G.R. No.

L-27072; July 31, 1968 SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD and the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners, vs.HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila and MAC-ARTHURINTERNATIONAL MINERALS CO., respondents. FACTS OF THE CASE: This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, to restrain the Honorable Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Gaudencio Cloribel, from continuing with the hearing of Civil Case involving herein Petitioners, and from enforcing a restraining order issued therein, as well as to annul an order of respondent Judge in the same case. It appears in the narrative of the case that respondent Judge ruled in favor of Respondent Company (MacArthur), which lost in a bid for the exploration and development of mineral deposits in a portion of the Surigao Mineral Reservation. The Petitioner did not award the contract to private respondent, which became the latters basis for filing an action against the former for the issuance of are straining order against the continuation of the bidding process. Respondent Judge thereby granted the private respondents request on the ground that there was a perfected contract when the Petitioners accepted their proposals as an answer in the Invitation to Bid. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE HAD COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION,AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, IN ISSUING THE RESTRAINING ORDER AGAINSTTHE PETITIONERS. HELD: It was held by the Court that respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, in issuing its restraining order. The Private respondent (MacArthur) had no cause of action against petitioners herein because contrary to the conclusions made in the pleadings of Mac Arthur, it has not adhered faithfully to the terms and conditions of the Invitation to Bid, which was a mere invitation, and not a contract. As the Invitation explicitly declared that "bids not accompanied by bid bonds will be rejected", the bid of the Mac Arthur had been submitted without the requisite bond which led to its disqualification. Since there is no contract (which is Mac Arthurs basis) to speak about, there is no cause of action on its part, and that the Judge cannot issue a restraining order on such ground.

In Re Gutierrez 5 SCRA 661 Conditional Pardon will not bar disbarment Facts: Attorney Gutierrez was convicted for the murder of one Filemon Samaco in 1956. He was sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In 1958, after serving a portion of the penalty, he was granted a conditional pardon by the President. He was released on the condition that he shall not commit any crime. Subsequently, the widow of Samaco filed a disbarment case against Gutierrez by reason of the latters conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Murder, is without a doubt, such a crime. ISSUE: Whether or not Gutierrez may be disbarred considering the fact that he was granted pardon. HELD: Yes. The pardon granted to Gutierrez is not absolute but conditional. It merely remitted his sentence. It does not reach the offense itself. Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder without regard to the pardon (which he invoked in defense). The crime was actually qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having been committed in hand, by taking advantage of his official position (Gutierrez being municipal mayor at the time) and with the use of motor vehicle. The degree of moral turpitude involved is such as to justify his being purged from the profession. QUINGWA VS. PUNO (19 SCRA 439) FACTS: Flora Quingwa filed a verified complaint charging Armando Puno, a member of the Bar, with gross immorality and misconduct. Complainant is an educated woman, having been a public school teacher for a number of years. The respondent took her to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel register as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her on the promise of marriage. Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of respondent's promise of marriage and not because of a desire for sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion. Complainant gave birth to a baby boy supported by a certified true copy of a birth certificate and to show how intimate the relationship between the respondent and the complainant was, the latter testified that she gave money to the respondent whenever he asked from her. The respondent denied all the material allegations of the complaint, and as a special defense averred that the allegations therein do not constitute grounds for disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of the former Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Puno should be disbarred/suspended.

HELD: YES. One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the applicant must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character (Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court). It is essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege to maintain good moral character. When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent in his answer to the charges of the complainant that the allegations in the complaint do not fall under any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar as enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of Court, it is already a settled rule that the statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of the court over its officers cannot be restricted. Times without number, our Supreme Court held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of court states that: A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. The respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and has, thus disregarded and violated the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is important that members of this ancient and learned profession of law must conform themselves in accordance with the highest standards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics: The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or education. He should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law but the administration of justice.

Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a consequence, his name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.

NOMBRADO v. Hernandez Facts: Disbarment case charging respondent with malpractice on two counts namely for having appeared as counsel for Crispin Nazareno in a civil case for forcible entry against Aresenio Pansaon, his former client and for having appeared as counsel for the accused and also for the complaining witness in a criminal case. With respect to the first count, respondent was engaged by Arsenio Pansaon as his counsel in the prosecution of a criminal case against Crispin Nazareno. However, the case was dismissed due to the absence of complainant during trial. Years later, Nazareno filed a complaint for forcible entry against Pansaon through Atty.Hernandez. Pansaon moved for the disqualification of Hernandez as counsel but the motion was withdrawn. When the disbarment case was heard, Pansaon testified for petitioner and said that he perhaps lost the case since respondent Atty was privy to valuable information from Pansaon. Respondent denied the claim and averred that he did not receive any valuable document from Pansaon in connection with the case. Under the second count, respondent was counsel for Storeo Pontawe and and Teofilo Aumida in a criminal case. Before the hearing, respondent was asked by complaining witness Ramon Morales to file a motion to dismiss on the ground that the real accused in this case are not the persons mentioned above. During the hearing, a heated exchange of arguments arose between respondent and the private prosecutor Atty. Danao because of the latters insistence on calling Morales to the witness stand despite expressed desistance to prosecute the criminal case.

Respondent manifested his intention to intervene in behalf of the complaining party in connection with the action of Atty. Danao in this case. Issue: WON respondent was guilty of malpractice Held: First Count: The Court made mention of their remarks in Hilado vs. David. In that particular case, the court held that communication between attorney and client area complicated affair consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant secret and well known facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of dealings between an attorney and client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice the complainant's cause. Whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent utilized against his former client information given to him in a professional capacity, the mere fact of their previous relationship should have precluded him from appearing as counsel for the other side in the forcible entry case. This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice.... It is founded on principles of public policy, of good taste. Second Count: Respondent's act of preparing the motion to dismiss and stating in the course of the hearing thereof that he was intervening "in behalf of the complaining party", did not constitute simultaneous appearance in behalf of the contending parties since there was no longer any conflict to speak of, the complainant having desisted from prosecuting the case against the accused. Consequently, there was nothing improper in respondent's conduct. Upon the facts established in connection with the first count the Solicitor General has recommended that the penalty of reprimand and warning be administered. Berenguer vs. Carranza, 26 SCRA 210 FACTS:

Atty. Pedro B. Carranza was filed a complaint against his acts of deception practiced in the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon. The alleged deception was the introduction of an Affidavit of Adjudication and Transfer of Title subscribed and sworn in Pasay City, which later turned out to be a falsity. Atty. Carranza claimed that he took no part in the said falsified document. It was contested that due to the said falsehood, whether or not a lawyer took part from, must still be held liable for lack of prudence and meticulous take on the matter, and as it had caused unnecessary delays in the administration of justice. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Carranza should be held responsible of the said falsehood committed in court. HELD: YES. Respondent was reprimanded. RATIO: There was a finding that there was nothing willful in the conduct pursued by the respondent in introducing the document that turned out to be false. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court reminded that the lawyers oath is one impressed with utmost seriousness and should not be taken lightly. In its decision to issue reprimand, the respondent is warned that a more severe penalty will be imposed if the offense of the same character is repeated again. Cobb-perez vs Lantim Counsels Assertiveness Facts: A civil case was filed by Ricardo Hermoso against Damaso Perez for the latters failure to pay a debt of P17k. Hermoso won and a writ of execution was issued in his favor. The sheriff was to conduct a public sale of a property owned by Damaso worth P300k. This was opposed by Damaso as he claimed the amount of said property was more than the amount of the debt. Judge Lantin, issuing judge, found merit on this hence he amended his earlier decision and so he issued a second writ this time directing the sheriff to conduct a public sale on Damasos 210 shares of stock approximately worth P17k. Subsequently, Damaso and his wife filed five more petitions for injunction trying to enjoin the public sale. The case eventually reached the Supreme Court where the SC ruled that the petition of the Perez spouses are without merit; that their numerous petitions for injunction are contemplated for

delay. In said decision, the Supreme Court ordered petitioners to pay the cost of the suit but said cost should be paid by their counsels. The counsels now appeal said decision by the Supreme Court as they claimed that such decision reflected adversely against their professionalism; that If there was delay, it was because petitioners counsel happened to be more assertive . . . a quality of the lawyers (which) is not to be condemned. ISSUE: Whether or not the counsels for the Spouses Perez are excused. HELD: No. A counsels assertiveness in espousing with candor and honesty his clients cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what is not tolerated is a lawyers insistence despite the patent futility of his clients position, as in the case at bar. It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his clients cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his clients propensity to litigate. A lawyers oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable. Zubiri vs Zubiri 18 scra 1157 Facts: The appellant's petition to set aside judgment, which was verified and duly supported by two affidavits of merit, was grounded on very serious allegations, to wit: that it was the plaintiff's counsel who prepared and induced the defendant to sign all the pleadings upon which the assailed decision was based, including and particularly the said defendant's answer, that the dismissal of the same, in the absence of the petitioner and without affording him the chance to be heard thereon, indeed was incompatible with the exercise of sound judicial discretion. This Court is gravely concerned with the truth of the above accusation something which, on account of the lower court's precipitate dismissal of the appellant's petition to set aside judgment is now hidden and undeterminable particularly because the very face, tenor, and form of the appellant's alleged answer established a prima facie case, so to speak, for the petitioner. Issue: WON the active participation of a lawyer in one party's affairs relating to a pending case in which the said lawyer is the counsel for the opposing party is brazenly unethical Ruling:

The Canons of Legal Ethics very explicitly declare that "it is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests" (No. 6), and command that A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel; much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should deal only with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to the law. (No. 9) A mere glance at the Answer should have prompted the trial court to wonder and inquire if the defendant was aware of what he was committing thereby. The admission was so total and unqualified a repudiation of the defendant's own interest that indeed, especially as it was avowed in the said pleading that the defendant was unassisted by counsel, the trial court should have insisted upon some assurance that the defendant was solely and fully accountable therefor. After the defendant represented under oath that the plaintiff's counsel was the principal author of the same, and the one who talked him into participating in it, the intervention of the lower court became an absolute necessity. Rubias v. Batiller Facts:

Before the war with Japan, Francisco Militante filed an application for registration of the parcel of land in question. After the war, the petition was heard and denied. Pending appeal, Militante sold the land to petitioner, his son-in-law. Plaintiff filed an action for forcible entry against respondent. Defendant claims the complaint of the plaintiff does not state a cause of action, the truth of the matter being that he and his predecessors-in-interest have always been in actual, open and continuous possession since time immemorial under claim of ownership of the portions of the lot in question.

Issue:

Whether or not the contract of sale between appellant and his father-in-law was void because it was made when plaintiff was counsel of his father-in-law in a land registration case involving the property in dispute

Held:

The stipulated facts and exhibits of record indisputably established plaintiff's lack of cause of action and justified the outright dismissal of the complaint. Plaintiff's claim of ownership to the land in question was predicated on the sale thereof made by his father-in- law in his favor, at a time when Militante's application for registration thereof had already been dismissed by the Iloilo land registration court and was pending appeal in the Court of Appeals.

Article 1491 of our Civil Code (like Article 1459 of the Spanish Civil Code) prohibits in its six paragraphs certain persons, by reason of the relation of trust or their peculiar control over the property, from acquiring such property in their trust or control either directly or indirectly and "even at a public or judicial auction," as follows: (1) guardians; (2) agents; (3) administrators; (4) public officers and employees; judicial officers and employees, prosecuting attorneys, and lawyers; and (6) others especially disqualified by law. Fundamental consideration of public policy render void and inexistent such expressly prohibited purchase (e.g. by public officers and employees of government property intrusted to them and by justices, judges, fiscals and lawyers of property and rights in litigation and submitted to or handled by them, under Article 1491, paragraphs (4) and (5) of our Civil Code) has been adopted in a new article of our Civil Code, viz, Article 1409 declaring such prohibited contracts as "inexistent and void from the beginning." Indeed, the nullity of such prohibited contracts is definite and permanent and cannot be cured by ratification. The public interest and public policy remain paramount and do not permit of compromise or ratification. In his aspect, the permanent disqualification of public and judicial officers and lawyers grounded on public policy differs from the first three cases of guardians, agents and administrators (Article 1491, Civil Code), as to whose transactions it had been opined that they may be "ratified" by means of and in "the form of a new contact, in which cases its validity shall be determined only by the circumstances at the time the execution of such new contract. The causes of nullity which have ceased to exist cannot impair the validity of the new contract. Thus, the object which was illegal at the time of the first contract, may have already become lawful at the time of the ratification or second contract; or the service which was impossible may have become possible; or the intention which could not be ascertained

may have been clarified by the parties. The ratification or second contract would then be valid from its execution; however, it does not retroact to the date of the first contract." DAVID P. FORNILDA, JUAN P. FORNILDA, EMILIA P. FORNILDAOLILI, LEOCADIA P. FORNILDA LABAYEN and ANGELA P. FORNILDAGUTIERREZ, petitioners,vs. THE BRANCH 164, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IVTH JUDICIALREGION, PASIG, JOAQUIN C. ANTONIO Deputy Sheriff, RTC, 4JR Tanay, Rizal and ATTY. SERGIO I. AMONOY respondents. G.R. No. 72306 October 6, 1988 FACTS: The Controverted Parcels were part of the estate of the late JulioM. Catolos subject of intestate estate proceedings, whereinRespondent Amonoy acted as counsel for some of the heirs from1959 until 1968 by his own admission. These properties were adjudicated to Alfonso Fornilda andAsuncion M. Pasamba in the Project of Partition approved by theCourt on 12 January 1965 On 20 January 1965, or only eight (8) days thereafter, and whilehe was still intervening in the case as counsel, these propertieswere mortgaged by petitioners' predecessor-in-interest toRespondent Amonoy to secure payment of the latter's attorney'sfees in the amount of P27,600.00 Since the mortgage indebtedness was not paid, RespondentAmonoy instituted an action for judicial foreclosure of mortgageon 21 January 1970

The mortgage was subsequently ordered foreclosed and auctionsale followed where Respondent Amonoy was the sole bidder forP23,600.00 Being short of the mortgage indebtedness, he applied for andfurther obtained a deficiency judgment. ISSUE: Whether or not the mortgage constituted on the ControvertedParcels in favor of Respondent Amonoy comes within the scope of theprohibition in Article 1491 of the Civil Code. HELD: YES The pertinent portions of the said Articles read:Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase even at a public or judicial or auction, either inperson or through the mediation of another:xxx xxx xxx(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, ... the property and rights in litigation or levied upon onexecution before the court within whose junction orterritory they exercise their respective functions; thisprohibition includes the act of acquitting by assignmentand shall apply to lawyers with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation inwhich they may take part by virtue of their profession .(Emphasis supplied) Under the aforequoted provision , a lawyer is prohibited fromacquiring either by purchase or assignment the property or rights involved which are the object of the litigation inwhich they intervene by virtue of their profession. Theprohibition on purchase is all embracing to include not only salesto private individuals but also public or judicial sales

 At the time the mortgage was executed, therefore, therelationship of lawyer and client still existed, the very relation of trust and confidence sought to be protected by the prohibition,when a lawyer occupies a vantage position to press upon ordictate terms to a harassed client. From the time of the executionof the mortgage in his favor, Respondent Amonoy had alreadyasserted a title adverse to his clients' interests at a time when therelationship of lawyer and client had not yet been severed. Considering that the mortgage contract, entered into incontravention of Article 1491 of the Civil Code is expresslyprohibited by law, the same must be held inexistent and void abinitio. Cuaresma vs Daquiz 63 scra 257 A lawyer owes candor to the court Facts: An order to demolish the property where Cuaresma was staying was issued by a trial judge pursuant to a civil case filed by Daquis. Cuaresmas lawyer, Atty. Macario Directo, filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court where he alleged that they had no knowledge of the said civil case hence the order of demolition is unjust. The Supreme Court however later found out that Cuaresma and his lawyer in fact knew of the existence of said civil case. The Supreme Court then directed Directo to show cause why he should not be disciplined. In his explanation, Directo stated that what he meant was that he and his client belatedly learned of the civil case; that had there been a mistake committed, it had been an honest one, and would say in all sincerity that there was no deliberate attempt and intent on his part of misleading this Honorable Court, honestly and totally unaware of any false allegation in the petition. ISSUE: Whether or not Directo should be subject to disciplinary actions. HELD: No. But he was reprimanded by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court gave Directo the benefit of the doubt although it did say that Directos reasoning could very well be just an afterthought. The Supreme Court also stated that Directo is presumed to be in good faith especially so that the misstatements in his petition could be attributed either to his carelessness or his lack of English

proficiency. The Supreme Court admonished Directo to prepare pleadings carefully in the future so that the least doubt as to his intellectual honesty cannot be entertained. Every member of the bar should realize that candor in the dealings with the Court is of the very essence of honorable membership in the profession. ANDRES v CABRERA Facts:

Stanley R. Cabrera (Cabrera) was a successful bar examinee in 1977.

Atty. Emilia Andres was a legal officer in the Ministry of Labor. She dismissed a case filed by Cabreras motheragainst a certain Atty. Perez.

Because of the dismissal, Cabrera filed with the city fiscal of Manila criminal charges against Andres (graft andcorruption, falsification of public documents)

Andres then filed a case of disqualification against Cabrera. Cabrera apparently used in his affidavit vile, inciviland uncouth language (e.g. moronic, unparalleled stupidity, idiotic)

Cabreras oath-taking was therefore postponed. The SC required him to file an answer to why he should not bedisqualified. In Cabreras reply he still used unfit language (e.g. calling Atty. Andres a moron). In subsequentmotions by Cabrera, he used the words a victim of the courts inhuman and cruel punishment through itssupreme inaction

1979: The court thereafter deferred his oath-taking until he has shown that he has changed his ways. Cabrerathen filed a motion for contempt of court. And guess what, he still used unfit language (e.g. supreme stupidity,degradation of the administration of justice)

Napikon yata yung SC, they required Cabrera to file a reply to why he should not be held in contempt. Cabrerafiled an apology but guess what, the language he used were still unfit and even insincere. Issue:

W/N Cabrera should be held in contempt Held:

Yes! Fine of P500 and imprisonment for 50 days.

The duty to observe and maintain the respect due the courts devolves not only upon lawyers but also upon thosewho will choose to enter the profession. Their failure to discharge such duty may prevent them from beinginducted into the office of attorney. B. R. SEBASTIAN ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner, vs. HO N. C OU RT OF APPEALS, E U

L OG I O B. REYES, NICAN O R G . SALAYSAY, in his capacity asProvincial Sheriff of Rizal; and ANT O NI O MARINAS, in his capacity as DeputySheriff, respondents. F acts of the case: In a case of the Eulogio B. Reyes vs. the DPWH and the petitioner, the regional trial court heldthe petitioner liable for damages while absolving DPWH. Thus, the petitioner appealed to theCourt of Appeals (CA) through its counselor Baizas, Alberto and Associates (BAA for brevity).However, BAA failed to file an Appellant s Brief and failed to comply with CA s resolution toshow cause why the

appeal should not be dismissed.On 9 September 1974, the CA issued another resolution dismissing petitioner s appeal.The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the account of their

counselor spartnership dissolution (due to untimely death of Atty. Crispin D. Baizas) and change of management. The motion was later denied, hence, the resolution is final and executory.A writ of execution for auction sale of petitioner s properties was apprehended. Consequently,the petitioner

filed a Motion to Reinstate Appeal; however, the CA denied the same.Hence, the petitioner filed this case against the respondent, but was eventually amended sinceEulogio B. Reyes is already dead.This court denied the petition due to lack of merit. Petitioners filed a motion forreconsideration. Issues: Whether or not CA gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner previously dismissed for failure to file the appellant s motion to reinstate itsappeal,

s brief Whether or not the death of a partner s brief

extinguishes the client-lawyer relationship as was a validcause for not filing an appellant H eld:

If the appellate court has not yet lost its jurisdiction, it may exercise its discretion in reinstatingan appeal, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case and the demands of substantial justice.But even if it has already lost jurisdiction over the appeal by reason of the remand of the

record to the lower court, it, nevertheless, has the inherent right to recall the remittitur or theremand of the record to the lower court if it had rendered a decision or issued a resolutionwhich was induced by fraud practiced upon it.However, in this instant case, no fraud is involved; what obtains is simple negligence on thepart of petitioner's counsel, which is neither excusable nor unavoidable. Petitioner thus failedto demonstrate sufficient cause to warrant a favorable action on its plea.Moreover, the death of Attorney Baizas was not a valid excuse on the part of his associates fornot attending to the first resolution. Undoubtedly, there was inexcusable negligence on thepart of petitioner's counsel in failing to file the Appellant's Brief.The "confusion" in the office of the law firm following the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas is not avalid justification for its failure to file the Brief. With Baizas' death, the responsibility of Atty. Alberto and his

associates to the petitioner as counsel remained until withdrawal by the formerof their appearance in the manner provided by the Rules of Court.The petition is hereby dismissed. VICTORIA LEGARDA vs. CA, NEW CATHAY HOUSE, INC. Petitioner was the owner of a parcel of land and the improvements thereon. Petitioner enteredinto a leased agreement with the respondent thru its representative, Roberto Cabrera, Jr. of the property for a period of five years that the rental is 25K per month with 5% escalation per year.Respondent deposited the down payment but petitioner failed and refused to execute and sign thesame despite demands of the respondent. Respondent suffered damages due to the delay in therenovation and opening of its restaurant business. Respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for specific performance. Petitioner engaged the services of the counsel to handle her case. Buther counsel failed to take any action for the case. So the property was sold by the sheriff thru public auction. After one year redemption period expired w/out the petitioner redeeming the property and the sheriff issued a final deed of sale.Upon learning of this unfortunate turn of events, petitioner prevailed upon her counsel to seek the appropriate relief. ISSUE: WON the petitioner can recover his property WON the counsel is negligent in handlingthe case of her client HELD: The Court finds that the negligence of the counsel in this case appears to be so gross and inexcusable. This was compounded by the fact , that after petitioner gave said counsel another chance to make up for his omissions by asking him to file a petition for annulment of the judgment in the appellate court, again counsel abandoned the case of petitioner in that after hereceived a copy of adverse judgment of appellate court, he did not do anything to save thesituation or inform his client of the judgment. He allowed the judgment to lapse and becomefinal. Such reckless and gross negligence should not be allowed to bind the petitioner. Petitioner was thereby effectively deprived of her day in court.Because of the gross negligence of the counsel for the petitioner, she lost the case as well as thetitle and ownership of the property, which is worth millions. The mere lessee then now becamethe owner of the property. The Court cannot allow such a grave injustice to prevail. It cannottolerate such unjust enrichment of the respondent at the expense of the petitioner.As

member of the Phil Bar he owes complete fidelity to the cause of his client. He should giveadequate attention, care and time to his cases. This is the reason why a practicing lawyer shouldaccept only so many cases he can afford to handle. And once he agrees to handle a case, heshould undertake the task with dedication and care. If he should do any less, then he is not true tohis oath as a lawyer.In this case, the Sheriffs Cert of Sale and the subsequent final deed of sale covering the same property are null and void. Respondent is directed to reconvey said property to the petitioner andthe register of Deeds is ordered to cancel the registration of the said property in the name of respondent and issue a new one in the name of the petitioner. The said counsel for petitioner isrequired to show cause w/in ten days from notice why he should not be held administrativelyliable for his acts and omissions. ROQUE V. CLEMENCIO Facts: Myrna Roque and Roberto Cruzado against attorney Feliciano Clemencio. Gross misconduct and oppression. Respondent was a LegalOfficer of the Commission on Audit appointed to investigate the charges filed by complainant Myrna D. Roque against COA officialJovencio Panelo. He was eventually relieved of this duty upon motion by Roque. He is now being charged for gross misconduct (byroque) since: a) he was seen in a beerhouse with Panelo's lawyer, b) he had "sat on" the complaint for almost a year, c) he hadconspired with his replacement investigator Atty. Tablang, and d) he drafted the decision against Panelo even though he had beenrelieved as investigator in the case. He is charged with oppression (by cruzado) since: He summoned complainant Roberto P.Cruzado (a lowly CoA employee) to the Office of the Chief, Security Affairs Service Unit, COA, and threatened him. After hearing,the IBP dismissed the complaints for lack of merit. Issue: won ibp is correct Ruling: The SC rejected the findings of the IBP. 1. Although what Clemencio preparedwas a draft decision and not a final one, the SC decided that the manner in which a draft is prepared can influence the reviewingauthority; in fact, in this case, the final decision was substantially identical to the prepared draft. Also, although drinking withPanelo's lawyer does not mean automatically that he is favoring him, a lawyer should avoid even the appearance of impropriety. 2.We take into serious account the fact that respondent is a lawyer, a superior who threatened a subordinate complainant withdismissal and a court suit. A man of the law should never use his legal expertise and influence in order to frighten or coerce anyone,especially the ordinary man who looks up to him for justice. The excuse of respondent that a

threat to prosecute is no intimidationdeserves scant consideration. Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not engagein unlawful, immoral or deceitful conduct. He is required not only in fact to be of good moral character, but must also be seen to beleading a life in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. CENSURED and WARNED. PEOPLE v. RENEGADO May 31, 1974 (G.R. No. L-27031)

FACTS: Mamerto de Lira was a math teacher in Tiburcio Tancinco Memorial Vocational School which is run by the national government. Loreto Renegado was a clerk in the same school. De Lira asked Renegado to type his exam questions but the latter refused. They had a small argument which left the accused fuming with anger. The accused told several people that hell gonna kill the deceased. They pacified him and told him the possible consequences that may happen. After a few days, while the deceased was in the canteen sitting with his back towards the accused, without warning the accused stabbed the deceased with a knife which later caused the latters death. The counsel of the accused pleads for an acquittal on the ground that the accused should be exempt from criminal liability because at the precise time he stabbed de Lira, the accused lost his senses and he simply did not know what he was doing. His counsel claimed that after Renegado was clubbed on the forehead, he suffered from head injury which produced ill-effects.

ISSUE: (1) WON the accused is exempt from criminal liability on the ground of insanity. (2) What are the mitigating and aggravating circumstances present in the case.

HELD: (1) No. Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing act, that is, the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is a total deprivation of freedom of the will, mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. In the case at bar, it just shows that Renegado is a man of

violent temper who can be easily provoked to violence for no valid reason at all. Thus in People vs. Cruz, this Court held that breaking glasses and smashing dishes are simply demonstrations of an explosive temper and do not constitute clear and satisfactory proof of insanity; they are indications of the passionate nature of the accused. In the absence of proof that the defendant had lost his reason or became demented a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it is presumed that he was in a normal condition of mind. (2) The killing of Mamerto de Lira is qualified by evident premeditation. Here, the accused has more or less sixty-four hours to ponder over his plan and listen to the advice of his co-employees and of his own conscience, and such length of time was more than sufficient for him to reflect on his intended revenge. There is treachery committed. There is treachery where the victim who was not armed was never in a position to defend himself or offer resistance, nor to present risk or danger to the accused when assaulted. The accused killed the deceased while he was eating and his back faced towards him. There was an assault upon a person in authority. A teacher either of a public or of a duly recognized private school is a person in authority. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was offset by the aggravating circumstance of treachery.