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Responses to Information Incongruency in Advertising: The Role of Expectancy, Relevancy, and Humor Author(s): YihHwaiLee and CharlotteMason Source: Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 26, No. 2 (September 1999), pp. 156-169 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/209557 . Accessed: 24/02/2014 06:41
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Responses to Information Incongruency in Advertising: The Role of Expectancy, Relevancy, and Humor
YIH HWAI LEE CHARLOTTE MASON*
Two studies examining the effects of expectancy, relevancy, and humor on attitude formation are presented. Following previous research, expectancy refers to the degree to which an item or a piece of information falls into some predetermined pattern or structure evoked by an ad. Relevancy refers to the degree to which an item or a piece of information contributes to the identication of the primary message communicated by the ad. Across two studies that examined immediate response, we found that information expectancy and relevancy interact to produce different levels of attitude favorability. Although ads with unexpected-relevant information elicited more favorable attitudes than did ads with expected-relevant information, ads with unexpected-irrelevant information yielded less favorable attitudes that did ads with expected-relevant information. Furthermore, humor and relevancy interact where a humorous execution was found to have a favorable effect in ads with unexpected-irrelevant information but not in ads with unexpected-relevant information. In addition, the second study further examined delayed responses in which the ndings revealed a different pattern. Particularly noteworthy is a sleeper effect for ads with unexpectedirrelevant information where attitudes for both the ad and the brand improved over time. We conclude with implications and suggestions for future research.

n any given day, the average American is exposed to about 300 ad messages. That is 9,900 a month, or 109,500 a year (McCarthy 1991). To rise above this clutter, advertisers try to create advertisements that are novel, humorous, or somehow attention getting to ad viewers. The theoretical underpinnings of this practice have been demonstrated in consumer research under the general term incongruency, or incongruity. For instance, past studies have looked at incongruity between verbal and picture information in print ads (Houston, Childers, and Heckler 1987), between picture information and an evoked ad theme

*Yih Hwai Lee is an assistant professor at the Department of Marketing, National University of Singapore. Charlotte Mason is an associate professor of marketing, Kenan-Flagler Business School, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The authors gratefully thank Kevin Keller for his guidance throughout the dissertation research on which this article is based. The rst author thanks Julie Edell, Michelle Hunt, and William Ware for their advice while serving on his dissertation committee. He also appreciates the helpful comments of Siew Meng Leong and the reviewers and editors. The research grant support to the rst author from the National University of Singapore is gratefully acknowledged. Please send all correspondence to Yih Hwai Lee, Department of Marketing, Faculty of Business Administration, National University of Singapore, 10 Kent Ridge Crescent, Singapore 119260, Republic of Singapore; e-mail: fbaleeyh@ nus.edu.sg; telephone: (65) 874-3168; fax: (65) 779-5941

(Heckler and Childers 1992), and between an ad and an evoked ad schema (Goodstein 1993). To further research on information incongruency, Heckler and Childers (1992) proposed a two-dimensional conceptualization of incongruency: expectancy and relevancy. Expectancy refers to the degree to which a piece of information falls into some predetermined pattern or structure evoked by an ad. Relevancy refers to the degree to which a piece of information contributes to the identication of the primary message communicated by the ad. Heckler and Childers (1992) found that recall differs between congruent and incongruent information. Unexpected information elicited better recall than expected information, and irrelevant information yielded inferior recall compared to relevant information. By examining recall and recognition measures, they demonstrated that the two dimensions are distinct. Although these two dimensions capture a wide gamut of incongruent information, both theoretical and anecdotal evidence suggest that humor may be another important executional factor that distinguishes between different types of information incongruency. Weinberger and Spotts (1989) suggest that as much as 24.4 percent of prime-time television advertising in the United States is intended to be humorous. In addition, Raskin (1985) and Alden, Hoyer, and Lee (1993) suggest that humor works by contrasting
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1999 by JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH, Inc. Vol. 26 September 1999 All rights reserved. 0093-5301/2000/2602-0005$03.00

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unexpected information with an existing schema structure. Thus, we extend Heckler and Childerss (1992) expectancyrelevancy classication to include information incongruency through humor. This extended classication is examined for its effects on attitude and memory for advertisements. Although much is known about the memory superiority of ads with incongruent information, their effect on consumer attitudes remains unexplored. Such study is warranted to address at least two important issues: Do different forms of incongruency affect attitude formation differently? And if so, do incongruent conditions that foster greater memory recall also have the same favorable effect on attitude formation? Alternatively, is there a trade-off involved between memory and persuasive effectiveness? Among the three dimensions of incongruency proposed here, much research has examined humors effect on attitudes. However, conicting ndings (see Weinberger and Gulas [1992] for a review) have led researchers to abandon the notion of whether or not humor enhances advertising effectiveness. Instead, the research agenda asks, when is humor effective? For instance, Chattopadhyay and Basu (1990) showed that the effectiveness of a humorous ad compared to its nonhumorous version depends on prior evaluation of the advertised brand. A humorous ad was more effective in changing attitudes and choice behavior when prior evaluation of the brand was favorable. The reverse was true with a negative prior attitude. In this research, examining humor together with expectancy and relevancy allows us to examine the effects of different types of humor to better understand the conditions under which humor affects attitudes. Accordingly, we investigate the effects of the expectancy, relevancy, and humor level of advertising information on both memory and evaluation measures. Although our ndings regarding evaluation measures are the primary contribution of this research, our results related to the memory measures strengthen previous ndings on the effects of information incongruency. To achieve these purposes, we conducted two studies. The rst examines the effects of information incongruency on attitude formation immediately after ad exposure. The second replicates the ndings of the rst study and those of Heckler and Childers (1992) and extends them by examining both attitude and memory effects after a signicant time delay from the initial ad exposure.

consider a courier service ad with a headline and ad copy touting fast delivery servicean ad with a theme of fast delivery. Expected picture information in the ad could be a eet of delivery trucks cruising at high speed. Unexpected picture information could be a eet of delivery trucks with bullet-shaped containers cruising at high speed. Both pictures are relevant, that is, contributing to the identication of the ad theme, because the pictures attempt to convey fast speed. However, they differ in their degree of novelty (or t with existing schema) in attempting to convey the fast delivery theme. In contrast, expected-irrelevant picture information could be a group of smiling delivery personsnothing extraordinary about the picture. Unexpected-irrelevant picture information could be an elephant hauling few packages. Both pictures are irrelevant because they do not help to identify the fast delivery theme. However, if the ad theme was service friendliness rather than fast delivery, a picture showing delivery trucks cruising at high speed would be irrelevant, and a picture with smiling delivery persons would be relevant. The important point is that the nature of (in)congruency of any ad information is determined by its relationship with the ad theme. Regarding humor and its relationship with incongruency, it should be noted that humor information can only be unexpected information (either relevant or irrelevant), while unexpected information can be either humorous or not. Although the use of humor in ads is a common executional approach, or even expected by media audiences, the specic information in humor is, by nature, unexpected. For example, although we expect to be amused by jokes when we go to a comedy club, the specic content of each joke is unexpectedthat is the basis of its entertainment value. Furthermore, Raskins (1985) theory of humor argues that jokes often produce a light-hearted response by including cognitive, structural contrasts between expected and unexpected situations. Similarly, Alden et al. (1993) suggest that humor is essentially some form of incongruent contrast. Thus, humorous information (at least on the rst exposure) is unexpected information (if the potential audience is to appreciate its humor). As a result, in addition to the four forms of (in)congruency from crossing expectancy and relevancy, two additional unexpected forms are introduced by considering humor. This yields four unexpected conditions: two with a humorous execution (relevant and irrelevant) and two without humor (relevant and irrelevant).

WHAT IS INCONGRUENCY? CONCEPTUAL DEFINITION AND DELINEATION

Heckler and Childers (1992) proposed that incongruent information can be classied into two dimensions expectancy and relevancy depending on its relationship with an ad theme. To illustrate the four conditions of (in)congruencies along the 2 (expected and unexpected) 2 (relevant and irrelevant) conceptualization in an advertising context,

STUDY 1: IMMEDIATE EFFECTS OF INCONGRUENCY ON ATTITUDE FORMATION Effects of Relevancy on Attitude Formation
Relevancy refers to whether an ad component contributes to the main message communication. Relevant components contain information useful to support the ad theme, while irrelevant ones do not. An exhaustive review of the literature by Muehling and McCann (1993) found that ad atti-

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tudes are higher when the ad contains useful information. Thus, we propose a main effect of relevancy as follows: H1: The presence of relevant (whether expected or unexpected) information, compared to irrelevant information, will lead to (a) more favorable ad evaluation, (b) more favorable thoughts about the ad, (c) more favorable brand evaluation, and (d) more favorable thoughts about the brand.

Effects of Expectancy on Attitude Formation

Berlyne (1960) theorized that when an individual is confronted with a novel object, the person will be more aroused; and the most effective means of reducing arousal is simply to explore the source of novelty. In addition, Berlyne (1971) argues for the pleasurable effects of incongruent stimuli. One such effect is what he termed arousal jag, where ambiguity of the stimulus initially causes tension, which is then resolved once the reader succeeds in understanding the message. Novelty is related to unexpectancy because, by nature, unexpected information is conveyed in a distinctive or unusual manner. As such, we argue that ads with unexpected information, relative to those with expected information, will elicit greater cognitive elaboration. Because the increased elaboration is primarily favorable, we posit that ad and brand responses will be more favorable in ads with unexpected information. H2: The presence of unexpected-relevant information, compared to expected-relevant information, will lead to (a) more favorable ad evaluation, (b) more favorable thoughts about the ad, (c) more favorable brand evaluation, and (d) more favorable thoughts about the brand. However, this evaluative advantage of unexpected information over expected information is dependent on the reader successfully resolving the incongruity. An assumption underlying the positive effects of an incongruent stimulus is that the reader must successfully decode the ad message. In other words, for unexpected information to generate favorable evaluative responses, the viewer must be able to make sense of the ad information after the increased elaboration. In this respect, one obstacle to successful decoding is when the unexpected information is also irrelevant in nature. For unexpected-relevant information, the cognitive elaboration may be rewarding in the form of tension reduction (Berlyne 1971) from understanding the cleverness of the incongruity with respect to the main ad message. However, unexpected-irrelevant information has no connection with the ad theme or the ad copy. When elaborated on, the process may lead to frustration rather than resolution from (1) failing to understand the connection between the piece of information with the rest of the ad, and as a consequence, (2) failing to reduce tension. We argue that this heightened futile elaboration produced by the unexpected-irrelevant information will generate unfavorable thoughts and evaluative responses relative to that

of ads with expected-relevant information. Hence, although ads with unexpected-relevant information should produce more favorable evaluative responses than ads with expected-relevant information, ads with unexpected-irrelevant information should produce less favorable responses than will ads with expected-relevant information. Comparing the unexpected-irrelevant and expected-irrelevant conditions, we expect unexpected-irrelevant information to elicit more negative thoughts about the ad and brand compared to expected-irrelevant information. The unexpected-irrelevant information condition represents the greatest incongruity compared to the other three conditions because the information possesses two distinct forms of incongruent characteristics (Heckler and Childers 1992). As such, we argue that cognitive elaboration of unexpectedirrelevant information will be more extensive than in the expected-irrelevant information, and thus, more unfavorable thoughts are likely. Since the amount and favorableness of cognitive elaboration determine the amount and direction of attitude change (Kiselius and Sternthal 1984, 1986), we propose the following: H3: The presence of unexpected-irrelevant information, compared to expected-irrelevant information, will lead to (a) less favorable ad evaluation, (b) more unfavorable thoughts about the ad, (c) less favorable brand evaluation, and (d) more unfavorable thoughts about the brand.

Effects of Humor on Attitude Formation

Humor has been shown to enhance liking for the ad (e.g., Belch and Belch 1984) and for the brand (e.g., Gelb and Pickett 1983). In addition, the inuence of humor through affective mechanisms such as transfer of liking for the ad to the brand has been demonstrated (e.g., Aaker, Stayman, and Hagerty 1986). Assuming exposure to humor tends to put people into a positive mood, research on mood provides additional evidence for the positive effects of humor on ad and brand evaluations. Batra and Stayman (1990) found positive moods indirectly affect attitudes through two cognitive processesa bias against the generation of negative thoughts and a reduction in total cognition elaboration. This suggests that the unexpected-irrelevant condition may benet more from humor because the predominant thoughts in this condition are unfavorable. Thus, we posit that humor may produce more favorable ad and brand evaluations. However, it is also likely that ads that elicit unfavorable ad and brand evaluations will benet more from the favorable effect of humor: H4: For ads containing unexpected-relevant information, the humor version, compared to the nonhumor version, will lead to (a) more favorable ad evaluation and (b) more favorable brand evaluation. H5: For ads containing unexpected-irrelevant information, the humor version, compared to the non-

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FIGURE 1 PICTORIAL SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES 1 6

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humor version, will lead to (a) more favorable ad evaluation and (b) more favorable brand evaluation. H6: The positive effect of humor on (a) ad and (b) brand evaluation is greater in ads with unexpected-irrelevant information than in ads with unexpected-relevant information. Figure 1 presents a pictorial summary of Hypotheses 1 6.

METHOD
Expectancy (two levels), relevancy (two levels), and humor (two levels) were operationalized as between-subjects variables. As discussed earlier, since humor information is by nature unexpected, a nested design was used. In other words, the expectedHUMOR-relevant and expectedHUMORirrelevant conditions were missing from the otherwise full 2 2 2 factorial design.

Stimulus Development
Black and white print ads representing the six conditions were developed. Two sets of ads were created to serve as a replication factor. Considering the subject pools product knowledge and familiarity, ads for personal computers and computer monitors were selected. Fictitious brand names were used to control for effects of prior brand attitude. Following the procedure in Heckler and Childers (1992), incongruency was manipulated through the picture component of print ads (see Heckler and Childers 1992, p. 478).

The verbal components for the ads were the same across treatments. Because the establishment of an ad theme to serve as a point of contrast is central to our hypotheses, we used a headline in our ads to cue the ad theme or primary message benet. The headlines were determined by importance to the appropriate product category. For the computer ads, Unleash the Power was chosen to convey fast computing power. For the computer monitor ads, Image Sharpness Your Eyes Will Appreciate was used to set up a pictureclarity ad theme. The rest of the ad copy (verbal component) of each product ad was written to support the respective ad themes. As an example, for the computer ads, the expectedrelevant version showed a picture of a computer with lightning serving as a background, while the expected-irrelevant version simply showed a computer. For unexpected-nonhumor pictures, a computer in fast motion was used for the relevant version, while the irrelevant version showed a computer with its screen smashed by a hammer. Finally, a computer that looks like a race-car engine served as the unexpected-relevant-humor picture, while a computer with ying pigs in the background provided the picture for the unexpected-irrelevant-humor condition.

Pretest
The picture for each of the six conditions was designed and pretested to represent the appropriate thematic relationship.1 Ninety subjects were randomly assigned to the six
1

With a separate 120 subject sample, we assessed liking for the picture

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conditions. Each subject saw two ads (one for each product), yielding cell sizes of 15. Following carefully worded instructions and explanations about the three dimensions tested in this study, subjects rated their agreement with the following statements using six-point scales: 1. The degree to which you expected the advertisement to use the particular picture to convey its main message (1 expected, 6 unexpected; to test the level of expectancy). 2. The degree to which you think the picture used in the ad conveys the main message that the ad is trying to convey (1 not at all, 6 very much; to test the level of relevancy). 3. The degree to which you think the picture in the advertisement is humorous (1 not humorous, 6 humorous; to test the level of humor). Analysis of variance showed main effects for expectancy, relevancy, and humor to be signicant for both sets of ads. For the computer ads, the unexpected conditions were rated more unexpected than the expected conditions (X 4.4 vs. X 2.9, F(1, 84) 31.68, p .001). The relevant conditions were rated more relevant than the irrelevant conditions (X 4.11 vs. X 2.91, F(1, 84) 18.8, p .001), and humor ratings were higher in the humor than in the nonhumor conditions (X 3.97 vs. X 2.37, F(1, 84) 43.1, p .001). Similarly, for the monitor ads, the unexpected conditions were rated more unexpected than the expected conditions (X 4.18 vs. X 2.77, F(1, 84) 33.85, p .001). The relevant conditions were rated more relevant than the irrelevant conditions (X 4.51 vs. X 3.0, F(1, 84) 24.03, p .001), and humor ratings were higher in the humor than the nonhumor conditions (X 3.8 vs. X 2.02, F(1, 84) 39.8, p .001).2 Dependent Measures. Following Wright (1980), subjects cognitive responses were measured immediately after the ad exposure. Next, ad and brand attitudes were colcomponents to address the alternative hypothesis that picture likability may drive our results. The ANOVA tests showed no signicant differences in picture liking among the six treatment cells ( ps .1) except for the main effects of humor in both sets of ads. The signicant main humor effect is not surprising given that several studies have shown that humor information is better liked than nonhumor information (Belch and Belch 1984; Gelb and Pickett 1983). The absence of signicant interaction effects found in studies 1 and 2 suggest that it is information incongruity and not the liking for the pictures per se that affected attitude formation. In addition, the signicant main effect of humor on picture liking suggests that both the unexpectedHUMOR-relevant and unexpectedHUMOR-irrelevant pictures were better liked than the other nonhumor pictures. In contrast, ndings from studies 1 and 2 suggest that attitudes toward the ad and brand for ads with unexpectedHUMOR-irrelevant pictures were not signicantly more favorable than in the other nonhumor conditions. 2 Although the analyses conrm the appropriateness of the picture manipulation, it should be noted that the mean humor ratings for the humor conditions in both sets of ads range around the mid-scale point. As such, the level of humor in the humor conditions is modest at best. Although we certainly would like the picture in the humor conditions to be more humorous, we were limited by the need to keep the pictorial information in each condition as equal as we possibly could.

lected. This was followed by manipulation checks, which contained similar statements to that of the pretest. The same sequence was repeated for the second ad exposure. Cognitive Responses. Cognitive responses were obtained following standard procedures in which subjects were asked to write down their thoughts about the ad and brand. Two independent judges coded the responses into ve categories depending on whether the thought was directed toward the brand (favorable and unfavorable), or the ad (favorable and unfavorable). Thoughts not specic to either the ad or brand were aggregated under other thoughts. Evaluations. Subjects were asked to indicate their extent of agreement with attitudinal statements using sevenpoint scales. To evaluate attitude toward the ad (Aad), the statements were as follows: I dislike the ad; the ad is appealing to me; the ad is attractive to me; the ad is interesting to me; and I think the ad is bad. To evaluate attitude toward the brand (Ab), the statements were as follows: the brand in the ad is likely to possess the stated ad claims; I react favorably to the brand; I feel positive toward the brand; I dislike the brand.

Experimental Procedure
Subjects were 120 undergraduates, randomly assigned to each treatment condition. They were told that they were participating in an advertising-related study, the cover story was that managers and advertising agencies were interested in consumer input early in the ad-design process for a new product. Subjects were told that the ads would be in draft as opposed to nal publishable form. Each subject received a booklet containing the two stimulus ads, the dependent measures as well as the manipulation checks. The presentation order of the two ads was counterbalanced. No time limit was given and subjects completed the questionnaire at their own pace.

RESULTS
Cronbachs alphas for inter-item reliability for the veitem Aad index and four-item Ab were .91 and .92, respectively. Consequently, the average scores for the two indices were used for subsequent analysis. The two coders who were blind to the treatments coded thoughts into the ve categories (r .93). Disagreements were resolved by discussion among the coders and researchers, and a single score was entered for further analysis. Table 1 reports the means and standard deviations of all the dependent measures.

Manipulation Checks
Tests for manipulation checks used the same analysis reported for the stimulus pretests. The results showed that main effects for ad expectancy, ad relevancy, and ad humor

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TABLE 1 MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR STUDY 1

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Cognitive responses Attitudes Treatment cells Expected-relevant Expected-irrelevant UnexpectedHUMOR-relevant UnexpectedNONHUMOR-relevant UnexpectedHUMOR-irrelevant UnexpectedNONHUMOR-irrelevant Aad 4.17 (.99) 3.29 (1.00) 4.88 (.96) 4.74 (.99) 3.78 (.94) 2.54 (.92) Ab 3.95 (.93) 3.33 (.96) 4.28 (.92) 4.21 (1.03) 3.46 (1.10) 2.53 (.88) Positive ad thoughts .23 (.48) .15 (.48) .68 (.83) .45 (.71) .28 (.51) .00 (.00) Negative ad thoughts .20 (.41) .58 (.60) .23 (.43) .24 (.48) .30 (.56) 1.00 (.74) Positive brand thoughts .23 (.43) .05 (.22) .30 (.47) .38 (.58) .08 (.27) .03 (.16) Negative brand thoughts .08 (.27) .33 (.53) .10 (.30) .07 (.26) .20 (.41) .39 (.59) Others thoughts 1.00 (.85) 1.00 (1.20) 1.25 (.95) 1.52 (1.19) .90 (1.19) 1.73 (1.67)

NOTE.The reported means are the means averaged across the two ads; numbers in parentheses represent standard deviations.

were all statistically signicant (p-values .05) for both computer and monitor pictures.3

Hypotheses Testing
In this study, the between-subjects factors were expectancy, relevancy, humor, and the order of ad presentation (nonsignicant and dropped from further analysis). The two ad exposures were treated as a within-subject repeated measure. For each dependent variable, ANOVAs and planned comparisons similar to the procedure outlined in Levine (1991, chap. 4) were performed. In addition, Hypotheses 13 were tested by comparing the nonhumor conditions, while Hypotheses 4 and 5 were examined by comparing humor and nonhumor versions of ads with relevant and irrelevant information, respectively. We present the results for Aad, Ab, and cognitive responses in that order. Results for Attitude toward the Ad and Brand. As predicted, main effects of relevancy were signicant for both Aad and Ab, supporting Hypothesis 1a and 1c, respectively (relevant 4.6, and irrelevant 3.22, F(1, 114) 84.44, p .001 for Aad; relevant 4.15, and irrelevant 3.12, F(1, 114) 48.69, p .001 for Ab). However, these main effects were qualied by the interactions between expectancy and relevancy. As posited in Hypothesis 2a, unexpected-relevant information produced higher Aad than did expected-relevant information (Aad 4.74 vs. 4.17, F(1, 114) 6.67, p .05). However, Ab was similar between the two conditions (Ab 4.21 vs. 3.95, F(1, 114) 1.35, p .1), contrary to Hypothesis 2c. The unexpectedNONHUMOR-irrelevant condition in turn generated less favorable Aad and Ab than did the expected-irrelevant condition, supporting Hy3 For the computer ads, the ANOVA results were signicant for expectancy (unexpected 4.26, expected 2.78, F(1, 114) 30.03, p .001), relevancy (relevant 3.86, irrelevant 2.41, F(1, 114) 46.98, p .001), and humor (humor 3.75, nonhumor 1.66, F(1, 114) 73.81, p .001). For the monitor ads, the ANOVA results were signicant for expectancy (unexpected 4.31, expected 2.58, F(1, 114) 57.33, p .001), relevancy (relevant 4.13, irrelevant 2.75, F(1, 114) 52.89, p .001), and humor (humor 3.43, nonhumor 1.89, F(1, 114) 33.55, p .001).

pothesis 3a and 3c, respectively (Aad 2.54 vs. 3.29, F(1, 114) 10.66, p .01; Ab 2.53 vs. 3.33, F(1, 114) 12.7, p .01). The results for humor revealed that the humor version of unexpected-irrelevant information had more favorable Aad and Ab than its nonhumor counterpart, supporting both Hypothesis 5a and 5b (Aad 3.78 vs. 2.54, F(1, 114) 29.36, p .01; Ab 3.46 vs. 2.53, F(1, 114) 17.5, p .01). However, contrary to Hypothesis 4a and 4b, Aad and Ab were not signicantly different between humor and nonhumor versions of unexpected-relevant information (Aad 4.88 vs. 4.74, F(1, 114) .38, p .5; Ab 4.28 vs. 4.21, F(1, 114) .09, p .5). Hypothesis 6a and 6b posited that the positive effect of humor on Aad and Ab is greater in ads with irrelevant information than in ads with relevant information. The interaction between relevancy and humor supported Hypothesis 6a for Aad (F(1, 114) 11.89, p .01) and Hypothesis 6b for Ab (F(1, 114) 7.73, p .01). The nature of the signicant interaction for Aad (Ab) is given by the combined results for Hypotheses 4a (4b) and 5a (4b) reported earlier. Specically, humor effect was signicant in the irrelevant but not in the relevant conditions. Results for Cognitive Responses. As predicted in Hypothesis 1b and 1d, more favorable ad and brand thoughts were produced under relevant than irrelevant conditions (ad .45 vs. .14, F(1, 114) 8.83, p .01; brand .30 vs. .05, F(1, 114) 17.81, p .001). Contrary to Hypothesis 2b and 2d, no differences in favorable ad and brand thoughts were found between unexpectedNONHUMOR-relevant and expected-relevant information (ad .45 vs. .23, F(1, 114) 2.79, p .1 ; brand .38 vs. .23, F(1, 114) 3.08, p .1). The results also show signicantly more unfavorable ad thoughts were elicited from unexpectedNONHUMOR-irrelevant information than from expected-irrelevant information, supporting Hypothesis 3b (ad 1.00 vs. .58, F(1, 114) 7.27, p .01). In contrast, the difference in negative brand thoughts produced between unexpectedNONHUMORirrelevant and expected-irrelevant information posited in

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Hypothesis 3d was not signicant (brand .39 vs. .33, F(1, 114) .44, p .5). Additional Analyses. While humor increased Aad and Ab in the irrelevant condition, it had no augmenting effect in the relevant condition. To get a better understanding for these ndings, we analyzed the cognitive response data to examine the effects of humor on the composition of each category of thought. Comparing the humor and nonhumor versions of unexpected-relevant and unexpected-irrelevant information, the results revealed that humor did not affect the amount of positive ad and brand thoughts for either the relevant or irrelevant conditions. In contrast, humor significantly reduced the amount of negative ad and brand thoughts under the irrelevant condition, suggesting that humor works through minimizing negative thought generation.4

cluded in study 2. First, to ensure comparability of our incongruency manipulations with those of Heckler and Childers (1992), recall measures were taken in addition to evaluative responses. To the extent that we can replicate the pattern of recall ndings from Heckler and Childers (1992), greater condence can be placed in our successful manipulation of theme-based incongruency. Second, an ease of understanding manipulation check used in Heckler and Childers (1992) was added in study 2.

Conicting Findings
We hypothesized that both Aad and Ab would be similarly affected by the different incongruent conditions. The ndings between Aad and Ab were largely consistent but with one exception. The unexpectedNONHUMOR-relevant condition produced more favorable Aad but not Ab over the expected-relevant condition. We defer possible explanations until the general discussion section. The hypotheses regarding cognitive responses received mixed support. One possible explanation may be in the cognitive response measures obtained. Although collecting only the volume of cognitive responses from subjects has been the most popular approach (e.g., Brucks, Armstrong, and Goldberg 1988), this does not capture the weight of the generated thoughts. For instance, a thought like this is stupid is more unfavorable than I dont understand the ad. Thus, we obtained weighted responses from subjects for each of their written thoughts in study 2.

DISCUSSION (STUDY 1)
The results from study 1 support the basic notion that expectancy, relevancy, and humor affect attitudinal response differently. Although incongruity in the form of unexpectancy tends to elicit favorable attitudinal responses, this effect depends on the relevance of the incongruent information. Both expected-irrelevant and unexpectedNONHUMOR-irrelevant information produced less favorable ad and brand responses than did the relevant conditions. However, our ndings suggest that introducing humor into irrelevant information signicantly lessens the negative effects of irrelevancy on evaluations. Contrary to our expectations, the positive effects of humor were found to be signicant only in the unexpectedHUMOR-irrelevant condition. One possible reason why humor did not work under the relevant condition is given by our nding that humor reduced negative thought generation but did not increase positive thought generation. Since thoughts generated under the relevant condition are predominantly favorable, the humor effect may be limited. Although the results of study 1 provide general support for our hypotheses, several issues warrant further investigation. We conducted study 2 to address the following points.

Extensions
The ndings from study 1 and Heckler and Childers (1992) suggest that information incongruency tends to affect memory and attitude measures of advertising effectiveness differently. Particularly noteworthy is that while unexpected-irrelevant information was found to be memorable, ads with such information tend to be unfavorably evaluated. Considering this, one interesting extension of study 1 is to examine the effects of information incongruency on recall and evaluative responses after a signicant delay from the initial ad exposure. In doing so, the interplay of memory and attitude effects can be further examined, providing a richer understanding of incongruency on advertising effectiveness. Specically, will the pattern of hypotheses shown in Figure 1 be different after a delay? And if so, in what ways does memory affect attitude under the different conditions of incongruency? Accordingly, study 2 was set up to achieve three purposes: (1) to replicate the recall results of Heckler and Childers (1992)the immediate recall following ad exposure; (2) to replicate the results of study 1the immediate evaluative responses following ad exposure; and (3) more important, to extend (1) and (2) by measuring recall and evaluations after a signicant time delay.

Conceptual Manipulation
To provide stronger evidence for our conceptual manipulations, several additional measures and checks were in4 For positive ad and brand thoughts, no signicant differences were found between the unexpectedHUMOR-relevant and unexpectedNONHUMORrelevant conditions (ad .68 vs. .45, F(1, 114) 2.68; p .1 ; brand .30 vs. .38, F(1, 114) .83, p .1), and between the unexpectedHUMORirrelevant and unexpectedNONHUMOR-irrelevant conditions (ad .28 vs. .00, F(1, 114) 3.88, p .05; brand .08 vs. .03, F(1, 114) .29, p .5). For negative ad and brand thoughts, signicant differences were found between the unexpectedHUMOR-irrelevant and unexpectedNONHUMOR-irrelevant conditions (ad .30 vs. 1.00, F(1, 114) 19.73, p .01; brand .20 vs. .39, F(1, 114) 3.45, p .06). In contrast, the unexpectedHUMOR-relevant and unexpectedNONHUMOR-relevant conditions produced similar numbers of negative ad thoughts (ad .23 vs. .24, F(1, 114) .01, p .5) and negative brand thoughts (brand .10 vs. .07, F(1, 114) .08, p .5).

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STUDY 2: DELAYED EFFECTS OF INFORMATION INCONGRUENCY Effects of Unexpectancy (Relevant) on Delayed Attitude Formation
Memory issues enter when dealing with delayed ad responses. Hutchinson and Moore (1984) proposed that the amount of elaborative processing toward ad information affects the strength of the respective memory trace and, consequently, its retrievability. Thus, conditions where ads receive more elaborative effort may develop stronger memory traces and a more enduring effect on evaluations. In other words, effects on evaluations may be relatively more enduring under unexpected than expected conditions. Under the expected conditions, memory for the advertisement should be minimal after a delay. As such, there should be few ad and brand cognitions available for attitudinal evaluations. In contrast, unexpected-relevant information is more memorable than expected information (Heckler and Childers 1992). Hence, the immediate evaluative advantage of such information found in study 1 may also hold after a delay. If the unexpected-relevant information is retrievable after a delay, it is likely that the information would serve as input for delayed evaluation. Thus, comparing across incongruency conditions, we suggest the following: H7: At a delay, the signicant ad and brand attitude differences found between the expected-relevant and expected-irrelevant conditions should dissipate. H8: At a delay, the signicant ad and brand attitude differences found between the unexpected-relevant and expected-relevant conditions should remain.

Effects of Unexpectancy (Irrelevant) on Delayed Attitude Formation

Although unexpected-irrelevant information elicits high recall, it produces unfavorable attitude evaluations. A straightforward proposition would be that ads with such information will be unfavorably evaluated at a delay as well. However, the familiarity effect suggests that persuasive messages that fail to produce immediate favorable responses may be effective after a delay. Familiarity Effects. The unconscious inuence of familiarity has been used to account for the mere exposure, sleeper, and truth effects (Begg, Anas, and Farinacci 1992; Jacoby et al. 1989). Using a similar concept of brand familiarity, Moore and Hutchinson (1983, 1985) advanced a sleeper-like hypothesis regarding the effects of affectively extreme ads on immediate and delayed brand attitude. They refer to affectively extreme ads as ads that produce very favorable or very unfavorable attitudes. They posit that while negative valenced ads would produce unfavorable brand attitudes in immediate measures compared to neutral or positive valenced ads, the unfavorable dispositions would improve after a signicant delay. Central to this formulation is the notion that affectively extreme ads create higher brand awareness and that brand attitude is increasingly a function of brand awareness visa ` -vis other attitudinal reactions over time. The empirical evidence from Moore and Hutchinson (1983, 1985) supports this J-shaped curve where brand attitude change is a function of ad affect. However, they qualied their ndings by limitations in the experimental designs. One notable weakness is that affective reactions to the ad stimuli (positive, negative, or neutral) were measured post hoc and not explicitly manipulated. There are several factors that argue for and against the likelihood that ads with unexpectedNONHUMOR-irrelevant information would be amenable to the sleeper hypothesis suggested by Moore and Hutchinson (1983, 1985). As the ndings from study 1 suggest, unexpectedNONHUMOR-irrelevant information tends to produce an unfavorable Ab (as well as Aad) immediately after ad exposure. In addition, Heckler and Childers (1992) demonstrated that such information can be memorable. Thus, the likelihood that such ads may enhance brand awareness, or the feeling that one has seen or heard of a brand before (Moore and Hutchinson 1985, p. 69), is probable. Both the memory and attitudinal effects of ads with unexpectedNONHUMOR-irrelevant information tend to suggest that such ads may exhibit a J-shaped effect for brand attitude. In addition, there is no reason for the theorized premises underlying this familiarity-based sleeper effect to be localized only to brand attitude. We argue that ad attitude may be subjected to such inuences as well. Just as the feeling that one has seen or heard of a brand before may elicit a familiarity effect, so may the feeling that one has seen or heard of an ad. In light of our experimental design, and the limitations as stated by Moore and Hutchinson

Effects of Humor on Delayed Attitude Formation

Study 1 found that humor produces a signicant increase in Aad and Ab under the unexpected-irrelevant condition. However, several studies suggest that humor effects are likely to dissipate after a delay. Chattopadhyay and Nedungadi (1992) found that immediately after ad exposure, humorous ads elicit more favorable ad and brand attitudes than nonhumorous ads. However, at a delay, both forms of ads produce similar ad and brand attitudes. In addition, assuming humor puts people into a positive mood, mood studies have shown that the effects of any given mood dissipate over time (Schellenberg and Blevins 1973). Based on the above discussion, we suggest the following: H9: At a delay, ads with humor information should produce similar levels of ad and brand attitudes as do ads with nonhumor information.

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(1985) about their studies, this research presents an opportunity for manipulating, instead of measuring post hoc, attitude extremity to test the familiarity effect on both ad and brand attitude formation. However, an embedded premise in the J-shaped effect is that such a phenomenon may be unlikely when specic details responsible for the unfavorable evaluations from the prior exposure are retrievable from memory. When the information eliciting the incongruity are retrievable after a delay, the unfavorable incongruency effect would potentially mitigate any brand familiarity effects that may be operating. In addition, since the familiarity effect is postulated to work for negatively valenced ads, based on the Aad and Ab results from study 1, we test this hypothesis under the unexpectedNONHUMOR-irrelevant condition. Thus, we propose the following: H10a: For ads with unexpectedNONHUMOR-irrelevant information, ad and brand attitude would be signicantly more favorable at a delay compared to immediately after ad exposure. H10b: However, this effect may be moderated by the retrievability of ad specic information.

Childers (1992) measuring the degree of understandability. The premise is that the higher the incongruity of the information, the less understandable it is.

Experimental Procedure
Two hundred and forty undergraduates participated in the study, making a cell size of 20 for each of the 12 conditions. The cover story was similar to that of study 1. Both sessions were experimenter-paced. In the rst session, subjects were exposed to four print ads (two target and two ller ads). The rst and third exposures were always the target ads and were counterbalanced. Subjects in the immediate condition responded to questions regarding their Aad and Ab after each ad exposure, while subjects in the delayed condition responded to ller questions. Following the four ad exposures, subjects in the delayed condition were thanked and dismissed. For the immediate condition, a four-minute ller task was administered to clear short-term memory. This was followed by the recall task, the cognitive response measures, and the manipulation check measures, in that order. Manipulation checks in the rst session were included only in the immediate condition, not in the delayed condition to prevent the possibility that responding to the manipulation check measures in the rst session would affect subjects responses in the second. In the second session (three days after the rst session), subjects in the delayed condition were asked about their evaluation, recall, and cognitive responses in that order.

METHOD
Expectancy (two levels), relevancy (two levels), humor (two levels), and time of response (two levels) were operationalized as between-subjects variables, while the two sets of ads served as a within-subjects replication factor. Four sets of ads were used in Heckler and Childers (1992) to assess recall effects. In attempting to replicate their recall results, we try to match their experimental design closely. In response, we added two ller ads, making a total of four ad exposures, to assess recall of the two target ads.

Coding Procedure
For picture recall, our goal is to examine the memorability of information representing different forms of themebased incongruencies. In response, each correct mention of the picture exemplifying the relationships dened by the different treatments and the targeted ad theme was scored as a hit.5 Two coders independently coded the picture recall (91 percent agreement) as to whether it was successful or unsuccessful. For the cognitive responses, the favorability of each written thought was determined using subjects own ratings. Two independent coders further coded the weighted thoughts (94 percent agreement) depending on whether they were directed toward the ad or toward the brand or as other thoughts. Disagreements were resolved among the coders and the researchers, and a single score was entered for the analysis.
5 We adopted this strict coding scheme to increase the sensitivity of the recall results. Since pictures in all six conditions include a computer in one form or another, the mentioning of a computer alone may not represent the effects of congruity or incongruity evoked by the pictures, but may simply represent a minimal memory trace for the general product class. Coding the pictures representing the different congruent and incongruent conditions plus the ad theme that provided the necessary contrast to evoke the different form of incongruency as a successful recall would help to minimize the effects of other extraneous inuences on the coded recall.

Dependent Variables
Cognitive Responses. To better assess the extremity of each response, we asked the subjects to rate each of their thoughts on three-point scales. For favorable thoughts, they rated 3 for very favorable, 2 for moderately favorable, and 1 for slightly favorable; for unfavorable thoughts, they rated 3 for very unfavorable, 2 for moderately unfavorable, and 1 for slightly unfavorable. They rated neutral thoughts zero. This procedure is similar to those reported in Calder, Insko, and Yandell (1974). Attitude Evaluations and Recall. The Aad and Ab questions were similar to those used in study 1. For recall, subjects were asked to recall all that they could about the ads with a recall sheet that was separated into columns. They were instructed to use a separate column for each ad and to complete the protocol in whatever order they wished. For the picture recall, subjects were told they could either draw or provide verbal descriptions of them. Manipulation Checks. In addition to those used in study 1, we included an additional item used by Heckler and

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TABLE 2 MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR STUDY 2

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Cognitive responses Attitudes Treatment cells Immediate: Expected-relevant Expected-irrelevant UnexpectedHUMOR-relevant UnexpectedNONHUMOR-relevant UnexpectedHUMOR-irrelevant UnexpectedNONHUMOR-irrelevant Delay: Expected-relevant Expected-irrelevant UnexpectedHUMOR-relevant UnexpectedNONHUMOR-relevant UnexpectedHUMOR-irrelevant UnexpectedNONHUMOR-irrelevant Aad 3.74 (.82) 3.20 (.82) 4.37 (1.00) 4.54 (.77) 3.75 (1.09) 2.66 (.83) 3.34 (.48) 3.29 (.45) 3.74 (.64) 3.83 (.60) 3.09 (.81) 3.21 (.75) Ab 3.72 (.86) 3.11 (.74) 3.98 (.77) 4.11 (.85) 3.74 (.84) 2.59 (.89) 3.21 (.43) 3.23 (.45) 3.45 (.61) 3.64 (.64) 2.96 (.79) 3.18 (.76) Recall Positive ad thoughts Negative ad thoughts Positive brand thoughts Negative brand thoughts

Others thoughts

.70 (.73) .30 (.47) .85 (.93) .80 (.89) 1.00 (.79) 1.10 (.91) .10 (.31) .05 (.22) .55 (.76) .60 (.75) .65 (.75) .55 (.83)

.45 (.81) .15 (.53) 1.05 (1.15) 1.10 (1.35) .45 (1.26) .10 (.44) .58 (.96) .23 (.62) 1.15 (1.31) 1.20 (1.42) .43 (.78) .38 (.84)

.30 (.61) .85 (1.03) .40 (.96) .23 (.58) .65 (1.05) 1.43 (1.32) .20 (.65) 1.00 (1.38) .40 (.93) .30 (.69) .98 (1.46) 1.08 (1.51)

.35 (.62) .20 (.52) .70 (.85) .80 (1.04) .25 (.63) .10 (.30) .38 (.81) .15 (.43) .65 (1.03) .53 (.85) .18 (.45) .18 (.45)

.18 (.50) .73 (1.13) .43 (.78) .20 (.56) .38 (.90) 1.48 (1.84) .13 (.40) .45 (.99) .28 (.64) .28 (.55) .78 (1.19) .85 (1.41)

.35 (.48) .25 (.54) .23 (.48) .23 (.42) .25 (.54) .20 (.41) .50 (.60) .23 (.42) .35 (.58) .38 (.54) .28 (.45) .33 (.53)

NOTE.The reported means are the means averaged across the two ads; numbers in parentheses represent standard deviations.

RESULTS Manipulation Checks

Main effects for ad expectancy, ad relevancy, and ad humor were all statistically signicant ( p-values .05) for both computer and monitor picture components.6 For the ease of understanding measure, we followed Heckler and Childers (1992) and summed the means across the two ads and performed ANOVA on the aggregated means. The results revealed a signicant main expectancy effect (F(1, 114) 14.90, p .001) and interaction effect between expectancy and relevancy (F(1, 114) 4.70, p .05). Ads containing the unexpected-irrelevant pictures were rated most difcult to understand (X 8.95), followed by those in the unexpected-relevant, expected-relevant, and expected-irrelevant conditions, in descending order (X 7.20, 6.85, and 6.75, respectively). These results are generally consistent with Heckler and Childers (1992), suggesting that differential cognitive effort was required to process the ads representing the different treatment conditions.7
6 For the computer ads, the ANOVA results were signicant for expectancy (unexpected 4.1 vs. expected 2.85, F(1, 114) 20.84, p .001), relevancy (relevant 3.78 vs. irrelevant 2.75, F(1, 114) 15.82, p .001), and humor (humor 3.48 vs. nonhumor 1.89, F(1, 114) 31.78, p .001). For the monitor ads, the ANOVA results were signicant for expectancy (unexpected 4.14 vs. expected 2.93, F(1, 114) 21.12, p .001), relevancy (relevant 3.77 vs. irrelevant 2.83, F(1, 114) 13.12, p .001), and humor (humor 3.58 vs. nonhumor 2.26, F(1, 114) 18.31, p .001). 7 Two particular contrast tests for this manipulation check are noteworthy. The means were signicantly different between relevant and irrelevant versions of unexpected information (X 8.95 vs. X 7.20, F(1, 114) 9.93, p .01), but not for relevant and irrelevant versions of expected information (X 6.85 vs. X 6.75, F(1, 114) .03, p .5). This

Hypotheses Testing
Similar to study 1, the order of ad presentation was nonsignicant and dropped from further analysis. The ANOVAs and planned comparisons were performed to address the hypotheses of both studies. For recall, we followed the analysis procedure reported in Heckler and Childers (1992) by summing recall across the two ads. Results pertaining to picture recall, Aad, Ab, and cognitive responses are presented in that order. Table 2 reports the means and standard deviations of all the dependent measures.8 Results for Picture Recall. The ANOVA revealed a main effect for expectancy (F(1, 228) 22.50, p .001) and time of response (F(1, 228) 14.97, p .001). Planned comparisons to address the hypotheses tested in Heckler and Childers (1992) revealed that, under immediate response, expected-relevant pictures were marginally better recalled than expected-irrelevant pictures (X .70 vs. X
demonstrates that the effect of irrelevancy on processing load is signicant only when the information does not t well with existing schema structure. We thank a reviewer for this comment. 8 We also collected brand familiarity measures (only under the delayed conditions) to assess memory effects. Subjects were asked to rate How familiar are you with each of these brands? on a six-point scale anchored by not familiar at all and very familiar for a list of 10 brand names (four stimuli brands and six distracter brands). The ndings revealed a signicant main expectancy effect (F(1, 228) 20.61, p .001), suggesting that brand familiarity was higher in the unexpected conditions (X 2.73) than in the expected conditions (X 1.89). In addition, regression analysis revealed that subjects who were more familiar with the brand evaluated Aad and Ab more favorably. Other main effects of relevancy and humor as well as all interaction effects were insignicant (for humor, X 2.71 for humor and X 2.31 for nonhumor; for relevancy, X 2.45 for relevant and X 2.44 for irrelevant).

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.30, F(1, 228) 2.99, p .08), and unexpectedNONHUpictures were better recalled than expectedirrelevant pictures (X 1.10 vs. X .30, F(1, 228) 11.97, p .001). Similar to their ndings, unexpectedNONHUMOR-relevant pictures were not better recalled than expected-relevant pictures (X .80 vs. X .70, F(1, 228) .25, p .5 ). These results are generally consistent with those of Heckler and Childers (1992).9 We performed further tests that were not addressed in Heckler and Childers (1992). Memory for the humor versions of unexpected-relevant and unexpected-irrelevant pictures was similar to their nonhumor counterparts. UnexpectedHUMOR-relevant pictures were not better recalled than expected-relevant pictures (X .85 vs. X .70, F(1, 228) .42, p .5), while picture recall in the unexpectedHUMOR-irrelevant condition was higher than in the expectedirrelevant condition (X 1.00 vs. X .30, F(1, 228) 9.16, p .01). Under delayed responses, picture recall in the unexpectedNONHUMOR-relevant condition was better than in the expected-relevant condition (X .60 vs. X .10, F(1, 228) 4.67, p .05), and there was no difference in picture recall between the expected-relevant and expected-irrelevant conditions (X .10 vs. X .05, F(1, 228) .05, p .5). However, the relatively high memorability of unexpected-irrelevant information remained: the unexpectedNONHUMOR-irrelevant picture was signicantly better recalled than expected-relevant (X .55 vs. X .10, F(1, 228) 3.79, p .05) and expected-irrelevant pictures (X .55 vs. X .05, F(1, 228) 4.67, p .05).
MOR-irrelevant

Results for Attitude toward the Ad and Brand. Results for immediate Aad and Ab responses were similar to those of study 1. Main relevancy effects were signicant for both Aad and Ab (relevant 3.92, and irrelevant 3.2, F(1, 228) 56.45, p .001 for Aad; relevant 3.68, and irrelevant 3.13, F(1, 228) 37.47, p .01 for Ab). Again, these main effects were qualied by expectancy-relevancy interactions. In the relevant condition, both Aad and Ab in the unexpectedNONHUMOR-relevant condition were signicantly more favorable than in the expected-relevant condition (Aad 4.54 vs. 3.74, F(1, 228) 17.58, p .001; Ab 4.11 vs. 3.72, F(1, 228) 4.45, p .05). In the irrelevant condition, the unexpectedNONHUMOR-irrelevant condition produced signicantly less favorable Aad and Ab than did the expected-irrelevant condition (Aad 2.66 vs. 3.20, F(1, 228) 8.01, p .01; Ab 2.59 vs. 3.11, F(1, 228) 7.79, p .01). In addition, the effect of humor was signicant for the unexpected-irrelevant condition (Aad 3.75 vs. 2.66, F(1, 228) 32.64, p .001; Ab 3.74 vs. 2.59, F(1, 228) 39.24 p .001) but not for the unexpected-relevant condition (Aad 4.37 vs. 4.54, F(1, 228) .84, p .1; Ab 3.98 vs. 4.11, F(1, 228) .51, p .1). Hypotheses 710 dealt with delayed attitude responses. Hypothesis 7 stated that there would be no differences in
9 The restricted recall range (0 2) may have reduced the power of our recall tests. We thank a reviewer for this observation.

Aad and Ab under the expected conditions. The results supported this hypothesis. No differences in Aad and Ab between the expected-relevant and expected-irrelevant conditions were found (Aad 3.34 vs. 3.29, F(1, 228) .07, p .5; Ab 3.21 vs. 3.23; F(1, 228) .01, p .5). In contrast, Hypothesis 8 predicted that Aad and Ab in the unexpectedNONHUMOR-relevant condition would be signicantly more favorable than in the expected-relevant condition. As posited, the unexpectedNONHUMOR-relevant condition produced higher Aad and Ab than did the expected-relevant condition (Aad 3.83 vs. 3.34, F(1, 228) 6.73, p .05; Ab 3.64 vs. 3.21, F(1, 228) 5.52, p .05). Although humor effect was predicted and found to be signicant under immediate response, Hypothesis 9 suggested that the delayed humor effect on Aad and Ab should be nonsignicant. A signicant humor time of response interaction was observed (for Aad, F(1, 228) 8.69, p .01; for Ab, F(1, 228) 15.19, p .001) As hypothesized, humor effects on delayed Aad and Ab were not signicant (for Aad, F(1, 228) .61, p .1; for Ab, F(1, 228) 2.32, p .1). Hypothesis 10a proposed that Aad and Ab would improve under the unexpectedNONHUMOR-irrelevant condition over time. Planned comparisons revealed a signicant increase for both Aad (X 3.21 vs. X 2.66, F(1, 228) 8.31, p .01) and Ab (X 3.18 vs. X 2.59, F(1, 228) 10.03, p .01), supporting Hypothesis 10a. Hypothesis 10b stated that the sleeper effect observed under Hypothesis 10a would be moderated by the recall of ad specic information. If both the unexpected-irrelevant information and the ad theme can be remembered, the incongruency effects that would be operating may likely negate any potential sleeper effect. To test this hypothesis, a regression was tted separately for Aad and Ab for each set of ads. The recall data were the same as those used for testing the picture-recall hypotheses reported earlier. The results revealed that the RECALL beta coefcients were signicant ( ps .01) and negative across the four regression analyses (.8, .75, .68, and .81). The negative coefcients imply that delayed Aad and Ab were lower for subjects that were able to recall the picture and the ad theme, suggesting that for these subjects, a sleeper effect on Aad and Ab was not observed.10 Results for Cognitive Responses. The results supported all cognitive response hypotheses. More favorable ad and brand thoughts were produced under relevant than irrelevant conditions (ad .92 vs. .29, F(1, 228) 27.13, p .001; brand .57 vs. .18, F(1, 228) 24.43, p .001), supporting Hypothesis 1b and 1d. UnexpectedNONHUMOR-rele10 Examining the means for subjects that could recall the picture and ad theme (RECALL 1), means for Aad and Ab were 2.23 and 2.25 for the computer ads, and 2.40 and 2.20 for the monitor ads. In comparison, the respective means for subjects that could not recall the picture and ad theme (RECALL 0) were signicantly higher. For these subjects, mean Aad and Ab were 3.51 (F(1, 18) 32.32, p .001) and 3.52 (F(1, 18) 23.45, p .001) for the computer ads, and 3.57 (F(1, 18) 15.31, p .01) and 3.55 (F(1, 18) 34.41, p .001) for the monitor ads.

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vant information elicited a higher amount of favorable thoughts compared to expected-relevant information for both the ad and the brand (ad 1.1 vs. .45, F(1, 228) 6.94, p .01; brand .80 vs. .35, F(1, 228) 7.99, p .01), supporting Hypothesis 2b and 2d. Furthermore, unexpectedNONHUMOR-irrelevant information produced more unfavorable ad and brand thoughts than did expectedirrelevant information, supporting Hypothesis 3b (X 1.43 vs. X .85, F(1, 228) 4.64, p .05) and Hypothesis 3d ( X 1.48 vs. X .73, F(1, 228) 10.02, p .01). These ndings suggest that collecting both thought volume and weight may be useful when comparing conditions that may produce thought responses that are similar in number but dissimilar in their evaluative implications.11

DISCUSSION (STUDY 2) Replication of Study 1 and Heckler and Childerss Recall Findings
Results for Aad and Ab between studies 1 and 2 were largely consistent. Furthermore, the cognitive response ndings for study 2 provided better support for our hypotheses than did study 1. Our picture-recall results in the immediate condition were similar to those of Heckler and Childers (1992), thus replicating their recall ndings. Interestingly, both studies suggest that unexpected-irrelevant information can be highly memorable. However, the attitude ndings of studies 1 and 2 suggest that this high memorability may potentially be a double-edged sword.

tion is likely to be minimal, thus limiting the effects of information incongruency. In contrast, the unexpectedNONHUMOR-relevant condition produced more favorable Aad and Ab than the expected conditions at a delay, which is similar to the immediate response ndings. The delayed recall results suggest that these effects are primarily driven by the relatively superior memory performance of the two unexpected conditions, which allowed information incongruency to play a role in enhancing delayed Aad and Ab. The more interesting results come from the two unexpected-irrelevant conditions. First, the signicant humor effect in the unexpectedHUMOR-irrelevant condition for both Aad and Ab under immediate responses dissipated over a signicant time delay, highlighting the eeting nature of humor effect on attitudes. Second, Aad and Ab in the unexpectedNONHUMOR-irrelevant condition improved over a signicant time delay. However, this effect is attenuated when the ad components responsible for the unfavorable attitudes can be recalled.

GENERAL DISCUSSION Theoretical Implications

Across two studies, our ndings furnish further support for the two-dimensional conceptualization of incongruency advocated by Heckler and Childers (1992). Although they examined memory measures, we showed that the expectancy-relevancy-humor distinction provides useful insights to the effects of information incongruency on attitude. Creating incongruity through unexpectedness is effective on attitude formation only when it is relevant to the main ad message; when it is irrelevant, unexpectancy exacerbates the unfavorable attitude effects that irrelevancy brings. In addition, results from Heckler and Childers (1992) and study 2 suggest that unexpected and irrelevant information can be highly memorable. It seems reasonable to expect the ad viewer to remember not only the unexpected-irrelevant ad information longer but also the unfavorable attitude evaluation attached to it. However, our ndings suggest that the reverse may also be true. The increased cognitive effort in processing such ads may produce relatively strong memory traces. Over time, such memory traces would become a liability when ad recipients are able to remember or reconstruct the incongruent characteristics of the ad information, which in turn may produce possible negative reactions toward the ad and/or brand. However, when the exact nature of the incongruent information cannot be remembered or reconstructed, such memory traces may potentially trigger a familiarity effect that in turn may improve attitude formation. It is worth noting that the possibility of such memorybased contingencies in advertising delayed effects may be dependent on whether attitude judgments are memory-based or made on-line (e.g., Fazio 1986). When judgments are made on-line, incoming information is spontaneously processed to form a judgment, and this judgment may simply

Extending Study 1 and Heckler and Childerss Study

Picture Recall. The pattern of delayed recall ndings generally followed that of the immediate measures from this study and Heckler and Childerss (1992). Particularly noteworthy here is the delayed picture-recall advantage of unexpectedNONHUMOR-relevant information over expected-relevant information that eluded Heckler and Childers (1992). This may suggest that memory decay may be slower for unexpected-relevant than for expected-relevant information. The recall superiority of unexpected-irrelevant information remained under delayed recall response. Not surprisingly, this delayed memory performance played a role in shaping the memory-based attitude in the delayed condition. Ad and Brand Attitude. In line with our predictions, there was no signicant difference in delayed Aad and Ab between the two expected conditions. This is consistent with the poor delayed recall performance of these two conditions where memory for the ad and brand informa11 When the unweighted raw thoughts count was used instead, the results basically mirrored the cognitive response ndings of study 1. For instance, no differences were found between unexpectedNONHUMOR-relevant information and expected-relevant information for both favorable ad (X .48 vs. X .28, F(1, 228) 2.14, p .1) and brand thoughts (X .48 vs. .28, F(1, 228) 3.43, p .05), contrary to Hypothesis 2b and 2d.

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be retrieved during postexposure inquiries. In contrast, when judgments are memory based, appropriate information from the exposure has to be recalled to form a postexposure judgment. The resultant judgment is dependent on the specic information that can be retrieved from memory. Study 2 was designed to facilitate memory-based rather than on-line judgments in the delayed condition, thus making the observation of a sleeper or familiarity effect more probable. It remains an empirical question how the ndings reported here are affected when attitudes are formed on-line. We hypothesized that both Aad and Ab would be similarly affected by the different incongruent conditions. The ndings in both studies showed that in the relevant condition, unexpected information produced more favorable Aad than did expected information. In contrast, evidence for Ab was mixed. One possible explanation is that subjects were cautious about giving high ratings for Ab in the unexpectedNONHUMOR-relevant condition (hypothesized to elicit the most favorable attitude response) solely on the basis of the information from the advertisement. This unwillingness may be attributed to (1) the fact that the products concerned (computer and monitors) are high involvement, high expenditure products and (2) ad viewers skepticism regarding ad information credibility (Scott 1994). A visual examination of means for Aad and Ab across the conditions supports this observation in that means for Ab were generally lower than for Aad. An alternative explanation is given by the elaboration-likelihood model (Petty and Cacioppo 1986). Perhaps the message argument (or the central route to persuasion) plays a more substantive role in Ab than in Aad. The unusual ad-execution style of the pictorial information in unexpectedNONHUMOR-relevant ads may have failed to produce superior arguments as compared to expected-relevant information, which increases Ab. This would also suggest that the link between Aad and Ab may be attenuated by the form of incongruency in advertisement. Humor in Incongruent Information. Humor increased attitude evaluations only when it is irrelevant. Consistent with the literature on mood and feelings (e.g., Batra and Stayman 1990), our results suggest that humor may bias negative cognitive evaluation or production. When irrelevant, humor reduces the negative thoughts that would otherwise be elicited from the irrelevant nature of the information. However, under relevant conditions, humor did not increase positive-thought generation, giving little benet over a nonhumorous execution. Together, these ndings suggest that ads incorporating humor to create unexpectedirrelevant information may enjoy high memorability while minimizing unfavorable impression formation.12 The ndings also highlight a methodological explanation for the conditional effect of humor on attitudes. We compared the unexpectedHUMOR-relevant with the unex12 The ndings also suggest that any positive advertising execution (e.g., music) that may potentially bias negative thought processing could achieve a similar trade-off. We thank the associate editor and a reviewer for this comment.

pectedNONHUMOR-relevant conditions and the unexpectedHUMOR-irrelevant with the unexpectedNONHUMOR-irrelevant conditions. However, choosing a different baseline for the nonhumor condition would lead to a different conclusion. For instance, in study 2 immediate Aad results, if we compare the two humor conditions with the expectedrelevant condition, the humor effect would be signicant for unexpectedHUMOR-relevant (X 4.37 vs. X 3.74, F(1, 228) 10.73, p .01) but not for unexpectedHUMORirrelevant (X 3.75 vs. X 3.74, F(1, 228) .001, p .5), which is exactly the opposite of our ndings. Thus, depending on the nature of the baseline comparison, different conclusions may be drawn regarding the effects of humor on attitudes. In sum, our ndings offer another factor to consider regarding when humor would be effective: the nature of incongruency of the ad information.

Managerial Implications
For managers and practitioners, our ndings suggest that incorporating humor affords varying mileage to ads with different incongruent information characteristics. For instance, including ad information that is nonhumorous, uncommon, and able to push through the main message may give an equally favorable ad impression as a humorous execution. In addition, adding humor to ads with highly memorable unexpected-irrelevant information may be an effective tactic. Along this vein, future research could examine whether ads with unexpected-irrelevant information work better for a well-known company/brand or whether source credibility or popularity affects the negative attitude evaluation from such ads. If so, the attention-grabbing benet of such ads may outweigh their evaluative disadvantage. In this respect, our ndings suggest that humorous execution of such information may be one way to reap this favorable trade-off. The dependency of unexpectancy on relevancy of information regarding attitude evaluation suggests that efforts for presenting unexpected information may be counterproductive if the target audience fails to see the relevant nature of the ads. Even if the advertisers construed them to be relevant, the possibility remains that unexpected information may backre on the advertisers. Finally, two qualications to our ndings are noteworthy. First, our ndings are based on ads for two high-involvement, technical products. Although the similar results for both sets of ads tend to lessen the possibility of confounding explanations for our ndings, further empirical investigations with other kinds of productsfor instance, low-involvement convenience goodswould help to address generalizability questions. Second, our theorizing and operationalization of ad information incongruency is qualied by the specic nature of incongruency that we investigated. The examination of theme-based picture information incongruency in print ads represents one of several ways to study the multifaceted incongruency construct. Although a formal typology detailing the potentially different perspectives is lacking in the

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RESPONSES TO INFORMATION INCONGRUENCY

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literature, future studies in this area should carefully determine the exact forms, dimensions, and operationalizations of incongruency before meaningful comparisons and integration of ndings are propounded. [Received August 1996. Revised March 1999. Robert E. Burnkrant served as editor, and Richard F. Yalch served as associate editor for this article.]

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