rig!ts* Bt %ears stressing t!at, unli7e t!e process of in&uiry in aid of legislation w!ere t!e rig!ts of witnesses are involved, impeac!ment is primarily for t!e protection of t!e people as a %ody politic, and not for t!e punis!ment of t!e offender*

"ufficiency in Eorm and "u%stance of an Bmpeac!ment Complaint

Rule BBB#8$ of t!e Bmpeac!ment Rules of t!e (5t! Congress reflects t!e impeac!ment procedure at t!e Committee-level, particularly "ection 5 w!ic! denotes t!at petitioner3s initial participation in t!e impeac!ment proceedingsRt!e opportunity to file an 8nswerRstarts after t!e Committee on Kustice finds t!e complaint sufficient in form and su%stance*

+!e determination of sufficiency of form and su%stance of an impeac!ment complaint is an exponent of t!e express constitutional grant of rule-ma7ing powers of t!e Douse of Representatives w!ic! committed suc! determinative function to pu%lic Committee on Kustice*R

Contrary to petitioner3s position t!at t!e Bmpeac!ment Rules do not provide for compre!ensi%le standards in determining t!e sufficiency of form and su%stance, t!e Bmpeac!ment Rules are clear in ec!oing t!e constitutional re&uirements and providing t!at t!ere must %e a 0verified complaint or resolution,1 and t!at t!e su%stance re&uirement is met if t!ere is 0a recital of facts constituting t!e offense c!arged and determinative of t!e 6urisdiction of t!e committee*1

.otatu dignum is t!e fact t!at it is only in t!e Bmpeac!ment Rules w!ere a determination of sufficiency of form and su%stance of an impeac!ment complaint is made necessary* +!is re&uirement is not explicitly found in t!e organic law, as "ection )#2$, 8rticle JB of t!e Constitution %asically merely re&uires a 0!earing*1

Bn t!e disc!arge of its constitutional duty, t!e Douse deemed t!at a finding of sufficiency of form and su%stance in an impeac!ment complaint is vital 0to effectively carry out1 t!e impeac!ment process, !ence, suc! additional re&uirement in t!e Bmpeac!ment Rules*

Promulgation vs Pu%lication Bn t!e case of administrative agencies, 0promulgation1 and 0pu%lication1 ta7e on different meanings as t!ey are part of a multi-stage procedure in &uasi-legislation* 8s detailed in one case, t!e pu%lication of implementing rules occurs after t!eir promulgation or adoption*

8s far as promulgation of 6udgments is concerned, !owever, promulgation means 0t!e delivery of t!e decision to t!e cler7 of court for filing and pu%lication*1

Promulgation must %e used in t!e context in w!ic! it is generally understoodRt!at is, to ma7e 7nown9 Generalia ver%a sunt generaliter inteligencia* 5!at is generally spo7en s!all %e generally understood*"ince t!e Constitutional Commission did not restrict 0promulgation1 to 0pu%lication,1 t!e former s!ould %e understood to !ave %een used in its general sense* Bt is wit!in t!e discretion of Congress to determine on !ow to promulgate its Bmpeac!ment Rules, in muc! t!e same way t!at t!e Kudiciary is permitted to determine t!at to promulgate a decision means to deliver t!e decision to t!e cler7 of court for filing and pu%lication*

Bt is not for t!is Court to tell a co-e&ual %ranc! of government !ow to promulgate w!en t!e Constitution itself !as not prescri%ed a specific met!od of promulgation* +!e Court is in no position to dictate a mode of promulgation %eyond t!e dictates of t!e Constitution*

Pu%lication in t!e -fficial Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is %ut one avenue for Congress to ma7e 7nown its rules9 -n grounds of respect for t!e %asic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in t!e internal affairs of t!e legislature9 it is not wit!in t!e province of courts to direct Congress !ow to do its wor7* -t!er t!an 0promulgate,1 t!ere is no ot!er single formal term in t!e Englis! language to appropriately refer to an issuance wit!out need of it %eing pu%lis!ed*

Bnitiation of Bmpeac!ment Proceedings2 -ne-Hear Iar Rule +!e initiation starts wit! t!e filing of t!e complaint w!ic! must %e accompanied wit! an action to set t!e complaint moving, i*e*, Congress3 ta7ing initial action of said complaint w!ic! is its referral of t!e complaint to t!e Committee on Kustice*RContrary to petitioner3s asseveration, Erancisco states t!at t!e term 0initiate1 means to file t!e complaint and ta7e initial action on it*

Bmpeac!ment Complaint as to Bmpeac!ment proceedings +!e petitioner3s reliance on t!e singular tense of t!e word 0complaint1 to denote t!e limit prescri%ed %y t!e Constitution goes against t!e %asic rule of statutory construction t!at a word covers its enlarged and plural sense*RContrary to petitioner3s emp!asis on impeac!ment complaint, w!at t!e Constitution mentions is impeac!ment 0proceedings*1 +!e Court, of course, does not downplay t!e importance of an impeac!ment complaint, for it is t!e matc!stic7 t!at 7indles t!e candle of impeac!ment proceedings* +!e filing of an impeac!ment complaint is li7e t!e lig!ting of a matc!stic7* Lig!ting t!e matc!stic7 alone, !owever, cannot lig!t up t!e candle, unless t!e lig!ted matc!stic7 reac!es or torc!es t!e candle wic7* Referring t!e complaint to t!e proper committee ignites t!e impeac!ment proceeding* 5it! a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more t!an one lig!ted matc!stic7s lig!t t!e candle at t!e same time* 5!at is important is t!at t!ere s!ould only %e -.E C8./LE t!at is 7indled in a year, suc! t!at once t!e candle starts %urning, su%se&uent matc!stic7s can no longer re7indle t!e candle*

Bnitiation of Bmpeac!ment Proceedings +!e &uestion as to w!o s!ould administer or pronounce t!at an impeac!ment proceeding !as %een initiated rests also on t!e %ody t!at administers t!e proceedings prior to t!e impeac!ment trial9R Bt is t!e Douse of Representatives, in pu%lic plenary session, w!ic! !as t!e power to set its own c!am%er into special operation %y referring t!e complaint or to ot!erwise guard against t!e initiation of a second impeac!ment proceeding %y re6ecting a patently unconstitutional complaint*

Bt %ecomes clear t!at t!e consideration %e!ind t!e intended limitation refers to t!e element of time, and not t!e num%er of complaintsRt!e impeac!a%le officer s!ould defend !imself in only one impeac!ment proceeding, so t!at !e will not %e precluded from performing !is official functions and duties, w!ile, similarly, Congress s!ould run only one impeac!ment proceeding so as not to leave it wit! little time to attend to its main wor7 of law-ma7ing*R purpose of t!e one-year %ar is two-fold4 a$ 0to prevent undue or too fre&uent !arassment9 and %$ to allow t!e legislature to do its principal tas7 :of; legislation,1 wit! main reference to t!e records of t!e Constitutional Commission*

8rticles of Bmpeac!ment +!e Constitution allows t!e indictment for multiple impeac!ment offenses, wit! eac! c!arge representing an article of impeac!ment, assem%led in one set 7nown as t!e 08rticles of Bmpeac!ment1Rit, t!erefore, follows t!at an impeac!ment complaint need not allege only one impeac!a%le offense

GUTIERREZ V THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE G.R. NO. 19 )#, MARCH %, 2011 - DESUYO
Ruling4 +!e motion for reconsideration was denied* +!e Court finds neit!er su%stantial nor cogent reason to reconsider its /ecision* Bt reaffirmed t!e decision and illuminated t!e Erancisco doctrine in lig!t of t!e particular facts of t!e present case* Petitioner3s Motion concedes t!at t!e Erancisco doctrine on t!e initiation of an impeac!ment proceeding includes t!e Douse3s initial action on t!e complaint* Iy recognizing t!e legal import of a referral, petitioner a%andons !er earlier claim t!at per Erancisco an impeac!ment proceeding is initiated %y t!e mere filing of an impeac!ment complaint* Bn re-affirming w!at t!e p!rase Nno impeac!ment proceedings s!all %e initiatedN means, t!e Court closely applied Erancisco on w!at comprises or completes t!e initiation p!ase* .ot!ing can %e more une&uivocal or well-defined t!an t!e elucidation of filing-and-referral in Erancisco* Petitioner3s discussion on t!e singular tense of t!e word NcomplaintN is too tenuous to re&uire consideration* +!e p!raseology of t!e one-year %ar rule does not concern itself wit! a numerical limitation of impeac!ment complaints* Bf it were t!e intention of t!e framers of t!e Constitution to limit t!e num%er of complaints, t!ey would !ave easily so stated in clear and une&uivocal language* +!e present case does not involve an invalidation of a legal provision on a grant of power* "ince t!e issue precisely involves up!olding an express limitation of a power, it %e!ooves t!e Court to loo7 into t!e

rationale %e!ind t!e constitutional proscription w!ic! guards against an explicit instance of a%use of power* +!e Court did not deviate from, as it did apply t!e twin rule of filing and referral in t!e present case, wit! Erancisco as t!e guiding lig!t* Petitioner, meanw!ile, reiterates !er argument t!at promulgation means pu%lication* +o reiterate, w!en t!e Constitution uses t!e word Npromulgate,N it does not necessarily mean to pu%lis! in t!e -fficial Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation* Promulgation, as used in "ection )#@$, 8rticle JB of t!e Constitution, suita%ly ta7es t!e meaning of Nto ma7e 7nownN as it s!ould %e generally understood* 8n impeac!ment is not a 6udicial proceeding, %ut rat!er a political exercise* Petitioner t!us cannot demand t!at t!e Court apply t!e stringent standards it as7s of 6ustices and 6udges w!en it comes to in!i%ition from !earing cases* Bncidentally, t!e Bmpeac!ment Rules do not provide for any provision regarding t!e in!i%ition of t!e Committee c!airperson or any mem%er from participating in an impeac!ment proceeding* +!e Committee may t!us direct any &uestion of partiality towards t!e concerned mem%er only* 8nd any decision on t!e matter of in!i%ition must %e respected, and it is not for t!is Court to interfere wit! t!at decision*

G.R. NO. 191$1% NOVEMBER 2 , 2010 MACALINTAL VS. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL - VILLAVER

Eacts4

Par A, "ec , 8rt CBB of t!e (?@A Constitution provides4 0+!e "upreme Court, sitting en %anc, s!all %e t!e sole 6udge of all contests relating to t!e election, returns, and &ualifications of t!e President or CicePresident, and may promulgate its rules for t!e purpose*1

"ec (2, 8rt* CBBB of t!e Constitution provides4 +!e Mem%ers of t!e "upreme Court and of ot!er courts esta%lis!ed %y law s!all not %e designated to any agency performing &uasi-6udicial or administrative functions* +!e case at %ar is a motion for reconsideration filed %y petitioner of t!e "C3s decision dismissing t!e former3s petition and declaring t!e esta%lis!ment of t!e respondent PE+ as constitutional* Petitioner argues t!at PE+ is unconstitutional on t!e ground t!at "ec , 8rt CBB of t!e Constitution does not provide for t!e creation of t!e PE+, and it violates "ec (2, 8rt CBBB of t!e Constitution* +!e "olicitor General maintains t!at t!e constitution of t!e PE+ is on firm footing on t!e %asis of t!e grant of aut!ority to t!e "upreme Court to %e t!e sole 6udge of all election contests for t!e President or CicePresident under par A, "ec , 8rt CBB of t!e Constitution* Bssue4 5!et!er or not PE+ is constitutional*

5!et!er or not PE+ exercises &uasi-6udicial power*

Deld4 Hes* +!e explicit reference of t!e Mem%ers of t!e Constitutional Commission to a Presidential Electoral +ri%unal, wit! Er* Koa&uin Iernas categorically declaring t!at in crafting t!e last paragrap! of "ec* , 8rt CBB of t!e (?@A Constitution, t!ey 0constitutionalized w!at was statutory*1 Kudicial power granted to t!e "upreme Court %y t!e same Constitution is plenary* 8nd under t!e doctrine of necessary implication, t!e additional 6urisdiction %estowed %y t!e last paragrap! of "ection , 8rticle CBB of t!e Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes t!e means necessary to carry it into effect* .o* +!e traditional grant of 6udicial power is found in "ection (, 8rticle CBBB of t!e Constitution w!ic! provides t!at t!e power 0s!all %e vested in one "upreme Court and in suc! lower courts as may %e esta%lis!ed %y law*1 +!e set up em%odied in t!e Constitution and statutes c!aracterize t!e resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of 6udicial power* 5!en t!e "upreme Court, as PE+, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs w!at is essentially a 6udicial power* +!e C-MELEC, DRE+ and "E+ are not, strictly and literally spea7ing, courts of law* 8lt!oug! not courts of law, t!ey are, nonet!eless, empowered to resolve election contests w!ic! involve, in essence, an exercise of 6udicial power, %ecause of t!e explicit constitutional empowerment found in "ection 2#2$, 8rticle BJ-C #for t!e C-MELEC$ and "ection (A, 8rticle CB #for t!e "enate and Douse Electoral +ri%unals$ of t!e Constitution*

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, ET AL V. CONCERNED CITIZENS OF MANILA G.R. NOS. 1*19)*-)% FEBRUARY 1#, 2011 - LIM
.otes4 courts 6udgment9 continuing mandamus E8C+"4 Court rendered a decision ordering petitioners to clean up, re!a%ilitate and preserve Manila %ay in t!eir different capacities* +!e government agencies did not file any motion for reconsideration so t!e decision %ecame final* +!e case is now in t!e execution p!ase* +!e Manila Iay 8dvisory Committee was created to receive and evaluate t!e &uarterly progressive reports on t!e activities underta7en %y t!e agencies in accordance wit! said decision and to monitor t!e execution p!ase* Bn t!e a%sence of specific completion periods, t!e Committee recommended t!at time frames %e set for t!e agencies to perform t!eir assigned tas7s* +!is may %e viewed as an encroac!ment over t!e powers and functions of t!e Executive Iranc! !eaded %y t!e President of t!e P!ilippines* B""FE4 5!et!er or not t!e acts #decision$ of t!e court is an encroac!ment to t!e powers and functions of t!e Executive %ranc! DEL/4 +!e issuance of su%se&uent resolutions %y t!e Court is simply an exercise of 6udicial power under 8rt* CBBB of t!e Constitution, %ecause t!e execution of t!e /ecision is %ut an integral part of t!e ad6udicative function of t!e Court*

Einal 6udgment includes not only w!at appears upon its face to !ave %een so ad6udged %ut also t!ose matters Nactually and necessarily included t!erein or necessary t!ereto*N Certainly, any activity t!at is needed to fully implement a final 6udgment is necessarily encompassed %y said 6udgment* Moreover, t!e su%mission of periodic reports is sanctioned %y "ecs* A and @, Rule @ of t!e Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases4 "ec* A* Kudgment*LLBf warranted, t!e court s!all grant t!e privilege of t!e writ of continuing mandamus re&uiring respondent to perform an act or series of acts until t!e 6udgment is fully satisfied and to grant suc! ot!er reliefs as may %e warranted resulting from t!e wrongful or illegal acts of t!e respondent* +!e court s!all re&uire t!e respondent to su%mit periodic reports detailing t!e progress and execution of t!e 6udgment, and t!e court may, %y itself or t!roug! a commissioner or t!e appropriate government agency, evaluate and monitor compliance* +!e petitioner may su%mit its comments or o%servations on t!e execution of t!e 6udgment* 5it! t!e final and executory 6udgment in MM/8, t!e writ of continuing mandamus issued in MM/8 means t!at until petitioner-agencies !ave s!own full compliance wit! t!e Court3s orders, t!e Court exercises continuing 6urisdiction over t!em until full execution of t!e 6udgment*

PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. VS COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Eacts4 +!ese incidents arose from our "tatus >uo -rder directing t!e Comelec to restore and maintain t!e PGIB to its situation prior to t!e issuance of Comelec Resolution .o* @OA?, pending t!e resolution of t!e petition for certiorari t!at PGIB filed to c!allenge t!is Comelec Resolution* -ur "tatus >uo -rder, in s!ort, directly ordered t!e Comelec to include PGIB in t!e list of candidates under t!e party-list system in t!e May (', 2'(' elections pending t!e final determination of PGIB3s &ualification to %e voted upon as a party-list organization* Bn its Comment to Comelec3s Motion for Reconsideration wit! Manifestation,? PGIB essentially alleged t!at t!e Comelec posited seemingly misleading and innocuous reasons in see7ing reconsideration* Bn our Resolution of 8pril 2?, 2'(',(2 we granted PGIB3s petition and, accordingly, annulled t!e assailed Comelec Resolutions in "PP .o* '?-'' #MP$() w!ic! delisted PGIB from t!e roster of duly registered national, regional and sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions* 5e declared at t!e same time t!at PGIB is &ualified to %e voted upon as a party-list group or organization in t!e May (', 2'(' elections* /espite t!e "tatus >uo -rder and t!e Resolution, !owever, PGIB was never included in t!e %allot as one of t!e accredited party-list groups or organizations eligi%le for election under t!e party-list system* Dence, PGIB was never voted upon as a party-list candidate in t!e May (', 2'(' elections*

Bssue4 5!et!er t!e petitioner, P!ilippine Guardians Irot!er!ood, Bnc* #PGIB$, s!ould %e declared to !ave participated in t!e party-list elections of May (', 2'(', in lig!t of t!e Comelec3s failure to o%ey our "tatus >uo -rder and our su%se&uent Resolution granting PGIB3s petition to annul its delisting from t!e roster of accredited party-list groups or organizations*

Deld2"ylla%us4 Election Law9 commission on Elections4 Iased on t!e recited antecedent facts, it cannot %e disputed t!at t!e Comelec did not comply wit! our "tatus >uo -rder9 it simply pleaded insurmounta%le and tremendous operational constraints and costs implications as reasons for its avoidance of our -rder* Bt essentially posited t!at compliance wit! our "tatus >uo -rder was rendered impossi%le %y t!e automation of t!e May (', 2'(' elections*Dowever, we find t!is explanation unaccepta%le, given t!e Comelec3s own self-imposed deadline of Ee%ruary , 2'(' for t!e correction of errors and omissions, prior to printing, of t!e pu%lis!ed list of participating party-list groups and organizations in t!e May (', 2'(' elections*+!e Comelec deadline could only mean t!at t!e Comelec !ad determined t!at c!anges in t!e official %allot could still %e made at any time prior to t!e deadline* Bn t!e context of t!e cases t!en pending involving t!e registration of party-list organizations, t!e deadline was a clear signal from t!e Comelec t!at t!e cases would !ave to %e resolved %efore t!e deadline9 ot!erwise, t!e Comelec could not %e !eld lia%le for t!eir non-inclusion*5e fully read and respected t!e Comelec3s signal, fully aware t!at we !ave to %alance t!e interests t!e Comelec !as to protect, wit! PGIB3s intent to %e voted as a party-list organization* +!us, on Ee%ruary 2, 2'(', we issued our "tatus >uo -rder after a preliminary %ut 6udicious evaluation of t!e merits of PGIB3s motion for reconsideration, only to receive t!e Comelec3s response on Ee%ruary ), 2'(' manifesting t!at it could no longer c!ange t!e %allots %ecause of t!e nature of an automated election*Bn an exercise as important as an election, t!e Comelec cannot ma7e a declaration and impose a deadline, and, t!ereafter, expect everyone to accept its excuses w!en it %ac7trac7s on its announced declaration* +!e Comelec 7new very well t!at t!ere were still cases pending for 6udicial determination t!at could !ave %een decided %efore t!e deadline was set* Party-list "ystem4 8lt!oug! we !ave recognized t!e validity of t!e automation of t!e May (', 2'(' elections in Ro&ue, Kr* v* Comelec,2) we stress t!at automation is not t!e end-all and %e-all of an electoral process* 8n e&ually important aspect of a democratic electoral exercise is t!e rig!t of free c!oice of t!e electorates on w!o s!all govern t!em9 t!e party-list system, in t!e words of 8ng Iagong IayaniL -E5 La%or Party v* Comelec,2 affords t!em t!is c!oice, as it gives t!e marginalized and underrepresented sectors t!e opportunity to participate in governance* 5ittingly or unwittingly, t!e Comelec too7 t!is freedom of c!oice away and effectively disenfranc!ised t!e mem%ers of t!e sector t!at PGIB soug!t to represent w!en it did not include PGIB in t!e list of &ualified parties vying for a seat under t!e party-list system of representation* +!is is a consideration no less weig!ty t!an t!e automation of t!e election and cannot %e simply disregarded on mere generalized allegations of automation difficulties* Bn t!e present case, special circumstances exist w!ic! call for our leniency and compel us to impose t!e penalty of severe reprimand instead of of imprisonment and2or fine under "ection A, of Rule A( of t!e Rules of Court as we !ave ruled in 8ng Iagong Iayani--E5 La%or Party* 5e emp!asize t!at alt!oug! automation is a special circumstance t!at s!ould %e considered in t!e present incidental matter, !owever, its effect on t!e Comelec3s non-compliance is merely to mitigate, not to totally exculpate, t!e Comelec from lia%ility for its failure to comply wit! our "tatus >uo -rder* Bn ot!er words, even if we grant t!at automation mig!t !ave posed some difficulty in including a new party in t!e party-list listing, t!e Comelec still failed to prove to our satisfaction t!at t!e PGIB3s inclusion was tec!nically impossi%le and could not !ave %een done even if t!e Comelec !ad wanted to* +!us, at t!e most, we can give t!e Comelec t!e %enefit of t!e dou%t to t!e extent of recognizing its excuse as a mitigating factor* 5e partly agree wit! t!e Comelec t!at we cannot recognize PGIB to %e a party-list organization fully &ualified to run under t!e party-list system in t!e coming 2'() party-list elections* +!e &uestion of full and total &ualification is not ripe for 6udicial determination as t!is is not %efore us for resolution*

Participation in a previous election and t!e level of votes in favor of a participating organization are not t!e only &ualification issues t!at can arise in a party-list election, and we cannot assume t!at PGIB s!all meet all ot!er legal standards to &ualify as a party-list organization in t!e 2'() elections* Iut separate from t!e &uestion of PGIB3s overall &ualification is t!e narrower &uestion of its participation in t!e May (', 2'(' elections L an issue t!at is su%sumed %y t!e issues in t!e main certiorari case* 8s s!own a%ove, PGIB intended to participate in t!e May (', 2'(' elections %ut it was not a%le to do so %ecause t!e Comelec did not L contrary to our express directive L include it in t!e list of party-list organizations to %e voted upon in t!e May (', 2'(' elections* 8s it was t!e Comelec itself w!ic! prevented PGIB from participating in t!e May (', 2'(' party-list elections w!en it deleted PGIB, wit! grave a%use of discretion, from t!e list of accredited party-list groups or organizations and, t!ereafter, refused to return it to t!e list despite our directive, PGIB s!ould, at t!e very least, %e deemed to !ave participated in t!e May (', 2'(' elections, and cannot %e dis&ualified for non-participation or for failure to garner t!e votes re&uired under "ection O#@$ of R*8* .o* A? (* +o conclude ot!erwise is to effectively recognize t!e ineffectiveness of our "tatus >uo -rder, of our 8pril 2?, 2'(' /ecision, and of t!is Court*

DAYAO VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. NO. 19 $) , G.R. NO. 19 *0) JANUARY 29, 201 - DAMAOLAO

Eacts4 Derein petitioners are dealers of different %rands of Li&uefied Petroleum Gas or LPG w!ile private respondent LPGM8 is a non-stoc7 non-profit association of consumers and small industry players in t!e LPG and energy sector w!o !ave %anded toget!er in order to pursue t!eir common o%6ective of providing &uality, safe and reasona%ly priced gas and oil products* +!e group advocates access to reasona%ly priced LPG %y !ouse!old consumers* mont!s after t!e re&uisite pu%lication, !earing, and after t!e approval of t!e application of !erein respondent wit! t!e C-MELEC, a complaint was lodged %y petitioners arguing t!at LPGM8 does not represent a marginalized sector of society %ecause its incorporators, officers and mem%ers are not marginalized or underrepresented citizens since t!ey are actually LPG mar7eters t!emselves* Petitioners assailed t!at !erein respondent LPGM8 is a mere lo%%y group t!at espouses t!eir own interest %efore congress and t!e department of energy* LPGM8 on t!e ot!er !and countered t!at under t!e (?@A constitution, t!ere are no provisions t!at re&uires a party-list representative must %e mem%ers of t!e marginalized sector or underrepresented sector of society* Bn addition, LPGM8 asserted t!at t!e grounds cited %y !erein petitioners are not t!ose t!at are cited under R8 A? (* Bn its first assailed decision, t!e C-MELEC dismissed t!e petition on 2 reasons9 first, t!e ground for cancellation cited %y petitioner is not among t!e exclusive enumeration under R8 A? (* "econd, t!e complaint is actually a %elated opposition to LPGM83s petition for registration w!ic! !as long %een approved wit! finality on Kanuary 5, 2'('* +o reiterate t!eir position, LPGM8 asserts t!at C-MELEC !as already !eard and verified t!e respondent3s &ualifications during t!e proceedings for its petition for registration*

Dence, t!is petition for certiorari under rule O5 for grave a%use of discretion* Bssue4 5!et!er dismissal of t!e complaint %y t!e C-MELEC was properT Ruling4 +!ere is no valid dismissal of t!e complaint for cancellation* Dowever, in lig!t of t!e C-MELEC resolution dated /ecem%er (), 2'(2, t!e present petition must %e dismissed* Eor t!e Commission on Elections to validly exercise its statutory power to cancel9 t!e registration of a party-list group, t!e law imposes only two conditions4 (* due process and !earing is afforded to t!e partylist concerned9 and 2* 8ny of t!e enumerated grounds for dis&ualifications as provided under R*8* .o* A? (, "ec* O* Eac! accreditation !anded %y t!e C-MELEC to any party-list organization can %e li7ened to a franc!ise granted %y Congress, t!ru t!e "ecurity and Exc!ange Commission, to corporations or associations create under t!e Corporation Code* 8 party-list organization, li7e a corporation, owes its legal existence to t!e concession of its franc!ise from t!e state, t!ru t!e C-MELEC and %eing a mere concession, it may %e revo7ed %y t!e granting aut!ority upon t!e existence of certain conditions* +!e fact t!at a franc!ise and accreditation may %e revo7ed means t!at it can never %e final and conclusive* 8 fortiori, t!e factual findings leading to t!e grant of t!e franc!ise or accreditation can never attain finality as well* Iot! t!e accreditation and t!e facts su%stantiating it can never attain perpetual and irrefuta%le conclusiveness as against t!e power t!at grants it* Bt s!ould %e noted t!at t!e resolution of t!e C-MELEC din not!ing more %ut to vest wit! LPGM8 t!e rig!t to participate in t!e party-list elections* LPGM83s rig!t to run as it !as already ran for office during t!e 2'(' party-list elections is already %eyond c!allenge* +!e resolution did not create in LPGM83s favor a perpetual and indefensi%le rig!t to its accreditation as a party-list organization, neit!er did it grant finality to t!e factual findings of t!e C-MELEC on t!e &ualifications of t!e group* 8ccreditation can %e reviewed and revo7ed %y t!e C-MELEC motu proprio, or upon t!e stance of t!e any interested party t!ru a complaint for cancellation, as set fort! in R*8* A? (* 8ll told, t!e C-MELEC committed grave a%use of discretion in dismissing t!e complaint for cancellation of LPGM83s party-list accreditation* Bn view !owever of superseding events, t!e issues involved in t!e complaint for cancellation can %e deemed to !ave already %een settled and remand to t!e C-MELEC would %e only circuitous and dilatory* Dence, petition s!ould %e dismissed*

AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE !ATO" VS. SPS. DAVID ELISEA RAMOS G.R. NO. 1#9)02, FEBRUARY 2 , 2011 - BARLOSO

Eacts4 "pouses /avid and Elisea Ramos #respondents$ discovered t!at a portion of t!eir land was %eing used as part of t!e runway and running s!oulder of t!e Loa7an 8irport %eing operated %y petitioner 8+-*

-n 8ugust ((, (??5, t!e respondents agreed after negotiations to convey t!e affected portion %y deed of sale to t!e 8+- in consideration of t!e amount of PAA@,(5'*''* Dowever, t!e 8+- failed to pay despite repeated ver%al and written demands*

+!us, on 8pril 2?, (??@, respondents filed an action for collection against 8+- and some of its officials in t!e R+C*

Bn t!eir answer, 8+- and its co-defendants invo7ed as an affirmative defense t!e issuance of Proclamation .o* ()5@, w!ere%y President Marcos !ad reserved certain parcels of land t!at included t!e respondents3 affected portion for use of t!e Loa7an 8irport* +!ey asserted t!at t!e R+C !ad no 6urisdiction to entertain t!e action wit!out t!e "tate3s consent considering t!at t!e deed of sale !ad %een entered into in t!e performance of governmental functions*

Bssue4 5!et!er or not t!e 8+- can %e sued wit!out t!e "tate3s consent*

Ruling4 Hes* 8+- can %e sued even wit!out "tate3s consent*

+!e immunity of t!e "tate from suit, 7nown also as t!e doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-sua%ility of t!e "tate, is expressly provided in 8rticle JCB of t!e (?@A Constitution, viz4 0"ection )* +!e "tate may not %e sued wit!out its consent*1

+!e immunity from suit is %ased on t!e political truism t!at t!e "tate, as a sovereign, can do no wrong* Practical considerations dictate t!e esta%lis!ment of immunity from suit in favor of t!e "tate, ot!erwise, t!e government service may %e severely o%structed and t!e pu%lic safety may %e endangered %ecause of t!e num%er of suits t!at t!e "tate !as to defend against*

8n unincorporated government agency wit!out any separate 6uridical personality of its own en6oys immunity from suit %ecause it is invested wit! an in!erent power of sovereignty* 8ccordingly, a claim for damages against t!e agency cannot prosper9 ot!erwise, t!e doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated* Dowever, t!e need to distinguis! %etween an unincorporated government agency performing governmental function and one performing proprietary functions !as arisen* +!e immunity !as %een up!eld in favor of t!e former %ecause its function is governmental or incidental to suc! function9 it !as not %een up!eld in favor of t!e latter w!ose function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of government %ut was essentially a %usiness*

Bn t!is case, t!e 8+- as an agency of t!e Government .-+ performing a purely governmental or sovereign function, %ut was instead involved in t!e management and maintenance of t!e Loa7an 8irport, an activity t!at was not t!e exclusive prerogative of t!e "tate in its sovereign capacity* Dence, t!e 8+!ad no claim to t!e "tate3s immunity from suit*

+!e issue, !owever, of w!et!er or not t!e 8+- could %e sued wit!out t!e "tate3s consent !as %een rendered moot %y t!e passage of R8 ? ?A, ot!erwise 7nown as t!e Civil 8viation 8ut!ority 8ct of 2''@*

"ection 2) of R8 ? ?A enumerates t!e corporate powers vested in t!e C88P, including t!e power to sue and %e sued, to enter into contracts of every class, 7ind and description, to construct, ac&uire, own, !old, operate, maintain, administer and lease personal and real properties, and to settle, under suc! terms and conditions most advantageous to it, any claim %y or against it*

8ll assets, real and personal properties, funds and revenues owned %y or vested in t!e different offices of t!e 8+- are transferred to t!e 8ut!ority* 8ll contracts, records and documents relating to t!e operations of t!e a%olis!ed agency and its offices and %ranc!es are li7ewise transferred to t!e 8ut!ority* 8ny real property owned %y t!e national government or government-owned corporation or aut!ority w!ic! is %eing used and utilized as office or facility %y t!e 8+- s!all %e transferred and titled in favor of t!e 8ut!ority*

5it! t!e C88P !aving legally succeeded t!e 8+- pursuant to R*8* .o* ? ?A, t!e o%ligations t!at t!e 8+- !ad incurred %y virtue of t!e deed of sale wit! t!e Ramos spouses mig!t now %e enforced against t!e C88P* "ylla%us Constitutional Law9 "tate Bmmunity9 +!e immunity of t!e state from suit, 7nown also as t!e doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-sua%ility of t!e "tate, is expressly provided in 8rticle JCB of t!e (?@A Constitution* +!e immunity from suit is %ased on t!e political truism t!at t!e "tate, as a sovereign, can do no wrong* -- +!e immunity of t!e "tate from suit, 7nown also as t!e doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-sua%ility of t!e "tate, is expressly provided in 8rticle JCB of t!e (?@A Constitution, viz4 "ection )* +!e "tate may not %e sued wit!out its consent* +!e immunity from suit is %ased on t!e political truism t!at t!e "tate, as a sovereign, can do no wrong* "ame9 "ame9 Practical considerations dictate t!e esta%lis!ment of an immunity from suit in favor of t!e "tate9 "everal 6ustifications !ave %een offered to support t!e adoption of t!e doctrine in t!e P!ilippines, %ut t!at offered in Providence 5as!ington Bnsurance Co* v* Repu%lic of t!e P!ilippines, 2? "CR8 5@? #(?O?$, is Nt!e most accepta%le explanation* -- Practical considerations dictate t!e esta%lis!ment of an immunity from suit in favor of t!e "tate* -t!erwise, and t!e "tate is sua%le at t!e instance of every ot!er individual, government service may %e severely o%structed and pu%lic safety endangered %ecause of t!e num%er of suits t!at t!e "tate !as to defend against* "everal 6ustifications !ave %een offered to support t!e adoption of t!e doctrine in t!e P!ilippines, %ut t!at offered in Providence 5as!ington Bnsurance Co* v* Repu%lic of t!e P!ilippines is Nt!e most accepta%le explanation,N according

to Eat!er Iernas, a recognized commentator on Constitutional Law, to wit4 :8; continued ad!erence to t!e doctrine of non-sua%ility is not to %e deplored for as against t!e inconvenience t!at may %e caused private parties, t!e loss of governmental efficiency and t!e o%stacle to t!e performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if suc! a fundamental principle were a%andoned and t!e availa%ility of 6udicial remedy were not t!us restricted* 5it! t!e well-7nown propensity on t!e part of our people to go to court, at t!e least provocation, t!e loss of time and energy re&uired to defend against law suits, in t!e a%sence of suc! a %asic principle t!at constitutes suc! an effective o%stacle, could very well %e imagined* "ame9 "ame9 8n unincorporated government agency wit!out any separate 6uridical personality of its own en6oys immunity from suit %ecause it is invested wit! an in!erent power of sovereignty* -- 8n unincorporated government agency wit!out any separate 6uridical personality of its own en6oys immunity from suit %ecause it is invested wit! an in!erent power of sovereignty* 8ccordingly, a claim for damages against t!e agency cannot prosper9 ot!erwise, t!e doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated* Dowever, t!e need to distinguis! %etween an unincorporated government agency performing governmental function and one performing proprietary functions !as arisen* +!e immunity !as %een up!eld in favor of t!e former %ecause its function is governmental or incidental to suc! function9 it !as not %een up!eld in favor of t!e latter w!ose function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of government %ut was essentially a %usiness* "ame9 "ame9 +!e Court of 8ppeals #C8$ correctly appreciated t!e 6uridical c!aracter of t!e 8+as an agency of t!e Government not performing a purely governmental or sovereign function* -- Bn our view, t!e C8 correctly appreciated t!e 6uridical c!aracter of t!e 8+- as an agency of t!e Government not performing a purely governmental or sovereign function, %ut was instead involved in t!e management and maintenance of t!e Loa7an 8irport, an activity t!at was not t!e exclusive prerogative of t!e "tate in its sovereign capacity* Dence, t!e 8+- !ad no claim to t!e "tate3s immunity from suit* 5e up!old t!e C83s afore&uoted !olding* "ame9 "ame9 +!e doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot %e successfully invo7ed to defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from t!e ta7ing wit!out 6ust compensation and wit!out t!e proper expropriation proceedings %eing first resorted to of t!e plaintiffs3 property*-- 5e furt!er o%serve t!e doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot %e successfully invo7ed to defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from t!e ta7ing wit!out 6ust compensation and wit!out t!e proper expropriation proceedings %eing first resorted to of t!e plaintiffs3 property* +!us, in /e los "antos v* Bntermediate 8ppellate Court, t!e trial court3s dismissal %ased on t!e doctrine of non-sua%ility of t!e "tate of two cases #one of w!ic! was for damages$ filed %y owners of property w!ere a road ? meters wide and (2@*A' meters long occupying a total area of (,(O5 s&uare meters and an artificial cree7 2)*2' meters wide and (2@*O? meters long occupying an area of 2,?'O s&uare meters !ad %een constructed %y t!e provincial engineer of Rizal and a private contractor wit!out t!e owners3 7nowledge and consent was reversed and t!e cases remanded for trial on t!e merits* +!e "upreme Court ruled t!at t!e doctrine of sovereign immunity was not an instrument for perpetrating any in6ustice on a citizen* "ame9 "ame9 +!e issue of w!et!er or not t!e 8+- could %e sued wit!out t!e "tate3s consent !as %een rendered moot %y t!e passage of Repu%lic 8ct .o* ? ?A, ot!erwise 7nown as t!e Civil 8viation 8ut!ority 8ct of 2''@*-- +!e issue of w!et!er or not t!e 8+- could %e sued wit!out t!e "tate3s consent !as %een rendered moot %y t!e passage of Repu%lic 8ct .o* ? ?A, ot!erwise 7nown as t!e Civil 8viation 8ut!ority 8ct of 2''@*

CHINA NATIONAL MACHINERY - E&UIPMENT CORP. !GROUP" VS. HON. CESAR D. SANTAMARIA - NEJUDNE

E8C+"4 +!is is a Petition for Review on Certiorari wit! Prayer for t!e Bssuance of a +emporary Restraining -rder #+R-$ and2or Preliminary Bn6unction assailing t!e )' "eptem%er 2''@ /ecision and 5 /ecem%er 2''@ Resolution of t!e Court of 8ppeals #C8$ in C8LG*R* "P .o* ('))5(*:(; Petitioner C!ina .ational Mac!inery X E&uipment Corp* #Group$ #C.MEG$, represented %y its c!airperson, Ren Dong%in, entered into a Memorandum of Fnderstanding wit! t!e .ort! Luzon Railways Corporation #.ort!rail$, represented %y its president, Kose L* Cortes, Kr* for t!e conduct of a feasi%ility study on a possi%le railway line from Manila to "an Eernando, La Fnion #t!e .ort!rail Pro6ect$*:2; C!inese 8m%assador to t!e P!ilippines, 5ang C!ungui #8m%* 5ang$, wrote a letter to /-E "ecretary Kose Bsidro Camac!o #"ec* Camac!o$ informing !im of C.MEG3s designation as t!e Prime Contractor for t!e .ort!rail Pro6ect*:O; -n 2O Ee%ruary 2'' , t!e P!ilippine government and EJBM Ian7 entered into a counterpart financial agreement L Iuyer Credit Loan 8greement .o* IL8 ' '55 #t!e Loan 8greement$*:?; Bn t!e Loan 8greement, EJBM Ian7 agreed to extend Preferential Iuyer3s Credit in t!e amount of F"/ '',''',''' in favor of t!e P!ilippine government in order to finance t!e construction of P!ase B of t!e .ort!rail Pro6ect*:('; Respondents filed a Complaint for 8nnulment of Contract and Bn6unction wit! Frgent Motion for "ummary Dearing to /etermine t!e Existence of Eacts and Circumstances Kustifying t!e Bssuance of 5rits of Preliminary Pro!i%itory and Mandatory Bn6unction and2or +R- against C.MEG, t!e -ffice of t!e Executive "ecretary, t!e /-E, t!e /epartment of Iudget and Management, t!e .ational Economic /evelopment 8ut!ority and .ort!rail* +!ey alleged t!at t!e Contract 8greement and t!e Loan 8greement were void for %eing contrary to #a$ t!e Constitution9 #%$ Repu%lic 8ct .o* ?(@ #R*8* .o* ?(@ $, ot!erwise 7nown as t!e Government Procurement Reform 8ct9 #c$ Presidential /ecree .o* ( 5, ot!erwise 7nown as t!e Government 8uditing Code9 and #d$ Executive -rder .o* 2?2, ot!erwise 7nown as t!e 8dministrative Code*:(2; C.MEG filed a Motion to /ismiss, arguing t!at t!e trial court did not !ave 6urisdiction over #a$ its person, as it was an agent of t!e C!inese government, ma7ing it immune from suit, and #%$ t!e su%6ect matter, as t!e .ort!rail Pro6ect was a product of an executive agreement, !owever, t!e appellate court dismissed t!e Petition for Certiorari* B""FE4 (* 5!et!er C.MEG is entitled to immunity, precluding it from %eing sued %efore a local court*

2* 5!et!er t!e Contract 8greement is an executive agreement, suc! t!at it cannot %e &uestioned %y or %efore a local court RFLB.G4 .-* Bmmunity from suit is determined %y t!e c!aracter of t!e o%6ects for w!ic! t!e entity was organized* +!e principle of state immunity from suit, w!et!er a local state or a foreign state, is reflected in "ection ?, 8rticle JCB of t!e Constitution, w!ic! states t!at 0t!e "tate may not %e sued wit!out its consent* Bt is readily apparent t!at C.MEG cannot claim immunity from suit, even if it contends t!at it performs governmental functions* Bts designation as t!e Primary Contractor does not automatically grant it immunity, 6ust as t!e term 0implementing agency1* 8lt!oug! C.MEG claims to %e a government-owned corporation, it failed to adduce evidence t!at it !as not consented to %e sued under C!inese law* +!us, in t!e a%sence of evidence to t!e contrary, C.MEG is to %e presumed to %e a government-owned and -controlled corporation wit!out an original c!arter* 8s a result, it !as t!e capacity to sue and %e sued under "ection )O of t!e Corporation Code*

.-* +o %e considered an executive agreement, t!e following t!ree re&uisites provided under t!e Cienna Convention must nevert!eless concur4 #a$ t!e agreement must %e %etween states9 #%$ it must %e written9 and #c$ it must governed %y international law* +!e first and t!e t!ird re&uisites do not o%tain in t!e case at %ar*

5DEREE-RE, t!e instant Petition is /E.BE/* Petitioner C!ina .ational Mac!inery X E&uipment Corp* #Group$ is not entitled to immunity from suit, and t!e Contract 8greement is not an executive agreement* C.MEG3s prayer for t!e issuance of a +R- and2or 5rit of Preliminary Bn6unction is /E.BE/ for %eing moot and academic*

CAYAT V. COMELEC - REGUDO

+!e Eacts Petitioner .ardo Cayat and respondent +!omas R* Palileng are t!e only candidates for mayor in Iuguis, Ienguet in t!e May (', 2'' national and local election"* Cayat filed !is candidacy on Kanuary 5, 2'' * Dowever, on Kanuary 2O, 2'' , Palileng filed a dis&ualification case against Cayat %efore t!e C-MELEC regional office alleging t!at t!e former is not eligi%le to run for Mayor for !aving %een convicted %y final 6udgment for t!e crime of 8cts of Lasciviousness wit! an order of conviction dated -cto%er ), 2'')* Bt was furt!er alleged t!at Cayat was still under pro%ation w!en !e filed !is certificate of candidacy wit! t!e C-MELEC, t!us, Palileng contends t!at Cayat made misrepresentation and committed acts of per6ury w!en !e declared in !is Certificate of Candidacy t!at !e is eligi%le to run for t!e mayoralty race in t!eir municipality* +!e C-MELEC Provincial Election "upervisor acted on t!e dis&ualification case and served summons to Cayat and order Cayat to file !is answer wit!in t!e given period %ut t!e latter failed to file for an answer* /espite t!e a%sence of Cayat t!e trial proceeded and Palileng filed !is position paper on Ee% 2O, 2'' * +!e C-MELEC Provincial Election "upervisor resolved t!e issue %ased on t!e availa%le records and su%mitted !is findings and recommendations to t!e -ffice of t!e Cler7 of t!e C-MELEC* +!e C-MELEC Eirst /ivision found no compelling reason to distur% t!e C-MELEC Provincial Election "upervisor findings and resolution !ence, it conse&uently cancelled Cayat3s certificate of candidacy on 8pril (2, 2''' * Cayat filed a motion for reconsideration on t!e ground t!at t!e C-MELEC did not ac&uire 6urisdiction over !im %ecause summons was received %y !im a day after t!e rendition of said 6udgment* "uc! MR was denied %ecause of Cayat3s failure to pay t!e filing fee, !ence , t!e decision %ecame final and executory* "uc! resolution denying t!e MR was promulgated a day %efore t!e election t!us, t!e name of Cayat was still in list of official candidates on t!e election day w!ere !e got ma6ority vote as compared to Palileng* Cayat was t!en proclaimed as t!e duly elected Mayor in Iuguis, Ienguet and too7 !is oat! of office on May (A, 2'' * Palileng filed a petition for annulment of t!e proclamation and w!ile pending resolution of said petition, !e also filed a motion for t!e execution of 6udgment t!e on t!e cancellation of Cayat3s candidacy* +!e motion for t!e execution of t!e 6udgment on t!e cancellation of Cayat3s candidacy was given due course* Palileng was proclaimed as t!e mayor and too7 !is oat! of office on t!e same day of t!e proclamation* Eelisio Iayacsan, t!e elected and proclaimed vice mayor intervened and prayed t!at t!e proclamation of Palileng %e nullified and declare !im as t!e rig!tful mayor to t!e municipality of Iuguis, Ienguet on t!e %asis of t!e doctrine on t!e re6ection of t!e second placer* +!e Bssue 5!et!er or not t!e doctrine on t!e re6ection of t!e second placer applies on t!is case*

+!e Ruling of t!e Court +!e doctrine cannot %e applied in t!is case %ecause t!e dis&ualification of Cayat %ecame final and executory %efore t!eelections and !ence, t!ere is only one candidate to spea7 of* +!e law expressly declares t!at a candidate dis&ualified %y final 6udgment %efore an election cannot %e voted for, and votes cast for !im s!all not %e counted* 8s suc!, Palileng is t!e only candidate and t!e duly elected mayor* +!e doctrine will apply in Iayacsan3s favor, regardless of !is intervention in t!e present case, BE two conditions concur4 #($ t!edecision on Cayat3s dis&ualification remained pending on election May, (' May 2'' , resulting in t!e presence of two mayoralty candidates for Iuguias, Ienguet in t!e elections9 and #2$ t!e decision onCayat3s dis&ualification %ecame final only after t!e elections*

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ET AL. V. PHILIPPINE PHARMA 'EALTH, INC., G.R. NO. 1%2 #%, FEBRUARY 20, 201 - ALPUERTO

E8C+"4 8dministrative -rder #8-$ .o* 2A series of (??@5 was issued %y t!en /epartment of Dealt! #/-D$ "ecretary 8lfredo G* Romualdez #Romualdez$* 8- 2A set t!e guidelines and procedure for accreditation of government suppliers of p!armaceutical products for sale or distri%ution to t!e pu%lic, suc! accreditation to %e valid for t!ree years %ut su%6ect to annual review* +!e /-D, t!roug! former Fndersecretary Ma* Margarita M* Galon #Galon$, issued Memorandum .o* 2'? series of 2''',(' inviting representatives of 2 accredited drug companies, including !erein respondent P!il P!armawealt!, Bnc* #PPB$ to a meeting on -cto%er 2A, 2'''* /uring t!e meeting, Fndersecretary Galon !anded t!em copies of a document entitled NReport on Ciolative Products issued %y t!e Iureau of Eood and /rugs(2 #IE8/$, w!ic! detailed violations or adverse findings relative to t!ese accredited drug companies3 products* "pecifically, t!e IE8/ found t!at PPB3s products w!ic! were %eing sold to t!e pu%lic were unfit for !uman consumption* +!e 2 drug companies were directed to su%mit wit!in (' days, or until .ovem%er O, 2''', t!eir respective explanations on t!e adverse findings covering t!eir respective products contained in t!e Report on Ciolative Products* Bnstead of su%mitting its written explanation wit!in t!e ('-day period as re&uired, PPB %elatedly sent a letterdated .ovem%er (), 2''' addressed to Fndersecretary Galon, informing !er t!at PPB !as referred t!e Report on Ciolative Products to its lawyers wit! instructions to prepare t!e corresponding reply* Dowever, PPB did not indicate w!en its reply would %e su%mitted9 nor did it see7 an extension of t!e ('day period, w!ic! !ad previously expired on .ovem%er O, 2''', muc! less offer any explanation for its failure to timely su%mit its reply* Bn a letter-reply, Fndersecretary Galon found Nuntena%leN PPB3s letter and t!erein informed PPB t!at, effective immediately, its accreditation !as %een suspended for two years pursuant to 8- (' and Memorandum .o* (A(-C* PPB, t!roug! counsel &uestioned t!e suspension of its accreditation, saying t!at t!e same was made pursuant to "ection CBB of 8- (' w!ic! it claimed was patently illegal and null and void %ecause it arrogated unto t!e /-D 8ccreditation Committee powers and functions w!ic! were granted to t!e IE8/

under Repu%lic 8ct #R8$ .o* )A2'(A and Executive -rder #E-$ .o* (A5* PPB added t!at its accreditation was suspended wit!out t!e %enefit of notice and !earing, in violation of its rig!t to su%stantive and administrative due process* Bt t!us demanded t!at t!e /-D desist from implementing t!e suspension of its accreditation, under pain of legal redress*

Ruling of t!e Regional +rial Court +!e trial court dismissed Civil Case .o* O@2'', declaring t!e case to %e one instituted against t!e "tate, in w!ic! case t!e principle of state immunity from suit is applica%le*

Ruling of t!e Court of 8ppeals /oc7eted as C8-G*R* CC .o* @5OA', PPB3s appeal centered on t!e issue of w!et!er it was proper for t!e trial court to dismiss Civil Case .o* O@2''*

+!e C8, in t!e !erein assailed /ecision,2? reversed t!e trial court ruling and ordered t!e remand of t!e case for t!e conduct of furt!er proceedings* +!e C8 concluded t!at it was premature for t!e trial court to !ave dismissed t!e Complaint* Examining t!e Complaint, t!e C8 found t!at a cause of action was sufficiently alleged L t!at due to defendants3 #petitioners3$ acts w!ic! were %eyond t!e scope of t!eir aut!ority, PPB3s accreditation as a government supplier of p!armaceutical products was suspended wit!out t!e re&uired notice and !earing as re&uired %y "ection 2O#d$ of R8 )A2' as amended %y E- (A5* Moreover, t!e C8 !eld t!at %y filing a motion to dismiss, petitioners were deemed to !ave !ypot!etically admitted t!e allegations in t!e Complaint L w!ic! state t!at petitioners were %eing sued in t!eir individual and personal capacities L t!us negating t!eir claim t!at Civil Case .o* O@2'' is an unaut!orized suit against t!e "tate*

+!e C8 furt!er !eld t!at instead of dismissing t!e case, t!e trial court s!ould !ave deferred t!e !earing and resolution of t!e motion to dismiss and proceeded to trial* Bt added t!at it was apparent from t!e Complaint t!at petitioners were %eing sued in t!eir private and personal capacities for acts done %eyond t!e scope of t!eir official functions* +!us, t!e issue of w!et!er t!e suit is against t!e "tate could %est %e t!res!ed out during trial on t!e merits, rat!er t!an in proceedings covering a motion to dismiss*

B""FE4 "!ould Civil Case .o* O@2'' %e dismissed for %eing a suit against t!e "tateT

RFLB.G4 petition is granted* +!e doctrine of non-sua%ility*

+!e discussion of t!is Court in /epartment of 8griculture v* .ational La%or Relations Commission )2 on t!e doctrine of non-sua%ility is enlig!tening*

+!e %asic postulate ens!rined in t!e constitution t!at =#t$!e "tate may not %e sued wit!out its consent,3 reflects not!ing less t!an a recognition of t!e sovereign c!aracter of t!e "tate and an express affirmation of t!e unwritten rule effectively insulating it from t!e 6urisdiction of courts* Bt is %ased on t!e very essence of sovereignty* x xx :8; sovereign is exempt from suit, not %ecause of any formal conception or o%solete t!eory, %ut on t!e logical and practical ground t!at t!ere can %e no legal rig!t as against t!e aut!ority t!at ma7es t!e law on w!ic! t!e rig!t depends* +rue, t!e doctrine, not too infre&uently, is derisively called =t!e royal prerogative of dis!onesty3 %ecause it grants t!e state t!e prerogative to defeat any legitimate claim against it %y simply invo7ing its nonsua%ility* 5e !ave !ad occasion to explain in its defense, !owever, t!at a continued ad!erence to t!e doctrine of non-sua%ility cannot %e deplored, for t!e loss of governmental efficiency and t!e o%stacle to t!e performance of its multifarious functions would %e far greater in severity t!an t!e inconvenience t!at may %e caused private parties, if suc! fundamental principle is to %e a%andoned and t!e availa%ility of 6udicial remedy is not to %e accordingly restricted*

+!e rule, in any case, is not really a%solute for it does not say t!at t!e state may not %e sued under any circumstance* -n t!e contrary, as correctly p!rased, t!e doctrine only conveys, =t!e state may not %e sued wit!out its consent93 its clear import t!en is t!at t!e "tate may at times %e sued* +!e "tate3s consent may %e given eit!er expressly or impliedly* Express consent may %e made t!roug! a general law or a special law* x xx Bmplied consent, on t!e ot!er !and, is conceded w!en t!e "tate itself commences litigation, t!us opening itself to a counterclaim or w!en it enters into a contract* Bn t!is situation, t!e government is deemed to !ave descended to t!e level of t!e ot!er contracting party and to !ave divested itself of its sovereign immunity* +!is rule, x xx is not, !owever, wit!out &ualification* .ot all contracts entered into %y t!e government operate as a waiver of its non-sua%ility9 distinction must still %e made %etween one w!ic! is executed in t!e exercise of its sovereign function and anot!er w!ic! is done in its proprietary capacity*))

8s a general rule, a state may not %e sued* Dowever, if it consents, eit!er expressly or impliedly, t!en it may %e t!e su%6ect of a suit*) +!ere is express consent w!en a law, eit!er special or general, so provides* -n t!e ot!er !and, t!ere is implied consent w!en t!e state Nenters into a contract or it itself commences litigation*N)5 Dowever, it must %e clarified t!at w!en a state enters into a contract, it does not automatically mean t!at it !as waived its non-sua%ility* )O +!e "tate Nwill %e deemed to !ave impliedly waived its non-sua%ility :only; if it !as entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity* :Dowever,; w!en t!e contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity:,; x xx no suc! waiver may %e implied*N)A N"tatutory provisions waiving :s;tate immunity are construed in strictissimi6uris* Eor, waiver of immunity is in derogation of sovereignty*N)@

+!e /-D can validly invo7e state immunity* a$ /-D is an unincorporated agency w!ic! performs sovereign or governmental functions*

Bn t!is case, t!e /-D, %eing an Nunincorporated agency of t!e governmentN)? can validly invo7e t!e defense of immunity from suit %ecause it !as not consented, eit!er expressly or impliedly, to %e sued* "ignificantly, t!e /-D is an unincorporated agency w!ic! performs functions of governmental c!aracter* +!e ruling in 8ir +ransportation -ffice v* Ramos ' is relevant, viz4 8n unincorporated government agency wit!out any separate 6uridical personality of its own en6oys immunity from suit %ecause it is invested wit! an in!erent power of sovereignty* 8ccordingly, a claim for damages against t!e agency cannot prosper9 ot!erwise, t!e doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated* Dowever, t!e need to distinguis! %etween an unincorporated government agency performing governmental function and one performing proprietary functions !as arisen* +!e immunity !as %een up!eld in favor of t!e former %ecause its function is governmental or incidental to suc! function9 it !as not %een up!eld in favor of t!e latter w!ose function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of government %ut was essentially a %usiness*

%$ +!e Complaint see7s to !old t!e /-D solidarily and 6ointly lia%le wit! t!e ot!er defendants for damages w!ic! constitutes a c!arge or financial lia%ility against t!e state*

Moreover, it is settled t!at if a Complaint see7s to Nimpose a c!arge or financial lia%ility against t!e state,N 2 t!e defense of non-sua%ility may %e properly invo7ed* Bn t!is case, PPB specifically prayed, in its Complaint and 8mended and "upplemental Complaint, for t!e /-D, toget!er wit! "ecretaries Romualdez and /ayrit as well as Fndersecretary Galon, to %e !eld 6ointly and severally lia%le for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney3s fees and costs of suit* ) Fndou%tedly, in t!e event t!at PPB succeeds in its suit, t!e government or t!e state t!roug! t!e /-D would %ecome vulnera%le to an imposition or financial c!arge in t!e form of damages* +!is would re&uire an appropriation from t!e national treasury w!ic! is precisely t!e situation w!ic! t!e doctrine of state immunity aims to protect t!e state from*

+!e mantle of non-sua%ility extends to complaints filed against pu%lic officials for acts done in t!e performance of t!eir official functions*

8s regards t!e ot!er petitioners, to wit, "ecretaries Romualdez and /ayrit, and Fndersecretary Galon, it must %e stressed t!at t!e doctrine of state immunity extends its protective mantle also to complaints filed against state officials for acts done in t!e disc!arge and performance of t!eir duties* N+!e sua%ility of a government official depends on w!et!er t!e official concerned was acting wit!in !is official or 6urisdictional capacity, and w!et!er t!e acts done in t!e performance of official functions will result in a c!arge or financial lia%ility against t!e government*N 5 -t!erwise stated, Npu%lic officials can %e !eld personally accounta%le for acts claimed to !ave %een performed in connection wit! official duties w!ere t!ey !ave acted ultra vires or w!ere t!ere is s!owing of %ad fait!*N O Moreover, N:t;!e rule is t!at if t!e 6udgment against suc! officials will re&uire t!e state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy t!e same, suc! as t!e appropriation of t!e amount needed to pay t!e damages awarded against t!em, t!e suit must %e regarded as against t!e state x xx* Bn suc! a situation, t!e state may move to dismiss t!e :C;omplaint on t!e ground t!at it !as %een filed wit!out its consent*N A

Bt is %eyond dou%t t!at t!e acts imputed against "ecretaries Romualdez and /ayrit, as well as Fndersecretary Galon, were done w!ile in t!e performance and disc!arge of t!eir official functions or in t!eir official capacities, and not in t!eir personal or individual capacities* "ecretaries Romualdez and /ayrit were %eing c!arged wit! t!e issuance of t!e assailed orders* -n t!e ot!er !and, Fndersecretary Galon was %eing c!arged wit! implementing t!e assailed issuances* Iy no stretc! of imagination could t!e same %e categorized as ultra vires simply %ecause t!e said acts are well wit!in t!e scope of t!eir aut!ority* "ection of R8 )A2' specifically provides t!at t!e IE8/ is an office under t!e -ffice of t!e Dealt! "ecretary* 8lso, t!e Dealt! "ecretary is aut!orized to issue rules and regulations as may %e necessary to effectively enforce t!e provisions of R8 )A2'* @ 8s regards Fndersecretary Galon, s!e is aut!orized %y law to supervise t!e offices under t!e /-D3s aut!ority, ? suc! as t!e IE8/* Moreover, t!ere was also no s!owing of %ad fait! on t!eir part* +!e assailed issuances were not directed only against PPB* +!e suspension of PPB3s accreditation only came a%out after it failed to su%mit its comment as directed %y Fndersecretary Galon* Bt is also %eyond dispute t!at if found wanting, a financial c!arge will %e imposed upon t!em w!ic! will re&uire an appropriation from t!e state of t!e needed amount* +!us, %ased on t!e foregoing considerations, t!e Complaint against t!em s!ould li7ewise %e dismissed for %eing a suit against t!e state w!ic! a%solutely did not give its consent to %e sued* Iased on t!e foregoing considerations, and regardless of t!e merits of PPB3s case, t!is case deserves a dismissal* Evidently, t!e very foundation of Civil Case .o* O@2'' !as crum%led at t!is initial 6uncture*

VINZONS-CHATO V. HRET - PACAYRA

E8C+" 4 Liwayway Cinzons C!ato renewed !er %id in t!e 2'(' election as representative of t!e 2nd legislative disrtrict of Camarines .orte* "!e lost to Elmer Panotes w!o was proclaimed winner* C!ato filed an electoral protest* +!e DRE+ directed t!e copying of t!e picture images files of %allots relative to t!e protest* Dence t!is petition*+!e crucial issue posed %y C!ato is w!et!er or not t!e picture images of t!e %allots may %e considered as t!e Nofficial %allotsN or t!e e&uivalent of t!e original paper %allots w!ic! t!e voters filled out* "!e maintains t!at, since t!e automated election system #8E"$ used during t!e May (', 2'(' elections was paper-%ased,)( t!e Nofficial %allotN is only t!e paper %allot t!at was printed %y t!e .ational Printing -ffice and2or t!e Iang7o "entral ng Pilipinas pursuant to "ection (5 of R*8* .o* @ )O, as amended %y R*8* .o* ?)O?* B""FE"4 ($ 5!at are t!e two types of automated election system #8E"$T 2$ 5!at system was adopted in t!e may 2'(' electionsT )$ 5!et!er or not t!e picture images of t!e %allots may%e considered as official %allots* RFLB.G4 ($ 8n automated election system, or 8E", is a system using appropriate tec!nology w!ic! !as %een demonstrated in t!e voting, counting, consolidating, canvassing, and transmission of election result, and ot!er electoral process* +!ere are two types of 8E" identified under R*8* .o* ?)O?4 #($ paper-%ased election system9 and

#2$ direct recording electronic election system*

8 paper-%ased election system, suc! as t!e one adopted during t!e May (', 2'(' elections, is t!e type of 8E" t!at Nuse paper %allots, records and counts votes, ta%ulates, consolidates2canvasses and transmits electronically t!e results of t!e vote count*N -n t!e ot!er !and, direct recording electronic election system Nuses electronic %allots, records, votes %y means of a %allot display provided wit! mec!anical or electrooptical component t!at can %e activated %y t!e voter, processes data %y means of computer programs, record voting data and %allot images, and transmits voting results electronically* 2$ +!e May (', 2'(' elections used a paper-%ased tec!nology t!at allowed voters to fill out an official paper %allot %y s!ading t!e oval opposite t!e names of t!eir c!osen candidates* Eac! voter was t!en re&uired to personally feed !is %allot into t!e Precinct Count -ptical "can #PC-"$ mac!ine w!ic! scanned %ot! sides of t!e %allots simultaneously, meaning, in 6ust one pass* 8s esta%lis!ed during t!e re&uired demo tests, t!e system captured t!e images of t!e %allots in encrypted format w!ic!, w!en decrypted for verification, were found to %e digitized representations of t!e %allots cast* )$ 5e agree, t!erefore, wit! %ot! t!e DRE+ and Panotes t!at t!e picture images of t!e %allots, as scanned and recorded %y t!e PC-", are li7ewise Nofficial %allotsN t!at fait!fully captures in electronic form t!e votes cast %y t!e voter, as defined %y "ection 2 #)$ of R*8* .o* ?)O?* 8s suc!, t!e printouts t!ereof are t!e functional e&uivalent of t!e paper %allots filled out %y t!e voters and, t!us, may %e used for purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest*

Bt %ears stressing t!at t!e digital images of t!e %allots captured %y t!e PC-" mac!ine are stored in an encrypted format in t!e CE cards* NEncryption is t!e process of encoding messages #or information$ in suc! a way t!at eavesdroppers or !ac7ers cannot read it, %ut t!at aut!orized parties can* Bn an encryption sc!eme, t!e message or information #referred to as plaintext$ is encrypted using an encryption algorit!m, turning it into an unreada%le cip!ertext* +!is is usually done wit! t!e use of an encryption 7ey, w!ic! specifies !ow t!e message is to %e encoded* 8ny adversary t!at can see t!e cip!ertext, s!ould not %e a%le to determine anyt!ing a%out t!e original message* 8n aut!orized party, !owever, is a%le to decode t!e cip!ertext using a decryption algorit!m, t!at usually re&uires a secret decryption 7ey, t!at adversaries do not !ave access to*

+!e Constitution mandates t!at t!e DRE+ Ns!all %e t!e sole 6udge of all contests relating to t!e election, returns and &ualificationsN of its mem%ers* Iy employing t!e word NsoleN, t!e Constitution is emp!atic t!at t!e 6urisdiction of t!e DRE+ in t!e ad6udication of election contests involving its mem%ers is intended to %e its own L full, complete and unimpaired* +!e +ri%unal, t!us, une&uivocally asserted its exclusive control in Rule A of t!e 2'(( DRE+ Rules, as follows4

Rule A* Exclusive Control of Eunctions* L +!e +ri%unal s!all !ave exclusive control, direction, and supervision of all matters pertaining to its own functions and operation*

Daving, t!us, esta%lis!ed t!e futility of PanotesP case, we need not %ela%or t!e ot!er issues raised in t!is petition* 5DEREE-RE, t!e petitions are !ere%y /B"MB""E/ for lac7 of merit* "- -R/ERE/*

FEDERICO VS. COMELEC JAN. 22, 201

Eacts4

- ALCE

Edna "anc!ez #Edna$ and private respondent -smundo M* Maligaya #Maligaya$ were candidates for t!e position of municipal mayor of "to* +omas, Iatangas, in t!e May (', 2'(' 8utomated .ational and Local Elections* Maligaya was t!e Li%eral Party3s official mayoralty candidate* -n 8pril 2A, 2'(', 8rmando "anc!ez, !us%and of Edna and t!e gu%ernatorial candidate for t!e province of Iatangas, died* +wo days later, Edna wit!drew !er Certificate of Candidacy #C-C$ for t!e position of mayor* "!e t!en filed a new C-C and t!e corresponding Certificate of .omination and 8cceptance #C-.8$ for t!e position of governor as su%stitute candidate for !er deceased !us%and* -n May 5, 2'(', petitioner Renato M* Eederico #Eederico$ filed wit! t!e -ffice of t!e Election -fficer of "to* +omas, Iatangas, !is C-C and C-.8 as official candidate of t!e .ationalista Party and as su%stitute candidate for mayor, in view of t!e wit!drawal of Edna* +!e C-MELEC En Ianc gave due course to t!e C-C of Edna as su%stitute gu%ernatorial candidate in t!e Iatangas province and to t!at of Eederico as su%stitute mayoralty candidate in "to* +omas* Iy t!at time, !owever, t!e official %allots !ad already %een printed* Expectedly, on May (', 2'(', t!e day of elections, t!e name 0"8.CDEW, Edna P*1 was retained in t!e list of candidates for Mayor of "to* +omas, and garnered t!e !ig!est num%er of votes against Maligaya* -n May ((, 2'(', t!e Municipal Ioard of Canvassers #MI-C$ printed t!e Certificate of Canvass of Cotes and Proclamation of 5inning Candidates #C-CCP$ s!owing 0"8.CDEW Edna P*1 as t!e winning mayoralty candidate* +!is action of MI-C prompted Maligaya to file !is Petition to 8nnul Proclamation of Respondent Edna "anc!ez* Dowever, t!e petition was dismissed %y t!e Comelec* 8 second print-out of t!e C-CCP was issued %y t!e MI-C %earing t!e same time and date wit! t!e same num%er of votes garnered %y Edna %eing credited to Eederico and proclaims Eederico as t!e duly elected mayor* Fpon learning of t!e proclamation of Eederico as t!e winning mayoralty candidate %y t!e MI-C, Maligaya filed !is Petition to 8nnul Proclamation of Respondent Renato M* Eederico( as mayor* Dowever t!e petition was denied for !aving %een filed out of time* Maligaya t!en filed !is Cerified Partial Motion for Reconsideration insisting t!at !is petition !ad not yet prescri%ed and t!at Eederico3s su%stitution was null and void* +!e said partial motion for reconsideration was elevated to t!e Comelec En Ianc for proper disposition* +!e Comelec En Ianc considered t!e case su%mitted for resolution9 Eederico filed a motion for reconsideration of t!e Comelec En Ianc3s -rder claiming t!at t!e case was %arred %y forum s!opping and litispendentia* Pending !is motion, !e elevated t!e matter to t!e "upreme Court %y way of a Petition for Certiorari and Pro!i%ition* +!is petition was su%se&uently dismissed %y t!e Court for %eing premature* -n /ecem%er 2(, 2'((, t!e Comelec En Ianc issued t!e assailed Resolution granting Maligaya3s partial motion for reconsideration and t!e proclamation of respondent Eederico is annulled* Dence, Eederico filed t!e present Petition for Certiorari* Bssues4

#($ 5!et!er Eederico could validly su%stitute Edna w!o wit!drew !er candidacy for t!e mayoralty position9 #2$ 5!et!erMaligaya3sPetition to 8nnul Proclamation of Eederico as mayor of "to* +omas, Iatangaswas filed on time9 and #)$ Grantingt!at Eederico was dis&ualified, w!et!er !e s!ould %e succeeded %y Bntervenor "ilva under t!e LGC or replaced %y Maligaya* Court Rulings4 Eederico3s su%stitution of Edna "anc!ez as mayoralty candidate was not valid* Regarding t!e May (', 2'(' automated elections, t!e Comelec came out wit! Resolution .o* @OA@* -n su%stitution, "ection () t!ereof provides4 "EC* ()*"u%stitution of Candidates, in case of deat!, dis&ualification or wit!drawal of anot!er*L Bf after t!e last day for t!e filing of certificate of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered political party dies, wit!draws or is dis&ualified for any cause, !e may %e su%stituted %y a candidate %elonging to, and nominated %y, t!e same political party* .o su%stitute s!all %e allowed for any independent candidate* +!e su%stitute for a candidate w!o wit!drew may file !is certificate of candidacy as !erein provided for t!e office affected not later t!an /ecem%er ( , 2''?* +!e su%stitute for a candidate w!o died or suffered permanent incapacity or dis&ualified %y final 6udgment, may file !is certificate of candidacy up to mid-day of Election /ay* Bf t!e deat! or permanent disa%ility s!ould occur %etween t!e day %efore t!e election and mid-day of election day, t!e su%stitute candidate may file t!e certificate wit! any %oard of election inspectors in t!e political su%division w!ere !e is a candidate, or in t!e case of a candidate for President, Cice-President or "enator, wit! t!e Law /epartment of t!e Commission on Elections in Manila* .o person w!o !as wit!drawn !is candidacy for a position s!all %e eligi%le as su%stitute candidate for any ot!er position after t!e deadline for filing of certificates of candidacy* 8s correctly pointed out %y t!e -"G, it is clear from t!e foregoing t!at different deadlines were set to govern t!e specific circumstances t!at would necessitate t!e su%stitution of a candidate due to deat!, dis&ualification or wit!drawal* Bn case of deat! or dis&ualification, t!e su%stitute !ad until midday of t!e Election /ay to file t!e C-C* Bn case of wit!drawal, w!ic! is t!e situation at %enc!, t!e su%stitute s!ould !ave filed a C-C %y /ecem%er ( , 2''?* +!e reason for t!e distinction can easily %e divined* Fnli7e deat! or dis&ualification, wit!drawal is voluntary* Generally, a candidate !as sufficient time to ponder on !is candidacy and to wit!draw w!ile t!e printing !as not yet started* Bf a candidate wit!draws after t!e printing, t!e name of t!e su%stitute candidate can no longer %e accommodated in t!e %allot and a vote for t!e su%stitute will 6ust %e wasted* 5!en Iatangas Governor 8rmando "anc!ez died on 8pril 2A, 2'(', Edna wit!drew !er candidacy as mayor and su%stituted !er late !us%and as gu%ernatorial candidate for t!e province on 8pril 2?, 2'('* +!e party actually !ad t!e option to su%stitute anot!er candidate for Governor aside from Edna* Iy fielding Edna as t!eir su%stitute candidate for Governor, t!e party 7new t!at s!e !ad to wit!draw !er candidacy for Mayor* Considering t!at t!e deadline for su%stitution in case of wit!drawal !ad already lapsed, no person could su%stitute !er as mayoralty candidate* +!e sudden deat! of t!en Governor

8rmando "anc!ez and t!e su%stitution %y !is widow in t!e gu%ernatorial race could not 6ustify a %elated su%stitution in t!e mayoralty race* +!e second C-CCP in favor of Eederico !ad no legal %asis* 5it!out &uestion, t!e votes garnered %y Edna could not %e credited to Eederico as !e was never a legitimate candidate* 8s t!ere was an invalid su%stitution, t!ere could not %e a valid proclamation* Bn effect, t!e second C-CCP in !is name !ad no legal %asis* Maligaya3s Petition to 8nnul t!e Proclamation of Eederico was filed on time Maligaya %ecame aware of t!e issuance of t!e second C-CCP in favor of Eederico only on May 2A, 2'('* Erom t!at day, !e !ad ten #('$ days to &uestion t!e du%ious proceeding in t!e MI-C under "ection O of Resolution .o* @@' * Considering t!at Maligaya filed !is petition to annul Eederico3s May (', 2'(' proclamation on Kune (, 2'(', it was indeed filed on time* +!ere %eing no valid su%stitution, t!e candidate wit! t!e !ig!est num%er of votes s!ould %e proclaimed as t!e duly elected mayor 8s EedericoPs su%stitution was not valid, t!ere was only one &ualified candidate in t!e mayoralty race in "to* +omas, IatangasMaligaya* Ieing t!e only candidate, !e received t!e !ig!est num%er of votes* 8ccordingly, !e s!ould %e proclaimed as t!e duly elected mayor in t!e May (', 2'(' elections* Considering t!at Maligayawas t!e winner, t!e position of Bntervenor"ilva t!at !e %e considered t!e legal successor of Eederico, w!om !e claims failed to &ualify, !as no legal %asis* +!ere is simply no vacancy* 5!en t!ere is no vacancy, t!e rule on succession under "ection 2 of t!e LGC cannot %e invo7ed* 5DEREE-RE, t!e petition is /E.BE/

LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES V. DENR - ABUBA(AR

G*R* .o* (A5)O@* 8pril ((, 2'() #Bssuance of Mining Permit %y LGF "u%6ect to "upervision, Control and Review %y /E.R$

Eacts4 Private individuals filed wit! t!e Provincial Environment and .atural Resources -ffice #PE.R-$ of Iulacan t!eir respective 8pplications for >uarry Permit #8>P$ on certain areas* 8 mining firm #8M+C$ also filed wit! t!e same PE.R- an 8pplication for Exploration Permit #8EP$ covering t!e same areas* +!e 8>P was later on converted to 8pplications for "mall-"cale Mining, w!ic! was su%se&uently approved %y PE.R-* Gov* /ela Cruz of Iulacan issued t!e corresponding "mall-"cale Mining Permits* 8M+C appealed to /E.R "ecretary t!e grant of t!e aforesaid Permits, arguing inter alia, t!at t!e Mining Permits were null and void %ecause t!ey covered areas t!at were never declared PeoplePs "mall-"cale Mining Program sites as mandated %y t!e PeoplePs "mall-"cale Mining 8ct*

/E.R "ecretary rendered a decision in favor of 8M+C* Bt !eld t!at t!e &uestioned "mall-"cale Mining Permits were issued in violation of "ec* of R*8* .o* A'AO and %eyond t!e aut!ority of t!e Provincial Governor pursuant to "ec* ) of R*8* .o* A? 2, %ecause t!e area was never proclaimed to %e under t!e PeoplePs "mall-"cale Mining Program* Dence, t!e assailed Mining Permits granted %y t!e Governor were null and void*

+!e League of Provinces filed t!is present petition for certiorari, pro!i%ition and mandamus, assailing /E.RPs decision of nullifying t!e "mall-"cale Mining Permits issued %y t!e Governor* Bt was argued t!at /E.R "ecretary, as an alter ego of t!e President, !as t!e power of supervision, IF+ .-+ C-.+-L over acts of t!e LGFs* Petitioner t!en assailed t!e constitutionality of "ec* (A#%$#)$#iii$ of LGC and pertinent mining laws, insofar as t!ey grant power of control to t!e /E.R* -n t!e ot!er !and, t!e "olicitor General contended t!at t!e power to implement t!e small-scale mining law must %e carried out Npursuant to national policies and "FIKEC+ +- "FPERCB"B-., C-.+R-L 8./ RECBE5 of t!e /E.R*N

Bssues4 5!et!er or not "ec* (A#%$#)$#iii$ of R8 A(O' #LGC$ and "ec* 2 of R8 .o* A'AO #PeoplePs "mall-"cale Mining 8ct of (??($ are unconstitutional insofar as t!ey grant t!e /E.R control and review powers over LGFPs in respect to t!e enforcement of small-scale mining law* 5!et!er or not /E.R "ecretaryPs nullification, voiding and cancellation of t!e "mall-"cale Mining Permit issued %y t!e Provincial Governor is contrary to law*

Ruling4 PE+B+B-. L8CS" MERB+* Exploration, development and utilization of natural resources s!all %e under t!e EFLL C-.+R-L 8./ "FPERCB"B-. of t!e "tate #8rt* JBB "ec 2, Constitution$*

(* 8 statute is presumed to %e valid* +!is presumption is rooted in t!e doctrine of separation of powers w!ic! en6oins upon t!e t!ree coordinate departments of t!e Government a %ecoming courtesy for eac! ot!erPs acts* +!is Court, !owever, may declare a law, or portions t!ereof, unconstitutional w!ere a petitioner !as s!own a clear and une&uivocal %reac! of t!e Constitution, leaving no dou%t or !esitation in t!e mind of t!e Court* Ieltran v* "ecretary of Dealt! #.ov* 25,2''5 : AO "CR8 (O@;$4 N+!e fundamental criterion is t!at all reasona%le dou%ts s!ould %e resolved in favor of t!e constitutionality of a statute* Every law !as in its favor t!e presumption of constitutionality* Eor a law to %e nullified, it must %e s!own t!at t!ere is a clear and une&uivocal %reac! of t!e Constitution* +!e ground for nullity must %e clear and %eyond reasona%le dou%t* +!ose w!o petition t!is Court to declare a law, or parts t!ereof, unconstitutional must clearly esta%lis! t!e %asis t!erefor* -t!erwise, t!e petition must fail*N Petitioner failed to overcome t!e constitutionality of t!e assailed provisions of laws*

2* C-.+R-L of t!e /E.R2/E.R "ecretary over small-scale mining in t!e provinces is granted %y t!ree statutes4 #($ R*8* .o* A(O' #LGC$9 #2$ R*8* .o* A'AO, t!e PeoplePs "mall "cale Mining 8ct of (??(9 and #)$ R*8* .o* A? 2, t!e P!ilippine Mining 8ct of (??5* Even 8dministrative Code of (?@A provides t!at t!e /E.R is in c!arge of carrying out t!e "tatePs constitutional mandate, under "ec* 2, 8rt* JBB of t!e Constitution, to control and supervise t!e exploration, development, utilization and conservation of t!e countryPs natural resources* Dence, t!e enforcement of small-scale mining law in t!e provinces is made su%6ect to t!e "FPERCB"B-., C-.+R-L and RECBE5 of t!e /E.R under t!e LGC, w!ile t!e People3s "mall-"cale Mining 8ct provides t!at t!e "mall-"cale Mining Program is to %e implemented %y t!e /E.R "ecretary in coordination wit! ot!er concerned local government agencies* +!e LGC #"ection (A :%;:);:iii;$ did not fully devolve t!e enforcement of t!e small-scale mining law to t!e provincial government, as its enforcement is su%6ect to t!e supervision, control and review of t!e /E.R* Dence, t!e decision of t!e /E.R "ecretary was rendered in accordance wit! t!e power of review granted to t!e /E.R "ecretary in t!e resolution of disputes* +!e /E.R "ecretaryPs power to review and, t!erefore, decide, in t!is case, t!e issue on t!e validity of t!e issuance of t!e "mall-"cale Mining Permits %y t!e Provincial Governor as recommended %y t!e PE.R-, is a >F8"B-KF/BCB8L EF.C+B-., w!ic! involves t!e determination of w!at t!e law is, and w!at t!e legal rig!ts of t!e contending parties are, wit! respect to t!e matter in controversy and, on t!e %asis t!ereof and t!e facts o%taining, t!e ad6udication of t!eir respective rig!ts* +!e /E.R "ecretary exercises &uasi6udicial function under R*8* .o* A'AO and its Bmplementing Rules and Regulations to t!e extent necessary in settling disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims* +!is &uasi-6udicial function of t!e /E.R "ecretary can neit!er %e e&uated wit! Nsu%stitution of 6udgmentN of t!e Provincial Governor in issuing "mall-"cale Mining Permits nor NcontrolN over t!e said act of t!e Provincial Governor as it is a determination of t!e rig!ts of 8M+C over conflicting claims %ased on t!e law* Control v* "upervision4 +!e term NcontrolN !as %een defined as t!e power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside w!at a su%ordinate officer !ad done in t!e performance of !is2!er duties and to su%stitute t!e 6udgment of t!e former for t!e latter, w!ile t!e term NsupervisionN is t!e power of a superior officer to see to it t!at lower officers perform t!eir function in accordance wit! law*

ALCANTARA V. COMELEC - VERONILLA

.-+E4 according to Kudge P3s discussion, t!is case tal7s a%out 8lcantara3s ouster as President of 8I8S8/8 %ecause !e filed for candidacy in t!e senate* Iut in t!e case itself, t!e said issue is an o%iter and i &uote in w!ole, 05e dismiss t!e petition* 8t t!e outset, t!e respondents informed t!e Court #and t!e Court ta7es 6udicial notice$ of t!e fact t!at 8tty* 8lcantara is now running for a seat in t!e "enate under t!e group "ocial Kustice "ociety* +!e respondents claim t!at %y filing !is certificate of candidacy for t!e "enate under a different party, 8lcantara effectively a%andoned any claim to t!e 8I8S8/8 presidency - t!e position !e see7s to recover %y as7ing for t!e nullity of t!e "upreme 8ssem%ly* +!ey argue t!at petitioner 8lcantara3s claim to t!e presidency of 8I8S8/8, a marginalized and underrepresented party-list group, is inconsistent wit! !is act of waging an expensive national campaign for t!e P!ilippine "enate*

5e need not dwell at lengt! on t!is development as t!is is not a matter t!at t!e parties presented and argued %efore t!e C-MELEC and w!ic! t!at tri%unal resolved9 t!ere is no ruling on t!e matter t!at is now %efore us for review* 8dditionally, w!at t!e petitioners &uestion is petitioner 8lcantara3s expulsion as a party president and as a mem%er of t!e party w!en !e &uestioned t!e legality of t!e !olding of t!e "upreme 8ssem%ly* +!is was t!e matter directly litigated %efore t!e C-MELEC and an issue t!at t!e tri%unal directly ruled upon* 5e can resolve t!is issue wit!out need of considering t!e effect of petitioner 8lcantara3s "enate candidacy* 5e additionally o%serve t!at t!e respondents merely informed us of t!e fact of petitioner 8lcantara3s "enate candidacy %ut did not at all attempt to s!ow t!at %y running under anot!er group, t!e "ocial Kustice "ociety, 8lcantara effectively acted pre6udicially or to t!e detriment of t!e interests t!at 8I8S8/8 see7s to advance* 5e !ave not %een li7ewise directed to any provision in t!e 8I8S8/83s CIL t!at would support t!e respondents3 claim of inconsistency %etween 8I8S8/8 leaders!ip and filing of a certificate of candidacy in t!e "enate* Dence, petitioner 8lcantara3s "enate candidacy is a non-issue in t!e present case* #8nyway, !ere3s t!e digest, s!ould you want to read furt!er 4Y $ E8C+"4 Petitioner is t!e president of 8I8S8/8 Partylist* Bn 2''?, mem%ers proceeded to !old a "upreme 8ssem%ly* 8lcantara failed to attend t!e meeting %ut sent a representative in !is %e!alf* -ne of t!e agenda of t!e meeting was to elect new officers as well as ot!er election related matters* /ela Cruz &and 8l%ano was lected as president and general-secretary respectively* +!is prompted t!e petitioner to file a petition wit! t!e C-MELEC to decalre t!e meeting void and restrain private respondents from falsely representing t!emselves as duly elected officers of 8I8S8/8* De alleged t!at as president, !e must %e t!e one w!o s!ould call t!e meeting* Moreso, t!at !e did not approved t!e new mem%ers w!o too7 part in t!e assem%ly* +!e C-MELEC "econd /ivision dismissed t!e petition* Bt ruled t!at t!e !olding of an assem%ly for purposes of electing party officers and t!e amendment of t!e party3s CIL !ave long %een overdue* Fnder t!e party3s CIL, a "upreme 8ssem%ly must %e convened every t!ree years to elect officers and to amend or revise t!e party3s CIL* Fnder 8lcantara3s leaders!ip, no "upreme 8ssem%ly was convened since 8I8S8/83s accreditation in 2'' * Dence, t!is present petition* B""FE"4 52. C-MELEC !as 6urisdiction of t!e instant case* 52. t!e !olding of t!e "upreme 8ssem%ly and expulsion of 8lcantara as president of 8I8S8/8 is valid* DEL/4 8s a 6uridical entity, a party-list group can only validly act t!roug! its duly aut!orized representative2s* Bn t!e exercise of its power to register parties, t!e C-MELEC necessarily possesses t!e power to pass upon t!e &uestion of w!o, among t!e legitimate officers of t!e party-list group, are entitled to exercise t!e rig!ts and privileges granted to a party-list group under t!e law* +!e C-MELEC3s 6urisdiction on t!is point is well settled and is not !ere disputed* 5it! clear 6urisdictional aut!ority to resolve t!e issue of party leaders!ip and party identity, t!is Court will only %e 6ustified in interfering wit! t!e C-MELEC3s action under Rules O and O5 of t!e Rules of Court if t!e petitioners can esta%lis! t!at t!e C-MELEC

acted wit!out or in excess of 6urisdiction or wit! grave a%use of discretion amounting to lac7 or excess of 6urisdiction* Iy grave a%use of discretion is generally meant t!e capricious and w!imsical exercise of 6udgment e&uivalent to lac7 of 6urisdiction* Mere a%use of discretion is not enoug!* Bt must %e grave, as w!en it is exercised ar%itrarily or despotically %y reason of passion or personal !ostility* "uc! a%use must %e so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform t!e duty en6oined or to act at all in contemplation of law* Petitioner failed to !urdle t!is %arrier* +!e petitioners opened t!eir petition wit! t!e principle t!at only mem%ers of a registered party can c!art its destiny to t!e necessary exclusion of non-mem%ers* +!e C-MELEC correctly o%served t!at w!ile t!is may %e true, all t!at t!e petitioners esta%lis!ed is t!e group3s mem%ers!ip as of 2'')* +!e petitioners failed to account for t!e group3s actual mem%ers!ip at least as of 2''?, i*e*, five #5$ years after 8I8S8/8 was accredited and t!e year immediately prior to t!e "upreme 8ssem%ly !eld in Ee%ruary 2'(' and t!e party-list elections of May 2'('* +!e petitioners !ave not pointed out t!e %asis for suc! %road claim of aut!ority %y 8lcantara* Fnder 8rticle BC #Mem%ers!ip$ of 8I8S8/83s CIL !owever, t!e President or t!e .ational Executive Ioard is not given t!e exclusive aut!ority to approve applications for party mem%ers!ip* Political parties are generally free to conduct its internal affairs pursuant to its constitutionally-protected rig!t to free association* +!is includes t!e determination of t!e individuals w!o s!all constitute t!e association and t!e officials w!o s!all lead t!e party in attaining its goals* +!e petitioners3 argument is contrary to t!ese %asic tenets* Bf t!e validity of t!e "upreme 8ssem%ly would completely depend on t!e person w!o calls t!e meeting and on t!e person w!o sends t!e notice of t!e meeting L w!o are petitioners 8lcantara and /a%u t!emselves L t!en t!e petitioners would %e a%le to perpetuate t!emselves in power in violation of t!e very constitution w!ose violation t!ey now cite* +!is 7ind of result would stri7e at t!e !eart of political parties as t!e 0%asic element of t!e democratic institutional apparatus*1 +!is potential irregularity is w!at t!e C-MELEC correctly prevented in ruling for t!e dismissal of t!e petition*

DE LA LLANA V COA COMMISSIONER - CAPON

E8C+"4 -n -ct (?@2, C-8 issued t!e Circular .o* @2-(?5 lifting t!e pre-audit of government financial transactions* +!e circular affirmed t!e state policy t!at all resources of t!e government s!all %e managed, expended or utilized in accordance wit! law and regulations, and safeguarded against loss or wastage t!roug! illegal or improper disposition, wit! a view to ensuring efficiency, economy and effectiveness in t!e operations of government* Eurt!er, t!e circular emp!asized t!at t!e responsi%ility to ensure fait!ful ad!erence to t!e policy rested directly wit! t!e c!ief or !ead of t!e government agency concerned* +!e circular was also designed to furt!er facilitate or expedite government transactions wit!out impairing t!eir integrity* 8fter t!e c!ange of administration due to t!e E/"8 Revolution, anomalies and grave irregularities in government financial transactions were uncovered* Dence, C-8 reinstated t!e pre-audit system t!roug! Circular .o* @A-25A* 5it! t!e sta%ilization of political system and governmental operation C-8 deemed it proper to lift again t!e pre-audit system %y issuing Circular .o* @?-2??* Bn May 2''?, C-8 reinstated again t!e pre-audit %ut only on selected governmental transactions* Bn t!e interregnum, on ) May 2''O, petitioner dela Llana wrote to t!e C-8 regarding t!e recommendation of t!e "enate Committee on 8griculture and Eood t!at t!e /epartment of 8griculture set up an internal pre-audit service* -n (@ Kuly 2''O, t!e C-8 replied to petitioner, informing !im of t!e prior issuance of Circular .o* @?-2??* +!e (@ Kuly 2''O reply of t!e C-8 furt!er emp!asized t!e re&uired o%servance of 8dministrative -rder .o* 2A@ dated @ Kune (??2, w!ic! directed t!e strengt!ening of internal control systems of government offices t!roug! t!e installation of an internal audit service #B8"$*

/e La Llana filed a taxpayer3s suit wit! t!e "C against C-8* De alleges t!at t!e pre-audit duty on t!e part of t!e C-8 cannot %e lifted %y a mere circular, considering t!at pre-audit is a constitutional mandate ens!rined in "ection 2 of 8rticle BJ-/ of t!e (?@A Constitution* B""FE4 5-. t!e pre-audit of governmental financial transactions is a constitutional mandate w!ic! C-8 cannot lift %y mere circular DEL/4 Pre-audit system is not mandatory under t!e constitution +!e (?@A Constitution !as made t!e C-8 t!e guardian of pu%lic funds, vesting it wit! %road powers over all accounts pertaining to government revenues and expenditures and t!e use of pu%lic funds and property, including t!e exclusive aut!ority to define t!e scope of its audit and examination9 to esta%lis! t!e tec!ni&ues and met!ods for t!e review9 and to promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations* Bts exercise of its general audit power is among t!e constitutional mec!anisms t!at give life to t!e c!ec7 and %alance system in!erent in our form of government* Petitioner anc!ors !is argument on "ection 2 of 8rticle BJ-/ of t!e (?@A Constitution, w!ic! reads as follows4 "ection 2* (* +!e Commission on 8udit s!all !ave t!e power, aut!ority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to t!e revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or !eld in trust %y, or pertaining to, t!e Government, or any of its su%divisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations wit! original c!arters, and on a post- audit %asis4 a* constitutional %odies, commissions and offices t!at !ave %een granted fiscal autonomy under t!is Constitution9 %* autonomous state colleges and universities9 c* ot!er government-owned or controlled corporations and t!eir su%sidiaries9 and d* suc! non-governmental entities receiving su%sidy or e&uity, directly or indirectly, from or t!roug! t!e Government, w!ic! are re&uired %y law or t!e granting institution to su%mit to suc! audit as a condition of su%sidy or e&uity* Dowever, w!ere t!e internal control system of t!e audited agencies is inade&uate, t!e Commission may adopt suc! measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct t!e deficiencies* Bt s!all 7eep t!e general accounts of t!e Government and, for suc! period as may %e provided %y law, preserve t!e vouc!ers and ot!er supporting papers pertaining t!ereto* 2* +!e Commission s!all !ave exclusive aut!ority, su%6ect to t!e limitations in t!is 8rticle, to define t!e scope of its audit and examination, esta%lis! t!e tec!ni&ues and met!ods re&uired t!erefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including t!ose for t!e prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconsciona%le expenditures or uses of government funds and properties* #Emp!asis supplied$

De claims t!at under t!e first paragrap! &uoted a%ove, government transactions must undergo a preaudit, w!ic! is a C-8 duty t!at cannot %e lifted %y a mere circular*

5e find for pu%lic respondents* Petitioner3s allegations find no support in t!e afore&uoted Constitutional provision* +!ere is not!ing in t!e said provision t!at re&uires t!e C-8 to conduct a pre-audit of all government transactions and for all government agencies* +!e only clear reference to a pre-audit re&uirement is found in "ection 2, paragrap! (, w!ic! provides t!at a post-audit is mandated for certain government or private entities wit! state su%sidy or e&uity and only w!en t!e internal control system of an audited entity is inade&uate* Bn suc! a situation, t!e C-8 may adopt measures, including a temporary or special pre-audit, to correct t!e deficiencies* Dence, t!e conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty t!at t!is Court may compel t!e C-8 to perform* +!is discretion on its part is in line wit! t!e constitutional pronouncement t!at t!e C-8 !as t!e exclusive aut!ority to define t!e scope of its audit and examination* 5!en t!e language of t!e law is clear and explicit, t!ere is no room for interpretation, only application*

BU(LOD NANG MGA MAGBUBU(ID SA LUPAING RAMOS, INC V RAMOS AND SONS, INC. $)#SCRA)0. GR 1 1)%1, MARCH 1$, 2011 - SAMONTE

"HLL8IF"4 Constitutional Law9 Local Government Fnits9 Municipal Corporations9Woning 9Woning Classification is an exercise %y t!e local government of police power, not t!e power of eminent domain* Woning Classification is an exercise %y t!e local government police power, not t!e power of eminent domain* 8 zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation w!ic! logically arranges, prescri%es, defines and apportions a given political su%division into specific land uses as present and future pro6ection of needs* "ame9 "ame9 "ame9 "ame9 Iy virtue of a zoning ordinace, t!e local legislature may arrange, prescri%e, define and apportion t!e land wit!in its political 6urisdiction into specific uses %ased not only on t!e present, %ut also on t!e future pro6ection of needs* Iy virtue of a zoning ordinance, t!e local legislature may arrange, prescri%e, define and apportion t!e land wit!in its political 6urisdiction into specific uses %ased not only on t!e present, %ut also on t!e future pro6ection of needs* +o limit zoning to t!e existing c!aracter of t!e property and t!e structures t!ereon would completely negate t!e power of t!e local legislature to plan land use in its city or municipality* Fnder suc! circumstance, zoning would involve no planning at all, only t!e ru%%er-stamping %y t!e local legislature of t!e current use of t!e land* Civil Procedure9 8ppeals9 8s a rule, no issue may %e raised on appeal unless it !as %een %roug!t %efore t!e lower tri%unal for its consideration 8s a rule, no issue may %e raised on appeal unless it !as %een %roug!t %efore t!e lower tri%unal for its consideration* Dig!er courts are precluded from entertaining matters neit!er alleged in t!e pleadings nor raised during t!e proceedings %elow, %ut ventilated for t!e first time only in a motion for reconsideration or on appeal*

"ame9 "ame9 +!oug! not raised %elow, t!e issue of lac7 of 6urisdiction over t!e su%6ect matter may %e considered %y t!e reviewing court , as may it %e raised at any stage* +!ere are exceptions to t!e aforecited rule t!at no &uestion may %e raised for t!e first time on appeal* +!oug! not raised %elow, t!e issue of lac7 of 6urisdiction over t!e su%6ect matter may %e considered %y t!e reviewing court, as it may %e raised at any stage* +!e said court may also consider an issue not properly raised during trial w!en t!ere is plain error* Li7ewise, it may entertain suc! arguments w!en t!ere are 6urisprudential developments affecting t!e issues, or w!en t!e issues raised present a matter of pu%lic policy* Iu7lod, !owever, did not allege, muc! less argue, t!at its case falls under any of t!ese exceptions* Constitutional Law9 "ocial Kustice9 .ever is it 6ustified to give preference to t!e poor simply %ecause t!ey are poor, or to re6ect t!e ric! simply %ecause t!ey are ric!, for 6ustice must always %e served for poor and ric! ali7e, according to t!e mandate of t!e law Bt is true t!at, in case of reasona%le dou%t, t!e court is called upon to tilt t!e %alance in favor of t!e poor to w!om t!e constitution fittingly extends its sympat!y and compassion* Iut never is it 6ustified to give preference to t!e poor simply %ecause t!ey are poor, or to re6ect t!e ric! simply %ecause t!ey are ric!, for t!e 6ustice must always %e served for poor and ric! ali7e, according to t!e mandate of t!e law* Cigilance over t!e rig!ts of t!e landowners is e&ually important %ecause social 6ustice cannot %e invo7ed to trample on t!e rig!ts of property owners, w!o under our constitution and laws are also entitled to protection* E8C+"4

+!e su%6ect of t!e controversy involves several parcels of unirrigatedland, a part of t!e )A2-!ectare land owned %y t!e respondent #EMR8"-.$* Bt was ac&uired in (?O5 for t!e purpose of developing into a residential su%division 7nown as N+ravellerPs Life DomesN* +!e Municipal Council of /asmar, Cavite, acting in pursuance of t!e Local 8utonomy 8ct, enacted an ordinance providing su%division regulation and penalties for violation t!ereof* Bn (?A2, EMR8"-. applied for an aut!ority to convert and development its )A2-!ectare property into a residential su%division*+!e Municipal Council approved t!e said application t!roug! t!e issuance of a resolution* "u%se&uently, :EMR8"-.; paid t!e fees, dues and licenses needed to proceed wit! property development* Dowever, t!e actual implementation of t!e su%division pro6ect suffered delay due to t!e fact t!at t!e property in &uestion was mortgaged to, and t!e titles t!ereto were in t!e possession of, t!e -verseas Ian7 of Manila, w!ic! during t!e period material was under li&uidation* -n Kune (5* (?@@, Repu%lic 8ct .o* OO5A, ot!erwise 7nown as t!e Compre!ensive 8grarian Reform Law or C8RL, too7 effect, us!ering in a new process of land classification, ac&uisition and distri%ution* /uring t!e 8&uino administration, /8R was tas7ed wit! to ac&uire additional lands from t!e near%y areas as part of its conversion pro6ect* +!e /8R earmar7ed for t!is purpose t!e property of EMR8"-.* +!e /8R "ecretary sent out notices of ac&uisition to EMR8"-. w!ic! t!e latter protested* EMR8"-. filed wit! t!e /8R8I separate petitions to nullify t!e first ) sets of t!e notices and was t!en referred to t!e -ffice of t!e Regional /irector* +!e issue t!erein was to determine w!et!er or not t!e su%6ect property is covered %y t!e C8RPand, if not, to cancel t!e notices of ac&uisition* /8R conducted an on-site inspection of t!e su%6ect property* +!e Legal /ivision of /8Rrendered a decision declaring as null and void all t!e notices of ac&uisitions, o%serving t!at t!e property covered

t!ere%y is, pursuant to /epartment of Kustice #/-K$ -pinion .o* , series of (??', exempt from C8RP* +!e /-K -pinion adverted toclarified t!at lands already converted to non-agricultural uses %efore Kune (5, (?@@ were no longer covered %y C8RP*+!e /8R Regional /irector motupropio elevated t!e case to t!e /8R "ecretary assailing t!at t!e Legal /ivision3s decision ran contrary to t!e departmentPs official position Nto pursue t!e coverage of t!e same properties and its eventual distri%ution to &ualified %eneficiaries particularly t!e Lang7aan farmers in fulfillment of t!e commitment of t!e government to deliver to t!em t!e %alance of )? !ectares x xxN* /8R "ecretary Garilao issued an order affirming t!e .otices of 8c&uisition and directing t!e -8R field officials to pursue t!e coverage under R8 OO5A of t!e properties of EMR8"-.* EMR8"-. to t!e -ffice of t!e President %ut suc! was dismissed stating t!atEMR8"-.3s property !as remained 8GRBCFL+FR8L in classification and t!erefore falls wit!in t!e coverage of t!e C8RP for its failure to comply wit! t!e re&uirements of t!e Municipal -rdinance, 8dmin -rder (52 and Certification of t!e D"RC and DLFRI* +!e matter was %roug!t %efore t!e C8 w!ere t!e latter issued a +R- #+R- en6oining t!e /8R "ecretary and /eputy Executive "ecretary from implementing t!e t!eir decision and resolution until furt!er orders from t!e court* C8 later on granted EMR8"-.3s writ of preliminary in6unction* 5!ile t!e /8R "ecretary filed for MfR, /8R already prepared Certificates of Land -wners!ip 8ward #CL-8s$ to distri%ute t!e su%6ect property to farmer-%eneficiaries* Dowever, t!e writ of preliminary in6unction issued %y t!e C8 en6oined t!e release of t!e CL-8s* Iu7lod, on %e!alf of t!e alleged )'' farmer-%eneficiaries of t!e su%6ect property, filed a Manifestation and -mni%us Motion, w!erein it moved t!at it %e allowed to intervene as an indispensa%le9 t!at t!e writ of preliminary in6unction %e immediately dissolved9 and t!at t!e Petition for Review of EMR8"-. %e dismissed since t!e appropriate remedy s!ould !ave %een a petition for certiorari %efore "C* C8 allowed t!e intervention of Iu7lod %ecause t!e latterPs participation was Nnot %eing in any way pre6udicial to t!e interest of t!e original parties, nor will suc! intervention c!ange t!e factual legal complexion of t!e case*N +!e appellate court, !owever, affirmed t!e propriety of t!e remedy availed %y EMR8"-.* C8 ruled in favor of EMR8"-. %ecause t!e su%6ect property was already converted2classified as residential %y t!e Municipality of /asmarinas prior to t!e effectivity of t!e C8RL* B""FE"4 #+!e main issue of t!e case is 5-. t!e su%6ect property could %e placed under t!e C8RP %ut for Constitutional Law purposes ---- Y$5-. t!e Woning -rdinance and t!e Resolution approving t!e reclassification of t!e land issued %y t!e Municipality of /asmarinas is in accordance wit! t!e powers of suc! LGF* RFLB.G4 "C affirms t!e decision of t!e C8, in favor of EMR8"-.

+!e Local 8utonomy 8ct of (?5? aprecursor of t!e Local Government Code of (??(, provided9

"EC* )* 8dditional powers of provincial %oards, municipal %oards or city councils and municipal and regularly organized municipal district councils Power to adopt zoning and planning ordinances*8ny provision of law to t!e contrary notwit!standing, Municipal Ioards or City Councils in cities, and Municipal Councils in municipalities are !ere%y aut!orized to adopt zoning and su%division ordinances or regulations for t!eir respective cities and municipalities su%6ect to t!e approval of t!e City Mayor or Municipal Mayor, as t!e case may %e* Cities and municipalities may, !owever, consult t!e .ational Planning Commission on matters pertaining to planning and zoning* #Emp!ases supplied*$ +!e Municipal Council of /asmarinas approved -rdinance .o* (w!ic! laid down t!e general su%division regulations for t!e municipality9 and Resolution .o* 2?-8 on Kuly ?, (?A2, w!ic! approved t!e application for su%division of t!e su%6ect property* "ection ) of R*8* .o* 22O or t!e Local 8utonomy 8ct, empowers a Municipal Council Nto adopt zoning and su%division ordinances or regulationsN for t!e municipality* Clearly, t!e law does not restrict t!e exercise of t!e power t!roug! an ordinance* +!erefore, granting t!at Resolution .o* 2A is not an ordinance, it certainly is aregulatory measure wit!in t!e intendment or am%it of t!e word NregulationN under t!e provision* Woning and reclassification Woning classification is an exercise %y t!e local government of police power, not t!e power of eminent domain* 8 zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation w!ic! logically arranges, prescri%es, defines, and apportions a given political su%division into specific land uses as present and future pro6ection of needs* Woning is governmental regulation of t!e uses of land and %uildings according to districts or zones* Bt is compre!ensive w!ere it is governed %y a single plan for t!e entire municipality and prevails t!roug!out t!e municipality in accordance wit! t!at plan* Bt is partial or limited w!ere it is applica%le only to a certain part of t!e municipality or to certain uses* Eire limits, !eig!t districts and %uilding regulations are forms of partial or limited zoning or use regulation t!at are antecedents of modern compre!ensive zoning*

t!e term, ordinarily used wit! t!e connotation of compre!ensive or general zoning, refers to governmental regulation of t!e uses of land and %uildings according to districts or zones* +!is regulation must and does utilize classification of uses wit!in districts as well as classification of districts, inasmuc! as it manifestly is impossi%le to deal specifically wit! eac! of t!e innumera%le uses made of land and %uildings* 8ccordingly, #zoning !as %een defined as t!e confining of certain classes of %uildings and uses to certain localities, areas, districts or zones*$ Bt !as %een stated t!at zoning is t!e regulation %y districts of %uilding development and uses of property, and t!at t!e term NzoningN is not only capa%le of t!is definition %ut !as ac&uired a tec!nical and artificial meaning in accordance t!erewit!* #Woning is t!e separation of t!e municipality into districts and t!e regulation of %uildings and structures wit!in t!e districts so created, in accordance wit! t!eir construction, and nature and extent of t!eir use* Bt is a dedication of districts delimited to particular uses designed to su%serve t!e general welfare*$ .umerous ot!er definitions of zoning more or less in accordance wit! t!ese !ave %een given in t!e cases, #pp* 2A-2@*$:2@;

Conversion is t!e act of c!anging t!e current use of a piece of agricultural land into some ot!er use as approved %y t!e /epartment of 8grarian Reform* Reclassification, on t!e ot!er !and, is t!e act of specifying !ow agricultural lands s!all %e utilized for nonagricultural uses suc! as residential, industrial, commercial, as em%odied in t!e land use plan, su%6ect to t!e re&uirements and procedure for land use conversion9 Reclassificationalso includes t!e reversion of non-agricultural lands to agricultural use* Fnder t!e present Local Government Code, t!e aut!ority to reclassify agricultural lands primarily resides in t!e sanggunian of t!e city or municipality* Iy virtue of a zoning ordinance, t!e local legislature may arrange, prescri%e, define, and apportion t!e land wit!in its political 6urisdiction into specific uses %ased not only on t!e present, %ut also on t!efuture pro6ection of needs* +o limit zoning to t!e existing c!aracter of t!e property and t!e structures t!ereon would completely negate t!e power of t!e local legislature to plan land use in its city or municipality* Fnder suc! circumstance, zoning would involve no planning at all, only t!e ru%%er-stamping %y t!e local legislature of t!e current use of t!e land* t!e regulation %y local legislatures of land use in t!eir respective territorial 6urisdiction t!roug! zoning and reclassification is an exercise of police power* #guys, t!is is a ))-page case and naglisod7o determine unsana issues a7odapat B-apil<sorry 7aau if di 7aaumasa%tana7o digest**i really tried very !ard <if li%ogra7aau or taas tan awanalangang sylla%us maora man naang gist 6udsa7aso**$

ASHARY M. ALAUYA, CLER( OF COURT, SHARI/A DISTRICT COURT, MARA'I CITY V. JUDGE CASAN ALI LIMBONA, SHARI/A CIRCUIT COURT, LANAO DEL SUR - MEDINA
RE4 8dministrative Matter in t!e "upreme Court* Gross Misconduct and /is!onesty Kudges9 Election Law9 Partisan Political 8ctivity9 5ords and P!rases9 +!e act of a 6udge in filing a certificate of candidacy as a party-list representative in t!e May (??@ elections wit!out giving up !is 6udicial post violated not only t!e law, %ut also t!e constitutional mandate t!at 0no officer of employee in t!e civil service s!all engage directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign19 +!e filing of a certificate of candidacy is a partisan political activity as t!e candidate t!ere%y offers !imself to t!e electorate for an elective post* --5e find t!e -C83s recommendation to %e well-founded* Kudge Lim%ona committed grave offenses w!ic! rendered !im unfit to continue as a mem%er of t!e Kudiciary* 5!en !e was appointed as a Kudge, !e too7 an oat! to up!old t!e law, yet in filing a CoC as a party-list representative in t!e My (??@ eletions wit!out giving up !is post, Kudge Lim%ona violated not only t!e law, %ut t!e constitutional mandate t!at 0no officer or EE in t!e civil service s!all engage directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign1* +!e .IB investigation on t!e aut!enticity of Kudge Lim%ona3s signature on t!e CoC un&ualifiedly esta%lis!ed t!at t!e 6udge signed t!e CoC for t!e May (??@ elections, t!us negating !is claim t!at !is

signature were forged* +!e filing of a CoC is a partisan political activity as t!e candidate t!ere%y offers !imself to t!e electorate for an elective post* Grave Misconduct9 8 6udge w!o continued to perform !is 6udicial duties despite !is candidacy for a political post is guilty of grave misconduct in office --- 5!ile we cannot interfere wit! Kudge Lim%ona3s political aspirations, we cannot allow !im to pursue !is political goals w!ile still on t!e %enc!* 5e cannot li7ewise allow !im to deceive t!e Kudiciary* 5e find relevant t!e -C83s o%servation on t!e point4 0Kudge Lim%ona3s concealment of !is direct participation in t!e (??@ elections w!ile remaining in t!e Kudiciary3s payroll and !is vain attempt to mislead t!e Court %y !is claim of forgery, are patent acts of dis!onesty rendering !im unfit to remain in t!e Kudiciary*1

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAIL'AYS VS. (ANLAON CONSTRUCTION ENTERPRISES CO., INC. 0G.R. NO. 1%29$*. APRIL $, 20111 - BABATUAN
Case /octrine4 8dministrative Code of (?@A expressly pro!i%its t!e entering into contracts involving t!e expenditure of pu%lic funds unless two prior re&uirements are satisfied4 +!ere must %e an appropriation law aut!orizing t!e expenditure re&uired in t!e contract* +!ere must %e attac!ed to t!e contract a certification %y t!e proper accounting official and auditor t!at funds !ave %een appropriated %y law and suc! funds are availa%le* Eailure to comply wit! any of t!ese two re&uirements renders t!e contract void* Certificate "!owing 8ppropriation to Meet Contract* .o contract involving t!e expenditure of pu%lic funds %y any government agency s!all %e entered into or aut!orized unless t!e proper accounting official of t!e agency concerned s!all !ave certified to t!e officer entering into t!e o%ligation t!at funds !ave %een duly appropriated for t!e purpose and t!at t!e amount necessary to cover t!e proposed contract for t!e current calendar year is availa%le for expenditure on account t!ereof, su%6ect to verification %y t!e auditor concerned* Coid Contract and Lia%ility of -fficer* R 8ny contract entered into contrary to t!e re&uirements of t!e two #2$ immediately preceding sections s!all %e void, and t!e officer or officers entering into t!e contract s!all %e lia%le to t!e Government or ot!er contracting party for any conse&uent damage to t!e same extent as if t!e transaction !ad %een w!olly %etween private parties* E8C+"4 P.R and Sanlaon entered into contracts for t!e repair of t!ree P.R station %uildings and passenger s!elters* Fpon Sanlaon3s alleged completion of t!e pro6ects, it demanded for t!e payment and t!e release of t!e 0retention money*1 P.R denied Sanlaon3s demand %ecause apparently, C-8 sent .otices of "uspension against t!e release of t!e 0retention money1 for payment to Sanlaon* R+C and C8 decided against P.R and ruled t!at P.R is lia%le to pay Sanlaon* B""FE"4 8re t!e decisions of R+C and C8 properT RFLB.G4

.-* +!e Court notes t!at one of t!e reasons t!e C-8 issued t!e .otices of "uspension was %ecause t!e contracts did not contain a Certificate of 8vaila%ility of Eunds as re&uired under "ections @5 and @O of Presidential /ecree .o* ( 5*(@ Sanlaon does not dispute t!e a%sence of a Certificate of 8vaila%ility of Eunds* +!e law expressly declares void a contract t!at fails to comply wit! t!e two re&uirements, namely, an appropriation law funding t!e contract and a certification of appropriation and fund availa%ility*22 +!e clear purpose of t!ese re&uirements is to insure t!at government contracts are never signed unless supported %y t!e corresponding appropriation law and fund availa%ility*2) +!e t!ree contracts %etween P.R and Sanlaon do not comply wit! t!e re&uirement of a certification of appropriation and fund availa%ility* Even if a certification of appropriation is not applica%le to P.R if t!e funds used are internally generated, still a certificate of fund availa%ility is re&uired* +!us, t!e t!ree contracts %etween P.R and Sanlaon are void for violation of "ections O, A, and @, C!apter @, "u%title I, +itle B, Ioo7 C of t!e 8dministrative Code of (?@A, as well as "ections @5, @O, and @A of t!e Government 8uditing Code of t!e P!ilippines*(avvp!i( Dowever, Sanlaon is not left wit!out recourse* +!e law itself affords it t!e remedy* "ection @ of t!e 8dministrative Code of (?@A provides t!at Nt!e officer or officers entering into t!e contract s!all %e lia%le to t!e Government or ot!er contracting party for any conse&uent damage to t!e same extent as if t!e transaction !ad %een w!olly %etween private parties*N2 Sanlaon could go after t!e officers w!o signed t!e contract and !old t!em personally lia%le*

CAYETANO V. COMELEC AND TINGA G.R. NO. 19 %)$. APRIL 12, 2011 BILOCURA
"ylla%us Motion for Reconsideration9 C-MELEC9 N-nly final orders of t!e C-MELEC in /ivision may %e raised %efore t!e C-MELEC en %anc* "ection ), 8rticle BJ-C of t!e (?@A Constitution mandates t!at only motions for reconsideration of final decisions s!all %e decided %y t!e C-MELEC en %anc*Fnder t!is constitutional provision, t!e C-MELEC en %anc s!all decide motions for reconsideration only ofNdecisionsN of a /ivision, meaning t!ose acts !aving a final c!aracter* Clearly, t!e assailed status &uo ante -rder, %eing interlocutory, s!ould first %e resolved %y t!e C-MELEC Eirst /ivision via a motion for reconsideration* "C3s 6urisdiction to review via certiorari a decision, order, or ruling of t!e C-MELEC9 Plainly, from t!e foregoing, t!e Court !as no 6urisdiction to review an order, w!et!er final or interlocutory, even a final resolution of a division of t!e C-MELEC* "tated ot!erwise, t!e Court can only review via certiorari a decision, order, or ruling of t!e C-MELEC en %anc in accordance wit! "ection A, 8rticle BJ-8 of t!e Constitution*(avvp!i( Certiorari against C-MELEC9 5!en 8llowed9 Einal decision or resolution of t!e C-MELEC en %anc9 Repol went directly to t!e "upreme Court from an interlocutory order of t!e C-MELEC Eirst /ivision* "ection A, 8rticle BJ of t!e (?@A Constitution prescri%es t!e power of t!e "upreme Court to review decisions of t!e C-MELEC, as follows4 "ection A* Eac! commission s!all decide %y a ma6ority vote of all its mem%ers any case or matter %roug!t %efore it wit!in sixty days from t!e date of its su%mission for decision or resolution* 8 case or matter is deemed su%mitted for decision or resolution upon t!e filing of t!e last pleading, %rief, or memorandum re&uired %y t!e rules of t!e commission or %y t!e commission itself* Jxx 5e !ave interpreted t!is constitutional provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of

t!e C-MELEC rendered in t!e exercise of its ad6udicatory or &uasi-6udicial powers* +!e decision must %e a final decision or resolution of t!e C-MELEC en %anc* +!e "upreme Court !as no power to review via certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a /ivision of t!e C-MELEC* Eailure to a%ide %y t!is procedural re&uirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of t!e petition* #Emp!asis supplied*$ Certiorari against C-MELEC9 5!en .ot 8llowed9 Exceptions9 +!e general rule is t!at a decision or an order of a C-MELEC /ivision cannot %e elevated directly to t!is Court t!roug! a special civil action for certiorari* Eurt!ermore, a motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a C-MELEC /ivision s!all %e elevated to t!e C-MELEC En Ianc* Dowever, a motion to reconsider an interlocutory order of a C-MELEC /ivision s!all %e resolved %y t!e division w!ic! issued t!e interlocutory order, except w!en all t!e mem%ers of t!e division decide to refer t!e matter to t!e C-MELEC En Ianc*+!us, in general, interlocutory orders of a C-MELEC /ivision are not appeala%le, nor can t!ey %e proper su%6ect of a petition for certiorari* +o rule ot!erwise would not only delay t!e disposition of cases %ut would also unnecessarily clog t!e Court doc7et and unduly %urden t!e Court* +!is does not mean t!at t!e aggrieved party is wit!out recourse if a C-MELEC /ivision denies t!e motion for reconsideration* +!e aggrieved party can still assign as error t!e interlocutory order if in t!e course of t!e proceedings !e decides to appeal t!e main case to t!e C-MELEC En Ianc* +!e exception enunciated in S!o and Repol is w!en t!e interlocutory order of a C-MELEC /ivision is a patent nullity %ecause of a%sence of 6urisdiction to issue t!e interlocutory order, as w!ere a C-MELEC /ivision issued a temporary restraining order wit!out a time limit, w!ic! is t!e Repol case, or w!ere a C-MELEC /ivision admitted an answer wit! counterprotest w!ic! was filed %eyond t!e reglementary period, w!ic! is t!e S!o case* Certiorari against C-MELEC9 Einally, certiorari will not lie in t!is case* 8s stated in "oriano, Nt!e general rule is t!at a decision or an order of a C-MELEC /ivision cannot %e elevated directly to t!is Court t!roug! a special civil action for certiorari*N Bn s!ort, t!e final order of t!e C-MELEC #"econd /ivision$ denying t!e affirmative defenses of petitioner cannot %e &uestioned %efore t!is Court even via a petition for certiorari* +rue, t!e aforestated rule admits of exceptions as w!en t!e issuance of t!e assailed interlocutory order is a patent nullity %ecause of t!e a%sence of 6urisdiction to issue t!e same* Fnfortunately for petitioner, none of t!e circumstances permitting an exception to t!e rule occurs in t!is instance* Einally, certiorari will not lie in t!is case* Certiorari against C-MELEC9 +!e issuance of a special writ of certiorari !as two prere&uisites4 #($ a tri%unal, %oard, or officer exercising 6udicial or &uasi-6udicial functions !as acted wit!out or in excess of its or !is 6urisdiction, or wit! grave a%use of discretion amounting to lac7 or excess of 6urisdiction9 and #2$ t!ere is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and ade&uate remedy in t!e ordinary course of law* 8lt!oug! it is not t!e duty of t!e Court to point petitioner, or all litigants for t!at matter, to t!e appropriate remedy w!ic! s!e s!ould !ave ta7en, we refer !er to t!e cue found in "oriano, i*e*, N:t;!e aggrieved party can still assign as error t!e interlocutory order if in t!e course of t!e proceedings !e decides to appeal t!e main case to t!e C-MELEC En Ianc*N Bn addition, t!e protest filed %y private respondent and t!e counterprotest filed %y petitioner remain pending %efore t!e C-MELEC, w!ic! s!ould afford petitioner ample opportunity to ventilate !er grievances* +!ereafter, t!e C-MELEC s!ould decide t!ese cases wit! dispatc!* E8C+"4 Bn t!e automated national and local elections !eld on May (', 2'(', petitioner M8RB8 L88R.B L* C8HE+8.- and private respondent /8.+E -* +B.G8 were candidates for t!e position of Mayor of +aguig City* Petitioner was proclaimed t!e winner t!ereof on May (2, 2'(', receiving a total of ?5,@O5 votes as against t!e ?), 5 votes received %y private respondent*

Private respondent /8.+E -* +B.G8 filed an Election Protest against petitioner %efore t!e C-MELEC and listed election frauds and irregularities allegedly committed %y petitioner, w!ic! translated to t!e latter3s ostensi%le win as Mayor of +aguig City and t!at in trut! private respondent is t!e actual winner* Petitioner filed !er 8nswer wit! Counter-Protest and Counterclaim stating t!e affirmative defense of insufficiency in form and content of t!e Election Protest and prayed for t!e immediate dismissal t!ereof* C-MELEC !eld a preliminary conference and issued an -rder granting private respondent a period wit!in w!ic! to file t!e appropriate responsive pleading to t!e 8nswer of petitioner* +!e C-MELEC issued t!e assailed Preliminary Conference -rder finding t!e protest filed %y private respondent and counter-protest filed %y petitioner to %e sufficient in form and su%stance* Effectively, t!e C-MELEC denied petitioner3s affirmative defense of insufficiency in form and su%stance of t!e protest filed %y private respondent* Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of t!e Preliminary Conference -rder relative to t!e denial of !er affirmative defenses* Private respondent filed a Comment and -pposition* Conse&uently, t!e C-MELEC issued t!e second assailed -rder denying petitioner3s Motion for Reconsideration* Dence, t!is petition for certiorari positing t!e singular issue of w!et!er t!e C-MELEC committed grave a%use of discretion amounting to lac7 or excess of 6urisdiction in refusing to dismiss t!e protest of private respondent for insufficiency in form and content* .ot unexpectedly, private respondent refutes t!e allegations of petitioner and raises t!e procedural infirmity in t!e instant petition, i*e*, t!e power of t!is Court to review decisions of t!e C-MELEC under "ection ), 8rticle BJ-C of t!e Constitution, pursuant to t!e leading case of Repol v* C-MELEC* Private respondent li7ewise counters t!at t!e petition fails to demonstrate grave a%use of discretion* 8damantly, petitioner insists t!at t!e case at %ar differs from Repol since t!e !erein assailed -rders constituted a final order of t!e C-MELEC #"econd /ivision$* B""FE4 5!et!er or not "upreme Court !as t!e power to review via certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a division of t!e C-MELEC* RFLB.G4 8s stated in "oriano, Nt!e general rule is t!at a decision or an order of a C-MELEC /ivision cannot %e elevated directly to t!is Court t!roug! a special civil action for certiorari*N Bn s!ort, t!e final order of t!e C-MELEC #"econd /ivision$ denying t!e affirmative defenses of petitioner cannot %e &uestioned %efore t!is Court even via a petition for certiorari* "ection ), 8rticle BJ-C of t!e (?@A Constitution mandates t!at only motions for reconsideration of final decisions s!all %e decided %y t!e C-MELEC en %anc, t!us4 "EC* )* +!e Commission on Elections may sit en %anc or in two divisions, and s!all promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies* 8ll suc! election cases s!all %e !eard and decided in /ivision, provided t!at motions for reconsideration of decisions s!all %e decided %y t!e Commission en %anc* #Emp!asis supplied*$ Fnder t!is constitutional provision, t!e C-MELEC en %anc s!all decide motions for reconsideration only ofNdecisionsN of a /ivision, meaning t!ose acts !aving a final c!aracter* Clearly, t!e assailed status &uo ante -rder, %eing interlocutory, s!ould first %e resolved %y t!e C-MELEC Eirst /ivision via a motion for reconsideration*

+rue, t!e aforestated rule admits of exceptions as w!en t!e issuance of t!e assailed interlocutory order is a patent nullity %ecause of t!e a%sence of 6urisdiction to issue t!e same* Fnfortunately for petitioner, none of t!e circumstances permitting an exception to t!e rule occurs in t!is instance* Repol case applies in t!e present case* Repol went directly to t!e "upreme Court from an interlocutory order of t!e C-MELEC Eirst /ivision* "ection A, 8rticle BJ of t!e (?@A Constitution prescri%es t!e power of t!e "upreme Court to review decisions of t!e C-MELEC, as follows4 "ection A* Eac! commission s!all decide %y a ma6ority vote of all its mem%ers any case or matter %roug!t %efore it wit!in sixty days from t!e date of its su%mission for decision or resolution* 8 case or matter is deemed su%mitted for decision or resolution upon t!e filing of t!e last pleading, %rief, or memorandum re&uired %y t!e rules of t!e commission or %y t!e commission itself* Fnless ot!erwise provided %y t!is constitution or %y law, any decision, order, or ruling of eac! commission may %e %roug!t to t!e "upreme Court on certiorari %y t!e aggrieved party wit!in t!irty days from receipt of a copy t!ereof* "upreme Court interpreted t!is constitutional provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of t!e C-MELEC rendered in t!e exercise of its ad6udicatory or &uasi-6udicial powers* +!e decision must %e a final decision or resolution of t!e C-MELEC en %anc* +!e "upreme Court !as no power to review via certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a /ivision of t!e C-MELEC* Eailure to a%ide %y t!is procedural re&uirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of t!e petition* #Emp!asis supplied*$ +!e general rule is t!at a decision or an order of a C-MELEC /ivision cannot %e elevated directly to t!is Court t!roug! a special civil action for certiorari* Eurt!ermore, a motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a C-MELEC /ivision s!all %e elevated to t!e C-MELEC En Ianc* Dowever, a motion to reconsider an interlocutory order of a C-MELEC /ivision s!all %e resolved %y t!e division w!ic! issued t!e interlocutory order, except w!en all t!e mem%ers of t!e division decide to refer t!e matter to t!e C-MELEC En Ianc* +!us, in general, interlocutory orders of a C-MELEC /ivision are not appeala%le, nor can t!ey %e proper su%6ect of a petition for certiorari* +o rule ot!erwise would not only delay t!e disposition of cases %ut would also unnecessarily clog t!e Court doc7et and unduly %urden t!e Court* +!is does not mean t!at t!e aggrieved party is wit!out recourse if a C-MELEC /ivision denies t!e motion for reconsideration* +!e aggrieved party can still assign as error t!e interlocutory order if in t!e course of t!e proceedings !e decides to appeal t!e main case to t!e C-MELEC En Ianc* +!e exception enunciated in S!o and Repol is w!en t!e interlocutory order of a C-MELEC /ivision is a patent nullity %ecause of a%sence of 6urisdiction to issue t!e interlocutory order, as w!ere a C-MELEC /ivision issued a temporary restraining order wit!out a time limit, w!ic! is t!e Repol case, or w!ere a C-MELEC /ivision admitted an answer wit! counter-protest w!ic! was filed %eyond t!e reglementary period, w!ic! is t!e S!o case* +o reiterate, for petitioner, none of t!e circumstances permitting an exception to t!e rule occurs in t!is instance* Einally, certiorari will not lie in t!is case* #Bn fine for t!e certiorari to "C to %e valid, two re&uirements must %e met4 MR re&uirement and Einal /ecision or -rder Re&uirement*$

JAMSANI-RODRIGUEZ VS. JUSTICES GREGORY S. ONG, ET AL. A.M. NO. 0%19-SB-J APRIL 12, 2011 $)% SCRA 1 - ALO

/FE PR-CE"" 8./ "PEE/H +RB8L9 5ould t!e %latant disregard of Kustices of t!e procedures em%odied in t!e Rules of Court constitutes a violation of /ue Process and "peedy +rial guaranteed %y t!e (?@A Consitution*

Courts9 "andigan%ayan9 Collegial court Kustices cannot lig!tly regard t!e legal re&uirement for all of t!em to sit toget!er as mem%ers of a /ivision in t!e trial and determination of a case or cases assigned t!ereto* L 5e deny t!e plea of Kustice -ng and Kustice Dernandez for complete exoneration, considering w!at we !eld in t!e /ecision, w!ic! we reiterate !ereunder, as follows4 Respondent Kustices cannot lig!tly regard t!e legal re&uirement for all of t!em to sit toget!er as mem%ers of a Eourt! /ivision 0in t!e trial and determination of a case or cases assigned t!ereto*1 +!e information and evidence upon w!ic! t!e Eourt! /ivision would %ase any decisions or ot!er 6udicial actions in t!e cases tried %efore it must %e made directly availa%le to eac! and every one of its mem%ers during t!e proceedings* +!is necessitates t!e e&ual and full participation of eac! mem%er in t!e trial and ad6udication of t!eir cases* Bt is simply not enoug!, t!erefore, t!at t!e t!ree mem%ers of t!e Eourt! /ivision were wit!in !earing and communicating distance of one anot!er at t!e !earings in &uestion, as t!ey explained in !indsig!t, %ecause even in t!ose circumstances not all of t!em sat toget!er in session*

E8C+"4

8 6oint Motion for Reconsideration was filed %y respondents "andigan%ayan 8ssociate Kustice Gregory "* -ng #Kustice -ng$ and 8ssociate Kustice Kose R* Dernandez #Kustice Dernandez$ for a complaint*

+!e complainant, t!en an 8ssistant "pecial Prosecutor BBB in t!e -ffice of t!e "pecial Prosecutor, filed an affidavit-complaint dated -cto%er 2), 2''@ c!arging Kustice -ng, Kustice Dernandez and Kustice Ponferrada, as t!e Mem%ers of t!e Eourt! /ivision of t!e "andigan%ayan wit!4 grave misconduct, falsification of pu%lic documents , improprieties in t!e !earing of cases and most importantly, manifest partiality and gross ignorance of t!e law #grounded on t!e fact t!at Criminal Case .o* 25@'(, entitled People v* Puno, was dismissed upon a demurrer to evidence filed %y t!e accused upon a finding t!at t!e assailed contracts su%6ect of t!e criminal case !ad never %een perfected contrary to t!e evidence of t!e Prosecution, t!e dismissal order %eing signed %y all t!ree respondents$*

B""FE4 5!et!er or not t!e actions of t!e 6ustices violated t!e Constitutional guarantee of due process and speedy trial*

RFLB.G4

HE"* +!e court ruled t!at t!e procedure adopted %y respondent Kustices for t!eir provincial !earings was in %latant disregard of t!e Rules of Court, and t!e Revised Bnternal Rules of t!e "andigan%ayan* Even worse, t!eir adoption of t!e procedure ar%itrarily denied t!e %enefit of a !earing %efore a duly constituted /ivision of t!e "andigan%ayan to all t!e affected litigants, including t!e "tate, t!ere%y rendering t!e integrity and efficacy of t!eir proceedings open to serious c!allenge on t!e ground t!at a !earing %efore a duly constituted /ivision of t!e "andigan%ayan was of t!e very essence of t!e constitutionally guaranteed rig!t to due process of law*

Respondent Kustices did not ensure t!at t!eir proceedings accorded wit! t!e provisions of t!e law and procedure* +!eir insistence t!at t!ey adopted t!e procedure in order to expedite t!e !earing of provincial cases is not a sufficient reason to entirely exonerate t!em, even if no malice or corruption motivated t!eir adoption of t!e procedure* +!ey could !ave seen t!at t!eir procedure was flawed, and t!at t!e flaw would prevent, not promote, t!e expeditious disposition of t!e cases %y precluding t!eir valid ad6udication due to t!e nullifying taint of t!e irregularity* +!ey 7new as well t!at t!e need to expedite t!eir cases, al%eit recommended, was not t!e c!ief o%6ective of 6udicial trials

8lt!oug! a speedy determination of an action or proceeding implies a speedy trial, it s!ould %e %orne in mind t!at speed is not t!e c!ief o%6ective of a trial* Careful and deli%erate consideration for t!e administration of 6ustice is more important t!an a race to end t!e trial* 8 genuine respect for t!e rig!ts of all parties, t!oug!tful consideration %efore ruling on important &uestions, and a zealous regard for t!e 6ust administration of law are some of t!e &ualities of a good trial 6udge, w!ic! are more important t!an a reputation for !asty disposal of cases*

NAVARRO V ERMITA - MONSANTO

Eacts4 Repu%lic 8ct .o* ?)55 created a province of /inagat Bslands, formerly part of "urigao /el .orte* Bt was &uestioned for constitutionality for not %eing in compliance wit! t!e population or t!e land area re&uirements of t!e Local Government Code under "ec* O(* Previous decisions relating to t!is case declared t!e creation of t!e province as unconstitutional*

Bssue4 5!et!er creation of /inagat Bslands as a separate province constitutionalT

Deld4 HE"*

+!e provisions in 8rt ?#2$ of t!e Rules and Regulations Bmplementing t!e Local Government Code of (??( stating, 0+!e land area re&uirement s!all not apply w!ere t!e proposed province is composed of one#($ or more islands,1 is declared C8LB/* 8ccordingly, R8?)55 is declared C8LB/ and Constitutional and t!e proclamation of t!e Province of /inagat Bslands and t!e election of t!e officials t!ereof are declared C8LB/*

"C now loo7s into central policy considerations in t!e creation of provinces* LGC provisions on t!e creation of municipalities and cities provides t!e exception to t!e land area re&uirement in cases of noncontiguity as provided for under "ections 2 and 5' of t!e LGC* Dowever, t!e "C concluded t!at it must !ave %een t!e intent of t!e legislators to extend suc! exception to provinces especially considering t!e p!ysical configuration of t!e P!ilippine arc!ipelago* Bn fact, w!ile suc! exemption was a%sent under "ection O( of t!e LGC #provision relating to creation of provinces$, suc! was incorporated under t!e LGC-BRR t!us correcting t!e congressional oversig!t in said provision and reflecting t!e true legislative intent* Moreover, t!e earlier decisions s!ow a very restrictive construction w!ic! could trenc! on t!e e&ual protection clause, as it actually defeats t!e purpose of local autonomy and decentralization as ens!rined in t!e Constitution* Dence, t!e land area re&uirement s!ould %e read toget!er wit! territorial contiguity*

"alient Points2.otes4 Local 8utonomy4 8 local government is a political "u%division of a nation or state w!ic! is constituted %y law and !as su%stantial control of local affairs +!e Central Policy Considerations in t!e creation of local governments units are4 Economic Cia%ility9 Efficient 8dministration9 and Capa%ility to deliver %asic services to t!eir constituents9 Criteria prescri%ed %y t!e LGC4 Bncome, Population and land area +!e primodial criterion in t!e creation of LGFs, particularly of province, is EC-.-MBC CB8IBLB+H* Exception from t!e Land 8rea Re&uirement in forming LGFs#on provinces$4 +!e oversig!t Committee conducted due deli%eration and consultations wit! all t!e concerned sectors of t!e society and considered t!e -perative Principles of local autonomy as provided in t!e LGC w!en t!e BRR was formulated, amounting not only to an executive construction, entitled to great weig!t and respect from t!e court, %ut to legislative construction as well, especially wit! t!e inclusion of representatives from t!e four leagues of local government units as mem%ers of t!e oversig!t committee9 Bn effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers, congress %reat!ed fles! and %lood into t!at exemption in 8rticle ?#2$ of t!e Local Government Code L BRR and transformed it into law w!en it enacted R8?)55 creating t!e Bsland Province of /inagat*

PEOPLE V. LUIS J. MORALES GR 1$$ ## MAY

0, 2011 - DESUYO

Eacts4 Luis Morales, t!e acting president of Expocorp at t!e time relevant to t!e case, was c!arged %y t!e -m%udsman3s Eact-Einding and Bnvestigation Iureau* De was c!arged of unlawfully selling a Mercedes %enz issued to !im wit!out t!e re&uisite pu%lic %idding nor approval of t!e Ioard of /irectors of Expo Corporation and t!ereafter failed to deposit t!e proceeds of t!e sale of t!e aforementioned ve!icle to t!e account of Expo Corporation, to t!e damage and pre6udice of t!e Corporation and t!e pu%lic interest as well* Morales moved for t!e dismissal of t!e case for lac7 of 6urisdiction over !is person and over t!e offense c!arged* De alleged t!at Expocorp is a private corporation and t!at !e is not a pu%lic employee or official* De added t!at Expocorp is not a government-owned or controlled corporation %ecause it was not created %y a special law, it did not !ave an original c!arter, and a ma6ority of Expocorp3s capital stoc7 is owned %y private individuals* "andigan%ayan ruled t!at ruled t!at t!e position of a president of a government-owned or controlled corporation clearly falls wit!in its 6urisdiction* Dowever, %efore Morales could %e !eld accounta%le as Expocorp3s president, it must first %e esta%lis!ed t!at Expocorp is a government-owned or controlled corporation* "andigan%ayan ruled, citing Laurel v /esierto, t!at Expocorp is a private corporation9 t!at it was not created %y a special law nor did it !ave an original c!arter* Bt was organized under t!e Corporation Code and was registered wit! t!e "ecurities and Exc!ange Commission* 8ccording to t!e "andigan%ayan, Expocorp could not derive its pu%lic c!aracter from t!e fact t!at it was organized %y t!e .CC* Dence, its officers and employees are private individuals w!o are outside t!e 6urisdiction of t!e "andigan%ayan* -n t!is %asis, t!e "andigan%ayan dismissed t!e information against Morales* Bssues4 a* 5!et!er or not Expocorp was organized and created for t!e sole purpose of performing t!e executive functions of t!e .ational Centennial Commission and t!e sovereign functions of t!e government, and s!ould %e considered as a pu%lic office* %* 5!et!er or not petitioner, as president of Expocorp, s!ould rig!tfully %e considered as a Npu%lic officerN, falling under t!e 6urisdiction of t!e "andigangayan*() Ruling4 Petition is denied* Expocorp is a private corporation as found %y t!e "andigan%ayan* Bt was not created %y a special law %ut was incorporated under t!e Corporation Code and was registered wit! t!e "ecurities and Exc!ange Commission* Bt is also not a government-owned or controlled corporation* 8 government-owned or controlled corporation must %e owned %y t!e government, and in t!e case of a stoc7 corporation, at least a ma6ority of its capital stoc7 must %e owned %y t!e government* Fnder "ection 5, 8rticle JBBB of t!e (?A) Constitution, "andigan%ayan s!all exercise 6urisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and suc! ot!er offenses committed %y pu%lic officers and employees, including t!ose in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to t!eir office as may %e determined %y law*

Iut since Expocorp is a private corporation, not a government-owned or controlled corporation, Morales, as Expocorp3s president w!o now stands c!arged for violating "ection )#e$ of R*8* .o* )'(? in t!is capacity, is %eyond t!e "andigan%ayan3s 6urisdiction*

GSIS AND 'INSTON F. GARCIA VS. AR'IN T. MAYORDOMO 0G.R. NO. 19121%, MAY 1, 20111 - DAMAOLAO
/octrine4 Bn order to %e considered as 0misconduct,1 t!e act must !ave a 0direct relation to and %e connected wit! t!e performance of !is official duties amounting eit!er to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect or failure to disc!arge t!e duties of t!e office*1

Eacts4

Respondent 8rwin +* Mayordomo was employed as 8ccounts Management "pecialist of t!e G"B" Eund Management 8ccounting /epartment #EM8/$* Bgnacio L* Liscano, t!en G"B" Bnformation +ec!nology officer #B+-$ BBB called t!e attention of Kosep! "ta* Romana anot!er B+-, a%out a networ7 conflict in !is personal computer* "ta* Romana conducted a networ7 scan to identify t!e source of t!e pro%lem and !e discovered t!at anot!er personal computer was also using t!e internet protocol #BP$ address of Liscano3s computer* +!is ot!er computer was eventually identified as t!e one assigned to Mayordomo*

"ta* Romana immediately restored t!e correct BP address assigned to Mayordomo3s personal computer* Fntil t!is restoration, Liscano was deprived of access to t!e G"B" computer networ7 and prevented from performing !is wor7 as B+-* Mayordomo was ver%ally reminded t!at !e !ad no aut!ority to c!ange !is BP address and warned t!at doing so would result in networ7 pro%lems* "u%se&uently, "ta* Romana again encountered t!e same username*

+!e President and General Manager Garcia issued a formal administrative c!arge against Mayordomo, for Grave Misconduct and2or Conduct Pre6udicial to t!e Iest Bnterest of t!e "ervice* +!e G"B" rendered its /ecision finding Mayordomo guilty of Grave Misconduct and imposing upon !im t!e penalty of dismissal, wit! forfeiture of %enefits, loss of eligi%ility and dis&ualification from government service* Dowever t!e Court of 8ppeals downgraded t!e offense to "imple Misconduct*

Bssue4

5!et!er t!e Donora%le Court of 8ppeals Committed error in downgrading t!e offense to simple misconduct*

Deld4

Hes* +!e Court !as come to a determination t!at t!e administrative offense committed %y t!e respondent is not 0misconduct*1

+o constitute misconduct, t!e act or acts must !ave a direct relation to and %e connected wit! t!e performance of official duties* +!e duties of Mayordomo as a mem%er of t!e G"B" EM8/ surely do not involve t!e modification of BP addresses* +!e act was considered unaut!orized, precisely %ecause dealing wit! t!e G"B" networ73s BP addresses is strictly reserved for B+"G personnel w!o are expectedly 7nowledgea%le in t!is field*

Bn Manuel v* Calimag, Kr*, t!e Court emp!atically ruled4 Bn order to %e considered as 0misconduct,1 t!e act must !ave a 0direct relation to and %e connected wit! t!e performance of !is official duties amounting eit!er to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect or failure to disc!arge t!e duties of t!e office* Misconduct in office !as %een aut!oritatively defined %y Kustice +uazon in Lacson v* Lopez in t!ese words4 NMisconduct in office !as a definite and well-understood legal meaning* Iy uniform legal definition, it is a misconduct suc! as affects !is performance of !is duties as an officer and not suc! only as affects !is c!aracter as a private individual* Bn suc! cases, it !as %een said at all times, it is necessary to separate t!e c!aracter of t!e man from t!e c!aracter of t!e officer xxxx Bt is settled t!at misconduct, misfeasance, or malfeasance warranting removal from office of an officer must !ave direct relation to and %e connected wit! t!e performance of official duties amounting eit!er to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and failure to disc!arge t!e duties of t!e office xxxx1

More specifically, in Iuenaventura v* Ienedicto, an administrative proceeding against a 6udge of t!e court of first instance, t!e present C!ief Kustice defines misconduct as referring =to a transgression of some esta%lis!ed and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful %e!avior or gross negligence %y t!e pu%lic officer*1

FLORES V. MONTEMAYOR - PACAYRA

E8C+"4 Respondent was found administratively lia%le for failure to declare in !is 2''(

and 2''2 "worn "tatement of 8ssets and Lia%ilities #""8L$ two expensive cars registered in !is name, in violation of "ection A, Repu%lic 8ct #R*8*$ .o* )'(? in relation to "ection @ #8$ of R*8* .o* OA()* +!e -P adopted t!e findings and recommendations of t!e Presidential 8nti-Graft Commission #P8GC$, including t!e imposition of t!e penalty of dismissal from service on respondent, wit! all accessory penalties* Dence t!is motion for reconsideration*

+!e motion is anc!ored on t!e following grounds4

(* Respondent was e&uivalently resulting 6eopardyN* 2* 5!o involving to t!e follow same

in

su%6ected to two #2$ administrative2criminal Bnvestigations violation of !is constitutional rig!t against Ndou%le

%etween conflicting decisions facts and issues affecting

of two #2$ t!e rig!ts

government agencies of t!e Respondent*

)* RespondentPs constitutional rig!t to due process was violated* * Penalties prescri%ed %y t!e alleged offense committed2omitted* Donora%le Court is too !ars! and severe on t!e

-n t!e first ground, t!e court finds it %ereft of merit /ou%le 6eopardy attac!es only #($ upon a valid indictment, #2$ %efore a competent court, #)$ after arraignment, # $ w!en a valid plea !as %een entered, and #5$ w!en t!e defendant was convicted or ac&uitted, or t!e case was dismissed or ot!erwise terminated wit!out t!e express consent of t!e accused* 5e !ave !eld t!at none of t!ese re&uisites applies w!ere t!e -m%udsman only conducted a preliminary investigation of t!e same criminal offense against t!e respondent pu%lic officer*+!e dismissal of a case during preliminary investigation does not constitute dou%le 6eopardy, preliminary investigation not %eing part of t!e trial* -n t!e second ground, Bt is argued t!at t!e -ffice of t!e -m%udsman as a constitutional %ody, pursuant to its mandate under R*8* .o* OAA', !as primary 6urisdiction over cases cogniza%le %y t!e "andigan%ayan, as against t!e P8GC w!ic! is not a constitutional %ody %ut a mere creation of t!e -P* Fnder said law, it is t!e -m%udsman w!o !as disciplinary aut!ority over all elective and appointive officials of t!e government, suc! as !erein respondent* +!e argument is untena%le* B;t is a %asic principle of t!e law on pu%lic officers t!at a pu%lic official or employee is under a t!ree-fold responsi%ility for violation of duty or for a wrongful act or omission* +!is simply means t!at a pu%lic officer may %e !eld civilly, criminally, and administratively lia%le for a wrongful doing* /ismissal of a criminal action does not foreclose institution of an

administrative proceeding against t!e same respondent, nor carry wit! it t!e relief from administrative lia%ility*O Res 6udicata did not set in %ecause t!ere is no identity of causes of action* Moreover, t!e decision of t!e -m%udsman dismissing t!e criminal complaint cannot %e considered a valid and final 6udgment* -n t!e criminal complaint, t!e -m%udsman only !ad t!e power to investigate and file t!e appropriate case %efore t!e "andigan%ayan*A decision of t!e -m%udsman does not su%6ect of t!is review* +!e doctrine &uasi-6udicial proceedings, not to operate as res 6udicata in t!e PC8GC case of res 6udicata applies only to 6udicial or t!e exercise of administrative powers* we find no merit in !is reiteration

8s to t!e t!ird ground raised %y respondent, of t!e alleged gross violation of !is rig!t to due process*

+!e essence of due process in administrative proceedings is t!e opportunity to explain onePs side or see7 a reconsideration of t!e action or ruling complained of* 8s long as t!e parties are given t!e opportunity to %e !eard %efore 6udgment is rendered, t!e demands of due process are sufficiently met*() 5!at is offensive to due process is t!e denial of t!e opportunity to %e !eard* Bn t!e landmar7 case of 8ng +i%ay v* parties in administrative proceedings, as follows4 ($ +!e rig!t to a !earing, su%mit evidence in support t!ereof* w!ic! CBR, we laid down t!e cardinal rig!ts of

includes

t!e

rig!t

to

present

onePs

case

and

2$ +!e tri%unal must consider t!e evidence presented* )$ +!e decision must !ave somet!ing to support itself* $ +!e evidence must %e su%stantial* 5$ +!e decision must %e rendered on t!e evidence presented least contained in t!e record and disclosed to t!e parties affected* O$ +!e tri%unal or %ody or any of its 6udges independent consideration of t!e law and facts of accept t!e views of a su%ordinate in arriving at a decision* at t!e !earing, or at

must act on its or !is own t!e controversy and not simply

A$ +!e %oard or %ody s!ould, in all controversial in suc! a manner t!at t!e parties to t!e proceeding involved, and t!e reason for t!e decision rendered*

&uestion, render its decision can 7now t!e various issues

.ote t!at t!ere is no re&uirement in 8ng +i%ay t!at t!e decision must express clearly and distinctly t!e facts and t!e law on w!ic! it is %ased* Eor as long as t!e administrative decision is grounded on evidence, and expressed in a manner t!at sufficiently informs t!e parties of t!e factual and legal %ases of t!e decision, t!e due process re&uirement is satisfied*

-n t!e fourt! ground cited %y t!e respondent, we maintain t!at t!e penalty of dismissal from t!e service is 6ustified as no accepta%le explanation was given for t!e non-declaration of t!e two expensive cars in !is 2''( and 2''2 ""8L* Pursuant to "ection ((, paragrap! #%$ of R*8* .o* OA(), any violation of t!e law Nproven in a proper administrative proceeding s!all %e sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of a pu%lic official or employee, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against !im*N

RE2 PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY AMPATUAN, ET AL., A"2" N-" 9B!99!8!14LA"2" N-" 9B!99!H!14LA"2" N-" 9B! 99!=!14" @5N. 9>, :B99 . - LIAO
Rig!t to fair trial v* freedom of t!e press* Rig!t to fair trial v* freedom of t!e press* Pre6udicial pu%licity insofar as it undermines t!e rig!t to a fair trial must pass t!e 0totality of circumstances1 test t!at t!e rig!t of an accused to a fair trial is not incompati%le to a free press, t!at pervasive pu%licity is not per se pre6udicial to t!e rig!t of an accused to a fair trial, and t!at t!ere must %e allegation and proof of t!e impaired capacity of a 6udge to render a %iasfree decision* E8C+"4 -n .ovem%er 2), 2''?, 5A people including )2 6ournalists and media practitioners were 7illed on t!eir way to "!ariff 8gua7 in Maguindanao* +!is tragic incident came to %e 7nown as 0Maguindanao massacre1 spawned c!arges for 5A counts of murder and additional c!arges of re%ellion against (?A accused* 8lmost a year later on .ovem%er (? 2'(', t!e .ational Fnion of Kournalists of t!e P!ilippines #.FKP$, 8I"-CI. Iroadcasting Corporation, GM8 .etwor7 Bnc*, relatives of t!e victims, individual 6ournalists from various media entities and mem%ers of t!e academe filed a petition %efore t!is court praying t!at live television and radio coverage of t!e trial in t!is criminal cases %e allowed, recording devises %e permitted inside t!e court room to assist t!e wor7ing 6ournalists, and reasona%le guidelines %e formulated to govern t!e %roadcast coverage and t!e use of devices* B""FE4 5!et!er or not t!e petition for radio and television coverage of t!e Maguindanao Massacre s!ould %e allowed* DEL/4 8EEBRM8+BCE* +!e Court partially grants pro !ac vice petitioners3 prayer for a live %roadcast of t!e trial court proceedings, su%6ect to certain guidelines as enumerated* +!e present petition w!ic! asserts t!e exercise of t!e freedom of t!e press, rig!t to information, rig!t to a fair and pu%lic trial, rig!t to assem%ly and to petition t!e government for redress of grievances, rig!t of free access to courts, and freedom of association, su%6ect to regulations to %e issued %y t!e Court* Respecting t!e possi%le influence of media coverage on t!e impartiality of trial court 6udges, petitioners correctly explain t!at pre6udicial pu%licity insofar as it undermines t!e rig!t to a fair trial must pass t!e 0totality of circumstances1 test, applied in People v* +ee!an7ee, Kr* and Estrada v* /esierto, t!at t!e rig!t of an accused to a fair trial is not incompati%le to a free press, t!at pervasive pu%licity is not per se pre6udicial to t!e rig!t of an accused to a fair trial, and t!at t!ere must %e allegation and proof of t!e impaired capacity of a 6udge to render a %ias-free decision* Mere fear of possi%le undue influence is not tantamount to actual pre6udice resulting in t!e deprivation of t!e rig!t to a fair trial*

-ne apparent circumstance t!at sets t!e Maguindanao Massacre cases apart from t!e earlier cases is t!e impossi%ility of accommodating even t!e parties to t!e cases L t!e private complainants2families of t!e victims and ot!er witnesses L inside t!e courtroom* +!e impossi%ility of !olding suc! 6udicial proceedings in a courtroom t!at will accommodate all t!e interested parties, w!et!er private complainants or accused, is unfortunate enoug!* 5!at more if t!e rig!t itself commands t!at a reasona%le num%er of t!e general pu%lic %e allowed to witness t!e proceeding as it ta7es place inside t!e courtroom* +ec!nology tends to provide t!e only solution to %rea7 t!e in!erent limitations of t!e courtroom, to satisfy t!e imperative of a transparent, open and pu%lic trial*

Bn t!is day and age, it is a%out time to craft a win-win situation t!at s!all not compromise rig!ts in t!e criminal administration of 6ustice, sacrifice press freedom and allied rig!ts, and interfere wit! t!e integrity, dignity and solemnity of 6udicial proceedings* Bndeed, t!e Court cannot gloss over w!at advances tec!nology !as to offer in distilling t!e a%stract discussion of 7ey constitutional precept into t!e wor7a%le context* +ec!nology per se !as always %een neutral* Bt is t!e use and regulation t!ereof t!at need finetuning* Law and tec!nology can wor7 to t!e advantage and furt!erance of t!e various rig!ts involved, wit!in t!e guidelines*

TALAGA VS. COMELEC - ROJAS

FA4T14 Ramon +alaga #Ramon$ and P!ilip M* Castillo #Castillo$ respectively filed t!eir certificates of candidacy #CoCs$ for t!e position of Mayor of Lucena City to %e contested in t!e sc!eduled May (', 2'(' national and local elections* Ramon, t!e official candidate of t!e La7as-Sampi-CM/, declared in !is CoC t!at !e was eligi%le for t!e office !e was see7ing to %e elected to* Castillo filed wit! t!e C-MELEC a petition denominated as Bn t!e Matter of t!e Petition to /eny /ue Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Ramon H* +alaga, Kr* as Mayor for Daving 8lready "erved +!ree #)$ Consecutive +erms as a City Mayor of Lucena* +!e C-MELEC Eirst /ivision issued a Resolution on 8pril (?, 2'(' granting Castillo3s petition and declared +alaga /B">F8LBEBE/ to run for mayor* Ramon filed !is Cerified Motion for Reconsideration %ut later on wit!drawn* -n t!e same date, Iar%ara Ru%y filed !er own CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in su%stitution of Ramon, attac!ing t!ereto t!e Certificate of .omination and 8cceptance #C-.8$ issued %y La7as-Sampi-CM/* -n May 5, 2'(', t!e C-MELEC En Ianc, acting on Ramon3s Ex parte Manifestation of 5it!drawal, declared t!e C-MELEC Eirst /ivision3s Resolution dated 8pril (?, 2'(' final and executory* -n election day on May (', 2'(', t!e name of Ramon remained printed on t!e %allots %ut t!e votes cast in !is favor were counted in favor of !is wife, Iar%ara Ru%y, as !is su%stitute candidate, resulting in Iar%ara Ru%y %eing ultimately credited wit! ,'?? votes as against Castillo3s )?,O(5 votes* Barbara ,uby #as proclaimed the #inner through ,esolution No" <;9= of #hich 4astillo #as notified but failed to any action #ithin the prescribed period" Dence, said resolution %ecame final and executory* Dowever, upon appeal, C-MELEC en %anc pointed out t!at4

#a$ Resolution .o* @?(A did not attain finality for %eing issued wit!out a !earing as a mere incident of t!e C-MELEC3s ministerial duty to receive t!e C-Cs of su%stitute candidates9 #%$ Resolution .o* @?(A was %ased on t!e wrong facts9 and #c$ ,amon&s dis?ualification #as resolved #ith finality only on 2ay 8, :B9B, the 4-2.0.4 .n Banc concluded that Barbara ,uby could not have properly substituted ,amon but had simply become an additional candidate #ho had filed her 4-4 out of timeE and held that 6ice 2ayor Alcala should succeed to the position pursuant to 1ection >> of the 0ocal Government 4ode (0G4 " Dence, t!is petition %y +alaga* I115.4 5!et!er or not t!e su%stitution %y Iar%ara Ru%y as candidate for t!e position of Mayor of Lucena City in lieu of Ramon, !er !us%and, was valid* H.0A4 .o, t!e substitution #as not valid" Existence of a valid CoC of t!e sus%stituted candidate is a condition sine &ua non for a valid su%stitution* 5!ile a person w!o is dis&ualified under "ection O@ is merely pro!i%ited to continue as a candidate, t!e person w!ose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under "ection A@ is not treated as a candidate at all, as if !e2s!e never filed a CoC* Bn t!is case, considering t!at a cancelled CoC of +alaga does not give rise to a valid candidacy,)) t!ere can %e no valid su%stitution of t!e candidate under "ection AA of t!e -mni%us Election Code* Bt s!ould %e clear, too, t!at a candidate w!o does not file a valid CoC may not %e validly su%stituted, %ecause a person wit!out a valid CoC is not considered a candidate in muc! t!e same way as any person w!o !as not filed a CoC is not at all a candidate* 8s to w!o s!all succeed as mayor, "C ruled t!at it s!ould %e t!e elected vice mayor pursuant to t!e law on succession defined in "ection of t!e LGC* Castillo could not assume t!e office for !e was only a second placer* La%o, Kr* s!ould %e applied* +!ere, t!e Court emp!asized t!at t!e candidate o%taining t!e second !ig!est num%er of votes for t!e contested office could not assume t!e office despite t!e dis&ualification of t!e first placer %ecause t!e second placer was Nnot t!e c!oice of t!e sovereign will* +!e only time t!at a second placer is allowed to ta7e t!e place of a dis&ualified winning candidate is w!en two re&uisites concur, namely4 #a$ t!e candidate w!o o%tained t!e !ig!est num%er of votes is dis&ualified9 and #%$ t!e electorate was fully aware in fact and in law of t!at candidate3s dis&ualification as to %ring suc! awareness wit!in t!e realm of notoriety %ut t!e electorate still cast t!e plurality of t!e votes in favor of t!e ineligi%le candidate* +!e exception did not apply in favor of Castillo simply %ecause t!e second element was a%sent* +!e electorate of Lucena City were not t!e least aware of t!e fact of Iar%ara Ru%y3s ineligi%ility as t!e su%stitute* .eit!er could Iar%ara Ru%y from assume t!e position of Mayor of Lucena City* +o %egin wit!, t!ere was no valid candidate for !er to su%stitute due to Ramon3s ineligi%ility* 8lso, Ramon did not voluntarily wit!draw !is CoC %efore t!e elections in accordance wit! "ection A) of t!e -mni%us Election Code* Lastly, s!e was not an additional candidate for t!e position of Mayor of Lucena City %ecause !er filing of

!er CoC on May , 2'(' was %eyond t!e period fixed %y law* Bndeed, s!e was not, in law and in fact, a candidate*

ABUNDO V. COMELEC - ABUBA(AR

G*R* .o* 2'(A(O Kanuary @, 2'() (Three!Term 0imit ,uleE #hat are considered Involuntary Interruptions Eacts4 8%undo first served as t!e elected municipal mayor of Ciga, Catanduanes from 2''(-2'' * -n 2'' mayoralty election, 8%undo was accordingly defeated %y +orres as found %y t!e %oard of canvassers* 8%undo t!en filed an election protest %efore t!e C-MELEC* 8fter two years and nine mont!s service of +orres as mayor, t!e C-MELEC rendered resolution declaring 8%undo as t!e real winner of t!e 2'' mayoralty race* 8%undo t!en assumed office as mayor for t!e second term, %ut only for an unexpired portion of one year and one mont! #2''O-2''A$* -n 2''A election, 8%undo run for t!e t!ird time and was elected as mayor, serving as suc! from 2''A-2'('* -n 2'(' election, 8%undo again run for t!e same position for t!e fourt! time* 5!ile !e was proclaimed as winner, +orres, !is opponent, !as consistently opposed 8%undoPs eligi%ility to run for mayor* Iefore t!e start of t!e campaign period, +orres filed %efore t!e C-MELEC a dis&ualification case praying t!at 8%undo %e dis&ualified from t!e mayoralty post !aving served already for t!ree terms as mayor* +!e Constitution and t!e Local Government Code expressly provides t!at no elective official s!all serve for more t!an t!ree consecutive terms* 8%undo counters t!e protest, arguing t!at t!e t!ree-term limit rule is not applica%le to !im %ecause !e was not a%le to fully serve as mayor for t!ree terms* De was not a mayor for t!e entire term of 2'' -2''A* De only assumed office in 2''O w!en t!e election protest filed %y !im was finally decided in !is favor, w!ic! eventually allowed !im to serve as mayor for t!e remaining one year and a mont!* +!e C-MELEC, !owever, found 8%undo ineligi%le for t!e mayoralty post in 2'('* Bt ruled t!at in t!e 2'' election, 8%undo was a %ona fide winner9 +orresPs proclamation was erroneous* 5!en C-MELEC declared !im as t!e winner in 2''O, it s!ould %e deemed t!at !e was declared as mayor in 2'' * Dis assumption of office in 2''O retroacts to 2'' w!en t!e constituents !as in fact elected !im as mayor* Bt is t!e election for t!ree consecutive terms w!ic! matters, and not service for t!ree consecutive terms* +!us, 8%undo was deemed to !ave served as mayor for t!ree consecutive terms* Dence, t!is petition for certiorari under Rule O5 was %roug!t contending t!at C-MELEC acted wit! grave a%use of discretion in issuing suc! resolution* Issue4 5!et!er t!e service of a term less t!an t!e full t!ree years %y an elected official arising from !is %eing declared as t!e duly elected official upon an election protest is considered as full service of t!e term for purposes of t!e application of t!e t!ree consecutive term limit for elective local officials* ,uling: .-* 1ervice of less than the full three years is not considered in the application of the three!term limit rule" The :BB>!:BB= term #hich #ould have been served by him #as effectively and involuntary interrupted" Involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by la# amounts to an interruption of continuity of service" An involuntary

interrupted term, cannot, in the conte7t of the dis?ualification rule, be considered as one term for purposes of counting the three!term threshold" To constitute a dis?ualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the three!term limit rule, the follo#ing ,.R5I1IT.1 must concur: (* t!at t!e official concerned !as %een elected for t!ree consecutive terms in t!e same local government post9 and 2* t!at !e !as fully served three consecutive terms* Coluntary renunciation of t!e office %y t!e incum%ent elective local official for any lengt! of time s!all .-+, in determining service for t!ree consecutive terms, %e considered an interruption in t!e continuity of service for t!e full term for w!ic! t!e elective official concerned was elected* +!e principle %e!ind t!e t!ree-term limit rule covers only consecutive terms and t!at w!at t!e Constitution pro!i%its is a consecutive fourt! term* xxxxx +!ere !as, in fine, to %e a %rea7 or interruption in t!e successive terms of t!e official after !is or !er t!ird term* 8n interruption usually occurs w!en t!e official does not see7 a fourt! term, immediately following t!e t!ird* +!e intention behind the three!term limit rule #as not only to abrogate the Omonopoli$ation of political po#erO and prevent elected officials from breeding Oproprietary interest in their positionO but also to Oenhance the people&s freedom of choice"O +!e notion of full service of t!ree consecutive terms is related to t!e concepts of interruption of service and voluntary renunciation of service* +!e word B.+ERRFP+B-. means temporary cessation, intermission or suspension* +o interrupt is to o%struct, t!wart or prevent* 5!en t!e Constitution and t!e LGC of (??( spea7 of interruption, t!e reference is to t!e o%struction to t!e continuance of t!e service %y t!e concerned elected official %y effectively cutting s!ort t!e service of a term or giving a !iatus in t!e occupation of t!e elective office* -n t!e ot!er !and, t!e word RE.F.CB8+B-. connotes t!e idea of waiver or a%andonment of a 7nown rig!t* +o renounce is to give up, a%andon, decline or resign* Coluntary renunciation of t!e office %y an elective local official would t!us mean to give up or a%andon t!e title to t!e office and to cut s!ort t!e service of t!e term t!e concerned elected official is entitled to* #Bnvoluntary$ interruption %ars t!e application of t!e t!ree-term limit rule, w!ereas #voluntary$ renunciation does not* Bnvoluntary interruption is claimed to result from any of t!ese events or causes4 succession or assumption of office %y operation of law, preventive suspension, declaration of t!e defeated candidate as t!e winner in an election contest, declaration of t!e proclaimed candidate as t!e losing party in an election contest, proclamation of a non-candidate as t!e winner in a recall election, removal of t!e official %y operation of law, and ot!er analogous causes* +o summarize, !ereunder are t!e prevailing 6urisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness of terms and2or involuntary interruption, viz4 Khen a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely assumed the position pursuant to the rules on succession under the 0G4 #i*e*, w!en t!e supposed incum%ent refuses to assume office, fails to &ualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns or is ot!erwise permanently incapacitated to disc!arge t!e functions of !is office$, then his service for the une7pired portion of the term of the replaced official 4ANN-T be treated as one full term as contemplated

under the subDect constitutional and statutory provision that service cannot be counted in the application of any term limit #Ior6a, Kr* v* C-MELEC :(??@;$* If the official runs again for the same position he held prior to his assumption of the higher office, then his succession to said position is by operation of la# and is considered an involuntary severance or interruption #Monte%on v* C-MELEC :2''@;$* 8n elective official, w!o !as served for t!ree consecutive terms and w!o did not see7 t!e elective position for w!at could %e !is fourt! term, %ut later won in a recall election, !ad an B.+ERRFP+B-. in t!e continuity of t!e official3s service* Eor, !e !ad %ecome in t!e interim, i*e*, from t!e end of t!e )rd term up to t!e recall election, a private citizen* 8n elective local official cannot see7 immediate reelection for a fourt! term* +!e pro!i%ited election refers to t!e next regular election for t!e same office following t!e end of t!e t!ird consecutive term and, !ence, any subse?uent election, li*e recall election, is no longer covered #"ocrates v* C-MELEC and Dagedorn :2''2;$* +!e abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a municipality to a city does N-T, by itself, #or* to interrupt the incumbent official&s continuity of service" The very instant the municipal mayor has vacated his office, he also assumed office as city mayor" +!us, !e never ceased from acting as c!ief executive of t!e LGF #Latasa v* C-MELEC :2'');$* +reventive suspension is N-T a term!interrupting event as the elective officer&s continued stay and entitlement to the office remain unaffected during the period of suspension, although he is barred from e7ercising the functions of his office during this period * +!e best indicator of the suspended official&s continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lac* of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy e7ists #8ldovino, Kr* v* C-MELEC :2''?;$* 5!en a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes office, !is term is B.+ERRFP+E/ w!en !e loses in an election protest and is ousted from office, t!us disena%ling !im from serving w!at would ot!erwise %e t!e unexpired portion of !is term of office !ad t!e protest %een dismissed #/izon v* C-MELEC :2''?;$* +!e assumption of office cannot %e deemed to !ave %een %y reason of a valid election %ut %y reason of a void proclamation* +!e %rea7 or interruption need not %e for a full term of t!ree years or for t!e ma6or part of t!e )-year term9 an interruption for any lengt! of time, provided t!e cause is involuntary, is sufficient to %rea7 t!e continuity of service #Lonzanida v* C-MELEC :(???;$* 5!en an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision %ecomes final after said official !ad served t!e full term for said office, t!en !is loss in t!e election contest does .-+ constitute an interruption since !e !as managed to serve t!e term from start to finis!* Dis full service, despite t!e defeat, s!ould %e counted in t!e application of term limits %ecause t!e nullification of !is proclamation came after t!e expiration of t!e term #-ng v* 8legre :2''O;$* :-n finally concluding t!e present case, t!e Court !eld t!at t!e facts of t!e case clearly point to an involuntary interruption during t!e Kuly 2'' -Kune 2''A term* +!ere can %e no &ui%%ling t!at, during t!e term 2'' -2''A, and wit! t!e enforcement of t!e decision of t!e election protest in !is favor, 8%undo assumed t!e mayoralty post only on May 2''O and served t!e term until Kune )', 2''A or for a period of a little over one year and one mont!* Conse&uently , it cannot be said that 2ayor Abundo #as able to serve fully the entire :BB>!:BB= term to #hich he #as other#ise entitled *;

SABILI VS COMELEC, G.R. 19 2$1 APRIL 2), 2012 - TAMSI

Facts:

C-MELEC denied "a%ili3s Certificate of Candidacy for mayor of Lipa due to failure to comply wit! t!e one year residency re&uirement* 5!en petitioner filed !is C-C for mayor of Lipa City for t!e 2'(' elections, !e stated t!at !e !ad %een a resident of t!e city for two #2$ years and eig!t #@$ mont!s* Dowever, it is undisputed t!at w!en petitioner filed !is C-C during t!e 2''A elections, !e and !is family were t!en staying at !is ancestral !ome in Iarangay #Irgy*$ "ico, "an Kuan, Iatangas* Respondent Elorencio Li%rea #private respondent$ filed a NPetition to /eny /ue Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and to /is&ualify a Candidate for Possessing "ome Grounds for /is&ualification* 8llegedly, petitioner falsely declared under oat! in !is C-C t!at !e !ad already %een a resident of Lipa City for two years and eig!t mont!s prior to t!e sc!eduled (' May 2'(' local elections* +!e 4-2.0.4 1econd Aivision granted the +etition of private respondent, declared petitioner as dis?ualified from see*ing the mayoralty post in 0ipa 4ity , and canceled !is Certificate of Candidacy for !is not %eing a resident of Lipa City and for !is failure to meet t!e statutory one-year residency re&uirement under t!e law* Petitioner moved for reconsideration of t!e 2O Kanuary 2'(' Resolution of t!e C-MELEC, during t!e pendency of w!ic! t!e (' May 2'(' local elections were !eld* +!e next day, he #as proclaimed the duly elected mayor of 0ipa 4ity after garnering the highest number of votes cast for the said position* De accordingly filed a Manifestation wit! t!e C-MELEC en %anc to reflect t!is fact* Bn its Resolution dated (A 8ugust 2'(',t!e C-MELEC en %anc denied t!e Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner* Dence, petitioner filed wit! t!is Court a Petition #Petition for Certiorari wit! Extremely Frgent 8pplication for t!e Bssuance of a "tatus >uo -rder and for t!e Conduct of a "pecial Raffle of t!is Case$ under Rule O in relation to Rule O5 of t!e Rules of Court, see7ing t!e annulment of t!e 2O Kanuary 2'(' and (A 8ugust 2'(' Resolutions of t!e C-MELEC* Issue4 Khether the 4-2.0.4 committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that 1abili failed to prove compliance #ith the one!year residency re?uirement for local elective officialsE ,uling: 8s a general rule, the 4ourt does not ordinarily revie# the 4-2.0.4&s appreciation and evaluation of evidence* Dowever, exceptions t!ereto !ave %een esta%lis!ed, including w!en t!e C-MELECPs appreciation and evaluation of evidence %ecome so grossly unreasona%le as to turn into an error of 6urisdiction* Bn t!ese instances, t!e Court is compelled %y its %ounden constitutional duty to intervene and correct t!e C-MELECPs error* Khen 4-2.0.4Fs action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, the 4ourt is not only obliged, but has the constitutional duty to intervene" Petitioner !as alleged and s!own t!e C-MELEC3s use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding t!e issue of w!et!er petitioner made a material misrepresentation of !is residency &ualification in !is C-C as to order its cancellation* Dence, in resolving t!e issue of w!et!er t!e C-MELEC gravely a%used its discretion in ruling t!at petitioner !ad not sufficiently s!own t!at !e !ad resided in Lipa City for at least one year prior to t!e May

2'(' elections, we examine t!e evidence adduced %y t!e parties and t!e C-MELEC3s appreciation t!ereof* Iasically, t!e allegations of t!e Petitioner "a%ili are tantamount to allege t!at t!e C-MELEC, in denying !is C-C committed grave a%use of discretion* Eventually, t!e petitioner was a%le to prove t!at !e was a resident of Lipa and t!e "C granted !is petition* ,uling as to the evidence presented by the petitioner: Petitioner3s Coter Certification Registration and C-Cs in previous elections4 +!e C-MELEC correctly ruled t!at t!e Coter Certification issued %y t!e C-MELEC Election -fficer, 8tty* 8guila Kr*, was not conclusive proof t!at petitioner !ad %een a resident of Lipa City since 8pril 2''A* Bt noted t!at 8guila is not t!e competent pu%lic officer to certify t!e veracity of t!is claim particularly %ecause petitioner3s C-MELEC registration was approved only in -cto%er 2''?* 4ertificates regarding o#nership of real property: +!e various certificates and tax declaration adduced s!owed t!at t!e Lipa property was solely registered in t!e name of petitioner3s common-law wife* +!e C-MELEC reasoned t!at %eing a 0seasoned politician,1 !e s!ould !ave registered property in !is own name* "uc! action 0would !ave offered positive proof of intent to c!ange actual residence1 from "an Kuan Iatangas to Lipa City, considering t!at !e !ad previously declared !is ancestral !ome in "an Kuan Iatangas as !is domicile* 14: +roperty o#nership is not among the ?ualifications re?uired of candidates for local election * Rat!er, it is a candidate&s residence in a locality through actual residence in #hatever capacity" It is not re?uired that a candidate should have his o#n house in order to establish his residence or domicile in a place" It is enough that he should live in the locality, even in a rented house or that of a friend or relative" 5!at is of central concern t!en is t!at petitioner identified and esta%lis!ed a place in Lipa City w!ere !e intended to live in and return to for an indefinite period of time* 4ertifications regarding the family members of petitioner: Private respondent presented a Certification from /epEd, Lipa City indicating t!at t!e petitioner3s c!ildren do not appear on t!e list of graduates of Lipa City* 8 certification from t!e -ffice of t!e Election -fficer of Lipa City s!ows t!at t!e family mem%ers of petitioner do not appear in its list of voters* 14: The issue is the petitioner&s residence, and not the educational or voting record of his family" Iut even assuming t!at it was petitioner !imself #rat!er t!an !is c!ildren$ w!o attended educational institutions or w!o registered as voter in a place ot!er t!an Lipa City, (absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place #here one is elected does not constitute loss of residence"' "ection ((A of the -mnibus .lection 4ode provides that transfer of residence to any other place by reason of one&s occupation, profession, employment in private and public service, educational activities, etc" is not deemed a loss of residence * +!ere is not!ing wrong for individual c!anging residences so !e could run for an elective post, for as long as he is able to prove #ith reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of residence for election la# purposes for the period re?uired by la#" Bn sum, t!e petition is granted not only because petitioner sufficiently established his compliance #ith the one!year residency re?uirement for local elective officials under the la# * +!e court !as

also recognized t!at 0a%ove and %eyond all, t!e determination of t!e true will of t!e electorate s!ould %e paramount* Bt is t!eir voice, not ours or of anyone else, t!at must prevail* +!is, in essence, is t!e democracy we continue to !old sacred*

ARATEA V. COMELEC !$%

FA4T1:

SCRA 10#, OCTOBER 9, 2012" - LIM

Romeo Lonzanida and Estela 8ntipolo were candidates for Mayor of "an 8ntonio, Wam%ales in t!e May 2'(' Local and .ational Elections* Lonzanida filed !is certificate of candidacy* Dowever, /ra* "igrid Rodolfo filed a petition under "ection A@ of t!e -mni%us Election Code to disc&ualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel Lonzanida3s certificate of candidacy on t!e ground t!at Lonzanida was elected, and !ad served, as mayor of "an 8ntonio for consecutive terms immediately prior to t!e term for t!e May 2'(' elections and made false material representation in !is certificate of candidacy w!en !e filed certified under oat! t!at !e was elgi%ile for t!e office !e soug!t election* C-MELEC rendered a decision cancelling Lonzanida3s certificate of candidacy* Lonzanida filed a motion for reconsideration %efore t!e C-MELEC en %anc and remained pending during t!e May 2'(' elections* Lonzanida and Efren Racel 8ratea garnered t!e !ig!est votes and were respectively proclaimed Mayor and Cice-Mayor* 8ratea too7 !is oat! of office as 8cting Mayor and su%se&uently was allowed to ta7e an oat! of office permanent Mayor of "an 8ntonio, Wam%ales wit!out pre6udice to t!e outcome of t!e case pending %efore t!e C-MELEC* C-MELEC en %anc rendered a resolution dis&ualifying Lonzanida from running for Mayor in t!e May 2'(' elections* Antipolo filed a motion to claim her right to be proclaimed as 2ayor because 0on$anida ceased to be a candidate* Aratea asserted that Antipolo, as the candidate #ho received the second highest number of votes, could not be proclaimed as the #inning candidate * "ince Lonzanida3s dis&ualification was not yet final during election day, t!e votes cast in !is favor could not %e declared stray* Lonzanida3s su%se&uent dis&ualification resulted in a permanent vacancy in t!e -ffice of Mayor, and 8ratea, as t!e duly-elected Cice-Mayor, was mandated %y "ection (O of t!e Local Government Code to succeed as Mayor* I115.4 +!e manner of filling up t!e permanent vacancy in t!e -ffice of t!e Mayor of "an 8ntonio, Wam%ales is dependent upon t!e determination of Lonzanida3s removal* Khether 0on$anida #as dis?ualified under 1ection H< of the -mnibus .lection 4ode, or made a false material representation under 1ection =< of the same 4ode that resulted in his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio, is determinative of w!et!er 8ratea or 8ntipolo is t!e rig!tful occupant to t!e -ffice of t!e Mayor of "an 8ntonio, Wam%ales* H.0A4 5e !old t!at Antipolo, the alleged Osecond placer,O should be proclaimed 2ayor because 0on$anida&s certificate of candidacy #as void ab initio* Bn s!ort, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all* 8ll votes for Lonzanida were stray votes* +!us, 8ntipolo, t!e only &ualified candidate, actually garnered t!e !ig!est num%er of votes for t!e position of Mayor*

False 2aterial ,epresentation "ection A@ of t!e -mni%us Election Code states t!at a certificate of candidacy may be denied or cancelled #hen there is false material representation of the contents of the certificate of candidacy* +!e conviction of Lonzanida %y final 6udgment, wit! t!e penalty of prisiZn mayor, dis&ualifies !im perpetually from !olding any pu%lic office, or from %eing elected to any pu%lic office* +!is perpetual dis&ualification too7 effect upon t!e finality of t!e 6udgment of conviction, %efore Lonzanida filed !is certificate of candidacy* Three!term limit rule After being elected and serving for three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot see* immediate reelection for the same office in the ne7t regular election because he is ineligible* -ne w!o !as an ineligi%ility to run for elective pu%lic office is not Neligi%le for :t!e; office*N 8s used in "ection A , t!e word Neligi%leN means !aving t!e rig!t to run for elective pu%lic office, t!at is, !aving all t!e &ualifications and none of t!e ineligi%ilities to run for t!e pu%lic office* 4onclusion Bn a certificate of candidacy, t!e candidate is as7ed to certify under oat! !is eligi%ility, and t!us &ualification, to t!e office !e see7s election " .ven though the certificate of candidacy does not specifically as* the candidate for the number of terms elected and served in an elective position, such fact is material in determining a candidate&s eligibility, and thus ?ualification for the office * Election to and service of t!e same local elective position for t!ree consecutive terms renders a candidate ineligi%le from running for t!e same position in t!e succeeding elections* Lonzanida misrepresented !is eligi%ility %ecause !e 7new full well t!at !e !ad %een elected, and !ad served, as mayor of "an 8ntonio, Wam%ales for more t!an t!ree consecutive terms yet !e still certified t!at !e was eligi%le to run for mayor for t!e next succeeding term* +!us, Lonzanida3s representation t!at !e was eligi%le for t!e office t!at !e soug!t election constitutes false material representation as to !is &ualification or eligi%ility for t!e office* .ffect of a 6oid 4ertificate of 4andidacy +!e dis&ualification of Lonzanida is not simply anc!ored on one ground* -n t!e contrary, it was emp!asized in our En Ianc resolution t!at Lonzanida3s dis&ualification is two-pronged4 first, !e violated t!e constitutional fiat on t!e t!ree-term limit9 and second, as early as /ecem%er (, 2''?, !e is 7nown to !ave %een convicted %y final 6udgment for ten #('$ counts of Ealsification under 8rticle (A( of t!e Revised Penal Code* Bn ot!er words, on election day, respondent Lonzanida3s dis&ualification is notoriously 7nown in fact and in law* Ergo, since respondent Lonzanida was never a candidate for t!e position of Mayor :of; "an 8ntonio, Wam%ales, t!e votes cast for !im s!ould %e considered stray votes* Conse&uently, Bntervenor 8ntipolo, w!o remains as t!e sole &ualified candidate for t!e mayoralty post and o%tained t!e !ig!est num%er of votes, s!ould now %e proclaimed as t!e duly elected Mayor of "an 8ntonio, Wam%ales*